NDVA Committee Meeting

37th PARLIAMENT, 2nd SESSION

Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs

EVIDENCE

CONTENTS

Wednesday, December 4, 2002

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1535

The Chair (Mr. David Pratt (Nepean—Carleton, Lib.))

Lieutenant-General M.K. (Mike) Jeffery (Chief of the Land Staff, Department of National Defence)

The Chair

Mr. Leon Benoit (Lakeland, Canadian Alliance)

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1540

LGen Mike Jeffery

Mr. Leon Benoit

LGen Mike Jeffery

The Chair

LGen Mike Jeffery

Mr. Leon Benoit

The Chair

Mr. Leon Benoit

The Chair

Mr. Leon Benoit

The Chair

Mr. Leon Benoit

The Chair

LGen Mike Jeffery

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1545

The Chair

Mr. David Price (Compton—Stanstead, Lib.)

The Chair

LGen Mike Jeffery

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1550

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1555

The Chair

Mr. Claude Bachand (Saint-Jean, BQ)

LGen Mike Jeffery

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1600

Mr. Claude Bachand

LGen Mike Jeffery

The Chair

Mr. John O'Reilly (Haliburton—Victoria—Brock, Lib.)

LGen Mike Jeffery

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1605

The Chair

Mrs. Elsie Wayne (Saint John, PC)

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1610

The Chair

Mrs. Elsie Wayne

LGen Mike Jeffery

Mrs. Elsie Wayne

LGen Mike Jeffery

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1615

The Chair

Mrs. Elsie Wayne

LGen Mike Jeffery

Mrs. Elsie Wayne

LGen Mike Jeffery

The Chair

Mr. Bob Wood (Nipissing, Lib.)

LGen Mike Jeffery

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1620

The Chair

Mr. Bob Wood

LGen Mike Jeffery

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1625

The Chair

Mr. Bob Wood

The Chair

Mr. Leon Benoit

LGen Mike Jeffery

Mr. Leon Benoit

The Chair

LGen Mike Jeffery

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1630

Mr. Leon Benoit

The Chair

Mr. Joe McGuire (Egmont, Lib.)

LGen Mike Jeffery

Mr. Joe McGuire

LGen Mike Jeffery

The Chair

Mr. Joe McGuire

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1635

The Chair

Mr. Claude Bachand

The Chair

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1640

LGen Mike Jeffery

The Chair

Mr. David Price

LGen Mike Jeffery

Mr. David Price

LGen Mike Jeffery

Mr. David Price

The Chair

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1645

Mr. David Price

LGen Mike Jeffery

The Chair

Mrs. Elsie Wayne

The Chair

Mrs. Elsie Wayne

The Chair

LGen Mike Jeffery

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1650

The Chair

Mrs. Elsie Wayne

The Chair

LGen Mike Jeffery

The Chair

Mr. Bob Wood

LGen Mike Jeffery

Mr. Bob Wood

The Chair

Mr. Bob Wood

LGen Mike Jeffery

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1655

The Chair

Mr. Bob Wood

LGen Mike Jeffery

Mr. Bob Wood

The Chair

Mr. Bob Wood

LGen Mike Jeffery

The Chair

Mr. Leon Benoit

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1700

LGen Mike Jeffery

Mr. Leon Benoit

LGen Mike Jeffery

Mr. Leon Benoit

LGen Mike Jeffery

Mr. Leon Benoit

LGen Mike Jeffery

»

1705

The Chair

Mr. Bob Wood

LGen Mike Jeffery

Mr. Bob Wood

The Chair

Mr. David Price

LGen Mike Jeffery

The Chair

Mr. Claude Bachand

»

1710

The Chair

Mr. Claude Bachand

Mr. Claude Bachand

The Chair

LGen Mike Jeffery

The Chair

Mr. Claude Bachand

The Chair

Mr. Claude Bachand

LGen Mike Jeffery

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1715

The Chair

LGen Mike Jeffery

The Chair

Mr. Leon Benoit

»

1720

LGen Mike Jeffery

Mr. Leon Benoit

LGen Mike Jeffery

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1725

The Chair

Mr. Leon Benoit

The Chair

LGen Mike Jeffery

The Chair

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CANADA

Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs

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NUMBER 004

l

2nd SESSION

l

37th PARLIAMENT

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EVIDENCE

Wednesday, December 4, 2002

[Recorded by Electronic Apparatus]

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[English]

    The Chair (Mr. David Pratt (Nepean—Carleton, Lib.)): I'd like to call this meeting of the Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs to order.

    On behalf of the members of the committee, I'd like to welcome a familiar guest, Lieutenant-General Mike Jeffery, Chief of the Land Staff. He is here to talk to us about general issues related to the state of readiness of the Canadian Forces and/or budgetary issues.

    General, before the meeting started, we had a conversation about an event you attended. I believe that was last weekend, in connection with the involvement of 2 Battalion, Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry, in the Medak Pocket, and the recognition of that unit. That was an issue this committee was seized of some time ago, in terms of our belief generally at the table that the soldiers of 2 Battalion did require some special recognition for their efforts at Medak. On behalf of all members of the committee, I think I can say we were very pleased to see that recognition come through the Governor General's special citation or unit citation that has been provided.

    With that, let me turn the floor over to you. I'm sure we're going to have a number of questions following your comments.

    Some of our members aren't here, but they should be here a little bit later. An important statement is being made by the Minister of Veterans Affairs in the House, and a number of members of the committee have to be in the House for that purpose.

    General, please provide us with your comments.

    Lieutenant-General M.K. (Mike) Jeffery (Chief of the Land Staff, Department of National Defence): Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It's a pleasure to be back to address you as the Chief of the Land Staff, on the subject of Canada's army and its continuing mission to generate and maintain combat-capable, multi-purpose land forces to meet the country's defence objectives.

    I would like to give you a snapshot, if you will, a bit of a sense of where I think we are. I would say Canada's army continues to perform well. I believe our success in Afghanistan showed all Canadians the quality of our soldiers and what they're able to accomplish under difficult circumstances. But in my view, our highly publicized success in this region should not overshadow our continuing good work in other regions, particularly in Bosnia—where we maintain a very effective mechanized infantry battle group—or on a number of other smaller missions around the world in which we, alongside our colleagues in the navy and air force, continue to do service for the country.

    That performance notwithstanding, we continue to face the same sorts of challenges I have spoken about in previous sessions. Limited resource flexibility and a high personnel tempo are the major constraining factors that limit our depth and our ability to sustain more than we are doing at present. These issues continue to be addressed internally, and we are making progress in a number of areas. The most significant of these is the introduction, within the army, of a managed readiness system, which is already improving our ability to manage the army at all levels. In and of itself, this initiative won't solve shortfalls in resources or personnel, but it will reduce significantly the chaos caused by a small army trying to do so much.

    Recent recruiting initiatives for both regular and reserve soldiers have been successful in most areas, albeit we continue to have shortfalls in some of the technical trades. Once the new recruits get through the training pipeline, the manning situation will be much improved. Of course, this does not mean we can declare victory, because we continue to have a significant number of our personnel who are not deployable for health or other reasons. As we look forward, we also have concerns that retention will increasingly be a challenge in the years ahead.

    On the equipment front, we continue to bring new kit into service, and it is providing new and positive challenges to our soldiers. However, the high tempo does place a strain on our ability to maintain our equipment fleets, particularly the older ones. Here, recapitalization looms large as a growing concern.

    Our recent experiences in Afghanistan have confirmed the value of our individual training system, and we continue to place a great deal of effort on individual training. At the same time, we're working to improve collective training, in line with the concerns and approaches I have previously addressed with the committee. In this regard, we are planning, as I said we would, a brigade training event for this spring in Wainwright, Alberta. It will start to address the erosion of collective capability that we are experiencing. This exercise is not without its difficulties, but by concentrating essential functions in time and space, we are trying to maximize the resources we have in order to get the best possible value for money.

    Finally, plans continue to evolve on the development and implementation of army strategy. This sees us concentrating on the implementation of an interim army model that is focused primarily on improving our force generation capability. In parallel with this, we continue to develop our concepts for the army of tomorrow, which I have spoken about. Those concepts will ultimately see us transform Canada's army into an information-based and, I think, strategic army. In this way, it is my objective to ensure both sustainment of the army of today while preparing it for the new demands ahead.

    Mr. Chairman, that concludes my opening remarks. I'm certainly available to try to answer any of the questions the committee may have.

    The Chair: Thank you, General.

    Mr. Benoit, for seven minutes.

    Mr. Leon Benoit (Lakeland, Canadian Alliance): Thank you, Mr. Chair.

    Thank you very much for being here today, General Jeffery. Before I get into my questions, I just want to say that I think you and some others in the top leadership have, over the last couple of years, really improved the image of leadership in the Canadian military. In fact, I think you and your colleagues have provided top-notch leadership, and that's being better recognized. I'm delighted to see that, and I just want to thank you for your service before we start here today. It has been exemplary, and it's important to recognize that from time to time. It seems the brass often get beaten up. Sometimes it's fair and sometimes it's not, but I do appreciate the job you and some of your colleagues have done.

    In terms of the questions, I'd like to ask you a fairly broad question to start with. I think it's a very important question to which Canadians really have been looking for some answers.

    If Canada were to have to deploy somewhere overseas in the next six months in order to contribute in striking terrorism at its source, as you did in Afghanistan, what could the Canadian army send? I'd like you to answer that question for a contribution made sometime in the next six months, but also in terms of a contribution based on the information and the reality that you have to work within. What could we see in terms of a similar contribution made five years from now, based on the realities of what you have to deal with as a leader who is planning not only for next year but for five years from now as well?

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    LGen Mike Jeffery: Mr. Chairman, this issue clearly gets at the heart of current capability, which I'm more than willing to address. The scenario surrounding particularly current considerations is obviously a sensitive one, and I will not specifically address that. Let me talk as a force generator responsible for providing overall military capability.

    As you are well aware, in terms of my requirements, I need to be able to maintain an immediate reaction unit—basically a light infantry battalion—on 10 days' notice to move; a mechanized battle group on 21 days' notice to move; and up to a full mechanized brigade group on 90 days' notice to move. Achieving all of that has a wide variety of factors around it, and I don't intend to go into those in a great deal of detail unless you wish me to.

    Suffice it to say that we certainly can achieve the immediate reaction unit requirements, and indeed we can do that now in terms of that level of capability. A mechanized battle group within 21 days would be a challenge right now, but to go back to the question, it certainly would be easily achievable within six months.

    Mr. Leon Benoit: How long could that be sustained? That's another part of the question that maybe I didn't ask.

    LGen Mike Jeffery: That's acknowledged, Mr. Chair. I'll leave that part of the question and come back to it after I talk about capability and readiness first.

    The Chair: Mr. Benoit, again, I would ask you to direct your comments through the chair—and we'll try to hold to that rule for all of the members of the committee, please.

    General, go ahead.

    LGen Mike Jeffery: In terms of achieving those two unit contributions within the required timeframe, that is achievable in general. There are some continuing matériel challenges—these are not current equipment or personnel training issues, but matériels in terms of combat supplies—that, certainly in the case of the mechanized unit, would not allow us to achieve it within the requisite time.

    Mr. Leon Benoit: Could you explain that a little more, General?

    The Chair: Mr. Benoit, I would ask you to direct your comments through the chair, and please allow the general to finish his comments.

    Mr. Leon Benoit: Mr. Chair, maybe you could explain what directing a question through the chair actually means.

    The Chair: It means exactly that, so that we don't have discussion going back and forth between witnesses and members. All comments have to be directed through the chair, by the rules of the House of Commons and its committees.

    Mr. Leon Benoit: And how would that be done, Mr. Chair? Just explain it to me.

    The Chair: Address all of your questions through me, Mr. Benoit. It's a fairly simple procedure. It's not uncommon in this place. In the House of Commons, we direct our comments through the Speaker. In committee, it's through the chair. Okay?

    Mr. Leon Benoit: Okay.

    The Chair: General, please continue.

    LGen Mike Jeffery: In terms of a mechanized brigade group or brigade group requirement, as I've expressed to the committee before, collective training would be a significant factor here, given the fact that we haven't done that kind of training in quite some time. Achieving that within the ninety days would clearly be problematic. Depending on the circumstances, we may very well be able to do it within a six-month timeframe, but a lot of factors would go into play there.

    Obviously the decision to commit to any of that, given the level of capability—i.e:, the equipment we have, the levels of training, and the sustainability—very much becomes a risk factor. To say those units are ready to go doesn't mean they can go anywhere to do anything. It then becomes very much a situational issue, which is very difficult to address even in the abstract.

    In terms of what we do, we look, on a regular basis, at where those units are and whether or not they could, in principle, achieve the necessary response timelines. That becomes our readiness level. Whether or not we actually would put them into operations is another matter.

    If I could now go to the second part of the question, which was on sustainment, clearly that is the part of this that has been a continual challenge, both in matériel and personnel terms. Personnel sustainment is... [Editor's Note: inaudible] ...principally because of overall tempo. We are using our people very hard. That doesn't mean they can't do more, but how long can they sustain it? There's no black-and-white answer to that. It's a judgment call, and it's relative to the importance or seriousness of the issue.

    I think I've used this before, but it makes the case. When he was in front of this committee some years ago, General Maurice Baril reminded everybody that our parents and grandparents went off to World War II and spent five or six years away from home, but the demands of the time required that. We could do exactly the same thing now and I'm sure young Canadian men and women would be prepared to sacrifice that, but it's not called for given the nature of the security environment. So how much can we expect them to go back again and again? It's a judgment call, and it's a fine balance.

    On the matériels side, it's a simple matter of stocks and resources. Given the financial limits that we've been under, we have taken risks in that area over time. In order to sustain that, we would have to purchase things we currently don't hold in a number of areas, frankly. That goes back even to the readiness issue. In some areas, those matériel stocks have meant our readiness levels are not as high as they should be. We are addressing that and we are looking seriously at it, but those are our risks.

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    The Chair: Thank you, General.

    Mr. Price, for seven minutes.

    Mr. David Price (Compton—Stanstead, Lib.): Thank you, Mr. Chair.

    Thank you for being here today, General. You always have interesting information when you do stop by to visit us.

    I have four questions. I'll ask you all four and then let you go on them.

    The last time you were here, General, you talked to us about a rather radical plan on restructuring. It was quite interesting, actually. It was really thinking outside the box. I'm wondering if you are still moving along in that direction.

    The next one would be on the reserves. Of course, we're looking for $1.2 billion just to maintain things right now. That's what we're talking about. If you were to receive 50% of those funds, for instance, would you still go ahead with phase II of the reserve restructuring? How much of it would you be able to do?

    In the reserves right now, yes, recruiting has been coming along fairly well, but we have a major problem there in terms of the long wait in the recruiting offices in order to get approval to get in.

    You mentioned the brigade exercise in Wainwright. Will you be using reserve units in that exercise, and will you be using units integrated into the brigade from other countries that could be at Wainwright at the time?

    That will get it started, Mr. Chair.

    The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Price.

    General.

    LGen Mike Jeffery: Mr. Chair, first of all, in terms of restructuring, the plan for army strategy that I briefed you on some time ago is still being developed and being implemented. I'll remind you that there are basically two phases. One is to move the army of today into an interim army model over the next three to five years. That basically means changing the way in which we generate force, in order to improve efficiency and effectiveness. And over the next five years following that, we intend to fundamentally change the way in which the army operates from an overall concept and doctrine point of view.

    So to answer the question in a straightforward manner, yes, we are continuing down that road. This is the vision that I had for the army. It was approved by the previous minister and by the CDS, and it is in line with how we make the best use of the resources we have, based on our best professional judgment, to achieve what the government expects us to do. While it is new and it is different, I'm not sure I would agree with the word “radical”, but I won't argue the point that it is a significant change from what we have been doing.

    The other three questions really deal with the whole issue of reserves. I would like to start out by reminding the committee that I've said consistently that the reserves are a significant part of our combat capability, and we are using them more and more—and I mean that in a positive manner. Over the last eighteen months to two years, we have significantly improved our ability to use formed units. We started out by putting six full reserve infantry sections into a battle group in Bosnia. In the next rotation, we then put a full platoon in. And in the current rotation, 1 PPCLI is in Bosnia right now and has only two infantry companies with it, one of which is fully reserve. There are only three regular force personnel in that whole company.

    Beyond infantry, there are other component parts to the organization, but I think that's a significant move forward and it shows you what we can do. It is in many respects a bit of a trial. We're not sure what the limits are here, and we're not sure now much we can sustain there, but it does two things. It takes a bit of a load off the regular force, and I think it really provides a challenge to our reservists to help them improve what they're capable of doing in order to build leaders and so on, which really benefits the organization in the long term.

    Phase II LFRR really has two key components that we need. One is money, and the other is some direction or guidance from government in terms of what it is that they expect us to do with it. In my mind, that means ensuring that the reserves are part of that army of tomorrow—that army strategy I spoke of—in a fully integrated way. That is to say, they're a fully contributing part of the overall army. But we're expecting that money to come with some guidance in terms of what return on investment the government expects. That will help significantly and will be able to focus that.

    I can give you my own view in terms of where it will go, but in terms of how much you get and what it costs, there are some detailed questions there. The phase talks about an additional 3,000 people, and the original plan was $147 million. That has actually increased due to inflation and a few other things, but it's in that ballpark just for the personnel increase.

    Those reservists increasingly will be integrated into our training. As I said in my opening remarks, we are planning a brigade training event in Wainwright this summer. Our hope is that there will be a full brigade there. There will be reservists involved. At this stage of the game, I can't state how many with any specificity because those details are still being worked out, but I certainly hope and expect that there will be some there.

    There won't be a lot this time around, and while there will probably be some U.S. troops there with things like helicopters particularly, there won't necessarily be a lot of U.S. troops. At this stage of the game, I don't expect there to be any British troops, although there could be in time, given the location. The reason is that we have been away from doing this type of work for so long that we wanted to start relatively small and relatively simply, frankly, and we'll go from there.

    In this first session, after having been away from brigade-level training for over ten years, we want to make sure we get it right and that we don't set ourselves up for failure but set ourselves up for success. So there will be reserves and there will be U.S. troops, but in terms of how many and what's beyond that, it's a bit too early to tell at this stage.

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    Finally, the issue of recruiting continues to be a concern. I will remind you that I am not responsible for recruiting, nor do I have immediate control of it, either regular or reserve. That is done centrally by my colleague General Christian Couture, who is ADM of human resources for the military.

    We have improved the recruiting system significantly. Is it perfect? No. The problems with it are extremely well documented. We know exactly where the problems are and why they are there. They are a combination of policy issues that we either cannot or have not yet adjusted—in most cases for good reason—and they are due to resource constraints.

    The piece of this that I have taken on, in cooperation with General Couture's staff, is the attraction piece of the recruiting. In a partnership arrangement, the army has been providing a significant number of NCOs, officers, and indeed other capabilities such as equipment displays and those sorts of things, to help in the attraction part of this. At schools and at local community events, young people in this country can talk to people their own age who have had the experience, they can see equipment, and so on, and a lot of that is coming out of the army. But I do not have the resource flexibility or the people flexibility to actually put more than that into the equation.

    To be frank, I'm not sure we have the wherewithal to significantly improve the “processing of recruits” part of the problem in the short term. It's not recruiting in terms of getting them in the door, it's the processing that is taking the time. But that's not so in all cases. I think General Couture would tell you that, on average, the results for about half of the people are actually quite good and the time is quite short. But if you have difficulty like security problems or medical problems, then because of legal issues and risk, they can take some significant time in some cases.

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    The Chair: Thank you, General.

    Monsieur Bachand.

[Translation]

    Mr. Claude Bachand (Saint-Jean, BQ): Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I also want to thank the general for his presentation. If there's one thing I've always recognized in him, it is his great intellectual honesty. I believe he is capable of giving us the true picture.

    However, in his presentation and in his answers to my colleague from the Alliance, he tells us some very worrisome things. If I understood correctly, the quick response light infantry would be ready to move in 10 days, and there's no problem there. The mechanized group could move out in 21 days, but that would be a challenge. As for the full brigade, the general said that 90 days would have to be expected. It seems to me that, to do that, we would need 180 days rather than 90. As for materiel, he says that always presents a major challenge because storage is limited.

    I also thought I understood that, to support troops in the field, it would be a major challenge to exceed the time they were in Afghanistan, among other things. Everyone knows that the troops probably came back from Afghanistan because the soldiers could no longer take the pace. We had to bring them back.

    I have a hypothesis, but I won't ask the general to respond. In case of a conflict in Iraq, would that be under the aegis of the U.N. or would we have to follow the Americans in a coalition? I know that's a strictly political question, but let's say that a conflict breaks out in Iraq in a month. Given the description General Jeffery has just given us on the current situation, if the Minister of Defence told the Chief of Staff, General Henault, at that point that Canada had to make a contribution and that request were forwarded to him, would the latter's response be that we are unable to send troops to Iraq in the next few months?

    That's my first question.

[English]

    LGen Mike Jeffery: Mr. Chairman, there's always a challenge in getting into hypothetical questions, particularly when we're dealing with an issue as sensitive as what's going on in Iraq. Based on the question, though, I don't really think it's necessary for me to go back over the issues of readiness and capability that I already spoke of.

    From the time I first got into this job, I've had people trying to put me into a yes-or-no, black-or-white box in terms of what capability is. At the end of the day, it's an issue of judgment, based on the scenario and management of risk, in terms of whether we are prepared—whether I am prepared, as the army commander, to advise the CDS that we're ready to go or not, and whether the government is prepared to accept the risks inherent in sending troops into that environment.

    I'd like to stress that the pluses of this organization are our people. What you saw the Canadian army do in Afghanistan—and particularly 3 PPCLI—is indicative of the quality of people and the kind of small professional army—and, indeed, I would suggest the navy and air force as well—that we have in this country. That's the strength and the core of it.

    We have some good equipment and some not-so-good equipment. All of that is a risk factor that has to be taken into account. We also have sustainment problems because, frankly, we have had money cut back and have taken risks in all of the last decade as we've restructured since the end of the Cold War. The cost of that is now starting to show.

    Are we capable of doing all things for all people all of the time? Definitely not. Do we have good capability? We most certainly do. Would I be shy about sending troops into harm's way in any region in the world? As long as the mission matched what we are capable of doing, no, not at all, because I'm convinced our soldiers can do it. But we're not going to put them into harm's way without a reasonable, balanced capability and a reasonable probability that they can do the mission.

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[Translation]

    Mr. Claude Bachand: May I ask a supplementary question? I would like to ask the general whether he agrees with one of the recommendations contained in the Senate's last report.

    The Senate firmly recommends that no international mission be undertaken in the next 24 months in view of the inadequate capability of the Canadian Armed Forces. In view of what he just said, I would be inclined to think he agrees with the Senate's recommendation not to send troops into a theatre of operations in the next 24 months.

    Does he agree with that Senate recommendation?

[English]

    LGen Mike Jeffery: Mr. Chairman, I'm a pragmatist. I believe simple solutions like that are not necessarily always practical in the real world. If we had the right requirement, we would go into operations tomorrow, notwithstanding the risks, the problems, and the difficulties that we have.

    Am I looking for a period of respite? Yes. That's why I recommended that we not go back into Afghanistan. Do I want to get troops out of Bosnia? Yes, because I'm not sure, certainly from the load the army is carrying, whether that is the kind of mission we should be continuing. But to suggest that the solution to this is just no operations for 24 months, frankly I don't think it's realistic.

    Again, it goes back to a balance issue. Money, people, and tasks are the combinations there. If you need to do more, put more money and more people into the task. If you can't afford what you're doing, then cut back on the tasks. Those are the balance issues. I can't be clearer than that.

    The Chair: Thank you, General.

    Thank you, Mr. Bachand.

    Mr. O'Reilly.

    Mr. John O'Reilly (Haliburton—Victoria—Brock, Lib.): Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Some of my questions have been answered, but I want to thank the lieutenant-general for coming.

    I have a couple of concerns that are troubling me on the training side. We recruit people, train them, and then have them sit around the base for months and months, doing nothing. I get this all the time from parents of people who have encouraged their sons and daughters to go into the military and who then find that those sons and daughters don't feel they're accomplishing anything. So that's my first question. I just want to know if we can do something about that, because it makes for very low morale.

    The second thing I want your comments on is the Iltis Jeep replacement program, where it stands, what it's being replaced with, and how long that will take.

    My third question is on the LAV versus the Striker, and whether there is merit to having the same equipment as the United States. Or are they just copying our equipment?

    My fourth and probably most important question is whether or not the minister will upset everyone at National Defence Headquarters if he asks civilian experts on costs savings to do analyses of how NDHQ operates and how the military operates.

    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

    LGen Mike Jeffery: Mr. Chairman, I will try to go fairly quickly, given the time that we have.

    In terms of people awaiting training, it is a concern. In fact, it's a serious concern for us. Understandably, we have launched a massive recruiting campaign to try to bring young men and women into the Canadian Forces. It has been quite effective. Having gotten them in, we recognize that we have a capacity problem in a number of areas, and that's the difficulty. My colleague General Couture is working hard to resolve that. We're using the resources not only of his training system, but indeed those of all three services to address it.

    I also have my own staff working on how we can help to resolve this issue. It's not easy overnight given the strains on the organization, but it's certainly well recognized and well acknowledged. It is a concern, because if we have young men and women sitting around too long, it sends all the wrong messages, all the wrong signals, about belonging to an organization that is forward-looking and knows what it is doing. So I similarly share the concern.

    On overall equipment, the Iltis replacement or LUVW project is in the final stages of contract, Mr. Chairman, but I don't have it at my fingertips in terms of being able to say exactly where it is. There is a two-part issue here. One part of it has already been announced and is in contract. The other part is not, but we're expecting it to be finalized. There are two parts to this equipment. One is a military/commercial, off-the-shelf version. The other is a full, standard, military-pattern version, basically as an economizing measure to only put the extra cost into the SMP version for the higher-end combat support function.

    In terms of the LAV versus the Striker, as you are well aware, it is produced by the same company. In essence, it is the same system. It is the same basic chassis, so there is a tremendous amount of commonality here. Ours was literally first off the line. We contracted for this. Indeed, the Canadian army worked very closely with the company in developing this to meet our needs. We like to believe the Americans took what we developed and then moulded it to their needs, although they might suggest it's a slightly different perspective.

    The Striker actually is a lighter vehicle. It doesn't have the same high level of firepower that the Canadian model has, but they're designing it for a very specific purpose, primarily to put it quickly in and out of a C-130 Hercules aircraft. That was not part of our requirement when we contracted for it, so ours doesn't have that same ease of use with the C-130.

    To pick up on that point, the real strength of it is that within the next three to five years, Canada's army will be virtually at the same level of capability as the U.S. interim force, which is what they are buying the Striker for. This means that in that medium-weight, middle ground of military capability—the other extremes being the high end with the main battle tanks and the low end with light forces—Canada will be at the same level of capability, and in some respects will be even superior to the Americans when we both get there.

    The final question, Mr. Chairman, is a fascinating one. I have to tell you that, in an earlier life when I was working within the department, a couple of my colleagues and I were responsible for efficiency measures in the mid-nineties, when we had to look at serious reductions in budget. We did a lot of work on re-engineering the organization and looking at all sorts of efficiencies. While I think all of us would say there are still real improvements to be made, there are no easy solutions. The low-hanging fruit, if you will, has probably been picked.

º  (1605)  

    To be fair to the minister—and we have discussed this—he is well aware of what has gone on. Given what we face, it's reasonable to have a fresh look at it. The only concern I would have and that I think all of my colleagues would have, is that we don't rush off figuring that a new philosophy in management is going to solve the problem quickly. As long as we take a considered and balanced approach to this, it makes eminent sense. But I'll wait to see what the experts have to say.

    The Chair: Thank you, General.

    Mrs. Wayne.

    Mrs. Elsie Wayne (Saint John, PC): Thank you very much, Mr. Chair. I want to apologize to General Jeffery. I had to speak in the House with regard to a veterans' issue, and that's why I was late.

º  (1610)  

    The Chair: I explained that, Mrs. Wayne.

    Mrs. Elsie Wayne: Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.

    General, in your earlier appearance before this committee, you indicated at the time that there were three brigades and twelve battle groups in the Canadian army. You also stated that if you had to continue with deficit financing, it was likely that you would soon have to look at reducing the number of brigades from three to two. General, has a decision been made with respect to the potential elimination of one of our brigades? If so, could you tell us what the final decision was? If not, could you tell us when a final decision is expected?

    LGen Mike Jeffery: Mr. Chairman, when we were discussing that earlier on, I believe I said the three-to-two option was one that had been looked at several times. Indeed, it was still potentially one of the options if we were going to live within our current resources. Bearing in mind that there is a gap, that was one of those options. But no such decisions have been made.

    Clearly, the decision is one that is made not by me, but ultimately by government, given what the magnitude of such a reduction would be. At this stage of the game, the question is whether or not we close that resource gap. If so, how? It's a combination of potentially more money or less capability.

    Since that time, we have looked at a wide variety of options. Those options are still there in front of the minister, and it is my understanding that they will be considered over the next little while, leading up to the budget. If the budget closes some of that gap, then we'll have to look at how we close the rest of it.

    But no decisions have been made. At this stage of the game, I frankly couldn't even forecast exactly where we'll go.

    Mrs. Elsie Wayne: On the army's website, on the page “The Army Strategy”, under “Key Deductions”, it states:

The Army of Today (in particular the field force, and the training and support systems) is unbalanced and action must be taken to avoid further institutional deterioration in critical areas - quality of life for personnel subject to excessive operational and training demands, formation-level combat capability and the morale of the Army.

    General, could you give the committee some indication of the actions you have been taking or will be taking to address these concerns that have been listed on the army's website?

    LGen Mike Jeffery: Mr. Chair, if you read all of what's on that army website, not only that question but indeed much of the answer is there, because the essence of what is implied in the question is the whole issue of management readiness.

    There are two parts to it. The first is what we refer to as the institutional army. The training system and the support system of the army and the field force of the army have to be in balance. What we have and what we've been living with for a good number of years is the fact that the demands for training are sufficiently high that we have to augment out of the field force and into the institutional army. What that means is that there physically are not enough instructors in the training system, so we have to pull NCOs and officers out of the field force and send them to the schools. What that does is create a constant movement of people, which adds to the overall personnel tempo.

    What we're trying to do, in part, is determine if we can reduce the amount of training required and increase the number of people in the training system at the same time, so that we get an overall balance. That does mean we inevitably have to reduce the field force somewhat, but if we can do that, we reduce the overall amount of tempo. That's in part what we're trying to do.

    The other piece of this management readiness is ensuring that the field force is prepared for operations and that we get a very structured, cyclical approach to preparing units for operations. When we came out of the Cold War, by and large we had a larger army sitting there preparing for operations. We've quickly moved to a smaller army that is constantly doing operations. As we've done that, we have reacted as best we could, but what we have recognized is that we can't leave it to chance. We have to plan that activity much more carefully than we have in the past. Basically, we're moving to a model that has a third of the army at high readiness or on operations, a third in the training system getting ready to go, and a third in what we call reconstitution, with improved quality of life, more time at home, and so on.

    If we can do that, moving between those facets in a cyclical manner, we get an overall better balance to the army. There's a greater predictability, so soldiers know what's happening. A large part of their stress is caused by the uncertainty. As I tell people, when I come home at night and my wife says we're going to the opera, I may be prepared to handle the opera, but that sort of surprise really adds a little strain to the organization. When my soldiers get home and say they're leaving next week for Bosnia, it creates a lot of strain. When they get home and say our plans are to send them to Bosnia in a year, that's a much better issue. So it's that long-term management readiness that we're trying to do. That's what is referred to in the army strategy in terms of correcting that imbalance.

º  (1615)  

    The Chair: You have time for a very quick, final question in this round, Mrs. Wayne.

    Mrs. Elsie Wayne: If you had an open budget right now, and if you had the resources and everything, what steps would you take? What level would you bring our army up to? What numbers would you say you would want? From where you are now, where would you like to be?

    LGen Mike Jeffery: Mr. Chair, that's a Sears Christmas Wishbook type of question, and I'm not sure—

    Mrs. Elsie Wayne: It is, but I'd like your answer, because then we can fight for you.

    LGen Mike Jeffery: If I may respond in terms of what I think the priorities need to be, one first has to be sure that the current structure is sustainable. The committee has looked at this from a number of points of view, and I think it recognizes that people and matériels are key parts to that. So take the current structure as it is and ensure that it doesn't have any hollowness to it.

    Thereafter, the issue is to increase the capacity in a way that is in line with what the government believes is necessary to manage the international threats. I have a view on that, and I'm more than prepared to discuss it in the right context, but it is a hypothetical. Maybe as we look at where the security in the country is going in the longer term, there will be an opportunity to discuss it and provide you with those perspectives.

    The Chair: Thank you, General.

    Thank you, Mrs. Wayne.

    Mr. Wood.

    Mr. Bob Wood (Nipissing, Lib.): Thank you, Mr. Chair.

    General, in a presentation to the committee on Monday of this week, the chair of the Conference of Defence Associations said:

The army is running a deficit in all its budget accounts—a deficit approaching $1 billion per annum.

A serious shortage in the number of skilled technical tradesmen and spare parts exists. We believe these problems could result in 40% to 50% of army weapons and vehicles being grounded over the next eighteen months.

I'd like your reaction to those comments.

    LGen Mike Jeffery: In answering the question in terms of a figure like that, the issue of the budget deficit is extremely difficult. My business plan, my strategic resources plan, which is published annually and is available... It's a public document. This committee has looked at it before, it has been accessed by many parts of the media, and the Conference of Defence Associations has accessed it and has done an analysis of it.

    The operating budget, which is the only part I control—and that operating budget is in the order of $840 million—is inadequate. By my calculation, it's easily upward to $500 million short in terms of what we need to be able to achieve. That doesn't mean we can't run without $500 million in the net budget. It does mean we're managing a level of risk. We can't work without some of that money being put into it, but do we need all of it? Definitely not. There are risks that we will manage over time.

    When you add the personnel, the equipment, and all of that, you can come up with all sorts of figures, and I couldn't either confirm or refute the figures stated. It's a matter of the analysis that you do. Certainly, when you look at it overall, in order to maintain an organization this big, you're probably talking somewhere in that range.

    In terms of personnel, as I said in my opening remarks, we still have problems in a number of technical trades areas, and we will for quite some time, both within the army and the other two services, maybe for a long time to come. Attracting the kinds of people we need in some very critical trades areas is difficult not just for us, but for government generally. Some businesses have the same problem.

    Right now, there are three or, at the outside, four major trades that are a problem for us. Two of them are mechanical engineering trades. One is called a fire control systems technician, and the other is a weapons technician, both of which are essential to do the maintenance on our large equipment fleets. There are also problems in two communications disciplines, those of land command information systems technician and signals operator, both of which are essential to handling our new command and control communications systems.

    Those are the four critical ones that we're particularly having trouble with. My sense is that we're probably going to have trouble for the next decade, and no amount of money thrown at the problem is going to solve it. It's a matter of attracting the right people, retaining them, and adjusting the demands on them so that we have a sustainable system.

    There are other parts of the system that I won't talk about, but I will highlight them. You've heard some of them before. They include pilots particularly, as well as engineering officers. There are a number of those disciplines in which we're going to have difficulty.

    Does that all mean 40% of our weapons systems or vehicles could be grounded? I don't believe so. In certain locations at any one time, do we have a high number of vehicles that are not operational? Yes, and it has always been so. It's a matter of the time available to the available technicians to maintain them and of the spare parts needed to fix them as we have reduced the matériels. In some cases, vehicles are awaiting spare parts. In some cases, they're awaiting labour.

    I cannot give you one figure that will cover everything across the board. To my mind, 40% is a very high figure, and I would be surprised if that were the average across the board. But could you find certain units within the army that are at a low end of readiness and have that figure? Yes, you certainly could.

    In terms of my concern and the management of risk, Mr. Chairman, I want to be clear. Is that a serious or catastrophic situation? No, it's a manageable situation. If it's allowed to continue for a long period of time, then it could become catastrophic, but I don't believe it is today.

º  (1620)  

    The Chair: Mr. Wood, do you have any further questions?

    Mr. Bob Wood: Yes, one more.

    The Conference of Defence Associations paper, as you already know, is entitled A Nation at Risk: The Decline of the Canadian Forces. Are we a nation at risk, and is there a decline in the Canadian Forces?

    LGen Mike Jeffery: On balance, let's talk about decline in the Canadian Forces. I'll reiterate what I've said many times in front of this committee. I'm not a guy who is going to give you black-and-white answers. Indeed, I believe that when you get into those, you create all sorts of misunderstandings of what reality is.

    The Canadian Forces are significantly smaller today than they were a decade ago. They have significantly more sustainability problems than they did a decade ago. One cannot refute that there has been a reduction in those areas. The Canadian Forces have some of the best people in the world and some of the best personnel they've ever had. We now have some excellent equipment. Certainly, the army has better equipment in many areas than it had a decade ago. On balance, is that a significant decline in the Canadian Forces?

    Certainly, I am concerned. At the time I took over this job, I said the army was fragile, but how does one put a label on that? On overall risk, Mr. Chairman, I go back to my earlier comments in terms of where this nation goes in security and defence. That's the sort of question that really needs to be addressed in that forum. Unquestionably, the ground rules are changing. We're not sitting here in a relatively stable, bipolar world anymore. We have a world that's much more chaotic. Indeed, I have serious concerns about the magnitude of that chaos and what it means for the nation.

    I don't think this country is at serious risk. Just look at our position geographically and geopolitically. No one is banging on our doors. Our way of life is not immediately at danger. But do I, as a professional soldier, believe we could be over the long term? Yes, and I think any considered person on this issue will understand that those broad trend lines are there. I think we all understand that, and I believe the government well understands that. That's the reason they have indicated the need to look seriously at this problem in the longer term.

º  (1625)  

    The Chair: Thank you, General.

    Thank you, Mr. Wood.

    Mr. Bob Wood: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

    The Chair: We're in our five-minute round now, beginning with Mr. Benoit.

    Mr. Leon Benoit: Thank you, Mr. Chair.

    General Jeffery, through the chair, I would like to say that in response to an earlier question about what we could deliver to an overseas deployment in six months, you said it would be very difficult to deliver a full brigade. However, the 1994 white paper, which is the government's commitment to the people of Canada in terms of what our military would provide, calls for that within a certain time period.

    The mandate of this committee—a mandate set out just a week or so ago—is that the committee hold hearings on Canada’s possible military contribution in the event of a conflict with Iraq. What I'd specifically like to ask you, General, is whether or not we could deliver an overseas deployment in the case of a conflict with Iraq, or whether or not we could deliver the commitment that was promised to the Canadian people by this government in the 1994 white paper.

    LGen Mike Jeffery: Mr. Chairman, given what I've already said—and I think I've addressed the issue—that's a question that is very much theoretical. Could we produce a brigade-sized formation to do certain things in that sort of timeframe? Yes. Could we do so in any circumstance? No. The more demanding the requirement, the less likely that we would be able to respond and be able to do that.

    What is a brigade? A brigade is effectively two units or more, with anywhere from 2,000 to 6,000 people put into operation. The white paper doesn't define what a brigade is. In the world we live in today, it's not necessarily the large combat brigades we've had in the past. Basically, it's two units or more, with a formation-level headquarters and the necessary level of support needed to go somewhere to do something. In the last couple of years, we have had that many troops outside the country at any one time already, able to do the job.

    Could we do that again tomorrow? Yes, we could. But if we were talking about a full combat brigade of 5,000 to 6,000 personnel, with all the equipment needed to sustain for the long haul, then, no, we clearly could not achieve that. But it's a theoretical question and I'm not sure it tells anybody anything.

    Mr. Leon Benoit: Through the chair, General, I'm specifically asking about the commitment laid out in the 1994 white paper. Maybe you did answer that, but I just want to make sure you did.

    Can we deliver the commitment as laid out in the 1994 white paper? If we can, how long can we sustain it, and in what type of operation? You said you could deliver for some types of operations, but you definitely couldn't for others. Looking at delivering what was promised to Canadians in the white paper, could you do it and sustain it under those terms laid out in that white paper?

    The Chair: Mr. Benoit, I'm hard-pressed to understand the difference between your first and second questions, but if the general would like to respond, I invite him to.

    LGen Mike Jeffery: I would just say two things, if I may, in terms of trying to provide a contribution to this discussion. The first is that, as I understand it, a policy statement is not a promise of a specific level of organization or number of people. It's one of those continual issues in terms of how much detail goes into a policy paper.

    The white paper talks about a main contingency force, that being a brigade. I believe that's all it says in terms of what the overall commitment is. It doesn't define the size and it doesn't define the task or the circumstances. So I wasn't trying to hedge the issue. I was just saying that, depending on what that is, we may or may not be able to provide it. At the high end, we probably could not, given the requirement and the risk. At the lower end, we almost certainly could. Where that leaves us in the middle is not clear.

    In terms of sustainment, just to be clear, the white paper does not require us to sustain. The policy does not require us to sustain a brigade. It requires us to deploy and sustain up to two battle groups—or, to be precise, a battle group and an infantry battalion group—and to deploy but not sustain a brigade group.

º  (1630)  

    Mr. Leon Benoit: Through the chair, then, General—

    The Chair: I'm sorry, Mr. Benoit, but that's five minutes.

    Mr. McGuire, for five minutes.

    Mr. Joe McGuire (Egmont, Lib.): Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I just have two questions.

    First, the Americans have restructured and they now have what they call Northern Command. What do you think Canada can offer an integrated Northern Command if that request comes through? And what would be the difference between NORAD versus Northern Command? Would that overlap NORAD or would it be an adjunct to NORAD? How would that work out if we had two competing integrated forces in North America?

    LGen Mike Jeffery: First of all, NORTHCOM is a U.S. command structure, and I believe the committee is aware that there are continuing discussions on it. Indeed, work has gone on between Canada and the U.S. to look at the manning of a planning group within the NORTHCOM structure. That is an issue the government has not decided upon, so I don't think I'm at liberty to discuss it here. My understanding is that it will be presented to government or will be discussed with government in the days ahead. With that, decisions will be made and we'll react accordingly. But this is part of Canada–U.S. cooperation in which we will not be embedded. We are not integrated into NORTHCOM command and control. That is an American system, unlike NORAD, which is a fully integrated structure.

    The relationship between NORTHCOM and NORAD is rapidly evolving, and while I have an understanding or a perspective at this stage of the game, Mr. Chairman, I'm not sure it would be helpful to the committee, because I am not working in that area all the time. I actually could be misleading the committee here, and I would not want to do that. Clearly, that relationship is evolving, and it will continue to evolve as the U.S. looks at how it will integrate and change its command structure and how NORAD will respond in that overall context.

    Mr. Joe McGuire: Do the Americans envision Northern Command operating in Canadian territory? Is that how it's set up? It's not just going to be the northern United States, it will be the northern part of North America. We're going to be involved one way or the other, whether it's integrated or not integrated.

    LGen Mike Jeffery: Mr. Chairman, let me start by explaining what the American approach is. As a global power and a global military force, the U.S. military looks at the whole world. They have what they have been referring to as CINCs—commanders-in-chief—although I think that terminology is changing. Anyway, they've basically divided the world up into five major areas. They have military commanders responsible for operating in each area. If the requirement comes up to operate in their area, they are in charge. They have headquarters and staffs that spend their time focused on their area, and if military operations are required in their area, they are assigned forces and they undertake those military operations. As a result of 9/11, they have rethought their structure and have basically looked at NORTHCOM—which is all of North America and adjacent regions—as a command area, and they put one person in charge.

    Clearly, the focus is principally defence of the United States homeland, but do they have interests outside of that? They most certainly do. Does that imply that they automatically will operate outside of that area? No, definitely not. Clearly, whether they're talking about NORTHCOM or SOUTHCOM or any of the other commands, relations with other nations in those environments obviously is one of those issues. So from my vantage point, just because they've called it NORTHCOM and their area of interest globally encompasses Canada, that doesn't imply that we have to work with them or that somehow they're going to come walking across the border.

    The Chair: Thank you, Mr. McGuire.

    Mr. Joe McGuire: The distinction, Mr. Chairman, is that it would imply that, but I guess that's a debatable point.

º  (1635)  

    The Chair: It is indeed.

    Monsieur Bachand.

[Translation]

    Mr. Claude Bachand: Mr. Chairman, I will start by recalling the committee's mandate as well. You will remember that I suggested we receive the head officers of the three main branches of Canada's Armed Forces because we were not immediately ready to begin the study on Canada-U.S. relations concerning the Armed Forces, and it was quite clear that we had to focus on the preparedness of the three branches of Canada's Forces in the event of a conflict in Iraq. Moreover the three heads will be coming here.

    I want to tell the general that the questions that will be put to us as members will certainly not be intended to determine whether the Iltis has five gears or whether the caliber of the VBL III is greater than 105 millimeters. In the riding of Saint-Jean, in Quebec and in Canada, people don't want to know that. It's current affairs that interest people. They see how things are unfolding at present; they see President Bush's reactions; they see the inspectors and live in fear that they will discover something major that would sanction an attack against Iraq. The people of Saint-Jean, like those of Quebec and Canada, will ask us whether our Armed Forces are ready to go. What will my answer to them be?

    I'll ask the general to give me his support so that I can give people an answer. Of course, if I tell my electors that the White Paper states that we need a brigade, I'm going to be asked how many persons there are in a brigade. I'll tell them that there are from 2,000 to 6,000. Then they'll ask me what duties the brigades can perform. I'll answer them that that depends on the situation, that we can send 2,000 persons to perform one specific task and that we can send 6,000 for another task. Then I'll be asked the nature of those tasks, whether we are ready, whether we are going there to tend the gardens and go for walks in the presidential palaces in Iraq, with 2,000 soldiers, or whether we are going there to check the identities of people at the entrance to a presidential palace. We're going to be asked whether that's what the Canadian Armed Forces will be called upon to do.

    It seems to me that people currently want to know how we can contribute, how much we can contribute and whether that contribution is significant.

    I can't accept answers such as “between 2,000 and 6,000” and “that will depend on the duties we are asked to perform”. I know that the general will tell me that that's the sad truth, but, ultimately, why doesn't he tell us that we are unable to go there? He just said himself that he withdrew troops from Afghanistan after six months and is now recommending that troops be withdrawn from Bosnia because they are exhausted. I don't think we can send them on a new adventure for at least six months, with a full brigade. He should simply tell us that we are unable to send them. I'll understand and I'll tell people that.

    That may be good for our file as well. Perhaps people will say it makes no sense to send anyone over there. We don't have the budget to send them. We could ask them whether they would agree to pay more. That's when the real debate will start.

    I wouldn't want to be a victim of a switch in the committee's mandate as a result of which we would be talking about the fifth gear of the Iltis and canon calibers. I want to know whether we can go and how many persons we can send to Iraq to perform important tasks. That's the committee's mandate at this time.

[English]

    The Chair: Mr. Bachand, I think the general certainly made it fairly clear earlier on that he is under constraints in terms of providing specific information, given the fact that, first of all, our government hasn't taken a position on this, and notwithstanding the fact that the committee was looking for information. The committee is fully within its rights to look for information. The amount of information that the government can provide and that Lieutenant-General Jeffery can provide, however, may not necessarily meet our expectations. I think that is also a given.

    We also have to understand that no mission has been defined for Canada in this regard. The number of troops that would be applied to a particular mission would be contingent on defining that mission. I'm sure the general will be able to provide further comments and further illumination on this, though.

    General.

º  (1640)  

    LGen Mike Jeffery: Well, Mr. Chairman, I'm not sure I can. It's not that I'm not willing to try to provide more information. Given what I've already said, however, and understanding the committee's concern and perhaps its degree of frustration about this, the reality is that I sense we're looking for a black-and-white answer from shades of grey in an environment that is not even defined.

    I can provide a light infantry battle group. I can provide a mechanized infantry battle group. I can provide more than that, up to a brigade, depending on the circumstances. I have said that, and I'll reiterate it. I can't sustain it for long periods of time, because we have some sustainment issues. That is really within the mandate of what I'm expected to do, as is the case in all organizations.

    Even if I had an army that was three times its current size, the answers at this stage would probably be no less or no more specific, because the reality is that readiness capabilities ebb and flow based on a variety of issues. We really can't say we can go and do this and can accept these risks until we know what the task is and we do the analyses.

    The Chair: Thank you, General.

    Monsieur Bachand, your time has expired, as I'm sure you can appreciate.

    Mr. Price, for five minutes.

    Mr. David Price: Thank you, Mr. Chair.

    General Jeffery, in relation to the Prague summit and the rapid response force, I realize you can't talk to us about the navy or air force, but they're looking at a standing force. That means people on the ground somewhere. I imagine you're looking at this, too, to see what you can provide.

    They have said quite clearly that the forces coming from different countries are going to specialize in one particular field. That's what they're looking for. Each country will have a specific field and will add to that standing force so that the rapid response force can be set up and ready to go within the designated time—and I forget what the timeframe was.

    Could you talk to us about where we are in that, what we're looking at, and what timeframes are involved?

    LGen Mike Jeffery: Mr. Chairman, this is an area in which I'm not up to speed in terms of what the current discussion is, because those discussions are literally going on right now. There are a range of issues here in terms of what size the force would be and what specific capabilities it would have. A lot of discussion and almost a negotiation goes on to be able to achieve this.

    Clearly, in line with the sort of capability we have, a battle group, and at most a couple of battle groups, is realistically the order of magnitude that we can potentially achieve. In the longer term, clearly more would be possible with more resources, but I think we're probably in that range. The difficulty is going to come in that the expectation of some of the nations in NATO is certainly that we're really talking about brigade-sized formations and not smaller. We would have difficulty in the short term in regard to being able to do that, so I'm not sure where that leaves us.

    There's a fair bit of discussion and negotiation. If we're not going to have a brigade but we are going to have something smaller, who do we go with? At this stage, I'm starting to get into speculation, frankly, because I haven't been involved in those discussions.

    Mr. David Price: Just to narrow it down a bit, because we're in the Christmas season, maybe we can look at the Christmas wish list. If you were able to choose the specialty that you'd like to insert into that force, would it be a reconnaissance group that you might be looking at? That's on the army side, of course, because I realize you can't answer for the other sides.

    LGen Mike Jeffery: If we were down to that sort of size, then there are a number of potentials. We have good infantry, we have good reconnaissance, and we have a number of other capabilities that we could easily ensure are of the level of capability and readiness needed to do that. But since you started by asking about a Sears Christmas Wishbook desire, I would suggest to you that I'd like to have a brigade, if you really want a serious Sears Christmas Wishbook answer. Of course, it's not achievable right now—

    Mr. David Price: You have to have a wish list, though.

    The Chair: You never know.

    Anything further, Mr. Price?

º  (1645)  

    Mr. David Price: Yes, and it's just on something brought up earlier about the new vehicles. The reserves would have one type of vehicle—the type already ordered—and the regulars would have another. Are we talking about the same general vehicle, with one just a little more heavily armoured than the other? I'm sure you're into the planning stages for the second one. Could you give us a little bit of a breakdown on that?

    LGen Mike Jeffery: The concept originally was whether or not we would get a vehicle that is both an operational vehicle and a training vehicle at the same time. We've tried this a number of different ways. We've gone to commercial, off-the-shelf-pattern vehicles before for operational purposes. While they work, there is frankly an issue of overall capability and durability, given that. And we've also gone to what we call SMP vehicles—standard military pattern—which are much more expensive to buy.

    The concept was that if you could get one vehicle that effectively came in two models, a military/commercial off-the-shelf vehicle—which means it's an off-the-shelf vehicle with minor modifications made to meet the military requirements—principally for training or domestic operations, and ideally the same model of vehicle in a standard military pattern for actual major operations, you would get a high level of skill transfer between the two vehicles. One's a good training and domestic operations vehicle, and the skills are transferrable to the other vehicle. That was the concept. That was quite a long time ago, and for a variety of reasons—not the least of which is contracting—we ended up in a situation in which there almost certainly are going to be two different vehicles.

    The original concept as it was envisaged was not achievable. That doesn't negate the concept, though. Realistically, however, do we need to spend the same level of money to buy standard military pattern vehicles for training in Canada for domestic use? The answer is no, so we've taken a two-track approach to having a less capable and therefore less expensive vehicle, so that we can have more of them and fit them within the overall budget. That's what the logic was, and that's where we are.

    The Chair: Thank you, General.

    Thank you, Mr. Price.

    Mrs. Wayne.

    Mrs. Elsie Wayne: General Jeffery, based on the report that we've received, A Nation at Risk—which was referred to by my colleague Bob Wood—my understanding is that since the program review in 1994, our army has underfunded national procurement, initially at about 10% a year, but more recently at about 30%. The report states that within eighteen months—that's 2004—up to 40% to 50% of the army's weapons and vehicle fleet could be grounded because the purchase of spares has been inconsistent and inadequate. It says grounded systems are likely to be parked for two to five years awaiting parts, and five to ten years awaiting labour. Could you address that please?

    The Chair: I think the general touched on this a little earlier, Mrs. Wayne.

    Mrs. Elsie Wayne: Oh, I'm sorry.

    The Chair: General, did you have anything further to add to that?

    LGen Mike Jeffery: When we go back to the 1994 program review timeframe, I really want to make sure we understand the dynamic going on here.

    First of all, the army's part of the national procurement budget—and the national procurement budget is a departmental budget, it doesn't belong to the army—basically provides the funding for the spares for all of our vehicles for major repairs and for overhaul. The actual amount of money that the army has had out of that budget has increased significantly over that same timeframe. That's the first thing.

    It has increased significantly because as we have brought new fleets of vehicles into service, the demands for that national procurement have increased. Higher technology is actually more expensive, so our part of that budget has gone up significantly with all those new fleets. Of course, with an overall diminishing budget, that has created tremendous pressure on the overall national procurement, so there are conflicting forces at play here. When you say it's underfunded 10% and has gone up from there, then, I can't confirm or refute that. I can't put that particular figure into context.

    As I said earlier on the issue of grounding 40% to 50% of the fleets awaiting parts and awaiting labour, I again can't confirm or refute those statistics. I don't know the means by which that analysis was done. It does seem extremely high to me. The issue of parts and national procurement, however, is clearly something we manage on a year-to-year basis. As we look at the risks, we put more money into buying those spares.

    If you project anything in the right direction, you can come up with those sorts of crisis-type scenarios, but we have means of controlling things. So I'll put it into some context. We are managing a significant capability and resource gap. The minister sat here and explained that it's $1 billion. That's not a small amount of money, and it has been there for a significant amount of time, so you are seeing those risks manifest themselves. The question is whether or not we are able to manage that gap. My view is that we are.

    Do I have vehicles and weapons awaiting labour? Yes, I do. And if you continued to project that, you could come up with those crisis scenarios. Will we allow that to happen? No, because we will make the necessary changes and change the priorities to do that. Long before I get to that sort of point, I start grounding parts of the army so that I can focus on and fix the problem.

    So I can't refute the theoretical analysis, but I can say that our responsibility is to ensure that we don't get there. But the underlying root causes are there, and I won't shy away from that fact.

º  (1650)  

    The Chair: Mrs. Wayne, you have time for a very quick question.

    Mrs. Elsie Wayne: Mr. Chair, I just want to let the general know that David Price, Leon Benoit, and I were on a panel on CPAC. It was a call-in show, but they also were doing a poll. The poll showed that 89% of Canadians are in support of supporting our military. The military is number one, and 89% of the people across this nation right now feel very strongly about that.

    We're not here to be critical. This committee is here to support you. We're here to give the government whatever facts we can to show the need for an infusion, for the money that you require in order to increase your brigades, in order for you to increase the numbers that you have, or in order to give you all of the equipment you need in whatever it is. That's what we're here for, sir. I want you to know that. But if you leave us with the impression that you don't need that kind of help, then I think we're going to have to have a little private talk somewhere.

    The Chair: Mrs. Wayne is out of time, General, but I think you should be allowed the opportunity to respond to that.

    LGen Mike Jeffery: Mr. Chairman, I learned a long time ago to never reject support and assistance. I don't think anybody in the Canadian Forces or the Department of National Defence is doing that. But I think we all understand the context of this, and trying to provide objective and balanced testimony and insights is what we are trying to achieve. We're not trying to hide anything. I think the reality is that people understand where we are, but managing through times of difficulty and shortfall is what we're doing.

    The Chair: Thank you, General.

    Mr. Wood.

    Mr. Bob Wood: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

    General, a couple of weeks ago, the Prime Minister was quoted as saying there's going to be money for defence in the new budget. Everybody is looking at $1.5 billion. Using that as a benchmark, I want to talk about the reserves. After everybody divvies up the $1.5 billion and everybody gets their hands on it, is there going to be any money left to go forward with phase II of the land force reserve restructure? You're the special assistant to the CDS for reserve restructure, aren't you?

    LGen Mike Jeffery: I was.

    Mr. Bob Wood: Are you not still?

    The Chair: Before you answer that question, General, maybe Mr. Wood knows something we don't know about the next budget.

    Mr. Bob Wood: No, I don't, but it's a good guess. Of course, the Prime Minister did say there was money in there, so we'll just take him at his word.

    LGen Mike Jeffery: Mr. Chairman, as you know, when I arrived in Ottawa, I originally came as the special assistant to the CDS on LFRR, prior to assuming command of the army. In a sense, I'm still in that capacity, but I'm no longer called that. As the army commander, I'm responsible for the reserves, though, so I still have that overall responsibility.

    Given that, to my knowledge, we have been given no money or no indication of money, and given that I certainly have not been told to plan on any, we have not come up with a new pot to start divvying up, theoretical or otherwise. We know in global terms what it would cost for LFRR phase II, and that is published as part of the overall strategy. We keep those figures current in terms of inflation and changes, and as I said earlier, we're looking forward to having government decisions in regard to both policy and resources in order to allow us to move forward with the reserve restructure. If the government were to select not to, we would hope it would give us that clear indication as well, because more than anything else, I think we do need clarity.

    I would hope it's a positive view. I think the reserves do need that sort of support. At the end of the day, though, we're waiting to get the money. We can then have the discussion on how it's divided up.

º  (1655)  

    The Chair: Mr. Wood, do you have anything further?

    Mr. Bob Wood: Do you think the money for the reserves should be clearly earmarked for the army reserves, precluding any possibility of it being utilized in other fields?

    LGen Mike Jeffery: Mr. Chairman, my understanding, my expectation, is that phase II is a change to force structure, and that's why the policy dimension of this is clear direction from the government. We're growing part of the organization, and it has to come with clear direction to do that. And obviously the money has to be identified to do that

    There's no question in my mind, though. I would have concerns if someone were to then say we are going to partition or put a fence around the funding for the reserves versus the regular force in some manner—which some have suggested should be done—because that actually creates real difficulties for us. The reality is that the two components are fully integrated, and trying to pull them apart and identify what's reserve money and what's regular force money would be extremely difficult. But clearly, additional money has to be identified so that it actually comes in and is focused on the reserve.

    I should also tell you—and I think it's important in terms of context—that over the last three or four years, given the pressures on the army, the funding for the overall army reserve has gone up while within the field force of the army in particular, it has gone down in relative terms. So contrary to what some may believe, we've actually protected the reserves more than the regular force over the last three to four years, in terms of overall funding.

    Mr. Bob Wood: Thank you, General.

    Do I have any more time?

    The Chair: You have 35 seconds.

    Mr. Bob Wood: I need a 20-second answer here. Do you feel there's a need for another white paper on defence? Can you answer that in 20 seconds?

    LGen Mike Jeffery: I made the statement earlier that I believe that, given the magnitude of the issues we face as a nation and around the world, and given the many very different priorities that the nation has to grapple with, some debate on the security of this country is important. As for whether it results from or has to be done in the context of a policy review or a white paper, to my mind it's either not my place or I don't have a strong view on it. But as the minister has said here, the first priority is to deal with the sustainability problem of the Canadian Forces, and we're clearly of one mind in that view.

    The question then becomes how you deal with the longer term. There are many ways of doing that, but I do think there needs to be an open and transparent debate on this issue in order to get clarity on where security in this nation is going.

    The Chair: Thank you, General Jeffery.

    Thank you, Mr. Wood.

    Mr. Benoit, for five minutes.

    Mr. Leon Benoit: Thank you, Mr. Chair.

    I want to get back to sustainability, the issue just mentioned, in a minute. First, however, I want to just ask a question regarding the comment the chair made at the start about the medal presentation last weekend for some of those involved in the battle at the Medak Pocket. It was really heartwarming to finally see that.

    We had people come to this committee in either 1997 or 1998, and I believe Matt Stopford was one of those people. He brought it to the attention of the public. Matt Stopford, who brought this to the attention of the public, was there in the Medak Pocket, but he wasn't awarded a medal. I'd just like to ask you if you know why that is.

»  (1700)  

    LGen Mike Jeffery: Could I be precise, Mr. Chairman? What medal? Are we talking about the unit commendation?

    Mr. Leon Benoit: We're talking about the medal that was presented by the Governor General to those who were in the heat of action in the Medak Pocket.

    LGen Mike Jeffery: First of all, Mr. Chairman, my understanding—and it is just that—is that we had many people who served with the 2 PPCLI battle group in the Medak Pocket who, for a wide variety of reasons, either could not or did not attend the ceremony in Winnipeg. To my knowledge, Mr. Stopford did not attend that ceremony. Therefore, he was not on parade to receive the medal. But it is also my understanding and certainly my expectation that all of those who served at that time will receive that. It's a matter of getting it to them in the appropriate manner at the appropriate time. There's no intent not to do that.

    This medal, this unit commendation, is not a medal like those you normally wear. A device or a symbol is put on the uniform or worn on civilian clothes. Everybody who was in that operation is entitled to have that and wear it whenever. Those people who are 2 PPCLI, even though they weren't at the Medak Pocket, can also wear it as long as they're within that unit. Mr. Stopford is entitled to have and to wear that, and I'm sure he will be awarded it at the appropriate time.

    Mr. Leon Benoit: So he would have received an invitation to go to this ceremony, then.

    LGen Mike Jeffery: I spoke to retired Sergeant-Major Mike Spellen—who I think you may be familiar with—and he personally told me that he'd spoken to Mr. Stopford to ensure that he knew he was welcome at the ceremony.

    Mr. Leon Benoit: Thank you, General.

    Regarding sustainability, I asked you earlier about the possibility of delivering a brigade, and you said rightly that there are no commitments in the white paper to sustaining a brigade beyond six months. That's accurate, but there is a commitment to sustain two battle groups indefinitely. That's laid out in the white paper. Could you deliver that?

    LGen Mike Jeffery: The answer, Mr. Chair, is that it depends. Let me put it in the theoretical and in the practical.

    The difficulty with the white paper and policy documents like it is that they don't specify what we mean by “battle group” and what the specific size is, so let me go back and put it in the context of normal military terminology. A battle group is normally based on an infantry battalion. An infantry battalion, a mechanized battalion, is normally in the order of 700 to 750 strong. In normal operations like those we found in Central European combat operations, a battle group with its supporting bits and pieces would be upward to 1,000 maximum. The army can basically sustain about 2,000 people out of the country at any one time, so you are in the realm of sustaining two battle groups. That's the kind of thinking and logic that went into what was in the white paper.

    The problem is that as the world has changed over the last ten years and we have gotten into more and more different kinds of operations, what used to be called a battle group has changed, as has the reality of what we are now calling a battle group. Until we reduced it in the last rotation, we got to the stage at which we had a battle group in Bosnia that was approaching 1,900 troops at one point. In other words, you can see a situation in which one battle group effectively eats up what we traditionally call two battle groups' worth of personnel. In that context, in putting an additional battle group into Afghanistan, it was actually three.

    So in the theoretical, based on the computations that led to the white paper policy and, flowing from that, the force structure decisions and resourcing decisions that ensured that the army had the capability to achieve that, we're still in the right ballpark, notwithstanding personnel shortfalls and resources. As the demand has grown in practical terms, we can't sustain it, not over the long term. We can sustain that additional level once in a while, and we have done it. I would invite you to look at where we've gone well beyond that over the last ten years. At some stages, we have had as many as 4,000 outside the country. But over the long haul, it starts to really have a corrosive effect. That's why we can't continue to do it.

»  (1705)  

    The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Benoit.

    There are two questioners on the government side, so I guess I'm going to have to wait.

    Mr. Wood, go ahead.

    Mr. Bob Wood: General, just to follow up on my question on the white paper, I just wanted to know if you think there is an urgent need to do that.

    LGen Mike Jeffery: What is “urgent”? And I don't mean that facetiously.

    The immediate requirement is to deal with the issue of sustainability. There's no question about that. The kind of debate that I personally think needs to go on is one that needs to be a considered debate that takes some time. I don't see us rushing off to do that immediately, and it's certainly not any priority over the sustainability challenge, but I would hope there is a debate in this country in the months and years ahead that leads to some decisions to provide some clarity. Based on the discussions we're having here, based on the types of concerns put forward by this committee, other committees, the Conference of Defence Associations, and others, and based on the concerns expressed by many in Canadian society, I think the government has said it is required that this be dealt with. It requires an answer, requires some clarity. It is an important issue that needs to be dealt with not with haste, but with the intent to try, as soon as is reasonable, to provide some clarity on where the institution has to go.

    Mr. Bob Wood: Thank you.

    The Chair: Mr. Price.

    Mr. David Price: Thank you, Mr. Chair. I just have a short question.

    I think many of us have had a chance to take a look at our Coyote reconnaissance vehicles, and they're just an incredible piece of kit. Really, if we look at today's battlefield out there, reconnaissance has changed quite a bit. It's done on a very high-tech level. This is a really good piece of high-tech equipment, but we're seeing unmanned air vehicles being used more and more. I can see an incorporation between the Coyote and that type of vehicle. Are we doing any work on that?

    LGen Mike Jeffery: If you were to go back to the discussions that we've had previously on army strategy and the kinds of new approaches that we're talking about, we see an environment in which information knowledge is much more important. The use of both ground-based and air-based high-tech systems to provide a more all-encompassing understanding of what's there—greater situational awareness, as we call it—along with a range of manned vehicles like the Coyote and potentially unmanned vehicles in the future, as well as manned aircraft and unmanned aircraft, are all the kinds of platforms we would look at.

    We are developing the concepts. We are doing research and development and some experimentation on a variety of different systems. We share information with our allies so that we get the benefits of some of their research. And we have capital programs that we're trying to proceed with and that obviously are intended to try to get us there. We want to spend a fair bit of our limited dollars in this area to provide us with the command and control, communications, and surveillance platforms needed to ensure that we have a much better level of understanding of what's there. If you don't have that in this day and age, you're effectively blind and don't have very much operational capability.

    To go back to army strategy, the challenge for us is that in a relatively closed system, that means some of those resources have to be found internally, so we're financing from within. Some of the people we need to man those systems will come out of other functions, and that means we're going to take some risks somewhere else. But that's where we're trying to go.

    The Chair: Okay, thank you, Mr. Price.

    There's still a little time left on the government side, so I'm going to avail myself of the opportunity to ask one quick question.

[Translation]

    Mr. Claude Bachand: We aren't supposed to go from one to the other?

[English]

You just gave the—

»  (1710)  

    The Chair: No, this is within the five minutes.

    Mr. Claude Bachand: They split the five minutes?

    An hon. member: Yes.

    Mr. Claude Bachand: So you still have some time left? How long?

    The Chair: Yes, I do, but it's being eaten up.

    General, maybe you can give me a quick answer to this question. I understand that the forces are possibly in the process of selling off twelve of the Griffin helicopters. Could you tell us what's behind that decision?

    LGen Mike Jeffery: To be honest, Mr. Chair, you have me cold, because I am not aware of any such plans. I'm saying that quite honestly. In the context of pressures, we have clearly looked at a number of options in terms of how we can live within our means. That isn't to say there couldn't be such plans, but I honestly am not aware of them.

    The Chair: Fair enough.

    Mr. Bachand—and I was within the five minutes.

    Mr. Claude Bachand: Okay, thanks.

    I have five minutes also?

    The Chair: Yes, you do.

[Translation]

    Mr. Claude Bachand: I entirely agree with the general on one point.

    I think it's time we had a debate on national defence policy. Moreover, I would respectfully like to remind my colleagues that it was our party that proposed to develop a national defence policy before massive amounts of money were injected in this sector.

    In my view, Mr. Chairman, the Canadian Armed Forces are at a kind of crossroads. For example, some generals and colonels, whose identity I cannot reveal, have informed me that, in their view, ships are what count the most and the army, by comparison, is relatively unimportant. That's an example I often cite.

    I also think that military doctrine has changed enormously since the events of September 11; the general might have a few words to say on that subject.

    For millennia, men have been used to entering battlefields or theatres of operations in which they had an enemy in front of them. September 11 changed that. I regularly ask the question whether we need submarines in order to conduct the war on terrorism. The answer, in my view, is no. In my opinion, sovereignty, the polar ice cap and the Northeast Passage are the real issues.

    It is time we took initiatives with regard to national defence policy and gave taxpayers the opportunity to state directly how they view matters. It is important to proceed this way, given that they pay the bills.

    I now come to my main question.

    As I see it, the Special Forces are well adapted to the new military doctrine. The enemy cannot always be seen. In the circumstances, it must be said that the contribution of Canada's Special Forces in Afghanistan was substantial.

    I would like to know, Mr. Chairman, whether the general thinks that the Special Forces are a unique army corps, distinct from the Air Force and the Navy. In the current global context, in view of terrorism, the war on terrorism, a traditional situation of conflict in which troops are sent in advance to perform a certain job and an armed conflict which could break out, does he feel this group has become a very important component?

[English]

    LGen Mike Jeffery: Mr. Chairman, if I can address the issue of—as I understand the question—defence policy prior to resources, I understand the logic of the question. The reality, though, is that we're talking about dollars needed to sustain the organization, recognizing that any serious consideration or debate is going to take time, be it a policy review or however it is conducted. The institution needs resources and some clarity in the short term, so what I'm suggesting is that it needs to be the priority.

    In terms of whatever that debate is and where we go, I will certainly not get into an army–navy–air force type of discussion. These are national security issues and national defence issues, and we try very hard to maintain that global and national perspective. Recognizing that there are tough decisions if we can't afford to do it all, I think we need to have a holistic view of that. In my personal view, it is too simple to just say to do away with this or do away with that, to not have an army or a navy or an air force, and that this will solve all the problems. You could do that, but those are very tough national decisions. As a soldier, as much as I want to see a good army, I would have a concern that we take a more balanced approach or that, at the very least, we're very clear on and understand the risks that we're taking as a nation if we take an approach other than that.

    In terms of special operating forces, I certainly see the value in them. I have for a long time. Indeed, as you well know, the government has made a decision to increase the size of our special operating forces. As I look at army transformation and the work going on within the army, the question I have is whether my own light infantry forces could in fact do more and more of those kinds of functions. So I believe they are an important part of military capability going into the future.

    The only concern I have is a generation and sustainment concern, because the reality is that the skills we're talking about are very difficult to achieve and maintain. We're talking about young men—and maybe some young women in some cases—who are very highly capable individuals. They're very rare. We just can't mass-produce them. I am not sure that the base—and I don't mean this pejoratively—gene pool within the military is broad enough or deep enough to sustain too much of an increase in special operating force capability. If we're not very careful, we risk eroding quality. If we do that given the kinds of things we expect these troops to achieve, we end up facing some very big high-risk situations. I think that's a caution we all have to bear in mind.

»  (1715)  

    The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Bachand.

    Are there any questions on the government side? No?

    I would like to ask you another question in relation to intelligence cooperation, General. It's obviously not something you can get into in very much detail, but I guess it's fair to say Canada's participation in Afghanistan gave us some pretty good intelligence from the standpoint of what was happening on the ground with some of the other allies over the course of our engagement there, especially on the land side. Given the fact that the British and the Australians have lined up very squarely behind the Americans, do you feel at this point that perhaps we're getting the cold shoulder on some of the intelligence being generated from the region?

    LGen Mike Jeffery: Mr. Chairman, in terms of my own expertise and personal knowledge, I'm not sure I can answer that question. That question probably is best addressed by Admiral Greg Madison, the Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff, or by his senior intelligence officer, General Michel Gauthier.

    Clearly, we have strategic national agreements with our allies in terms of sharing intelligence, and that sharing does continue. While we were in Afghanistan, we certainly had some significant capability that we took in ourselves and shared with our allies, as they did with us. That continues. However, when we get into preparations for specific operations, even in international or multinational organizations there are different levels of groups. As you get into nations that have agreed to go and do something, they share amongst those who have agreed to do that something. For some nations, by agreeing to get on board, they are engaged in some level of planning that we don't have visibility into, and they share certain types of information.

    I think it's clear that we don't get all of it, but do we get good information? I think we do, but as I said when I started, you'll get a better answer from Admiral Madison on that than the one I can provide to you.

    The Chair: Mr. Benoit.

    Mr. Leon Benoit: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

    Just following up on sustaining two battle groups indefinitely, you answered the question on that and said we could under some circumstances, but not others.

    There have been a lot of complaints from people in the forces about over-deployment. I would just like to ask you what your evaluation would be if Canada were to sustain a commitment of two battle groups indefinitely, particularly if there were also deployments of air force and navy personnel. I understand there's a lot of back-and-forth between the army, navy, and air force, when it comes to technicians, communications people, and certain other people, and that over-deployment is a particular problem with these people. I would like your evaluation of what the impact could be on personnel, and whether you would see some of our very experienced personnel leaving due to over-deployment.

»  (1720)  

    LGen Mike Jeffery: Given the high tempo that we've seen over the last decade, I don't think there's any question that it has taken its toll on our people, either army, navy, or air force. As I look at it from an army point of view, there are certainly those in the organization who are tiring of the number of deployments.

    The difficulty in answering the question on whether or not that would result in an exodus of people—I take that to be the essence of the question— is that it's very hard to judge. And I'm not trying to skirt the issue. Let me address a number of its component parts.

    I go around the army and consciously talk to soldiers, NCOs, and officers. Sometimes I'll ask them the blunt question about how many operational tours they have had and whether they are interested in another one. Other times, I'll get into a discussion and get a sense of where people are. You'll find those people who have eight or nine tours but are eager to go again. You'll find those who have one or two and will say they're really tiring of all of it. So there's no easy answer. There's no one number that says, “This is the magic number”.

    It relates in part to age. You tend to see that the young soldiers are full of vigour and want to do more. You tend to see that the older, experienced NCOs who have done a fair number and who have a family, who have teenaged kids, would like to spend more time at home. But even that's not a hard and fast rule. It's difficult to get that real sense of it. I've spent a lot of time talking particularly to my senior commanders as we collectively try to evaluate just that.

    We are seeing a growing level of fatigue. I don't think there's any question about that. Does it mean that one day we'll wake up and realize a large part of the army won't go? No, I don't think so. What you're going to see over time, unless we change some things, is a slow increase in the level of attrition.

    Remarkably, the attrition levels are quite low. They're in the 5% to 6% range, which is on the low side even for the last ten or twenty years. So the evidence isn't there today that it is a problem, but our instincts tell us that it's going to become one, in part because the demographic of the forces, and the army in particular, sees a large part of our experienced people coming up to the magic 20/40 point, as we call it, with twenty years of service at forty years of age or thereabouts. That's the point at which they are entitled to retire with a pension or an annuity. They can go out and have a regular income, and they're still young enough to move on to another line of work.

    As you look at a fairly large bump in the demographic profile of people coming up to that point, and when you combine that with ten years of fairly high tempo, our concern is that we're going to see a larger and larger number of people taking up the opportunity to leave over that three- to five-year period. But I have to be really clear here that this is our sense of it. You can't measure anything to determine that, and only by watching the number of people being released over time can you start to get a sense of either confirming, or otherwise, that fear.

    Mr. Leon Benoit: What about the particular groups in which there's a real shortage, like maintenance technicians, communications people, and some logistics people? You certainly know better than I do. I understand that a lot of people who are normally in the army have been going to help out with the navy or the air force, and the other way around, just to get enough people together.

    My other question would be this: If Canada does commit in Iraq—say, in February or something like that—what happens to this brigade-level training being planned in Wainwright? Will that go ahead?

    LGen Mike Jeffery: The area that is under the greatest stress from a personnel point of view, I think across the board, is that of technical specialists in some of the logistics functions, because of the amount we've been using them. If you take particular technicians—one group that comes to mind is fire control systems technicians—they are very highly skilled tradesmen. They have to be bright. They have a lot of aptitude for technical issues. They take years to get to the journeyman level, to really become proficient. I can't quote you the figure, but I think we're at a level at which we have only about 75% of the overall number of fire control systems technicians that we need. We're also bringing more and more high-tech equipment in, so we actually need to grow the overall requirement. The result is that the same people are going back on operational tours again and again.

    You already have a trade that's undermanned. You know you're going to have to grow it in terms of changing requirements. You have to use them because you have this high-tech kit in service, so you have to push them to go into operations. How do you regenerate from below? That's the basic dynamic of the problem.

    I don't have an answer to that. There is no easy answer. You need to get the people in and you need to regenerate more, and that's what we're working at. We try to ensure that we take the load off of them when we can so that we don't drive them into the ground, but it is a very delicate balancing act. And a number of those trades fall in that category.

    Could operational deployments, for whatever reason, impact on something like the brigade training event? Yes, they certainly could. It depends on how much would be required to do what, and on when and where. But the brigade training event is a means of trying to bring the critical people together in time and space to achieve that level of training. If those troops are off somewhere else, then obviously we're not going to do that. As long as we are able to sustain the kind of output that we have to sustain, though, there still is the potential to be able to do it. We're not creating additional training requirements, we're just making sure that the ones we have to train come together to get that experience.

    I'm not trying to answer that two ways. It could be at risk if the operational missions come along, but I have some hope that if they're not too much, we'll be able to salvage some of the brigade training event.

»  (1725)  

    The Chair: Mr. Benoit, do you have anything further?

    Mr. Leon Benoit: No, thank you.

    The Chair: What about you, Mr. Bachand? No?

    Is there anything on the government side? No?

    General, on behalf of all the members of the committee, I'd like to thank you for being here today. We've had some very interesting questions and some equally interesting answers. I think your comments have helped us considerably, and I'm sure we'll see you again soon.

    LGen Mike Jeffery: My pleasure. Thank you.

    The Chair: The meeting is adjourned.