FAIT Committee Meeting

STANDING COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE

COMITÉ PERMANENT DES AFFAIRES ÉTRANGÈRES ET DU COMMERCE INTERNATIONAL

EVIDENCE

[Recorded by Electronic Apparatus]

Tuesday, February 29, 2000

• 0947

[English]

The Chair (Mr. Bill Graham (Toronto Centre—Rosedale, Lib.)): I need a police officer to give me some authority up here. No one's paying attention. I have Mr. Miller.

Colleagues, could we get going? We're running late.

I'd like to welcome our group of government officials back again to talk about and serve as our wrap-up of Kosovo.

I'd like to make a couple of suggestions to our witnesses. Could you keep your interventions as short as possible? You've already sent written answers, I know, to Mr. Robinson's questions, which we received. We've all heard a great deal of evidence from all sorts of sources. I know you've been getting reports on it. I think the members of the committee would be interested in your comments on where you feel there are lacunae in what we've heard or where there are some inaccuracies, in your opinion. That would be most helpful to us.

Then we'll try to get to questions as quickly as possible, because now that we've heard quite a bit about this, I know the members will have some questions that have built up in their minds about what they've heard and would like to ask you questions: “Well, we heard such-and-such from so-and-so and something different from somebody else. How do you reconcile it?”, etc.

We thank you very much for coming. I have one last observation. There will be a vote at 10.40.

[Translation]

Ms. Lalonde is already aware of the situation, no doubt because she is responsible for the vote being held in the first place.

Ms. Francine Lalonde (Mercier, BQ): Really, Mr. Chairman!

The Chairman: It wasn't Ms. Debien.

Ms. Francine Lalonde: No, it was Mr...

The Chairman: I see.

Ms. Francine Lalonde: Are you looking to point the finger at someone?

[English]

The Chair: So the bells will start at 10.10 and the vote will be at 10.40 if it works that way. Bear that in mind, everybody. We went through this before. This is why you're back. So let's try to get through this in one session.

Mr. Wright, we'll start with you, sir.

Mr. Jim Wright (Director General for Central, East and South Europe, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada): Mr. Chairman, honourable members, we've read with a great deal of interest the testimony of all those who have appeared before this committee since we last addressed you a few weeks ago, and the questions you have asked. A number of the witnesses have raised valid concerns about peace-building challenges we face in Kosovo and throughout the region. There is no doubt that the situation is difficult. We welcome constructive advice from all sources. The government shares some of the concerns expressed by others during these hearings, as outlined in our previous interventions.

• 0950

[Translation]

I would, however, like to address the broader strategy being pursued by the international community and our partners in Kosovo, elsewhere within the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and with its neighbours. As significant as Kosovo undoubtedly is, to focus so intently on its challenges sometimes causes us to lose the regional perspective. Committee members are familiar with Canada's peacekeeping and peacebuilding role in the Balkans over the past decade, but I would like to touch on some key elements in outlining the way ahead.

[English]

The tragic human costs of the conflict in the Balkans since the rise to power of Slobodan Milosevic are well known. No community has been untouched by the violence. Ethnic cleansing has been perpetrated against ethnic Croats, Bosniaks, Serbs, Albanians, Roma, Jews, and others. This is not to equate blame among the leadership of the countries of the former Yugoslavia but to make it clear that many innocent people have been victimized and that guilt is individual, not collective.

Massive efforts have been made to mitigate and reverse this human suffering, and progress is finally being shown. The return of hundreds of thousands of ethnic Albanian deportees last year constitutes an unprecedented reversal of ethnic cleansing. It must not be the last such reversal. We are working hard throughout the region to ensure it is not.

[Translation]

With respect to your previous witnesses, what was missing from a number of their interventions was any realistic alternative approach to the problems of Kosovo. There is also the unasked question of what would have been the likely cost of a decision by NATO Allies not to intervene decisively. Our firm view is that such a decision would have been disastrous.

[English]

Had Slobodan Milosevic succeeded in his campaign to deport his ethnic Albanian citizens, refugees would today be freezing in makeshift Macedonian and Albanian camps. These countries, both fragile democracies with their own challenges to address, would have suffered profound political and economic destabilization as a result of the refugee wave and the costs to already strained economies of hosting them. The Bosnian authorities, who are struggling to implement the Dayton peace agreement, were gravely concerned about the possible impact in Bosnia of instability caused by Serb forces on their doorstep.

Had Serb authorities succeeded in their ethnic cleansing campaign in Kosovo, would they have capitalized on this momentum to move against Montenegro, where President Djukanovic's reform policies are perceived by the Milosevic regime as a direct threat to its entrenched interests?

We had more than ample evidence of what was already happening in Kosovo and were fully aware of what had preceded in each of the conflicts waged since Milosevic's rise to power. To wait until all worst-case scenarios had played themselves out in order to dispel any lingering doubts we may have had about Belgrade's intentions would clearly have been irresponsible.

[Translation]

In addition, what signal would have been sent to other tyrants around the world, had the world stood by and allowed Milosevic to succeed, where it had the means and the will to stop him? That they can violate their citizens human rights with impunity? Committee members expressed interest about what the implications of a failure to act decisively in Kosovo, in the face of massive violations of human rights and of humanitarian law, would have meant for the rule of law internationally. Our view is that it would have been a major step backward.

[English]

No student of the Balkans thought our post-conflict role in Kosovo would be easy. The answer does not lie in a defeatist attitude bolstered by historical revisionist theory. Instead it lies in the implementation of resolution 1244, which requires the full engagement of the international community and full cooperation from the local people.

Without minimizing in any way the challenges we face, in particular in Mitrovica, where Canadian troops are working valiantly to stabilize the situation, progress is emerging in various areas. Schools have reopened, with teachers and students now trying to resume the normal process of learning. Reconstruction is proceeding. Major efforts are being made to instil law and order, especially in terms of providing protection for members of minority groups. Attacks against innocent people are totally unjustifiable and cannot be tolerated in any way.

• 0955

As security is stabilized and accountable institutions continue to be established, we need to make more progress toward reconciliation among Serb and Albanian Kosovars. None of this will happen overnight, but there are important signs of progress. It is our clear conviction that the situation in and around Kosovo would have turned out far worse had we allowed Milosevic's campaign of repression to succeed.

[Translation]

There are important signs of progress in neighbouring states, which serve to demonstrate that the region is not condemned to repeat the mistakes made by its extremist leaders of the part. In Croatia, the recent elections of President Mesic and Prime Minister Racan are making it possible for Croatia to play a constructive role as a bridge between the West and the Balkans. It must do more to allow its ethnic Serb refugees to return home, in safety and in dignity, and the Croatian authorities have indicated clearly that they will do so. They have also pledged their full cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal in the Hague. These developments offer the prospect of a real breakthrough in Croatia, and send the clearest signal to others that peaceful democratic change is possible.

[English]

Five years after the Dayton agreement was reached, progress—slow, painful progress—has been made. The people of Bosnia have made it clear, whatever their remaining differences, they wish to find a better road to the future within the European family of nations. When Macedonian president Boris Trajkovski was in Ottawa two weeks ago, he demonstrated a strong desire to ensure that his country continues to serve as a model of multi-ethnicity and stability for its neighbours. Albania has come through the storm having demonstrated a degree of generosity and openness from which many more developed countries can certainly learn lessons.

Elsewhere within Yugoslavia itself, reformists continue to struggle to present real alternatives for their people. The Serbian opposition, which has so often played into Milosevic's hands in the past, is working to improve its cohesion and credibility. The fact that opposition leaders travelled to Zagreb for Croatian President Mesic's inauguration offers a sign of their intention to work to overcome past injustices.

The people of Serbia need to be able to channel their own real desire for meaningful reforms through responsible leaders. We hope the opposition will rise to the challenge.

In Montenegro President Djukanovic continues in his efforts to encourage meaningful reform in his own republic, but also within the institutions of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

Canada wants to see Yugoslavia itself be reintegrated into the family of nations, but that will not happen while it is under the leadership of an indicted war criminal, whose most recent statement offered little but threats against the peace mission in Kosovo, and while Serbia continues to threaten its neighbours and its own reformists.

The way ahead for Yugoslavia is within a prosperous and peaceful Europe, but the momentum for this cannot be generated from the outside only. It must be rooted in deep reform in Belgrade. Until such reform has occurred, Canada and our partners will focus on the humanitarian aid and support for populations in need in Serbia.

[Translation]

It is worth remembering that Canada and the former Yugoslavia, including Serbia, had excellent relations in the past. Serbian Canadians have long made up an important part of our population, and some of the most recent arrivals from Serbia have themselves been seeking better lives abroad as a result of past conflicts. The former Yugoslavia played an important international role in the past and we hope the current Yugoslavia can do so in the future.

• 1000

[English]

The road map for lasting change was clearly laid out at the Sarajevo stability pact summit last July in which Prime Minister Chrétien joined his colleagues from around the world in offering a viable plan for greater democracy, peace, and prosperity through a process of reform and deeper integration into European and Euro-Atlantic institutions.

Canada has been particularly active in working table I, focusing on democratization and human rights, and working table III, security issues. Through task forces set out by each of these working tables, we are addressing some of the major priority areas for Canadian foreign policy in the region, including de-mining, small arms, child soldiers, security sector reform, human rights, refugee return, gender issues, and media reform.

For the region, the pact offers meaningful incentives to encourage the fundamental reforms needed to avert future conflicts. The pact has been well received, and despite the difficult environment, expectations of the countries of the region are high. Regional ownership of solutions and effective cooperation among countries of the region will be key to the success of the pact. For Canada and other participants from outside the Balkans, the pact offers a means to translate our own enlightened self-interest based on respect for human rights and human security into reality.

We know that this broad objective is shared by members of the committee, and we look forward to your views on how Canada can best play its role in this demanding but crucial challenge.

[Translation]

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[English]

The Chair: Thank you very much, Mr. Wright.

Our next witness is Madame Corneau.

[Translation]

Ms. Hélène Corneau (Program Manager, Southern Europe, Central Asia and Humanitarian Aid, Canadian International Development Agency): I do not have a prepared statement, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman: That's alright.

[English]

Mr. Wright, you're the only one giving a statement and everyone else is just here for questioning. Wonderful. That's very helpful. Thank you very much.

Just to exercise the chair thing, let me ask two quick questions, Mr. Wright, and then we'll go to general questions.

You mentioned Montenegro and Mr. Djukanovic. We heard from one witness that there's a very serious possibility of a coup, a countercoup, against Mr. Djukanovic being mounted by Mr. Milosevic's forces in Serbia, which would be totally destabilizing of the whole area. What is your comment on that?

Mr. Jim Wright: We clearly are watching the situation in Montenegro very carefully. We haven't seen any movements of Yugoslav military or special police to suggest that such a coup is immediately in the offing. Of course, the regime in Belgrade is coming under increasing pressure—economic pressure, political pressure—and it has been President Milosevic's behaviour in the past to go ahead and strike out just when you least expect it, to try to find new victims, so that the people of Yugoslavia and Serbia in particular will not focus on their plight, which has been brought about by President Milosevic.

All of this to say that while there is no evidence today to suggest that a coup is in the offing, obviously tensions are very high between Podgorica and Belgrade. We are in touch on a regular basis with Montenegro. In fact, our chargé is in Podgorica as we speak, talking to the Montenegrin leadership. We met with President Djukanovic. In fact, the chairman was present for our last meeting with President Djukanovic when we were in Istanbul with Foreign Minister Axworthy, and we reassured him of the support that Canada continues to offer to Montenegro for its democratic reforms, for its market reforms. We encourage that process and we are watching the situation extremely carefully. Any effort by President Milosevic to try to move on Montenegro would be met by I think a very quick reaction on the part of the international community.

The Chair: Secondly, you say in your statement:

Until such reform has occurred, Canada and our partners will focus on the humanitarian aid and support for populations in need in Serbia.

What does that mean about sanctions? Canadians here want to send packages to family members. There's difficulty of communication with people in Serbia at the moment because of the sanctions. Are you saying we're prepared to look at relaxing sanctions? And are they being effective?

Mr. Jim Wright: The sanctions regime Canada put in place during the war is essentially still in place right now. Yugoslavia remains on the area control list. However, there are exceptions for humanitarian items, and that includes food, clothing, medicine, and educational goods. In fact we are trying to exploit that particular area of exemption by providing humanitarian assistance to Serbia and to Montenegro. We've had a number of humanitarian missions in Yugoslavia, in Serbia. Hélène Corneau was on the most recent visit there. We've provided something in the order of about $11 million already in humanitarian assistance to Serbia and Montenegro, mostly in the area of health care, medicines, and shelter, I think.

But, Hélène, perhaps you want to add to that.

• 1005

Ms. Hélène Corneau: That is correct, Mr. Chairman.

[Translation]

We carried out a humanitarian relief mission to Serbia last January. We met with representatives of multilateral organizations and NGOs present on the ground. To date, CIDA has pledged approximately $11.5 million to multilateral organizations and to several Canadian NGOs, including World Vision and the Canadian Red Cross.

Further initiatives are being planned for the coming fiscal years and these would focus on three priority areas, namely education, health and housing.

[English]

The Chair: Thank you, Madame Corneau.

Mr. Martin.

Mr. Keith Martin (Esquimalt—Juan de Fuca, Ref.): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you, Mr. Wright, and the rest of the party, for coming here today. I'll keep my comments brief so that you can answer the questions, so you will have enough time for it.

The question we struggle with here, obviously, is whether to bomb or not to bomb. We've heard submissions from other people saying there were other options and bombing was not the option to take.

I'd like to know from you what evidence you had of the necessity to bomb and that it was the last best resort to prevent a humanitarian disaster.

The second question is, you would like to effect changes within Belgrade, so what levers are being applied today to effect those changes?

And lastly, in terms of a long-term solution to this problem, where the seeds of ethnic discontent have been there for a long time, where blood has been shed and therefore the seeds of future conflicts are already sown, is the partition of Kosovo the only realistic, long-term solution to this problem, in other words, the northern half of Kosovo continuing to be part of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and southern Kosovo becoming an independent state, or is the only other option an extremely long-term commitment, in terms of troops and economic support, to keep the parties separated or to ensure that at least war doesn't break out again? Thank you.

Mr. Jim Wright: The first question is the most difficult one and obviously the one the international community and the Canadian government struggled with the most. Obviously, the decision on the part of NATO to take a collective security action against Kosovo, against Yugoslavia, was an extremely difficult one, and it was only taken after very careful reflection. There had been efforts under way throughout the 1990s to try to encourage change in attitudes in Belgrade to encourage a dialogue between Belgrade and Pristina.

I remember some of the discussions we had with the Yugoslav leadership as far back as 1996, trying to encourage them to deal with the moderate Kosovar leadership led by Dr. Ibrahim Rugova. The great regret here is that in fact within Kosovo there was not the kind of hatred and revenge climate that you see in Kosovo right now. By and large, I think most Serbs and Kosovars were able to live in relative harmony with each other. The problem, frankly, was more in Belgrade and an unwillingness on the part of Belgrade, and in particular President Milosevic, to give back to the Kosovar Albanians what they took away from them in 1989, which was their autonomy.

Despite the encouragement of the international community through organizations such as the OSCE, the G-8, and the UN Security Council, there was no movement on the part of Belgrade. There was a buildup of extremist elements in Kosovo. The KLA, which hadn't existed before, all of a sudden came into existence.

• 1010

There were repeated efforts on the part of the international community, such as UN Security Council resolutions in 1998 and 1999, that were ignored by Belgrade. There was a political process that was agreed to in October 1998 when Ambassador Holbrooke visited Belgrade, when Minister Axworthy sent me as an emissary for the Government of Canada to meet with the Yugoslav leadership to try to encourage reason there. The net result was a compromise where Belgrade agreed to the presence in Kosovo of an OSCE Kosovo verification mission to monitor developments on the ground. They were there as a confidence-building measure, to encourage dialogue between the communities and to try to encourage solutions.

Despite these efforts by the international community, that confidence-building measure did not work. There was a diplomatic process initiated in Paris at Rambouillet to try to find a political solution to the problem. Those talks went on in January, February, and March. The process broke down I think on March 15. Again, there were repeated resolutions at the United Nations—

Mr. Keith Martin: Let me interrupt for one second. One of the comments that was made by certain individuals to this committee was that Rambouillet wouldn't have been accepted by any sovereign state at all and it was an untenable proposition.

Mr. Jim Wright: I'm not sure I would share that view. Rambouillet may not have been perfect, and I think people looking back on Dayton today would turn around and say that Dayton was not a perfect agreement, but Rambouillet offered the opportunity for a political process. For the Serbian side, Rambouillet preserved territorial integrity and sovereignty of Yugoslavia and preserved a role for the Republic of Serbia in Kosovo. Provisions on national communities offered clear protection for Kosovo Serbs.

I've seen criticism in this committee that because of annex B in the Rambouillet agreement this essentially gave the international military force free reign in Yugoslavia; in essence, an occupying force, I think is the term that has been used, and that's the reason the Yugoslav government rejected the agreement. In fact, annex B was not a major focus of discussion at the Rambouillet discussions at all. The main concern on the part of the Yugoslav authorities was that they did not want to give autonomy back to Kosovo Albanians and they were not prepared to have an international military presence in Kosovo.

Annex B essentially is a standard status forces agreement that NATO has, that SFOR has, in Bosnia. It would have given to the international force a means of accessing Kosovo that would have ensured that there were no surprises with respect to Belgrade or with respect to the international military force. In the mandate for the military force in Rambouillet, the focus was exclusively on Kosovo. That was the mandate that was prescribed in Rambouillet. So I would not agree with the assessment that Rambouillet was a dead letter. Certainly in relation to the circumstances that prevail on the ground right now, obviously Yugoslav authorities would have been far better off had they agreed to Rambouillet than the current set of situations right now, which essentially has turned Kosovo over to the United Nations to administer on an interim basis until a political process plays out.

All of this is to say, in answer to your first question, that I think we did our level best under extremely difficult circumstances to try to facilitate a political process. We got a signature from the Kosovar Albanians to the Rambouillet agreement. We did not from the Serbian side. That was regrettable. A decision was ultimately taken by NATO to initiate this collective security action to respond to this humanitarian crisis. Today we are all engaged in this process of trying to draw the appropriate lessons from that experience.

• 1015

You asked about the levers the international community is using with respect to Belgrade to effect change. There are a number of levers are out there. Some of them are economic and some of them are political, but in the final analysis this is going to be a decision for the Serbian people to make.

The democratic process will prevail in Yugoslavia and in Serbia, and the Serbian people are going to have to choose whether they want their country to continue to be isolated by the international community, whether they want their country run by an indicted war criminal, or whether they want to return to the family of nations, where Yugoslavia played a very helpful role in the 1970s and 1980s. I think it's a great regret that the Yugoslavian people right now are laboured with a government run by indicted war criminals.

We will use our political levers and we will use our economic levers to try to offer some relief on the ground in terms of humanitarian assistance. The main economic and political levers, including a visa ban against senior Yugoslav officials, will continue to be exercised, not just by Canada but by the European Union, the United States, and most other members of the international community.

In terms of your final question on whether the partition of Kosovo is the only solution, I certainly hope not. That's not the intention of the international community. We are seeing a certain cantonalization taking place in Kosovo because of the security situation on the ground. That's not surprising given the fact that minority groups have felt threatened and the only way they felt safe was in larger numbers. That's why you're seeing a number of Serb communities congregate in places like Mitrovica.

The plan for Kosovo that is enshrined in UN Security Council resolution 1244 is for a pluralistic, multi-ethnic Kosovo. That is what the UN special representative, Bernard Kouchner, is committed to. That's what Canada signed up to when it agreed to UN Security Council resolution 1244, and that remains the ambition of the international community.

The circumstances that prevail on the ground right now are regrettable, but it is a short- to medium-term problem and we do not see a solution in Kosovo around the possible partition. I don't think any country is seriously looking at partition as a solution for Kosovo.

Mr Keith Martin: Thank you.

The Chair: Thank you very much.

Madame Lalonde.

[Translation]

Ms. Francine Lalonde: It has been clearly demonstrated here to our satisfaction that action needed to be taken. Brigadier General Maisonneuve, among others, told us in reference to the OSCE verifiers that the more time passed, the greater the risk that the verifiers' plans to stop Milosevic would be defeated.

However, the other witnesses who testified here, among other Mr. Polanyi and Mr. Green, a former Canadian ambassador to Croatia, stated that while they agreed on the need for action of some kind, they were not in favour of an air strike campaign. Mr. Green told us that in his opinion, Milosevic appeared to back down in the face of a threat of a ground invasion.

A voice: A threat of a bombing campaign.

Ms. Francine Lalonde: No, not a bombing campaign. According to Mr. Green, Milosevic didn't appear to be concerned about air strikes. He was more worried about the threat of a ground invasion.

• 1020

We are trying to draw some lessons from this whole experience. Was the planned bombing campaign... In the case of Bosnia- Herzegovina, in 1993 and 1994, NATO had foreseen a similar strategy. Is your assessment of the situation a sound one? Certainly, the circumstances were disturbing. That's my first question.

Secondly, I would now like to touch on the current and future situation. Resolution 1244 calls for a number of initiatives, some of which may seem contradictory. Since I travelled to the area with Minister Axworthy and because I've been monitoring the situation closely ever since, I know that the economic outlook hasn't really improved at all. The current economy is fueled by the consumption of the hundreds of NGOs on site.

Given the situation in Mitrovica, peace seems even less certain today than it was when I travelled to the area in November. One witness, Mr. Green, told us last time when he was here that in his opinion - and I have a copy of his testimony here - the situation in Mitrovica was part of a strategy to separate de facto the north, which would go to Serbia, and the south, which would remain as Kosovo.

For my last question, the objective of preserving the multi- ethnic nature of the region, one that is set out in resolution 1244, would appear difficult to attain. Mr. Kouchner stated as much, as did Mr. Covey. As for Ambassador Graham Green, he said that as a result of everything that's happened in Yugoslavia, the various ethnic groups have retreated behind their respective borders and that appears to be the condition for peace. That's a rather discouraging observation.

[English]

Mr. Jim Wright: I'll do my best to answer all three questions.

First of all, was the bombing strategy the right approach? I think what you're going to find is that governments, foreign ministries, defence departments, and standing committees such as yours around the world will be debating some of the lessons to be learned from the Kosovo conflict for years to come. We certainly are not there yet, and we'll look forward to any final deliberations from this committee and what advice you have for the Canadian government.

Certainly there are quite a few lessons we can draw from this experience. One of the questions that a lot of people are asking is should all force options have been kept on the table right from the very outset? Was NATO right in making it so clear at the outset that this was only going to be an air campaign? It's a good question.

Certainly there were a lot of factors that contributed to the final decision by President Milosevic to agree to the terms that were presented to him by the international community. The pressures included the effects of the military campaign, the bombing campaign that had been prosecuted against his military assets and infrastructure. They were very significant. I don't think you can diminish the impact that had, not only on the military but on the morale of the military as well.

Ms. Francine Lalonde: I repeat what Mr. Graham Green said.

Mr. Jim Wright: You mean his question of whether it was the threat of the invasion that provoked Milosevic? I'm not sure it was. With the peacekeepers who moved into the theatre in Macedonia and in Albania, it was clear to all concerned that those forces were there to join a post-conflict situation on the ground. This was not an invasion force.

• 1025

Very clearly, there was lots and lots of pressure on President Milosevic, and that included political pressure from Russia, from the United Nations, from the European Union. In the final analysis, it became abundantly clear to him that this was not a battle he was going to win. The international community in this particular instance said that we were going to follow through. This was not just another threat we had presented to Milosevic that we were then going to back away from. There had been too many of these in the past. He convinced himself and the people around him convinced him that it was time to cash in his chips, and that's exactly what happened.

In terms of resolution 1244 and the situation in Mitrovica and the situation on the ground in Kosovo today, it is less stable than when you visited Kosovo in November with Minister Axworthy. Certainly, in the area of Mitrovica the situation is more tense than when we were there.

In terms of achievements on the ground, UNMIK and KFOR have made a number of important achievements that we tend to take for granted. It's important that the committee understand what some of those achievements include: a return of 800,000 refugees; schools opening; an infrastructure; homes rebuilt; power reconnected. While there continues to be violence, the number of ethnic attacks is down. The January crime figures are the lowest since June 1999.

I'm not suggesting we're condoning what's going on there right now. On a relative scale, as bad as it is, it's better than what it was before. You have a civilian UN authority that is very clearly in charge.

We also have fairly effectively disarmed the KLA. It still is a gun culture. There are still far too many weapons in Kosovo, but a lot of those weapons have been taken off the streets, and that has contributed to a degree of stability.

Interim administrative structures have been put in place in 19 departments by the UN special representative, Bernard Kouchner, and these departments are working.

It's not everything we wanted it to be. The objective remains multi-ethnicity.

In the meantime, Mr. Kouchner has said to all who have met him that in the current environment, reconciliation is extremely difficult. It is just not possible to get these people to sit down around the same table to cooperate with each other.

Based on our Bosnia experience, there will be a point where we know we can get more constructive engagement by the different ethnic communities and by the leadership. The engagement of the leadership in Serbia and in Kosovo will be critical, but it's not going to be with the current leadership in Belgrade. Within Kosovo elections have not taken place yet. There are municipal elections slated for later in the fall. So a new generation of leadership is going to have to come along that's committed to tolerance, committed to constructive engagement.

In the meantime, what Kouchner talks about is peaceful co-existence—that's the priority—and securing an environment that is safe for all communities, especially minority communities in Kosovo.

The Chair: Thank you.

Mr. Robinson.

Mr. Svend J. Robinson (Burnaby—Douglas, NDP): I want to note that because the committee only received the written responses to the questions that were submitted last night around 5.30 p.m., we haven't had any meaningful opportunity to review them. Obviously, I will submit some follow-up questions and other members as well may submit some through the clerk back to the witnesses. We would also appreciate an opportunity to have timely replies to those before we draft our final report.

• 1030

Some of my questions arise from the written responses that we received. First of all, Mr. Wright has referred to Mr. Kouchner. Kouchner said that the UN has failed to protect the Serb minority in Kosovo. I wonder if Mr. Wright could just tell us specifically what his best understanding is of the number of ethnic Serbs who have in fact left Kosovo since June.

Mr. Jim Wright: I'm not sure I could give you an exact figure.

Mr. Svend Robinson: An approximate figure.

Mr. Jim Wright: The figure I can give you is the number of internally displaced people within Serbia and the number of refugees in Serbia. That figure is not exclusive of Kosovo, so it's not exactly what you're looking for. Hélène may have more information on this. My recollection is that in terms of internally displaced people, it's something in the order of 200,000. In terms of refugees, and this would include those from the Bosnia conflict, from Croatia, the number is something in the order of 500,000 or 600,000.

Mr. Svend Robinson: I'm just a little concerned. Mr. Wright seemed to have fairly precise figures on the number of Kosovar Albanians who have returned. I think he said 800,000. I'm a little surprised that he doesn't have any figures with respect to the number of Kosovar Serbs who left.

Mr. Jim Wright: Do you have a sense of that?

Ms. Hélène Corneau: My understanding is that there are 240,000 Serbs and Romas who have left Kosovo and have gone to Serbia.

Mr. Svend Robinson: It's a fairly staggering figure.

Ms. Hélène Corneau: It is.

Mr. Svend Robinson: I have a couple of questions for Mr. Miller.

Sorry, what is your rank?

Chief Superintendent Peter Miller (Officer in Charge, International Training and Peacekeeping Branch, Royal Canadian Mounted Police): I am chief superintendent.

Mr. Svend Robinson: Do we have any representative here from the military at all?

Mr. Jim Wright: No.

Mr. Svend Robinson: Is there a reason for that?

The Chair: General Henault was not able to come today.

Mr. Svend Robinson: Okay. I had a number of questions for him, for a representative from the military. So I guess we'll have to submit that in writing to the military and get a response back.

The military indicates something like 30% to 35% of their laser-guided bombs, their precision bombs, did not hit their target. I'd obviously be interested to know what they did hit, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Wright referred to Rambouillet and annex B. In the written information we received he indicated that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia posed the most basic elements of a solution, namely the presence of an international force to keep the peace in Kosovo. He also said that Yugoslavia didn't want to give autonomy. Perhaps Mr. Wright could clarify that.

My understanding is that Yugoslavia is in fact particularly concerned about the presence of a NATO force, not necessarily an international force under UN auspices, but specifically a NATO force. Mr. Wright might want to just clarify the answer that was given both in writing and to the committee.

Of course, there is no NATO force now. There is no annex B in resolution 1244, even though this is a standard provision. There is no provision for a referendum. So I wonder if he might take the opportunity to clarify his evidence on that.

Furthermore, Gwynne Dyer has said to lift the sanctions. I want to ask Mr. Wright why the sanctions are being maintained, what the legal basis is for these sanctions. We can't seem to sanction Burma, for example, where there are terrible human rights violations. And yet somehow we can maintain the sanctions on Yugoslavia, even though I don't think it's suggested by anybody that Yugoslavia poses a threat to its neighbours at this point.

Finally, Ambassador Bissett, a distinguished former Canadian ambassador, has taken a position before this committee and elsewhere that differs fundamentally with the government's position. He was treated, in my view, as I said in my letter, in a fairly shabby and humiliating way when he sought to visit our embassy in Belgrade.

In the written response we received from Mr. Wright, he said the department had absolutely no obligation to offer Mr. Bissett a platform under embassy auspices to promote his views. In fact, as I understand it, instructions were given to embassy staff not to communicate with former Ambassador Bissett.

I wonder if Mr. Wright could just explain this again. First of all, is that the case? Secondly, was there a written instruction from headquarters to Belgrade on this issue? If so, I trust that Mr. Wright is prepared to forward a copy of that to the committee. And why on earth was there this absolutely shameful treatment of a former ambassador, telling him he can't even speak, for example, to the locally engaged staff he used to work with in his embassy? Why this kind of treatment, Mr. Chairman?

• 1035

The Chair: You've used up your time with your question. There are only about four minutes left for the answer. If you could compress your answer, Mr. Wright, we would appreciate it.

Mr. Jim Wright: In terms of the sanctions regime and the legal mandate, the UN arms embargo was imposed against Yugoslavia under resolution 1160 on March 31, 1998. The freezing of the assets of Mr. Milosevic and other senior indictees in the territories of UN member states was brought about by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia. The G-8, when it was meeting in May 1998, encouraged a ban on new investments and a freeze of assets held abroad by Yugoslav and Serbian governments, and an agreement was reached to take steps to ban flights by Yugoslav carriers between Yugoslavia and their countries. Loans to Yugoslavia from international financial institutions have been blocked for some time.

In terms of Canadian measures, which have been in place for some time—and I would make the point that we have excluded Montenegro from this process—as of April 30, 1999, Yugoslavia was added to the area control list so that all exports to Yugoslavia require an export permit. But, as I said earlier, the exception here is humanitarian assistance, which includes food, clothing, medicine, and educational goods. The Canadian government has a ban on EDC export credits to Serbia, which has been in place since March 1998. There are no airline routes between Canada and Yugoslavia, so the issue of a flight ban does not impact at all on Canada. There has been a ban on investments since June 1998, a freeze of assets since June 1998, and in July 1999 the Minister of Citizenship and Immigration introduced sanctions against senior representatives of the regime that prevent them from coming to Canada. This was done under paragraph 19(1)(l) of the Immigration Act.

Those constitute the majority of the sanctions that have been put in place either by the international community or by Canada.

In terms of the argument to lift sanctions, I think the answer very clearly is that the international community, Canada included, does not want to do anything that is going to be seen to be benefiting the regime. We're quite prepared to go ahead and try to help out the people of Yugoslavia and Serbia. Hèléne Corneau and others from Foreign Affairs and CIDA were in Belgrade, and we've been to Montenegro as well, trying to see what sort of humanitarian assistance we can offer to the people of Serbia and Montenegro. But there is a firm conviction on the part of the international community that there needs to be this political and economic pressure on the regime in order to demonstrate the conviction of the international community and the unwillingness to work with a regime that is run by indicted war criminals.

The European Union took a decision a little while ago to offer some sanctions relief in the area of flights from Belgrade to Europe. This is not a program that impacts on Canada because there are no flights between Canada and Yugoslavia. This was a measure that was sought very actively by Serbian opposition leaders. The decision was taken by the European Union on a six-month provisional basis, and I think it was taken as a political signal of support from the European Union to Serbian opposition to try to support some of their efforts to promote reform, to promote change, and to consolidate some of their efforts to coordinate things within the Serbian opposition community.

• 1040

I think the program that's in place right now continues to have a significant impact on the regime.

Our hope is that in time the opposition will organize itself well enough and will present a comprehensive program to the Serbian people and that through a peaceful, democratic process, change will come about and the Yugoslav people will finally get what they have long deserved, which is leadership to allow Yugoslavia to return to the family of nations.

On Rambouillet, I am not sure exactly how you want me to answer this. We have given some fairly detailed answers in writing to you and the other committee members.

Yugoslav authorities had concerns on a number of different fronts in terms of the Rambouillet process. You're right. One of their concerns very clearly was that they did not want a NATO force in Kosovo. That's absolutely right. But in the final analysis what they have ended up with as a consequence of UN resolution 1244 is an international military presence. I suspect that under Rambouillet you would have ended up with a very similar type of arrangement. I don't think it would have been exclusively NATO. I think NATO may very well have been at the core. But in the current set of circumstances, KFOR consists of participants from the 19 NATO members and I believe 15 other participating countries, including Russia, and they make a very significant contribution to the KFOR presence.

So I'm not sure that Yugoslavia is any farther ahead today by rejecting Rambouillet. In fact, in many respects they're much farther behind the eight ball than they would have been had they agreed to Rambouillet. But that's Sunday afternoon quarterbacking, I think, on all of our parts.

That's the destiny they chose. The international community reacted. The UN acted in terms of resolution 1244, giving a civilian mandate to UNMIK and a security mandate to KFOR, and I think Canada and NATO were very pleased to contribute to that peacekeeping presence on the ground.

Finally, with regard to—

The Chair: I'm going to have to stop you there because you're well over the time.

Mr. Svend Robinson: He was just going to give a response to the next item.

The Chair: Yes, I know, but he has already taken 13 minutes. You're just taking the time of everybody else. If you ask a six-minute question, you can't have a 10-minute answer. It just doesn't work that way. I'm sorry.

Mr. Svend Robinson: Perhaps he could briefly reply.

The Chair: No. We'll go to somebody else. Maybe you'll get a chance for another five-minute bounce back.

Mr. Assadourian.

Mr. Sarkis Assadourian (Brampton Centre, Lib.): Thank you very much.

Mr. Wright, I have two questions. One of them has to do with your presentation. On page 1 in the third paragraph you mention the leadership of the country, and it says:

...many innocent people have been victimized, and that guilt is individual, not collective.

I am really happy you made that statement. It was made earlier during those days of hot debates between the communities and governments in the world. But can you elaborate on that and make sure the Canadian Serb community members are not tagged along with the Milosevic regime and that there is some cultural disassociation between what happened there, as is described here, and the community? I don't want them to feel left out. That's my first question.

My second question has to do with the refugees. We were told that about 800 to 900 Albanian refugees were removed from Kosovo or ethnically cleansed and that most of them are now back in Kosovo. You also told us that 240,000 Serbs were deported from Kosovo. How many of them have returned to their ancestral home? What are we doing to bring them back to live in their old communities?

Mr. Jim Wright: Thank you very much. The first question is a very important one. I know there is a very high level of concern on the part of Serb communities around the world, and that includes, of course, the very significant Serbian Canadian community. The war was a very difficult period for them. We have tried in our public statements to reassure that community that the action undertaken by the international community was not undertaken against Serbians. It was certainly not undertaken against Serbian Canadians, who have a very proud tradition in Canada.

• 1045

The other point I would make is that we tend to forget the important role Yugoslavia played on the world stage in the 1960s and 1970s, when Yugoslavia was one of the leading countries in the non-aligned countries and was in the forefront of political and economic change in central and eastern Europe. At that time, in fact, Canada had very extensive and very good relations with Yugoslavia. In fact, towards the end of the 1980s, I guess, Canada and Yugoslavia had a very vibrant bilateral and commercial relationship.

There is nothing better that we would like than to see Yugoslavia resume its rightful place in the European family of nations and the international family of nations, and that includes full participation in all of the appropriate international councils.

I thank you for the question and the opportunity to try to reassure the Serbian Canadian community that what has been undertaken was not directed at them nor at the Serbian people themselves. It was very much directed against a regime that has been persecuting its own people for too long and has destabilized the southeastern part of Europe for over a decade now. It was time the international community called Mr. Milosevic and his regime to account. That's the answer to your first question.

On the second question, Madame Corneau talked about something in the order of 240,000, including Roma, that left Kosovo at the end of the war to go principally to Serbia and to Montenegro. As for the answer to the question in terms of how many have returned to Kosovo, I suspect the number is very, very small.

That's not to say that down the road there will not be an opportunity for these people to return to their homes, to their communities. I think that certainly is very much the hope of the international community and of the UN special representative, Mr. Kouchner, but the priority right now very clearly is the security situation on the ground in Kosovo. Mr. Kouchner and General Reinhardt want to ensure that they can offer a level of protection and security for all citizens in Kosovo. Those who have been at greatest risk include minorities.

So have we seen minorities return to Kosovo to the extent that we would like? Of course not. Will we see that down the road? I certainly hope so. That very much remains the objective of the international community. It's the principle that underpins UN Security Council resolution 1244, which Canada helped to draft and which we continue to fully support.

Mr. Sarkis Assadourian: Thank you.

The Chair: Four minutes, Mr. McWhinney.

Mr. Ted McWhinney (Vancouver Quadra, Lib.): Mr. Wright, I want to direct some questions to you on the legal issues, not on the merits. My colleagues can handle that very well and time is limited. I'll put three questions to you, and perhaps you could hold your answers until the end.

Can I confirm from this very nuanced statement you've given to Mr. Robinson that Canada was not a legal party to the Rambouillet process and that the draft agreement was not submitted to us for legal approval?

The second question would be on the role of the legal adviser. We all know and very much respect Philippe Kirsch, who is our adviser, and we know from the detailed case study that during the Cuban missile crisis, President Kennedy's legal adviser was present, not merely as legal adviser but advising in policy issues what can and cannot be done under national law. Was the legal adviser present during the policy discussions that preceded our intervention as part of the NATO forces in Yugoslavia?

• 1050

The third issue is an interesting suggestion by David Matas, who has appeared before this committee in many capacities on many issues. He raised the issue of the current litigation in Yugoslavia and Canada. You will remember that the United States and other countries had the ruling in their favour. There was no jurisdiction. The issue is still open in relation to Canada.

Mr. Matas raised this issue: should not Canada, at the next hearings, waive jurisdictional defences, get into the merits, and affirmatively raise legal merits such as the progressive development, in accordance with the charter, of a right of humanitarian intervention, if it exists, and the possibility of armed action by regional security bodies outside the United Nations charter, which would be, of course, NATO? I wonder if you could respond to that.

I think the latter is an interesting suggestion. Good lawyers, as the chairman of this committee knows well, never abandon any defences, including procedural ones, but the World Court in the 1980s showed a tendency to hear arguments on the substantive merits even before it would give a decision on jurisdictional issues, so there may be tactical advantages in that too, in any case, for an updating, whatever it may be, of the international law.

Mr. Jim Wright: Thank you very much.

With respect to your first question on the text of the Rambouillet agreement, we tried not to nuance our answers too much. We tried to make them as direct as we could.

Canada was not a direct participant in the Rambouillet talks. We kept in very close touch with France, with Great Britain, with others, and with the Americans, who were direct participants in the process. We were briefed. We received confidential texts of the agreement from time to time. We contributed our own thoughts on the process. In terms of your specific question—in the final analysis did we get a text in timely fashion and were we asked to give our approval of this text—the answer is no.

Secondly, in terms of the role of the legal adviser, I think Mr. Kirsch certainly was very much involved throughout the conflict in Kosovo. Did he participate in all of the critical policy discussions? I think the answer is no, but to reassure you, if he was not there, his office was represented. The task force that was established by the Canadian government to oversee all aspects of the Kosovo crisis included—

Mr. Ted McWhinney: Represented in terms of listening or...

Mr. Jim Wright: No, as a full participant around the table in terms of the regular task force discussions that we had every day for the 78-day campaign. The office of the legal adviser was a full participant in the process, providing critical policy advice to us at each step along the way. While it may not always have been Mr. Kirsch himself, his team was represented, and their advice was crucial to the Canadian government throughout the process in terms of determining our position.

I think I'll probably have to duck the third question that you've asked. I did see the testimony by Mr. Matas. I'm not a lawyer by profession, but what I can do is this: we can certainly refer the matter to our legal authorities to see whether or not they are as intrigued by this suggestion as I know you and perhaps others may be. But I think for me to venture into this territory would only run the risk of giving you inaccurate advice.

Mr. Ted McWhinney: Yes, if we could have perhaps even a response in writing to the extent that it's proper, without giving our legal case away...

By the way, being intrigued doesn't necessarily mean one approved—

Mr. Jim Wright: No.

Mr. Ted McWhinney: —but it seemed an opportunity for getting a substantive ruling on our case for progressive development of international law, which is never static, as any good lawyer knows.

• 1055

Thank you, Mr. Wright.

Mr. Jim Wright: Thank you very much.

The Chair: Mr. Martin.

Mr. Keith Martin: Briefly, Mr. Wright, to get back to the comment on the issue of partition, you said in your comments that reconciliation is very difficult in Kosovo at this time. Other reports that I've seen show that the people really are not getting along at all. If I can use Bosnia as a backdrop, behind closed doors at the State Department people are saying the only reason we're keeping these people together in Bosnia—and Kosovo is the face of Bosnia in the future—is that there will be a long-term input of troop commitments and finances in order to keep these people separated or to keep the peace.

Realistically, is the partition of Kosovo the only long-term solution without a long-term commitment on the part of Canada and the other countries that are involved in the region in terms of troop commitment?

Secondly, a comment by currently active, very high-level American generals was that they would never want to say to a American parents that their child died in the field to make a point.

The question I have is on the active bombing. Was its main purpose to make a point? One could argue that what it did was galvanize the people behind the despotic Mr. Milosevic while destroying or significantly hampering the opposition forces within the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. In terms of bombing, why did we not bomb the hard military targets that were engaging in the ethnic cleansing that was taking place within Kosovo?

Thank you.

Mr. Jim Wright: On the question of partition, I think my first answer still stands. However, I will say that as is very clearly the case in Bosnia, the commitment by the international community to the peace process in Kosovo is going to be long-term. There's no question about this. As anybody who knows anything about the Balkans and our experience in Bosnia will say, before we initiated the action that we did in Yugoslavia, I think the international community knew full well that we were committing ourselves to a long-term engagement to try to bring about change in that part of the world.

Reconciliation is not easy. These are people who are not prepared to live with each other in the present set of circumstances. The culture of revenge and hatred is simply too fresh in their minds, and they have an enormous amount of difficulty talking to each other. Bernard Kouchner, General Reinhardt, and everybody else who is on the ground in Kosovo are doing our best to try to encourage change in that respect, but it's not going to happen overnight. Changing attitudes will take years. And it may also be a generational problem. You have hard-line extremist leaders heading up communities right now, and we can only hope that over time, through a democratic political process and through support from the international community, the change will come about.

You mentioned the example of Bosnia. I don't want to suggest for a minute that the Dayton peace process has gone absolutely according to script and that we are satisfied with where that process stands. We're not, but we have seen generational change in Bosnia. We are seeing new and younger leaders coming up. We are seeing greater, more moderate political forces that want to get away from that culture of hatred, and we are seeing more reconciliation. We are seeing more institution-building in Bosnia that is bringing together the different ethnic groups.

• 1100

So what I can say is that this remains the long-term objective of the international community. But if the UN Secretary General and the special representative, Mr. Kouchner, were here today, I think what they would say is that this is eight months after the conflict and we need to be realistic. The priority right now has to be the security and safety of all the communities, especially the minorities on the ground.

Reconciliation remains absolutely a priority. I think what is probably a little bit more realistic is peaceful coexistence and, over time, working through conflict resolution, through peace-building, and through confidence-building measures on the ground, in order to build toward the kind of multi-ethnic society that does not require the type of cantonalization that is in place in Kosovo right now—and for very good reason—in order to protect those minorities.

I don't think you're going to find that, eight months into the process, Canada or any other country is going to turn around and say the solution lies in partition. That was not the objective going into this conflict in Yugoslavia, and it is certainly not the objective today. The objective is what is spelled out in resolution 1244. And that is the commitment of Mr. Axworthy and the Canadian government.

Mr. Keith Martin: There was the question of bombing.

Mr. Jim Wright: Well, the objective of the bombing campaign—I'm not a military expert, but I certainly recall the observations of General Henault and General Jurkowski. The principal objective was to degrade the Yugoslav military regime and to stop them from prosecuting the ethnic cleansing they were undertaking in the period leading up to the start of the NATO campaign.

Mr. Keith Martin: Why didn't we bomb the soldiers?

Mr. Jim Wright: Again, I don't pretend to be a military expert, but I think the military would turn around and explain to you the nature of the bombing campaign. You go after the infrastructure, you go after command and control, you go after communications, and then you go after the hardware on the ground as best as you can. Given the geography of Kosovo and given the way in which the program of ethnic cleansing was being carried out by the Serb forces, they were not an easy target. Did that mean NATO was unsuccessful in terms of prosecuting its bombing campaign against the Yugoslav military? I don't think so.

In answers that we've given to Mr. Robinson, I believe we spell out some of the details in terms of some of the damage that was inflicted on the Yugoslav military. Did that damage have an impact on the Yugoslav leadership in terms of ending the campaign? Absolutely. There is no question about it, especially toward the end of the campaign, given the intensity of the air bombardment.

Again, though, I think those are questions probably a little more pertinent to the defence experts than to myself.

The Chair: Thank you.

[Translation]

Ms. Debien.

Ms. Maud Debien (Laval-Est, BQ): Mr. Wright, after listening to your answer concerning the bombing strikes, I don't think that you'll be able to answer my question. Nevertheless, I will put it to you. My question concerns a reply from departmental officials to Mr. Robinson regarding cluster bombs. I had intended to ask you this question myself anyway.

You say that Canada did not use bombs containing specific munitions. As I see it, that's merely a euphemistic way of saying that Canada did not use munitions containing radioactive materials. What exactly do you mean by specific munitions?

The last sentence notes that NATO carefully examined every incident in which there were civilian casualties and took appropriate action to minimize the risk to civilians. Are you saying that specific munitions could in fact be used by the military to achieve military objectives, provided care was taken to not inflict damage on civilians? Unless I'm mistaken, international conventions prohibit the use of weapons containing radioactive materials. Would you care to respond to this question?

• 1105

My other question concerns CIDA and its commitments in Kosovo. In the document submitted on February 10, you mentioned that CIDA had pledged to spend $177 million over an 18-month period to meet a number of objectives in Kosovo. This morning, Ms. Corneau reported that CIDA had pledged $11 million for humanitarian relief in such areas as education, health and housing. I've tried to group together some of the figures, but I have to admit that it's somewhat confusing. Ms. Corneau, could you possibly provide us with a breakdown of the amounts CIDA plans to spend in certain areas to achieve some of the priority objectives that have been set? Could you also identify for us the channels through with this aid will flow, how much money has currently been pledged and how much is yet to be committed? Perhaps you could also give as a timetable of some kind. I'm not asking you to answer the question immediately, but a written response at a later date would be appreciated.

[English]

Mr. Jim Wright: Thank you very much. I'll do my best to answer the first question. I think some aspects of these questions would be better answered by someone from the Department of National Defence.

There are two issues that come to mind on the issue of munitions. Specifically in respect to the question of depleted uranium munitions, the response we gave to Mr. Robinson said two things: (1) that the use of specific munitions by NATO allies is a national decision—in other words, each country has to make its own determination; and more specifically, (2) that Canada did not use depleted uranium munitions.

The second issue pertaining to munitions that was called into question during the war related to the possible use of cluster bombs. Again, Mr. Robinson asked this question, and we stated in our response to him that Canada did not use cluster bombs. Again, the decisions on specific munitions by NATO allies are national decisions.

We did make clear, though, to Mr. Robinson in our response that we did voice concerns in the North Atlantic Council after incidents in which such munitions were used, and that we, I think, during the course of hearings during the war, and certainly in the course of our daily press encounters, made very clear that NATO carefully examined every incident in which there were civilian casualties and took appropriate action to minimize the risk to civilians. I can say with confidence that Canada fully participated in some of that debate that took place at the North Atlantic Council.

[Translation]

Ms. Hélène Corneau: I can pass along some information to you right now, if you like. The $165 million that CIDA has pledged can be broken down as follows: $75 million for humanitarian relief; $45 million for the creation of a safe environment and for peace consolidation efforts; approximately $20 million for community rebuilding; and $25 million for economic support.

Let me just clarify one thing. These funds are not intended only for relief efforts in Kosovo, but for those efforts also under way in neighbouring regions. Mention was made of the situation in Serbia and Montenegro, but some financial resources have also been earmarked for Macedonia and for Albania, both of which were hard hit by the events of last spring.

In terms of how this humanitarian aid will be channeled, the bulk of the $75 million in relief will flow through multilateral organizations such as the UNHCR, UNICEF, the World Food Program and the International Committee of the Red Cross.

With respect to strictly bilateral aid, a very substantial effort is under way to work closely with Canadian partners and NGOS, and with our colleagues from other departments, including the RCMP and Correctional Service Canada.

• 1110

You had the opportunity earlier to meet with some of our partners, including CARE and CECI. In terms of commitments, of the $165 million pledged by CIDA over an 18-month period, between 70 and 80 per cent of this total has either been committed already or plans are being drawn up to spend the money.

The Chairman: Ms. Debien, you may recall that at our initial meeting, CIDA produced a document explaining the aid pledged to Kosovo.

[English]

Mr. Robinson.

Mr. Svend Robinson: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Just for clarification,

[Translation]

Ms. Debien has asked several questions to which the witness will respond in writing. My questions will also require a written response. Frankly, I'm very disappointed not to see an Armed Forces representative here today because there are a number of questions that I would have liked to ask. Will anyone from the Armed Forces be appearing later? At least I could submit my questions to them in writing.

The Chairman: I suggest you do that. Unfortunately, Lieutenant General Henault couldn't be here today and, rather than postpone this hearing until later, I preferred to proceed in his absence. Lieutenant General Henault has assured me that if necessary, he would be prepared to come and testify.

[English]

Mr. Svend Robinson: Mr. Chairman, I certainly understand that decision and will submit a written question, but I'm saying it may be necessary, depending on the responses, to ask him to appear. And I'm pleased he has indicated that he is prepared to appear.

The Chair: Oh yes, he in no way said he wouldn't come. It's just that he wasn't able to come today.

Mr. Svend Robinson: I understand.

Mr. Chairman, I have a couple of questions. I would like to hear the response to my question with respect to former ambassador, Mr. Bissett, and if any written instructions were issued, to receive copies of that before the committee.

I have two other brief questions, and I will be very brief.

First, with respect to NATO's targeting decisions, in the written material we got we were told that NATO took appropriate action to minimize the risk to civilians. How does that square with the fact that NATO bombed a bridge in Varvarin at the end of May in broad daylight, on a busy shopping day—as I indicated in my letter—killing a young girl on her bicycle, a local priest, and seven other innocent civilians, and injuring others?

That was a deliberate targeting decision by NATO. It wasn't a mistake, as if they didn't know it was daytime. How does Mr. Wright respond to that concern?

Secondly, does the Government of Canada take the position that the international tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, chaired by Madame Del Ponte, does have jurisdiction to review possible war crimes that were committed by NATO? I understand in the written response it's indicated that the prosecutor stated there was no formal inquiry into the action of NATO. But what is Canada's position with respect to their jurisdiction to review alleged crimes by NATO?

Mr. Jim Wright: On the third question, again I'm not a lawyer, so I will give you the best response I can under the circumstances. If there is more to the question than I am able to answer, we'll get back to the committee.

As we indicated in the written responses to your questions, the statute for the tribunal states the following:

The International Tribunal shall have the power to prosecute persons responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian law committed in the territory of the former Yugoslavia since 1991 in accordance with the provisions of the present Statute.

Our view, as we have stated here, is that given that NATO took extraordinary efforts to comply with international humanitarian law, it's unlikely the tribunal will have factual grounds on which to bring a case against NATO.

• 1115

Mr. Robinson, you've referred to the statement by the office of the chief prosecutor. I'm not sure, beyond that, I can say much more in terms of—

Mr. Svend Robinson: That's not jurisdiction, technically.

The Chair: Mr. Wright, your answer presupposes the court had jurisdiction if it chose to exercise it.

Mr. Jim Wright: Yes.

The Chair: If you're saying you assume there are not facts that would justify a prosecution, you're assuming they would have jurisdiction if there were.

Mr. Jim Wright: Again, Mr. Chairman, I think you're right. I would draw the same inference, the same assumption, but I'm not a lawyer. So the answer I'm giving you is the answer we provided to Mr. Robinson and committee members in writing. But I think your assumption is absolutely right. If the court decided it wanted to do it, it would have the mandate to be able to do it.

Mr. Ted McWhinney: Your answer would logically be the position of our legal adviser, in accordance with what the chairman just said.

Mr. Jim Wright: Yes.

Mr. Ted McWhinney: Thank you.

Mr. Jim Wright: With respect to the incident involving the bridge, again this was a very complex military campaign. NATO's efforts clearly were aimed at Yugoslav military targets and military infrastructure. Every target that was attacked by NATO had been put through a rigorous review procedure to do everything possible to avoid civilian casualties.

Mr. Svend Robinson: It didn't work right, did it?

Mr. Jim Wright: In that particular instance, clearly it did not.

Mr. Svend Robinson: Why would you bomb a bridge in daylight as opposed to darkness, assuming it was a legitimate military target?

Mr. Jim Wright: Mr. Chairman, I don't have a specific answer in terms of the targeting decision that day for that particular bridge. But I think throughout the campaign, when mistakes were made and accidents did occur, NATO took responsibility for them and acknowledged that mistakes had been made. I can't give you a military response in terms of that individual target.

Mr. Svend Robinson: We'll follow up on that with the military, then.

Mr. Jim Wright: You can indeed. But I think it's fair to say that the campaign that was waged by NATO was the most precise air campaign in history and that enormous care was taken by NATO to avoid all possible civilian casualties.

Mr. Svend Robinson: And my question on Mr. Bissett?

Mr. Jim Wright: The answer to your written question to us I think is fairly complete. I guess what I would add is that Mr. Bissett came to pay a social call on the embassy, unannounced, at a time when the mission was extremely busy. We had more important things to do, frankly, given that we had a humanitarian delegation from Canada in Belgrade assessing the situation on the ground.

It was explained to Mr. Bissett that there was no one available, that we did not particularly want to engage him. His views on Kosovo are well known to this committee. He has appeared before you.

Mr. Svend Robinson: Mr. Wright, were the locally engaged staff that he used to work with as ambassador told they could not communicate with him?

Mr. Jim Wright: The job of those locally engaged staff during the office hours of the mission was to get on with the priority mission at the embassy. It's a small mission. We don't have the resources we used to have there.

Mr. Svend Robinson: And they were told they couldn't communicate with him?

Mr. Jim Wright: They were told by Ottawa that they had more important things to do with their time than to see Mr. Bissett.

Now, the question did arise whether these instructions from Ottawa were to be interpreted to mean after office hours or during office hours. I think, under the circumstances, had Mr. Bissett wanted to see these individuals beyond office hours, that would have been a personal choice of the employees in question.

• 1120

Mr. Svend Robinson: That was very generous.

You talk about instructions. Were there written instructions?

Mr. Jim Wright: There were instructions that were sent to the embassy. We indicated at the time that we thought they had more important things to do.

Mr. Svend Robinson: I trust those can be tabled with the committee.

Mr. Jim Wright: I will refer the matter to colleagues and we'll get back to the committee.

Mr. Svend Robinson: Thank you.

The Chair: I just have a couple of questions, since we have Chief Superintendent Miller here.

We've heard quite a bit about... In particular Mr. Kouchner has made a point of saying that many governments have failed to deliver the resources they promised. One of them that is missing very badly and seriously is adequate civilian police as well as judicial officers, which clearly are necessary to establish a climate of decent security in that area.

How do you feel about our police operations there? Could you tell us a bit about your experience of what we're able to deliver? Does the failure of other governments to live up to their commitments seriously impact on our ability to perform our services there adequately?

C/Supt Peter Miller: First of all, I had occasion to visit Kosovo about two weeks ago. I was on the ground. Since that time, the strength of the civilian police officers is now up to 2,341, according to my latest figures, which is roughly half of the complement they're supposed to have. What that does is it makes it more difficult for us. We can't move ahead with some of the things that perhaps we would like to do at the pace we would like.

In approximately 70% of the areas of Kosovo, we are responsible basically for the full policing. We're working with the KPF, the Kosovo police force, but again we are hampered by the fact that there are not enough civilian police officers there. The UN is doing everything they can to try to accelerate the participation or the contribution by countries, but it is very difficult because of domestic responsibilities and international commitments elsewhere. The same thing applies with us here.

We're up to our full complement of 100 Canadian police officers from 17 different police forces across Canada. Our Canadians in particular are heavily involved in many key positions within the mission. We occupy many positions where we're involved on a day-to-day basis in investigating threats and complaints by people who are being harassed by the opposite side, you might say: Serbs complaining against Albanians and Albanians against Serbs and so forth. We're heavily involved in those types of investigations.

We're very much in demand, especially in the Mitrovica area. Just under half of our Canadians are currently serving in Mitrovica, and there's a good reason for that. Our Canadians are very well respected as peacekeepers, and when there is a hot spot, that's where they'll tend to send them. As you know from having watched the news lately, our Canadian military is also in Mitrovica.

The situation on the ground over there right now has calmed down considerably from the incidents of last week. This is from conversations we had as recently as this morning. The situation is relatively stable, but again it's like a boiling pot on the stove; it could overflow at any time. We have that concern.

I think one of the reasons we had those problems a couple of weeks ago is there probably were not sufficient resources there to really do the job that had to be done, sufficient resources on the police side and also on the military side. What we've seen since then is that corrective measures have been taken by the UN and by KFOR to bolster the resources there to ensure that we can keep a lid on things and hopefully calm things down. It's proven to be effective since then.

Until we get more police resources in there, it's going to be hard to move forward as quickly as we would like with the training of the Kosovo police force. I believe there are now 370-odd police officers who have graduated from the academy. That's Kosovo police officers who are now out there working alongside our civilian police officers at this time.

The Chair: Thank you. That's helpful.

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I want to follow up on Madame Debien's question about depleted uranium and its use. When we were having our hearings at the time of the conflict, General Henault told us we weren't using it. I suppose Mr. Wright would be wondering to what extent the department or the government is looking into this.

People have written to me in my office telling me there's clear evidence that soldiers in Iraq have suffered side effects from it. Our own soldiers or soldiers engaged in using it... A lady spoke to me at the end of one of these hearings, saying there is going to be uranium in the soil of Yugoslavia for thousands of years.

We saw the immense distress that the carrying of two small vials of uranium to Chalk River caused in this country. How would we feel if there were a lot of depleted uranium bullets flying around and piled into the soil for the next while? Who is looking at this? What scientific studies are being done to assure people that either our own troops or innocent civilians won't pay the price of the use of these things for generations to come?

It is a concern. I know we don't use it ourselves, but the fact is that we're engaged in theatres where it is being used. Are we studying it?

Is this beyond your competence? I'm not trying to put you in a position where... If you don't know anything about it, just say so, but I must say it's a concern for most of the members of the committee.

Mr. Jim Wright: It's certainly an understandable concern on the part of the committee, given the extent to which this issue has been publicly addressed in recent weeks. I think the correct answer on this should come from the Department of Defence.

There has been work done by the international community to a certain extent, assessing environmental degradation in Serbia. There was a joint task force undertaken by the UN Environment Programme and Habitat, which looked at some of the large-scale regional environmental aspects of the conflict. To the best of my knowledge, Mr. Chairman, I don't think they looked into specifically the issue of the possible impact of depleted uranium in Yugoslavia and Serbia or in Kosovo following the conflict.

I'm afraid I don't have an answer for you on that beyond what the Canadian military has already said, which was that they did not use depleted uranium munitions during the conflict.

More to the point, has the international community undertaken a review of the impact of those munitions in Yugoslavia? I am not aware of that specific aspect being looked at by the international community.

Mr. Svend Robinson: May I just ask something on that, Mr. Chairman?

Did Canada voice any concern about the use of depleted uranium? I note that on the issue of cluster bombs, you indicated that in the North Atlantic Council, Canada did voice concerns about the use of cluster bombs. Did Canada voice concerns about the use of depleted uranium by the United States, for example?

Mr. Jim Wright: Again, my answer today would simply be that these were national decisions by governments participating—

Mr. Svend Robinson: That's what we did for cluster bombs, Mr. Wright. We voiced concerns about that. Did we voice concerns about depleted uranium?

Mr. Jim Wright: I can't give you a specific answer to that particular question because I'm not an expert on the number of members of the alliance who used munitions that used depleted uranium. I know we did not use it.

Mr. Svend Robinson: That's not the issue. Did we voice concerns?

Maybe Mr. Wright can find out and report back to the committee, Mr. Chairman.

The Chair: He's said that he doesn't think we did.

When we raised this issue during the actual conflict itself, when we were concerned about it, you'll recall that General Henault told us that the evidence was that in fact it didn't have the deleterious effects that people said it did. There was no evidence to show that in fact the use of depleted uranium, which evidently hardens the bullets in some way and enables them to be armour-piercing or something, so there is some tactical advantage to it, doesn't have the deleterious effects that people fear it has.

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It seems to me this is an area where there's a considerable amount of room for debate and discussion and scientific inquiry, and we're trying to find out what our own government is doing about that, I suppose.

Mr. Jim Wright: Excuse me for interrupting. I think the chair is absolutely right.

In specific answer to Mr. Robinson's question, to the best of my knowledge, Canada did not voice a concern at the North Atlantic Council in terms of the use of depleted uranium by other countries. We chose not to use it. That's the first point.

The second point is that the jury is still out in terms of the impact of depleted uranium. I know studies are being undertaken by a number of countries. The Americans in particular are very active in this area. But I could not present myself to the committee as an expert on this to tell you exactly what the current scientific findings are. That's a much more complex issue.

But specifically to the question, did we raise a concern at the North Atlantic Council table, the answer is no.

The Chair: Mr. McWhinney, do you have a question?

Mr. Ted McWhinney: Mr. Wright, you've been a very frank and forthcoming witness.

My question on the legal adviser was not directed to academic issues. I was concerned about the legal adviser role not merely on macro issues such as article 2.4 of the charter, but also the modalities of conducting an operation, what's permissible and what's impermissible under the law of war—for example, the bombing of the Danubian bridges, which on the face of it would conflict with 19th century agreements on free navigation of the Danube, and also the use of permissible and impermissible weapons, such as uranium-affected weapons. Would that be the sort of thing on which the legal adviser's advice would have been sought in the policy making, to your knowledge?

Mr. Jim Wright: Again, the answer I'll give you is drawn to a certain extent from the answer we gave in writing to Mr. Robinson, and I appreciate that not all committee members may have had an opportunity to look at these detailed responses.

One of the questions Mr. Robinson raised related to NATO targeting decisions. We said a couple of things in terms of the response, but specifically as it relates to Canada, I think what in part answers your question is that Canadian military authorities obviously were very closely involved in all targeting decisions that involved our aircraft. For every Canadian mission flown, a Canadian Forces legal officer carefully examined the target that had been assigned, with a view towards its legitimacy and relevance under Canadian and international legal standards.

If the task force commander doubted the relevance of the target or there was not enough information on the target to make a determination of its legitimacy, the Canadian task force commander refused that particular target. A general I know has spoken to this issue very specifically, I think, both before this committee and in other sessions that I've attended with the general.

So, in part, the answer is that in accepting targeting decisions by the alliance, a Canadian Forces legal officer was giving advice to the Canadian military and to the pilots who were flying each of those missions to reassure the Canadian side that the targets were deemed entirely legitimate.

[Editor's Note: Inaudible]

Mr. Ted McWhinney: ...the differences between a legal officer in the field and the legal adviser on top at home. Some of these issues, the balance between the Danubian conventions and a tactical decision to bomb Danubian bridges, are what I would call frontier issues of international law today for which you probably, to be effective, would need to go to the top.

If I can get this on the record, though, because I think it's very important and it distinguishes our position from the United States, we would agree, however unlikely it may be on the facts, that the tribunal in the Hague must have jurisdiction over Canadian Forces. The United States takes another position, but it also refuses the jurisdiction of an international criminal court. But opposition is fairly clear, is it not, technically?

Mr. Jim Wright: Again, Mr. McWhinney, you and the chairman have the benefit of being international lawyers. I think the answer to your question is absolutely, yes, but I do not pretend to be and I'm not presenting myself to the committee as an international legal expert on behalf of the Canadian government.

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Mr. Ted McWhinney: I appreciate your frankness in answering these questions. They were not intended to embarrass you in any way. It's important that we do have a position that may differ from some of our associated countries. And ours is a very clear one of respect for international...

The Chair: I'm sorry, Mr. Wright. I hope that before you come back to this committee you'll get yourself a law degree so that you can deal with these issues.

Mr. Robinson has a secret law degree, as is obvious from his questions.

Mr. Svend Robinson: I try to keep quiet about that.

The Chair: Thank you all very much. We appreciate you coming.

Mr. Svend Robinson: Following consultation with the chair, I wonder if it might be agreed by the committee that the written questions that have been submitted and that will be submitted, as well as the written answers that have been submitted and presumably will be submitted, be posted on the committee's website for the information of those who are following these proceedings.

The Chair: They're part of the transcript. They are complementary to the hearings and the hearings are posted on the website, so I would see no problem.

So there's no problem with that. We have a consensus.

[Translation]

Ms. Lalonde.

Ms. Francine Lalonde: Mr. Wright, you have answered all my questions, with the exception of the one concerning the economic outlook. It's important that the region's economic development be self-generated. According to the latest reports received last week from the NGOs that testified before the committee, the economy appears to be driven solely by the consumption activities of the NGOs working on site.

Mr. Jim Wright: Ms. Corneau from CIDA could probably answer that question better than me.

Ms. Hélène Corneau: I read CECI's comments about the Kosovar economy and the consumer society. I have to admit that these statements were largely accurate. There's is also the informal economy to contend with and mention should be made at this time of MINUK's tremendous efforts to formalize the situation. MINUK has made significant progress on the budget side of things. Perhaps you have heard of the consolidated budget for Kosovo which encompasses all operations in Kosovo. Canada and the community of donor agencies are committed to allocating substantial sums of money to this consolidated budget. We offered a $2 million contribution some time ago, with further payments to follow.

Most of the resources pledges are earmarked for critical sectors of the Kosovar economy, namely education, health and social services. Between 70 and 80 per cent of these funds will go to these areas. I've given you an overall picture of the budget situation.

The Chairman: Thank you, Ms. Corneau.

I want to thank all of the witnesses who have appeared, along with the committee members. We will now adjourn until 3:30 p.m., at which time we will hear from representatives of the Red Cross.

This afternoon we will be presenting a draft resolution on Kosovo. I suggest that we debate this resolution at our first scheduled meeting after the break.

Ms. Francine Lalonde: On Thursday?

The Chairman: No, when we return after the break.

A voice: That would be Tuesday then.

The Chairman: Yes.

Ms. Francine Lalonde: After the break.

The Chairman: Yes, after the break.

[English]

Mr. Svend Robinson: It may be a little premature to discuss that resolution at this point because we may not have any answers back to the other questions that are being submitted. I just want to flag that.

The Chair: We'll get that process going. We'll circulate it to people this afternoon so they have it and they can understand it.

The meeting is adjourned until 3.30 p.m.