FAIT Committee Meeting

STANDING COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE

COMITÉ PERMANENT DES AFFAIRES ÉTRANGÈRES ET DU COMMERCE INTERNATIONAL

EVIDENCE

[Recorded by Electronic Apparatus]

Thursday, March 2, 2000

• 0910

[Translation]

The Acting Chairman (Mr. Bernard Patry (Pierrefonds—Dollard, Lib.)): Pursuant to Standing Order 108(2), we now begin a study of Canada's policy on nuclear non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament.

We are pleased to welcome this morning the Canadian Ambassador to the UN for Disarmament, Mr. Chris Westdal. In its 1998 report Canada and the Nuclear Challenge: Reducing the Political Value of Nuclear Weapons for the 21st Century, the committee strongly supported the NPT as the cornerstone of international efforts to both limit the spread of nuclear weapons, and to maintain pressure for their reduction and eventual limitation.

The committee recommended, inter alia, than an annual consultation be held with civil society on nuclear issues, and that Canada's Ambassador for Disarmament appear before the committee on an annual basis to discuss nuclear issues. It should be noted that the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty came into force in 1970 and that we will be marking its thirtieth anniversary very shortly. This is Ambassador Westdal's second appearance before the committee. He also led Canadian efforts at the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference.

In January 2000, the Government of Canada held its first consultation with civil society on nuclear issues. Summing up, Canada's efforts at the NPT Review Conference slated for April and May will also be led by Ambassador Westdal.

Therefore, welcome, sir. You have ten minutes to make your opening statement and then we will go to questions.

Ambassador Westdal.

Mr. Chris Westdal (Canadian Ambassador to the United Nations for Disarmament): Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will be making my presentation in English, but I will be delighted to field questions in French as well.

[English]

It is an honour for me to appear before you this morning to discuss Canada's nuclear disarmament and the non-proliferation policy. I'd welcome the opportunity at any time, but I am particularly pleased that my appearance before the committee comes on the eve of an important milestone. This Sunday, March 5, will mark the 30th anniversary of the entry into force of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the NPT.

Three decades after its inception, the NPT remains the most widely adhered to multilateral arms control treaty in history. It is the only legally binding worldwide instrument that prevents the proliferation of nuclear weapons and that commits the nuclear weapons states to disarm. It was intended to limit the number of nuclear weapons states to those five that had manufactured and exploded a nuclear device prior to 1967: Britain, France, China, Russia, and the United States. The NPT represents a three-part bargain for its 187 members: nuclear non-proliferation, nuclear disarmament, and cooperation and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

The treaty is on many people's minds these days, not just for historical reasons. In a little more than six weeks, the 187 state parties to the treaty will assemble in New York for a full-fledged review of the treaty, the first since it was indefinitely extended in 1995. I can assure you that Canada is and will do everything possible to ensure the success of that conference. We are, after all, convinced that the NPT is the most effective international instrument to achieve Canada's fundamental objectives of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. We firmly believe that future stability and security depend on the implementation by the international community of all of the obligations of the NPT.

Our commitment to that treaty was clear throughout the 1995 review and extension conference. We were very actively involved in the indefinite extension of the treaty and we promoted a strengthened review process intended to ensure the long-term relevance and viability of the treaty. In an earlier incarnation, when I was our Ottawa-based ambassador for disarmament, I led Canada's delegation to that 1995 conference.

• 0915

The strengthened review process, which we have championed at the three sessions of the preparatory committee and which we will actively promote at the 2000 review conference, is based on the principle of permanence with accountability. That's a phrase we coined to describe the essence of the extension decision.

In the context of a treaty extended indefinitely, our view of permanence with accountability is that all states have a continuous and continuing obligation to demonstrate that they are fulfilling all NPT undertakings, to account, in a word, for their fidelity. This includes fulfilment of article VI of the NPT, which calls on all states party to the treaty to pursue in good faith negotiations on “effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament”.

At the 1995 review conference, states party to the treaty understood well the difficulties inherent in fulfilling the obligations of the treaty. They therefore drafted a set of principles and objectives that provided, among other elements, a program of action for future non-proliferation and disarmament efforts.

The 1995 principles and objectives document set out several indicative targets to promote the full implementation of the treaty and established specific standards against which compliance with the treaty could be measured. These included progress in such fields as universality of treaty membership, non-proliferation, the establishment of new nuclear weapon-free zones, the negotiation of a ban on the production of fissile material weapons, and a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty.

Five years after the principles and objectives were set out, we must ask to what extent they have been realized. The question is particularly resonant now. As we mark the 30th year of the NPT age and prepare for the review conference, we must critically assess the situation on the road to nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. How far have we come, how far is left to go, and what is the outlook?

Honourable members, there is good news and there is bad news. Let me begin with some of the more sombre realities.

You well know that following the immediate post-Cold War period of hope in the early 1990s, the last few years have not been encouraging for advocates of better nuclear arms control and progressive disarmament. There has been horizontal proliferation. India and Pakistan, regularly bitter rivals, now have nuclear weapons and plans for more. An attitude prevalent in south Asia was expressed by Indian Foreign Minister Jaswant Singh in 1998:

If deterrence works in the West—it so obviously appears to, since Western nations insist on continuing to possess nuclear weapons—by what reasoning will it not work in India?

On the question of nuclear deterrence in the west, note that south Asians are very well informed and they quote NATO text on the subject regularly.

There has been a rerationalization of nuclear arsenals in Russia and a lowering of the threshold for nuclear use. In the new Russian military doctrine, nuclear deterrence is given high priority and no differentiation is made between the use of nuclear weapons in regional conflict or in global war.

While the military doctrine includes a pledge that Russia will not use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapons states except in cases where those states attack Russia in alliance with a nuclear weapons state, it also states that Russia retains the right to use nuclear weapons in response not only to other nuclear weapons but also in response to the use of other weapons of mass destruction. In NATO circles there is ambiguity and speculation about the use of nuclear weapons to deter not only nuclear but also biological and chemical weapons.

• 0920

The bilateral U.S.-Russia strategic arms reduction process, START, is stalled, though there is fresh speculation that the Russian Duma might, in the context of agreement on an Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty amendment, soon ratify START II, which would put the START ball back in the American court, where U.S. Senate ratification is needed for START II amendments subsequent to the original U.S. ratification of START II.

In a major setback, the U.S. Senate failed to ratify the CTBT, the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, and that repudiated decades of hope and labour at the Conference on Disarmament, which was held in Geneva, and undermines prospects for progress in directly related fields, such as the negotiation we have long anticipated of a treaty banning the production of fissile material for weapons.

In Geneva, the Conference on Disarmament, which is our sole multilateral negotiating body in this field, has been unable to agree on a work program on account of real differences among major members on such subjects as nuclear disarmament talks; the prevention of an arms race in outer space, which is, of course, intimately tied up with national missile defence and the ABM Treaty; and fissile material control, along with rigid attitudes in such fields as the way in which consensus is interpreted and an insistence that nothing is agreed until everything is agreed. As you parliamentarians will know well, those attitudes are certainly a recipe for paralysis.

I must also, of course, mention American aspirations to build a national missile defence system, which Russia and China vehemently oppose, insisting that any national military defence deployment would violate the 1972 ABM Treaty and undermine the entire system of disarmament treaties and agreements. Canada regards the ABM Treaty as a cornerstone of global strategic stability and is concerned that the treaty should not be undermined with changes that are incompatible with its intent. We are following the evolving situation very carefully, as my colleague Paul Heinbecker will make clear in his remarks later this morning, which are focused on that subject.

That's a list of some of the obstacles that have been and remain in our path. Let me say that things could be better.

That said, all is far from lost. I want to touch on just a few positive developments. We need to note that, first of all, since 1995, the CTBT negotiation was in fact completed, and work is proceeding on the development of its international monitoring system, a system quite without precedent in international arms control. A total of 155 countries have signed the treaty and 53 have ratified it. You will of course have noticed that the American administration and many spokesmen have insisted that it is not a matter of if the United States Senate will ratify the CTBT but of when.

The aggregate number of deployed nuclear warheads continues to drop quite rapidly. U.S. and Russian reductions under START I are in fact ahead of schedule. Indeed, warhead dismantlement, which is complex and extremely expensive, is underway at about full capacity. Somewhere between 1,000 and 2,000 warheads a year are being dismantled, and that's about the capacity of the very expensive system that has been created. That's about its full capacity at the moment.

The United States, Russia, and the IAEA have launched a trilateral initiative to place excess weapons material under IAEA supervision. You will have seen in the newspapers not long ago news of another 36 tonnes of Russian material being sequestered from the military cycle and subjected to IAEA supervision. Tonnes of fissile material are being subjected to safeguarding despite prospects for an FMCT negotiation in Geneva being delayed. This is real, vitally important fissile material control happening on the ground.

There is further good news. The United Kingdom and France have taken steps to reduce warhead quantities, types, and deployment locations; to increase transparency; and to impose unilateral moratoria on the production of fissile material for weapons' purposes.

• 0925

As a segue, and speaking of good news, I don't want to forget to mention your own impressive study. I have a dog-eared copy of your work at hand here. The subtitle of it is something I've quoted very often to summarize Canada's essential stand on nuclear weapons, Reducing the Political Value of Nuclear Weapons for the Twenty-First Century. Together with the government's very forthcoming response and its policy statement of last April, your study has given me and my colleagues a unique and comprehensive base of policy analysis for our work at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, at the UNGA First Committee in New York, and at major treaty meetings.

I should say in closing that we've been very busy implementing the government's response to your report, which includes, as you know, annual appearances before your committee by me and my successors.

I hope you'll be pleased to know that I'm leaving later today on a speaking tour on these issues, part of the department's sustained outreach and public consultation. As well, I expect that you all have heard about the consultations with civil society on nuclear issues, which were held here in Ottawa a month ago, in which both Minister Axworthy and your chairman, Bill Graham, took part. From my vantage point, those consultations—another of your recommendations implemented—were extremely valuable.

After all, the political will and energy required to restore vital momentum to nuclear arms control and threat reduction does not get generated in the stale basements of the UN in New York or in the closed council chamber of the Palais in Geneva. In democracies such as ours, political energy and will are made in the hearts and minds of citizens and then in the platforms offered, the mandates given, and the policies pursued at home and abroad by our political leaders.

That concludes, monsieur le président, my introductory statement. I thank you for your attention, and I look forward to your comments and questions and to our discussion.

The Acting Chair (Mr. Bernard Patry): Thank you very much, Ambassador Westdal, for your presentation.

We will go now to questions from my colleagues, and we'll start with Madame Debien.

[Translation]

Ms. Debien.

Ms. Maud Debien (Laval East, BQ): Good morning, Ambassador and welcome to our committee. Thank you for taking the time to come and meet with us. One somber development that you alluded to in your statement is the construction by the US of a national missile defence system as part of the famous Star Wars initiative. It's no secret that China and Russia are opposed to this US venture which would violate, as you aptly stated, the Antiballistic Missile Treaty. You say that Canada is monitoring these developments closely, but nowhere is mention made of Canada's position on the construction by the US of this missile defence system. As you know, our position may be somewhat contradictory in light of the fact that we are an ally of the United States on defence matters. I'm thinking here about our commitment to our powerful NATO ally. If such a system is eventually built, and it would appear that plans have already been drawn up and some action taken - what position would Canada adopt vis-à-vis its powerful neighbour on the construction of these antiballistic missile systems?

• 0930

[English]

Mr. Chris Westdal: I think the first thing I should say is that Paul Heinbecker, the ADM responsible for those questions, will appear before you later this morning. I would therefore leave to him a detailed response and discussion and would in fact invite you to return to the subject with him.

That said, from my point of view as the disarmament ambassador—and these are views that we have expressed publicly and to many other states, of course—naturally we are concerned with the impact of change or particularly any possible abrogation of an important treaty like the ABM Treaty and the impact of such an abrogation on related disarmament and arms control agreements and on the field generally.

We're naturally watching very closely the negotiations that are taking place between the United States and Russia. Much will depend on the outcome of those negotiations and whether they feel the treaty might be amended in ways that don't contradict its basic purposes but nonetheless allow for a limited national missile defence. I think we'll all have to wait until those negotiations have reached a further stage.

From my vantage point as ambassador for disarmament, naturally I'm concerned about the knock-on effects of possible changes in that treaty, but beyond saying that those negotiations are in train, that we are paying very close attention to that subject in Geneva and New York, and that we are reviewing it with colleagues and with other officials in the United States and Russia, I will leave further commentary on the government position to ADM Paul Heinbecker.

Thank you.

The Acting Chair (Mr. Bernard Patry): Did you have a question, Madame Debien?

[Translation]

Ms. Maud Debien: No, I have no further questions at this time.

The Acting Chairman (Mr. Bernard Patry): Thank you.

[English]

Mr. McWhinney.

Mr. Ted McWhinney (Vancouver Quadra, Lib.): Thank you, Ambassador.

President Nagendra Singh—who was then president of the World Court—and I wrote a book called Nuclear Weapons and Contemporary International Law in 1989. It was just the end of the Cold War and the consummation of détente, and we identified disarmament as not a body of static treaties but a process of progressive development unfolding. We were quite optimistic. The American Star Wars initiative had been dropped by President Reagan as part of the process of getting the intermediate nuclear ban treaty of 1987. There was a very hopeful progression.

I know you mentioned—and it's quite clear—the juxtaposition of your own role and that of your very able colleague who is here this morning. But on balance, would you think the situation is not as favourable now as it was in 1989, or at the end of the 1980s anyway, at the consummation of the détente period at the end of the Cold War? Would you think the initiative, the unilateral initiative, by the United States would certainly have been viewed as counter to the détente process? In other words, aren't we really in a situation in which your activities as specialist ambassador, expert ambassador, in this field are really conditioned by larger, mega-political issues, the end of bipolarity, the end of the system of checks and balances, and moving from bipolarity to unipolarity? That's really the issue, isn't it? Today that overshadows all your activities and those of your colleague to a certain extent.

Mr. Chris Westdal: Yes, there is no question that my work and the work of my colleagues exists within the larger framework of the political relations between major states. At the CD, the Conference on Disarmament, in Geneva, for example, we are no more able to negotiate specific treaties in the absence of political will and energy and specific instructions to do so than a professional ball team is able to play ball in the absence of any kind of league schedule and an agreement on when they're going to play.

• 0935

Now, there is much useful other discussion that can take place. Nonetheless, of course the prospect for a specific treaty is very much a function of the current relations between the major players. Our work is derived from and very much affected by whether there's hope and progress and a desire for positive trends or whether there's increasing distrust or difficulty in relations. So, yes, I agree very much with what you were saying about the larger context that conditions our work.

I think you're also quite right that disarmament is best seen as a quite dynamic process in which trends are more important than specific numbers or pieces of paper. We need to bear in mind the difference between 8,000 or 6,000 strategic nuclear weapons, because you can only die once anyway.

I think you're right in wondering whether the outlook is not less propitious now than it was in 1989 or just after the Cold War. Certainly there was a period in which trends were very positive indeed. That has been described, and I think it culminated in a way in the indefinite extension without a vote—which was important—in New York in 1995. Much of the good news that we were then reciting is now a little stale. For all the reasons that I described in my opening statement, there is a trend of faltering nuclear arms control and lost momentum in progress toward improved control, toward reductions, and toward the ultimate prohibition. That's why this meeting of the NPT is so important.

The review conferences of the NPT are built into that system precisely to give its members a chance to see whether or not the provisions of the treaty are being respected; whether or not it has being fulfilled; and whether the trends are positive with respect to the prospects of the fulfilment of the treaty or whether they aren't. In six weeks' time in New York, of course, the members are going to review all of these trends and are going to ask the same question you've asked: are we wasting or are we now losing the opportunity to take full advantage of the incomparably better and less hostile relations between major powers that prevail now, as opposed to those that prevailed 15 years ago, for example?

Finally, on that, I think it's very important that we do keep an historical advantage, that we do follow these trends, and that we don't lose sight of the fact that our situation, whatever these difficulties that I've described and whatever deterioration there is in these trends, are not nearly so frightening as some of the risks with which we contended through the Cold War.

Mr. Ted McWhinney: I'm glad to have that on record. I think we all appreciate the work the department's doing, and we do recognize that your job is tougher than your predecessor's job was 10 years ago, when the movement was there and there was a system of equilibrium between larger powers.

Let me ask you about some specifics that, within departmental instruction, you may or not be able to answer. Maybe I could pose them to you and you could take them on whole.

In relation to the ABM Treaty, are you in a position to make any comment on whether we have made representations to the United States on the possible impact of the new anti-missile defence system that they're proposing, which in détente has been a unilateral step that would break the rules of the game in relation to U.S.-Russian relations?

Mr. Chris Westdal: Yes, we have expressed our concerns about the possible impact of any undermining or abrogation of that treaty. We've expressed those concerns publicly and directly to the parties concerned.

Of course, we have taken note—and I think it's important to stress this—that in the discussion of this question at the first committee last fall, we were always at pains to point out that this is a bilateral agreement signed 28 years ago with the U.S.S.R., and that we always have to be very respectful about where we think bilateral agreements should be reconsidered if there is need to reconsider them. We wanted to respect the bilateral nature of this treaty. Of course, it has implications that extend far beyond the United States and Russia, its two signatories.

• 0940

Mr. Ted McWhinney: Mr. Chairman, would you object if I continued for another couple of minutes?

The Acting Chair (Mr. Bernard Patry): Yes, you can go ahead.

Mr. Ted McWhinney: Fine, thank you. I have two other related questions.

There is an international law obligation under the entity treaties for the members of the nuclear club, those who hold nuclear weapons—and we're not one of them. There is an obligation to disarm, to proceed with all deliberate speed to reduce the nuclear weapons. Do you think more affirmative action by the five would be helpful to your work and to our work as the Canadian government?

Mr. Chris Westdal: Yes, I think another thing to be noted from the last five years is the opinion of the International Court, which was a quite complicated opinion, as you well know. It was quite straightforward with respect to the fact that the treaty, in article VI, obliged the nuclear weapons states to try to bring these negotiations to a conclusion and not just to discuss this indefinitely. Of course, leadership in this field, as in many others, must be in part by example.

Mr. Ted McWhinney: We have the files of the period of the approach to the court. I recommended, I think it may have been to Joe Clark and the Conservative government, and then to our government, that we intervene in the nuclear weapons case. I even offered to write a free opinion, although I was not then in government. We didn't do so. In retrospect, would you feel it might have been helpful to project our affirmative view on disarmament?

Mr. Chris Westdal: A general comment that I would make is that these issues are political issues that will be resolved politically and at the moment. When they will enter the effective realm of international law is a subject about which you have thought and written more thoroughly than I. Nonetheless, we are not yet in an age when the laws about nuclear weapons are determining them.

Mr. Ted McWhinney: Granted the affirmative educational effect of that opinion, would you perhaps... I had the impression, and I got a similar answer ten years ago on this issue, that it was given, sadly, by the professional offices of the department. You don't have to comment on that, though.

[Translation]

The Acting Chairman (Mr. Bernard Patry): Thank you, Mr. McWhinney.

You're next, Mr. Speller, followed by Ms. Debien and Mr. Paradis.

[English]

Mr. Bob Speller (Haldimand—Norfolk—Brant, Lib.): Thank you. I'll just follow up on what Ted was saying.

It's always nice to follow Ted, because you get a better theoretical aspect of the whole question.

I know you didn't bring your crystal ball at all, but I want to ask about NPT 2000. Obviously there's a lot of hope from people that it may produce something. Do you feel there is a chance of success? What further could we be doing as a committee to help move that forward?

Secondly, just as a human being, I worry about this new proliferation amongst rogue states and India and Pakistan. I heard what you said in terms of their justification for moving forward. It's a case of “If the big guys can do it, why can't we?” What are we doing to help deal with that situation in these meetings? In my mind, I see that as more of a threat to our future than the big five. I'm not convinced there's a lot of attention being paid to that. Maybe there is.

• 0945

Mr. Chris Westdal: On the first question, the outlook for the NPT, one needs to begin by defining what we would consider the success of that meeting. Naturally, everyone is in favour of a successful meeting, but we need to try to pin down what that means.

In the papers we've circulated, we've listed our four objectives. None of them are too surprising.

One is a reaffirmation, kind of a palpable reaffirmation, that we members have faith in this treaty and intend to respect it, a statement about preserving and extending universality, which means to keep those who are in, in, and to make the point that we wish the other four states on Earth, particularly India, Pakistan, and Israel, were also in, along with Cuba as well.

We would hope to reach some general agreement on a look forward. It might include kind of reinforced principles and objectives, a work program for the future.

As well, we would be taking a look back. It would be very unusual if all the members were able to agree on a statement about what had happened in the last five years. We will be looking for an event that has some political substance and impact. As I said in my statement, the kind of political will that's required to restore momentum to faltering nuclear arms control and restore progressive trends does not get generated in closed UN basements.

So one of our objectives is that the meeting have some political impact. That may involve a higher public profile as well. But, for example, we have been encouraging countries to follow our own example where our minister will be present. We have consulted with civil society and with journalists, and we will work further with them.

You will hear about some of the work that the middle powers initiative, which Senator Roche heads, is doing, and you will hear about the campaign of the New Agenda Coalition, a coalition that will appear as well at the NPT, as it did at the first committee—a group of countries with which we work closely, trying to ensure that the review conference does send a signal that there is widespread concern about these deteriorating trends and that there is a determination to see that the NPT is respected and fulfilled.

On the second question, on the risks of the proliferation in South Asia and what we are doing about that, I think Canada has been among the most active. We have been very active in the G-8, for example, where a South Asia task force has been established, and we are chairing it at the moment. There will be a meeting of that task force in Ottawa at the end of this month. It intends to sustain pressure to fulfil the eight or nine benchmarks that are in Security Council resolution 1172 on this subject.

I could recite, or I can give you later, the particular benchmarks. They have to do with whether or not India will weaponize. They encourage much closer relations, transparency, and efforts to build confidence between the parties, and they include the signature of the CTBT. There is much prospect that the Indians might be considering a CTBT signature, perhaps in coordination with the visit of President Clinton this week.

So the committee wants to sustain the pressure, and the committee wants to make sure there is not a reward to proliferators. This question is very close to the heart of the problem; that is, the attitudes of weapon states toward their arsenals and the perception of the role of arsenals. If they're militarily useless, some find that they nonetheless carry status, and that has been explicitly the motive of some proliferators.

• 0950

That committee—and we are very active in it—wants to make sure that the message is no, there is not a reward in status available to proliferators. It's a vitally important message. But I think you can know that we share your sense that this kind of proliferation poses risks and contributes to the most general risk, which is simply that the more weapons there are and the wider they're spread, the greater the risk over time that some may reach hands evil enough to use them.

Mr. Bob Speller: Is technology leading to that? Are we getting to the X-Files and Star Wars thing, where they're walking around with them in briefcases?

Mr. Chris Westdal: The achievements of the weapons establishment have been quite astonishing over the decades, such that there are now nuclear weapons that might blow the shell off your egg cup in the morning, they're so gentle, right up to multi-megaton nuclear weapons that will destroy whole cities. There's a kind of seamless web of nuclear weapons.

Yes, there are very small, mobile nuclear weapons, so that isn't science fiction, but I think the risks of that kind of very high technology finding its way into the wrong hands can be exaggerated. Certainly the risks that people might make one of those in their basements can be exaggerated.

Generally, with respect to the fear of nuclear agents in the hands of terrorists, for example, one is imagining relatively crude devices.

The Acting Chair (Mr. Bernard Patry): Thank you, Mr. Westdal.

[Translation]

Go ahead, Ms. Debien.

Ms. Maud Debien: If you recall, Ambassador, when the NPT was first reviewed in 1995, Canada has expressed a desire to see negotiations undertaken with a view to drafting a convention banning the production of these weapons. At the time, there was serious disagreement over the CTBT negotiations, which led to growing support for India's position. The latter wanted negotiations on a convention to ban production to be tied to nuclear disarmament talks. Given that the US Senate voted not to ratify the CTBT last October, do you not think that similar problems will arise when the second review is undertaken?

[English]

Mr. Chris Westdal: There's no question that the American rejection or failure to ratify the CTBT has set back prospects for the FMCT, the Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty. They are linked.

I would just say that you should not want to let these many acronyms confuse you. Like many fields, it's surrounded by a thicket of them.

But as to a quick fix on the nuclear arms control and disarmament agenda, you'll remember the PTBT, the Partial Test Ban Treaty of 1963, where we stopped testing them in the atmosphere. Then, with the NPT in 1968, we tried to stop their spread and commit those who had them to get rid of them. Then, with the CTBT, we were to stop testing them entirely, and then, with the FMCT, the Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty, we were to stop making the stuff they're made of.

There's no question that the demand for the stuff they're made of is affected by whether or not you can test them. So you're quite right, there's a straight link between a testing ban and the prospects for achieving a ban on the production of fissile material. We share the hope that progress toward the ratification of the CTBT, which is, after all, a historic goal toward which the Conference on Disarmament worked for decades, will be restored and that the American Senate will in fact ratify it.

• 0955

You know that the requirements for entry into force are quite stringent—all 44 states that have nuclear programs must ratify it before it comes into force—but we will remain very active and among the most vigilant in trying to make that happen.

[Translation]

The Acting Chairman (Mr. Bernard Patry): Mr. Paradis.

Mr. Denis Paradis (Brome—Missisquoi, Lib.): First of all, allow me to congratulate you, in particular on being asked to update committee members every year on this subject. This is just as important as ensuring public awareness of this matter, which also happens to be part of your work.

I'd like your opinion on a few things. Last year, we were part of a delegation that travelled to Washington. While there, we met with a number of people, including someone who touched on the issue of "no first use". Canadian policy dictates that Canada will continue to stress the need for disarmament for political reasons. This is happening now, but if we could manage first to achieve disarmament and remove any political significance associated with having weapons, do you think that a no first use policy could also be incorporated into our overall policy? How do you feel about this? I know the US doesn't support the no first use policy, although there are some people in the US who do favour this approach.

[English]

Mr. Chris Westdal: The notion of “no first use” is not simple. It's sometimes referred to, I think, in ways that don't reflect the complexity of the issues involved.

I don't want to “fuzzify” it, but first of all, one needs to ask whether one's talking about the first party to act or whether one's talking about the first party to use nuclear weapons as opposed to other weapons.

We have expressed the Canadian government's position very carefully on this subject, but I want to note, just in advance, that contrary to some expectation in public opinion, the Canadian government has not taken a position on first use, and neither has this committee, although we have said that first use and other dimensions of other NATO nuclear doctrine and policy will be subject to the review that is now underway.

But in this document, Canada will continue to express the view, and it is our view, that its understanding of nuclear deterrence is that the only function of nuclear weapons is to deter the use by others of nuclear weapons.

If there were ever the kind of nuclear catastrophe we pray—and work—will never happen, do not imagine it would be forestalled at the end by an official racing in to say, oh, by the way, there's a legal problem in that this needs to be understood in political as well as legal terms, or, oh, by the way, there is a policy of no first use.

I focus there on nuclear weapons, because part and parcel of nuclear deterrence, and part and parcel of the logic of nuclear deterrence during the Cold War, and part of the dreadful characteristics of nuclear weapons is that they of course must be used first. Nuclear war would not be fought with anything comparable to the decisions made in other kinds of warfare to invest in new arms or develop new kinds of arms. The terrifying dimension of that kind of exchange, of course, would be that it happens up front. That's built into the problem.

I go on that way just to assure you that no first use is an issue that is thought about very deeply. It is an issue that will be considered, as our minister has said, in the context of the review now underway within NATO. It is a subject on which the Canadian government has not expressed an opinion.

• 1000

The Acting Chair (Mr. Bernard Patry): Thank you, Mr. Westdal. That's all the time we have this morning. I want to thank you, Mr. Ambassador, for your appearance in front of this committee.

I would like also to thank Mr. David Viveash, who was very silent this morning. He's the deputy director for the non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament division at the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade.

Thank you, gentlemen, for your appearance.

Mr. Chris Westdal: Thank you.

The Acting Chair (Mr. Bernard Patry): We'll recess for five minutes.

• 1001

• 1011

The Acting Chair (Mr. Bernard Patry): If everyone wants to be seated, we'll start back.

This morning we have, pursuant to Standing Order 108(2), an examination of missile defence, and our witness is Mr. Paul Heinbecker, assistant deputy minister, global and security policy.

The issue of national missile defence is a very important one and something that parliamentarians need to follow closely. In order to help us understand important policy implications on this issue, we are pleased this morning to have Mr. Paul Heinbecker.

Mr. Heinbecker, you have 10 minutes of presentation. I've been told that you don't have any text. Take all the time you want, and whenever you're ready, you can start.

Mr. Paul Heinbecker (Assistant Deputy Minister, Global and Security Policy, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada): Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Merci, monsieur le président.

Thank you for inviting me to participate in these hearings. What I'll present to you today are perceptions that strike me, as a senior official, to be significant. I will not be speaking on behalf of the government, or indeed of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, as the government hasn't made a decision in this area, as you know.

The most fundamental point is that the national missile defence program is a U.S. program. The United States has not yet decided to deploy it, and the U.S. government has not officially invited Canada to participate. The national missile defence program raises very large issues for Canada, and endorsement of it would have far-reaching consequences. An eventual NMD decision would be taken by the government in light of a wide range of factors.

Before discussing some of those factors, perhaps it would be helpful for me to give you some of the what, why, where, and when of NMD, as we see it.

What is NMD? Work has continued in the United States on ballistic missile defence since the end of the Star Wars program of the mid-1980s. NMD would be based on earth, not in space, although space sensors would be used to detect and track missile launches. A national missile defence system would launch from the ground an unarmed projectile called a kill vehicle that would intercept an incoming missile and destroy it by the force of impact. As currently planned, NMD would counter an attack by a limited number of missiles and warheads.

You're all aware also of the term “theatre missile defence”. The systems are akin to each other, although there are differences. Theatre missile defence is intended, as its name implies, for use in the theatre to protect U.S. troops, and possibly U.S. allies, abroad. It complies with the 1997 revisions to the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, which have yet to be ratified. BMD, or ballistic missile defence, is a generic term that includes both TMD and NMD, and to avoid confusion I won't use that term.

Why is the U.S. developing this system? Essentially, the proponents' argument is that the emerging threat caused by the proliferation of missiles and weapons of mass destruction, WMD, technology is a new factor, that the old bipolar world no longer exists, and that U.S. security is being undermined and the nature of international relations changed. Two recent developments have added urgency to their thinking.

First, in 1998 the bipartisan Rumsfeld report, named after its chairman, former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, and mandated by Congress, concluded that the U.S. could face an ICBM threat from a rogue state within five years, much sooner than had been expected.

Second, in August 1998, North Korea launched a Taepo Dong 1 ballistic missile capable, potentially, of reaching parts of the United States. On January 20 last year, U.S. Secretary of Defense Cohen concurred that a threat exists, it is growing, and it is expected soon to pose a threat, not only to American troops overseas, but also to the United States itself.

• 1015

A rogue state with an ICBM could limit American foreign policy options by blackmailing future American governments.

In March 1999, bills calling for the deployment of a national missile defence system were approved in the Senate and in the House by wide margins. On July 23, President Clinton signed the National Missile Defense Act, which states that an NMD system would be deployed when technologically feasible. He also set out criteria that would govern deployment decisions.

These criteria are: first, whether the threat is materializing; second, the status of the technology; third, whether the system is affordable; and fourth, national security considerations, including arms control and disarmament regimes, relations with Russia, and the impact of the decision on allies. These are major considerations for the United States.

The deployment decision has not yet been taken, and as a matter of fact, might not be taken by this or even a succeeding administration.

Where would an NMD system be located? Currently, U.S. planning is for the initial deployment of 100 ground-based interceptor rockets at a single site in Alaska. This number of interceptors would have the capability to address only a limited number of incoming warheads. It could theoretically protect all of the United States, I understand, including Hawaii, from that location.

The U.S. apparently needs to use radar equipment located in other countries to track incoming missiles and to guide the interceptor. None of these countries has as yet apparently assented to this use of its territory. As currently envisioned, none of the NMD components, launchers or radars, would be based on Canadian territory. The U.S. does not appear to need Canadian territory to host any of the components of an NMD system.

There has been talk in Washington of a second phase with greater capability and possibly an additional site for further interceptors.

[Translation]

When will the system be deployed? When President Clinton signed the National Missile Defence Act last July, he stressed that a final decision regarding deployment would be made only after a review of the state of preparedness of the system which is scheduled for June. Two of the three tests to be conducted before such a decision is made have been completed.

The first test of the NMD kill vehicle was carried out last October. Although the vehicle managed to find and destroy the incoming missile, some doubts about the test were expressed. The second test in January 2000 was not entirely successful. The kill vehicle's guidance system malfunctioned six seconds before the scheduled impact and as a result, the vehicle did not hit the target, although it wasn't very far off the mark.

Another critical test is planned for May. US officials maintain that two successful tests must be carried out before a decision can be made to deploy the system. Recently, the US government was asked to postpone its decision, primarily for technological reasons. In November 1999, a group of Pentagon experts recommended that additional tests be carried out before any deployment decision is made. In January 2000, the Pentagon's director of operational evaluations and tests stated that excessive pressure was being put on the Pentagon to make an artificial decision respecting development and that the current timetable failed to take into account major technical problems. Although a decision could be made as early as June 2000 to deploy the system, it will still be several years until the system is actually operational. The earliest that deployment could occur is 2005, if everything goes well, technologically speaking.

• 1020

[English]

NMD raises large issues. First and foremost, no national missile defence is permitted under the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty signed by Russia and the U.S.A., hence the discussions underway.

Under that treaty, as amended in 1974, each side is allowed to protect either its capital or an ICBM field, not both, and not the national territory. The Soviet Union chose Moscow and installed a system. The U.S. chose Grand Forks, but has not installed a system.

The treaty is intended to ensure that deterrence works. Deterrence is based on mutual vulnerability, the premise that since each side can destroy the other, neither side will try.

Underlying the ABM Treaty was the fear that if one side had an effective missile defence system, it could launch nuclear weapons at the other side without fear of retaliation. The thesis was that a national missile defence system would touch off a spiral of offensive weapons development to overcome the defences.

To sustain deterrence, the two sides agreed that neither side would have the capability to protect itself from the nuclear weapons of the other side.

Both the United States and Russia agree that an NMD system would be inconsistent with the ABM Treaty. The United States has engaged Russia in discussions to amend the treaty. The United States is attempting to persuade the Russians both that the threat from the rogue states is real and must be countered and that the size and character of the NMD system the U.S. would deploy against that threat would not undermine Russian defence.

The Russians accept that the proliferation of missile capability and weapons of mass destruction does create a new situation. Indeed, they maintain that they are potentially in greater danger from it than the United States is.

Nonetheless, they believe that a U.S. national missile defence system would eventually undermine Russian defence, that the threat from rogue states is not sufficient to jeopardize the stability that the ABM treaty has delivered, and that other methods can and should be used to counter that threat.

That is the nub of the diplomatic issue.

While we are not a party to the ABM treaty, we do consider it to be a cornerstone of the international arms control and disarmament regime. We are open to seeing the treaty amended if the parties can agree, but we would obviously have reservations if one side were to abrogate the treaty unilaterally.

Great circumspection is warranted when decisions that could damage a system that has underpinned nuclear restraint and allowed for nuclear reductions could take place.

It is worth reiterating that the President of the United States has not decided to deploy an ABM system, that Canada has not been invited, and that the Canadian government has, accordingly, not decided whether it would participate.

We have, nevertheless, been following development of the technology for some time. In the interests of time, I won't go into what we have been doing. You had a briefing from General Macdonald, and I think he probably explained that in some detail.

A major factor to be weighed in the NMD debate is obviously our relationship with the United States. Obviously, we have an extensive, close, and productive relationship with the United States across the entire range of bilateral and international affairs.

For this reason alone, no decision on NMD would be taken lightly. There are several issues that would play in any eventual cabinet decision to join in an NMD program, among others: whether by doing so Canada would be more or less secure; whether and how such a decision could be expected to affect Canadian economic relations with the United States; how such a decision would affect Canadian foreign policy, for example, if we would be more or less independent; how much it would cost—the U.S. national missile defence program costs something approaching our total defence budget; and how it would affect Canadian defence relations with the United States.

Some have argued, for example, that were we not to subscribe to NMD, NORAD would automatically atrophy. Such an outcome does not strike me as preordained. Certainly if NMD was awarded to NORAD, changes would be required in the way NORAD works. But a good argument can be made that were the ABM Treaty to be abrogated unilaterally, and should the Russian-U.S. relationship turn hostile again, NORAD and Canadian air space would likely grow in significance.

I can hear the bell ringing.

The Acting Chair (Mr. Bernard Patry): I think it's a 30-minute bell, Mr. Heinbecker. We'll let you go for another four or five minutes.

• 1025

Mr. Paul Heinbecker: I'll be finished in that time.

The Acting Chair (Mr. Bernard Patry): Thank you.

Mr. Paul Heinbecker: The government would take an NMD decision in light of these factors and in light of decisions it would make on other security issues. Terrorism, crime and drug trafficking, cyber-defence, and the protection of critical infrastructure are all changing the American defence posture and are all of interest to us too. Taken together, and however Canada responds, they add up to a significant change in Canada-U.S. security relations. Nor would the government obviously make an NMD decision without weighing the merits of the arguments of the proponents and opponents both of the NMD system.

Do we share the Rumsfeld report's assessment of the threat, as well as more recent assessments, such as the national intelligence estimate of 1999? Is NMD the appropriate response to that threat?

For one thing, the Russian nuclear weapons systems are real and sophisticated. Any emerging rogue state's threat is much less immediate and less capable. A good number of Americans, including former U.S. Under-Secretary of Defense Joe Nye, now at Harvard, have argued that a ballistic missile attack by a rogue state is the least likely form of action against the United States. There would be no doubt where the missile came from and not much doubt about the consequences for the perpetrator.

Perhaps more important, cruise missiles, unmanned aircraft from freighters, tramp steamers into the port of New York, the proverbial suitcase bomb, and even made-in-the-U.S.A. bombs by terrorist groups seem more plausible near-term threats. There is currently little effective defence against any of these threats beyond intelligence queuing, that is, warning by intelligence means. The national missile defence program would offer little in this area, as General Macdonald has observed.

Will NMD work? My own view is that it would be unwise to bet against the technology eventually working, especially where money for it is not an issue and the sense of national vulnerability is deeply felt.

Would it be cost-effective? That depends on how the costs would be calculated. If Russia and the United States cannot reach agreement on amending the ABM Treaty and if the United States were to unilaterally abrogate the treaty, there would be significant consequences internationally. The ABM Treaty has been the key first of the strategic arms limitation agreements and more recently the strategic arms reduction treaties. It has permitted the build-down of missiles that we have seen in recent years.

START I saw reduction to 6,000 deployed strategic warheads on both sides. START II calls for a reduction to 3,500. The United States has ratified START II and the Russians have not. The Russians have signalled their intention to do so in the spring following the presidential elections. We are certainly encouraging them to do so. Once so ratified, START III would follow and would reduce strategic weapons on both sides possibly to as low as 1,500 each but more likely 2,000, 2,500. And for the first time, START III would also address the large number of tactical nuclear weapons.

These treaties all depend on an assumption of stability in terms of the strategic nuclear balance. That balance could be lost if the ABM Treaty were abrogated. There would quite possibly be a knock-on effect also for other arms control and related treaties, including crucially the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, and the Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty, for which there are current attempts at negotiation.

Whether strategic stability will endure in these conditions is not certain, but it would be initially at least unlikely. The Russians apparently worry that NMD would progressively undermine their own strategic deterrence and would provide a basis for a U.S. breakout and make the United States invulnerable. The system would have a significant impact on the current Chinese strategic nuclear deterrent. Both Russia and China believe as a minimum that their own geostrategic positions would suffer. Although neither, especially the Russians, can afford an arms race, it is quite possible that new offensive arms programs could be triggered in Russia and in China, and possibly by both in cooperation with each other. A potential alliance of Russian technology and growing Chinese prosperity would nevertheless be cause for considerable concern.

• 1030

There would also be consequences for our NATO allies if the ABM Treaty were unilaterally abrogated. If their vulnerability were to increase, the Atlantic would figuratively widen further. It is evident that the issues a unilateral abrogation of the ABM Treaty would raise are significant and far-reaching.

Further, as Henry Kissinger pointed out in a recent Los Angeles Times article in which he said a deployment decision should be the first duty of the next president, it doesn't take a degree in political science to see that there are better times than in a middle of an election campaign to make a decision so fraught with potential consequences.

Talks between the United States and Russia continue. The United States negotiators are trying to persuade Russia that the ABM Treaty can and should be changed in ways that safeguard, indeed enhance, each other's security.

The Russians are trying to persuade the Americans that U.S. and Russian security can be better assured by other means. The Russians are apparently making counter-proposals to that effect based on unratified 1997 U.S.-Russian agreements.

Both sides have told us that they remain hopeful that the other side will ultimately agree.

Conclusion. The ABM Treaty is between the United States and Russia, but the strategic stability in arms reduction that it generated is everyone's business, including ours.

NMD appears to be on a fast track in the U.S., but there remain some significant unknowns. Will the technology work? If the rogue state threat does materialize, can it be countered by other means? Will the Russians ultimately acquiesce in an amendment to the ABM treaty? If the Americans abrogate the ABM Treaty, will they be able to maintain strategic balance with Russia? Will the U.S.'s allies support a unilateral abrogation if it comes to that? These are all real and serious questions that remain to be answered. It remains to be seen what the U.S. administration will decide, and the question of Canadian participation remains open.

The Acting Chair (Mr. Bernard Patry): Thank you very much, Mr. Heinbecker. It was very interesting. This is the first time our committee is doing an examination of missile defence.

Now we're going to go to 10-minute questions and answers from each party. Mr. Martin is first.

Mr. Keith Martin (Esquimalt—Juan de Fuca, Ref.): Thank you very much, monsieur le président. Thank you, Mr. Heinbecker, for appearing in front of us today. I'll keep my questions brief.

A strategic balance, in my view, is anything but certain. Could you let us know what the capability of the Chinese are right now with respect to their ICBM capabilities?

Secondly, the failure of Canada to support the weapons missile defence system—what would that do to our relations with the U.S. and also to NATO?

Thirdly, I'd like to know your opinion on de-alerting and de-mating the nuclear weapons.

Lastly, on the issue of the UN's arms registry, could you give us a quick exposure on what the situation is with respect to that, as to whether there's any move on the part of the permanent five members of the Security Council to engage in a greater amount of transparency in terms of their arms sales.

Thank you.

Mr. Paul Heinbecker: I think for a good treatment of Chinese strategic capability you'd have to talk to our defence department, who know this subject much better than I.

I understand the Chinese have something like 20 ICBMs capable of reaching North America and a substantial number of other missiles. I also understand that there is a modernization program underway.

On the question of failure to support an NMD decision and the impact on NATO, I think it was fairly evident from what I was saying that we still think this is a hypothetical question. The discussions are underway still between the Americans and the Russians. I've talked to both sides. The impression I have is that each side still thinks that some way can be found to go forward on this.

Mr. Keith Martin: If I may interrupt you, Mr. Heinbecker, just for a second, the factor I'm putting in here... we look at this as between the Russians and the Americans, but I believe if we look into the future, a far greater threat is posed by the Chinese, potentially, in terms of not only their actions in engaging in quite a modernization program with respect to their military but also with respect to the aggressive foreign policy they've demonstrated, from a regional perspective. Therefore, we cannot be certain of what their actions may be in the future. Certainly their weapons capabilities are improving dramatically.

• 1035

My question is, are policy makers such as yourselves, within our country and also abroad, really taking into consideration the potential for a Chinese threat from a nuclear perspective? Or are you looking at it as just a Russian-American issue?

Mr. Paul Heinbecker: I'm talking of it in Russian-American terms primarily because the ABM Treaty is between them. The Chinese are also very interested in the ABM Treaty and would not welcome its abrogation. Further, they would probably not welcome it even were there to be an agreement between Russia and China that a limited ABM system would be installed, because a limited ABM system would have a significant impact on the Chinese missile capability, given that, as I said, it is only 20 ICBMs at the moment. The question then becomes, what would the Chinese do about that? The classic response has been to build more offensive missiles.

Are we taking this issue seriously? We take it very seriously. So far the defence against nuclear weapons, as Mr. Westdal said before, is other nuclear weapons. The basic defence is deterrence. I think the deterrence is still real and effective vis-à-vis China—the American deterrent, that is to say.

On the issue of de-alerting and de-mating, obviously this is an issue that has considerable appeal, because if you are worrying about missiles being on a hair trigger or at least on an immediately launchable basis, de-alerting, and more particularly de-mating, builds time into any decision. It also goes some way to avoiding the unintended and unauthorized launch. This is an idea that is being advocated in the United States by General Butler and a number of other people—retired General Butler, I should say. It's one that we also put some stock in. It's one of the issues, for example, that is likely to come up in the course of the NATO review of NATO nuclear policy and strategic doctrine, which is going to take place—in fact will be underway any day now—as a consequence of decisions reached, I think it's not an exaggeration to say, at our urging at the NATO summit last year and at the NATO foreign ministers' meeting in December.

On the question of the UN arms registry, I don't have a lot to report, except to say that I have just returned—in fact I was in Japan until yesterday. This is actually nighttime for me. The main issue on the agenda for the foreign ministers' meeting in Miyazaki, the G-8 foreign ministers, in the summer, as I mentioned to you privately a little while ago, is going to be conflict prevention. Under conflict prevention there is going to be, as things now stand at least, an initiative on small arms, and in that the question of registries and much greater transparency will be considered. I think it's fair to say, although the proof of the pudding will be in the eating, that the impression I had from the five permanent members around the G-8 table, which is to say four of the five permanent five, was that they were really quite interested in making progress in this area. So time will tell.

The Acting Chair (Mr. Bernard Patry): Thank you, Mr. Heinbecker.

[Translation]

Ms. Debien.

Ms. Maud Debien: Good morning, Mr. Heinbecker and thank you for coming. I also want to thank you for answering just about all of the questions I had intended to ask you.

• 1040

I asked the Ambassador a question concerning the deployment of a national missile defence system and the Antiballistic Missile Treaty and he said you were perhaps better able to respond. You've provided us with a number of explanations. As a former professor, I have an old habit of synthesizing any information I receive. Since your explanations were very technical and complex, I'd really like to be clear about what you said.

You told us that the United States currently has developed a two-pronged program. The first component involves ground-based interceptor rocks at a site in Alaska. You say that Canada is not involved in this program in any way and that there was never any question of using Canadian territory as a base for these ground- based rockets.

The second component would involve the deployment of the US National Missile Defence system. Two more or less successful system tests have been carried out and a third is planned for May 2000. Is that correct?

However, you informed us that tremendous pressure was being put on those involved to speed things up and to keep to the deadline set by the United States. You also stated, however, that Canada had not been invited to participate in the NMD system deployment program. However, if the May 2000 test is a success, given the timetable calling for possible deployment in 2005, shouldn't Canada be making some kind of preparations and, at the very least, be reflecting upon the implications of a request by the US to participate in this program?

You've also identified a number of issues that the Canadian government should consider before agreeing in any way to go along with the deployment of a NMD system. Among other things, you mentioned that the government should ensure that the system does not influence our national sovereignty or our world standing. You stated that there were real security issues to consider, among other things.

I apologize for the length of my synopsis.

Since you mentioned 2005 as the target date for deployment by the US, don't you think our committee should move immediately, possibly in conjunction with the National Defence and Veterans Affairs Committee, to consider the implications of such a request by the US, so that we are not caught off guard?

The Acting Chairman (Mr. Bernard Patry): Mr. Heinbecker.

Mr. Paul Heinbecker: Thank you, Madam.

Obviously, the committee sets its own agenda, depending on the views and needs of its members. I think we'll be talking about this issue in the years to come. It's a very important issue that needs to be dealt with carefully and with foresight.

It's an issue that should be debated by all Canadians. A debate in this forum would probably be useful, but the US is still a long way off from making a final decision, if in fact it ever comes to that. It all depends how you want to schedule your activities.

• 1045

Ms. Maud Debien: It was the target date of 2005 that stuck in my mind when you referred to the technology used and to the possibility that the tests would be successful. Given that you were specific about the date, you must have some indications that something is happening. In light of everything you've said, would it not be wise for us to hold consultations on this important subject?

Mr. Paul Heinbecker: I wouldn't want to interfere in the committee's business. It's up to you to decide if you want to debate the NMD program. I think this issue should be part of a broader pan-Canadian debate.

On the other hand, like you said, it's possible that some decisions will have to be made well before 2005.

Ms. Maud Debien: Thank you.

The Acting Chairman (Mr. Bernard Patry): Thank you, Mr. Heinbecker.

Mr. Paradis.

Mr. Denis Paradis: I have a brief question about the significance of the NMD program to NORAD. Could NORAD operate effectively without the NMD program? Or is there a link of some kind between the two? Could you enlighten me further on this?

Mr. Paul Heinbecker: As I already said, there is no question that NORAD would be affected if Canada decided not to participate in the NMD program or if the Americans came to this decision. However, it's by no means a given. Certainly some changes would have to be made to NORAD's operations, although one can imagine circumstances where NORAD would become even more important that it now is. If we compare the pace of NORAD operations to the pace in the 1980s, it's clear that things have slowed a great deal. Of course, if hostilities were to increase between the superpowers, the bombers would still pose a threat or, as they say in the United States, a real and present danger, particularly when combined with cruise missiles. It's hard to imagine NORAD serving no purpose under these circumstances.

NORAD also plays an important role in other areas, including, as General Mcdonald indicated, anti-terrorism activities and the monitoring of Canadian and US coastlines to halt smuggling operations.

The Acting Chairman (Mr. Bernard Patry): Thank you.

[English]

Mr. McWhinney.

Mr. Ted McWhinney: Welcome. It's nice to have your expertise on the ABM Treaty. I did a lot of work in that 30 years ago. It's nice to have somebody here who's up to date on it.

Mr. Paul Heinbecker: That's always a terrifying introduction.

Some hon. members: Oh, oh!

The Acting Chair (Mr. Bernard Patry): Wait until the question.

Mr. Ted McWhinney: Yes, I have two questions.

• 1050

One relates to the current U.S. anti-missile defence project. You may remember the Star Wars project that was floated during the first Reagan administration with General Haig, but as soon as the change of tack came in, the second Reagan administration with George Schultz, one discovered that Star Wars was a drawing-board project and not operational.

Do you have any reaction to the current project? In other words, how close is it to being operational? Or is it still drawing-board and therefore tactically negotiable?

Mr. Paul Heinbecker: My recollection of Star Wars is that when it was first introduced it really was a concept. What made it, in practice, so effective was that the United States had the wherewithal to pursue this very expensive project and the Soviet Union didn't. It had a dramatic effect on the Soviet Union when they realized that they were not able to keep up in this game any more—even if it was only a concept—because it was going to require the expenditure of a lot of money.

Mr. Ted McWhinney: Although it was an enormous amount of capital in the United States, which a budget-balancing president would not wish to engage in unnecessarily.

Mr. Paul Heinbecker: Yes. My understanding of the national missile defence program is that it's much more real and much more near-term than the Star Wars issue was. It's much less ambitious, at least initially. It's intended only to knock down a few missiles rather than the entire stock of Soviet missiles. It's also not using any sort of advanced physical properties and radar and other... Remember the smart, the Brilliant Pebbles, and other kinds of activities, which were going to be space-based? It's not doing that. It's ground-based.

It is nonetheless daunting. It's a bullet effectively hitting a bullet and it has to do it every time to be reliable. Senator Biden once called the system the Maginot line in the sky. So there is—

Mr. Ted McWhinney: A dangerous metaphor, though, isn't it, Maginot line in the sky?

An hon. member: Yes.

Mr. Paul Heinbecker: It's a dangerous metaphor. Whether he's right or not, I don't know, but it gives one pause to think about that. Nevertheless, the national missile defence is certainly a much more near-term technology than Star Wars was when we were debating that.

Mr. Ted McWhinney: Was Senator Biden being ironic when he said that? If you remember, the Maginot line was a massive investment by the French before World War II and a defensive strategy for World War I, and a total waste of money. The Germans just went around it.

Mr. Paul Heinbecker: Senator Biden is a very knowledgeable person.

Some hon. members: Oh, oh!

Mr. Ted McWhinney: All right.

Let me get you back to ABM. A number of those provisions there were defeasible in terms of years and were subject to renewal at five-year intervals by bilateral agreement, not necessarily a protocol. Is that still going on? Similarly, with the unratified SALT II, there was what was also understood as gentlemen's agreements even though SALT II wasn't ratified; both the United States and the Soviet Union agreed, without being formal about it, that they would abide by certain provisions. Is that sort of process continuing, to your knowledge?

Mr. Paul Heinbecker: With respect to...

Mr. Ted McWhinney: The ABM Treaty.

Mr. Paul Heinbecker: I'm not sure I've understood the question. The ABM Treaty is being observed.

Mr. Ted McWhinney: But there were defeasances; parts of it would have to be renewed after 20 years and I think were done last fall, for several cases, for five-year periods. It was a continuing process. Is that going on, to your knowledge?

Mr. Paul Heinbecker: It's going on.

In addition to that, in 1997 the United States and Russia got together and worked out some modifications of it. One of the modifications, if ratified, would allow for the use of theatre missile defences. That would then recognize that if you had a concentration of troops, for example, in the Gulf again, and if Saddam Hussein were to decide to use a weapon of mass destruction based on a missile, there would be cause for wanting to be able to stop him from doing that and for stopping the missile from being used.

But those have not been ratified by either side yet, although the intention on both sides seems to be to ratify them.

• 1055

Mr. Ted McWhinney: To add to the metaphor and to what Ambassador Westdal mentioned earlier, the Russian and U.S. officials, in the continuation of SALT I, became very friendly and very close. In fact, Mr. Foster and Mr. Kuznetsov, on the Russian side, went for walks in the park together. You remember there was a Broadway play written on it. Is that sort of positive dialogue still going on between the Russians and the Americans?

Mr. Paul Heinbecker: In the G-8 context, the Russian representative is their senior arms control negotiator, Mamedov. The senior American arms control negotiator, Strobe Talbott, is not part of that group, but I have the impression that they have a very close, professional relationship. I also have the impression that each side has a very sophisticated understanding of the politics of the other side. I've been struck, in fact, in talking to them, by how knowledgeable the Russians are about what's going on in the United States and by the Americans' knowledge of Russia.

So I think the personal and professional relationships are every bit as strong as they used to be.

Mr. Ted McWhinney: Thank you very much.

The Acting Chair (Mr. Bernard Patry): The last short question is from Mr. Martin.

Mr. Keith Martin: Thank you very much.

Mr. Heinbecker, since you're not speaking for the minister, I'd like your professional opinion on what your wish list would be of what Canada could do to decrease the nuclear threat we have—what Canada could pursue. If there were no Russian threat, would the Chinese threat, in and of itself, justify the weapons missile defence system proposed? I'm putting you on the spot.

Mr. Paul Heinbecker: Bear in mind that any time we Canadians talk about nuclear weapon disarmament, we're talking about other peoples' weapons—with that kind of caveat. Obviously it's Canadian policy, and our goal is a world where there are no nuclear weapons.

In the meantime, I really believe that de-mating and de-alerting are probably the two things that would assure a great degree of peace of mind. They would build some time into any calculation, and you wouldn't get “launch on instinct” kinds of responses. I don't think either government would do that, but the possibility is there, when the missiles are aimed and ready to go. Some of that has already been done with respect to NATO's weapons, and we would like to see that practice followed more generally.

It would be good if people closed their testing sites. I think the French have done that. I'm speaking personally. I would like to see the Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty proceed and succeed, because at the moment that's a very important piece of the puzzle.

Mr. Keith Martin: Sorry—the Fission Missile Cut-Off Treaty?

Mr. Paul Heinbecker: It's the Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty. There's also the CTBT. Ending the testing would help a lot.

If I had my druthers, I would like to see India and Pakistan build down. I think they have succeeded, for different reasons, in making themselves less secure, rather than more secure. In the current circumstances, there is a great deal of tension in the Indian-Pakistani relationship. It's probably, at the moment, the nearest threat of an actual war we see.

As for the Chinese nuclear capability, whether it would justify a national missile defence is part of the larger question we're trying to cope with here. Deterrence is the way it has been responded to thus far. The Chinese think in very long-term scenarios, and they are clearly planning to make themselves a more significant player in international relations. Whether a national missile defence would be helpful in those circumstances I guess would have to remain a hypothetical question.

Mr. Keith Martin: Thank you very much.

• 1100

[Translation]

The Acting Chairman (Mr. Bernard Patry): Thank you very much, Mr. Heinbecker. On behalf of the committee, I want to thank you for stopping by this morning. Your visit was greatly appreciated, all the more so since we realize you're coping with the time difference. We'll take a five-minute break before reconvening to hear from the third group of witnesses. Thank you very much.

[English]

Thank you very much for your visit.

• 1101

• 1109

The Acting Chair (Mr. Bernard Patry): If you don't mind, we're going to start now.

We have Dr. Pavel Podvig with an individual presentation. Dr. Podvig is a research associate at the Centre for Arms Control, Energy and Environmental Studies, Moscow Institute of Physics and Technology.

• 1110

We also have Mr. Ernie Regehr, who is well-known to this committee. He's responsible for Project Ploughshares.

We'll have Dr. Podvig make a presentation of about eight or ten minutes. Then we'll have some remarks from Mr. Regehr and proceed to questions from our members.

Dr. Podvig.

Mr. Pavel Podvig (Individual Presentation): Thank you very much. I'll try to be short and emphasize just very basic points.

As you know, in July this year the U.S. administration is going to make the decision on whether to deploy any missile defence. The decision may well be postponed, but I want to make it very clear that even if it is postponed, the uncertainty that surrounds the ABM Treaty issue now, and the whole question of missile defence, are really damaging to U.S.-Russian relations and the process of nuclear disarmament.

The idea of a national missile defence is apparently not new and goes back to the Star Wars years. This idea was strongly opposed by Russia in particular, which is a party to the ABM Treaty. It is also strongly opposed by China, for example. China is not a party to the ABM Treaty, but has made it clear that it considers itself a stakeholder in that treaty in the sense that it has interest in having this treaty maintained.

If you look at the recent debate, I think you would agree that even U.S. allies were rather skeptical about the idea of missile defence—certainly about national missile defence, which is supposed to cover the U.S. territory. But even if they favour missile defence, which in theory could cover European countries or NATO troops, as far as I know, all the joint projects the United States tried to initiate with European allies on developing a further missile defence system didn't go very far.

What exactly are the concerns in Russia and China about this system? I will speak more about Russia, as you will understand. First of all, the United States certainly argues that this system has a very limited nature and is supposed to intercept only a few incoming warheads. However, if you look at the architecture of the system and the technical side of things, you realize that the system is intentionally made to be scaleable. The system could be expanded relatively easily and rapidly because the main part of the infrastructure will be there at the first stage of the deployment. This is, of course, the major reason for concern in Russia because Russia believes this system could eventually be used to counter a Russian deterrence force.

In China, the concern is the same, but it's more than that. China is very much concerned about the theatre missile defence plans of the United States. Again, if you look at the technical side of things, even if we say theatre defence is relatively less advanced, the major part of it would be space-based infrastructure, namely space-based censors that would detect incoming warheads and ballistic missiles.

China, in particular, registered its concern at the conference on disarmament very recently, saying it would probably oppose, and would take steps to oppose, any development that would put weapons or parts of defence systems in space.

• 1115

Speaking of Russia exactly, probably we are slowly entering into a practical phase of things. The decision on the U.S. pulling out of the ABM Treaty could be imminent, in fact. What would the Russian reaction be? Russia indicated that of course if the United States chooses to withdraw from the ABM Treaty, Russia would consider pulling out of START II. But START II is not yet ratified and hasn't entered into force, so that's not a real threat.

However, the question of Russia's pulling out of the START treaty and terminating the mutual inspection programs that are part of that arms control agreement was mentioned unofficially. Unofficially that was discussed in very much detail.

In fact, the more important point here is the uncertainty that surrounds the ABM Treaty now and the concerns Russia has about future missile defence deployment in the United States. This uncertainty is inflicting real damage to the nuclear disarmament process as we speak, basically.

The most dangerous thing here is that if you look at the U.S.-Russian relations, especially on the nuclear disarmament side, you would see that now almost everything is linked to the question of modifying the ABM Treaty, which I think is very unfortunate. In Russia and the United States, we do have a very broad agenda. We have a lot of things to do as far as disarmament is concerned and real reduction of nuclear weapons. Unfortunately, the ABM Treaty question and the intention of the United States to build missile defence is basically blocking any development in this area.

That's probably it for my opening remarks. If there are questions, I will be glad to answer them.

The Acting Chair (Mr. Bernard Patry): I'm sure there are some.

Mr. Regehr.

Mr. Ernie Regehr (Director, Policy and Public Affairs, Project Ploughshares): Thank you very much.

I just want to add very briefly to those remarks and make some comments about Canadian response to the debate, or the lack of debate. That's part of the problem in the United States; the discussion has been in a very particular and peculiar context of presidential politics. The arms control implications of the proposal really have not had a major public hearing yet. They need to be engaged there, and I think the work the committee is doing here will be an important part of engaging those concerns and those issues in Canada.

I think Canada is well placed to insert into that public debate an assertion of the importance of multilateralism in exploring the implications of national missile defence. The ABM Treaty is a bilateral treaty, but it is an eminently multilateral instrument. It has implications for global security, not just for relations between those two states. All of the states that are non-signatory have a very profound interest in ensuring its survival and ensuring that while the Cold War deterrence structure still really obtains between the United States and the Soviet Union, one of the foundations of the stability of that structure is not dismantled.

Within the United States, what we are seeing there is fundamentally a unilateralist effort to pursue national security on a unilateral basis, based not on mutual deterrence and mutual respect but on the pursuit of a superior military capability that makes a fortress of America and protects it. I think we have a role there to assert the mutuality of security.

On the role of NORAD, there we also need to remind ourselves and to remind the United States that the fundamental basis of that agreement was the mutual concern and interest between the two countries regarding air defence. Those mutual interests for air defence of the territory are there, and whatever the Americans do on the base of national missile defence, those concerns about territorial surveillance in defence will remain there.

• 1120

As Mr. Heinbecker said—and I'm sorry we missed the larger part of his presentation—national missile defence is likely to enhance the importance of issues related to air defence, the cruise missile threat not being the least of it.

I think it's very important that Canada use its good offices in engaging the United States administration about the concerns about arms control and disarmament implications of that. I think you're familiar with those, and we can talk about those in the discussion. The sense is that despite all of the competence and expertise that surely exists south of the border, decisions are being heavily driven and being made there by presidential politics and the attempt to remove from the Republicans a particular card. It's important for us to address them and to remind them of some of the multilateral global implications of their response.

In the context of multilateralizing the response to the ballistic missile threat, inasmuch as there is one out there, we need to emphasize that the responses to those threats need to be part of the broad concern of the international community. It's not just the responsibility of the United States to respond to that.

The report of this standing committee and the response of the government referred to the U.S.-Russian interest in the international system on launch notification. That's an issue that has been noted in principle, but in practice it's not pursued or explored in detail. I think that's a thing Canada can encourage.

There's potential not only for there to be early identification of launch but also for mutual monitoring of the pre-launch status of missiles and missile programs. In that capacity, such a system would also essentially become a verification mechanism for the de-alerting and de-mating kinds of programs that Mr. Heinbecker was talking about. This proposal needs very serious attention in its capacity for Canada to support and sponsor some attention to that issue.

We want to keep the opening remarks brief, so I'll close with that and look forward to the discussion.

The Acting Chair (Mr. Bernard Patry): Thank you very much.

[Translation]

We will now go to questions. Ms. Debien.

Ms. Maud Debien: Welcome, Mr. Podvig and Mr. Regehr. It occurs to me, Mr. Chairman, that the very first question I put to the ambassador about the deployment of the missile defence system seems to have captured the interest of all of the witnesses. We seemed to focus almost solely on this topic, whereas the primary purpose of our meeting was to discuss the next NPT review, which is to take place shortly, and the position to be adopted by Canada.

Mr. Podvig, you stated that the main impediment to the nuclear disarmament process was the uncertainty surrounding the ABM Treaty. Could you elaborate further on that statement?

• 1125

I have a question as well for Mr. Regehr concerning the upcoming second review conference scheduled for next April in Geneva.

[English]

Mr. Pavel Podvig: Okay. I think I understood the question.

There are uncertainties, as I said. For example, the decision the U.S. administration is supposed to take this July could well be postponed. As you know, the U.S. legislation is that the system should be deployed as soon as is technically possible. But if you look at the technical side of things, then you'll see that the system could not do the job it is supposed to do. So if you judge it on technical merits, the decision won't happen at all.

However, apparently the United States... and you can see many vested interests in having this idea of missile defence deployment promoted. You would see that in the United States. So we now live—and “we” means Russia and the United States, in their bilateral relations—with this constant pressure that we should think about the possibility of the ABM Treaty being abrogated by the United States and the constant pressure of this possibility of missile defence being deployed.

I think that's very damaging for bilateral nuclear disarmament and for non-proliferation in general.

[Translation]

The Acting Chairman (Mr. Bernard Patry): Ms. Debien, did you have a question for Mr. Regehr?

Ms. Maud Debien: Yes, I wanted to ask him about the second NPT review conference which is scheduled to get under way shortly. In your opinion, in terms of priorities, what should the Canadian government be focusing on at this conference?

I'd also like to ask you the same question I raised earlier. You may recall that some countries were dissatisfied with the CTBT talks during the first review conference, which led to growing support for India's position. The latter held that any negotiations to draft a convention on disarmament pursuant to the CTNT should be tied to negotiations on nuclear disarmament. As you know, the US Senate has refused to ratify the CTBT. I'm wondering if we're likely to run into the same problem at the second review conference?

[English]

Mr. Ernie Regehr: I think it is very important to understand that the issues related to the national ballistic missile defence comprehensive test ban, the failure of that to be ratified, and the review of the NPT are all intimately linked. The survival of the non-proliferation regime and the continued respect for that in the international community depends very heavily on the outcome of the other two.

• 1130

I think the perception of the signatories to the non-proliferation treaty will be this. If the United States proceeds with national missile defence, the response of Russia must inevitably be to counter that deployment in some way, and the same for China. That will be perceived, and correctly perceived, as an escalation and a reassertion of the importance and role of nuclear weapons in the security designs of the major powers, increasing the instability and dangers they pose to the international community. It thus will be understood by the non-military signatories of the NPT as a continued violation of their obligations under article VI of the non-proliferation treaty.

So I think these things are very closely related. The opening remarks I made about the importance of Canada reasserting a multilateral approach to this really spoke to that question—namely, that we need to preserve the non-proliferation regime, and the preserving of that regime means reducing, as this committee said and the government responded as being a central policy of the government, the political salience of nuclear weapons in security systems.

National missile defence coming on and the refusal to ratify the CTB signal the opposite intent, really, and I think the implications are grave. It's one of the reasons we need to be very, very careful about our response to national missile defence and respond to it not in terms of bilateral Canada-U.S. relations, and managing that relationship, but in terms of our multilateral security interests.

The Acting Chair (Mr. Bernard Patry): Thank you.

[Translation]

Mr. Paradis.

Mr. Denis Paradis: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[English]

First I would like to congratulate Dr. Pavel Podvig for his presentation. I think it's very interesting for the members of this committee to have him here.

My question is in relation to what you are doing. Just so that we understand where you're situated, what is the Institute of Physics and Technology? Is it part of a university or a part of government?

Second, what is your job there?

Mr. Pavel Podvig: The Centre for Arms Control is a non-governmental organization. We work mainly on technical issues related to arms control and disarmament. We work on technical issues because all people at the centre, including me, are graduates of the Moscow Institute of Physics and Technology. It is a rough equivalent of MIT in the United States. It's a very high-quality technical school in Russia.

So I'm speaking here as a non-governmental person. I don't represent the Russian government. I speak for myself.

Mr. Denis Paradis: Okay.

Again, welcome, and thank you for your presentation.

Mr. Pavel Podvig: Thank you.

The Acting Chair (Mr. Bernard Patry): Mr. Speller.

Mr. Bob Speller: Thank you, Mr. Chair.

I do apologize for not hearing your presentations, but I have done a little bit of research and I understand what you said. So my questions would be somewhat general.

It seems they're having some difficulties with the Russian military. There seems to be some concern in certain circles that what's happening is that more emphasis is being put on the nuclear side because of the fact that the Russian military is having some difficulties themselves. In fact, there's a view in Russia that, maybe for the defence of Russia, they should put more emphasis on the nuclear side. That's my first question.

• 1135

Secondly, if that's the case, does this whole process not lead into that or give argument to those who would want to increase Russia's nuclear capabilities? Wouldn't this ultimately lead into that?

Mr. Pavel Podvig: First, I wouldn't say it's a totally new trend in Russian politics, this greater reliance on nuclear weapons. It's been this way for a few years now. The conventional wisdom in Russia is that Russia doesn't have the means to support a conventional army and therefore it should rely more on nuclear weapons.

It's true there is this school of thought, if you want, in Russia, and especially in the military. However, I wouldn't be pessimistic in that regard, because this does not preclude all the work done toward nuclear disarmament.

If you are asking whether this reliance on nuclear weapons actually plays any role in the difficulties we have in Russia and the United States with, for example, the START II Treaty and the failure of the Duma to ratify this treaty, I would say no. I mean, that's unrelated to these issues.

At the same time, I would agree that this idea of relying more on nuclear weapons is... I wouldn't say it's dangerous. I just think this is not something Russia should be doing, in fact. However, the way out of this situation would be to engage Russia in a new round of nuclear disarmament, as I say.

For example, if you look at the current status of the START II Treaty, again, although it has not been ratified by the Duma, it's clear that it's not a dead end. Something could be done. There are ways that would lead us toward a new nuclear disarmament treaty with lower levels of nuclear weapons.

However—and I would repeat that point—the biggest problem now is that any step that would eventually lead toward some real progress in eliminating nuclear weapons or removing this emphasis from nuclear weapons in the Russian doctrine is linked, explicitly or implicitly, to Russian concessions as to the ABM Treaty in question.

This is really unfortunate. As I said, the position in Russia is to very strongly oppose the ABM Treaty. Frankly, I don't see any reason why it should be that way, why that position should be linked to the question of missile defence. Unfortunately, this is the way it is now.

Did I answer your question?

Mr. Bob Speller: Yes.

We were told this morning something I wasn't aware of, that both the United States and Russia are allowed a missile defence system. Russia now has one around Moscow. Is this system similar to what the Americans are wanting to do for their whole country? Are you aware of this?

• 1140

Mr. Pavel Podvig: The system that Russia has now around Moscow is, in many respects, the same safeguard system that the United States once deployed in 1974 or 1975. The United States operated the safeguard system for four months and then shut it down because it was ruled impractical.

Apparently the Soviet Union thought it had a lot more money than the United States. That was a really big mistake.

What we have now is comparable to that old U.S. safeguard system in very many respects. That's dictated by technology.

Mr. Bob Speller: So it's very early technology.

Mr. Pavel Podvig: Yes, it is very early technology, although the system was deployed and put in line in the early to mid-1980s, as far as I remember. But still, it is basically 1970s technology.

There is nothing of the kind that the United States is going to do. Russia doesn't have either this system or any plans to have one. In a sense, I would argue that for many reasons that's a very prudent decision, not to go into the missile defence business. In fact, it was mentioned here earlier that during the Star Wars program, for example, the Soviet Union didn't have the technology or resources to compete with the United States. Although that's true, that's only part of the truth. The other part is that in fact there wasn't a political force in the Soviet Union that would drive us into this very costly and very technically adventurous program.

The Acting Chair (Mr. Bernard Patry): Dr. Podvig, what do you think are the chances that the U.S. and Russia could reach an agreement on certain modifications to the ABM Treaty? If so, which agreement would be helpful?

Mr. Pavel Podvig: That's a very difficult question.

The Acting Chair (Mr. Bernard Patry): It's a short question.

Mr. Pavel Podvig: If you look at the politics that surround the ABM issue in Moscow, as I said, the main player there is the military, and the military very strongly opposes any modification of the treaty—with good reason, in fact, because, as I said, although what the United States is suggesting is a very slight modification to allow this very limited system that would consist of a few counter-interceptors and so on, if you look at the text of the treaty, it is very clear that in order to allow this limited defence, you will have to change the fundamental provisions of the treaty, namely, article I.

In Russia, there is a very good understanding, I would say, in all quarters, that any agreement on modification of the ABM Treaty would in fact be the end of the treaty as we know it. So modification is not possible, in a sense. However, again, if you look at the politics, there are signs that in some circumstances, Russia could agree on modifying the treaty. In my view, that could bring short-term relief in U.S.-Russia relations. However, longer-term consequences would be very unfortunate.

• 1145

To give you an example, the START II treaty, in 1993, was actually seen as a very good development and a very big step forward. However, seven years after that, it's now clear that in fact that was a mistake. Instead of being a step forward, that really became a stumbling block on the way toward disarmament. So I would be very cautious of any possible U.S.-Russian deal on that, because, again, it may work short term, but in the longer term that would be much more questionable.

The Acting Chair (Mr. Bernard Patry): Thank you.

Mr. Regehr, do you want to comment?

Mr. Ernie Regehr: Yes, briefly on that. I think it's quite conceivable that the United States and Russia could come to some agreement for modification of the treaty. I think, though, the implications of that would be profound and wouldn't necessarily be in Russia's best interests, nor would Russia willingly do it, inasmuch as it's susceptible to certain pressures from the United States, obviously. That's why I think the Canadian position on the ABM treaty is very important.

The position is stated as no unilateral modification of the treaty. But I think the position really ought to be no modification, no weakening of the treaty, because right now, Russia is out there alone and on its own as the only bulwark against the modification of the treaty. It needs much stronger international diplomatic support, because I think it's absolutely clear that modification of the treaty and proceeding toward even the most limited form of national missile defence will be perceived by Russia and China both as first steps toward more substantial missile defence, and that will generate a whole series of implications for arms control and disarmament, including the militarization of space and the kinds of things Professor Podvig was mentioning, the positioning in space of sensors that are linked to control and command of interceptor missiles.

That raises the whole question. We had Professor John Steinbruner here with Professor Podvig in the last couple of days. Unfortunately he couldn't stay for this meeting, but he raised regularly the fundamental problem of the incompatibility between the military use of space and the commercial use of space. When assets in space become viewed to be legitimate military targets, as these kinds of sensors would inevitably be, that will put a major chilling effect on the commercial exploitation of space. So there are long-term implications of this that have not yet been thought through and need to be carefully aired before any decisions are made on the national missile defence system.

The Acting Chair (Mr. Bernard Patry): Dr. Podvig.

Mr. Pavel Podvig: If I may add briefly, the second part of your question was, if there is an agreement what kind of agreement would it be?

If you really think about an agreement, as I said, under some circumstances that could be possible. Then, in my view, currently the agreement should uphold the fundamental principle of the treaty, which is that no robust defence of a territory should be allowed. However, there could be an exception made for the kind of limited defence the United States is planning.

I think the most important principle that should be included in any modified treaty—it will lose most of its colour, but still we could strengthen it; we could use this occasion to make some statements stronger—and this in fact has some implications for what has just been said, is that there should be a total blanket ban on any weapons in space, on any interceptors in space.

If you look at the current ADM Treaty, it is more or less clear as to whether interceptors could be put in space; they are banned. However, there are several loopholes that could be exploited on the weapons based on new physical principles.

• 1150

So if we talk about any kind of modification of the ABM Treaty, then I think it should be a very strong point of the international community as well that any interceptors based on any physical principle should be banned outright—no space-based lasers or any kind of weapons there. That would in fact somehow soften the effect of destroying the essence of the treaty.

The Acting Chair (Mr. Bernard Patry): Thank you very much, Dr. Podvig, and thank you, Mr. Regehr, for your comments this morning. It's very much appreciated.

Before we adjourn, on the agenda today we have the notice of motion by Keith Martin regarding CIDA, but I don't see any quorum to discuss it. It's going to be postponed to our next meeting. Thank you.

I adjourn the meeting to the call of the chair.