NDVA Committee Meeting

37th PARLIAMENT, 2nd SESSION

Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs

EVIDENCE

CONTENTS

Monday, December 2, 2002

¹

1540

The Chair (Mr. David Pratt (Nepean—Carleton, Lib.))

Mr. Arthur H. Hughes (Director General, Multinational Force and Observers)

The Chair

Mr. Arthur Hughes

The Chair

Mr. Arthur Hughes

The Chair

Mr. Peter Stoffer (Sackville—Musquodoboit Valley—Eastern Shore, NDP)

The Chair

Lieutenant-General (Retired) Richard Evraire (Chairman, Conference of Defence Associations)

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1545

¹

1550

¹

1555

The Chair

Mr. Leon Benoit (Lakeland, Canadian Alliance)

LGen Richard Evraire

º

1600

Mr. Leon Benoit

LGen Richard Evraire

Mr. Leon Benoit

LGen Richard Evraire

Mr. Leon Benoit

LGen Richard Evraire

Mr. Leon Benoit

LGen Richard Evraire

Mr. Leon Benoit

LGen Richard Evraire

Mr. Leon Benoit

Colonel (Retired) Alain Pellerin (Executive Director, Conference of Defence Associations)

Mr. Leon Benoit

LGen Richard Evraire

º

1605

Mr. Leon Benoit

LGen Richard Evraire

Mr. Leon Benoit

LGen Richard Evraire

The Chair

Mr. Bob Wood (Nipissing, Lib.)

LGen Richard Evraire

Col Alain Pellerin

º

1610

Mr. Bob Wood

Col Alain Pellerin

Mr. Bob Wood

LGen Richard Evraire

Col Alain Pellerin

Mr. Bob Wood

LGen Richard Evraire

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1615

Mr. Bob Wood

The Chair

Mr. Peter Stoffer

LGen Richard Evraire

Col Alain Pellerin

Mr. Peter Stoffer

º

1620

LGen Richard Evraire

Mr. Peter Stoffer

LGen Richard Evraire

Mr. Peter Stoffer

LGen Richard Evraire

The Chair

Mr. Janko Peric (Cambridge, Lib.)

º

1625

Col Alain Pellerin

Mr. Janko Peric

Col Alain Pellerin

Mr. Janko Peric

The Chair

Mr. Janko Peric

The Chair

Mr. Janko Peric

The Chair

Mr. Janko Peric

The Chair

Mr. Janko Peric

LGen Richard Evraire

The Chair

Mr. Janko Peric

The Chair

Mr. Janko Peric

The Chair

Mr. Janko Peric

The Chair

Mr. Janko Peric

The Chair

Mrs. Elsie Wayne (Saint John, PC)

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1630

LGen Richard Evraire

Col Alain Pellerin

LGen Richard Evraire

Col Alain Pellerin

Mr. Peter Stoffer

Mrs. Elsie Wayne

LGen Richard Evraire

º

1635

The Chair

Mr. Robert Bertrand (Pontiac—Gatineau—Labelle, Lib.)

Col Alain Pellerin

Mr. Robert Bertrand

Lt-Gen Richard Evraire

Col Alain Pellerin

Mr. Robert Bertrand

º

1640

Lt-Gen Richard Evraire

Mr. Robert Bertrand

Lt-Gen Richard Evraire

The Chair

Mr. Rob Anders (Calgary West, Canadian Alliance)

Col Alain Pellerin

Mr. Rob Anders

LGen Richard Evraire

º

1645

Col Alain Pellerin

Mr. Rob Anders

The Chair

Mr. Joe McGuire (Egmont, Lib.)

LGen Richard Evraire

Mr. Joe McGuire

LGen Richard Evraire

Mr. Joe McGuire

LGen Richard Evraire

º

1650

Mr. Joe McGuire

LGen Richard Evraire

Mr. Joe McGuire

Col Alain Pellerin

Mr. Joe McGuire

Col Alain Pellerin

The Chair

Mr. Leon Benoit

The Chair

Mr. Leon Benoit

The Chair

Mr. Peter Stoffer

LGen Richard Evraire

Mr. Peter Stoffer

LGen Richard Evraire

Mr. Peter Stoffer

LGen Richard Evraire

Mr. Peter Stoffer

LGen Richard Evraire

º

1655

Col Alain Pellerin

LGen Richard Evraire

The Chair

LGen Richard Evraire

»

1700

The Chair

LGen Richard Evraire

Col Alain Pellerin

The Chair

Mrs. Elsie Wayne

LGen Richard Evraire

Mrs. Elsie Wayne

»

1705

Col Alain Pellerin

Mrs. Elsie Wayne

The Chair

Mr. Leon Benoit

Col Alain Pellerin

»

1710

Mr. Leon Benoit

Col Alain Pellerin

Mr. Leon Benoit

Col Alain Pellerin

Mr. Leon Benoit

Col Alain Pellerin

Mr. Leon Benoit

Col Alain Pellerin

The Chair

Mr. Leon Benoit

The Chair

Mr. Bob Wood

»

1715

Col Alain Pellerin

The Chair

Mr. Leon Benoit

LGen Richard Evraire

»

1720

Mr. Leon Benoit

LGen Richard Evraire

Mr. Leon Benoit

LGen Richard Evraire

The Chair

Col Alain Pellerin

The Chair

Mr. Rob Anders

LGen Richard Evraire

Col Alain Pellerin

»

1725

Mr. Rob Anders

LGen Richard Evraire

Mr. Rob Anders

Col Alain Pellerin

Mr. Rob Anders

LGen Richard Evraire

Col Alain Pellerin

Mr. Rob Anders

Col Alain Pellerin

Mr. Rob Anders

Col Alain Pellerin

Mr. Rob Anders

LGen Richard Evraire

Col Alain Pellerin

The Chair

Mr. Bob Wood

The Chair

Mr. Leon Benoit

»

1730

LGen Richard Evraire

Mr. Leon Benoit

LGen Richard Evraire

The Chair

Col Alain Pellerin

The Chair

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CANADA

Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs

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NUMBER 003

l

2nd SESSION

l

37th PARLIAMENT

---

EVIDENCE

Monday, December 2, 2002

[Recorded by Electronic Apparatus]

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[English]

    The Chair (Mr. David Pratt (Nepean—Carleton, Lib.)): I'd like to call to order this meeting of the Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs.

    Members, before we proceed with our scheduled witnesses, I would like to draw your attention to the presence here today of Ambassador Arthur Hughes, who is accredited to the Multinational Force and Observers, an organization responsible for the Sinai, obviously a very critical part of the world where Canadians are involved in terms of the multinational force.

    Ambassador, on behalf of all of the members of the committee, I'd like to extend a warm welcome to you. We hope your meetings here in Ottawa with the Department of Foreign Affairs and the Department of National Defence are very productive, and we also wish you well in your important work.

    Some hon. members: Hear, hear!

    Mr. Arthur H. Hughes (Director General, Multinational Force and Observers): Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

    I would like to thank Canada for the great soldiers it has been sending there to do peace work since 1985.

    The Chair: Thank you.

    The ambassador has provided me with a copy of a document, of which we're going to be getting additional copies. I will circulate those to members of the committee.

    Ambassador, did you receive back the photocopied material?

    Mr. Arthur Hughes: Not yet.

    The Chair: I'm sure it's on its way. Again, though, welcome and thank you for being here.

    Mr. Arthur Hughes: Thank you for sharing the invitation to your meeting.

    The Chair: Mr. Stoffer.

    Mr. Peter Stoffer (Sackville—Musquodoboit Valley—Eastern Shore, NDP): Thank you, Mr. Chair. I don't want to interject in the meeting before we hear from our witnesses, but I'm being asked by many veterans groups about when we are going to strike a subcommittee on veterans to address some of their serious issues. As you know, we had a veterans' affairs subcommittee in the last session. We haven't gotten around to doing that this time, though. I'm just wondering if we could do that fairly quickly in the new year, so that we can deal with some of those issues.

    The Chair: Thank you for that intervention, Mr. Stoffer. I know a number of members on this side would like to get that committee up and running as quickly as possible, but I understand that there may be some problems in terms of our whip's office getting a list of members out. We will attempt to deal with that just as quickly as possible, so that we can get the subcommittee up and running very quickly.

    At this point, I'm very pleased to welcome two faces who are very familiar to this committee: retired Lieutenant-General Richard J. Evraire,chairman of the Conference of Defence Associations; and retired Colonel Alain Pellerin.

    Gentlemen, you have the floor. Please proceed.

[Translation]

    Lieutenant-General (Retired) Richard Evraire (Chairman, Conference of Defence Associations): Mr. Chairman, ladies and gentlemen, good afternoon.

    I am pleased to offer these remarks from the Conference of Defence Associations on a topic that should be of concern to all Canadians, that is, the decline of the Canadian Forces.

[English]

    Mr. Chair, this committee is already in receipt of the Conference of Defence Associations Institute's latest study A Nation at Risk: The Decline of the Canadian Forces, released on October 8 of this year. We believe this study is both timely and relevant in light of the Speech from the Throne delivered on September 30. The government's commitment to set out

before the end of this mandate...a long-term direction on international and defence policy that reflects our values and interests and ensures that Canada’s military is equipped to fulfill the demands placed upon it,

is very welcome and is seen for what it is: one of a number of steps on a very long journey.

    It must be realized that this promise will do nothing to solve the current short-term crisis that the forces are facing, and for which an emergency infusion of funds of $1.5 billion must be made to the defence budget in order to stop further loss of operational capability and to stop further deterioration of existing equipment and infrastructure, as well as to allow for adequate equipping and training of our men and women in uniform. If this short-term action is not taken immediately, the Canadian Forces will continue to dwindle below a level of operational capability already considered inadequate in terms of this government's defence policy in the 1994 defence white paper, and this will cause serious risk to our nation.

    It is no secret that the state of the Canadian Forces is critical. Over the past year, parliamentary and other respected agencies and organizations have confirmed that fact. You will find selected recommendations of twelve of these agencies and organizations—including this committee's recommendations of May 2002—at annex C of our report.

[Translation]

    A Nation at Risk was written with two objectives in mind: to develop and support, using additional information, the analysis and results of the similar study of defence that we published a year ago under a title Caught in the Middle: An Assessment of the Operational Readiness of the Canadian Forces.

    To meet this first objective, we present what I can only describe as irrefutable evidence that the Canadian Forces are in a state of crisis.

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[English]

    Because the state of the forces is critical, I do urge you to read the document in detail. I promise that you will be troubled by the information we have assembled, as it does illustrate the seriousness, the immediacy, and the depth of the malaise afflicting the Canadian Forces today. It's a malaise that cannot be corrected solely through a commitment by the government to set out, some two years from now, a long-term direction on international and defence policy. The personnel, equipment, and training shortfalls from which the Canadian Forces suffer today, Mr. Chair, place the Canadian Forces at risk today.

    Secondly, our study examines how, at a time of growing world instability, the pursuit of Canada's national interests of prosperity, security, and the promotion of Canadian values are also at risk as a direct result of the fact that our armed forces have fallen into disrepair. We have identified three related areas of risk.

    The first of these areas is Canada's economy. Given our extraordinarily heavy reliance on trade with the United States, any major disruption to the United States' economy will have severe repercussions on Canada's economy. Canada must therefore, in a meaningful way, assist the United States and other like-minded nations in the maintenance of world peace and security, without which normal trade flows will be disrupted. To do so, Canada must have viable, deployable, and sustainable armed forces. Canada currently cannot claim to have such armed forces.

[Translation]

    The second area is Canada's security in the face of the various threats that exist both outside and within Canada's borders. Defending Canada's territory and North America, in cooperation with the United States, remains essential. If we are not prepared to contribute to this defence in a viable manner, Canada's sovereignty will be jeopardized.

[English]

    The third element is Canada's sovereignty. If Canadians are not prepared to contribute in a meaningful and viable way to the defence of Canada, and if the threat to our country is viewed by the United States as a threat to their territorial integrity, then the U.S. will defend their territory as well as our own in whatever way suits them. This, Mr. Chair, cannot but result in a severe loss of our sovereignty. To quote Minister McCallum from a recent Toronto speech, “sovereignty does not come cheap.”

    The CDA Institute's study A Nation at Risk shows that problems common to all three of Canada's armed services, as well as to the reserves and the logistics element, contribute to the crisis in Canadian defence. These problems begin with inadequate funding, which is the fundamental problem from which the others flow. The second is demilitarization. Between one-quarter and one-third of the budget of the Department of National Defence not available for spending on military capabilities. This point is addressed in annex A of our study, and I will briefly address it in my concluding remarks. The third is a severe shortage of personnel, especially those with leadership experience and technical skills. Fourth is a severe shortage of spare parts and other supplies. Fifthly, equipment is rusting out. Finally, infrastructure on military bases is decaying. And when we apply this template of problems to each of the components of Canada's military, we quickly see the risks emerge.

[Translation]

    The navy will be forced to take more ships out of service, and will not be able to assemble and maintain independent Canadian task groups. This means that instead of deploying a distinctly Canadian naval presence in international operations, our navy will only be able to deploy individual Canadian ships and assign them to task groups of other navies.

[English]

    The army is in the worst condition of all of the three services. Personnel levels are well below those required to execute assigned missions. The constant rotations of personnel overseas adds a dimension of instability and disarray that contributes to personnel stress and a rundown of professional expertise. The army is running a deficit in all its budget accounts—a deficit approaching $1 billion per annum.

    A serious shortage in the number of skilled technical tradesmen and spare parts exists. We believe these problems could result in 40% to 50% of army weapons and vehicles being grounded over the next eighteen months. We think the army as it now stands is unsustainable.

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[Translation]

    For the air force, the most critical limitation today is a lack of trained and experienced personnel. Aircraft holdings have been reduced from over 700 to fewer than 300 over the past decade. More reductions could be in the works as there is insufficient money to upgrade existing holdings of fighter, maritime patrol and transport aircraft. The Sea King helicopter is a special case that needs no elaboration.

    The air force cannot airlift army units overseas without help from allies or foreign civilian agencies. There is no strategic air-to-air refueling capability, and electronic warfare capability is next to non-existent. Flying hours have been cut to reduce operations and maintenance costs, further complicating the critical training and experiential gaps.

    Also, sovereignty patrols over the vast Canadian Arctic have diminished just as climate change raises prospects of expanded traffic and trade in that vulnerable region.

[English]

    Turning to the reserves, the army reserve—or militia—could provide significant assistance in resolving some of the army's personnel shortages. Indeed, a recent initiative to do this has been achieved with the assignment of a composite militia company to the infantry battalion group recently deployed in Bosnia. However, it is far from certain that this contribution can be sustained. Overall, the militia suffers from the same limitations as the rest of the army. Plans have been put forward to increase militia strength, as mentioned by the minister when he appeared in front of this committee, but no funds have been allotted to that program.

    In regard to logistics support, the adequacy of logistics support in any operation can indeed determine the success or failure of that military operation. Unfortunately, the malaise that grips the fighting services also afflicts the logistics element of the forces. The resulting shortage of trained personnel, and a policy of replacing military logisticians with contracted civilians, could indeed place the success of operations and the safety of personnel at risk. Making matters worse is the fact that the logistics system does not have enough supplies to sustain military operations.

[Translation]

    A major portion of our study is devoted to Canada-U.S. relations. This is a hot-button topic in Canada today, as it focuses directly on the sensitive issue of sovereignty. Ironically, many of the people who are against spending money on defence cannot see that a primary means of maintaining national sovereignty is to maintain healthy armed forces, as highlighted recently by Mr. Tom Axworthy.

[English]

    The Canada–U.S. relationship is a unique one. It is unique in its complexity and scope. Our two nations share an extensive web of ties in areas ranging from free trade through defence to the environment. Canadian bilateral trade relations with the United States are the most significant in the world. Some 87% of Canada's exports are with the U.S.; hence, anything that injures the U.S. economy will immediately impact negatively on Canadian trade, and therefore on our prosperity. To keep trade channels open and healthy, Canada must contribute armed forces to missions that support international stability.

[Translation]

    At the end of July, CDA interviewed a broad range of Americans in Washington on the subject of Canada-U.S. relations, especially as regards Canada's defence contributions. Those who were interviewed demonstrated a sound understanding of Canadian internal affairs. They all expressed a strong concern over the decline of the Canadian forces in the past decade. Their detailed comments, as well as information on the controversial topic of northern command and ballistic missile defence, are provided in our study.

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[English]

    Mr. Chair, I cannot end my intervention without drawing your attention to an important fact regarding government-reported funding of DND and the Canadian Forces. Repeatedly of late, and most recently in its response to the latest SCONDVA recommendations, the government has stated that

the $3.9 billion of new funding in the Budgets of 1999 and 2000 and the more than $1.2 billion in new funding in the 2001 Budget mean that the Government will, this fiscal year and over the period extending to 2006-2007, have increased Defence funding by a total of $5.1 billion.

    Mr. Chair, when the government states it has added $5.1 billion to the DND budget since 1999, what it does not say is that up to one-quarter of that amount has been assigned to non-operational objectives or to service the operations and maintenance deficit. The Auditor General has identified the latter as $1.3 billion per annum.

    Over the period 1999-2007, during which the $1.5 billion is to be applied, the accumulative O and M deficit will be $8.4 billion. As well, the Auditor General has identified additional shortfalls of some $5 billion to $6 billion in the DND capital account. Most importantly, over the same period, only $750 million of the $5.1 billion has been added to the DND budget base. This means most of the money will either be used to pay current bills or will be transferred to other government agencies or to provinces, with little left over to prevent the further decline of the Canadian Forces and allow them to prepare for the future. In other words, the $5.1-billion expenditure will barely allow DND and the Canadian Forces to keep their heads above water.

    Mr. Chair, the Canadian Forces are in crisis. This is not an apocalyptic statement. Rather, it is a logical conclusion drawn from our study A Nation at Risk. As a result, we face increased risk to our economic well-being, to our security, and to our sovereignty. We in the CDA are especially worried that the ongoing defence update, now apparently in its final stages in DND, will result in arbitrary cuts to military capabilities and will amount to little more than an exercise aimed at constraining our armed forces to live within the existing annual budget of $12 billion—I repeat that 25% of it is spent on other than direct operational readiness requirements—and will increase the decline of the Canadian Forces.

    The CDA strongly believes and recommends that the ongoing defence update should be used to support an emergency additional allocation of $1.5 billion to the DND budget base in order to arrest the decline of the forces and provide a stable foundation for rehabilitation. This figure, you will know, is entirely consistent with recent recommendations made by the Senate and House of Commons defence committees and by the Auditor General. In this vein, we fully support the recommendations of this committee to increase the defence budget by between 1.5% and 1.6% over the next three years, up from the current 1.1%. We think an immediate infusion of funds is absolutely necessary to prevent the loss of critical operational capabilities.

    The Canadian government must then carry out a full defence policy review—with parliamentary and public input, as recommended by this committee—with a view to publishing a new white paper in 2003 or 2004 at the latest. When conducting that defence policy review, the following key question must be asked and answered by informed and responsible Canadians: What kind of armed forces, for what kind of Canada, in what kind of world?

[Translation]

    Mr. Chairman, thank you for your kind attention. I will be glad to answer any questions you may have.

[English]

    Thank you, Mr. Chair. I am prepared—as is Colonel Pellerin, our executive director at the CDA—to answer any questions you might have.

    The Chair: General, once again, thank you for your presentation.

    Our first questioner is Mr. Benoit, for seven minutes.

    Mr. Leon Benoit (Lakeland, Canadian Alliance): Thank you, Mr. Chair.

    Thank you for being here today, gentlemen.

    In your presentation, under the army section, you have a figure showing the running of a deficit of $1 billion. The way you put it is, “The army is running a deficit in all its budget accounts; a deficit approaching $1 billion per annum.” What would that figure be in the navy and the air force?

    LGen Richard Evraire: We have to refer to the Auditor General's figure of a $1.5-billion operating deficit annually. So, in fact, the army is close to $1 billion, with the other two services making up the difference of $500 million to $600 million, for an operating deficit total of $1.5 billion.

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    Mr. Leon Benoit: Is that where the $1.5-billion figure that you've asked for has come from?

    LGen Richard Evraire: We don't necessarily see the whole of that amount being applied to the O and M deficit. There would have to be some partitioning or allotting of those funds in a way that would stave off some increase to the O and M deficit or budget deficit, but funds would also have to be applied to a variety of other functions in the service.

    In looking at $1.5 billion as the requirement, our principal concern is to prevent further loss of operational capability. This may require the continuation of O and M deficits in some areas in order to stave off the continued disappearance of operational capabilities.

    Mr. Leon Benoit: In your report, you also called for more money for capital expenditures. In your presentation here, you've called for more money to help build up the reserves, to build up logistics support, and so on. Yet you've only called for $1.5 billion per year. I'm just wondering why you've set the sights so low. It clearly doesn't do the job. You said there would still be operational and maintenance deficits even with that amount.

    LGen Richard Evraire: To go back to the final remarks in the formal presentation, our current concern is to stave off the loss of further operational capability. We are not in a position to suggest exactly how much money would be required beyond that, simply because we believe a requirement exists for a major defence policy review to be carried out, at the conclusion of which the costs of doing what the forces are required to do could be determined.

    Again, as I said, our concern is staving off any further loss of operational capability. Indeed, in the consultation last July or August with the Minister of National Defence, almost in response to the very same question, I indicated to the minister that we were not going to say we needed so much more over time. Our concern was a full defence policy review before much more money is allotted to the forces.

    Mr. Leon Benoit: Putting this all together, though, it sounds to me like you've conceded that the next white paper will lead to a considerably smaller Canadian Forces.

    LGen Richard Evraire: No, the $1.5 billion is to be applied to preventing the forces as they exist today from further losing operational capability.

    Mr. Leon Benoit: But you did say they would still be running operational and capital deficits.

    LGen Richard Evraire: Yes.

    Mr. Leon Benoit: Then if you're going to keep the forces at their current size, that leads to the conclusion that you'll have to put more money in than the $1.5 billion added to the base budget.

    LGen Richard Evraire: You would indeed. Your point is well taken. We can see a continuing increasing deficit in the capital acquisition budget.

    Mr. Leon Benoit: Yes, that has been increasing regularly as money has been taken from capital and put into operations and maintenance.

    Maybe I can give some advice to your organization, since you give us a lot that I do appreciate a lot. You've provided very good information, but when you're suggesting funding to government, I would suggest that you set the sights at a level that really would, at the very least, lead to the maintenance of the forces as they are until a white paper actually does take place—if it does—and would lead to some of the capital purchases that you know and have said in your papers are absolutely necessary, like strategic airlift and so on. You've gone through the list.

    Colonel (Retired) Alain Pellerin (Executive Director, Conference of Defence Associations): If I could just add to that, our first priority is to address the concerns of the next budget, as the general has mentioned. We feel the $1.5 billion addresses the immediate concern. It doesn't address, for instance, capital acquisition or what will follow afterward. Obviously, there's a requirement for more than that, as you suggest, but between now and the defence budget in February, that $1.5 billion is what we need to address the most urgent matter.

    Mr. Leon Benoit: What are you going to say if the minister comes up with $1.2 billion per year being added to the base budget?

    LGen Richard Evraire: Obviously, our response would have to be that the forces will continue to lose operational capabilities. That is exactly what will happen, as far as we're concerned. We will have to ground more aircraft and we will be less capable than we are now of maintaining ships at sea. The capabilities will simply be reduced.

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    Mr. Leon Benoit: In your report, you refer in two ways to the economic impacts of Canada losing capability in the forces. First, you say we can't contribute to help the United States prevent their economy from declining. And you then go on to imply—although you don't say it—that because Canada isn't coming across when the Americans ask us to, our trade is hurt. I'd just like you to expand a bit on both of those if you could.

    LGen Richard Evraire: On the second point, I think the word is “linkage”.

    Mr. Leon Benoit: Yes, and it's reality, it's human nature, isn't it?

    LGen Richard Evraire: Yes, and we feel that unless we are viably contributing to the defence of North America by, in the very first instance, ensuring the defence of Canada, then I think the reaction of the Americans will be negative and may impact on trade.

    The other point is that unless we are prepared to contribute, without being too specific, to peace and security in the world generally, then I think trade will simply be much more difficult and much more complicated. Of course, if our own trade and that of the United States is caused grief, then since we depend to such a large extent on the American economy, our own will quite obviously and consequently be caused some difficulty.

    I would simply refer to that very clear and visible difficulty along the Canada–U.S. border on September 11 and September 12. Trade flows were halted for a number of days, and they continue to be less than what they used to be prior to September 11. Can this have had anything but a detrimental effect on trade with the United States? If there's any other disturbance to the American economy, whether it's a terrorist attack somewhere else in the United States or in a major country trading with the United States, either along its border or at its ports anywhere along the American literals—and the Canadian ones, for that matter—there can't but be a negative impact on the economy.

    I made one point recently that had to do with trade. Unless Canada is contributing to peace and security in Africa in some way or another, can NEPAD expect to make it to first base? If indeed the countries that NEPAD is designed to help are themselves in conflict or their borders are in conflict, how far can we expect to go with a program of that sort that requires peace and security?

    The Chair: General, thank you.

    Thank you, Mr. Benoit.

    Mr. Wood.

    Mr. Bob Wood (Nipissing, Lib.): Thank you, Mr. Chair.

    Your report suggests that the 2001 federal budget misled the public on defence spending. That report says that of the $1.2 billion allocated, only $300 million was available for what you called “other purposes”.

    The next paragraph is also suggesting the public may have been misled when you say:

The Government also noted that it had allocated $ 5.1 billion to defence since 1999. What it did not say is that most of that amount had been assigned either to non-military objectives, or to service the Operations and Maintenance deficit.

    Sir, are you suggesting the government has deliberately misled the public?

    LGen Richard Evraire: The government has provided an amount of information, but less than might have been made available for a full understanding of what the money is used for. The $12.1-billion annual budget does not all go to operational capabilities. Part of that—in fact, close to 25%—in part goes to paying pensions, the costs of assistance to civil authorities for floods, ice storms, and a variety of things like that, if you look at budgets from the recent past. Not all of the $12.1 billion goes to operational capabilities.

    Col Alain Pellerin: I would add two examples to that. The fundamental problem that we're discussing here—and which your report also discussed in May—is the operational readiness of the Canadian Forces. To say $5.1 billion has been addressed to that problem is somewhat misleading, because in the $5.1 billion, for instance, only $700 million to $750 million has been added to the budget base.

    My two examples are of money that is included in the $5.1 billion but doesn't address the armed forces. For instance, in either the 1999 or 2000 budget, a flowthrough of $450 million went to the provinces of Ontario and Quebec for the ice storm and had nothing to do with the armed forces. Last year, in the $1.2 billion addressed to defence, about $450 million was for the Office of Critical Infrastructure Protection and Emergency Preparedness and the NBC Response Team. It was a flowthrough from the Department of National Defence either to the provinces or to other projects, and it didn't address the operational readiness of the Canadian Forces, which is the fundamental problem.

º  (1610)  

    Mr. Bob Wood: Reading that, you could also get the suggestion that the government should maybe split DND into two parts, one for dealing with aggression—for lack of a better word—and one for housecleaning. Is that true?

    Col Alain Pellerin: I think it would more clearly identify what is for the Canadian Forces. As the general mentioned, out of close to $12 billion, for instance, about $2 billion is for paying the pensions of the Canadian Forces, which is obviously required. Close to $1 billion is for other government projects like bilingualism, etc., and for some flowthrough to the provinces. Also, over the next four to five years, close to $1 billion will be allocated to the cleaning up of the environment at places like either the Argentia base or the DEW Line up north. It has nothing to do with the operational readiness of the Canadian Forces. So out of a budget of about $12 billion, you really end up with less than $9 billion that is addressed to the operational readiness of the Canadian Forces.

    Mr. Bob Wood: You're suggesting that $1.5 billion go in this year in this new budget, right? Are you suggesting that all of that should go to the operations and maintenance deficit? Is that what I hear you people saying? Explain that to me.

    LGen Richard Evraire: In fact, no. The $1.5 billion that we're suggesting would have to obviously be spread around to various O and M, some capital, a great deal of personnel development, training, and a variety of other issues, so that the forces can maintain their operational capability. To achieve that, you need equipment, personnel, training, and a variety of things. The $1.5 billion cannot be addressed to any single item in the pot.

    Col Alain Pellerin: It's also to increase the budget base, which has not been addressed satisfactorily in the last two to three years or in the last two to three budgets.

    Mr. Bob Wood: I would be interested in finding out precisely what you think the role of the Canadian Forces should be.

    LGen Richard Evraire: Interestingly, the forces respond to government tasking—and I'm basing my comments on the 1994 white paper—which currently includes the defence of Canada, the defence of North America, and participation in international peace and security. As a G-7 country, I think Canada owes it to itself and to the rest of the world to contribute in a meaningful way in all three of those areas. Quite obviously, if you wish to attribute an order of priority, I think the order is quite correct. We defend our own territory to the extent that we can, in conjunction with allies; we defend North America the same way; and we contribute as much as we possibly can abroad.

    The forces should have an ability to contribute to a variety of roles within those three elements. We go from one end of the spectrum to the very other. In fact, our study has a chart indicating the variety of involvements from peacekeeping to high-intensity operations. If Canada is to remain a sovereign country, it should have forces that can compete in a viable way. I'm not suggesting that we should in any way be as capable as the Americans. We shouldn't be the same size as them, quite obviously. But proportionately and in terms of our economic capacity, we should be able to contribute to all of those areas. Indeed, if we have to make choices, then they should be—as the policy calls for right now—a reduction in the intensity of our ability in any of those eleven or twelve categories of involvement, as opposed to eliminating one entirely.

    If one eliminates a full capacity, if one chooses from a menu to fill some but not all military capabilities, then one is dependent on other countries to fill the bill when they can and when it suits them. Therefore, you're potentially causing yourself some grief in those areas.

º  (1615)  

    Mr. Bob Wood: Thank you, Mr. Chair.

    The Chair: Thank you, General.

    Thank you, Mr. Wood.

    Mr. Stoffer, for seven minutes.

    Mr. Peter Stoffer: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

    Gentlemen, thank you for your presentation. I must say I was impressed with the press conference that the CDA held a few months ago. I noticed that the tone of that press conference and the tone of this text that you've presented were a little more tempered than that of your colleagues like, say, Jack Granatstein, who was much more vocal and visceral in his concerns.

    One of the concerns that I always have—and I notice the minister is saying this as well—is that if the government does not put any more money into defence in the next budget.... Right now, we have approximately 52,000 to 54,000 regular troops, depending on who you argue with. What will happen to those service personnel who are contemplating leaving if there is no more additional money in the budget?

    LGen Richard Evraire: I'm engaging in speculation, but I'm trying to remember my own situation as a member of the forces. I wanted to belong to an organization that had a future, was an interesting one to work in, was professionally competent, and had the equipment to do its job. My reaction now would be, “I'm not quite sure I want to stick around very long. If the government doesn't think my job is important, why should I bother? Maybe I can do something better somewhere else. I'm a talented individual and I want to contribute, but I'm not being allowed to do that in the way I think I ought to.” I would probably choose to go.

    Col Alain Pellerin: Just to address the numbers, the total number in the forces now is 61,000, because recruitment has been good on the whole. But the effective strength is really the same, because you don't have an effective strength to go from 52,000 to 60,000 overnight. It remains at 52,000 to 53,000. There are still critical shortages in terms of combat service support and technicians. The recruitment drive didn't satisfactorily address those.

    On the other issue that you raise about the future, I think the concern that we have to look at—and this is from our own information—is that the people in the ranks from sergeant to major, those who are really the backbone of the armed forces, those who are getting close to the 20/40, are asking the questions that the general was asking: What's the future of the armed forces? We keep hearing about the uptempo, we keep hearing we're doing a wonderful job and whatnot, but is our government listening? I think the message that we hear and the conclusion that they draw, especially in that expertise range—which is crucial to the armed forces not to just keep them going, but to train all the new recruits—is whether they should stay with an organization that doesn't really care for their future.

    Mr. Peter Stoffer: Mr. Chairman, I just want to reiterate those comments. Recently, you've been to Bosnia, Mr. Chairman, and so have I, and that's exactly what the troops are saying. They're waiting with bated breath for the next budget, and if the government indicates its unwillingness to show some support in that regard financially, then I suspect our guests are right and that an awful lot of people will leave the military, because the private sector is calling, especially in the fields of engineering, for example.

    On pages xxii and xxiii of the report that we were handed, it says:

The only way that the Prime Minister and his close advisors could be convinced to increase defence spending would be if a major national embarrassment were to occur because of weak Canadian Forces. In the present situation this is possible.

    I was wondering if you could please elaborate a bit more on that. When you say “national embarrassment”, are you talking about a terrorist strike or something happening to our troops overseas? Precisely what do you mean by that?

º  (1620)  

    LGen Richard Evraire: Sadly, I think we would always expect that something could possibly happen to our troops overseas. Indeed, things have happened in almost all of the areas of involvement. But if there were a national disaster, if there was a terrorist threat, if there was a major disruption in Canada of the nature of something like 9/11, one would have to be concerned about Canada's ability to respond to a crisis of that sort.

    Were we to leave our troops in Bosnia right now and contribute what we might possibly be able to contribute in a potential war in Iraq, how well could we respond to a situation in which a natural disaster occurred in Canada or a tragic terrorist attack occurred in Canada? The cloth is threadbare and could easily rend. If all of those troops were in fact deployed abroad, we would be hard-pressed to participate and to contribute to a national, at-home disaster.

    Mr. Peter Stoffer: This is my last question, Mr. Chairman.

    When I was over in Bosnia, I was talking to the Delta reservists, and they're almost split down the middle in terms of asking for legislation that would protect their jobs when they leave. You had mentioned here that the militia could alleviate a lot of the concerns of the Canadian Forces, but a lot of the militia either have to quit their jobs or hope that they have a compassionate employer who will allow them to leave. Some of them have withheld their courses for a year in order to serve their country. Now, the reservists are split. If you ask one, that person says they absolutely have to have job protection. Another one says, no, if you put in job protection, the employer may not hire them.

    I would like to ask the CDA's professional opinion on this particular issue about asking the government to invoke job legislation similar to that in the United States, in order to protect the reservists' employment when they leave to serve their country, so that they can come back and still have their jobs. Again, I'm in favour of it, but the reservists are split down the middle. I'd like to know your opinion on it, please.

    LGen Richard Evraire: I have to admit to not having given a great deal of thought to that specific point.

    Mr. Peter Stoffer: Shame.

    LGen Richard Evraire: As I do, however, my suggestion is that it brings up two problems. First of all, our reliance on the militia is a result of the fact that we are very short of regular force personnel, to the extent that we must incorporate the militia and the other reserves into what the regular forces do. Despite the fact that there is this possibility that some employers might play the game by not hiring people who would be employed as reservists, as you suggested, if the legislation were designed in such a way as to not make it such a detriment to the employers, I think they would still agree to employ reservists, but the nature of the legislation would tell all. Obviously, though, if it were a severe problem for employers, then I suggest that they wouldn't play the game, quite naturally. So the nature of the legislation is all important in this issue.

    The Chair: Thank you, General.

    Thank you, Mr. Stoffer.

    Mr. Peric.

    Mr. Janko Peric (Cambridge, Lib.): Thank you, Mr. Chair.

    To both gentlemen here, in the last 15 to 20 minutes, I've had the opportunity to go through this publication. It's very interesting. You mention that you're non-profit, charitable, and non-partisan, but in the articles that I had the opportunity to read, it sounds like this publication is coming from the Canadian Alliance, not from a non-partisan, non-governmental side. Even Leon would be more objective than you gentlemen, you are so critical about Canadian defence. I'm just wondering how long you have been retired.

º  (1625)  

    Col Alain Pellerin: Sorry, but I don't know what you're talking about.

    Mr. Janko Peric: Well, let me get to the point. How long have you been out of the active forces?

    Col Alain Pellerin: Six years.

    Mr. Janko Peric: Six years.

    The Chair: Mr. Peric, from my standpoint, asking personal questions to the witnesses is not in order. If you want to ask about policy issues, defence-related issues, I think that's very important.

    Mr. Janko Peric: Exactly, and I'm getting to that, Mr. Chair.

    The Chair: If you want to talk about the organization, that's on line as well.

    Mr. Janko Peric: Mr. Chair, I have seven minutes, right?

    The Chair: Yes.

    Mr. Janko Peric: Then please don't interrupt.

    The Chair: It's my job to interrupt when things aren't going the way they should, Mr. Peric.

    Mr. Janko Peric: Don't interrupt, because I'm not finished.

    Gentlemen, were you so critical of the Canadian Forces while you were active?

    LGen Richard Evraire: Mr. Chair, I would delight in the opportunity to respond to that question, if I may.

    The Chair: No, I'm actually going to rule that question out of order as well, Mr. Peric, because that question really goes to the issue of the politicization of the armed forces, and that's not something that is—

    Mr. Janko Peric: I just want to hear from the witnesses. When I hear criticism, the criticism should be constructive.

    The Chair: Mr. Peric, you're eating up a lot of your time with a question that is not in order. I'm asking you to ask a question that is in order.

    Mr. Janko Peric: Mr. Chair, my question to our witnesses is whether they were—

    The Chair: I just ruled that question out of order, Mr. Peric. The military are not permitted to get engaged in politics when they're in uniform. They can do so without any difficulty when they're retired.

    Mr. Janko Peric: Exactly. That's my point.

    The Chair: Do you have anything further, Mr. Peric?

    Mr. Janko Peric: No.

    The Chair: Okay.

    Next on our list is Mrs. Wayne, for seven minutes.

    Mrs. Elsie Wayne (Saint John, PC): Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.

    Mr. Chair, I would like to bring something to the attention of the lieutenant-general and colonel once again. It won't surprise Colonel Pellerin that I'm going to speak about the lack of funds for replacements for the operational support ships, which they refer to on page 12. This has contributed directly to the industry department's decision to shut down the Canadian shipbuilding industry.

    I come from Saint John, New Brunswick, where we built the frigates. Since we closed down the shipyard, we have seen a very negative impact not on the industry in the U.S.A., but on the industry in Canada. I've been involved for 27 years, although only for 10 years up here. In the last 10 years, I have seen places in Saint John with paper bags up in the windows, and I've seen stores closing, and this all plays a major role in that.

    When we're talking about industry, we're talking about industry in Canada, because those dads who worked at that shipyard—almost 4,000 of them—fed their families and educated their children. They now come up from the U.S.A. and say we have the best shipbuilders anywhere the world, and the Americans offer them jobs down in the U.S.A. What are we doing in our country? Yes, we need the ships for our navy, but there's a twofold effect to this. The other is on our industry right here in Canada. It has been affected negatively right across this nation.

    Tell me something. When it comes to replacing the Sea Kings.... I'll go back to the navy, and then I'll go to the Sea Kings.

    While I was flying up today, I was reading an article in one of the national papers in which a coast guard representative was saying they cannot look after our coast out west, nor can they do it back east. This is a major concern. We talk about terrorist attacks. Glory be to God, they can come in on their ships and we can't stop them. We don't do the patrols. We don't have the ships to give to our navy to do the patrols and to look after the borders here in Canada.

    Have you looked at both sides of this right here? You mentioned the U.S. economy, but it has affected our economy as well.

º  (1630)  

    LGen Richard Evraire: It has indeed.

    Mr. Chair, the previous report of the CDA covered precisely this issue of the contribution of a—Dare I use this dirty term?—military industrial complex to Canada's economy. It's a bad name. The sound of that just sends shudders up and down one's spine, doesn't it? But I suggest that every time a base is to be closed or, as Mrs. Wayne suggests, an important industry such as the shipping yards in Saint John is shut down, the response is that we obviously should be much more involved.

    You mentioned the coast guard. The fisheries generally, the coast guard, and the Canadian Forces are all potential users of ships that might be built there. The CDA study—and Colonel Pellerin will remember the title of it—

    Col Alain Pellerin: It came out two years ago, and it was called Stability and Prosperity: The Benefits of Investmentin Defence.

    LGen Richard Evraire: Two years ago, that study made it very clear that there was a benefit to Canada's economy and to certain specific regions traditionally, as well.

    Col Alain Pellerin: I don't want to steal your time, but my answer follows from the question Mr. Wood asked before about the armed forces. I think we obviously need armed forces for our own sovereignty, but we also need our armed forces.... If we look at our history, we haven't really used our military force for military operations in Canada since Louis Riel's North-West Rebellion in 1885. All our wars have been fought abroad. If history tells us anything, it will be the same in the future, and if we need to deploy forces abroad, we need to have the lift to be able to deploy them, whether it's the strategic airlift or the sealift. That has to be addressed. I would suggest that it has to be addressed in a broad, national policy review from which defence policy and foreign policy would flow.

    The Americans recently published their own national strategy. We can agree or disagree with what's in it, but at least there is an umbrella, a national security policy. From that, our defence policy, foreign policy, and industrial policy naturally flow. Obviously, we shouldn't let our shipbuilding expertise die out in a country like Canada.

    Mr. Peter Stoffer: Hear, hear!

    Mrs. Elsie Wayne: On page 15 of your report, you suggest the following:

Within 3-5 years, the state of the Canadian Navy stands to be reducedfrom a Rank 3 World-Class force, to a Rank 6 “Offshore Territorial Defence Navy”.

Would you explain to us the substantive difference between a rank 3 and a rank 6 navy, and can you tell us in greater detail what you perceive happening in the next three to five years that would cause that decline, sir?

    LGen Richard Evraire: Mr. Chair, I'm not sure I can in fact give you a very technically correct response to this. The fact remains, though, that our navy is currently in considerable difficulty if it expects to deploy a task force—five to seven ships, including an AOR, along with frigates or destroyers, and helicopters—that would turn out to be a visible, recognizable, tangible contribution. This was the case precisely at the start of the navy's involvement in the Arabian Gulf. Since then, we have heard quite recently—in fact, only last week—that this is no longer possible. We are now sending individual ships to replace the two that are there now—at least, I believe it's two; if it's three, we will reduce that number to two very soon. And it should also be pointed out that, in that deployment, 50% of the navy's assets and 50% of its seagoing personnel were deployed on that original commitment.

    What essentially is being said here is that we are rapidly losing our capability to maintain a task force. In fact, I suspect that we can't do that right now. That capability is being reduced further, and we have put some dates or years on when we think we'll be a coastal navy. I suspect those are projections that may be difficult to prove with numbers, but the fact remains that it is the direction in which we're going.

º  (1635)  

    The Chair: Thank you, General.

    Thank you, Mrs. Wayne.

    Mr. Bertrand.

[Translation]

    Mr. Robert Bertrand (Pontiac—Gatineau—Labelle, Lib.): Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

    I have one or two short comments to make before asking my question. I read with a great deal of interest the document that you provided to us. I noticed that only seven or eight pages were bilingual; all the rest is in English.

    Is there a reason for that that may not be apparent?

    Col Alain Pellerin: It is essentially a question of money. The cost of having such a document translated is prohibitive, and as you know, we are not an organization that has a great deal of money. We did the best we could with the resources we had. We translated the executive summary, which as you can see, is very detailed, and the preface, but it was beyond our means to translate the whole document. We would really like to do that, both of us—we are francophones, after all—but it is simply a question of money.

    Mr. Robert Bertrand: You are part of the 1.5 billion...

    The minister appeared before our committee last week and he mentioned that he was looking at the possibility of a partnership with other countries to purchase aircraft, what he calls the strategic airlift. I would like to have your comments on that.

    Do you think that idea has merit?

    Lt-Gen Richard Evraire: Though I am not familiar with the details of the costs involved, I am sure that this idea has a great deal of merit. Clearly, and this is a position held by many people, the purchase of a fleet—if we limit ourselves, for example to one or two aircraft of this type to transport personnel and equipment over long distances: namely, strategic airlift—is tremendously costly, perhaps too costly for the government's current budget. Partnering with other countries in order to use this type of equipment may be an excellent idea.

    The problem, of course, is that we do not always have the equipment when we would like to have it. And we think here immediately of the story of the famous ship that was bringing Canadian equipment from Haiti, almost two years ago now. We almost witnessed the equipment of the armed forces being taken hostage.

    Thus, on the one hand, yes, it is an excellent idea, but we must not forget that if the government ever thought it could afford to purchase one or two aircraft—I am restricting myself to the air force, it could, that is the department, make use of agencies that can rent or make available aircraft, rather than depending on others.

    Col Alain Pellerin: I would like to add something, if I may. I would like to say that this was a German initiative designed to provide a pool of 16 aircraft, and Canada would have part of the pool. However, what we must remember is that the German, as well as the French and other European countries, have undertaken the Airbus A 400 M initiative. The Germans, for example, said initially that they would be buying 73 of them, and that number may go to 60. The same goes for the French. They have a long-term plan to purchase aircraft to provide strategic airlift. So the idea of a pool and the condo approach, if you will, at least for the European countries, is really a short-term solution, because their problem will be solved once these Airbus A 400 Ms are purchased in the medium term.

    Mr. Robert Bertrand: I was reading in the conclusion that there are some amounts that are billed to the National Defence budget, but which are not necessarily used by the Canadian Armed Forces. If I remember correctly, there are funds used to clean up the sites of the DEW line. Those were American sites.

    Do you think that we should be doing the clean up and then sending them the bill?

º  (1640)  

    Lt-Gen Richard Evraire: We could perhaps discuss the same thing with respect to Argentia, which remains a serious problem. Frankly, I would not want to get into that.

    Mr. Robert Bertrand: I think it would be important to...

    Lt-Gen Richard Evraire: I do not know what the initial agreement was. It may well be that the Americans, since they definitely contributed a great deal of money to install and operate this radar line, may have entered into an agreement with Canada whereby Canada would ultimately be responsible for maintenance and perhaps even clean-up activities. At the time, this may not have been mentioned, but it is certainly something worth checking.

[English]

    The Chair: Thank you, General.

    Thank you, Mr. Bertrand.

    Mr. Anders, for five minutes.

    Mr. Rob Anders (Calgary West, Canadian Alliance): Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

    I'm going to follow up on some of the questions posed by one of the other committee members in regard to page 15, where you state that “the Canadian Navy stands to be reducedfrom a Rank 3 World-Class force, to a Rank 6 ‘Offshore Territorial Defence Navy’.” I'm wondering if you can provide what you think are the best examples of where the government, in terms of funding the navy, if you will, has been falling down in that regard. What are the most tangible things that are going to result in that drop of three ranks?

    Col Alain Pellerin: The conclusion we drew in that part of our assessment was based on what we thought was the direction of the department, concerning what is required and what is identified in the white paper: that the navy should be able to deploy a task force. In order to deploy a task force, it requires frigates. We have modern frigates. We have less modern helicopters, but the frigates are there.

    The problem is the future. As part of a task force, you need the larger destroyers that provide the communications and the air defence. To be an independent task force, you also need resupply ships. There is no indication that the government intends to replace those.

    If that happens, then all you're left with are frigates that were not built, to start with, to provide for command and communication for the task force, nor were they built to provide long-range air defence. Essentially, the air defence on the frigates is for self-defence. Therefore, what you end up with is one, two, or three frigates that are deployed but cannot operate in the task force as envisaged in the white paper of 1994, hence the ranking.

    I understand that Admiral Ron Buck is coming here next week, Mr. Chairman. I would suggest that he would be in a better position than us on that sort of specific question, because the strategic study that they've done, Leadmark, addresses that in a lot of detail.

    Mr. Rob Anders: What I take from that is that the supply ships are forty years old, they're slow, and there's really no plan to replace them. And in terms of the destroyers, HMCS Huron is a perfect example of something that's just sitting there not being used. Fair enough.

    In question period today, a question was posed by one of my colleagues with regard to the coast guard. Basically, the coast guard is in a sense relying on word of mouth when it comes to activities offshore right now. I believe the parliamentary secretary actually responded by saying that if people wanted to know what ships were docking alongside the Russian ships, we basically had to ask the owners of the various ships docking alongside those Russian vessels. I want to get your perspective on that.

    What do you have to say about something like that? We're basically just abdicating any sense of being able to track who is pulling up alongside ships spying for foreign nations in our own waters.

    LGen Richard Evraire: I'm immediately attracted to the whole idea of global warming, the increased openness of our north, and our inability to properly patrol that region as well. Sovereignty is the issue here. If I could be very succinct, if we can't control who is in our harbour, let alone in our coastal waters, then I think we have a sovereignty problem, and a very serious one.

º  (1645)  

    Col Alain Pellerin: If I could just add a short comment to that, Mr. Chair, one area we need to keep an eye on in the future is the Arctic, because of the melting ice of the Arctic and the fact that we don't have any satisfactory resources in terms of the flying time for the planes and in terms of the ships being able to go there, and also in terms of the coast guard. Again, it's an issue of sovereignty that we need to address in the longer term.

    Mr. Rob Anders: Fair enough.

    The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Anders.

    Mr. McGuire.

    Mr. Joe McGuire (Egmont, Lib.): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

    Mr. Chairman, on page 9 of the presentation the witnesses just gave, it says, “They all expressed a strong concern over the decline of the Canadian Forces in the past decade.” Shouldn't that read, “in the past four or five decades”?

    LGen Richard Evraire: Mr. Chair, having been in the forces for four or five decades—until about seven years ago; I do recall having become a member of the forces right after the Korean conflict—I can say that is indeed precisely what did happen over that whole period of time. In our view, however, what is a little egregious is that the 1994 white paper indicated a certain level of capability but we have seen a very dramatic loss of capabilities in regard to our forces when measured against the 1994 government commitments in defence and security.

    Although there has been a tendency over the years—one not limited to Canada, but also seen in other armed forces across the world—I think somebody forgot to put the brakes on. We have now reached the point at which we are nowhere close to where the commitments in the white paper of 1994 indicate we ought to be.

    Mr. Joe McGuire: Do you think this resonates with the Canadian people? I don't recall any government being defeated for spending too little money on the armed forces.

    LGen Richard Evraire: I, for one, am delighted at the fact that I never had to fight in an actual war situation for all those years. Our alliances made that possible, as did our contributions to those alliances. As a consequence of that fact, however, Canadians have had the great luxury of not being terribly concerned, in our view. However, if you asked the average Canadian whether he has chosen to buy house insurance or fire insurance, I think he would say he would never live without it.

    My concern is that, in terms of making that point to Canadians in regard to our security, our sovereignty, and our economic well-being, that point is not being made to Canadians. What I particularly decry is the fact that we have made it a zero-sum game of defence, health, education, and environmental spending, among others. I and many others believe security is the most important social program any government can put in place. Indeed, without it, it is difficult to imagine the importance of other programs. But this debate has not been engaged. That Canadians generally do not worry or even think about the forces, or could care less in so many cases, is due to the fact that they have been kept uninformed about the importance and the impact of the result of that on so many aspects of what it is that we are about.

    I would conclude on that particular question by suggesting to you that if our own economy is in such fine fettle—as it seems to be when compared to the economies of many other countries in this world after having gone through an extended period of difficulty economically across the world—we may have reached that relatively wonderful state at the expense of our allies and some of our friends who have spent money on defence to make sure they could make up for any deficiencies that we seem to have developed over time.

    Mr. Joe McGuire: I certainly hope the next budget reflects some of your concerns in that regard.

    Going back to the coast guard, do you feel the coast guard is in the right department? Or where should the coast guard be? If it shouldn't be in Fisheries and Oceans, where should it be?

    LGen Richard Evraire: Mr. Chair, I'd just as soon not answer that question. I'm totally—

º  (1650)  

    Mr. Joe McGuire: You're retired. Okay.

    LGen Richard Evraire: No, it's not a question of retirement. I couldn't have answered it ten years ago. I'm an infantry officer, or at least a retired infantry officer.

    Mr. Joe McGuire: This new marriage of DFO and the coast guard doesn't seem to be working too well. I don't know how well it worked in Transport.

    Col Alain Pellerin: In trying to answer your question, maybe we should look at what the Americans did recently with the creation of their new Department of Homeland Security. In that Department of Homeland Security, they included the United States Coast Guard as part of the overall umbrella of security. Maybe we should be looking at an interior department in Canada to address all the various security issues.

    An hon. member: That's a good idea.

    Mr. Joe McGuire: Where does Great Britain have their coast guard? Is it under the military, or is it a separate...?

    Col Alain Pellerin: No, it's separate.

    The Chair: I will now go to Mr. Stoffer.

    Mr. Leon Benoit: On a point of order, Mr. Chair, the Canadian Alliance gets three spots before we go on to giving extra time. That's what we agreed to on the committee.

    The Chair: I'm afraid that's not what is in front of me here in terms of the rules of questioning. Mr. Anders had the last round of questioning on the opposition side. It then goes back to the Liberals and—

    Mr. Leon Benoit: And then it would come to us for a third spot.

    The Chair: No, it doesn't. I'm sorry.

    Mr. Stoffer, you have the floor for five minutes.

    Mr. Peter Stoffer: Going back to shipbuilding and Sea King concerns, it looks like replacing the Sea Kings is going to cost anywhere from $3 billion to $4 billion. To replace the supply vessels, we're looking at $4 billion to $5 billion. That's about $9 billion tops in order to do just those two replacements alone.

    In my opinion, I can't see the government putting that much money into the military in order to do that. Some people I have spoken to have said it should perhaps come out of a different department, another budget, similar to that of, say, Industry.

    Especially in Halifax, we know very well that if you have a military industrial complex like shipbuilding, that spawns the domestic industry as well. It's the same for the Sea King capability. If those were replaced, the jobs alone in the private sector for other.... For every dollar in the military, you would probably gain four or five dollars domestically in that regard.

    We've been saying that an investment in the military is an investment in the country. Where do you suppose the money for those large capital items should come from in the short and long term?

    LGen Richard Evraire: I would have to respond by falling back on our major recommendation. Do our armed forces require that equipment? Before one answers that question, the rest of it is rather academic. This is the point that we continually come back to.

    Currently, the defence update that is being carried out is essentially a program review. We're looking at how to manage within the existing budget or with possibly a small increase, and how to hold on to all of the capabilities. I'm not suggesting we should necessarily reduce our capabilities further. What we're suggesting here is that we determine what these capabilities ought to be, and then determine what funding would be required to achieve those.

    Mr. Peter Stoffer: Would your determination mean the CDA would obviously be recommending a replacement of the Sea Kings and the supply vessels, or would the CDA be saying it won't make those types of recommendations? The government would be looking at your organization, with its over 600,000 people, for guidance and advice. What would you advise them to do on those two major capital investments?

    LGen Richard Evraire: Under the current defence policy, we would say to replace them, and we would say they should have been replaced some time ago. At least, the program should have been in place.

    Mr. Peter Stoffer: But even with the new policy, wouldn't you still be advising that?

    LGen Richard Evraire: I would have to—

    Mr. Peter Stoffer: Sorry to interject, but I would find it rather astonishing that the CDA would not recommend anything else but.

    LGen Richard Evraire: We could be accused of saying nothing else but to spend money on all sorts of equipment, because that's what we've had to this point: that we should replace everything that we have. We don't believe that is the right approach. We believe that, first of all, we should prevent further loss of capabilities as we know them today. As quickly as possible, we should then review the defence policy—which is patently not being funded and is essentially non-operational—and determine what it is that Canadians want.

º  (1655)  

    Col Alain Pellerin: Could I just add a comment to that, Mr. Chair?

    To answer your question, I think the example of Australia is a good one. I know we've come back to that, but they came up with a white paper in 2000 and are doing another one now. Essentially, they looked at what the priorities for Australia are in terms of defence and security and what resources are required to implement such a policy, and they then committed themselves to an increase in budget of $23 billion over a ten-year period. There is a commitment to finance any resources that have been identified there, and I think that's what the general was alluding to.

    There's more than the sealift, the airlift, and the Sea Kings. The whole of the armed forces has to be looked at, because the issue hasn't been addressed satisfactorily over the years. At the end, we might come up with a conclusion that we don't need any sealift or airlift—although I doubt that—but I think we have to look at it. As far as resources go, the problem is so great in the armed forces now that you need to look at the overall problem. That's why we need to have a defence policy as soon as possible.

    LGen Richard Evraire: And, Mr. Chair, as a parting shot on this particular question, I would simply point out that we have more than once been accused of looking forward through our rear-view mirror. I make the point that this is precisely what we're not doing right now. We're saying we need to look ahead in terms of what it is that we require, as opposed to simply replacing what we have now based on the old quasi-unfunded defence policy.

    The Chair: Thank you, General.

    Thank you, Mr. Stoffer.

    Seeing no questions on the government side, I'm going to avail myself of perhaps five minutes' worth of questions, although they may not last that long.

    Within the last couple of weeks, we had an obviously very important meeting in Prague with NATO. Coming out of that, of course, was the addition of seven new members to the alliance. I believe those additions are going to potentially present the alliance with some significant challenges in the future. Of course, the alliance is both a political and military arrangement, and we're going to have to watch very closely to ensure that the new members hold up their part of the bargain in terms of issues like democratic values, commitments to anti-corruption, an end to illegal arms sales to countries potentially under embargo, and those sorts of things.

    On the military capabilities side, of course, we have the issue of maintaining defence expenditures at a level at which these countries make a tangible contribution to the alliance. That's something that I think we're going to be faced with more and more, because we have had the instance of Hungary, for instance. Hungary was part of the first tranche of additions to NATO, and it has not really fully lived up to some of the commitments it made when it joined the alliance back in 1999 along with the Czech Republic and Poland.

    Maybe both of you could take a whack at this in terms of an answer, but how realistic is it to think NATO, at some point in the future, is going to put in place some sort of review mechanism to ensure that members, both old and new, are living up to their commitment to the alliance, so that we don't have a situation in which we have backsliders as far as the political commitments are concerned, and free riders as far as the military commitments go?

    LGen Richard Evraire: My suggestion to you is that I don't doubt that these mechanisms will be put in place. In fact, they exist already, and we recognize that on a few occasions Canada's own contributions were brought forward as insufficient by the Secretary General and in other fora, as has often happened over the years.

    I repeat that I'm convinced these mechanisms will be put in place. Over the years since 1949, members of the alliance have fallen below the requirements. We've had difficulties and problems. We had political difficulties in terms of Portugal at one stage, and we've had the complexities of the Turkish–Greek relationship. Constantly within the alliance, effort is made to resolve these issues and to remind the countries of their political and military commitments to the alliance.

    I could leave it at that. Let me simply add, though, that however difficult it might be to keep the feet of the countries of the alliance—the existing and most recent new ones—to the fire in terms of commitments, one of the most important issues that has come out of that alliance is that a commitment or a decision to act, achieved through consensus, however difficult—and we all know how extremely difficult that has been—has been, without precedent, the right way to go. The alliance has achieved that with sixteen countries over many years, an additional three more recently, and now seven more. The consensus will now be even much more difficult to achieve, but every time the alliance has achieved it, its actions have certainly spoken much more loudly than words, and we look back at more than fifty years of a very successful alliance.

»  (1700)  

    The Chair: If I could just interject there—and there's less than a minute left—my understanding is that there are these review mechanisms, but strictly speaking, within the North Atlantic treaty itself, there is no provision for the expulsion or the suspension of members who are deemed to be in default.

    LGen Richard Evraire: No.

    Col Alain Pellerin: Could I just make two short points? One is that the new members, in looking at the older members, didn't necessarily have the best example to follow as far as defence spending was concerned in the last ten years. Except for the U.S., the U.K., and now France, most of the NATO countries followed through with the peace dividend. Therefore, if the older members, who are much richer than the new members, don't pull their weight, they'll wonder why they should.

    The other thing at the summit is the creation of the rapid reaction force. For the Americans, that will be a tangible aspect of a contribution to NATO and whether NATO is relevant. I think it addresses the issue of the capability of the nations to provide the capabilities to that force and be able to bring those capabilities where the crisis is in a timely fashion. And that's not in terms of months and years, as Donald Rumsfeld said, but rather in terms of days and weeks.

    The Chair: Thank you, Colonel.

    Mrs. Wayne.

    Mrs. Elsie Wayne: Thank you very much.

    Just so the lieutenant-general and the colonel know, David Price, Leon Benoit, and I did a call-in show about defence a week ago on CPAC. They did a poll, and 89% of the people who did call felt that defence should be number one. I say that just so you know that I think our people out there are finally seeing that this is an urgent matter that needs to be addressed.

    I think all of you are aware that one of my greatest concerns with respect to the Canadian Forces surrounds the Sea King helicopters and their replacements. Does the CDA have a formal position on the use of the lowest-price-compliant requirement in the MHP procurement program? Has the CDA had the opportunity to review the industry proposal that the government change the requirement to allow for a designed-to-cost model instead?

    LGen Richard Evraire: The CDA does not have a position on that.

    Mrs. Elsie Wayne: You don't have a position on that.

    I was just told the other day by a group of business people who met with me that with the EH-101, you have three engines. If one stops while you're flying, you still have the other two, but that's not the position with some of the others that are coming forward. What I have a concern about is making sure that whenever we replace these Sea Kings—and hopefully it will be soon—we will definitely give them the best. Whatever that is in today's society, we must give them the best because we don't want to jeopardize their lives. I have to say that.

    Both Minister McCallum and Mr. Eggleton have consistently stated that the Sea Kings will only be allowed to fly when they're safe. That said, in the last nine years we have witnessed the incident just outside of my city of Saint John, the incident in East Timor, off the coast of Hawaii, and ones in other areas as well. So in the CDA's opinion, is it possible for the government to say in advance when a Sea King is safe? Or has their condition been allowed to deteriorate to a point where they are now all equally unsafe?

»  (1705)  

    Col Alain Pellerin: I would like to address that one, because last night I had a conversation with Brigadier-General Don MacNamara, the president of the CDA Institute. He spent a couple of days in Halifax, and he said that one message came out very clearly on the issue of the Sea Kings.

    When we talk about the Sea King replacements, it's important to remember that both the pilots who fly them and the technicians who repair them are assured that when the Sea King takes to the air, it's a safe helicopter to fly, and that they wouldn't fly a helicopter that is not safe. Obviously, though, as with any piece of military equipment, there will be accidents. We've seen some in Germany when tanks have backed up on soldiers. When you train with military equipment, there will always be accidents.

    Mrs. Elsie Wayne: But just on that point, Colonel Pellerin, just recently one of the Sea Kings once again had to make an urgent landing in Saint John, once again because the crew had been told it was safe when it took off from Nova Scotia. It wasn't safe, and that has happened more than once with those Sea Kings. God love them, we're lucky we're there and we can accommodate those helicopters right there at our port in Saint John, but their safety is a major concern, it truly is.

    I know my time is just about up, but I want to say this to you. I honestly believe one of the best things we could do for the military would be to have the Department of National Defence engage you retired people who have been there, and have you working there—they could even hire you, pay you, or put you on a contractual basis or whatever—for the advice they need for the future of our military.

    I thank you very much for being here.

    The Chair: Thank you, Mrs. Wayne.

    Mr. Benoit.

    Mr. Leon Benoit: Gentlemen, as I'm sure the chair has pointed out, the purpose of having you before this committee was to have you give us information on what Canada could contribute in a war in Iraq, should we become involved. I'd like you to do that, please.

    Col Alain Pellerin: Again, this is speculation to a certain extent, but it's also based on our own study and the conclusions that we drew from it.

    If you look at the navy, the navy has two frigates in the region. That could be a contribution in the same role that they're playing now. We don't have any cruise missiles on our ships, so they could not be used in an offensive capacity. We don't have long-range air defence, so it's unlikely they would be part of the American battle groups with the aircraft carriers. They would probably carry on doing the mission of interdiction that they are doing now, and that's an important task to do.

    For the air force, it would be more difficult to undertake offensive operations because of the issue of secure voice, the issue of electronics, and also the issue of precision-guided missiles, although I understand that there might be some available from the Americans. So I think the role more than likely would be a defensive role for the CF-18s if they're committed.

    Numbers obviously will depend very much on the number of trained pilots they can send to a mission, because it's normally three-to-one. If you have ten aircraft committed, you'll end up probably with at least thirty pilots. There's a shortage of trained pilots in our air command now, so that's a factor.

    In the case of the army, it depends very much on what sort of battle plan the Americans have in terms of whether it would be a mechanized operation or the establishment of some sort of base—like what they did in Afghanistan—and then urban fighting or whatever. I think the army could probably commit a battle group, as they did in Afghanistan. The problem would be to fly them there, with their equipment, in a timely fashion. That would be a premium, because the Americans would obviously need their own strategic lift. But then it's also a matter of sustaining that force.

»  (1710)  

    Mr. Leon Benoit: Wouldn't the same problem arise if Canada were to get into a joint procurement of strategic airlift with the Europeans?

    Col Alain Pellerin: Oh, yes. We are limited in that field.

    Mr. Leon Benoit: Everybody needs them at the same time, so how much of a benefit are those? Anyway, that was just....

    Col Alain Pellerin: Finally, there's the issue of sustainment. Beyond six months, we had a problem in Afghanistan. If we get involved in the war in Iraq, who knows? Once you get involved in Iraq or any war, the original battle plan is likely to change overnight. It could last weeks or it could last months.

    The issue also is that if you commit a land force, logistic support is going to be difficult. As we know, all of what we call the combat service support is at a shortage—the medical corps, for instance, and especially specialists in the medical corps; logisticians; and technicians for the vehicles. They would be at a premium, and whether we could sustain that commitment beyond six months is something that needs to be looked at very closely.

    Mr. Leon Benoit: What about sustaining each of the contributions from each of the forces? How long could the air force contribute, even if it was limited to protecting the base and was not getting involved in combat operations? How long could the navy sustain its contribution, even in the way you're talking about? How long could the army sustain a battle group?

    Col Alain Pellerin: I would suggest that the navy, if they deploy two ships or rotate two frigates, could sustain that commitment for a long time.

    The air force—

    Mr. Leon Benoit: Is that with helicopters functioning on board, or not? Some have gone out recently without them.

    Col Alain Pellerin: In terms of these technical or specific details, the best people to ask really would be the commanders when they're here next week or the following week.

    On the issue of sustainability for the air force and the army, if it goes on beyond the six months, that would be something to look at very closely.

    The Chair: Thank you, Colonel Pellerin.

    Thank you, Mr. Benoit.

    Earlier in your questioning, Mr. Benoit, you asked about the issue of Iraq and what the Canadian Forces could potentially do in terms of capabilities in Iraq. That was an issue I raised with the chiefs of the environment, through the minister's office, in connection with their responses. They have indicated to me that they're not in a position to identify specific capabilities that would be available for the Canadian Forces if we were to go into Iraq, and they cite security reasons for that. I think we have to respect that decision. In terms of the responses that we got from the CDA here today, obviously they are non-official responses in terms of what could possibly be provided.

    What we're going to have to do when the chiefs come forward is ask about budgetary issues and operational readiness issues, keeping in mind that we'd obviously like to know and satisfy ourselves that for whatever we're going to send to the Persian Gulf in terms of personnel and equipment, the training is there and the capability is there to provide some valued added. I wanted to make members of the committee aware of that situation. I was going to mention that at the beginning of the next meeting, but since you raised the issue, Mr. Benoit, now is an opportune time to address it.

    Mr. Wood, for five minutes.

    Mr. Leon Benoit: Mr. Chair, if I could—

    The Chair: Actually, perhaps we could save this comment for later in the meeting, Mr. Benoit. You can get it in at the end of the meeting, if there's time.

    Mr. Wood.

    Mr. Bob Wood: Thank you, Mr. Chair.

    I want to just touch on the reserves for a second, because nobody has said anything about them. In your minds, they obviously are increasing. There has been a substantial recruitment campaign on that I understand has been fairly successful. They're playing a more significant role in all the operations, especially with the army and its short staff.

    Maybe you people know. How does it work with the funding for the army reserve? Is it earmarked for the reserve, or is it put into a pot like everything else and distributed, with everybody having to make a request? If so, do you think there should be x amount of dollars earmarked for the reserves because of the fact that they are increasing and are becoming a more important part of the Canadian Forces? Do you have an opinion on that?

»  (1715)  

    Col Alain Pellerin: I think that's an excellent question on the issue of the reserves. If I could make a suggestion, Mr. Chairman, maybe you could eventually invite some people from Reserves 2000 who are very close to the issue. I think it's an important issue to pursue, because the problem is especially there for the army reserve. I think the problem is lesser for the air force and the navy and their smaller numbers. But the army reserve has to depend on the chief of the army to provide them with the money, and we've already identified that the chief of the army is short by maybe close to $1 billion a year. For him, his first priority is the troops that will go to Afghanistan—the regular troops and all of those—if he doesn't get any more money. That makes sense.

    The government has agreed to increase the reserve from phase I to phase II, which would be 15,500 to 18,500. The minister mentioned that when he was here last week. The problem is that it requires $150 million, and unless there's $150 million identified as an increase in the next budget for the reserves to go to 18,500, then based on recent experience with the reserve, it might not happen. That's speculation obviously, but unless they get the money identified specifically for that purpose in the budget, I would say it's unlikely to happen.

    The Chair: Thank you.

    Mr. Benoit.

    Mr. Leon Benoit: Gentlemen, a month ago now, the Minister of National Defence said he would set up a committee of some kind to look into the administrative practices of DND and report within six months. That gives them five months now. I'd just like you to comment on where you think he'll find the weaknesses in the department and waste in the department in terms of administrative weaknesses or administrative practices.

    LGen Richard Evraire: There would certainly be weaknesses as much as there is a choice to be made about the functions performed within the headquarters. Any number of solutions have been advanced over time as to what the function, composition, and structure of National Defence Headquarters should be. Some of these functions could in fact be either eliminated, reduced in scope, or, for that matter, moved out of the headquarters area and brought closer to the operational units in the field. I must admit, however, that it would be a horrendously difficult and complex task to arrive at recommendations of where these savings could go.

    Currently, the headquarters, amalgamated as it is, carries out what would be termed as essential functions. Whether or not there are too many members in uniform carrying out some of those functions is something I'm sure they'll be looking at. The premise here, of course, is that a civilian employee carrying out a function might be a less expensive employee or less costly employee in the long run than is a military person who is trained for a specific task in an operational environment but is employed in a non-operational environment. Beyond that, however, I have to admit it would be pure speculation on my part.

    The CDA has not spent a lot of time looking at this. It is simply of such complexity and detail that we don't have the wherewithal or the numbers of persons in our organization for permanent employees—in fact, part-time permanent, if you will—to run the shop. Therefore, other than in the broadest sense of looking at what functions could continue to be performed at NDHQ and by others sent back closer to the operational environment in some cases, an opinion on that issue would be rather inappropriate.

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    Mr. Leon Benoit: That's unfortunate, because parliamentarians really don't have the ability to get information that would allow us to make judgments on that. I've heard many people inside the forces—even at some very high levels—say there's too much interference from the civil service side in military decision-making, and that it leads to added expense and great inefficiency in the expenditure of money. Of course, they also complained about political interference in procurement, and we've seen that with the Sea King replacements. We always talk about money, but if we don't look at how we can spend money better, too, then we're not dealing with the whole issue.

    LGen Richard Evraire: I agree, but I would beg the committee's indulgence in understanding that we simply don't have the legs, the wherewithal, to make any concrete recommendations on a matter that is of such complexity.

    Mr. Leon Benoit: Do you have any suggestions as to how this parliamentary committee could best attack that issue?

    LGen Richard Evraire: I hate to suggest a review of the amalgamated headquarters. The construct that we have now is such that civilian and military are intertwined in headquarters, quite often without any very clear indication of where a decision is coming from. If a military decision is being made, how many civilians have been involved in it? Some of them are quite competent, of course; nevertheless, I think one of the suggestions made in the last couple of years was to go back to separate headquarters for the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Forces.

    That option is fraught with any number of chasses gardées, due to the great difficulty of individuals wanting to be let loose of control that they currently exercise right now and the requirement for the department to respond to any number of administrative government programs that are in the purview of the public service as opposed to that of the members of the military necessarily. So, other than wishing to have persons involved in that particular study appear as witnesses in front of this committee, I really don't know what else might be done.

    The Chair: Thank you.

    Col Alain Pellerin: If I could make just a suggestion on one point that the general raised, Dr. Doug Bland has appeared in front of this committee on a number of occasions. He was the chair of defence management at Queen's University, and he has done a lot of work on that subject. I understand that he has had discussions at NDHQ recently on that subject, so he might be a good candidate to appear in front of your committee, Mr. Chair.

    The Chair: Thank you, Colonel.

    Mr. Anders has the floor.

    Mr. Rob Anders: Thank you, Mr. Chair.

    The question I have relates to some statements that you make on page xviii. Just before mentioning Canada–United States relations, you talk about “the fundamental problem of a shortage of military personnel.” You continue by saying, “The Canadian Government continues to make military commitments without allocating sufficient funds for personnel”. I'm wondering if you have an opinion on what our critical mass is.

    I understand there was a white paper some years ago that talked about either 75,000 or 78,000 as a critical mass. I happen to like the number of 100,000. Right now, with recruiting, it's maybe 61,000, and it has had been down to the low- or mid-50,000s range. In your opinion, what is the regular force critical mass size?

    LGen Richard Evraire: The recommendation that was part of the last paper was 76,000 in order to accomplish the commitments that now exist or that did exist at that time, and that figure hasn't changed.

    Col Alain Pellerin: Also, the Senate report recommended 75,000 recently. Based on recent assessments, we're in the same ball park.

»  (1725)  

    Mr. Rob Anders: I seem to remember reading in this report as well something about going from around 15,000 as a reserve, up to around 45,000. Is that right?

    LGen Richard Evraire: Yes.

    Mr. Rob Anders: So you're ideal then, your critical mass, is to have 76,000 regulars and 45,000 in the reserves, is that right?

    Col Alain Pellerin: Yes.

    Mr. Rob Anders: Fair enough.

    I'd like to follow up on some other statements that you've made. On page xx, you state, “The US perceives that Canada does not recognize the security problem, let alone assign adequate resources to resolve it.” I'm taking it that you base that comment mostly on the statements of Ambassador Paul Cellucci. Are there other things that you point to with that?

    LGen Richard Evraire: No, there were other persons interviewed. It's certainly not the ambassador in this case.

    Col Alain Pellerin: In preparation for this study, Colonel Sean Henry, the author of this paper and someone known to this committee, spent a week in Washington, meeting with various people from the Pentagon, the State Department, think-tanks, and people from the Senate and the House of Representatives, and that was the result of these various conversations. He interviewed a broad mix of people and came up with these conclusions.

    Mr. Rob Anders: On page iv, you mention “intemperate anti-American statements made by members of the Canadian Government”. Is that a reference to a press person in the Prime Minister's Office, a certain Ms. Ducros?

    Col Alain Pellerin: This report came out on October 8, so, no.

    Mr. Rob Anders: So this is above and beyond her statements. Okay, fair enough.

    I also wanted to follow up on the comments you made with regard to the coast guard, because you were mentioning that you thought it would be wise to roll the coast guard into a homeland defence thing.

    Col Alain Pellerin: I didn't say it would be wise. I said we could maybe look at the example of the Americans, who recently created this new Department of Homeland Security and included their coast guard in it.

    Mr. Rob Anders: I've heard that proposal tossed around in Canada as well in terms of the idea, if you will, of creating a department of homeland defence. Obviously, as you've said, it's something the Americans looked at, but is it something you would therefore advocate for Canada as well? Would you roll that all into one?

    LGen Richard Evraire: It is something to look at, for sure. The fact is, of course, that the coast guard and the navy do operate in full knowledge of one another's operations. They cooperate a great deal, so one would want to look at that as a possibility, were there to be potential savings to be realized as a result of that, or were there to be a different sharing of responsibilities given the reduced capabilities of our own navy. Essentially, I think it is one of those things that, in a new defence policy review, is something we should most definitely include in that review.

    Col Alain Pellerin: Also, in the broader review, something that exists in the Department of National Defence, the Office of Critical Infrastructure Protection and Emergency Preparedness, could very well be in this homeland security department. As part of the overall security responsibility, it would make sense to include the critical infrastructure rather than having it in the department and giving the impression that it is part of the Canadian Forces or Department of National Defence.

    The Chair: Thank you, Colonel.

    Thank you, Mr. Anders.

    Mr. Wood, do you have any further questions?

    Mr. Bob Wood: No, but I understand that my colleague Mr. Benoit has a question. Being the non-partisan guy that I am, he can go right ahead and ask it.

    The Chair: Mr. Benoit, for one minute.

    Mr. Leon Benoit: When we visited NORAD headquarters recently, they talked about how NORAD had to be completely refocused to look at these threats from inside instead of being focused on the threats from outside, as they have been. They also said they didn't think air was probably the...they felt pretty confident that they could handle threats in the air, but they said the real gaffes are threats from ships and other boats going into ports with dangerous substances on board. That's a very real threat that neither country has really figured out how to deal with, quite frankly.

    I'd just like to hear some suggestions from you on how we can deal with this very real danger that both countries haven't figured out how to deal with.

»  (1730)  

    LGen Richard Evraire: It's a very soft underbelly, as it were. Given recent reports about the insecurity of most of our harbours and the smuggling and other things that are going on in those harbours, one must come way from that rather worried about the possibility of terrorist threats from the sea.

    Again, to go back to the responsibility of the government in terms of providing our own homeland security, this must be reviewed and solutions must be found. I also believe, though, that in looking at our recommendation for a full defence policy review, that threat must be included in the review, whether or not recommendations are made to the navy to get involved to a greater extent, or the coast guard, or customs.

    Mr. Leon Benoit: Yes, I understand it isn't strictly a military issue, but it's certainly one component.

    LGen Richard Evraire: Absolutely.

    The Chair: Could we wind up our answer, gentlemen?

    Colonel.

    Col Alain Pellerin: Just as a quick comment on that, as you mentioned, it's obviously a binational issue. Eventually, we should be looking seriously at expanding the current command that exists, NORAD, to include under that the responsibility, under the mandate of NORAD, both land and sea security. We've done that at NATO. Why not do it under a binational command in NORAD?

    The Chair: Gentlemen, thank you very much for being here today. I realize you came on fairly short notice, but you're always well equipped with facts and figures and information for the committee. We are indebted to you for that, so on behalf of all committee members, thank you again.

    The committee is now adjourned.