FAIT Committee Meeting

Notices of Meeting include information about the subject matter to be examined by the committee and date, time and place of the meeting, as well as a list of any witnesses scheduled to appear. The Evidence is the edited and revised transcript of what is said before a committee. The Minutes of Proceedings are the official record of the business conducted by the committee at a sitting.

For an advanced search, use Publication Search tool.

If you have any questions or comments regarding the accessibility of this publication, please contact us at accessible@parl.gc.ca.

Previous day publication Next day publication

37th PARLIAMENT, 2nd SESSION

Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade

EVIDENCE

CONTENTS

Thursday, November 6, 2003

0905

The Chair (Mr. Bernard Patry (Pierrefonds—Dollard, Lib.))

Mr. William Sampson (As Individual)

The Chair

Mr. Stockwell Day (Okanagan—Coquihalla, Canadian Alliance)

0910

Mr. William Sampson

0915

The Chair

Mr. Stéphane Bergeron (Verchères—Les-Patriotes, BQ)

0920

The Chair

Mr. William Sampson

The Chair

Mr. William Sampson

Mr. Art Eggleton (York Centre, Lib.)

0925

Mr. William Sampson

The Chair

Ms. Alexa McDonough (Halifax, NDP)

Mr. Greg Thompson (New Brunswick Southwest, PC)

The Chair

Ms. Alexa McDonough

0930

Mr. Greg Thompson

Mr. William Sampson

0935

The Chair

Ms. Aileen Carroll (Barrie—Simcoe—Bradford, Lib.)

Mr. William Sampson

0940

Mr. William Sampson

Ms. Aileen Carroll

Mr. William Sampson

The Chair

Ms. Alexa McDonough

0945

Mr. William Sampson

Ms. Alexa McDonough

Mr. James Sampson (As Individual)

The Chair

Mr. John Harvard (Charleswood—St. James—Assiniboia, Lib.)

Mr. William Sampson

0950

Mr. John Harvard

Mr. William Sampson

Mr. John Harvard

Mr. William Sampson

Mr. John Harvard

Mr. William Sampson

Mr. John Harvard

Mr. William Sampson

Mr. John Harvard

The Chair

Mr. William Sampson

The Chair

Mr. Deepak Obhrai (Calgary East, Canadian Alliance)

Mr. William Sampson

0955

The Chair

Mrs. Karen Redman (Kitchener Centre, Lib.)

Mr. William Sampson

The Chair

Mr. Dan McTeague (Pickering—Ajax—Uxbridge, Lib.)

Mr. William Sampson

1000

The Chair

Ms. Francine Lalonde (Mercier, BQ)

The Chair

Mr. Keith Martin (Esquimalt—Juan de Fuca, Canadian Alliance)

The Chair

Mr. Irwin Cotler (Mount Royal, Lib.)

The Chair

Mr. William Sampson

Mr. Irwin Cotler

Mr. James Sampson

Mr. William Sampson

Mr. Irwin Cotler

Mr. William Sampson

The Chair

Mr. William Sampson

1005

Mr. Irwin Cotler

The Chair

Mr. Mark Eyking (Sydney—Victoria, Lib.)

The Chair

1020

Mr. Art Eggleton

1025

The Chair

Mr. Keith Martin

The Chair

Mr. André Harvey (Chicoutimi—Le Fjord, Lib.)

The Chair

Ms. Francine Lalonde

1030

Ms. Diane Marleau (Sudbury, Lib.)

Ms. Francine Lalonde

The Chair

Ms. Francine Lalonde

The Chair

Mr. André Harvey

The Chair

Mr. Art Eggleton

The Chair

1035

Mr. Art Eggleton

The Chair

Mr. Irwin Cotler

The Chair

Mr. Keith Martin

The Chair

Mr. Irwin Cotler

The Chair

Ms. Francine Lalonde

The Chair

Ms. Francine Lalonde

The Chair

Mr. Art Eggleton

The Chair

The Clerk of the Committee

The Chair

Mr. Art Eggleton

The Chair

Mr. Art Eggleton

The Chair

Mr. Irwin Cotler

1040

The Chair

Ms. Aileen Carroll

Mr. Art Eggleton

Ms. Aileen Carroll

Mr. Irwin Cotler

Ms. Francine Lalonde

The Chair

Ms. Francine Lalonde

Le président

Ms. Aileen Carroll

The Chair

Ms. Francine Lalonde

Mr. Irwin Cotler

Ms. Aileen Carroll

Ms. Francine Lalonde

Ms. Aileen Carroll

The Chair

Ms. Francine Lalonde

Mr. Keith Martin

The Chair

Ms. Aileen Carroll

1045

The Chair

Mr. Murray Calder (Dufferin—Peel—Wellington—Grey, Lib.)

The Chair

Mr. Irwin Cotler

The Chair

Ms. Francine Lalonde

The Chair

Mr. Irwin Cotler

The Chair

Mr. Irwin Cotler

The Chair

Ms. Francine Lalonde

The Chair

Ms. Aileen Carroll

1050

Ms. Aileen Carroll

The Chair

Ms. Aileen Carroll

The Chair

Ms. Francine Lalonde

Ms. Aileen Carroll

The Chair

Ms. Francine Lalonde

The Chair

Mr. Keith Martin

1055

The Chair

Ms. Aileen Carroll

1100

The Chair

Mr. Keith Martin

The Chair

Mr. Art Eggleton

The Chair

Mr. Keith Martin

The Chair

Mr. Keith Martin

The Chair

CANADA

Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade

NUMBER 057

2nd SESSION

37th PARLIAMENT

EVIDENCE

Thursday, November 6, 2003

[Recorded by Electronic Apparatus]

¿ (0905)

[English]

The Chair (Mr. Bernard Patry (Pierrefonds—Dollard, Lib.)): I call the meeting to order, please.

Pursuant to Standing Order 108(2), we are considering cases involving the detention of Canadian citizens in certain foreign countries.

As a witness this morning, as an individual, we have Mr. William Sampson. Mr. James Sampson is here with him.

Mr. Sampson, welcome to our Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade. I know you have introductory notes. The floor is yours.

Mr. William Sampson (As Individual): Good morning, ladies and gentlemen.

As I've already been introduced, my name is Dr. William Sampson.

I've just spent the last two years and seven months or so in a Saudi Arabian prison. I was arrested on December 17, 2000, tortured, forced to confess to crimes I didn't commit, and sentenced to death. During those two long years I engaged in a series of activities, which were variously reported and variously misrepresented, that were effectively a protest at the conditions under which I was being held.

Whilst I was in prison, my case was being handled by the Department of Foreign Affairs here in Canada and by the embassy officials who are members of the Department of Foreign Affairs in Riyadh. Throughout my incarceration I considered that the activities of the embassy officials at the Riyadh embassy fell well short of anything that could be considered supportive. Their behaviour and treatment of my family, of my father in particular when he visited Saudi Arabia, was thoroughly inadequate. Certainly the handling by the Department of Foreign Affairs officials here in Canada of my family during this rather difficult situation for us was again less than adequate.

To give an example of this, it would appear that the Department of Foreign Affairs operated from the earliest stages as if I were guilty, long before I even had a trial, a trial that turned out to be nothing more than a farce, a trial at which I was brought before three judges without representation, without witnesses to the event other than those provided by the Saudi Arabian government. Even before that, I had received indications from the embassy officials that they considered me to be guilty, and my father in March 2000 had an embassy official in Riyadh actually state to him that they considered my situation to be very similar to that of the Hell's Angels in Montreal who themselves had been involved in turf wars.

To have members of the Canadian embassy making statements like that at those times was contrary to my best interests and contrary, certainly, to the best interests of my family. Subsequent to those statements my father asked for clarification on these points and received the most cursory and off-hand comments that one could imagine from Department of Foreign Affairs officials such as Gar Pardy.

I do not feel that throughout my long incarceration I was at all supported by the Department of Foreign Affairs. Certainly by the time of December 2001, I had come to believe that my best interests were served by withdrawing all cooperation from the Canadian government as well as from the Saudi Arabian government, as I already had done. As a result, I maintained a complete dirty protest, medical strike, and refusal to accept visitors, visitations, or assistance from anyone, either from the Canadian government, the Saudi Arabian government, or even the lawyers that had been foisted upon me by embassy officials. I was fighting alone in solitary confinement because of the behaviour of your officials.

Throughout that period, though, the one thing that has always surprised me but has also made me feel extremely humble and extremely grateful has been that the Canadian people in general have supported me, believed in my innocence, and behaved in a manner toward my family and taken an attitude toward my case that was wholly supportive and, as I said, very humbling.

It took two backbench MPs, Mr. McTeague and Mr. Bergeron, to actually continue to press my case in the House of Commons more effectively than any senior member of government or any senior member of the Department of Foreign Affairs.

That again is inexcusable and inexorable.

I'd like to close my statement by saying once again that I am thankful to the people of Canada for their support. I am thankful to those people who did come out—among some officials, among some members of Parliament—who supported me while I was in prison.

But I do believe that a public inquiry into the behaviour of the Canadian government officials, both here in Ottawa and at the embassy in Riyadh, is essential, given their performance during my incarceration.

If you have any questions....

The Chair: Thank you very much, Mr. Sampson.

We're going to proceed with questions and answers. They are going to be five-minute rounds, and we'll start with the opposition.

Mr. Day.

Mr. Stockwell Day (Okanagan—Coquihalla, Canadian Alliance): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Sampson, to you and to your father, who is also here today, you've already talked about the Canadian people, and I can tell you that those of us here and I think those of us across the country have no idea—we cannot even imagine—what this has been like for you these last two years and seven months, as you've indicated.

The ordeal obviously is not over. I know you still suffer physically. Our thoughts are with your dad today, because he was just sharing with me some of the physical pain he's dealing with today. This is a great effort on your part that you're here.

I'd like to tell you that I was just in Saudi Arabia with two of my colleagues. You had told me before we left that when we got there we would face denial across the board, at best. I need to tell you that is in fact what we found.

Depending on which officials or which individuals we talked to, there was expression of ignorance of the whole affair, from some officials who said they didn't know what we were talking about to others who abruptly said, “If he has a problem, he can take it up with our government”. Unfortunately, your worst fears and your predictions were true in terms of the reaction we would get.

We need to know from you what advice you have for us now. What can we do to further the concerns that weigh on your heart, and what advice would you have for the government in cases like this?

I want to assure you that though it would be no small consolation to you, your case is working like a lever in terms of an indictment on another regime, Saudi Arabia, but also on our own here, much like a similar case, the Kazemi case—you're familiar with it—which has literally broken things open in Iran in terms of the pressure it's applying.

If it's of any consolation to you in terms of what you've been through, it has not been in vain. Your pain and literally your torture is going to serve to somehow protect the lives of other Canadians and maybe even more of that in these regimes.

Can you give us some advice? What can we do? What should we do as people, and what should our government be doing from here for you specifically and for the future of other Canadians and other people in this condition?

¿ (0910)

Mr. William Sampson: Well, firstly, the thing I can say on that score is that various political parties in the country should better discipline their own constituency MPs so that they're a damn sight more supportive of the members of their own constituencies.

Your own party, the Alliance, happens to be the party that has an MP from my father's constituency. That individual provided not one ounce of support to my father or my family during this entire time.

The first thing that I would recommend is for the political parties of Canada to get their own houses in order with regard to these issues, and to raise the awareness of human rights issues among their own MPs before they start telling the government how to conduct themselves.

Secondly, I've heard a lot throughout the media of the soft power argument. As Teddy Roosevelt once said, “walk softly and carry a big stick”. Well, as I have pointed out previously, you either have to have a big stick or you have to be willing to use it, if you do have one. I'm not convinced that the soft power argument has worked in my case or has worked in any of the other cases.

In reality, events overtook my situation. There were major terrorist bombings in Saudi Arabia, which caused the Saudi Arabians sufficient embarrassment and forced them to admit to an internal terrorist problem, which ultimately allowed us to be released. Had those incidents not occurred, I doubt whether I would be free now. My freedom has been actually bought by the fact that the Saudi Arabians chose, for two and a half years, to ignore their own internal political problems, which resulted in the deaths of a number of other people.

If the Canadian government would effect an earlier release for myself or for anyone else in a situation such as this, they would have to be prepared to more publicly declaim the governments concerned. I am relatively certain that the Canadian government would have done that had I been incarcerated in a place such as Burundi, or somewhere of lesser political importance than Saudi Arabia. But because of the political clout that Saudi Arabia supposedly has, people were actually hiding behind the soft power argument to do nothing.

If the Canadian government is going to be effective in these cases, then it must, at various stages, consider attempting to block membership to international organizations; question the membership of certain countries in international organizations such as the World Trade Organization, such as accession to the membership of things such as the World Bank; question the right of countries such as Saudi Arabia to be signatories to the United Nations Charter on Human Rights; and consider putting extreme pressure on organizations to restrict their membership, until such time as they demonstrate transparency in their justice system. I've seen none of those things, but those are the types of things that are essential.

I'm not the only person who was in prison in Saudi Arabia. There was a total of ten of us arrested and falsely accused of these bombings: Ron Jones, from Britain, was arrested in the summer of 2001, along with another Canadian—both were released after 67 days; James Lee; James Cottle; Peter Brandon; Glen Ballard, who's married to a Canadian citizen; myself; Sandy Mitchell; and Raf Schyvens.

Eight of us were tortured. Eight of us were held for crimes that we didn't commit. Each one of us needs some form of redress. Each one of us needs to know that in the future, governments are going to take a much stronger line on this type of illegal incarceration, this illegal use of force by nation-states against citizens of another nation-state or even against their own.

When I left Saudi Arabia, I can promise you that there were hundreds of political prisoners in Saudi Arabia, who will be going through exactly the same thing I went through. There will be hundreds of foreign nationals arrested in Saudi Arabia, whose governments are not as strong as those in the west, and whose governments do not have the influence that countries like Britain, the United States, Canada, France, and Germany might have. They have no representation. They have gone missing. They are being subjected to the same things I was.

¿ (0915)

The only way for them to receive any justice is for countries such as Canada to change their tack on the soft power argument and actually try to bring about some form of pressure that will result in a greater transparency in the Saudi legal system, not just to protect citizens such as myself, but for others in that society and in that country who are falsely accused and wrongly convicted.

The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Sampson.

We will pass to Monsieur Bergeron, s'il vous plaît.

[Translation]

Mr. Stéphane Bergeron (Verchères—Les-Patriotes, BQ): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[English]

If you allow me, I will ask my question in French.

[Translation]

One of the first and most important problems I had to deal with when I started to get involved in this issue—and I raised this with the minister on Tuesday morning when he appeared before this committee concerning Canadians detained abroad—was that we had to comply with the legal rules in force in the countries where these Canadians were being held. I do think that under international law that this approach is legitimate.

However, when we are dealing with an obvious denial of justice, when our citizens are subjected to torture, when confessions are given under torture, when they are subjected to a mock trial completely lacking in credibility, when they are sentenced as a result of such a trial, how we can really tell our citizens in detention that we have to comply with the existing legal framework? How can we go along with those rules ourselves? How can we ask our consular officials to work within the existing legal framework?

I asked the minister that question. Obviously, given that we did not have much time and this issue is tremendously complex, his answer was completely unsatisfactory. I hope that the minister will answer me in writing, as he promised to, so that we obtain a more satisfactory answer than the one we had on Tuesday morning.

Perhaps you have something to tell us or some insight to give us about the situation of people, like you, who have been denied justice by a system that we were told that we had to comply with.

I would now like to ask two questions. Mr. Day spoke a little earlier of the physical ailments that you are suffering from after those months or even years of physical abuse. What is your state of health at present? Do you still have to undergo operations? If so, what types of operations? Who is paying for this surgery? What support are you getting from the Canadian government for this?

Here is my last question. On Tuesday morning, someone from the minister's office told me that the Canadian government paid for your travel to Canada to be here today. Is that so?

¿ (0920)

The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Bergeron. Mr. Sampson.

[English]

Mr. William Sampson: I will answer the second question, on my airfare: no. My father paid for my airfare; the Canadian government didn't. The gentleman who paid the cheque is right there. If you want to ask him how he paid for it, you may do so.

The Chair: That's okay.

Mr. William Sampson: As for the second question, I've recently come out of heart surgery, and that has been successful. That's now the fourth procedure I've had to have on my cardiovascular system since I collapsed whilst being tortured.

I am undergoing dental work and have had to have caps and crowns put on one side of my face from where teeth had been broken during an interrogation session. I've also lost a tooth down that side, which was too badly smashed. They just took it out of my mouth in Saudi Arabia. I unfortunately still have dental reconstruction that needs to be done on one side of my face, and it hasn't been completed yet.

I have undergone tests for ears, nose, and throat, dermatology, ophthalmology, proctology, and rheumatology so far. All of those have shown minor problems that have cleared up—in the case of dermatology, with an antibiotic and some skin creams. Basically two years of a dirty protest didn't exactly do my skin condition too much good.

I still have some orthopedic problems, in that I require an orthopedic investigation of my right ankle, followed by an MRI scan, and followed by arthroscopy.

I'm undergoing trauma counselling with a psychologist in London, who has basically requested that I see him for about three to four more visits, primarily for him to keep an eye on me to see that I don't slip into some form of post-traumatic stress disorder.

Initially this treatment was started as a result of an offer made by the Canadian government through the Canadian High Commission in London. They made an open-ended commitment to meet both my medical and my dental costs. However, in October of this year, as I began to undergo my medical treatment, it was assumed that this open-ended commitment pertained only to short-term treatment of problems arising from my incarceration, for which my doctor, Peter Mills, who is my cardiologist, embarked on a program of putting me before all the specialists necessary to treat me.

Two days before I had my cardiological procedure to open up a blocked stent that was causing me angina, I received a letter from the Canadian High Commission withdrawing financial support for my medical treatment. This was followed up by queries by my doctor to the Canadian High Commission, subsequent to my cardiovascular operation, and was met again by a letter delivered to me on the 27th of October of this year that stated categorically that all support for medical and dental costs was being withdrawn as of the 28th of this month.

Having offered open-endedly to pay for my medical costs and allowed a series of medical professionals to make judgments as to what my short-term—not my long-term, but my short-term—medical needs were, the Department of Foreign Affairs somewhere along the line has decided they can arbitrarily suborn the opinions of medical professionals they allowed to enter into commitments on for me. I'd like to know why the Department of Foreign Affairs made that commitment in the first place and why it is arbitrarily withdrawing it without adequate consultation with the medical professionals who are actually helping me.

Mr. Art Eggleton (York Centre, Lib.): Mr. Chairman, I would hope we would take up that question with the department and make representation to have any costs, short-term or long-term, that rise out of the treatment he received in Saudi Arabia restored and paid for.

Mr. Sampson, the minister and his officials have said to us they were making representation on your behalf, that they did care about your case. One official said at one point, in response I think to your initial comments that not enough was being done, that if they had pushed too hard, it might have backfired; that it might have resulted in your demise; that it was difficult to ascertain when to push hard and when not to push hard when dealing with the kind of regime they were dealing with in Saudi Arabia.

For the early stages I think you were quite clear in your comments here today about the kind of treatment you got from officials, and the kind of treatment your father got from officials. I wonder in the latter stage, as they became more engaged with it—and as the minister said, they were making representations—whether it becomes a question that they weren't doing their best for you or that you just had a difference of opinion about the strategy for going about doing it.

Certainly from your perspective, when you're under these circumstances, imprisoned and being tortured and under death sentence, nobody can do anything fast enough to help. One can really understand that. But I wonder, particularly in the latter stage as the minister became more engaged, whether it is a question that still the Canadian government wasn't doing enough for you or a difference of opinion about what was the correct strategy.

¿ (0925)

Mr. William Sampson: At the latter stages, you have to remember that I was in solitary confinement, without access to the media or even being allowed—even if I had decided to speak to the embassy—to actually discuss what was being done for me.

In the early stages, as I will point out, on more than one occasion it was indicated to me by embassy officials that I was guilty. If that's what you consider to be actions on my behalf, on which we have differences of opinion, I find it a bit strange. The fact of the matter is, at the initial stages when they needed to be at their most supportive, they weren't. They weren't supportive of me; they weren't supportive of my family. It was at those stages, at the very outset of the case, that the pressure needed to be started by the Canadian government, and it wasn't.

Pressure at the later stages...? The regime in question believes it has already gotten away with it, so pressure in the later stages is coming too late. All options should have been investigated at the very earliest stages; they weren't. It was obvious to me, from the way I was being treated during my interviews by members of the Canadian embassy.

By December of 2001, I withdrew all cooperation with the Canadian embassy. I wanted nothing to do with those officials, under any circumstances. In a situation such as this, if you push too hard, will a citizen be killed? The answer to that is quite possibly that would happen in the case of certain regimes that are quite happy to act totally and utterly illegitimately. That is always a risk you run. But by not acting forcefully enough, you guarantee that they believe they can get away with it anyway.

I was sentenced to death, gentlemen. I did believe I was going to be executed. I fought alone on the point that I wasn't coming out of there alive, and it was certainly indicated to me on more than one occasion that I wasn't coming out of there alive. For the Canadian government to have pushed harder would not have put me at any more risk than I already faced.

The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Sampson.

Now we'll go to Ms. McDonough.

Ms. Alexa McDonough (Halifax, NDP): Thank you very much.

Mr. Greg Thompson (New Brunswick Southwest, PC): Excuse me, Mr. Chairman. On a point of order, I believe that because of our ranking in the House of Commons, the Progressive Conservative member will be next.

The Chair: No, the rule here goes according to the way you're sitting, and you didn't give your name, Mr. Thompson, to the clerk. At this time I was going to go to Mrs. McDonough. He has your name, but after Mrs. McDonough. That's the way we proceed here. But you're going to get a chance. There's no problem; you're going to be able to speak. If Mrs. McDonough wants you to speak first, it doesn't matter.

Ms. Alexa McDonough: Mr. Chairman, I think the gravity of the issue we're dealing with is such that it is pathetic for us to be fretting about who speaks first.

Actually, there is very often not a Tory member here when the questioning takes place, but please go ahead. I'd be happy to wait my turn.

¿ (0930)

Mr. Greg Thompson: Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Mr. Casey would normally be here, Mr. Sampson, and I'm filling in for Mr. Casey.

I'm intrigued by this idea of soft diplomacy or soft power being exercised by the Government of Canada in its commitment to getting you released. Complicit in all this is the sense that they never really felt you were innocent. In other words, there was a sort of reluctance on their part to move vigorously in your case, because there was an underlying feeling that you were in fact guilty, that they didn't really believe in your innocence.

Along with this, I want you to comment, Mr. Sampson, on the obvious connection between your case and the Maher Arar case, where information is obviously being shopped around and exchanged by the Government of Canada with Syrian officials and others, in terms of the questioning and interrogation of Maher Arar, in an attempt to get information on you. Is there any evidence that is happening?

I do want you to focus on that sense of the lack of commitment to you on the part of the Government of Canada, in terms of your innocence.

Mr. William Sampson: First, I consider it substantially inappropriate for me to pass any comments on the Arar case. I've only been out of prison for three months. I've had enough to deal with on my situation. And whilst just prior to the Arar case reaching a resolution I was actually asked if I would become involved to help his case—which I would have done—my actual knowledge of what has been going on in that case is sufficiently limited that I'm not qualified to pass any answers or any comments on it at this moment.

Now with regard to my case, regardless of my guilt or innocence in the situation, I was held without counsel, without representation, for six weeks prior to my seeing a Canadian official. During those six weeks I was tortured into false confessions. After seeing Canadian officials, under threat of return to torture I made videos of my confessions. Subsequently, they required changes to my confessions and I was tortured again for another period, which resulted in my heart attack. During those periods I was kept incommunicado from the Canadian embassy--not that I was allowed to talk about what was happening to me, nor was the Canadian embassy allowed to talk about these things.

During that entire period there should have been a damned sight more pressure on the government for me to have counsel and for the government to be allowed—and it is, under various treaties to which I believe Saudi Arabia is a signatory—to have private access to me, which it never did at any stage, private and unrecorded access. I do know from one or two of the other detainees that when they finally did get lawyers, their supposedly privileged conversations were being monitored by the Ministry of Interior and they were subsequently confronted by their interrogators—who also happened to be their prosecutors--immediately after the discussions with their lawyers to try to force them to take back the private statements they made with their lawyers.

All through this stage, either the Canadian government was restricted in what it was allowed to talk to me about...and it did not, certainly in my presence, buck this, which it should have done, if for no other reason than to indicate it was providing me with some moral support, regardless of my guilt or innocence. Instead, what it seemed to be quite happy doing was allowing the Saudi Arabian process, which was in violation of various treaties the Saudi Arabians themselves had signed, which therefore made them prosecutable under international law. Yet the Canadians did not, certainly in my presence, protest--they did not publicly protest about it, nor did they indicate even to my family that they were protesting about that treatment.

As a potential detainee being questioned on a series of crimes, I was denied the most basic of human rights--the right to counsel. I was denied the most basic of human rights--to meet with representatives of my country. And that was never publicly raised in the manner that it should have been from the start. The fact of the matter was I was also innocent and I was being tortured into confessing to crimes I did not do.

Further to this was the fact that the Canadian embassy or the Canadian government I am sure was fully aware at the time of what the original confessions were, because at no point did I ever confess to being a bootlegger involved in a turf war. I was tortured to confess to being a British spy, along with Alexander Mitchell and Raf Schyvens, and that we were operating under the instruction of the British government.

There was, as a result of this, an incident during our time in prison where the British embassy was confronted with the initial confessions that the Saudi Arabian government had extracted from us by brutality, and two British diplomats were actually recalled for investigation in the United Kingdom over the matter, because under such allegations, the pro forma nature of such a thing would require an investigation. They were obviously cleared, and so should we be.

It was only after the fact that the Saudi Arabians realized they could not utilize the confessions of our being spies for the British government as a lever against the British government or any of the western governments involved that they began to concoct the bootlegger turf war theory, which seems to have been quite happily swallowed by a number of Canadian officials.

¿ (0935)

All one has to do is take a look at the confessions that were broadcast on Saudi Arabian television, which I have now watched repeatedly, and one sees the statement of Prince Naif at the end of those, in which he described us as operating and having received our materials and equipment from countries of the same nationality as the detainees', indicating that a foreign government was actually involved in trying to destabilize his country—which is ludicrous, and certainly so for a foreign western government.

The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Sampson.

We'll now go to Ms. Carroll.

Ms. Aileen Carroll (Barrie—Simcoe—Bradford, Lib.): Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Thank you, Mr. Sampson.

I, like the rest of us, cannot even contemplate the horrors of what you went through. All we can do is listen carefully and try to get a sense of them, not only from your testimony today, but also of course from the interviews you have done prior to this.

However, there are a few points I would like to make. First of all, Mr. Sampson, the term “soft power” is not a term that the Government of Canada nor the Department of Foreign Affairs utilizes. It is indeed a term that has been brought into the House during question period and utilized by opposition parties. The word we use is “diplomacy”. We use neither soft nor hard diplomacy, but diplomacy in every conceivable aspect.

My sense is—and I think the position I hold is one where I have some access to that kind of information—that every conceivable effort in every possible diplomatic venue was employed to try to obtain your release. We did so in conjunction with the United Kingdom government. We did so in many different bilateral venues, working wherever we could.

I am dismayed to hear your very negative judgment. My sense, indeed, was that your father was cared for in a very open way, in a way that was attempting to provide support. I would say that Mr. Gar Pardy and others did not work, Mr. Sampson, on a presumption of guilt, and I would assure you that the Department of Foreign Affairs works always on a presumption of innocence, as does the Government of Canada.

I would also add that while I was in Saudi Arabia recently, as has been mentioned, I happened to observe the place in Riyadh where people are executed. At that time, my thought instantly was of what was out in front of you—and that, Mr. Sampson, was exactly the grave concern of the government and the department, that it was a real possibility, and that every effort was being made to prevent that from happening. However much the horrors you have described are inconceivable to us, you are here with us today, and that incredible consequence did not occur.

You said as well that you were unaware of what was being done on your behalf by the department and the government because you were in solitary confinement. Yet you go on to conclude very negatively about what was being done and what was not being done.

I would also ask, do you you judge as harshly the Government of the United Kingdom, which worked with us as well in the efforts that were made to obtain your and British colleagues' release?

Mr. William Sampson: Personally, I know a great deal about the efforts that have been made on my behalf by the Department of Foreign Affairs here.

I hate to contradict you, but I'm going to.

Point one. Your embassy officials stated on numerous occasions while I was in Saudi Arabia, while I was in prison, that I was guilty. If you were operating on the presumption of my innocence, why was it that members of your embassy in Riyadh were contradicting that? They contradicted that to my father when he was there, and they made it known to me that they considered, I think one of the quotes was, “As you are guilty...”. That was a statement made to me by one of your officials. Another such statement made by one of your officials was “Considering what you have done, you must cooperate fully with the authorities.”

Since I have come out of prison, I have found out the statements that had been made by your officials to my family, which completely and utterly contradict your claims that you and your department were at all supportive of my family during my incarceration. The fact of the matter is that one of your operatives in the embassy put forward a statement to my father indicating my guilt. When my father asked your department—in the form of Mr. Gar Pardy—for a comment, he was given nothing but flannel.

An hon. member: Nothing but what?

¿ (0940)

Mr. William Sampson: Flannel--nonsense.

To therefore say that your department was wholeheartedly supportive of me throughout this is quite frankly nonsense. You may well have been, once you realized the full seriousness of this, but by that stage I had been in prison for a year, and by that stage I was already sentenced to death.

Ms. Aileen Carroll: Mr. Sampson—

Mr. William Sampson: During that period of time, members who were being dealt with by the British embassy were certainly receiving every indication from their embassy representatives that their government considered them to be innocent, whilst at the same time I am being told by my own representative at the embassy that I am guilty.

The Chair: Ms. Carroll, your time is over.

We'll go to Ms. McDonough.

Ms. Alexa McDonough: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Sampson, not one of us can even begin to fathom your ordeal of 31 months of imprisonment under the conditions you have described. I suppose we can only try very hard to imagine the amount of trauma, and the amount of healing—

¿ (0945)

Mr. William Sampson: It was a bit worse than summer camp, yes.

Ms. Alexa McDonough: —physically, mentally, and emotionally that you must now go through.

I would like to go to the issue of soft power again. Not to repeat what several others have said, it is indeed a major issue that all parliamentarians struggle with--particularly on the opposition side, but to be fair, I think, on the government side as well—to try to figure out what is a winning strategy under those terrible, terrible conditions.

I think none of us are here to try to argue with you at all. I think that's not a proper way for us to receive you or for us to use this opportunity to hear your story and learn from it. But without imposing on your father, Mr. James Sampson, I wonder if I might raise this question. When opposition members in such situations are trying to find strategies to put pressure on the government, hoping in turn that the government will do what will work, there are very often the threats—and not very subtle either—that you may cause this person's death, or you may cause this person to be tortured even worse than they are, or you may cause other prisoners to be harmed by our aggressivity in pushing for publicity and pressure, and so on.

I guess one of the things that has always been a great puzzle and frustration to me is, if indeed the government has a soft diplomacy strategy, why would they not at the very least bring other parliamentarians, if necessary, on a confidential basis, in on what is happening and what the strategy is? And more importantly—and this is where I turn to Mr. Sampson Senior—why would they not bring the family very much in, on a confidential basis, on what the strategy is and how family members, friends, members of civil society, and parliamentarians can in fact work in unison to be effective in getting the best possible outcome?

Mr. Sampson Sr., I wonder if I could ask you, sir, to comment on that from the point of view of your experience, and any advice you would have to all of us in that regard.

Mr. James Sampson (As Individual): Well, I would think if the government wanted to impress anybody who is in my position, they'd treat him with a little more courtesy than the way I was treated.

I came down from Vancouver, stayed in Ottawa two nights in the hotel, and went to the Department of Foreign Affairs, where I met Mr. Gar Pardy, who was more interested in telling me about his heroic efforts to find a French aircraft that was shot down during the war in Vietnam. He then brought two young men to see me. They were quite young, and they had difficulty containing their giggles when they were introduced to me as being quite important people, aides to John Manley or somebody. Then he took me out to lunch and tried to ply me with drink. He didn't try to reassure me in any way: “Oh, we're doing a lot”. What the lot was, I don't know.

When I did ask Gar Pardy a serious question, which was why did Jean Gobeil say to me that it was like the Hell's Angels in Montreal, that they were fighting for their turf, he ignored my questions. And when I sent him an e-mail, all he did was send me back a reply: “James: some things require a reply; others, based on misunderstood and misrepresented comments, do not.” Well, it wasn't a misunderstood or misrepresented comment. That's the way I was treated.

Ms. Carroll said the government helped me. I'd like to know when they helped me, what they did for me. I went out to Saudi Arabia. They had booked a hotel for me, for which I paid. I paid my own fares. I supported myself out there all the time I was there. Toward the end of Bill's imprisonment, I was going out again. I had heard that the British embassy had helped the families that went out there, so I phoned the British embassy and asked if they could provide accommodation. They said yes, of course. The Canadian embassy couldn't. One of their employees had offered to find accommodation for me in the embassy quarters on my first trip out there, but just before I left I was informed it wasn't available.

The Canadian government didn't do anything for me.

The Chair: Sorry, Ms. McDonough, your time is up.

We'll go to Mr. Harvard.

Mr. John Harvard (Charleswood—St. James—Assiniboia, Lib.): Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Thank you, Mr. Sampson, for coming today and sharing your experiences with us. Nothing that we say here today will in any way assuage the pain you endured during your ordeal. But I would like to treat your appearance as a learning exercise, and my questions will be to that end.

I guess what I want to know from you, Mr. Sampson, is how you reach certain objectives. That is, how does the government, in pursuing your release, in providing you any kind of assistance, providing you with a lawyer...the question is how do you do it when you're confined to a prison, when you're in solitary confinement?

You say things like the government should have pushed harder, the government should have been more supportive. I think at one time you drew a distinction between the Brits and us, saying that the Brits were more inclined to use the big stick.

So help me. Walk me through it. You know what you went through. Put yourself in Bill Graham's position, or as the head of mission in Riyadh. What could they have done that they didn't do, in your opinion? Just walk me through that. For example, on the question of the lawyer, what could they have done to get you a lawyer much sooner than it happened?

Mr. William Sampson: They should have been pushing very loudly and very publicly about the fact that the Saudi Arabian government was denying me my human rights. From the very start they should have been pointing out the hypocrisy and deceitfulness of the Saudi Arabian government, which is party to a series of international treaties that guarantee private access by a foreign government to their citizens who are incarcerated. They did not do that publicly. They never did that publicly. They should have been doing that publicly.

¿ (0950)

Mr. John Harvard: In other words, you're saying that in situations like this what our government should be doing is taking your case to the court of public opinion.

Mr. William Sampson: They should be making these things known in whatever forum will bring pressure upon the government concerned, whether that be on the floor of the United Nations, whether that be at a WTO meeting, be that wherever it happens to be.

Mr. John Harvard: Is that the big stick, or does—

Mr. William Sampson: That is part of it. Countries such as Saudi Arabia do not like the spotlight being turned on them in that way.

And whilst you might run a risk of aggravating them, before you even managed to aggravate them I was sentenced to death, Madam, and awaiting my death, and had been awaiting my death for more than two years. So your bringing things out hard and publicly would not have exacerbated my situation in the least.

Mr. John Harvard: What did the Brits do that we didn't do? What did the Brits do better than what we did?

Mr. William Sampson: They got us out.

Mr. John Harvard: How? What did they do?

Mr. William Sampson: They utilized economic pressure; that was one thing.

Mr. John Harvard: Give me an example. What is that economic pressure? Did they cancel a contract? I just want to know.

Voices: Oh, oh!

The Chair: Let the witness answer, Mr. Harvard.

Mr. William Sampson: They used a combination of political influence, of which they have more than Canada with the Saudi Arabians; they used their economic position in Saudi Arabia more effectively; added to which, it is well understood that in certain incidents the British government dealt—not necessarily publicly, but behind the scenes—with the Saudi Arabians in a much more forceful manner over this.

Certainly the conduct of their embassy officials in treating their prisoners in prison was substantially better and substantially superior to any treatment I received at the hands of Canadian embassy officials whilst I was in prison in Saudi Arabia, which was one of the reasons why I withdrew all support and all cooperation from the Canadian government and went on strike on my own and fought my own battle alone.

I did that because of the behaviour of the Canadian embassy officials. I did it because the Canadian embassy officials constantly reiterated their belief in my guilt, and I realized I had a greater problem in dealing with the Canadian government than I actually did with the Saudi Arabians. My way was clear with them: they had sentenced me to death and were going to make a show out of me. They were going to turn me into a dog and pony show for their own political purposes, and they might well have executed me.

Instead of seeing that I had support, what I saw was embassy officials who were quite happily cooperating in this. That was contrary to the behaviour of the British embassy officials in their treatment of the British prisoners, which was a damn sight better for their morale. They didn't have to fight alone.

The Chair: We'll go to Mr. Obhrai, without any preamble, please.

Mr. Deepak Obhrai (Calgary East, Canadian Alliance): Thank you for coming.

Mr. Chair, and to the members of the government and to everybody here, we now have had four serious cases here: the Kazemi case, yesterday Mr. Arar's case, Mr. Balfour's case, and Mr. William Sampson's case, pointing to very serious problems with the way Canada has been handling the subject of our inquiry, which is Canadian citizens in detention in foreign countries.

What we hear from Mr. Sampson here is really a cause of serious concern, and I hope the committee will work very hard to ensure that the government is held accountable when our citizens' rights come into play.

What I would like to ask Mr. Sampson is this. We have 9,000 Canadians living in Saudi Arabia and we have people going into and coming out of Saudi Arabia. You have very much illustrated the non-transparency of the judicial system there. I would like to ask you, from your experience, what would you say, when there are so many Canadians out there, to our department, to our government, and to us in the committee, so that what happened to you never happens to any other Canadian?

Mr. William Sampson: You cannot guarantee that what happened to me will not happen to any other Canadian citizen in any country, whether it's Saudi Arabia or anywhere else. Despotic regimes without proper legal transparency and without a proper respect for human rights are going to constantly violate those rights of their own citizens and of foreigners who are residents in their countries.

The only advice I can really give is for the Canadian government to recommend that those Canadians working and living in Saudi Arabia minimize the time they spend in Saudi Arabia and minimize the number of the members of their families who are living in Saudi Arabia at the moment.

The situation politically in Saudi Arabia has become significantly more unstable over the last few weeks. There are constant warnings of terrorist action, certainly since the May 12 suicide bombings. Those are situations in which westerners are direct targets, which means Canadians are direct targets, and the Canadian government should be warning its citizens to remain in the kingdom for as little time as possible or as little time as their jobs require and not to maintain their families there. That's the first thing.

The second thing is that the Canadian government needs to make it known it will pursue rigorously, in whatever public forum it can, any further such violations of its citizens' human rights and legal rights by a regime like Saudi Arabia's.

¿ (0955)

The Chair: Thank you.

I'll have one question from Mrs. Redman, please.

Mrs. Karen Redman (Kitchener Centre, Lib.): Thank you, Mr. Sampson. The bulk of Canadians and people hearing your story can do nothing but recoil at the experience you've gone through.

You mentioned in your comments that the assumption of guilt or innocence played huge, obviously, for you psychologically and you feel contributed to how you were treated. I would contend that your guilt or innocence should have nothing to do with how the Canadian government supports you. So as much as I can appreciate on a personal level how that must have been a huge indignity for you, I would think that absolutely has no bearing on how we would support you.

You mentioned that you felt that an inquiry needed to happen, and you mentioned redress. I wonder if you could help us understand the kinds of parameters that would satisfy both what a thorough inquiry would look like for you as well as what possible redress would look like for you.

Mr. William Sampson: A thorough inquiry.... Well, I've never exactly been involved in a governmental inquiry before, but one of the things it should do is involve examination of every single record, regardless of how security-sensitive they are, in my case, and in any other case of this nature in which the Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs has been shown to fall down. Certainly there have been a number of cases quite recently besides mine.

As I said, I cannot comment on the contents of those cases, but certainly it would appear that there is now a track record with the Department of Foreign Affairs that requires immediate investigation and an immediate interrogation of all officers involved in the case, all civil servants involved in the case, all communications and all actions taken, for immediate assessment to see where the mistakes were made, and if mistakes were made, why they were made and what can be done to rectify them in the future.

In many cases, this might come down to simple miscommunication between departments. In other cases, it might be a damn sight more serious than that and needs to be rectified.

The Chair: Thank you.

We'll have a closing question by Mr. McTeague.

Mr. Dan McTeague (Pickering—Ajax—Uxbridge, Lib.): Merci, monsieur le président.

Thank you for your indulgence, and I thank all the committee members for allowing me. As you know, I do not sit on this committee.

Mr. Sampson, it's a distinct privilege and honour to see you here today. We hope for the best for you and your family down the road--and as well, Mr. James Sampson, for your tenacity in these very trying circumstances.

You will recall that we had attempted to provide a letter, the effect of which would be to guarantee that you could not be executed. Mr. Justin Rodway, the son of the man whose murder you were accused of, graciously provided a letter that allowed, in effect, for not just your release, but more significantly, your opportunity to avoid execution, at the same time.

I should point out that during that period of time--it was several months--we had attempted to go to Saudi Arabia to deliver this personally to officials. We were told by Canadian foreign affairs officials here that the best way in which this could be secured would be to send it to the lawyers, the two lawyers who represented you, and some, of course, who were doing extremely well in this trade.

I wonder, Mr. Sampson, have you met with Mr. Rodway since? And moreover, can you comment on the kind of representation you had, the lawyers in Saudi Arabia on your behalf?

Mr. William Sampson: Firstly, I haven't met with Justin Rodway, but I have spoken to him and thanked him. We had quite a lengthy conversation on that, in which he further reiterated his belief in my innocence and the innocence of all the others involved, not just in the bombing that killed his father but in all the other bombings.

As to my legal representation in Saudi Arabia, it's hard to pass comment on the quality of legal representation that one might receive in a country such as that when there is no transparency in their legal system in the first place. You don't know whether or not you have effective legal representation, because you basically have no faith in the rule of law in such an institution in such a country. As such, your lawyers may be very, very knowledgeable about the law, but there's very, very little they can actually do for you because of the fact that the rule of law has been so corrupted by a system of absolute power.

À (1000)

The Chair: Thank you, Mr. McTeague.

Now I have some other people who would like to ask questions. With your permission, we'll go another five minutes.

I want to ask Madame Lalonde, Mr. Martin, and Mr. Cotler to go with a short question, no preamble and just a 30-second question. We're going to have the three questions together, and you'll answer at the end of those, Mr. Sampson, please.

Go ahead, Madame Lalonde.

[Translation]

Ms. Francine Lalonde (Mercier, BQ): Mr. Sampson, do you feel that Canada should ask Saudi Arabia for compensation for what you have gone through?

[English]

The Chair: Mr. Martin.

Mr. Keith Martin (Esquimalt—Juan de Fuca, Canadian Alliance): Dr. Sampson, do you know the names of the people who are currently incarcerated in Saudi Arabia and their nationalities, as well as the people in DFAIT and our embassy in Saudi Arabia who failed to help you, in the opinion of yourself and your father? If you could submit that to this committee, we would be grateful.

Thank you.

The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Martin.

Mr. Cotler.

Mr. Irwin Cotler (Mount Royal, Lib.): Mr. Sampson, you mentioned that during the first six weeks of your confinement you were both denied any right to counsel, even assuming that this could have been effective, and that you were tortured during that period. Was there any attempt on your part to contact Canadian embassy officials, or on their part to be in touch with you?

The Chair: Mr. Sampson.

Mr. William Sampson: Might I phrase the answer to your question as a question? How the hell do you get in touch with somebody from the bottom of a dungeon?

Mr. Irwin Cotler: Do you know if they had any knowledge of your situation during that period?

Mr. James Sampson: Yes, I do.

I was trying to contact Bill. I was phoning his home and eventually I phoned the office. Two times I didn't get a reply, and then the third time, after a lot of people were answering the phone, someone came forward--I've forgotten his name--and he told me that Bill had been arrested. Within a matter of days of Bill's arrest, he had been to the Canadian embasy and informed them that Bill had been arrested. So they had been informed within, I would say, five or six days of his arrest. They had been informed.

When I called the embassy to ask why they hadn't let his father know about it, I had a mumbled answer about the Privacy Act.

Mr. William Sampson: May I also continue to answer on that question?

On the day I was arrested, which was December 17, Alexander Mitchell was also arrested, and the British embassy was aware within a few hours of that.

And I have now come to know that friends of mine in Saudi Arabia were aware of my arrest. Friends who my father didn't actually know to contact, unfortunately, were aware of my arrest and were making efforts on my behalf within 24 hours of my being arrested.

So somebody at the embassy certainly would have known, I reckon, within three to four days of my having been lifted off the streets of Riyadh.

Mr. Irwin Cotler: And you had no contact with embassy officials during the first six weeks?

Mr. William Sampson: I saw nobody from the embassy during those six weeks.

The Chair: The other answers, please.

Mr. William Sampson: On the other questions, on the names of people in Saudi Arabian prisons, I do have, or I used to have, a list of a number of people. Whether or not that's current...that was three years ago. Certainly, given their track record, there are going to be plenty of them in their country. Amnesty International probably has a much better idea of this than I do right at the moment.

I certainly heard the screams of others who were being tortured, not just of my co-accused, but of other nationals who were being held in those prisons, and who are being tortured there. I could hear their screams all night long. The torture sessions in the interrogation centre where I was were a constant and continuous process that went on 24 hours a day. While you weren't being tortured, you were stood up, sleepless, chained to a door, and you listened to the screams of others.

As for the names of the embassy officials, they will be provided in due course. As for compensation, yes, I do believe that the Saudi Arabian government owes compensation to all those wrongly imprisoned, wrongly convicted and tortured. Whether or not we'll ever see such compensation is another matter. I am currently pursuing that matter through my solicitor, Geoffrey Bindman.

What more can the Canadian government do to help? I really don't know at this stage.

À (1005)

Mr. Irwin Cotler: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The Chair: Thank you very much, gentlemen, for your appearance today.

We have heard your specific recommendations, as Mr. Harvard mentioned, at the broadest level. This is also a learning experience that will help us all deal with situations such as yours more effectively in the future.

Good luck with your medical treatment, Mr. Sampson, and thank you again for meeting with us this morning.

We will suspend the meeting for a few minutes.

À (1006)

À (1019)

The Chair: Order, please.

You have in front of you a report of the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade. The subcommittee has provided a report on the economic relations between the Asia-Pacific countries and Canada.

Mr. Eyking, please.

Mr. Mark Eyking (Sydney—Victoria, Lib.): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

This is the first report I've tabled. I first have to commend the hard work and dedication of our committee. We've been at this for the last few weeks, finalizing it right up until last night. So at this moment I'd like to table this report and ask for your adoption. It's on the economic relationships between us and the Asia-Pacific countries.

The Chair: Thank you.

I have a motion that the report be adopted as a report to the House and that the chair or his designate present it to the House:

- That, pursuant to Standing Order 109, the Committee request that the Government table a comprehensive response to this report.

- That the Chair be authorised to make such typographical and editorial changes as may be necessary without changing the substance of the report.

- That, pursuant to Standing Order 108(1)(a), the Committee authorize the printing of brief dissenting and/or supplementary opinions as appendices to this report immediately after the signature of the Chair, that the opinions be sent to the Clerk of the Committee by electronic mail in both official languages on/before 8:00 p.m. Thursday November 6, 2003.

- That pursuant to Standing Order 109 the committee request that the government table a comprehensive response to this report.

- That the Chair be authorized to make such typographical and editorial changes as may be necessary without changing the substance of the report.

An hon. member: I so move.

(Motion agreed to)

À (1020)

Mr. Art Eggleton: Mr. Chairman, colleagues, when I was Minister of Defence, I became engaged with this question of a United Nations Mission to Ethiopia and Eritrea, or UNMEE. I in fact visited both countries and subsequently recommended to government that we do in fact send peacekeeping forces, which we sent--I think it was over 450--into that area as part of the initial peacekeeping effort. We did it together with the Dutch and helped to establish the basis for a settlement between the warring parties.

Now, the warring parties—the two countries—had already come to a comprehensive peace agreement on December 12, 2000, in Algiers. This comprehensive agreement has an article in it that established the Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission, because this was the issue—where exactly is the boundary. Article 4.2 of the agreement provided for this boundary commission to demarcate the disputed border.

In the Algiers agreement, both countries agreed to be bound by the commission and to accept its recommendations, and then when they finally made their recommendations, we had one party accept, Eritrea, but the other party has not accepted, largely, it appears, on the basis of a disputed town called Badme that the boundary commission recommended should be on the Eritrean side.

Since then, there have been a number of incidents following the fact that Ethiopia has not accepted the commission, even though the UN Secretary General has urged them to do so. There have been a number of incidents--in fact, even weapons drawn by Ethiopian militia against United Nations troops. The continuing tensions do not bode well, Mr. Chairman and colleagues, for the peace continuing.

I tell you, after having sent troops there and after having had a condition of peace, it would be a shame to see this deteriorate once again into an open conflict.

If you look in the latter four paragraphs, I'm calling on the Government of Canada to increase its pressure on the Government of Ethiopia to accept in full the recommendations of the Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission, including the decision that was made about the town of Badme.

And I'm proposing that the Government of Canada—here we get into a carrot-and-stick situation, or hard power and soft power. I actually don't think those phrases are appropriate at all, but it's perhaps a bit of a carrot-and-stick approach here. I'm proposing that the Government of Canada forcefully indicate to the Government of Ethiopia that our future cooperation, including development assistance, would heavily depend on Ethiopia's acquiescence to the recommendations of the Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission.

The United States Congress has dealt with something similar to this. I believe Senator Hillary Clinton was part of proposing that. We don't have nearly the amount of development assistance involved in Ethiopia as the United States does, but I think we need to indicate that we're serious about this matter by this particular stick approach.

The carrot approach is the next paragraph. It suggests that the Government of Canada offer incentives in terms of developmental aid and/or assistance to the Governments of Ethiopia and Eritrea, if they live up to their obligations under the comprehensive peace agreement signed in Algiers, especially with regard to the Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission provisions.

The European Union has already suggested that some assistance in development be given. In fact what they're saying in the case of the town of Badme is this town isn't in the greatest of shape and we could help improve it. We could have a Badme on the Ethiopian side and one on the Eritrean side of the border, so that people who want to be part of that general area could be, and we could build a far better Badme, a new one in Ethiopia, and build up the one in Eritrea that the boundary commission says, quite properly, belongs to that country.

I think we should join in with that, as part of that particular effort. That's my motion to try to move this matter along and prevent a flare-up again of hostilities. After having sent our Canadian troops there, I think it would be a shame to see that happen, so I would move the motion.

À (1025)

The Chair: Fine.

Mr. Martin wants to speak to the motion, then Monsieur Harvey, and then Madame Lalonde.

Mr. Martin.

Mr. Keith Martin: We all know that this situation between Ethiopia and Eritrea has, in the past, resulted in the deaths of hundreds of thousands of people. I compliment Mr. Eggleton for putting this motion forward.

I've been in contact with both Ethiopian and Eritrean sides on this. As Mr. Eggleton has pointed out, the situation is spiralling dangerously out of control. I think, if I might say, our fear is that another round of hostilities will occur. We don't know where this is going to end. It will no doubt result in the same incredible bloodletting that has resulted in the deaths of so many people over a piece of land, which quite frankly is not about resources.

This is, quite frankly, as Mr. Eggleton said, a boundary issue. There's no oil there, there's no gold there, and there's no timber there, as I understand it. It would be a tragedy for that to happen.

If we could put our good words and all of our efforts into preventing another round from occurring, that would be fantastic.

I wholeheartedly support Mr. Eggleton's motion.

The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Martin.

Monsieur Harvey.

[Translation]

Mr. André Harvey (Chicoutimi—Le Fjord, Lib.): Mr. Chairman, I would like to thank my colleague for his proposal.

This is indeed a very serious problem. In my opinion, we should not make the poorest people suffer even more because of this resolution. Poverty in these countries is already serious enough. I think that pressure should be brought to bear to reach a political solution to this conflict, without necessarily jeopardizing the development aid that they received and that is provided in cooperation with a number of other countries. Ethiopia, of course, is part of a group of countries that are targeted for our assistance.

I agree with most of the resolution. However, it contains the following statement:

Proposes that the Government of Canada forcefully indicate to the Government of Ethiopia that our future cooperation, including developmental assistance...

I find that difficult to accept, since we cannot deliberately threaten to suspend our assistance to the poorest of the poor in order to put pressure on the government. That aspect troubles me, including the reference to our developmental assistance.

I believe that we are among the international players that provide assistance on the front lines. This threatens to cut off all assistance for children and mothers, for those in the world who are in greatest difficulty. I find it hard to accept that aspect, Mr. Chairman.

We need to bring political pressure to bear, in cooperation with other countries, if necessary. However, I am not comfortable with going as far as suspending our humanitarian aid. That is the comment I wanted to make.

The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Harvey.

Ms. Lalonde, you have the floor.

Ms. Francine Lalonde: Mr. Chairman, I am pleased that Mr. Eggleton has made this proposal, because I wanted to come back to this. We have no choice but to use threats. Why? Because we need to press them to comply with UN decision that they agreed to accept once it was made. They agreed to that. There is a treaty, an agreement that was signed on where the boundary would be drawn.

It is worth keeping in mind that, if Ethiopia is as poverty stricken as it is, that situation is largely due to the war and this boundary conflict. Ethiopia used to be a prosperous country. It therefore seems to me that we have no choice but to support this proposal. It is not a case of an ongoing conflict that needs to be resolved. The conflict has been resolved using an agreed-upon procedure, one that Ethiopia supported.

I do not understand why we would not do what Mr. Eggleton is asking for. I know that Sweden has already done it. If all countries providing assistance did the same thing, it seems to me that that would put pressure on the government. There are 100,000 people who have died in these extremely poor countries. I feel that we need to exercise the only pressure we have on the government. It has just been explained why it is difficult to use this pressure, but I think that we need to, in this case.

First of all, I just have a few questions about the translation. I see words that do not exist in French. For example, in the fifth paragraph, the words "caractère controversable" are used. That should be changed to "conscient du caractère controversé". So I would ask for the French to be revised.

My real question, however, deals with the paragraph following your main proposal, Mr. Eggleton: "Suggests that the Government of Canada offer incentives, in terms of developmental aid..." Would these be incentives for the government to comply with the decision or incentives that would come into play once it had complied?

It also seems to me that the paragraph following the proposal contradicts—

À (1030)

Ms. Diane Marleau (Sudbury, Lib.): The English says: "if they live up to their obligations." It is a problem with the translation.

Ms. Francine Lalonde: Damn translation! I'm sorry, Mr. Chairman. I do not know how they translate that.

I have one final question. The text says: "Ordered,—that the chair of the committee forward this motion to the Minister of Foreign Affairs for consideration and action." Why not table it in Parliament? In any case, Minister Whelan is targeted by this just as much as the Minister of Foreign Affairs.

The Chair: With respect to your last comment, Ms. Lalonde, if the motion is adopted, I will probably ask Mr. Eggleton to have the committee chair report this to Parliament.

[English]

I think that's what we do usually. That's fine. Okay.

[Translation]

Ms. Francine Lalonde: Yes, thank you.

I have one question about the text. Oh no, it was about "if" and you have already answered me. So we will change the French text.

The Chair: Ms. Lalonde, the translation was done by Mr. Eggleton. If the motion is adopted, the clerk will ensure that the translation is an official one.

Go ahead, Mr. Harvey.

Mr. André Harvey: I just wanted to say that threats can sometimes have good consequences, but we always need to look at them in terms of the consequences. What will happen if those people do not react to our threats? Who will suffer the consequences? It will again be the poorest of the poor who suffer the consequences.

That is the point I wanted to make. I find it a bit disturbing that we are including direct developmental assistance in cooperation with international organizations and the World Food Program. But I respect my colleagues' point of view.

[English]

The Chair: I have a question for you, Mr. Harvey. If we delete

[Translation]

"that our future cooperation, including developmental assistance,"

[English]

because it said “all the future cooperation of Canada”, that's including, in a certain way, development aid. If we delete this, would you agree to get this motion passed as unanimous?

Mr. Art Eggleton: So you want to delete the words “including development assistance”?

The Chair: Yes, if he agrees. If he doesn't agree with this, we'll go for the main motion as it's written right now.

No, you don't want to. Okay, fine.

Monsieur Eggleton, you wanted to make a last comment.

À (1035)

Mr. Art Eggleton: In response to the concern Mr. Harvey raises, this does not include basic humanitarian assistance. We've never included that when we talk about development assistance being withheld. We always still provide for the basic needs--food, medicine, things like that--that would be needed if there is any difficulty. That is not affected. We've never affected that by this. This is a further level of assistance.

I'm hopeful that this wouldn't happen, but sometimes we have to be forceful about it. So far, we haven't been able to get them to abide by the agreement they signed. I think we have to be a little bit tougher.

On the second part of Madame Lalonde's request, if they are willing to live up to their obligations, then I think we should provide incentives and help in that respect, and we should look at what the European Union is doing, and maybe join with them.

I have no problem, finally, on the question of it going to Parliament, although I would like to see some action on it. I thought that it going to the minister might be the best way, but whatever you suggest.

The Chair: Unless you have something new, Mr. Cotler and Mr. Martin, I'm going to close it and call the question.

Mr. Irwin Cotler: I would like to suggest to the mover that the words “including development assistance” be removed, because they are inclusive in the terms of future cooperation. They don't have to be specifically identified; they're incorporated by reference. And adverse inferences could be drawn by some that it does mean humanitarian assistance. Therefore, in order that such adverse inference is not to be drawn and that the integrity of the motion be maintained, I would remove those words.

The Chair: Fine.

Mr. Martin, that's fine?

Mr. Keith Martin: Mr. Cotler's motion is acceptable.

The Chair: You make an amendment, Mr. Cotler?

Mr. Irwin Cotler: Yes.

The Chair: All agree on the amendment, that we delete it? Just those words.

[Translation]

Yes, you can make one last comment.

Ms. Francine Lalonde: To be clear, the United Nations provides multilateral assistance for basic needs. That is provided by the United Nations. Whether we like it or not, the UN goes into war areas. That is clear. There is the World Food Program, etc. So that is one thing.

However, Canada also has other development programs. Right now, I think that development assistance is becoming very targeted and is being aimed at selected countries. Not all countries receive our assistance. If we continue to provide assistance to Ethiopia, which is flouting an agreement proposed by the United Nations and signed by Ethiopia, it seems to me that we are not doing ourselves a favour. We are not sending a clear signal.

[English]

The Chair: I have an amendment proposed by Mr. Cotler. Do you agree on the amendment?

(Amendment agreed to)

The Chair: Madame Lalonde disagrees. No, that's fine. Good.

[Translation]

Ms. Francine Lalonde: Mr. Chairman, I think that we need to be clear after what we have just heard.

[English]

The Chair: Now, the main motion.

(Motion as amended agreed to) [See Minutes of Proceedings]

The Chair: Now, Mr. Eggleton, do you want to get a motion? You have a motion that this should be a report of the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade and be presented in the House of Commons.

Mr. Art Eggleton: Is that in addition to it going to the foreign affairs minister?

The Chair: Yes, it's an additional one. It's another motion.

The Clerk of the Committee: Mr. Chairman, I think that if you're going to send it to the House, you don't want to send it to the minister at the same time.

The Chair: But if you send it to the House, it's going to be to the minister, there's no doubt about it. But the House is better; it's stronger.

Mr. Art Eggleton: But it goes to the House and just gets received. What does that mean?

The Chair: No. At that time it will go to the minister.

Mr. Art Eggleton: Fine. I'll take your advice on it.

The Chair: Now we'll get the second motion. It's from Mr. Cotler.

Mr. Cotler, please.

Mr. Irwin Cotler: Yes, Mr. Chairman.

The motion has to do with one of the most distinguished of Chinese dissidents, Dr. Wang Bingzhang, who after being abducted to China was then tried and convicted of trumped-up charges of terror and kidnapping, though he was the victim of kidnapping and criminal violence. I want to say that his sentence of life imprisonment was the longest sentence ever meted out to a dissident.

The important thing here is that the United Nations Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, in an unusual fashion, took up his case and determined not only that the charges, as you can see, are without foundation, in violation of international law, and he was denied the right to a fair trial, but they also called on China to remedy these violations.

The next paragraph notes Dr. Wang Bingzhang's close connection to Canada, and then we call upon the Chinese government to release Dr. Wang Bingzhang from prison.

I am prepared to delete the last two words “in Canada”, because I know DFAIT apparently has some technical objection that if he's released, he may not be able to enter Canada, or that this resolution presupposes that. I don't believe it does, but in order to accommodate that concern, I'm prepared to delete those two words, and just state “permit him to be reunited with his family and colleagues”.

À (1040)

The Chair: Thank you.

Madame Carroll.

Ms. Aileen Carroll: I am overwhelmed by the generosity of my colleague here and appreciate his willingness, as we did discuss the matter of this committee passing a motion that asks for Dr. Wang to come to Canada. It isn't presupposing. He is not a landed immigrant, he has made no application to be a landed immigrant, and he has made no application to my knowledge to be a refugee, so we can't presume a status for which he has not applied. In fact, obviously, he is not a Canadian.

So what I would ask my honourable colleague.... To be quite honest, I was not going to support the motion for those reasons and because it included the words “in Canada”. Now Irwin has removed that, however; it is to permit him to be reunited with his family and colleagues. How would he be reunited with his family if his family lives in Canada?

Mr. Art Eggleton: Is that a sin?

Ms. Aileen Carroll: No, it's not a sin, Art, but there are certain regulations, to which you were once well cognizant.

Mr. Irwin Cotler: I want to say to the honourable member that principles of family reunification are set forth in United Nations and international law frameworks, and we're not saying that Canada must admit him, we're asking China to release him. If he then wants to come here, then he can then make that application. I don't understand the objection.

[Translation]

Ms. Francine Lalonde: [Editor's note: inaudible]

The Chair: Ms. Lalonde, would you like to make a comment?

Ms. Francine Lalonde: Yes.

[English]

Le président: I have Mrs. Carroll on the floor and Mrs. Lalonde after.

Did you finish, Ms. Carroll?

Ms. Aileen Carroll: Then I would ask Irwin to allow this to be held and allow me to speak to the department and the minister and see if I am able to support it or to recommend support.

The Chair: You make your comments about this. I'll go to Madame Lalonde and Mr. Martin.

[Translation]

Ms. Francine Lalonde: I thought I understood yesterday that Minister Graham had received this text yesterday morning from you. I was prepared to—

Mr. Irwin Cotler: Yes, he saw it.

Ms. Aileen Carroll: With the words that I used.

Ms. Francine Lalonde: It seems to me that all parties had agreed on the meaning of this proposal and—

[English]

Ms. Aileen Carroll: No, you had no agreement in principle. Let's try to continue--

The Chair: Do you agree with the motion presented by Mr. Cotler?

[Translation]

Ms. Francine Lalonde: Yes. Not only do I agree, but I hope that we will adopt it quickly and move on.

[English]

Mr. Keith Martin: It was 35 minutes ago that we heard William Sampson talk about his torture and incarceration in Saudi Arabia. Dr. Wang Bingzhang is held in a country that summarily executes people, engages in torture, and has portable execution chambers that are now running around the country because it's more “efficient”.

Professor Cotler has well articulated the complete violation of this person's basic human rights, and I fully support Professor Cotler's motion and efforts to release Dr. Wang Bingzhang. I certainly hope that in the context of what we heard this morning that other members will see fit to support it too.

The Chair: Thank you.

Any other comments, apart from Ms. Carroll? Yes, go ahead.

Ms. Aileen Carroll: I would like to support this as well. I am asking Irwin Cotler to pull the motion from the committee for today and allow me to seek further information. And to be honest, this is going to sound brutal, but we can all hear the kind of testimony we did today and it's horrendous, as is the testimony we're hearing from Mr. Arar, but we have to at the same time realize that we cannot be all things to all people, in all venues, at all times. What we will do and have done....

Let me finish, Keith, because I listened to you.

I very much am as horrified as anyone else around this table at what we're hearing. We know that we are not the greatest power on the earth, one that can wave magic wands for everybody, in every situation, and every country in every prison. And that said, we have to accept that and do what we're able to do and be committed to do that.

I'm asking you to pull this motion and see if I can bring you support.

À (1045)

The Chair: Ms. Carroll, I want to pinpoint one thing: a motion cannot be withdrawn without unanimous consent of this committee when it's on the table. The only thing you could do is to state that you want the debate to be adjourned. That's what you can do, but you cannot withdraw the motion.

Mr. Calder.

Mr. Murray Calder (Dufferin—Peel—Wellington—Grey, Lib.): Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.

I'm wondering whether or not, Irwin, there is a compromise here. I think the big thing is to get this man out of prison. That's what everybody's talking about here.

There seems to be a problem with the last sentence. Why don't we say “calls upon the Chinese government to release Dr. Wang from prison” and drop “and permit him to be reunited with his family and colleagues in Canada”?

The Chair: “In Canada” is already withdrawn.

Mr. Cotler.

Mr. Irwin Cotler: First, let me say that departmental officials were aware of this motion. Let me say that I've already made a compromise and offered, this morning, to remove the words “in Canada”. Let me say that is what I understood to be their objection to this motion, and therefore I withdrew it.

I would not wish to drop those other words, because he could be released from prison, still kept in China, and then put into another prison.

The motion is exactly what in effect we are asking and what the UN asked to remedy the violations. The remedy of the violations is to release him from prison and permit him to leave China to be reunited with his family and colleagues, wherever they may be. I'm not specifying Canada.

The Chair: Okay, now I call the question. If there's nothing new, I call the question now.

Madam Lalonde, qu'est-ce que vous avez?

[Translation]

Ms. Francine Lalonde: I would like to raise something new. I have taken part in the whole discussion, and we are hoping that the proposal will be adopted by many parliamentarians around the world. This is a motion by parliamentarians and not a motion from the government. It is important that parliamentarians be able to adopt proposals like this.

[English]

The Chair: Fine. I call the question. All in favour of the question, and the last two words “in Canada” have been withdrawn.

(Motion agreed to) [See Minutes of Proceedings]

The Chair: Now, Mr. Cotler, do you want this to be presented, as the previous motion, in Parliament?

You have a motion to be presented as a report in the Parliament.

Mr. Irwin Cotler: Yes, I do.

The Chair: That's fine. Do you move it?

Mr. Irwin Cotler: Yes, I so move.

The Chair: All agreed for it to be presented in Parliament, in the House of Commons?

(Motion agreed to)

The Chair: Now, the next motion is the motion of Mrs. Lalonde asking that the committee recommends to the government the action plan submitted by Stephan Hachemi and a coalition of 19 human rights defence organizations in order to ensure that justice be rendered in the case of the assassination of Mrs. Zahra Kazemi, Montreal photojournalist and Canadian citizen.

Madam Lalonde.

[Translation]

Ms. Francine Lalonde: Thank you.

We have had this proposal before the committee for time now. It has already been considered by the government, since the coalition met with Minister Bill Graham, who said that he was interested in a number of aspects. I feel that it is important for the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade to be involved as well in the issue of Ms. Zahra Kazemi's terrible death. We need to shed light on this whole affair and find solutions in similar situations, when someone has dual nationality. This is the case also for Mr. Arar. I think that this resolution gives the department full latitude to act at the national and international level. I hope that my colleagues, who seem to be listening very carefully and considering this issue seriously, will support the motion.

[English]

The Chair: Merci, Madam Lalonde.

Ms. Carroll.

Ms. Aileen Carroll: I feel like this is fifty ways to leave your lover.

Some hon. members: Oh, oh!

À (1050)

Ms. Aileen Carroll: I hope we're in camera and that this is not spinning into CBC.

Am I on, Mr. Chair? Can you get away from that BlackBerry a moment, and tell me whether I'm on?

The Chair: Yes, you have the floor. Don't miss it.

Ms. Aileen Carroll: Then my response to this is that we have seen, for many reasons and many efforts, progress in the case of the Kazemi matter, as Madame Lalonde of course knows—she and I having travelled together to Iran. The guarantee of three positions at the judicial proceedings, when they reconvene this month, has been a breakthrough, because they will go far in making sure that the transparency the Canadian government has demanded is in fact a part of the process.

We, too, continue to press for the return of the remains. Again, Ms. Lalonde is cognizant of the discussions over there and here in that regard.

But I would have to ask, before the foreign affairs committee recommends to the Government of Canada that it adopt an action plan, that the people who have put forward this plan come forward to committee. I realize that Ms. Lalonde has given us papers on the plan, but I really think that we would have to talk to the people, and get a sense of what their plan is. I, for one, would be more than willing to submit the plan to the Department of Foreign Affairs, but I don't think we can just holus-bolus adopt and recommend a plan to the government that none of us here has spent any time analyzing—particularly as discussions from the beginning of this day have indicated that certain actions can have a counter-effect to what you're attempting to produce.

Certainly we have been working very concertedly to get the kinds of fruitful responses we're getting out of Tehran. And if we're going to introduce a whole new kettle of fish, then that kettle of fish should come before committee, and this committee should know what they're recommending before they recommend it.

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

The Chair: Thank you.

Are there any other comments from colleagues?

Madam Lalonde, do you have a final comment?

[Translation]

Ms. Francine Lalonde: I would not want the motion to be defeated.

[English]

Ms. Aileen Carroll: What is the matter with what I asked for?

The Chair: No, no, no, Madame Carroll.

Madame Lalonde.

[Translation]

Ms. Francine Lalonde: I would accept postponing the study until after the results of the trial in Iran are known. However, I maintain that recommendations at the international level can go ahead while the trial is on.

I know that this motion has been before us for some time, but I really do not want it to be defeated.

[English]

The Chair: It means that the motion cannot be withdrawn. You want the motion to be adjourned until later.

Some hon. members: Agreed.

The Chair: On the last motion this morning, Mr. Martin, please go ahead.

Mr. Keith Martin: If we look at history, on the Zimbabwe motion, if we go back to Armenia, the Holocaust, Cambodia, Bosnia, or Rwanda, we will find that despite the full knowledge that mass killings were about to occur, we as part of the international community, and indeed the international community at large, have failed to act, with full knowledge that large numbers of civilians were about to be murdered. We say “Never again,” but all the time we see again and again and again large numbers of people being slaughtered under our noses.

What we have in situation is the following: one, food is being used as a weapon by Mr. Mugabe to deliberately kill up to five million--I repeat, five million--of his people; two, torture centres have been set up in Harare where civilians, people who Mr. Mugabe perceives oppose him, are hauled into and tortured, and sometimes murdered; three, up until 2000, rape was not being used as a weapon, but since 2000, with systematic rape, women have been raped in front of their families, in villages, in an effort to destabilize and to intimidate the civilian population--and I repeat, this is all about the civilian population; and four, and lastly, a scathing document put out by The Solidarity Peace Trust of southern Africa, supported by the churches of southern Africa, including South Africa, Zimbabwe, and Botswana, clearly shows that Mr. Mugabe has been forcibly using children as young as 11 to engage in this torture, in the murder, and older children are forced to rape other children, and indeed adults. All this information is documented from Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, Solidarity International, and again, the churches of southern Africa.

This, I might repeat, my colleagues, has absolutely nothing to do with land reform, but rather has everything to do with Mr. Mugabe's efforts to control power, to maintain power for his party, and to wreak vengeance on those individuals who he perceives did not support him politically.

The response from our government has been soft power. I've been under negotiations with them for some two years. Our officials have admitted that this approach is simply not going to stop Mr. Mugabe. Secondly, as of 48 hours ago, when I met individuals in the South African government, they also admitted that the soft power negotiating approach was simply not going to stop Mr. Mugabe from murdering his civilians.

So the purpose of this motion is for Canada to stand up, consistent with our laws, consistent with our Crimes Against Humanity and War Crimes Act, and say that we are going to side with the people of Zimbabwe; we are not going to tolerate again the mass murder of civilians; we are going to do all that we can to prevent the deaths of these innocent people. And this motion will help to lend credence to an indictment that has already been given to Martin Cauchon and Minister Graham, an indictment I would like to see them support, where this indictment will say to the world that Canada is prepared to say no to genocide. It is also intended to box in Mr. Mugabe, and I hope other countries will adopt similar legislation within their own countries.

We have a choice, my colleagues. If we do not stand up and say something publicly and do something publicly against this megalomaniac, then we will find down the line that once again hundreds of thousands of innocent civilians will be dead, murdered, raped, or tortured, and then we will have to ask ourselves, when we could have done something, what should we have done?

Thank you.

À (1055)

The Chair: Thank you.

Ms. Carroll.

Ms. Aileen Carroll: Well, Mr. Martin, I agree with what you're saying. Who could not? The horrors of what is going on there are again beyond what any of us can contemplate. We think that we can, but we can only guess at it.

I share—not agree with, but share—your frustration at how slowly it would appear that things are happening. But at the same time, I am compelled, as ever, with the hat that I wear, to look at the realities.

First of all, I would say that however frustrating it appears, the international community is engaged. While your discussions with South African officials who were here may have led you to believe nothing is being done, it is my understanding from Foreign Affairs Minister Zuma that there are talks going on, however much they are being done quietly.

Again, I have difficulty with this constant use of the words “soft power”. I don't know what anybody around this table means by “soft power”, but I do know the difference between “public” and “private”. I understand that private discussions are going on, working quietly to try to negotiate a transition government and working with the opposition and the current government in Zimbabwe. Like you, I wish those talks much success.

To talk about the legal apparatus available to us, I am not optimistic. To begin with, the International Criminal Court has no jurisdiction, because Zimbabwe is not a signatory, so it's not a venue.

In Canada, the government and the Prime Minister, as you know, have made it very clear that Mugabe is not allowed to come to Canada. “Not welcome” is a nice way of putting it, but he's not allowed to come here. Therefore, for us to pass a motion saying “If he comes here, we're going to indict him” makes no sense. He isn't going to come here. He isn't allowed to come here.

Again, I understand your desire, Mr. Martin, and the desire of many people around this table, to send messages. Perhaps I appear the pragmatist, but unless some of the messages have teeth, I don't believe they're very effective. In fact, I think the've become increasingly ineffective. If this committee thinks that by merely saying things, sending messages, and passing motions that we know, before we even pass them, cannot be put into effect, then we become largely ineffective. But that's my comment, not the parliamentary secretary's comment.

I would say that in trying to set up a special tribunal, I think you know that such a measure will be difficult, because getting a consensus on having a special tribunal isn't likely, for the very reasons that you mentioned earlier. Many leaders in South Africa and elsewhere, while quietly appearing to be doing things publicly, are not going to join in efforts to create a tribunal. You know that countries, such as that country and others, often do one thing publicly, while working quietly in other ways.

I don't see how we can effectively accomplish what you're asking in this motion.

Á (1100)

The Chair: Fine. Thank you.

Now, we're going to have to adjourn, because it's 11 o'clock. The room is for the Minister of Defence, who is coming here. We are, in turn, going into the other room.

Our witness, Dr. Feldman, is here.

I'm going to ask Dr. Martin if he wants to adjourn the debate. Do you want to adjourn the debate?

Mr. Keith Martin: We'll pick it up.

The Chair: No, we're not going to pick it up on the other side, unless we have time at the end.

Mr. Art Eggleton: Can't we stay here?

The Chair: No, we cannot stay here. We need to move to the other room.

But if it's adjourned, it's going to be adjourned in the same way that it was adjourned for Ms. Lalonde.

Mr. Keith Martin: I want a vote.

The Chair: If you want a vote--

Mr. Keith Martin: Question. By the time we do that it will be....

The Chair: It's going to be dead. If you vote, it's going to be dead. If you want to take the chance, I'll ask everyone to raise hands for a vote.

You adjourn.

The meeting is adjourned, and we're going into Room 253-D.

Thank you.