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37th PARLIAMENT, 2nd SESSION

Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade

EVIDENCE

CONTENTS

Thursday, April 3, 2003

0910

The Chair (Mr. Bernard Patry (Pierrefonds—Dollard, Lib.))

Professor Kim Nossal (Political Science, Queen's University)

0915

0920

The Chair

Professor Pierre Martin (Political Science, University of Montreal)

0925

0930

0935

0940

The Chair

Mr. Keith Martin (Esquimalt—Juan de Fuca, Canadian Alliance)

The Chair

Prof. Pierre Martin

0945

The Chair

Prof. Pierre Martin

The Chair

Prof. Kim Nossal

The Chair

Mr. Stéphane Bergeron (Verchères—Les-Patriotes, BQ)

0950

The Vice-Chair (Hon. Diane Marleau (Sudbury, Lib.))

Prof. Pierre Martin

Prof. Kim Nossal

0955

Mr. Stéphane Bergeron

Prof. Kim Nossal

The Vice-Chair (Hon. Diane Marleau)

Mr. Murray Calder (Dufferin—Peel—Wellington—Grey, Lib.)

Prof. Kim Nossal

1000

Prof. Pierre Martin

Mr. Murray Calder

Prof. Kim Nossal

Mr. Murray Calder

The Vice-Chair (Hon. Diane Marleau)

Mr. Murray Calder

Prof. Kim Nossal

Prof. Pierre Martin

Mr. Murray Calder

The Vice-Chair (Hon. Diane Marleau)

Ms. Alexa McDonough (Halifax, NDP)

1005

Prof. Kim Nossal

1010

Ms. Alexa McDonough

Prof. Kim Nossal

Prof. Pierre Martin

1015

Ms. Alexa McDonough

The Vice-Chair (Hon. Diane Marleau)

Mr. Irwin Cotler (Mount Royal, Lib.)

Prof. Pierre Martin

Prof. Kim Nossal

1020

The Vice-Chair (Hon. Diane Marleau)

Mr. Greg Thompson (New Brunswick Southwest, PC)

Prof. Kim Nossal

1025

Mr. Greg Thompson

The Vice-Chair (Hon. Diane Marleau)

Mr. Greg Thompson

The Vice-Chair (Hon. Diane Marleau)

Mr. Keith Martin

Prof. Pierre Martin

1030

Prof. Kim Nossal

1035

The Vice-Chair (Hon. Diane Marleau)

Mr. Odina Desrochers (Lotbinière—L'Érable, BQ)

1040

Prof. Pierre Martin

Mr. Odina Desrochers

Prof. Pierre Martin

Mr. Odina Desrochers

Prof. Pierre Martin

Mr. Odina Desrochers

Prof. Pierre Martin

1045

Mr. Odina Desrochers

Prof. Pierre Martin

Mr. Odina Desrochers

Prof. Pierre Martin

Mr. Odina Desrochers

The Vice-Chair (Hon. Diane Marleau)

Mr. Odina Desrochers

The Vice-Chair (Hon. Diane Marleau)

Mr. Odina Desrochers

The Vice-Chair (Hon. Diane Marleau)

Ms. Alexa McDonough

Prof. Kim Nossal

1050

Prof. Pierre Martin

The Vice-Chair (Hon. Diane Marleau)

Mr. André Harvey (Chicoutimi—Le Fjord, Lib.)

Prof. Pierre Martin

1055

Mr. André Harvey

Prof. Pierre Martin

The Chair

Mr. Stockwell Day (Okanagan—Coquihalla, Canadian Alliance)

The Chair

Hon. Diane Marleau

1100

The Chair

Ms. Alexa McDonough

The Chair

Mr. Irwin Cotler

The Chair

Ms. Aileen Carroll (Barrie—Simcoe—Bradford, Lib.)

1105

Mr. Greg Thompson

Ms. Aileen Carroll

1110

The Chair

Ms. Aileen Carroll

Mr. Stockwell Day

Ms. Aileen Carroll

Mr. Stockwell Day

Ms. Aileen Carroll

The Chair

Ms. Aileen Carroll

The Chair

Ms. Aileen Carroll

Ms. Alexa McDonough

Ms. Aileen Carroll

Ms. Alexa McDonough

Ms. Aileen Carroll

Ms. Alexa McDonough

The Chair

Ms. Aileen Carroll

1115

The Chair

Mr. Keith Martin

The Chair

1120

Ms. Aileen Carroll

The Chair

Ms. Aileen Carroll

The Chair

Mr. Stéphane Bergeron

The Chair

CANADA

Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade

NUMBER 028

2nd SESSION

37th PARLIAMENT

EVIDENCE

Thursday, April 3, 2003

[Recorded by Electronic Apparatus]

¿ (0910)

[English]

The Chair (Mr. Bernard Patry (Pierrefonds—Dollard, Lib.)): Order, please.

Pursuant to Standing Order 108(2), we meet today for consideration of a dialogue on foreign policy of the Minister of Foreign Affairs. We have two witnesses this morning.

First, from Queen's University, we have Monsieur Kim Richard Nossal. Mr. Nossal joined the Department of Political Science at McMaster University, where he was a professor and chair of the department from 1992 to 1996. In 2001 he was appointed professor and head of the Department of Political Studies, and professor in the School of Policy Studies, at Queen's.

[Translation]

It is also our pleasure to welcome Mr. Pierre Martin from the Université de Montréal. Mr. Martin is Associate Professor in the Department of Political Science at the Université de Montréal. In 1999-2000, he was a visiting professor at Harvard University, at the Department of Government and the Weatherhead Center for International Affairs, as William Lyon Mackenzie King Visiting Associate Professor of Canadian Studies and as a Fulbright scholar.

Welcome to both of you.

[English]

We're going to start with Mr. Nossal, please.

Professor Kim Nossal (Political Science, Queen's University): Thank you very much, Mr. Patry.

It's a great pleasure to appear before you this morning to participate in the parliamentary process of the dialogue on the minister's foreign policy.

I am particularly pleased to be here this morning with my colleague Pierre Martin. Pierre is going to focus on the present, and I want to draw a couple of lessons from the past, as I respond to the second question in the committee's discussion note of March 2003. That question is, very simply, how can Canada's commitment to multilateralism be combined with efforts to exert influence on the United States?

The issue of trying to influence American global policy is something that's not at all new for Canadian governments. On the contrary, this has been the very stuff of daily Canadian diplomacy, and always has been, since the United States emerged as a global power at the beginning of the 20th century.

The reason I'm looking at history this morning is that, in my view, reaching back into history helps illuminate the present. So preparing for the discussion this morning, I went back to Denis Stairs' book on the Korean War, The Diplomacy of Constraint , which was published in 1974.

Now, this book, although it's focused on a conflict that's more than 50 years old, remains very useful, not only because it's an excellent account of Canadian diplomacy on this important issue but also because of the lessons Denis Stairs drew from that experience, and because those lessons are so applicable today.

In Korea, the Canadian government worked hard to constrain the impulses of the Democratic administration of Harry S. Truman and the expanding war aims of the Truman administration. There was a real concern in Ottawa about the implications of widening the war to include the ongoing civil war between the Chinese nationalists, on Taiwan, and the newly established Communist People's Republic of China. Canadian diplomats tried on a number of occasions to change and moderate the course of American policy, and not always, it should be noted, successfully.

What's important about the Korean case are the assumptions that guided Lester Pearson, at the time Canada's foreign minister.

Stairs writes:

...Pearson's assumptions...entailed the tactical view that the possibilities for containing the behaviour of great power decision-makers are increased if they can be induced to operate within a multilateral arena. In such a context they are subject to the demands and pressures of smaller states....At the same time, however, it is vital to recall that the essence of great power status...is the capacity in the final analysis to treat lesser powers as incidental. This being the case, the leverage of small powers...is always limited by the degree to which their views are regarded as important.

In my view, those assumptions remain as relevant today as they were in Korea in the early 1950s, but note the essential, necessary condition: For the Canadian government to be able to exercise influence in Washington on matters of global policy, it is necessary that the government in Washington be willing to listen to what Canadians have to say on such matters. The question always was, and remains so today, how precisely to do this.

The late John W. Holmes was a Canadian diplomat in the 1950s who became director of the Canadian Institute of International Affairs and a professor of political science at the University of Toronto in the 1960s, 1970s, and early 1980s. He was the doctoral supervisor for a number of professors of political science across Canada, myself included, and was, in my view at least, one of the wisest observers of Canadian-American relations.

Holmes used to say that Americans needed friends like Canada to tell them when their breath was bad; in other words, when they were making what Canadians believed to be mistakes in global affairs. But Holmes' point was essentially to ask, when a friend's breath is bad, what do friends do? Do they broadcast the fact loudly? Do they subject them to hectoring lectures? Do they embarrass them in front of everyone? Are they rude? Insulting? Sniggering at them? Dumping on them? Subjecting them to juvenile, ad hominem attacks? No.

¿ (0915)

As Holmes used to say, the beginning of wisdom is the understanding that when friends disagree, there are good reasons for not wearing one's heart on one's sleeve, good reasons for not proudly proclaiming to the world that your perspective is right and the other guy's perspective is wrong--good reasons, in other words, for politeness, and quiet efforts to change minds.

This is a lesson that every spoiled brat learns eventually, but it is as true of international affairs as it is of interpersonal relations. Likewise, the beginning of wisdom is the understanding that effective diplomacy involves an ongoing process; that what you say today inexorably comes back to bite you tomorrow; that if you want to enjoy your relationships over the long term, your actions today always have to be governed by the shadow of the future.

Again, this is something that the vast majority of people know and practice at an interpersonal level, but for me, as a political scientist, it is always interesting to see how many people assume that these elementary rules for interpersonal behaviour simply don't apply at the international level.

If all of this is beginning to sound vaguely familiar, that's because Canadians had this very debate some 40 years ago on the matter of the Vietnam War. Pearson and his foreign minister, Paul Martin Sr., were convinced that the Johnson administration's policies on Vietnam were wrong-headed. But instead of the kind of diplomacy that he had used to such advantage in the 1950s, Pearson decided to try to influence the United States administration's war policies by some very public opposition to the escalation of that conflict.

As we all know, those efforts misfired badly, ruining Pearson's relationship with Johnson and ensuring that for the remainder of his tenure as Prime Minister, Canada was utterly irrelevant in Washington on global matters, simply no longer listened to. Indeed, so damaged was the relationship that two senior officials from either side of the border, Livingston Merchant and A.D.P. Heeney, were asked for their views on how to manage the relationship. Their report, entitled Principles for Partnership, published in the summer of 1965, suggested a number of elementary and common-sense rules for dealing with disagreements over global politics.

If I praise the quiet diplomacy recommended by the Merchant-Heeney report, it is because of the consequences of abandoning those principles. First, if you abandon those principles, you guarantee that you will become irrelevant. No one likes to be embarrassed or insulted, particularly not in public. Insult someone and they will simply close you down, turn you off, and close their doors. Indeed, they will take great pleasure in ignoring you. In such circumstances, you are left kvetching from the sidelines, blustering without any effect, feeling smug and righteous perhaps, but changing nothing.

Second, if you abandon the principles of quiet diplomacy, you run the very serious risk of having quarrels generated in one area of the relationship affect the atmospherics in other areas.

Applied to Canadian-American relations, this is not the tired old argument that Canadians will face overt retaliation from the United States for diverging on global issues. I don't need to tell this committee, with its recent report on Canadian-American relations, that this simply is not how politics in North America works. Rather, it is the argument that Canadians have an enduring interest in maintaining a certain kind of relationship with the United States.

In 1981, when the Reagan administration had just arrived in Washington, and Canadian-American relations were heading into one of their cyclical downturns, John W. Holmes wrote:

It is of very great importance to Canada to maintain amicable relations with whatever administrations the Americans elect. That does not mean supine agreement, but it suggests caution in picking a quarrel. The danger [of not exercising caution in picking a quarrel] is that we forfeit not only our vested interests but also the disposition in Washington to listen to our arguments on world affairs.

Twenty years later, Denis Stairs of Dalhousie would restate this Holmesian prescription. You all know what he argues, that there is only one imperative in Canadian foreign policy, and that is the maintenance of a politically amicable and hence economically effective working relationship with the United States. In this view, the consequence of not maintaining that amicable relationship will be far more subtle and thus far more damaging to Canadian interests.

¿ (0920)

My argument here is not that the Canadian government should simply roll over on disagreements they may have with the United States on global issues simply in an effort to keep the border open. Rather, the argument is that there are clever ways to deal with the U.S. and not-so-clever ways. In my view, what we've seen in the last year or so is the not-so-clever approach. The product of this has been to make Canada, at least in the short term, irrelevant in Washington on global policy, and put in considerable jeopardy the smooth management of the bilateral relationship and, in the process, I think it must be said, the wealth and livelihood of Canadians who may suffer the consequences of recession or unemployment that may well come with the tightening of the Canadian-American border.

But this is for the short term. If the past is any indication, we will see the emergence of a leadership committed to repairing the considerable damage done to the Canadian-American relationship in the last year. That will be the time, in my view, to revisit the principles of quiet diplomacy so effectively used by Canadian leaders in the past. That will be the time to rediscover why Canadian governments have been at their most effective when they have avoided the temptation of publicly cocking a snook at the hegemon when they disagree with their global policies.

Thank you.

[Translation]

The Chair: Thank you.

Mr. Martin, please.

Professor Pierre Martin (Political Science, University of Montreal): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

It is of course a pleasure for me to be here this morning, especially since I am here with a colleague for whom I have great respect, and whose ideas on the topics that we are discussing here I share to a large degree. I am also happy to see some familiar faces, as this is the first time I appear before a committee like this one.

Undertaking a comprehensive foreign policy review is a difficult exercise in circumstances like the ones we are currently facing. I must admit that I would not like to be in your shoes, because we are facing a very particular situation. It is one where some aspects of foreign policy are posing specific challenges and where we may lose sight of the overall picture.

The issues I have chosen to address are linked to the ones Kim Nossal discussed, but I am going to set aside the lessons of the past and deal directly with some current and future challenges. I will address two substantive issues. The first is drawn from the discussion document that the minister put out to launch the debate. It is the second question in the document:

In light of world development, should Canada's foreign policy continue to focus on a strategy based on “three pillars », or should it seek a new balance?

The second question was addressed by Kim Nossal, and it is also taken from the discussion document that the committee sent us:

How can Canada's commitment to multiculturalism be combined with efforts to exert influence on the United States?

In short, I think it would be worthwhile to put these questions into much simpler language. The first question would read as follows: What purpose does foreign policy serve? The second would be: How can we manage relations with the United States? That is a difficult undertaking if ever there is one.

It is all well and good to design a policy for a better world, as outlined in the document, but we are forced to admit that for Canada, the United States represents a very important if not dominant part of this world.

According to the three key objectives of the policy that was announced in 1995, Canada was to protect the country's security, promote prosperity, and project Canadian values and culture. To my mind, the first two objectives are inevitable and to be expected. In fact, all countries have one version or another of that in their foreign policies. So all states must guarantee a certain level of physical security and material well-being for their people, and this goes hand in hand with the other objectives involving human and social development.

However, the third key objective, which involves promoting values and culture, seems to me to be a lot less straightforward. In my opinion, it is a secondary objective, because one wonders why we must project these values. As far as I'm concerned, I think there is something even more fundamental behind an objective like that. We must try and understand the intangible aspects that we are looking for in addition to physical and moral security. Why do we want to defend, project or promote these values? First and foremost, because we want to guarantee them for ourselves. We want to establish a sense of identity, to know who we are. We want independence and a sense of controlling our destiny. In the end, it is our idea of what we want to accomplish, or our sense of purpose. Unfortunately, I'm taking my comments from an English text and I'm having trouble translating the expression “sense of purpose”.

¿ (0925)

Since I am perhaps not as good a wordsmith as the people who will synthesize your work in an attempt to redefine these objectives if necessary, I will use a plain, descriptive title for the third key objective : psychological security. So there is physical security and material security, but it is also important to feel good about ourselves. I think that is what we are seeking with this notion of projecting and promoting culture and values.

The most perceptive among you will undoubtedly have noticed that these three key objectives are not unique to foreign policy. I might add that while Canada is facing this type of foreign policy issue today, these issues have long been at the heart of its domestic policy concerns.

However, if we limit the discussion to foreign policy, and talk about physical, material or psychological security, we cannot deny the huge impact of our relationship with the United States.

In short, Canada's problem is that in terms of physical and material security, the country is almost entirely dependent on its relationship with the United States. I will not recite any trade statistics, nor will I talk about the fact that some people feel our neighbour dominates the alliance to which we belong to an outrageous degree, whereas others are comforted by that given the threats to our physical security. But the fact remains that this domination of American power will generate a third kind of insecurity that is not negligible, even in its best friends, and I am referring to psychological insecurity.

To simplify matters and to provoke you to some degree, if I have not already done so, I will add that since some Canadians now feel that their domestic debates on identity have been resolved, they feel compelled to pit themselves directly against the United States to feel better about their own identity. I am certainly not saying here that we must avoid expressing our disagreements on principle with our neighbours at all costs, but if we do so, we must be prepared to pay the price. And if we do so, as Kim Nossal stated earlier, we must pay specific attention to the way we express this disagreement and to the context in which this disagreement emerges.

For example, I think that Canadians have, for the most part, underestimated the impact of the events of September 11, 2001, on the Americans' sense of physical insecurity and on their determination to take early action on any danger they perceive.

In this new context, it is appropriate to say a few words about some of the challenges that bilateral security presents. I will address them briefly. I have chosen five, and I will just say a few words about each of them. I am sure we will have an opportunity to discuss them in greater detail later on.

The first issue is continental defence. I think that the changes that resulted from the integration of the forces, such as the creation of Northcom, were primarily a question of degree; they did not call into question the nature of defence cooperation with the United States. It was a matter of extending to all the forces a model that already existed with NORAD, which, to my mind, was far from justifying the countless objections that were raised by some people whom we might refer to in analytical terms as Canadian nationalists. So the outcry that occurred last spring, when these issues were discussed, was not based on very solid arguments, in my opinion.

Secondly, if we broaden the notion of continental defence, it is clear that problems will arise, namely with respect to anti-missile defence. If you think relations with our neighbours are strained, just wait until we discuss anti-missile defence, which is their number one priority for defending their territory, in a purely bilateral relationship with Canada. If we are having a hard time today, wait until tomorrow; this will not be an easy issue.

¿ (0930)

So even if the Canadian forces seem quite open to Canada's participation in this defence, it seems to me that this is a rather difficult choice to support politically, namely because of public opinion in Canada which is quite opposed to it, probably even more so today. I think that fundamentally, there are some major problems in the policy as such. But if I were south of the border, I would be saying the same thing.

However, if we say no to the Americans on anti-missile defence, which seems like a reasonable option, as regards the policy as such, we will have to expect to pay the price, namely in terms of the presumed spin-offs of such a program.

Thirdly, there is the issue of border control and the establishment of what is called a North American security perimeter. In that regard, I think we must bear in mind that even if Canada were to fully harmonize with the US policy its border controls as they apply to people entering the North American continent, we would be deluding ourselves if we believed that our neighbours would abandon their prerogative to control entry into the US, if the prevailing state of mind as regards security does not change in the years to come. What is essential, in my opinion, is making sure that crossing the border is as smooth and as effective as possible, taking into account the very high level security concerns that remain present in the United States.

I do not think that there is any discussion possible on controlling the North American perimeter or on concessions with respect to border crossings. Crossing the border will remain a problem that must be managed in keeping with the new security landscape in the US.

The fourth issue is not new. It's the gap between Canada's international commitments and its ability to implement them in the field. I think that the former minister of national defence is here and he knows specifically what I am talking about when I mention the difference that can exist between commitments and the ability to fulfil these commitments, even if it is just militarily speaking.

Whether we look at military expenditures or international aid, I cannot help but go back to an expression my colleague here used several years ago. He talked about “pinchpenny diplomacy”, which could be translated these days by “Séraphin diplomacy” in Quebec. So it is a major problem in that we are looking for a measure of autonomy. We are looking to play a major role, but we continue to refuse to give ourselves the tools we need to play it.

The problem is that there would have to be a considerable increase in the resources earmarked for foreign aid, but above all for defence. Even if public opinion is quite receptive to increases like that, a financial effort of that magnitude would force Canadian political leaders to clearly and effectively articulate the reasons why we must demand such sacrifices from our citizens. I do not think that in recent years the government has demonstrated its ability to clearly articulate policy objectives and to explain to people why we are committing to such large expenditures.

Fifthly and lastly, and we are moving closer to the topic of the day, the armed intervention in Afghanistan and the current conflict in Iraq has forced Canada to consider circumstances under which the use of force is considered acceptable. In the case of Afghanistan, it was quite clear that we were looking at a situation in which it was extraordinarily difficult to say no to the United States. Acting in good conscience, Canadians without hesitation joined the interventions in Afghanistan, qualify them as you will.

¿ (0935)

However, in the case of Iraq, Canada decided to take a multilateral approach, in other words to define the issue as a test of its policy stance in favour of multilateralism, but that is not how the US understood it. In fact, Canada quite clearly outlined its position as a defence of multilateralism, but did not speak to the merit of the intervention as such, which caused some dissatisfaction and some confusion in the US. For example, by adopting a position in support of a deadline for a possible intervention, we never excluded the possibility that the intervention would be justified, leaving aside for a moment all of the other ambiguous aspects that you are much more familiar with than I am: we refused to participate, but we were participating; we refused to support the war, but in fact we were not opposed to it. That is the kind of skating around the issue that made it difficult to identify our position.

For example, in 1998, when former US President Bill Clinton used force in Iraq without seeking any kind of Security Council mandate, Canada more or less approved this intervention, in veiled but rather clear terms, an intervention which, at the time, did not seem to require new Security Council action. So some ambiguity remains.

Given the circumstances, I think that Canada, by choosing to be an intermediary, gave itself a valid role, one that it could fulfil. This role as intermediary that Canada wanted to play could have helped rebuild certain bridges between the US and their allies, but for that, it would have been necessary for our links with the United States to have not been called into question by a communication strategy that at the least could be called a bit awkward, for the reasons Kim Richard Nossal covered earlier on, and which, I am sure, will be the subject of an interesting discussion among us.

Thank you.

In passing, I can answer questions in English or in French, but my brief was in French.

¿ (0940)

[English]

The Chair: Perfect.

We're going to start with questions and answers, beginning with Mr. Martin, and then Monsieur Bergeron and Mr. Calder.

Mr. Keith Martin (Esquimalt—Juan de Fuca, Canadian Alliance): Merci beaucoup, Monsieur Patry.

Professors Martin and Nossal, thank you for being here today. I have three questions.

First, now that the damage has been done to our relationship with the United States, specifically what should we do to repair that relationship?

Professor Nossal, I completely agree with you that in managing our relationship with the United States, quiet diplomacy on disagreements is a prudent way to go. However, at the end of the day, when we have a fundamental disagreement on an issue of public policy, how do we express that disagreement in a manner that doesn't poison our relationship with the United States but ensures that we reserve the right, as an independent nation, to exercise independent public policy decisions?

Lastly, our relationship is a two-way street. When Ambassador Cellucci says that if Canada was in a bind like the U.S. has been, they would stand up with us, that rings a little bit hollow to some extent, I would suggest, given the backdrop of the problems we've had with softwood lumber, and with agricultural subsidies. How do we express that to the United States in a manner that suggests that the relationship has to be repaired on both sides?

Thank you.

[Translation]

The Chair: Mr. Martin.

[English]

Prof. Pierre Martin: On the first question, how do you repair the relationship, I think some dimensions of the relationship are beyond repair--for example, some elements of interpersonal relationships and the kinds of messages that are channeled to the U.S. by some actions or inactions, such as when close members of the Prime Minister's cabinet or staff make declarations and the Prime Minister doesn't see fit to counter those declarations by concrete action. I've expressed this in writing, so I don't mind repeating it. In my view, the declaration at the NATO summit...and it has nothing to do with the U.S. If this thing had been said about the leader of Luxembourg, it would have been as reprehensible, and I think immediate action would have been warranted.

In my view, if the Prime Minister had acted immediately in sending back his aide to Ottawa for further review, this thing would have died within hours. I don't think he really needed that kind of communications advice, but he would have still have that adviser around him, and would not have needed to fire that person.

Now, when comments come from the cabinet, and the only reply is the vague notion that the Prime Minister doesn't share the opinion expressed by the member of the cabinet, I think it's much more serious. It's a communications strategy that really doesn't sit well with allies at any level. That's the first thing that I think is beyond repair, especially given the fact that the Prime Minister is on the way out.

¿ (0945)

The Chair: I just want to remind the witnesses that it's five minutes for the question and answer. If you just answer to one in five minutes, there will be no answer for the other question.

Prof. Pierre Martin: At my university we have three-hour lectures, so I go on forever.

The Chair: No, I know you're a teacher, and that's why. I just want to give a chance to every member.

Professor Nossal.

Prof. Kim Nossal: Let me follow on Pierre's comments, because some of what he said about question one can be responded to in question two. Is there a way to say no to the United States? Absolutely. And should Canada say no to the United States on some questions? Absolutely. From my perspective, though, much of this is in the optics.

Everyone around this table is well aware of that key optic of saying no to the United States on that particular day. When the Prime Minister made the announcement in the House of Commons, you could see, in the video clip, an entire caucus rising in joyful--and if you looked at the expression on their faces, it was joyful--opposition. The fact is, when a caucus behaves in such a fashion, and a Prime Minister is surrounded, that is the kind of optic where saying no is going to produce exactly the wrong kind of results.

There was a way to say no to this particular set of war aims, if you like, but it seems to me that what needs to be done is a calculation of Canadian interests and, as you point out, that decision on principle, but then to think about how you actually do this. And that was Holmes' whole point. That's what the entire history of Canadian post-war foreign policy has always been about, how to pursue your interests in a smart way in the face of a hegemonic and superior power. And I have to say, with all due respect, this has not been a smart way.

The Chair: Thank you.

Now we'll go to Monsieur Bergeron, and then Mr. Calder and Ms. McDonough.

Monsieur Bergeron, s'il vous plaît.

[Translation]

Mr. Stéphane Bergeron (Verchères—Les-Patriotes, BQ): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Gentlemen, I must say that I greatly appreciated your presentations. As part of this dialogue, we can get into a byzantine debate on the role of Canada in the international community and so on, but we know full well, and this is something I constantly go back to, that the main challenge, or the biggest challenge that Canada will face in the years to come is seeing how it will position itself with respect to this emerging hyperpower that is the United States. How much leeway will Canada have with respect to its foreign policy in the face of the US super giant?

To go back to something Mr. Martin said earlier, I think that in this regard, regardless of the goodwill that Canada may have with respect to the security perimeter, it will not be enough. We can delude ourselves into thinking that by accepting to harmonize our immigration policies we will facilitate crossing the border, but we know full well that that will probably not be the case.

We participated in the mission in Afghanistan. Despite the fact that we were not part of the coalition, we have troops in the field, whereas Spain, which is a member of the coalition, has no troops in the field. Regardless of the goodwill we display, we are always taken for granted; it's as if Canada owed that to the US. But when we want to have an independent foreign policy, the US shows its impatience, its malaise and its dissatisfaction. The question is really how much leeway Canada will have in the future.

I told the committee that one of the parts of the equation as regards Canada's relations with the US is Quebec. For example, I raised for the committee the fact that the US democratic Senator Joseph Biden stated for all intents and purposes that Canada's foreign policy is the rest of the country against Quebec. This point of view is shared to a certain degree by some academics, namely your colleague, political science professor at UQAM, Stéphane Roussel, who stated:

In Canada, the domestic policy problem that has the biggest impact on relations with the United States is national unity. In 1976, the election of the Parti Québécois and the threat of cessation seemed to have led the Trudeau government to adopt an attitude that was more conciliatory vis-à-vis Washington, in order to obtain support there and prevent Quebec sovereigntists from developing any sympathy in the US.

In your opinion, to what extent is the issue of Quebec part of the equation as regards relations between Canada and the US?

¿ (0950)

The Vice-Chair (Hon. Diane Marleau (Sudbury, Lib.)): Who would like to answer the first question? Go ahead, Mr. Martin.

Prof. Pierre Martin: I would like to answer the second question first, and then come back to the first one.

I think I have already touched upon part of the answer that would apply in this case. I don't think it is related to any voluntary action nor to some type of intentional tactic or strategy. What is most remarkable in this matter, and you might tell me that I am being somewhat abstract, is that our search for our identity and self-definition, the setting of priorities and values, turned inward for a ten-year period, from about 1987 to 1997, when Canada was undergoing an introspective phase. The country did not feel the need to differentiate itself from its neighbour in order to affirm its identity.

Things have started to change over the past few years, though. Of course, this strategy has always been present in popular opinion, in literature, in intellectual discussions, etc. This is normal and the Americans are not terribly concerned about it. However, when this translates into applause and outbursts in the House at a time when we do not support the Americans on something which is of great importance to them, then there are political implications, implications that could damage our relations with a fundamental ally, and I think we will have to make amends.

As to the first question : How do we position ourselves and how do we repair the damage that has been done? I think that Kim might have some answers to that question.

[English]

Prof. Kim Nossal: Let me say, Monsieur Bergeron, that it is precisely because of the need to be able to insert ourselves into the process at this particular moment, when the United States, in my estimation, is embarked on a radically different kind of foreign policy from what we have seen in the past. It seems to me that this very different kind of foreign policy is marked by unilateralism of a kind we haven't seen, I think, in the entire post-1945 period. That's number one.

Two, what Monsieur Védrine used to call “hyper-power” is a very apt and accurate description, I think, of the American position in the world.

Third, the contretemps over Iraq has demonstrated for Americans the need for a rather different view of the world, and I think the changes that we have seen since 9/11, confirmed by the war in Iraq, and in particular if the war in Iraq goes well from the American perspective, will confirm for them the rightness of their actions.

Therefore, Canada, it seems to me, to protect our own interests in the way in which we would like a new world order to unfold, needs to be in Washington. We need to have the ear of the President of the United States. We need to have the ear of the members of his administration, of the members in senior positions on Capitol Hill.

For me, that is of crucial importance. If doors are closed in Washington to those in Canada who might want to make some comments, that, to me, is bad for Canada's interests, which is one of the reasons I'm so concerned by the damage that has been done by this particular episode.

¿ (0955)

[Translation]

Mr. Stéphane Bergeron: And how would you answer the second question?

[English]

Prof. Kim Nossal: On the question of Quebec, I think the actions of the Clinton administration in 1995 represent the way in which American administrations, Republican or Democrat, are likely to see what happens north of their border. I would anticipate that what the Clinton administration did in 1995 would in fact probably be done by future administrations, regardless of what the Canadian government was doing on matters of international policy.

I don't know whether that really answers the question.

The Vice-Chair (Hon. Diane Marleau): We'll go to Mr. Calder.

Mr. Murray Calder (Dufferin—Peel—Wellington—Grey, Lib.): Thank you very much, Madam Chair.

I've really enjoyed this today.

Kim, you're very much into the Internet, and Pierre, political science, so my question is going to be kind of couched where both of you can get into this and answer it.

War, propaganda--two things that are very closely linked. This morning when I got up, I watched, on Canada AM, the Seventh Cavalry moving toward Baghdad. Reporting now is instantaneous. On the Internet, people are talking back and forth, on their opinions and everything else like that. So where governments had control over propaganda in the past, dealing with war, that control is diminishing very rapidly.

My question is, with that, with the Internet being such a powerful force in mobilizing international public opinion, what long-term lessons can we take from this, and what do you think will be the impact on future Canadian policy? Obviously, with the lessons we're learning from this right now, we're going to have to address it to future conflicts.

I'll let you answer that, and then I have one on Canada and Australian foreign policy.

Prof. Kim Nossal: I'll say just a couple of words on war and propaganda.

I must admit, I tend to be rather sceptical when it comes to new technologies and their impact on the generation of public opinion, in particular because a lot of it seems to me to be just simply a compression of time; what has really changed is the instantaneousness of the conveying of certain images, certain ideas to public opinion. But when you look at what actually happens when people look at Internet sites, the fact is, there are some very old-fashioned things still occurring. People actually do listen to their leaders, which is one of the reasons why Pierre's argument about the articulation of vision by political leaders remains so important. People will actually turn to a prime-time broadcast by their political leader. They don't need the Internet for that, although they might access it.

The reality, it seems to me, is that there's a real danger that much of the new technology can be overblown in terms of the assumed impact on the way in which public opinion is going. I don't think public opinion, for example, which is radically against this war throughout the world, has been affected that much by the Internet. It's been affected much more by simply the optics of other media that people are looking at.

À (1000)

Prof. Pierre Martin: On this particular point, I would add that I think what remains important, often through the myriad of new things happening and new ways of looking at the world, is old-fashioned, state-to-state politics. So not only do people and populations listen to their leaders but also the leaders listen to one another. That is why the articulation of policies and the style and substance of the communication of ideas is important, regardless of whether it's being done through the Internet, instantaneous television, or old-fashioned newspapers.

That's one of the points I would stress on this.

Now, you had another question on Australia, which Kim is probably more....

Mr. Murray Calder: Yes.

Kim, you've done comparisons between Canadian and Australian foreign policy. I'm wondering, are there any major lessons that Canada can learn from Australia in this situation?

Prof. Kim Nossal: One of the interesting lessons that I think can be learned comes from looking at the impact on Australia, and particularly on the Australian government, of the Bali bombings. In other words, examine why the Howard government is in fact so keen, and why Howard himself has embraced the....

It's really the first time I have heard a leader, at least in modern times, express the old Edmund Burkean argument--made to the voters of Bristol in the 1770s--that he understood that the vast majority of Australians opposed the Australian government's position; nonetheless, his calculation of the national interest was this, and if they didn't like it, they could vote against him in the next election.

The argument here is that there is a fundamental relationship between the perceived threat to security and the willingness to devote resources. And in Australia, there are some real resources. The Australians have radically changed their force structure in the last several years.

So from that point of view, I think it's important to recognize that it very much depends on where you are. Canada continues to be in the supremely fortunate position of being secure in a way that Australia just simply is not.

Mr. Murray Calder: If I have time, Madam Chair, I'd like to go back to the first part.

The Vice-Chair (Hon. Diane Marleau): Very short.

Mr. Murray Calder: Okay.

What I heard from both of you is that if I have voted for a leader, I am willing to stand behind that leader in bad times and good. In that essence, then, given the fact that the split between Bush and Gore was so narrow in the U.S. election, how do you think that's going to translate with the support of the U.S. population?

Prof. Kim Nossal: I honestly can't answer that. The fact is, the process ended up with Mr. Bush being President, and that's how basically the vast majority of Americans continue to regard it. Although there's considerable opposition in the United States to Bush's policies, there remains, I think, a deep split within American politics on the wisdom of this particular policy.

Prof. Pierre Martin: It just sounded as though you were in a position to choose a leader yourself....

Mr. Murray Calder: Yes, we're working towards it.

The Vice-Chair (Hon. Diane Marleau): Ms. McDonough, please.

Ms. Alexa McDonough (Halifax, NDP): Thank you, Madam Chair.

I just want to quickly say that I'm struck by your reminder to us, and I think it's an important one, that fear, just simple, raw fear, is what drives a lot of Americans today in terms of their interpretation of events.

Second, I was interested in your citing of John Holmes' bad breath analogy, and Denis Stairs' The Diplomacy of Constraint, but I guess I want to push you harder to look at what's happening in 2003 in Canada, as compared to what was happening in those days. I'm not sure that we don't need to do some new thinking about this new reality, which is very different.

I just want to raise a question that perhaps seems somewhat unrelated to what you've been focusing on, and that is around the issue of the health of our democracy, the health of our own democratic process. This may be an oversimplification, but I lived in Texas in the mid-1960s, and I saw that the answer to many of the questions government was faced with was repression; was law and order; was squashing democracy when it came to any challenges to corporate dominance and the ruling elite's interest.

I have to say, I think a lot of Canadians now--and I'll speak for myself--in the late 1990s into 2003 are also gripped with a tremendous sense of fear. I'm gripped by a tremendous sense of fear about how much Canada is abandoning some very important values, held dear by people, to basically embrace a very different way of dealing with tensions and problems. It looks way too much like the Texas of the sixties that I found truly frightening.

So I'm going to raise a question about the role of our own democratic process. You've talked exclusively about what does government do, how do cabinets behave, and how does the leader of your country behave, but I think it's true that Canadians are deeply divided about where we go with many of these issues.

In the process, I completely agree that mindless anti-Americanism in any form is just unacceptable, for all the reasons you've cited. At the same time, is there some new rule in terms of what we're facing here that opposition, genuine political opposition, is abandoned, so that there's no open debate about these issues? Because that is one of the most frightening things of all that we've seen happen in the U.S. I mean, democracy shuts down in the U.S. There is no real debate at all.

I visited Washington last year , and you couldn't get a Democrat who absolutely, vociferously disagreed with the direction of things to actually express it. Are we to go the same course? Because the reality is, the Parliament of Canada is deeply divided, reflecting how deeply divided Canadians are.

I would just be interested in your addressing that question. It may seem self-preoccupied for opposition members to raise that question, but I think we do have to address it. How do we maintain a healthy democracy in the face of American hegemony and corporate dominance; of the single-mindedness, seemingly, at an official level, of American politicians?

À (1005)

Prof. Kim Nossal: While you were talking I actually didn't know precisely where you were going, because invoking the word “democracy” raises all sorts of interesting questions. The democratic nature of certain institutions is, of course, very much in question in this country. Indeed, you're all part of an institution that arrives, in this building, through a rather interesting process, a process that has been abandoned by the vast majority of jurisdictions in the international system that are interested in trying to ensure that the preferences of the voters are reflected a little more clearly in their representative institutions.

That's where I at first thought you might be drifting--

À (1010)

Ms. Alexa McDonough: I could go there as well, but not today. You're talking about proportional representation in a--

Prof. Kim Nossal: No, I'm not even thinking of purely that debate, although it's an element there.

Really, what you're talking about is the role of deliberation in the coming to decision about public policy. It seems to me, and I come back to the comments I made to Mr. Martin, that there is absolutely no reason not to have an informed debate on certain important issues. And there can be no more important issue than putting members of the community in harm's way, in going to war.

The point, it seems to me, is how you have that debate, and what the tone of that debate is, and what is permissible debate--in particular, those who have the responsibility of governing the community. What a protester in the streets might have to say is relatively unimportant, all things considered, compared with the responsibility of those who have the reins of power to ensure that the well-being of the citizens of this country is ensured. The difficulty is that when the elected representatives in a sense bow to their self-indulgences, that puts in jeopardy a certain well-being on the part of the community. So people might well indeed fear certain things, but for rather different reasons than what you are suggesting.

My point, though, is that there's a way to have this debate, but the debate has to be above the juvenile level, number one; by people who really should know better, number two; and it should be full and frank, but it has to be informed. And the role here, to come back to something Pierre said, is leadership--in other words, the articulation by political leaders on all sides of politics of a particular voice.

Canadian people aren't stupid. They can follow a reasoned debate. But that debate has to be there, and that will be democratic.

Prof. Pierre Martin: There isn't much to add to that other than, in terms of the debate as it occurred, what made the debate go in an undesirable direction was the fact that it was turned, or toned, always in the sense of being in opposition to what the U.S. was doing, whichever position was really taken, instead of getting to the bottom of things or going to the merit of the intervention itself.

I think on this we could take lessons from the British, for example, who actually conducted a much more reasoned and in a sense intelligent debate on the merit of the intervention--even more so than the Americans themselves--in terms of legislators and political representatives.

We saw in Canada no frank positioning on whether intervention itself was warranted. Since we didn't have any substance in the debate, then we turned our debate towards people, whether it be George Bush or the Americans. In such a case, the position taken only places one in opposition to the U.S. rather than opposition to what the U.S. is doing.

I think there are perfectly legitimate ways to express opposition to what the U.S. is doing, even from within the U.S., and this has been done. It's pretty late on this particular issue. I think we have to let bygones be bygones and look at the next stage, the reconstruction, in terms of what's going on in Iraq, but there will be another debate. The one that's looming very close is the debate on ballistic missile defence. This is a very fundamental debate on an issue that is strictly bilateral and will have to involve very reasoned debate on the merits of the issue itself rather than the relationship with the U.S.

I think one can join coalitions, in fact, if one wants to express opposition to this issue; I for one am one of those. If one wants to save lives, there are better ways to spend billions upon billions of dollars. We all know where that money could go more productively.

The point is, we could form coalitions with people in the U.S. holding the same sort of position to conduct an intelligent debate on the merits of the issue rather than express it strictly in terms of facing off with the neighbours. I think it's the wrong way to go in terms of dealing with this next big issue.

À (1015)

Ms. Alexa McDonough: Thank you.

The Vice-Chair (Hon. Diane Marleau): Thank you very much.

Now I'll go to Mr. Cotler.

Mr. Irwin Cotler (Mount Royal, Lib.): I have a question for Professor Nossal, because Professor Martin just touched on this. Given time, though, both can answer.

Assuming that Canada did not want to join in the war on Iraq, how should we have managed this decision, and how can we manage the fallout from that decision now? Let me give one example, if I may.

International law, and the United Nations, is an organizing idiom of Canadian foreign policy. The U.S. action either did not appear to comport with international law or it enunciated a new doctrine, such as the pre-emptive use of force. How then could we have given expression to our position in that regard?

Prof. Pierre Martin: Two things. First, as I mentioned before, there is some dimension or some amount of ambiguity in the position in terms of, for example, the reaction to actions taken in 1998 that were perceived at the time as in line with resolutions from the Security Council. Of course, there is a significant difference in degree of the use of force in this one episode, but the Americans might have, at the time, perceived the message as being that Canada would be supportive of the legal grounds for intervention.

Now, in terms of the actual position and what was defended, I don't think it was fundamentally wrong. There was actual merit in taking a principled position in favour of the Security Council and international legality per se, and trying to build bridges between two positions that expressed themselves as irreconcilable but did seem to have common threads. The notion of trying to bring together the extremes by a middle ground position was a policy that turned out to have promise.

But to do that, to build bridges, you need to not blow up the bridges before you build them. And the kind of tone that was set in terms of the relationship with the U.S. has undermined, in my view, those kinds of issues. So in terms of what to do with Iraq, it would be not much different, but it's in terms of how to manage the tone of the relationship overall that....

What can be done from now on? I think the issue now has to turn to reconstruction. It has to turn to trying to again build bridges and to involve as many participants as possible in the reconstruction to make it as much as possible a multilateral effort. And it will take some convincing on the part of the U.S., I suppose.

Prof. Kim Nossal: Let me make one comment about international law and the Canadian position. Part of the problem is that Canada's behaviour in 1999 in the Kosovo affair ended up taking a lot of the wind out of the principled notion that we won't raise a finger against another country unless it is by and with the explicit authority of the United Nations Security Council. The reality is this: In 1999 the Government of Canada saw fit to wage war against the former Republic of Yugoslavia without a resolution by the United Nations Security Council, and we defended that on the grounds of national interest.

It seems to me that, really, if Canada did not want to be engaged in the use of force against Iraq, the time to have explicated that view was when it first became apparent that regime change as an American objective was clearly on the horizon. The Canadian government could have indicated quite explicitly where it was, and not tried to play what one journalist called “eight months of hide-and-seek” on the issue of what exactly we were doing.

Although lots of folks have dined out on looking at the twists and turns in Canadian foreign policy--everyone around this table will know Andrew Coyne's little piece on the clarity of contemporary Canadian policy--the reality is, you could have easily gotten away with saying no, provided you had been up front, had laid it out as clearly as you possibly could, and had been consistent. And all of those things, it seems to me, weren't done.

I don't know, Mr. Cotler, if you were referring to reconstruction, as Pierre was talking about, in Iraq, but with regard to reconstruction of the Canadian-American relationship, a lot of it, it seems to me, has to be now turned to trying to “refurbish” the relationship, to use the term of a former prime minister. There's no particular secret as to how that gets done.

Think about what Prime Minister Lester Pearson did in 1963 to repair damage done to the relationship by John Diefenbaker in the couple of years prior. Think about Mr. Mulroney's policies in 1984-85 to undo some of the consequences of the latter years of the Trudeau government. You can then get some sense of what constitutes refurbishing the Canadian-American relationship.

I must admit, as a political scientist--and now that Ms. McDonough's back, I can basically say this--I personally think there's a great deal of utility in looking to the past, simply because it is in those past practices that frequently there are important lessons.

That's one of the reasons why I'm actually fairly optimistic. Canadian-American relations are in a constant cyclical process of good times and bad times. Inevitably, good times lead to a downturn, and bad times, by contrast, inevitably, if you look at the long history of Canadian-American relations, lead to an upturn. And my view is that we're now at the point where we have to go up.

À (1020)

The Vice-Chair (Hon. Diane Marleau): Thank you.

Mr. Thompson.

Mr. Greg Thompson (New Brunswick Southwest, PC): Thank you, Madam Chair. As a guest to your committee, I appreciate the opportunity to put a couple of questions to our guests.

I'm intrigued by some of your analysis. In fact, I've been making notes as you speak. I would like you to continue in terms of looking back to the past with regard to dealing with the situation we have today, and to possibly be more specific.

You mentioned Mr. Mulroney and some of the repair work that he did. I guess what you are probably talking about, if memory serves me correctly, is that when the Mulroney government took office, one of the first things they wanted to do was abolish the Foreign Investment Review Agency, which appeared to be an instrument against the Americans, more so than any other country in the world. The other thing, of course, was the free trade debate. I guess the abolishment of FIRA came before the free trade debate. I think that came shortly after they took office in 1984.

Leading into the free trade debate, again, I think the Liberals lost that election, if you will--that election was a one-issue election--because of the anti-Americanism, or the stand they took that had very little to do with fact, or reality, but had a whole lot to do with American-bashing, if you will.

Maybe you could go into a little detail regarding that election and the repair work that was done over the years, and possibly talk about the reverse of that; you were talking about Mr. Diefenbaker, which I think is an intriguing piece of history as well. Time has probably stripped from our memory some of those nuances, some of those events.

Possibly, Professor, you could touch on some of that.

Prof. Kim Nossal: Generally speaking, I think it's a real mistake to attribute the winning or losing of a particular election to such single forces as you suggest. I certainly don't believe that the 1963 election was lost by the Conservatives because of their policies on defence, or that the 1984 election was lost by the Liberals because of Mr. Trudeau's relations with the Reagan administration. I don't think that's how politics works, certainly not when you have a first-past-the-post system.

Generally speaking, my own sense is, and my comments really were, that when Canadian relations with the United States, and in particular when the personalized relationship between the President and the Prime Minister, become too close, historically Canadians appear to get discombobulated; they tend to be concerned. That allows folks on the other side of politics to make arguments that might resonate with some voters.

Think about the resonance of Mr. Diefenbaker's attacks on the St. Laurent government in the 1957 election, and the closeness to the United States of the Liberal government of that period. It didn't win an election, but did it resonate with voters? Generally speaking, I think you could make that argument. Ditto for all of those other aspects.

I would not want to say, though, this election was won on this or that. A lot of it, as Pierre has said, has to do with style and tone. That, it seems to me, coming back to Mr. Cotler's question, is where the refurbishing can perhaps best take place in terms of the tone. That means that governments, and those who sustain governments in the House of Commons, might well reflect on the Hippocratic oath, “First, do no harm.”

À (1025)

Mr. Greg Thompson: Any time left, Madam Chair?

The Vice-Chair (Hon. Diane Marleau): Well...a small bit.

Mr. Greg Thompson: Then I'll pass, because I think I'll probably need more time than a small bit. I appreciate it anyway. Thank you.

The Vice-Chair (Hon. Diane Marleau): Thank you.

I'll go to Mr. Martin.

Mr. Keith Martin: Thank you, Madam Chair.

Professor Martin, I believe there are some very specific things we ought to do. You alluded to one of them, and that is our contribution to our military, or lack of, over the last decade or so.

I think--and perhaps, Professor Nossal, you could add to this--there are two things we ought to be doing. Most importantly, we need to make a substantial investment in our military, and we need to improve our commitments to our multilateral endeavours, through NATO in particular; with our relationship to the U.S.; and through UN deployments. As well, a firm and strong commitment to our military and a commitment in those endeavours would send a very strong message to Washington that we mean to live up to our commitments that we have failed in the last ten years.

Again, Professor Nossal--and this is a nuanced issue that you're discussing, and a very sensitive one, that gets to the heart, perhaps, of the art of diplomacy--perhaps you could give us some more specifics on how we could engage the U.S.

One of the difficulties I think we've all had in this committee, and previous committees, is how do we engage the U.S.? We have a tough enough time when we go to Washington to get an audience with our counterparts. What structure do you think we ought to have in terms of being able to better engage our counterparts south of the border, one on one, to improve the interpersonal relationships, as well as engage in meaningful debates, one to one, level to level, on issues that we are responsible for and they are responsible for?

Thank you. Merci beaucoup.

Prof. Pierre Martin: I think there are two sides to the question.

First, if Canada wants to have a say in international affairs, and an autonomous role to play, and the means to back up its own commitments internationally, yes, the Canadian government should devote more resources to its military. It's vastly understaffed and underequipped to cover only the commitments that exist now, let alone new commitments. I think it's just a matter of choice.

One could say, no, Canada is not going to make a difference through the use of force, so perhaps through some other means. It's a perfectly legitimate argument to be making, but in terms of worldwide perception, I think to devote any less resources would be counterproductive.

Now, the other part of the question is the message to Washington. That brings me to a quote from someone--I can no longer remember who it originated from, but it wasn't me--who said that for years now, Canada has been faced with the choice of having a defence that is inadequate and expensive or inadequate and cheap, and it has chosen a defence that is both inadequate and cheap.

In fact, to do anything that would remotely satisfy the expectations of the United States would involve huge increases in resources, and that's not even anywhere in sight. Let's say Canada increased from 25% to 30%, going from 1% to 1.3% of its GDP. Well, the U.S. would say, “Great, but big deal”, because going from not much to a little bit more is not going to make much difference in terms of perception from the U.S. I think it has to be self-determined in terms of whether Canada wants to fulfill particular missions, and not expect any return on the part of the U.S.

Am I saying there's no linkage between what Canada does or the resources it devotes in terms of some sort of a more constructive relationship with the U.S.? That's not what I'm saying. The only thing I'm saying is that it's much easier to lose on the linkage game than it is to win. To expect immediate returns in the bilateral relationship from huge investments in defence is, in my view, misguided.

À (1030)

Prof. Kim Nossal: Let me respond to the question first on the military and then on how to engage.

I agree with Pierre that one should not use the defence budget in the expectation that you're going to get any kind of serious, positive reaction from Washington. On the other hand, there's something to be said for taking a look at the importance of the defence budget and what it gets spent on for our foreign policy purposes.

It seems to me that one of the difficulties here is that, in large measure, the defence budget in Canada looks the way it does because we've spent 30 years avoiding taking serious decisions on what our defence expenditures are for. The fact is, what we have is this continuing commitment to a sort of multi-purpose combat-capable force, that is both cheap and inadequate, instead of trying to think through what we actually need to spend on the defence of Canada and Canadians in both a security defence notion and also in foreign policy terms.

Once again I come back to Australia. Australia spends roughly what we do on defence, but they have radically different capability from what we have. We can't keep 750 troops in a combat situation in the field for any longer than six months. The commitment of 3,000 troops to the cobble is going to reveal itself for the craziness, with all due respect, that it is. If we can't keep 750 troops in the field, how are we going to keep 3,000 in the field?

The Australians, by contrast, have chosen a very different approach. They spend their $11 billion a year...because they actually have sat down and thought about some strategic purpose, both foreign policy and military, for their forces. For example, over the last couple of years they have specialized. They have created niche military.

So instead of trying to have a military that is a mile wide and an inch deep, which Canada has been trying to do for the last 30 years or so, maybe it's time to think about the changing nature--if you want new thinking, Ms. McDonough--of the international system.

Pierre mentioned NATO. I have to say, when I look at the future, what future do I see for NATO? Not much; not much. And Canada will find itself, in my humble estimation, where two or three generations of Canadian foreign policy-makers have tried hard to avoid us being--that is, in the dismantling of the transatlantic linkages that allowed us to avoid being lumped with the United States on one side of the dumbbell. I think the dumbbell is coming, in spades, and it's going to be coming largely because of the war with Iraq.

Secondly, on the question of how to engage south of the border, I think the first thing is that the rule of the day should be ad hocery. We have spent as Canadians a couple of hundred years dealing with Americans on an utterly ad hoc basis--no big visions, no big ideas, just struggling through the different and hugely complex aspects of the relationship.

I'm made very nervous by mention of big ideas, simply because the one thing that seems to me has always served us well is the avoidance of linkage. Some questioner earlier on, maybe you--yes, it was you--talked about two-way streets. Don't link softwood lumber and Iraq. Deal with softwood lumber on its own. Understand the political dynamics south of the border on softwood lumber. Live with it. Deal with Iraq as something fundamentally different.

It seems to me that modelling through that ad hocery, which has indeed served Canadians very well in the past, is, in my humble estimation, the blueprint for the future. Big ideas might sound attractive, and might look good splashed on the commentary pages of the Post, the Globe , or Le Devoir , but the reality on the ground is that the relationship is too complex for a single big idea, with due respect to others.

À (1035)

The Vice-Chair (Hon. Diane Marleau): Thank you.

Monsieur Desrochers.

[Translation]

Mr. Odina Desrochers (Lotbinière—L'Érable, BQ): Thank you, Madam Chair.

Mr. Martin, Mr. Nossal, this morning's presentations have dealt with history as well as politics. We have discussed John Diefenbaker, Pierre Elliott Trudeau, Lester B. Pearson, Brian Mulroney, as well as the current Prime Minister. There is one common denominator in all that we have heard : the definition of a true partner is elusive.

It seems that for the United States, partnership is a one-way street. Let us take as an example the sad events of September 11, 2001. At that time, we opened up our airspace, and clearly proved that we were supporting them in their fight against terrorism. Later, however, once again with respect to partnership, Canada and Quebec were subjected to economic restrictions and an extremely harsh policy on softwood lumber, agriculture and steel. And I, myself, am very worried about our water, since we rank second in the world in terms of its availability.

Mexico also shares a border with its neighbour, the United States. I don't often read the Mexican newspapers, but from what I understand, the United States is not being as hard towards the Mexicans as it is towards Canada.To my knowledge, Mexico has also refused to go along with the Americans in their war against Iraq; it has maintained its position.

Mr. Nossal and Mr. Martin, how can a true partnership be defined in that context? The United States needs us, but it seems that everything we do for them is taken for granted. And when we try to stand on our own and support our international policies, then everything falls apart. We feel their wrath and we are made to pay for the positions that we take. Even though we live next to the United States, Canada's reach is international.

How would you define a partnership with the American superpower?

À (1040)

Prof. Pierre Martin: I would first of all like to clarify the part of your question that related to Mexico. That country is in a somewhat different situation. The support for the Vicente Fox government is much more tenuous than the support enjoyed by the Canadian government at this time. We must face the facts.

The American president is very much aware of that. In spite of the relationship itself and the role that Mexico might have played, the American president, first and foremost, needs to keep a government like that of Mr. Fox in place to avoid having Mexico adopt foreign policy positions which would not be in the interest of the United States. He was prepared to put up with it because the alternative could be...

Mr. Odina Desrochers: A socialist government?

Prof. Pierre Martin: It would certainly be a more nationalistic government, which would be more reluctant to accept other foreign policy priorities.

That said, Mexico no doubt regrets its insistence on becoming a member of the Security Council. It must wonder why it did not simply maintain its status quo within the United Nations. I recently discussed that with a Canadian diplomat who shall remain anonymous; he said that his Mexican colleagues did indeed have some regrets over the decision that had been made.

To come back to your question on the definition of a partnership, I might say that in my opinion, there is not one single partnership between Canada and the United States; there are millions of them. The relationship is not simply between two nations, but between businesses as well. And there are relationships within various businesses, between individuals, between institutions as well as parliamentarians. To wit, the relations you have with your American colleagues. We must take this broader definition of a relationship into account.

Mr. Odina Desrochers: Perhaps, but there has been diplomatic wrangling and there are messages circulating amongst the various partners of which you have spoken. It looks like they are becoming as wary as the United States administration.

Prof. Pierre Martin: That's true. You are speaking in terms of weeks or months, but things do evolve and eventually return to normal. The United States has been at war for two weeks; a number of factors have heightened the tensions and have led to this war. This is not a normal situation, and for the millions of partnerships that I mentioned earlier, things will quickly return to normal.

Right now, we are looking at the forest but we will have to see the trees from time to time. That is an important part of the definition of a relationship.

Mr. Odina Desrochers: You say that the United States is intentionally more tolerant towards Mexico for fear that they might elect a new, more nationalistic government, or maybe a more socialist one.

Are you saying that if the political landscape in Canada were to change, the Americans might become more tolerant towards us? Is that how they behave?

Prof. Pierre Martin: I see it in terms of the relationship between President Bush and President Fox. This is what I should have said. If Mexico were to find itself, today, in the same financial situation that it experienced in 1994, and if it went, cap in hand, to the doors of the US Congress to ask for emergency aid to support its currency, I am not at all sure that the result would be exactly the same. Therefore, in the short term, there are risks that are not negligible; however, the interests involved at this time mean that the United States would have very little to gain from taking an aggressive stand against Mexico.

Let us put this in perspective. The United States has not been terribly aggressive against Canada either. They have simply ignored us and are taking care of business.

À (1045)

Mr. Odina Desrochers: You and I do not have the same interpretation, Mr. Martin.

Prof. Pierre Martin: In the eyes of our American neighbours, Canada does not count for much. I am sorry to say it that way in the present context.

Mr. Odina Desrochers: But if we don't count for much in their eyes, why did they insist on having us take part in the war?

Prof. Pierre Martin: The United States pressed all of their allies to go to war. It must be said, however, that they were somewhat irritated by the fact that we didn't have a clear position.

Has our relationship with them been damaged more than that of France, Germany, and all the other countries who refused to join the coalition? I think we should not overestimate the significance of our position in this conflict.

Mr. Odina Desrochers: Would you like to comment, M. Nossal?

The Vice-Chair (Hon. Diane Marleau): I think you have already gone over your time.

Mr. Odina Desrochers: I would simply ask you to give Mr. Nossal 30 seconds.

The Vice-Chair (Hon. Diane Marleau): You are already at eight minutes and 39 seconds.

Mr. Odina Desrochers: Thank you, madam Chair.

[English]

The Vice-Chair (Hon. Diane Marleau): Ms. McDonough, for one last question.

Ms. Alexa McDonough: I'd just like to return to the discussion on our defence policy as it relates to foreign policy. I guess I'm going to suggest that all reasonable people would agree that one's defence policy should derive from one's deliberate foreign policy, and yet we've had a kind of review of Canada's defence policy through the parliamentary committee in isolation from our foreign policy, and are now having a foreign policy dialogue that hasn't really explicitly identified defence policy as a derivative of our foreign policy. I wonder if I might ask you to comment on that.

Secondly, very briefly, there is increasingly in the international arena a discussion that about the only way to really provide a counterbalance to the hyper-power that the U.S. constitutes today is through building a kind of counterforce through the progressive citizens of the world. That has pretty difficult implications in terms of what it actually means. I wonder if you'd just comment on this notion of a hyper-power for which there is no real balancing force in today's world.

Prof. Kim Nossal: Let me deal first with your question about the military and the relationship between the military and foreign policy.

Our military has been disconnected from foreign policy for many decades. It's not what we spend $11 billion a year for. While it can't be said in public terms, no defence review has ever really addressed the essence of the paradox of our defence policy, and I don't honestly believe any review would ever actually come to grips with why we actually spend this $11 billion a year.

On your second question, about countering the power of the hyper-power, my own sense is that there's not a great deal of countering that can or will occur. That's part of the definition of a hyper-power, that there is no countering force possible.

Now, you can end up postulating about the possibilities of progressive citizenry, but when all is said and done, in my humble estimation at least, what we're talking about here is looking at the governments of the world and looking at how governments will respond to the assertion of American power. It seems to me that's what is new, and that's something the Canadian government has not really thought through. It's still attaching itself to very old ideas; not that I want to dismiss that entirely, but it hasn't been thinking about what life next to a hyper-power is going to be. For example, Mr. Cotler mentioned the pre-emptive doctrine. My view is, if it's successful here, then I think it's going to be used elsewhere.

I'll turn it over to Pierre.

À (1050)

Prof. Pierre Martin: A quick point here...and I apologize, because I didn't hear your questions all that well.

On the question of conducting a defence review before a foreign policy review, I think it's putting the cart before the horse. The defence review, in my view, should be towed by the foreign policy. It only strikes me as obvious.

On the second point, on countering power, there's countering power in the classical sense and in the sense of the structural power of the markets. I think there are ways to understand it. Kim said that you cannot really counter it effectively, that you more or less have to live with it. But in a sense, even in strong winds, one can sail against the wind. There are ways to use the structures in order to.... By living within those structures, and within the constraints that they impose, without the illusion that one can change the overall structure from day one, there are ways to sail against the wind and to use those forces willingly to one's own advantage.

I know it's a very unsatisfactory response when the goal in the long run might be to change the structures, but it's at least a first step toward changing. It's also good governance in the sense of not necessarily going against those forces but trying to achieve objectives within those constraints.

But that's a philosophical answer, avoiding many issues, I know.

The Vice-Chair (Hon. Diane Marleau): Thank you very much.

[Translation]

Mr. Harvey, you had a question.

Mr. André Harvey (Chicoutimi—Le Fjord, Lib.): Mr. Martin, I would first of all like to thank you for appearing.

You talked about all of the summersaults punctuating the government's position. I would like you to elaborate on that since, from the very beginning of this crisis, the Prime Minister said that he was hoping the UN would assume its leadership role.

I don't know if your comment was intended as a reference to Canadian military personnel involved in operations as part of an exchange. When you take part in exchanges such as those, you can't just decide to call back our 30 soldiers because there is a bit too much action in a particular area. Their role has always been defined in terms of the war against terrorism. So I would like you to elaborate and tell us a bit more about the meaning you were giving to the term “summersaults”.

The Prime Minister stated from the very outset that our position was to put ourselves under the UN umbrella. In doing this, he was in fact defending those multilateral organizations which will be very helpful in the reconstruction effort and, in the end, in waging the war against global poverty. I feel that is what the major challenge will be in the 21st century.

Prof. Pierre Martin: I will check the transcripts to see if I did indeed used the word “summersaults”. I don't think I used it. Canada's position was that we would intervene only if the UN decided to intervene. I agree with you that we didn't deviate from our position, but in taking such a position, we failed to deal with the substance of the debate. At one point, we stated that, three weeks later, an intervention might be warranted, but that, for the time being, it was not. Now that the intervention has begun, we are continuing to say that the decision was not a good decision, but that if we had waited three weeks, it would have been appropriate to intervene.

So then, what was the position taken by the government, if it did indeed take a position, with respect to the intervention as such? I did not talk about summersaults since we never got anything going. We only came down on the side of the panel that was to make the decision, but we did not make a decision ourselves.

Thus, the situation lends itself to a variety of interpretations. If all of the other members of the United Nations had made the decision, we could have jumped on the bandwagon and said that we agreed and that we didn't need to deal with the substance of the matter since the UN had done it for us. However, we have as yet to take a position on the substance of the matter: was the intervention justified, yes or no?

À (1055)

Mr. André Harvey: For our part, we have always maintained that we should be guided by the resolution on disarming Iraq. At the same time, we have always shown the greatest respect for the interventionists who decided to move more quickly.

Prof. Pierre Martin: I would interpret that as your...

The Chair: Thank you very much, Mr. Nossal and Mr. Martin, for coming here. Please excuse me, I had to be in the House.

We have two motions this morning.

[English]

There is a motion from Mr. Stockwell Day, and after that the travel budget request, because we have changed the itinerary.

Mr. Day, the floor is yours. Do you want me to read it?

Mr. Stockwell Day (Okanagan—Coquihalla, Canadian Alliance): I will read it, Mr. Chair, and I thank you and the committee.

The motion is related to Taiwan's observer status participation at the World Health Organization. I move:

That the Committee, acknowledging that health issues transcend political borders, supports the bid of Taiwan for observer status at the World Health Organization and that the Committee so report to the House.

Mr. Chair, I'll be brief in my remarks. I know that people have very clear ideas on the positive effect of this motion. We need to keep in mind, I believe, today's great potential for the cross-border spread of various infectious diseases, such as HIV, tuberculosis, malaria, and SARS. These diseases pay no heed to political or national boundaries or race.

Taiwan has asked for assistance and has asked for observer status at the upcoming meeting of the World Health Organization. More than 150,000 Taiwanese people visit Canada every year, and that's in addition to the roughly 150,000 Taiwanese immigrants or students who live in Canada who make frequent visits back to Asia. This significant amount of human interchange makes it essential for Taiwan to have access to WHO in order to protect both the Taiwanese people and Canadian citizens. For Taiwan to be excluded from this organization would represent an epidemiological black hole in the functioning of WHO.

Mr. Chairman, I'd like to remind people that Taiwan has achieved substantial progress in many fields, including having one of the highest life expectancy levels in the world and maternal and infant mortality rates that are comparable to those of western countries'. They have eradicated such diseases as cholera, smallpox, and the plague.

Taiwan has a population larger than 148 other states in the United Nations, equivalent to the combined population of the United Nations' 50 least-populated countries. It's very important to note that Taiwan is the only remaining sizeable territory in the entire world whose people are denied the benefits that accrue from WHO engagement. All we're talking about is observer status.

The World Health Organization is very important. It does not share common membership with the United Nations. For instance, not just observer status but WHO membership has been granted to a little island only 260 square kilometres, with a population of 2,100, the Island of Niue. The Cook Islands, at 234 square kilometres, with a population of only 21,000, are not UN members, but they do have this possibility to engage at WHO. The Order of Malta, the Holy See, the International Committee of the Red Cross, and the Palestinian Liberation Organization--all have observer status.

As a committee, we would be seen as advancing humanitarian causes if we were to agree to do what we can to pass this motion. One tiny step to getting observer status at the World Health Organization is all they ask.

Thank you.

The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Day.

Madame Marleau.

Hon. Diane Marleau: I would like to speak in support of this motion. While I am well aware of Foreign Affairs' position on this issue, I believe we should disagree with that. I think Mr. Day put it very well, that it would be important for us to support Taiwan that they become observers at the World Health Organization.

It would not be the first time that a legislative body approved this. My understanding is that there were motions such as this passed by both houses in the United States. My understanding also is that the Europe Union passed a motion to this effect as well. So we are not breaking ranks with our allies in any way, and I think it would be very important for Taiwan, especially when you see what's happening now with SARS, to be allowed to be there as observers.

I think we would be remiss as a committee not to have our voice heard. The government has the right to take the position that they feel is right, but the committees are their own creatures. We are members of Parliament, and we have the right to make decisions and to make recommendations.

So this would be one of the recommendations we would make to Parliament, that they agree to have Taiwan be an observer at the World Health Organization.

Á (1100)

The Chair: Merci, Madame Marleau.

Ms. McDonough.

Ms. Alexa McDonough: I just want to say very briefly that I and my colleagues in the New Democratic Party caucus solidly support this motion before the committee. You will know, Mr. Chairman, that my predecessor on the foreign affairs committee consistently championed this point of view. I think we all recognize that it's an act of international statesmanship, really, for Taiwan to have worked very hard on ensuring that we have a full appreciation of why this is so important.

In some ways, it seems like a no-brainer. I haven't heard a single, solitary, substantive argument as to why we would not support this motion.

I guess mindful of the presentation we heard from our distinguished academic presenters this morning, for murky political reasons that are not even interpreted to the public, sometimes the government takes a stand on something and the world is left wondering what that was about, because the facts and the figures and the substantive arguments clearly come down on the side of supporting this motion.

Thank you.

The Chair: Thank you.

Mr. Cotler and then Madame Carroll.

Mr. Irwin Cotler: I have a few summary remarks.

Number one, I think we need a global health network in place, particularly as a result of the transnational spread of infectious diseases. Taiwan would be a natural presence in that global health network.

Second, it has been mentioned that WHO does not share a common membership with the UN General Assembly or other specialized agencies. But it's somewhat of an absurdity, even more, that we would keep out a country of 23 million that, as Mr. Day has mentioned, is larger than 148 sovereignties, at the same time as they would accommodate, not just as observer status but as state participants, Niue, with a population of 2,100, or the Cook Islands, at 21,000.

Third, excluding it from observer status is, I would say, a breach of the universality principle as expressed in the WHO constitution itself.

Fourth, reference has been made to the politicization of WHO. I would say that excluding it is what politicizes WHO; including it would in fact be an antidote to that kind of politicization.

Just as final very quick points, it's not just a question of Taiwan as a beneficiary but Taiwan as a contributor, given its own medical expertise. We've heard about other countries that have supported it--the European Parliament, the U.S. Congress, Japan. And the last absurdity is that there are already a number of observer status groups--the ICRC, the Holy See, the Order of Malta, and the PLO and the like.

For all these reasons, Mr. Chairman, I strongly support the motion.

The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Cotler.

Ms. Carroll.

Ms. Aileen Carroll (Barrie—Simcoe—Bradford, Lib.): Thank you, Mr. Chair.

I certainly listened to colleagues on both sides of the table. I am reminded, however, of one of my political science courses, back when we were studying British Parliament. The old adage used there was that the British Parliament has such power, it can do anything--except change a man into a woman.

So while we all may have strong emotional and political motivation here on this, and have been approached by well-organized lobbies over the years, I think the facts have to be looked at. If you'll just stay with me, I'll explain that.

In order to belong to the World Health Organization, the states, to belong, must belong to the United Nations. Taiwan does not belong to the United Nations. I hate to obscure this with facts, but the fact is, China does. It is a member of the Security Council. It has a veto. So the likelihood of Taiwan obtaining membership at the United Nations would probably be remote.

The second point I think is important is that the World Health Organization's constitution does not allow for observer status. So while a well-meaning group of Canadians may wish, as I said, to change these kinds of regulations, the same as the House of Parliament might in Britain, you do not have the power. You do not have the power to change the World Health Organization's regulations regarding observers. You cannot change the rules of the United Nations and make Taiwan a member of the United Nations and therefore a member of the World Health Organization.

So while it is sometimes frustrating to have to deal with realities, I think there is some onus on us to do so.

Now, a solution that would allow for Taiwan to participate in such related United Nations activities and agencies as the World Health Organization would then require the support of the UN, including support from China. And we've done that. The World Health Organization has indicated that there is no practical impediment--and this is a very important fact, that there is no practical impediment--to the exchange of information and cooperation between the World Health Organization and Taiwan that might threaten the health of Taiwanese in some manner. Neither would Taiwan be barred from humanitarian assistance from the World Health Organization in the event of a medical emergency.

In other words, we have dealt with the de jure situation, and now the de facto situation is that all that the World Health Organization provides, all the members states need to access from there, can be accessed by Taiwan. So while this motion says we ought not to allow political issues to transcend health issues, I would suggest, Mr. Chair, that in fact this is exactly the motivation behind Mr. Day's motion before us. It is to deal with a political rather than a health issue.

It is important, then, to understand that WHO has been cooperating directly with the Taiwanese in measures to control the spread of disease and has dispatched teams from its collaboration centres to Taiwan to assist in dealing with specific health issues. As a member of the international community, Taiwan is currently able freely to access health information from the World Health Organization, either directly, through WHO's website, or through WHO's collaboration centres. I'm going to share with you a document on collaboration centres.

Taiwan is able to participate in a whole range of World Health Organization health promotion programs, under current circumstances. The World Health Organization provides indirect assistance to Taiwan on health-related and disease control issues. This assistance is delivered by third parties acting privately on behalf of the World Health Organization, but not officially representing the World Health Organization.

There are some recent examples of this WHO-sponsored indirect assistance. In 1998, with an outbreak of viral fever in Taiwan, the WHO responded by arranging for a team from its collaboration centres in the United States and in Japan to travel to Taiwan to evaluate the situation.

Á (1105)

In March 1998, the World Health Organization arranged for the chair of its regional anti-polio committee, Dr. Anthony Adams, to travel to Taipei after a local meeting he had chaired, and the World Health Organization paid his expenses--

Mr. Greg Thompson: On a point of order, Mr. Chair, I'm just wondering, is this a lecture, is this a filibuster...?

I think most of us understand the issue enough, and I don't think this is going to change any of the votes on this side of the room, if you will, so could we...? I mean, most of us do have a schedule. I'm here filling in for another member.

So as a courtesy, Mr. Chair, could you move this to the vote? Would it be unreasonable to suggest that?

Ms. Aileen Carroll: May I continue, Mr. Chair?

Á (1110)

The Chair: I just want to let the members know that this was brought up by some other committee this week to the Speaker of the House, and Ms. Carroll is allowed to continue.

You can keep going.

Ms. Aileen Carroll: Thank you.

Mr. Stockwell Day: On a point of order, I appreciate how you're handling this, but if it is a filibuster, if the member could know...we can contact our offices, order in lunch, and do things like that. We'd like to know, with respect, because if it is a filibuster, the whole of Canada, believe me, will be hearing about this in some pretty extreme terms, rather than what could very well be a wonderful, cooperative issue here.

So if the member could just let us know, out of respect, we can make some arrangements, such as food and other scheduling changes.

Ms. Aileen Carroll: I don't think, in an attempt, Mr. Chair, to provide information, which is what I am very seriously doing, to try to consider this motion, whether or not it really is out of a concern that the Taiwanese are not receiving information on health...from what is the political motivation of this motion, which is to assist in a worldwide campaign. That is what I'm trying to do.

So I think it's very relevant, and I don't think it falls under the word “filibuster” for me, as the Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, to share what the organization that this motion deals with has done in the past for the country that this motion deals with.

Mr. Stockwell Day: Ten minutes, ten hours...?

Ms. Aileen Carroll: If you would just wait, Mr. Day, I think the chair can help you out here. Exactly how one defines that definition from a rather long intervention is not a ruling I'm aware of.

The Chair: Ms. Carroll, you're entitled, and it's relevant to what you're saying, so I'll let you go for a while, but for the good of this committee, if you're going past noon, members would like to know.

Ms. Aileen Carroll: No, I won't go past noon.

The Chair: Okay, fine. Thank you. The floor is yours.

Ms. Aileen Carroll: I would hope, since I spent a lot of time doing my homework in preparation for this, that the same courtesy of listening would be applied.

Ms. Alexa McDonough: Mr. Chairman, on a point of order--

Ms. Aileen Carroll: The World Health Organization--

Ms. Alexa McDonough: --if there was important substantive information to be shared by the committee--

Ms. Aileen Carroll: This is very substantive.

Ms. Alexa McDonough: --it's fairly customary for that to be shared in advance of a meeting, where we know that this was on the agenda for the last ten minutes. So maybe for future purposes, the foreign affairs parliamentary secretary could share that information in advance.

The Chair: Fine. I've taken note of that, Ms. McDonough.

Ms. Carroll.

Ms. Aileen Carroll: In 1999 the World Health Organization made a financial contribution to the International Red Cross to provide medical assistance to the victims of the 9/21 earthquake. This would be of the same order of contribution and in the same degree of urgency as it would with any member states of the World Health Organization. That's very important. Taiwan received just as urgent and good a response there as any other members. So we need to keep this in mind when we're asking for what this motion is asking.

Following the 1999 earthquake, the World Health Organization also arranged for technical information and guidance on managing evacuation centres to be translated into Chinese and distributed to public health workers.

I would have thought you all would have known this in advance.

A health information network covering public health workers in Taiwan and their counterparts in Japan was established through the World Health Organization's collaboration centre in Japan.

Now, I think it's very important, because a lot of us have expressed concern about SARS, the atypical pneumonia outbreak. Indeed, the mover and also my colleague Mr. Cotler have mentioned that this is a particular concern. Be assured it is for us as well. Taiwan has received assistance from the United States Center for Disease Control, CDC. I mention that because they are one of the World Health Organization's collaboration centres.

So it is important to know what's being done for SARS, and it would be very vital, I assure you, Ms. McDonough, to me as with anyone else on this side of the House, if we did not think Taiwan was receiving exactly the help that others are. So I don't think it's fair for that to have been brought into the motion from this side of the table.

On March 16, 2003, the CDC dispatched two officials to Taiwan to assess the SARS cases. Information on Taiwan's reported cases of SARS has been included in the World Health Organization's website reports since March 18, 2003.

Taiwan has the information it needs to deal with the outbreak of SARS, through the CDC, which is a de facto link to the World Health Organization. Taiwan has the same information as others, including Canada, to deal with the SARS outbreak. The only difference for Taiwan is that information has been provided through the CDC, a WHO collaboration centre, and not directly through WHO. This has in no way affected Taiwan's ability to deal with this outbreak, nor has it adversely affected the health and safety of the Taiwanese.

Monsieur Président, I really would have hoped that Mr. Day would have stayed in the room for that....

Mr. Day, it would be nice if you would join us; we're dealing with your motion.

This is in no way what a filibuster does. Some filibusters go on and on about irrelevant information. This is exactly the information that the motion we are considering should consider very vital and that is very much flying against the intent of that motion.

So I'm simply amazed that you say, Ms. McDonough, I should have given you that information on SARS. I should think there would have been some onus on your people--your health critic, perhaps--to provide that information to you as the foreign affairs critic on this committee.

Within this context--I've covered SARS and all of the ability of Taiwan to access the health services provided by the World Health Organization--I think it's important to mention, as has been mentioned, the context of Canada's one-China policy, and, with the absence of diplomatic relations, we have the flexibility to develop and maintain strong cultural, economic, and people-to-people relations with Taiwan. These unofficial ties, which continue to grow, are well demonstrated by the activities of the Canadian business and cultural communities. Canadian companies continue to enjoy the benefits of our strong economic links with Taiwan. Canada's culture is also front and centre, with shows at exhibitions representing a cross-section of Canada's dynamic artistic communities.

Canada has always supported Taiwan's access to the many World Health Organization health protection and health promotion programs, available to it under current circumstances, and continues to encourage the Taiwanese authorities to avail themselves of the opportunities that already exist for cooperation within the WHO framework, thus ensuring shared knowledge, and access to health care information for all.

Á (1115)

So, Mr. Chair, I think it was very important that, for those on the committee who were listening, they could understand that this motion is moot. The motion has nothing to do with the ability of this country, with whom we have very strong ties, as I have explained, on every conceivable level; it has nothing to do with this country's ability to access the World Health Organization and all of its programs and services, because they are already in place.

I think it's very important that this go on record as well as the fact that the regulations that exist, that prevent Taiwan from being an observer or a member, are the regulations of the United Nations and the World Health Organization itself. So this committee, I guess, is rather like the British Parliament--namely, attempting to overturn rules that it has no power over.

Thank you.

The Chair: Merci, Ms. Carroll.

Mr. Martin.

Mr. Keith Martin: No, we can go to the vote.

The Chair: Okay.

Are we ready for the question? All right.

The motion reads:

Are we agreed...?

You'd like a recorded vote? Okay, you only need to ask. We'll do a recorded vote, no problem.

(Motion agreed to: yeas 10; nays 3)

The Chair: Ms. Carroll.

Á (1120)

Ms. Aileen Carroll: As a point of information, on the question of the budget, I think we've run out of time.

The Chair: No, the budget will take just 10 seconds, if you don't mind.

Ms. Aileen Carroll: But just to give it automatic.... I was hoping to get some assistance--

The Chair: No, I think we can get unanimous consent. It's just because of the fact that we're changing one country. It was accepted unanimously by this committee that we travel to New York, Paris, London, and Brussels, but we're skipping Brussels to go to Morocco instead, Casablanca. That's the only request. According to the clerk, we need to go back in because there's a change in the travelling itself. As to the amount, we're not asking for a cent more. It's within the budget that was already accepted by the subcommittee.

Monsieur Bergeron.

[Translation]

Mr. Stéphane Bergeron: Mr. Chairman, I understand that the amount is identical to what we had asked for. Would it be possible, within that envelope, to see whether or not we could find a way to increase the number of members who would be travelling, since the number has been set at 10, and from what the clerk tells me, that would be five Liberals, two Alliance members, one BQ, one NDP, and one Progressive Conservative? The clerk tells me that that is in keeping with party representation in the House of Commons, which is not quite accurate, since the BQ has twice as many members as both the NDP and the Conservatives put together.

If it might be possible to consider including one or two additional members within the same envelope, I can assure you that that would be very much appreciated, given the interest that some of us have shown, myself included, in diligently taking part in the work of this committee on the issue of Canada's relationship with the Muslim world.

The Chair: A motion has been approved by the House for travel by 10 members as well as staff. That is what is provided for in the motion. Let's say that we could look at the budget, but the idea is to not request additional funds. I think that would be important.

The resolution we have before us this morning calls for the committee to ask the budget subcommittee of the Liaison Committee for authorization to charge, if need be, official hospitality costs to the committee's operational budget, when the hospitality costs exceed the amount approved for that particular item.

[English]

Sometimes for the costs of hospitality we have to budget, and there is a budget, a $10,000 budget, at the committee's wishes. It's $5,000 right now. It's going to be about another $5,000 in September; it's just the fact that sometimes, if we have an expense, it could be used within the envelope of the $5,000. We come back all the time in front of the committee for acceptance. Nothing is spent without the authorization of the committee itself.

Are we agreed on this?

Some hon. members: Agreed.

The Chair: Are we agreed on the motion?

(Motion agreed to [See Minutes of Proceedings])

The Chair: Anything else?

[Translation]

Is that all? Thank you.

The meeting is adjourned.