FAIT Committee Meeting

37th PARLIAMENT, 2nd SESSION

Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade

EVIDENCE

CONTENTS

Wednesday, December 4, 2002

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1535

The Chair (Mr. Bernard Patry (Pierrefonds—Dollard, Lib.))

The Clerk of the Committee

The Chair

The Clerk

Mr. John Duncan (Vancouver Island North, Canadian Alliance)

The Chair

Mr. John Duncan

The Chair

Mr. John Duncan

The Chair

Mr. Svend Robinson (Burnaby—Douglas, NDP)

The Chair

Mr. Sarkis Assadourian (Brampton Centre, Lib.)

The Chair

Mr. Svend Robinson

Mr. Sarkis Assadourian

The Chair

Mr. Svend Robinson

The Chair

The Chair

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1540

The Chair

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1705

The Chair

Mr. Charles-Philippe David (Holder of the Research Chair Raoul-Dandurand in Strategic and Diplomatic Studies, Université du Québec à Montréal)

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1710

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1715

The Chair

Mr. Ronald Cleminson (Individual Presentation)

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1720

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1725

The Chair

Mr. Deepak Obhrai (Calgary East, Canadian Alliance)

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1730

The Chair

Mr. Charles-Philippe David

The Chair

Mr. Ronald Cleminson

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1735

The Chair

Ms. Francine Lalonde (Mercier, BQ)

The Chair

Mr. Ronald Cleminson

Mr. Charles-Philippe David

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1740

The Chair

Mr. Yvon Charbonneau (Anjou—Rivière-des-Prairies, Lib.)

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1745

The Chair

Mr. Charles-Philippe David

The Chair

Mr. Ronald Cleminson

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1750

The Chair

Ms. Alexa McDonough (Halifax, NDP)

The Chair

Mr. Charles-Philippe David

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1755

Ms. Alexa McDonough

Mr. Charles-Philippe David

The Chair

Ms. Aileen Carroll (Barrie—Simcoe—Bradford, Lib.)

The Chair

Ms. Aileen Carroll

Mr. Ronald Cleminson

Ms. Aileen Carroll

The Chair

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CANADA

Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade

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NUMBER 014

l

2nd SESSION

l

37th PARLIAMENT

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EVIDENCE

Wednesday, December 4, 2002

[Recorded by Electronic Apparatus]

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[English]

    The Chair (Mr. Bernard Patry (Pierrefonds—Dollard, Lib.)): We're going to start the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade.

    The order of the day, pursuant to Standing Order 108(2), is consideration of a draft report on North American integration and Canada's role in the light of new security challenges. This is going to be between 3:30 and 5 o'clock. It will be in camera. We'll open it up to a public meeting after that, between five and six, on the Iraq situation. We're going to have some witnesses.

    Before we go in camera—

    The Clerk of the Committee: Are we in public now?

    The Chair: We're in public right now.

    The Clerk: One moment, Mr. Chairman.

    We are not in public yet. We will now go in public.

    Mr. John Duncan (Vancouver Island North, Canadian Alliance): On a point of order on the agenda, we have a note saying that we might be asked to come back here for seven o'clock. I'm sorry....

    The Chair: No. If you just want to let me finish, Mr. Duncan, I want to say that we go from five o'clock to six. If at six o'clock we haven't finished the North American integration relations, we're going to come back from six to seven. If we're not finished, we're going to be back here tomorrow morning.

    Mr. John Duncan: That's my point. Some of us have made commitments. I didn't get that notification until question period today. I think that's highly irregular.

    The Chair: You received the invitation for tomorrow this morning.

    Mr. John Duncan: No, tomorrow's not a problem; I'm talking about--

    The Chair: We'll see how we end up at four o'clock. If it's going well, we'll come back tomorrow morning.

    Before we start, I have a motion from Mr. Robinson regarding the Armenian genocide. There was a main motion adopted from Mr. Assadourian on November 27. Today it's the same motion, that the committee invite the House of Commons to recognize the genocide of the Armenians, which began at the turn of the last century by the Ottoman Turks during the First World War. This was accepted, but there was no mention that this motion be adopted as a report of the committee and that the chair report into the House. That's why Mr. Robinson has come back with the motion.

    I agree, and we all agree, with Mr. Robinson. We're not going to discuss the Armenian genocide, the pro and cons. We did this last time, on November 27. This is just for people to be ready to vote on that specific motion.

    Mr. Robinson, because you're the mover, you can go ahead.

    Mr. Svend Robinson (Burnaby—Douglas, NDP): Mr. Chairman, I will be brief. I wasn't, unfortunately, able to be present for the discussion in the committee last week. I was in fact with my colleague, Madame Lalonde, in Brussels. Members of the committee will know that I had given notice of a similar motion with respect to the recognition of the genocide of the Armenians. I was very pleased that the motion was adopted.

    When I read the motion, it was clear that there was an oversight and that in fact there was no provision within the terms of the motion that was adopted to report it to the House, as we report any other significant decision the committee makes of this nature.

    It's basically a technical motion. We don't have to re-debate the substance of the motion. It was adopted by the committee. I'm just suggesting, as in the case of any other significant decision by the committee, that we in fact report our decision to the House.

    The Chair: Merci beaucoup, Mr. Robinson, for your brief comments.

    Mr. Assadourian.

    Mr. Sarkis Assadourian (Brampton Centre, Lib.): Thank you very much.

    I totally agree with my colleague. It was an oversight on my side on the committee. But I would suggest, if it is possible and acceptable for him, that we postpone the voting on this issue to February or March next year, because we don't lose the effect of the motion as far as I'm concerned. I would appreciate it if he agrees with me to postpone to next February or March, after we come back from Christmas break. I would very much appreciate it because I think it will be better for everybody concerned, those who have good intent in heart, to do that. I would appreciate that.

    The Chair: According to the rules, with the advice of the clerk, I must tell you, Mr. Assadourian, because a motion is already on the table, we need to get unanimous consent of the committee for the motion to be postponed or to be withdrawn from the committee today.

    Mr. Svend Robinson: Mr. Chairman, I'm quite prepared to consider that. But I must say, I'm just at a little bit of a loss as to why Mr. Assadourian believes it's necessary to postpone this to February. What's the basis for that?

    Mr. Sarkis Assadourian: I totally agree with the intent of my colleague to pass the motion. I think it's important that we make sure the motion gets enough votes to pass. If it doesn't get enough votes to pass, I don't think it's going to be helpful to the cause. That's what I want to pass on to my colleague.

    I'm sure he understands that we want to make sure this motion passes and comes to the House of Commons for a vote. That's what we intend to do.

    The Chair: Mr. Robinson, as the mover, do you want to withdraw? If you want to withdraw, I need to have the unanimous consent of the committee.

    Mr. Svend Robinson: Mr. Chairman, I'm quite prepared to withdraw the motion on the understanding that apparently Mr. Assadourian is suggesting that he doesn't believe there's enough support on his side of the committee to report his motion to the House. I'm sorry to hear him suggest that. On the clear understanding that this will come back in February, I'm quite prepared to withdraw the motion, Mr. Chairman.

    The Chair: As I mentioned before, I need unanimous consent of the committee. Do we have the unanimous consent of the committee?

    Some hon. members: No.

    The Chair: We don't have the unanimous consent of the committee. We're going to vote.

    (Motion negatived: nays 6; yeas 5)

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    The Chair: We're going to now go in camera for the report.

    [Editor's Note: Proceedings continue in camera]

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     [Editor's Note: Public proceedings resume]

    The Chair: Our order of reference today, pursuant to Standing Order 108(2), is consideration of the situation in Iraq.

    Today we have the pleasure to have with us as a witness

[Translation]

    from the Université du Québec à Montréal, Mr. Charles-Philippe David, Holder of the Research Chair Raoul-Dandurand in Strategic and Diplomatic Studies.

    Welcome, Mr. David and thank you for providing us with advance copies of your presentation in both official languages.

[English]

    Also with us, appearing as an individual, is Mr. Ronald Cleminson, who is a member of the College of Commissioners of the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission. Welcome, Mr. Cleminson.

    I understand that Mr. Cleminson needs to leave at six o'clock sharp.

    I'm going to ask Mr. David to start with his opening comments. We'll go to Mr. Cleminson after that for comments also. Then we'll have questions from members. It's going to be five minutes of questions and answers.

    Monsieur David.

[Translation]

    Mr. Charles-Philippe David (Holder of the Research Chair Raoul-Dandurand in Strategic and Diplomatic Studies, Université du Québec à Montréal): Thank you very much, Mr. Patry, honourable members of the House of Commons. It is an honour for me to be here. Indeed, this is a first for me.

    I don't wish to make a lengthy statement or bore you with my comments. I submitted a written paper which, as you may have noticed, is in both official languages. It sets out my general position on the Iraqi question, a position which has not changed much since the text was first drafted a month or six weeks ago. I've made the necessary changes to the document to take into account the latest developments. Therefore, I will dispense with any lengthy pronouncements. I would especially like to answer your questions and, in so far as possible, shed some light on certain aspects of this issue.

    I would, however, like to comment briefly on several key points that I raise in my written submission and to discuss with you my position on the Iraqi question. The first comment -- and I think we need to be very clear on this - is that a war against Iraq should be waged for the right reasons.

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[English]

    You have to make this war against Iraq for good reasons. If you're not making it for the proper reasons, this would be detrimental to the legitimacy, the efficiency, and the accomplishments of that mission in the Middle East and the Persian Gulf.

    I am very worried about the fact that President Bush leads us to believe that maybe he won't wait for the inspectors to complete their work and to submit to us the evidence by which we would then decide to solicit again the Security Council under the current Resolution 1441 to go to war. If this is really about regime change and not inspections, I think this would be detrimental to a lot of issues for a lot of reasons.

[Translation]

    I'm prepared to wait for proof of Iraq's duplicity. For starters, a decision cannot be made after one week of inspections. There are people more qualified than I to prove that conducting inspections is painstaking, laborious work. It wasn't until 1995, a full four years after inspections were first undertaken in Iraq, that it was discovered Saddam Hussein was hiding biological weapons. It will take longer than one, two or even three weeks to uncover any sensational news.

    However, these inspections will certainly prove effective if inspectors obtain intelligence information from insiders, that is from people working in the Iraqi military-scientific complex. In my opinion, any clear evidence of bad faith on the part of Saddam Hussein's regime is likely to come from these quarters. If reliable informants come forward, then a solid case could be mounted to show that Iraq is indeed hiding illegal weapons.

    Like you, I'm not expecting any sensational revelations in the report that Iraq will be tabling, most probably on Saturday. I get the feeling that report will be quite voluminous. Iraq will deny having any weapons of mass destruction at this time. However, they will also acknowledge that recently and over the years, they have had such weapons in their possession. The report is likely to contain statements concerning obsolete weapons, primarily chemical and biological weapons. I'm not expecting any new revelations regarding nuclear weapons.

    Furthermore, having said that inspectors should be given time to do their work, I will admit to being uncertain that the administration will let inspectors do their job fully, because it has a military agenda and the clock is ticking. This brings me to my second point. There are two sides to every story and looking on the bright side, inspectors will be able to do a better job than they did in the past if their efforts are supported by a show of force.

[English]

    There is nothing like a good inspection when the inspected knows that if something is found or if he hides something, the threat of force is imminent or the threat of force will actually be deployed. We have had many deployments, or many indications of a war plan, which has actually started or is in operation. I think this is okay.

    But the other side of the story—and this is the bad story—is that you can't intervene in the month of May. You could with bombardment, but couldn't with ground troops. If the purpose is to have a regime change, you can't do that with just bombardment. So this would be excluded if it were to be done after the months of January, February, and March. So we're operating on a very tight schedule. This is why you get all this information about ships, aircraft carriers, and special operations headquarters being quickly moved to the Persian Gulf.

    You also have to prepare for peace. It's one thing to win the war, but you also have to win the peace. From everything I know and everyone I talk to—the people in Washington and academia—I am concerned that there has not been a serious enough commitment to plan for the period after a war in Iraq.

    For the reasons I lay out in my paper, nation building in Iraq will be quite a challenge, considering the fact that it is a multi-ethnic society. It's almost an artificial state, created only 80 years ago. It even has a younger history than Canada. So nation building in the Middle East is a very challenging area.

    I'm not saying it can't succeed. It perhaps can succeed. I'm more worried about the lack of commitment after a war than I am about the commitment for the war. I don't know. If anyone asked me what would happen with an American commander in charge of Baghdad the way that General MacArthur was in charge of Japan, I don't know how this would play out in Iraq. You're in the Middle East. This would be a first.

    Yes, we've rebuilt and democratized Japan and Germany. At the same time, we're also doing somewhat well in Bosnia. But the example of Afghanistan troubles me. The war was won, but the peace is far from being won. So if we're doing nation building in Iraq, we should do better nation building than we are doing in Afghanistan.

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[Translation]

    Ultimately, the United States would, in my opinion, be making a mistake by intervening unilaterally or with the help of a coalition force. I've always felt -- and it's not because the Afghan campaign was successful that I'm likely to change my position on this -- that it would be preferable for any interventions to take place quickly as part of a multilateral operation conducted under the auspices of the UN.

    The United States continue to enjoy a certain amount of support and it would be a shame to let that go to waste, particularly given that France's support was won with some difficulty, as we saw in the case of resolution 1441. It would be a shame to break this consensus at the UN level through unilateral actions that might give the impression that the UN's multilateral strategy is merely a foil for an agenda advocating unilateral action.

    Countless discussions have taken place where the concept of unilateralism is pitted against that of multilateralism and I would be happy to answer any questions about that subject. Nevertheless, it is vitally important not to alienate the handful of allies that support the United States in this affair.

[English]

    I think it would perhaps be a great win for America if they could democratize and liberate Iraq in a few months. But if this is done unilaterally, it might also do a lot of damage to the international system in terms of multilateral support. So I am concerned about this.

    I don't have definitive answers. I don't come from the future. I wish I did and that I could tell you what we should do or not do. Caution is in order. I think urgency is sometimes contrary to wisdom. So we should do things prudently.

    Thank you.

[Translation]

    The Chair: Thank you, Mr. David.

    Go ahead, Mr. Cleminson.

[English]

    Mr. Ronald Cleminson (Individual Presentation): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

    I'm not sure whether the selection of Professor David and myself was made so that one would look at the theory, and the other at the practical. However, I've just come back from New York, having had an opportunity to discuss with the commission the operation going on. So instead of going into some detail, I'd just like to touch on three principles.

    First, what is the United Nations doing in Iraq? If I were to select a title for this, I would call it “Containment as an Alternative to War”, because this is exactly what the United Nations is doing. It is not a new concept. We go back...as a matter of fact it's of interest to me because of the Korean War, when I joined the Royal Canadian Air Force. After I got my wings, the armistice was signed.

    Korea was a clear example of aggression—the north against the south. So the Security Council took action in accordance with chapter 7 of the UN Charter. It took military action, led dynamically—militarily and politically—by the United States, and by a very tenacious president, President Truman. Once the forces were put north of the 30th parallel, the armistice came into being.

    Forty years later we had the same situation in the gulf, a clear aggression by Iraq against Kuwait. The Security Council again took action under chapter 7, and again under the dynamic leadership of the United States of America, with a very determined president, President Bush Sr. The invaders were pushed out of the country, the integrity of the country was re-established, and Resolution 687 was passed. Of course, we have had a package of resolutions since then, the latest one being Resolution 1441. So this is what the United Nations has done on two occasions.

    What is containment? Containment is simply taking a country and ensuring that it does not bother its neighbours. If you look at what happened in Korea in 1950, the Korean leadership has done nothing for fifty years to its neighbours or to the international community. But most certainly, its people have suffered. In the last ten years or the last decade, what is the situation with Iraq? It is exactly the same. By and large, Saddam Hussein has just been a note on the international scene. Nevertheless, his people have suffered. So containment can work. Therefore, I suggest that containment is an alternative to war and has been proven to be so.

    What is the aim of the inspections being carried out? We've had three types of inspections. I won't go into them in any great detail, except to note that some say we have no background. Of course, the IAEA has had inspections for more than forty years under the safeguards program of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, and has been carrying out inspections in Iraq under Resolution 687 and Resolution 1441 for the last ten years.

    The Security Council created UNSCOM. Again, this was the sort of thing that was born in Washington, brought to New York, and adopted by the United Nations. I was at the first meeting of UNSCOM, where we had an empty table and 21 people sitting around it not even knowing one another. We gradually built this system. It called upon the nations in order to get its inspectors, which then provided them. Over the period of eight and a half years that UNSCOM operated, more than 3,000 inspectors went through.

    From time to time you hear the term “cowboyism” bandied about. Well, if you have 3,000 people coming from 32 different countries, you clearly are going to have problems from time to time. Nevertheless, it was a success—not a failure, as is indicated.

    UNMOVIC has taken UNSCOM's problems and solved them. One example is that all inspectors are now employees of the Untied Nations. They report only to the United Nations. UNMOVIC has taken a course that is unique in the history of the United Nations. Therefore, what is going on in Iraq today is a very professional operation, with planned objectives. The timeframe that was laid out—which they intend to follow—was laid out under Security Council Resolution 1284 in 1999. That resolution was also an American-sponsored and American-led resolution.

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    The timeframe that was laid out there was basically, as far as I can see, that from the start of work ten months later there would be a definitive report in front of the Security Council. It would be the Security Council that makes the decision as to whether there is a material breach or not.

    A material breach is something one can look at. Certainly lawyers will appreciate trying to determine what is a material breach, or in terms of 1441, what is a further material breach.

    At any rate, in regard to total containment we tend to, as certainly our news media does, be focusing on weapons inspections. They're important, obviously. My own guess is that there aren't very many weapons of mass destruction left in terms of Iraq. Be that as it may, we'll see what is found.

    Equally important and perhaps more important than weapons inspections is some way of monitoring the possibility that Iraq would have the capability to regenerate these weapons of mass destruction programs. No one seems to look at that very much, the ability to regenerate some time in the future. Nevertheless, that is to my mind as important or more so than the weapons themselves.

    I gave a little handout to the clerk, which I pulled together out of my own mind over a period of time. I started this in 1991. What I've tried to show is at least the English acronyms of the whole program the United Nations has, and I've labelled this “Containment as an Alternative to War” and said the key to effective containment is an effective and mutually supporting matrix of control mechanisms.

    I'm not going to go into this at all. It's what I keep calling my bubble diagram. There's no wiring diagram to it, but these are all things that are happening. For example, you often see in our press the idea people have that the sale of $38.5 billion worth of oil since 1996 has gone into the coffers of Saddam Hussein, and he's sitting in one of his palaces, counting American greenbacks. In fact, none of it has gone to Iraq. It has gone into an escrow fund of the United Nations, which is managed by the Office of the Iraq Program. That is dealt with from there. This is just one of the misapprehensions that exists.

    Let me just finally end by something that I have seen in the last two weeks, both in New York and here in Ottawa. There appears to me to be a concerted effort now in the press by certain people to call into question the credentials of Ambassador Blix, pulling on his background in the IAEA.

    The latest one of these I saw today, which really brought it to my attention, is in the Ottawa Citizen, and it's by David Warren. I called his office this afternoon and I left a little message on his machine, and asked him headfirst, had he ever met the man? Then secondly, since he said that he was unqualified for every position he had ever had, did he realize that he had been Foreign Minister of Sweden? With his doctorate in law, perhaps he at least was qualified for that position.

    I've only known Dr. Blix for three years, and not well. He's the chairman and I'm simply a member. You know how that happens with chairmen and members in any committee. At any rate, my impression is that Dr. Blix is an extremely competent individual. He has a unique background. He ran the IAEA, so he knows the nuclear side backwards. He is now responsible for chemicals, biological, and the missile aspects of it.

    I don't think there could have been a better person. No government has questioned his credentials. Most certainly the United States supported his nomination.

    I have seen now Frank Gaffney and Gary Mulholland.... I haven't seen an article by Jim Woolsey, but certainly the “Prince of Darkness”, Richard Pearle....

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    These things are in the newspapers out there. I wouldn't call it a conspiracy, because one shouldn't say that, but most certainly it is a concerted attempt.

    So I'll leave that with you and I'd be glad to answer any detailed questions.

    The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Cleminson.

    We're going to start questions.

    I want to remind the members that Professor David mentioned in his submission the independent research that has been done on the question of the weapons of mass destruction in Iraq by the IISS, the International Institute for Strategic Studies. I want to remind you that the summary of this study was given to all the members.

    Monsieur Obhrai, you can start for five minutes on questions and answers.

    Mr. Deepak Obhrai (Calgary East, Canadian Alliance): Thank you, sir.

    The past inspections that were done through the United Nations and the political play that Saddam did, and subsequently when they left everything, in my opinion, until the U.S. finally put its foot down very strongly and the threat of real war made Saddam change and agree to this inspection....

    There is absolutely no trust for this man--his past record. As well, the United Nations is an arena where you play political games and it's a political situation and every country has its own little interest. Many of my colleagues on this committee won't agree, but it took the U.S. to put its foot absolutely, without any questions, down to the level where we are today.

    I'll agree with you, Ronald. What is the next step after the inspection? If the inspection comes out and says we didn't find anything, is it a full stop with him? That removes it over there. Where is that confidence building that the international community wants? Many of the people who are supporting the U.S.A. are supporting them because if they hadn't done it, it wouldn't have reached this level.

    It's a small step to go over into the war. For all practical purposes, Afghanistan and all this proof, we may not even know. Saddam may be an unpopular man, for all practical purposes, in his region, and that may be a trigger for his people to say yes, finally we got rid of it, and get a chance to talk about it.

    So it's a very small jump, but how do we get confidence after this inspection is done? If you leave Saddam as is and we oppose the war and we don't want to go head to head over this thing, we don't want to do anything about it, what changes are down the road?

    Perhaps you can give me that perspective out there.

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    The Chair: Monsieur David.

    Mr. Charles-Philippe David: I took the time, which is sometimes very boring, to listen to the depositions of the inspectors to Congress. That was two months ago, in September. This was very revealing. First, no inspection system will be perfect and fully satisfactory for anyone to find out everything and to uncover anything that could still be in Iraq, especially underground.

    David Kay, who was one of the inspectors known from his experience at UNSCOM, said basically that if you really wanted to have a foolproof inspection regime and be fully satisfied with the results of the inspection regime, you would need to have inspectors holding hands, going from east, west, south, north Iraq, all the way, and make sure they are detecting and inspecting every piece of territory in Iraq.

    That's the purpose of having inspectors. As long as they don't find anything, you don't have a case. It's better to have them there than not to have them there. As long as they don't find anything, then you have to let it go. Unfortunately, we've lived with dictators before, and we will live with them again. The United States was perfectly at ease to live with Saddam Hussein in the 1980s, and we knew what he was doing.

    Now, if Saddam has weapons of mass destruction and wakes up in the morning and says that he is attacking the United States, he is attacking Israel, he is attacking Turkey, he is attacking Canada, or anybody, there will be a retaliation such that Iraq will disappear from the face of the earth.

    The danger, however, according to the American administration, and it's not totally groundless, is if Saddam were to give those weapons of mass destruction to al-Qaeda or anybody else, any terrorist organization--the Hezbollah, if you want, but hardly a believable scenario in this case--we have to be concerned about that. Obviously, we have to, but there is absolutely still no evidence that there have been serious contacts and serious collaboration between Saddam Hussein and al-Qaeda. If such evidence exists, please show it to us in a very clear-cut manner. So far, the evidence is not offered, and the jury is still out.

    The debate about the weapons of mass destruction is a very heated debate. Right now you have Scott Ritter versus IISS. But I would remind everybody of what Scott Ritter said in 1997 when he resigned from his position. He thought the administration and the international community was too weak and was not inspecting enough and not being hardline enough. So the peacenik of today, the hero of today, was in fact the proponent of very hard measures five years ago. I'm not saying he is wrong; I'm saying he changed his mind.

    The Chair: Mr. Cleminson.

    Mr. Ronald Cleminson: I think the point you are making is a valid one.

    First, the significant thing here is the consensus of the Security Council, all fifteen members. Most certainly essential to the effectiveness is American leadership, but it is American leadership in the multilateral sense, not the unilateral sense. This is a leadership that both George H. Bush and Harry S. Truman provided to the United Nations. That's the kind of leadership I would hope President George W. Bush will provide.

    But most certainly there has to be an answer. This is where initially for two years the Security Council was in consensus with what was going on, then gradually it started to break apart. As soon as it started to break apart, then the Iraqis of course could exploit that. Now the council is at fifteen in agreement. What we need essentially is American leadership, but as I say, American leadership in the multilateral role, and certainly not in the unilateral role.

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[Translation]

    The Chair: You have the floor, Ms. Lalonde.

    Ms. Francine Lalonde (Mercier, BQ): I'd like to thank the two witnesses for their very interesting presentations. Unfortunately, our time is limited.

    Last Sunday, I met with a group of constituents and observed that they were very concerned. Let me put a more positive spin on that. I observed that they were not greatly inclined to trust the Americans. Most people don't want a war. According to a survey reported on in last Saturday's edition of Le Journal de Montréal 75 per cent of the population is opposed to waging a war in Iraq.

    In September, Ms. Condoleezza Rice unveiled a new strategic policy. Is it possible the United States are too deeply involved in this matter? Is it possible that their agenda includes strikes in the not-too-distant future and that they are counting on a number of countries to support their actions?

    Wouldn't this kind of confrontation involve some rather serious risks? Many people fear the possible repercussions in the Arab world and believe the future of mankind could be threatened as a result of such action.

[English]

    The Chair: Mr. Cleminson, do you want to start for us?

    Mr. Ronald Cleminson: I'll simply pass it to Professor David, because it is a political aspect, and UNMOVIC has made the point over a period of time that it's a technical organization. Certainly I think these things are valid, but I wouldn't want to comment on them from a political perspective.

[Translation]

    Mr. Charles-Philippe David: I've been discussing this very subject with the students enrolled in my course War and Peace after 9-11.

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    We've had some very lively discussions over the past 12 weeks. I'll try to summarize them for you in a few points. At issue is the doctrine of preemption and the desire to combat terrorism.

    Obviously, the danger here is to link each strike to the fight against terrorism. Any support on the part of the American public for a strike against Iraq must be weighed within the post-September 11 context.

    Why is Iraq once again front and centre, after being virtually forgotten? That should never have been the case. Air strikes are launched on an almost daily basis in southern and northern Iraq. In the post-September 11 context, anxiety levels are very high in the United States. Once we acknowledge this fact, we can understand the position of the American public. They are afraid of being attacked. When their President says that Saddam may be supplying weapons of mass destruction to al-Qaeda, the public is undoubtedly disturbed by what they are hearing. At the same time, opinion is somewhat divided, as is the case here. I'm not saying that 75 per cent of the people are opposed to a war, but I do sense that opinion is divided, certainly among university students but more generally among those with whom I've been speaking. There is concern about how this war could be waged and about the post-Iraq climate.

    There is indeed a danger that the United States will overextend itself. Many people have said that launching an attack against Iraq could, regrettably, detract attention from the fight against terrorism and could undermine the multilateral effort that is so needed to combat this problem, since the battle cannot be fought alone. We need allies and a multilateral framework within which to act. For example, we need to tackle the problem of who finances terrorist activities and this we cannot do alone. Therefore, embracing the doctrine of preemption against Iraq to extreme could undermine the legitimacy of this war, if actions are not well planned and properly justified.

    After all, there is a history between the United States and Iraq. I'd have to say that one of the main reasons why the Bush administration wants to settle the score with Iraq is that for 12 years now, some members of the administration - you also alluded to this, Mr. Cleminson -- have wanted to oust Saddam Hussein. Installing a new regime in Iraq is not a new idea. It dates back to 1991, but at the time, it was difficult to criticize the victory of the elder Georges Bush, given that it was rather convincing. It was achieved as part of a multilateral effort. However, marching on Baghdad was out of the question then because such a move would have jeopardized multilateral support, particularly within the Arab world. The Arab world is also concerned about the situation.

    Could the various regimes survive an attack on Iraq? Most likely, but at the cost of a certain amount of repression and of maintaining control over their respective societies. However, the risk, as I see it, is that one day, the conflicts between al-Qaeda and the United States, and between the Palestinians and Israel will clash. The most unfortunate kind of fallout from of an attack on Iraq would be a renewed belief in the war of civilizations, which is not an issue today. We could also see the emergence of a war of sorts between Muslims who believe -- and fortunately they account for only a small minority -- that the Arab world is under siege and dominated by the West, and those factions who want to overthrow all of these regimes and replace them with fundamentalist ones. The worst possible thing that could happen would be for the average person on the street to go underground and join the ranks of the terrorists.

[English]

    It's the illusion that Thomas Friedman made, which I thought was very good, of people from the first floor, the open street of the Arab world, going into the basement to fight against the United States. That would be pretty detrimental to the cause.

[Translation]

    I hope I've been able to answer some of your questions.

    The Chair: Thank you, Mr. David.

    Mr. Charbonneau.

    Mr. Yvon Charbonneau (Anjou—Rivière-des-Prairies, Lib.): Mr. Chairman, I agree with many of the views espoused by Mr. David on the consequences or repercussions of a war against Iraq and the possible fallout in the Arab world. In my opinion, such action would only strengthen fundamentalism and the various fundamentalist factions that are present in many Arab countries.

    Mr. David, I'd like you to comment further on the ties between Iraq and al-Qaeda. In your paper, you focus on this subject in greater detail than you did earlier. Could you possibly elaborate further on this? As I see it, Iraq is a Muslim, Arab state, but it is also a secular state. Therefore, the regime's natural inclination is to repress rather than associate with proponents of fundamentalism. It is also important to bear in mind the division between Shiite and Sunni Muslims, that is between the majority and the minority. I'd also like to hear your views on that situation.

    Regarding inspections, the Prime Minister of Canada expressed the widely held view that war can perhaps be averted. However, on listening to President Bush, one gets the impression that inspections are an obligatory step on the road to war. Inspectors say they haven't found anything. Bush maintains that the regime is hiding things. I'd appreciate it if you and Mr. Cleminson could talk to us about the pluses of this inspection mission, its credibility and whether ultimately, if inspectors find anything, their reports will be taken seriously by the Security Council. Conversely, if inspectors find nothing, will their reports also be deemed credible and might they help avert a war? As far as the United States is concerned, war seems inevitable. If the inspection team fails to turn up anything, Iraq must then be hiding something, or so it believes. Conversely, if the inspectors find something, then the US will feel justified in attacking Iraq. Does this inspection mission have any credibility?

»  (1745)  

    The Chair: Mr. David, could you respond to the first question regarding al-Qaeda and Iraq?

    Mr. Charles-Philippe David: If the Americans want a valid reason for going to war with Iraq, maybe the best thing would be for three of their aircraft to be shot down, quite accidently, in the southern part of the country. Obviously, it would then be a matter of defending their national honour. It would be somewhat like the Turner Joy and Maddox incidents in 1964 which justified, whether rightly or wrongly, the US' involvement in the Vietnam War. I'm quite worried that accidents may occur. In times of crises, mistakes are always made. You know that better than I do. In politics, one can never make predictions. Can Saddam Hussein make a mistake? Will someone in the know spill the beans? A nephew could cross over into Jordan and claim to know the location of some biological weapons. I don't think it would take very much for President Bush to say that the terms of resolution 1441 have been broken.

    As for the particular pluses to which you alluded, had we been confronted with a missile crisis like the one the Kennedy regime faced, then I believe public opinion would be reversed and President Bush's actions would have the support of 75 per cent of the population. However, the Bush administration has no such proof, even though references to such proof continue to be made. Compounding the problem for the administration and for inspectors is the fact that ten sites have been inspected since the start of this mission and nothing has turned up. Moreover, photographs of several of the sites can be found in Great Britain's White Paper on weapons of mass destruction. It's rather unfortunate that the inspectors have come up empty because this undermines somewhat the credibility of certain photographs which were purported to be spectacular proof.

    Intelligence capability is the strongest asset they have, Mr. Charbonneau. Scott Ritter alluded to that fact. Intelligence, provided it's accurate, allows inspectors to go somewhere unannounced and find something. The inspection team gets its information from the United States, Great Britain, Israel and many other countries, but this isn't something we hear very much about. Inspectors have more than just a vague idea of where to look for weapons. It's more worrisome, however, if they don't find any weapons, because they are acting on intelligence information that you and I don't have.

    As for the link between Iraq and Al Qaeda, I think we're ultimately going to establish one. I'm not just saying that to make you happy. I'm concerned. We mustn't give Saddam Hussein the idea that the best solution is for him to embrace fundamentalism. He has always been a staunch opponent of fundamentalism, whether of the Shiite or Kurdish variety, displaying the same intensity as the dictator Stalin.

    As for proof of the meeting between Mohammed Attah and Iraqi intelligence services in Prague, quite frankly, Czech secret services have formally denied that any such meeting took place. May I remind everyone that the Czech Republic is a member of NATO. When the Ukraine claims not to have sold any missiles to Iraq, I'm less inclined to believe that's the truth, but the Czech Republic is a member of NATO. If it were lying about this, it would be just as serious as if Canada were lying about the inspectors.

    That's all. I don't wish to take up any more of your time.

[English]

    The Chair: Mr. Cleminson, do you have some comments?

    Mr. Ronald Cleminson: I think Professor David and I will probably start doing an act after this, since we agree on just about everything.

    Let me just give you two points. One is on weapons. We're talking about whether we're going to find weapons or not. First, the IAEA indicated and reported to the Security Council in 1996 that there were no nuclear weapons in Iraq, that there was no clandestine program, and that if there had been one they would have been able to find it. They moved to what's called ongoing monitoring and verification of compliance.

    On the chemical side, the Iraqis brought forward--and this is what they're supposed to do--40,000 shells loaded with chemicals and 40,000 empty shells, plus almost 3,500 tonnes of precursors and chemicals in bulk form. Those were destroyed by Iraq under monitoring by the United Nations.

    In terms of missiles, UNSCOM determined that they could account for 817 of 819 missiles Iraq had bought from Russia.

    In fact, as President Clinton said at one time, UNSCOM had destroyed more of these weapons than the entire war had done, so a lot had been happening. That is why I say UNSCOM is a success, not a failure, although it has had its problems.

    The other issue is tied to al-Qaeda, and there have been a lot of attempts one way or another, but one I remember is that they came up a while back with a photograph. They said that there was a 707 out at a place called Salman Pak near Baghdad and that this was being used to train al-Qaeda people on how to hijack airplanes, and this was a brand-new thing they had just found out. Well, then they found out that in fact UNSCOM had inspected that first in 1991 and five times since then, and it wasn't a 707, it was a TU-134. In fact, the Iraqis were training their people how to storm an aircraft that had been taken by terrorists and how to dislodge the terrorists. Far from cooperating with al-Qaeda, they were in some terror of terrorists.

    I'd only say as well that it seems to me that if you look at the leader of al-Qaeda and the leader of Iraq, they seem to be absolutely different kinds of people. One was a person who was born into wealth, who picked up a cause, and who seems to like to live in a cave. But Saddam, on the other hand, was born in poverty, has come up, and likes to live in palaces, and he has a lot of them.

    Deterrence can work in Iraq. Deterrence cannot work with a terrorist organization that has no national boundaries.

»  (1750)  

    The Chair: Thank you.

    Ms. McDonough, please.

[Translation]

    Ms. Alexa McDonough (Halifax, NDP): Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Thank you as well to our witnesses.

[English]

    Dr. David, you started out by making reference to the propaganda war that's clearly well under way to discredit Dr. Hans Blix. I'm not sure you used the word “propaganda”, but I think that was the general sense of what is going on, and it seems fairly transparent. I think what is a great deal more worrisome is the sense of inevitability, the sense that the U.S. is revved up for war, that it's ready to roll, and that it's just going to find an excuse no matter what.

    It seems to me absolutely imperative that we try to figure out what anyone can do about that. Since we're parliamentarians in Canada, I'd be very interested to know what thoughts you may have on that. What can Canada do in this instance? What should we do? What is our responsibility to try to do vis-à-vis our neighbour, the U.S.?

    We can talk about the importance of multilateralism, and of course we all agree that to have been able to keep the U.S. under the UN umbrella on this and bring them into Resolution 1441 was an important thing. But the question is, if they're going to find a pretext no matter what to get on with their war for their own reasons, then what can Canada do about it? And what ought Canada to do about it, in your view, if in fact the U.S. proceeds?

    Second, on the other side, the role of Arab nations, do you see a role for the League of Arab States here? I think it's been clear that they certainly had some role in bringing Iraq around to full cooperation. I know you indicated--I think both of you did--that the threat of imminent attack may have played some role as well, but it seems as though there was some fairly important diplomatic work done by the League of Arab States in the run-up to 1441. Do you see a continuing role there on the other end where Canada should in some way be connecting with, complementing, or whatever?

[Translation]

    The Chair: Professor David.

[English]

    Mr. Charles-Philippe David: Those are very challenging questions, and I'll perhaps take them in reverse order so I have time to think about Canada, though I do have an answer about Canada.

»  (1755)  

    Ms. Alexa McDonough: We only have five minutes, so make sure we have the answers.

    Mr. Charles-Philippe David: Okay, I'll keep you waiting for the final answer.

    The League of Arab States is not terribly, other than for diplomatic purposes.... For military and security purposes, it's a shame. It's terrible. It's depressing, in a sense. They were not able to get their act together to prevent the Gulf War or even signify to Iraq that they would be very united against Iraq. It was a very divided house.

    The fact that there's no institutional security arrangement in the Middle East other than an American-led security arrangement in the Middle East is very concerning to me when you consider what happens in Europe with NATO, OSCE, and a dozen other organizations. I think the lack of institutional security in the Middle East other than those bases and America being protective of these regimes is something we should be concerned about and concerned about in the long run.

    Now I'll go to the more current and perhaps more interesting question for you, and I think I'll perhaps get into trouble here. I think the Prime Minister of Canada should have very openly and very forcefully supported the French position. I think they could have made some more open, more forceful gestures.

    Basically--and this is in answer to your sense-of-inevitability question--to make sure that we stick with and abide by what's written in 1441.... I am not a lawyer, but we have what is to me a very long resolution, a long, laboured resolution that took over two months, and words mean what they mean. Yes, there are loopholes and there are questions that remain important, but we know that there's going to be use of force. France, like the rest of the Security Council, has been promised that use of force would not be unilateral and that you would have to go back to the current resolution--no second resolution--to obtain that support.

    That's where Canada can play a role, to make sure.... Not that we're going to change the Bush administration's mind. I'm sorry, but I'm very skeptical that we can change anything that has to do with planning this war; it has started. But we can make sure that we put the stakes diplomatically very high if we go outside the UN framework. And it does matter to me--to everyone here it should, I suppose--that the United States will go to war without the support of the UN Security Council over some reason other than what the inspectors find. If they were going as a minority party, at least Canada would be on record as saying that this is not the way to do things.

    I'm concerned about abstract things that will survive this Parliament and survive my life, about some kind of international order and the way we do things. A hundred years from now we'll be looking at these events as significant events in the grand storyline, ones that shaped international relations for hundreds of years.

    Thank you.

    The Chair: Madam Carroll, do you have any questions?

    Ms. Aileen Carroll (Barrie—Simcoe—Bradford, Lib.): I did, but they've been answered.

    The Chair: He answered all your questions? Great.

    It's six o'clock. I know Mr. Cleminson wants to leave.

    Merci beaucoup à nos deux témoins. Thank you very much to both witnesses. It was very interesting, and we hope to see you back in the future. Thank you very much.

    Ms. Aileen Carroll: It occurs to me to say that I agree with you very much. All of it was very interesting, but your comments about what the press is doing to vilify Dr. Blix...I think that's very apparent. And as you said--

    Mr. Ronald Cleminson: And very dangerous.

    Ms. Aileen Carroll: --there's no cause whatsoever. I just hope that people can see through it as you do. I fear that maybe they don't all read so critically.

    The Chair: This is just a reminder, colleagues, that tomorrow morning the committee is sitting at 9:15 in room 701 of La Promenade.

    Thank you. This meeting is adjourned.

Brief Charles Philippe David-Eng