FAAE Committee Report

While effective military action may deny victory to the insurgency [in Afghanistan]—only effective governance will defeat it.

Mark L. Schneider Senior Vice-President,
International Crisis Group, April 2, 2008[218]

[T]he war in Afghanistan cannot be won without a peace track, a political track. …My observations take into account the government and the politics a round the government. The civil war is hampering governance and civil service reform. Good governance is impossible to achieve unless this conflict is resolved.

Seddiq Weera, Senior Advisor,
Independent National Commission on Strengthening Peace and Senior Policy Advisor to the Minister of Education, Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, February 14, 2008[219]

[T]he strategic goal should be that the Afghan political system would be so strong that it could endure without international support.

Professor Robert Jackson, Director of International Relations,
University of Redlands, California, and former head of the Department of Political Science, Carleton University, Ottawa, March 13, 2008[220]

Imagine in a three to five years, when a trained Afghan army, having taken its losses, looks over at the civilian government and sees them as corrupt. Can you imagine the sort of things that can happen then?

General Rick Hillier,
Canada’s Chief of the Defence Staff, March 27, 2008[221]

We need to emphasise institution building and accountability over favoured individuals in every area if stability [in Afghanistan] is to prove sustainable in every area.

Nick Grono, Deputy President (Operations),
 International Crisis Group, April 2, 2008[222]

Good Governance as an Essential Objective of International Policy

As indicated in the above citations, and the points of agreement among witnesses underlined in the Introduction, good governance – which incorporates the rule of law, transparent accountable public administration, democracy and human rights – is an integral component of what Canadian Chief of Defence Staff General Rick Hillier referred to in the context of protecting civilians as “the winning conditions” in his April 2008 testimony to the Committee.[223] It is also one of the three main pillars of the Afghanistan Compact which is to guide international and Afghan government action during these critical years. Indeed, Chris Alexander, Canada’s first post 9/11 ambassador to Afghanistan who is currently Deputy Special Representative of the UN Secretary General for Afghanistan, stated during a March 2008 press conference in Kabul that “the conviction now, in Afghanistan and among the partners of Afghanistan, is stronger than ever that the key to peace and security here remains the success of state institutions.”[224]

Yet as also indicated in testimony before the Committee, and in a growing body of serious analytical literature on the subject[225], there is still a long way to go in actually achieving good governance goals from the highest international (UN/ISAF/Compact participants) to the most grounded local Afghan village level. With respect to the former, Stefan Lehmeier observed that: “Despite all these lessons learned over the years, even the recently established coordination mechanism to oversee the implementation of the Afghanistan Compact, the Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board, is proving to be largely ineffective in its current set-up and with its current procedures.”[226] With regard to the latter, the Afghan government and Afghan analysts have known for some time that poor governance is a major factor fuelling local grievances, especially in rural areas, which fan the flames of insurgency. Indeed, a 2006 intelligence assessment by Afghanistan’s National Directorate of Security (NDS) concluded that: “The first requirement of countering Taliban at the village level requires good governance, honest and competent leaders leading the institutions. … A lot of people in the villages of Zabul, Helmand, Kandahar, and Oruzgan … say this is a corrupt government.”[227]

His Excellency Omar Samad, Ambassador of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan to Canada, was equally candid about what remains to be done in his remarks to the Committee: “We also face weak institutions and government services, mixed with corruption, and at times a dysfunctional judiciary, which in our opinion will take a long time to reform. The enemy, however, is exploiting all these fault lines while we attempt to maintain our equilibrium. As we are a fragile state, we cannot always expect quick fixes and immediate solutions that can satisfy all the stakeholders, domestic or foreign. Given the Afghan traditions, the rebuilding process is a long-term mission, with many pitfalls along the way, and it will require statesmanship, strong political will, sacrifice, leadership skills, perseverance, and sustainable support to attain its objectives.”[228]

Overcoming weak governance that is prone to corruption has emerged as an overriding priority for achieving sustainable security and development in Afghanistan.[229] For example, Ashraf Ghani , Afghanistan’s first post-Taliban finance minister and co-author of a new book, Fixing Failed States: A Framework for Rebuilding a Fractured World, stated recently: “It is the weakness of the government, not the strength of the Taliban that is the issue.”[230] The Government of Afghanistan itself recognizes the problem, affirming in its new five-year National Development Strategy (2008-2013) discussed at the international conference on Afghanistan in Paris on June 12: “Improving governance is essential to the attainment of the Government’s national vision and the establishment of a stable and functioning society.”[231]

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The Paris conference brought into focus a number of concerns about the level and nature of international assistance, notably that only about $15 billion of the $25 billion already pledged from 2001-2008 has actually been delivered and much of this flows back to the donors, and that about two-thirds of international aid bypasses the Afghan government budget.[232] President Karzai stated in Paris that: “The current development process that is marred by confusion and parallel structures undermines institution building. While Afghanistan needs large amounts of aid, precisely how aid is spent is just as important.”[233] While analysts often point to corruption within the Afghan government, in an earlier interview with the German newsmagazine Der Spiegel, Mr Karzai turned the tables, alleging that: “Some members of the international community are strongly connected to corrupt elements and use them as their sources.”[234]

According to the Afghan government’s new five-year development strategy:

The governance agenda addresses three major challenges: pervasive corruption, low public sector capacity and human rights deprivations for girls and women in Afghanistan. 80 per cent of provinces identified reducing corruption in public administration as a priority during sub-national consultations.

The policy framework for the proposed reform program to strengthen governance includes all national and sub-national government, parliamentary, civil society and political structures.[235]

Afghanistan, dependent on foreign assistance for 90% of government expenditure, was seeking an additional US$50.1 billion in donor commitments from the Paris conference (about $20 billion was pledged, about half of that by the United States). Afghanistan’s plan drew support from UN Special Envoy Kai Eide, with, however, a critical proviso. As he stated on May 22: “It’s obvious the international community does not spend its resources as well as it should and it’s obvious that corruption is a much too widespread phenomenon in Afghanistan. I would like to see a partnership coming out of Paris where the international community says ‘yes, we will spend our resources better’, and the government says ‘yes, we will fight corruption more vigorously.”[236] On the eve of the conference he told a French television interviewer: “Too much of the donor money falls back into the hands of the donor country itself and never reaches the Afghans. That is a big problem. Another problem is that we do not follow what are the plans and priorities of the Afghan government. We start projects and sometimes the Afghans don’t even know about it, what we are doing in the field.”[237]

Public Administration Reform from the National to the Local Levels

The testimony of our witnesses reinforced numerous analyses in recent years that have detailed the deficits in the capacity of Afghan governance at all levels to carry out the functions of an effective state. One witness, Grant Kippen, former National Democratic Institute National Country Director for Afghanistan, referred the Committee to a report on public administration reform done by the Kabul-based Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit.[238] All acknowledge that Afghanistan was starting from near zero after the toppling of the Taliban, whose repressive regime had already turned the country into a failed state. Facing a huge uphill struggle from the start, Afghanistan is still paying the price.

Colonel (ret.) Mike Capstick, Canada’s first commander of the SAT-A in Kabul, told the Committee that: “We have a failure to develop the proper governance strategy. … We need a leader, and we need a strategy that addresses everything from soup to nuts, from A to Z in the civil service of Afghanistan – everything. …There are ministries there, such as the Ministry of the Interior ... Everybody knows that most of the wheels in the Ministry of the Interior are bad guys. They’re former warlords, you name it.”[239] Professor Robert Jackson told the Committee that: “There’s a lack of administrative capacity in the country. There is only a narrow skilled human resources base, and this is particularly true at the highest levels of government. Only about a quarter to a third of the government ministries, out of 27, are effective. The higher Afghan bureaucracy was decimated by decades of Soviet and Taliban control. Today they are struggling with huge amounts of paperwork required by international funding agencies and governments. About 25% of civil service time is spent merely reporting on the funds received. They don’t have much time for action.”[240]

Overcoming obstacles to good governance was always going to be a long difficult process. But in the view of some analysts, it has not been helped by the creation of a centralized unitary state in the 2004 constitution or the post-2001 flood of foreign consultants that moved in with uncoordinated Western-style “fixes”. As Barnett Rubin and Humayun Hamidzada have observed: “Emerging from decades of conflict, Afghanistan has one of the weakest governments in the world. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) estimates that government revenue will total 5.4 per cent of the non-drug GDP in 2005-2006, less than any country with data. Furthermore, the administration has difficulty disbursing the funds it has: the ten poorest provinces receive the smallest budgetary allocations, leading to a nearly non-existent government presence and rampant security problems. …. The government has started reforms at the national level, but many ministries are still non-functional or corrupt. The provincial and district administrations, the face of government for most Afghans, are largely controlled by illicit or violent power holders.”[241]

Marc André Boivin emphasized to the Committee that: “The critical issue for the future of Afghanistan is political. [T]he government is completely disconnected from the people. It is perpetuating predatory practices relating to the interests of certain factions rather than offering services.”[242] Another two of our witnesses, one civilian, the other ex-military, who have held Canadian leadership positions inside Afghanistan, were equally blunt about what still needs to be rectified and where our efforts can be most usefully focused. Both emphasized Afghan ownership of the governance reform process. Nipa Banerjee, former CIDA Head of Aid in Afghanistan from 2003-2006, and who had just returned from Afghanistan, told the Committee:

The legitimacy crisis of the Afghan government could be abated through a leadership role taken by Afghans and with a coordinated donor strategy supporting the leadership. Instead, domination of Afghanistan’s institution building process by the international community has tilted the entire process of nation building into a decline from which Afghanistan may not recover, ever. (…)

On state building linked to capacity building, at the base of the state-building agenda lies capacity building. With a $1.6 billion investment in capacity building, the international community has failed to build sustained capacity in the critical Afghan ministries and institutions. Capacity buying and replacement for quick and easy management solutions have failed to build sustained capacity. A slew of overpaid, inexperienced, and untrained recent graduates from the northern countries have used ODA resources to develop their own capacity, working in the ever-expanding aid industry that has engulfed Afghanistan.[243]

Colonel Mike Capstick, who during 2005-2006 headed Canada’s Strategic Advisory Team – Afghanistan, working directly with Afghan government ministries in Kabul, made the following appeal to the Committee:

Every single Canadian effort in the governance and development pillars of the compact must be designed to strengthen the legitimacy of the Afghan government. … CIDA support of the national solidarity program has not only resulted in the positive outcomes that other witnesses have described to you; it has also been one of the major reasons that the Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development, MRRD, is one of the most credible arms of the Afghan government. It should be our objective to make more ministries and the administration of Kandahar province as effective as MRRD. …

Public administration and governance reform efforts in Kabul have been ill-disciplined and fragmented since the fall of the Taliban regime. Despite the expenditure of large amounts of money and the presence of hundreds of international technical assistants, there is still no comprehensive strategy to reform the entire system and its processes. Canada could exercise leadership in this area by working closely with the UN and the World Bank to develop the necessary strategy and to focus international efforts.[244]

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A number of witnesses emphasized that state reforms must not be top-down but include the level of local self-governance, which as Rubin and Hamidzada observe, “have enabled people to survive even when the central government collapsed.”[245] Hon. Flora MacDonald, a frequent visitor to Afghanistan, gave the Committee examples from “a form of local governance [that] is emerging, although not particularly the one dictated by western thinking.” She noted that in the capital of Bamian province (Afghanistan’s poorest), a woman has been elected to head its local ‘shura’, the first time this has happened in Afghanistan’s history. Such locally-led developments are “now spreading to other provinces. It is a homegrown kind of governance, not the kind that is depicted through NATO, ISAF, Karzai, or through anybody else who is borrowing western ideas. This is something that is locally grown and is succeeding …”.[246]

These are small-scale signs of hope although still not part of the formal state system. More broadly, it is important to look at the Community Development Councils (CDCs) that have been created under the National Solidarity Program (NSP).[247] There are currently over 12,000 CDCs, the progress of which is documented in a recent World Bank study, Implementation Completion and Results Report of the National Solidarity Report Programme I.[248] According to Mariam Sherman, World Bank Country Manager for Afghanistan, “The NSP has for the first time in Afghanistan’s history introduced an institutionalized framework for inclusive consultative decision-making at the village level as part of the state governance system. Before NSP, women were not permitted to participate in rural institutions … With the introduction of CDCs, equal representation for women is actively promoted, and on average, 35 percent of the CDC representatives are female.”[249]

In addition, the Committee welcomes the increased focus of the Afghan government on local governance issues and its creation of an Independent Directorate for Local Governance in August 2007, and the consultations undertaken within Afghanistan by the Working Group on Sub-National Governance under the Auspices of the Afghanistan National Development Strategy (ANDS).[250]

Still, much remains to be reformed and sorted out in terms of overall provincial, district, and local governance structures, including the layer of provincial development committees initiated in 2006.[251] According to the summary of a July 2007 World Bank report: “One of the key constraints to strengthening the sub-national system in Afghanistan is the absence of a clear policy framework regarding its desired institutional structure, and a strategy to guide actions and activities to realize it.”[252] The bottom line for Afghans is that they need to be able to see effective public institutions working to meet their needs where they live, bearing in mind that the situation on the ground is locally complicated and constantly shifting.[253]

Over a year ago Sarah Chayes, founder of the Arghand Cooperative near Kandahar, warned the Committee by video-conference from Kandahar City about growing disillusionment with government among the local population, observing that: “The governor is not elected. The mayor is not elected. Nobody who was direct impact on the lives of people has been elected.”[254] Emmauel Isch of World Vision Canada also reminded the Committee that “sustainable development needs stable local governance. Canada’s approach to developing Afghanistan should support the development of strategies that can build up subnational governance structures. We often refer to some issue-related corruption and lack of capacity in that country, and we’re aware of it, but what we would like to see happen more is that there be more investment in the capacities of local governments and local communities … We need to invest not just at the national level but also within the communities so that the local authorities can more effectively provide and deliver services to their own people.”[255]

Better governance on the part of Afghan authorities is essential to the ultimate success of the Canadian mission in Kandahar. Colonel Capstick alerted the Committee to “a desperate need to extend good governance to Kandahar Province. The entire subnational governance structure in Afghanistan is problematic, and I’m being generous. Corruption, weak capacity, and arbitrary decision-making are all common.” He added that: “Clearly, projects intended to correct this situation in Kandahar should be a Canadian priority. This must include projects designed to reform the public administration system, the police and security forces, the penal system, and the control of public finances. At the same time, Canadian efforts must also focus on assisting the Afghan government in its efforts to deliver basic services to the population.”[256]

Recommendation 26

As part of helping to ensuring that the governance benchmarks in the Afghanistan Compact can be met, the Government of Canada should consider all means necessary to raise the legitimacy and effective capacity of public administration institutions in Afghanistan from the national to the local level. This should include, where feasible, exploring support for Afghan-led structures and processes. Particular attention should be paid to fostering improved governance mechanisms in Kandahar province aimed at providing better security and basic services to the population there. The Government of Canada should seek responsible local partners in this endeavour.

Reform of the Justice System and Security-Sector Institutions

Order and justice, as retired Lieutenant-Colonel Rémi Landry remarked to the Committee, are essential to the establishment of a stable legitimate Afghan state.[257] The rule of law encompasses both. Without order there can be no justice, and vice versa. Restoring a functioning justice system in Afghanistan remains a work in progress. The July 2007 Rome Conference on The Rule of Law in Afghanistan made a series of ambitious joint recommendations to the governments of Afghanistan, donor countries and the international community.[258] The March 2008 Report of the UN Secretary General to the Security Council observed a mixed picture. For example: “While public access to courts and legal aid is a constitutional right, it remains elusive to the majority of Afghans, especially women, children and vulnerable groups. This problem is compounded by the fact that public awareness of legal rights and processes is limited. … Nevertheless, there have been slow improvements in infrastructure development for the legal system, and a private corps of lawyers continues to grow.”[259]

Action being taken on a number of fronts rests on the Afghan state’s ability to provide basic justice and order to its citizens. Several of our witnesses suggested that minimal conditions of security of the person, and the means of achieve that – i.e., the instruments necessary to enforce the rule of law – must exist for progress on all other objectives to be achieved. As Sally Armstrong put it to us, “you can’t do anything without security. You can’t run a government, a judiciary, a school, a hospital, you can’t do anything.”[260]

Nipa Banerjee argued to the Committee that this has been a weak point in the trajectory of post 9/11 international intervention in Afghanistan: “In reality, security sector reform, the prerequisite to stability, became a secondary affair in the interest of rushing the political objectives of the Bonn process. The Afghan security forces and the army are not yet strong enough to resist aggression. The police force is unable to win the trust and confidence of the people. Reforms to the Ministry of Interior Affairs have not been implemented, and access to justice is non-existent.”[261]

Kamran Bokhari, Director of Middle East Analysis for Strategic Forecasting Inc. (STRATFOR), was even more pointed in telling the Committee: “We definitely need to develop institutions, but what are the primary institutions that we need to develop and upon which every other institution will rest? These are the security institutions, the Afghan National Police and the Afghan National Army. But they’re not there yet, and they’re not going to be there for a very long time. We need to admit that and to acknowledge it. Until such a time, we need to be able to support these institutions.”[262]

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Reform of the national police was of particularly urgent concern to witnesses, including retired General Lewis Mackenzie who suggested that such reform might be better organized at a provincial level[263], and was acknowledged by then Minister of Foreign Affairs Maxime Bernier in remarks at the opening of a new Canadian training centre at the Kandahar provincial reconstruction site on April 13, 2008: “Accountable and professional Afghan National Police is essential to stability and supporting the rule of law in Afghanistan Establishing effective rule of law is essential to rebuilding Afghanistan, promoting peace, stability and democracy, a goal that we all share.”[264] Another element to consider is adequate oversight of the large number of private security personnel operating in Afghanistan.[265]

Building a competent, trustworthy Afghan army of 70,000 (since increased to 80,000[266]) and police force of 62,000, for a total of 132,000 by 2011, is a benchmark goal of the 2006 Afghanistan Compact. Specifically with regard to the police component, the Compact states: “By end-2010, a fully constituted, professional, functional and ethnically balanced Afghanistan National Police and Border Police with a combined force of up to 62,000 will be able to meet the security needs of the country effectively and will be increasingly fiscally sustainable.”[267] According to the January 2008 Report of the Independent Panel on Canada’s Future Role in Afghanistan, this combined force total was subsequently amended upwards to 82,000.[268] It is difficult to be precise about the exact numbers actually on the job. In February 2008 the Afghan Ministry of the Interior provided the Afghanistan Compact’s Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board with a December 2007 estimate of 75,000 employed by the Afghanistan National Police (ANP) and foresaw the involvement of 1,417 contractors. The Ministry further stated that it was in the process of commissioning an professional and independent review.[269] In June 2008, Brig.-Gen. Peter Atkinson told the House of Commons Standing Committee on National Defence that as of February 1, 2008 the force strength of the Afghan National Police had reached 76, 410 (93% of the numerical goal). However, only half of the target for the Afghan Border Police (9,000 of 18,000) had been reached.[270]

Canada currently has 60 soldiers and police officers working with the border police, which have responsibility for patrolling Afghanistan’s 5,500-kilometre border, 14 land border crossings and four international airports.[271] At the same time, it is widely recognized that much still needs to be done with regard to the Afghan police forces as a whole in terms of their quality as well as numbers. Together with Afghan authorities, Canada and other international partners are striving to make progress on achieving the necessary institutional reforms, force strengths, and training. goals[272]

The Afghanistan Compact also affirms the following: “Democratic governance and the protection of human rights constitute the cornerstone of sustainable political progress in Afghanistan. … Reforming the justice system will be a priority for the Afghan Government and the international community. The aim will be to ensure equal, fair and transparent access to justice for all based upon written codes with fair trials and enforceable verdicts. Measures will include: completing legislative reforms for the public as well as the private sector; building the capacity of judicial institutions and personnel; promoting human rights and legal awareness; and rehabilitating judicial infrastructure.”[273]

Here again, the proof of progress will be putting these aims into practice. Barnett Rubin observed in 2006 that: “Police cannot provide security without courts. The judiciary is the sole part of the state still dominated by the ulama, the learned clergy, who play a central role in determining—and undermining—the legitimacy of governments. Hence judicial reform involves sensitive issues. By now however, the lack of judicial reform has become a bottleneck for security, governance, and economic development.” [274]

In proceeding, the international community needs to be cognizant of the fact that Afghanistan is an Islamic republic as defined by its constitution approved by almost all members of the 502-member Constitutional Loya Jirga on 4 January 2004.[275] The current constitution under Chapter One “The State” affirms in Article Two: “The religion of the state of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan is the sacred religion of Islam”, and in Article Three that: “In Afghanistan, no law can be contrary to the beliefs and provisions of the sacred religion of Islam.”[276] The new Afghanistan National Development Strategy also makes clear that “Islamic values” are to be reflected in every aspect of government policy.[277]

Obviously it makes a difference how liberally or narrowly these provisions are interpreted by the courts. Other issues of legal human rights import have come before Afghanistan’s legislature – the 249-seat lower house, the “Wolesi Jirga”, and the 102-seat upper house, the “Meshrano Jirga”. Two in particular are described in a document prepared for the US Congress:

Parliamentary opposition contributed to [Afghan President Hamid] Karzai’s apparent dropping of a July 2006 proposal to revive a “Ministry of Supporting Virtue and Discouraging Vice,” a ministry that was used by the Taliban to commit major human rights abuses. Karzai said the ministry would focus on advice and public relations to encourage Islamic behavior. Another significant vote came in February 2007, when both houses passed a law giving amnesty to so-called “warlords,” the faction leaders who participated in the two decades of anti-Soviet and then civil war. Despite demonstrations in Kabul by 25,000 Afghans supporting the resolution, Karzai returned a modified draft giving victims of these commanders the right to seek justice for any abuses. The new version was passed and has become law.[278]

As the Committee heard from witnesses, concerns persist about Afghanistan’s criminal justice system at all level from courts to corrections and prison conditions. As Hilary Homes of Amnesty International Canada told the Committee in March 2008: “Many promises have been made to improve human rights through the mandates of the international forces, the United Nations, the recent Rome conference on the rule of law in Afghanistan, and of course the Afghan constitution itself. These commitments to creating and strengthening institutions and building a broad culture of human rights to ensure their survival must be followed through if the progress that has been made is not to be lost.”[279] At the same time, Amnesty International’s Canadian Secretary General Alex Neve agreed with another witness, journalist and author Sally Armstrong, that the Canadian-supported Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission has achieved some real success.[280] In that context, he appealed for further support from Canada for this body:

The Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission is an incredibly important institution in the country; it has done some great work. … There’s a lot of work that they’ve done, not just with respect to this particular issue of battlefield detainees; that’s one very specific issue in a broad human rights landscape. …there’s a vital need, not just for somewhat increased resourcing, but substantially increased resourcing.[281]

The Committee has heard considerable testimony on the issue of detainees, which remains a matter under judicial review in Canada. What we would underline is that the Afghanistan motion passed by the House of Commons on 13 March 2008 stipulates that “with respect to the transfer of Afghan detainees to Afghan authorities, the government must: (a) commit to meeting the highest NATO and international standards with respect to protecting the rights of detainees, transferring only when it believes it can do so in keeping with Canada’s international obligations; (b) pursue a NATO-wide solution to the question of detainees through diplomatic efforts that are rooted in the core Canadian values of respect for human rights and the dignity of all people; (c) commit to a policy of greater transparency with respect to its policy on the taking of and transferring of detainees including a commitment to report on the results of reviews or inspections of Afghan prisons undertaken by Canadian officials.”

The Canadian government must be held to the above commitments. In addition, while respecting Afghanistan’s sovereignty, it has also made internationally-binding commitments under the terms of the 2006 Afghanistan Compact and it must be held to those. In the words of Marc André Boivin to the Committee, “internationally, the Afghan government must be required to meet its obligations in the areas of human rights, freedom of the press and freedom of association and to fully shoulder its responsibilities to its population.” [282]

Recommendation 27

As part of its quarterly progress reports to the Parliament of Canada on the Canadian mission in Afghanistan, the Government of Canada should include detailed information on what steps are being taken, and with what success, to implement the commitments on governance, rule of law and human rights — including benchmarks and timelines — undertaken by the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan and the international community under the terms of the Afghanistan Compact.

Recommendation 28

Given the progress that has been achieved to date working with the Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission, the Government of Canada should increase its support to that vital body so as to ensure that it has sufficient capacity and resources to effectively carry out its mandate.

Recommendation 29

In addition, with respect to the issue of transfer of Afghan detainees to Afghan authorities, the Government of Canada should indicate in its future reports the details of what it is doing to implement the terms of the Afghanistan motion passed by the House of Commons on March 13, 2008.

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Anti-Corruption and Counter-Narcotics Efforts

We made it clear to the president [of Afghanistan] that Canadians expect that if we’re going to be in Afghanistan – Canadian lives are being lost there, there’s a lot of money being spent – there’s got to be a sense of public confidence that the money and the lives are in pursuit of something worthy. And when there’s a scent of corruption you get people turning off. And so, I explained to him the importance of dealing with that.

Minister of Foreign Affairs David Emerson,
 Paris, June 12, 2008[283]

Everyone will agree that corruption is a cancer that must be constantly combated. Afghanistan, which ranked 172 out of 179 countries surveyed on a Transparency International index cited in a 2006 UN report, is clearly a hard case in point.[284] The Afghanistan Compact signed in early 2006 states that: “The UN Convention against Corruption will be ratified by end-2006, national legislation adapted accordingly by end-2007 and a monitoring mechanism to oversee implementation will be in place by end-2008.” Afghanistan actually signed the Convention in February 2004 and it was ratified by parliament in August 2006, meeting the Compact commitment. The last element of implementation remains the most crucial. Work continues in that area in 2008 assisted by international donors.[285]

There is no time to lose. As Barnett Rubin observed several months after the adoption of the Compact: “Afghanistan’s weak administration has few if any effective controls over corruption, which has undermined support for the government. Some systems have been instituted to prevent the most important types of corruption, notably a system requiring transparent public bidding for procurement. Increasingly, however, ministries are sidestepping this procedure and signing single-source contracts, many of which are then approved by the president in the interest of not delaying important projects. The compact obliges the government to fight corruption without saying how.”[286]

The Committee observes that some progress has been made through the establishment in August 2007 of the Independent Directorate for Local Governance (IDLG) with a mandate to review the performance of subnational governance appointees. Indeed, as of early May 2008, the IDLG had “fired the governors of eight of Afghanistan’s 34 provinces.”[287] Afghanistan has also established a High Level Commission against Corruption which has produced a “roadmap” document “Fighting Corruption in Afghanistan – Strategy and Action”.[288] Afghanistan needs to be encouraged to continue to strengthen such oversight and anti-corruption measures.

Improving government accountability and performance is a joint responsibility of the Afghan government and international partners. Rubin, who subsequently testified before the Committee several times, had recommended in 2006 that: “The Afghan president should tell his cabinet that he will no longer sign single-source contracts without exceptional circumstances and that all ministers found proffering such contracts will be sacked. International donors should invest in building the capacity of the Afghan government to draft proposals and process contracts so that transparent procedures do not lead to intolerable delays.”[289]

The need to keep the pressure on for reform was fully recognized by then Minister of Foreign Affairs Maxime Bernier when he stated to the Committee:

The fight against corruption in the public service is an important element, and Canada is making enormous efforts to help the Afghan government make its institutions more responsible. …That government must be present throughout the country, and in order for it to do that, the existing corruption has to be eliminated. We want the government to have the utmost credibility among the people; that is why we and the international community, together, are fighting to reduce and eliminate corruption in the various components of the Afghan public service. Canada has also insisted that the Afghanistan Compact include an important clause on the creation of a fair and transparent mechanism for reviewing government appointments. As you know, corruption is a human thing, and we want to be sure that the people whom the Afghan government appoints to various positions, to senior positions, such as chief of police, lawyers in the department of Justice, directors of security in the districts and provincial governors, for example, are above any suspicion of corruption. The mechanism for appointments to senior posts was recently established by order of the Afghan government, in September 2006, and we are currently working with our international and Afghan partners to ensure that the order is carried out.[290]

In subsequent testimony, Surendrini Wijeyartne of the Canadian Council for International Cooperation agreed that: “Canada and other donors have a distinct opportunity to take a very strong diplomatic role ensuring that the senior appointments panel functions fully and credible and doesn’t become manipulated by the government.”[291] At the same time, how this role is played can be a delicate matter, as Minister Bernier himself discovered when comments he initially made on 14 April 2008 about the governor of Kandahar province Asadullah Khalid – appearing to link him to corruption – had to be clarified after protests from the Afghan government. Minister Bernier issued a statement that: “Afghanistan is a sovereign state that makes its own decisions about government appointments. I can assure you that Canada fully respects this and is not calling for any changes to the Afghan government.”[292]

It is true that Afghanistan’s government has made anti-corruption reform commitments under the Afghanistan Compact, and it should be held to those. As Sally Armstrong described to the Committee, one problem to be overcome is that during the early years of the state-building process: “What happened, as you know, is that Mujahideen leaders took control of the ministries and simply refused to give them up. Remember that the international community was invited in by the government to help. We weren’t invited in to make decisions, and we couldn’t say, ‘Fire those three ministers.’ We couldn’t do that; it was not our role. This is a very tricky file.”[293] Debate continues about how public or not international donors should be in raising governance concerns linked to corruption. But all agree that the issue should not be swept under the rug. At least one Afghan government minister, education minister Haneef Atmar, is reported to “want foreign countries to name and shame corrupt officials”.[294]

Furthermore, dealing with corruption in Afghanistan is impossible to achieve without confronting the enormous illicit drug economy which has infected Afghan society, distorted governance at every level, and fuelled the insurgency.[295] Even though opium poppy production for trafficking is banned by the 2004 constitution[296], the raw figures are staggering. In 2007 Afghanistan accounted for fully 93% of global opium production; Helmand province next to Kandahar alone supplying nearly half of world production. The value of this illegal economy (around $5 billion annually, only about 20% of which is income at the “farm-gate”) is far higher than what Afghanistan receives in international aid, and is greater than any other country in the world in comparison to the size of the legal GDP. Indeed according to the United Nations Office for Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and the World Bank, the magnitude is virtually unprecedented in modern experience.[297] Moreover, this is a demand as well as a supply problem. Rates of drug abuse are rising inside Afghanistan, which now has nearly a million addicts as well as disturbingly high levels of mental illness.[298] Most opium, however, is exported, mainly to Europe where its street value has been estimated at $60 billion annually[299]. Some 70% of global heroin is refined from raw opium within the country. This in turn requires the interdiction of trafficking in precursor chemicals such as acetic anhydride used to make heroin.

The complexity of the problem, its links to Taliban insurgency – it is estimated that from 20-40% of Taliban financing comes from opiate exports[300] – and government corruption, are compounded by the problems with existing counter-narcotics approaches which have been amply documented.[301] The Committee has heard considerable testimony outlining the issues.[302] One of our witnesses, noted analyst Barnett Rubin, has called for reformed comprehensive strategies that include long-term rural development and improved cross-border interdiction[303] – which must involve all of Afghanistan’s neighbours, Iran and the Central Asian Republics[304], as well as Pakistan.[305] This is in line with the Manley report’s assessment that: “Opium profits flow to the Taliban, to criminal elements and to corrupt provincial and central-government officials. The Panel found that different and in some cases contradictory Afghan government and foreign counter-narcotics policies and practices have been working at cross-purposes. Coherent counter-narcotics strategies need to be adopted by all relevant authorities.[306] These approaches must include justice-sector reforms to tighten the prosecution of traffickers. And they must offer effective economic provisions to induce would-be poppy farmers and middlemen to prefer and find alternative lines of work.”[307]

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Efforts to eradicate the poppy crop have been especially contested, including by local Afghan government officials[308], and US proposals for aerial spraying have been resisted by Afghan President Hamid Karzai[309] and some international partners who feel that this may further alienate small farmers and the migrant labourers who actually harvest most of the raw opium.[310] Alternative uses for opium – in effect, a legalization of production – notably the “poppy-for medicine” proposal advanced by the privately-funded Senlis Council led by Canadian Norine MacDonald[311] – have attracted interest. The Manley panel report stated cautiously that: “As one possibility, a limited poppy-for- medicine project might be worth pursuing. Any good strategy will take time to yield results.”[312] However, the Senlis proposals have been rejected by the Afghan and Canadian governments and critiqued by knowledgeable analysts.[313]

The latest report of the UN Secretary General on the situation in Afghanistan observed some “significant momentum” in counter-narcotics efforts in response to the alarming rise in production in trafficking in 2007, but also presented a mixed picture:

The Government [of Afghanistan] will provide force protection to counter-narcotics operations, bearing in mind the powerful link between the drug industry and the insurgency. The plan strongly emphasizes the importance of alternative development, a province-centred approach and strengthened donor support for the Counter-Narcotics Trust Fund, the successful restructuring of which is essential to its improved performance. … There is an urgent need for strengthened counter-narcotics leadership based on clarity regarding the roles and responsibilities of the Ministry of Counter-Narcotics and other relevant authorities. … In 2008 opium-poppy cultivation is not expected to change significantly, according to the Opium Winter Rapid Assessment Survey issued by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime in February. Cultivation remains concentrated, and is likely to increase, in the insurgency-affected provinces in the south and west. No major change is expected in Helmand province, which accounted for over half of Afghan production last year. While, on a positive note, 12 provinces are expected to remain free of opium cultivation this year, Afghanistan is emerging as one of the largest suppliers of cannabis in the world, with an estimated 70,000 hectares of cannabis crops cultivated in 2007.[314]

Recommendation 30

The Government of Canada should use prudent and measured diplomacy to hold the Afghanistan government to its anti-corruption commitments under the Afghanistan Compact. The Government of Canada should support a coordinated approach to anti-corruption measures and in particular should work with the Government of Afghanistan and its international partners to ensure that the senior appointments panel is functioning effectively as a key part of preventing corruption within the institutions of governance.

Recommendation 31

The Government of Canada should work with the Government of Afghanistan and international partners to reform counter-narcotics policies so that effective and coherent counter-narcotics strategies can be adopted. All feasible measures should be examined in that regard.

Support for Accountable Governance, Multiparty Democracy, Elections, and Effective Legislative Institutions

Building an effective, more democratic state in Afghanistan will be a long, difficult process, one in which, rather than the imposition of any Western “models”, local characteristics in conformity with both Afghanistan’s Islamic constitution and its international human rights obligations must be respected. In the Committee’s July 2007 report on Canadian assistance to international democratic development, we noted how Elections Canada supported the electoral processes of 2004 (presidential) and 2005 (parliamentary) and how other Canadian expertise in this field has been deployed in Afghanistan. A Canadian role in additional democratic development activities in Afghanistan was suggested to the Committee by several witnesses. At the same time, our report stated that “much greater knowledge of the highly varied circumstances in Afghanistan is essential for a long-term democratic development program for that country to have a chance to succeed.”[315] If anything, events since then have reinforced that view.

At the time of the Bonn Agreement of December 2001, the mood was one of buoyant optimism, with the preamble to it ambitiously calling for “the establishment of a broad-based, gender sensitive, multi-ethnic, and fully representative government”.[316] The “Timelines and Benchmarks” appended to the 2006 Afghanistan Compact (see Appendix II) address governance and participation but do not make any specific reference to democratic goals as such. Clearly, notwithstanding the holding of the first democratic elections in decades, democracy-building in Afghanistan remains a work in progress.

By way of brief background, Afghanistan’s 2004 constitution instituted a form of presidential system in which voting for the president (along with two vice-presidential candidates as part of the “ticket”) is by direct popular vote for a five-year term. No president can serve more than two terms. The bicameral national legislature is divided into an elected lower chamber (also five-year terms), the 249-seat Wolesi Jirga (House of People) and the partly-elected, partly-appointed upper chamber the Meshrano Jirga (House of Elders). The Wolesi Jirga reserves ten seats for the ‘kuchi’ (nomad) population (three of which must be held by women), and requires that two female candidates be elected from each of the country’s 34 provinces in order to give women overall about 25% of the seats. The president appoints one-third of the members of the Meshrano Jirga (half of these must be women); the others are to be selected, one-third by elected provincial councils, and the final third by about 400 district councils (although elections to the latter have been postponed).[317] As of April 2008, female representation was 27.7% in the lower house (67 of 242 sitting members) and 21.6% of the upper house (22 of 102 members).[318]

Adding to the complexity of the system, and seen by a number of analysts as problematic, is the fact that the parliamentary electoral process is conducted using the complicated little-known and little-used proportional representation system known as the Single Non-Transferable Vote (SNTV). It appears that the choice of SNTV was at least in part motivated as a means to inhibit the formation of political parties, but it is hard for the average person, much less an illiterate majority, to understand it and has resulted in some perverse effects. This is only one of the questions that surround legislative development in Afghanistan.[319] Another is the parliament’s ability to provide to provide proper oversight of public expenditures. Indeed this aspect of accountable governance affects Afghan government as a whole, since, as Nipa Banerjee stated to the Committee – “A government’s primary accountability is to its people. Both overdependence and long-term dependence of a government on aid transfers the government’s accountability from its citizens to the donor community.”[320]

With respect to parliamentary development, in additional to some bilateral donor support, there are multilateral initiatives such as the United Nations Development Program’s Support to the Establishment of the Afghan Legislature (SEAL) which started working in 2005.[321] After decades of dictatorship and war, these have had to start from a very low base. Efforts are also underway to provide support for women parliamentarians, although again, there is a long road ahead. Surendrini Wijeyaratne told the Committee that “the women in Parliament do face more challenges and that there is a need to further support them. There is a lot of intimidation, a lot of harassment for all of them to do their jobs. There does need to be much more support so that these women, after having gone to Parliament, are able to actually do their jobs in Parliament.”[322]

Also looking ahead, witnesses told the Committee that the time is now to start preparing in earnest for the next electoral cycle in 2009 (presidential in September) and 2010 (legislative). Indeed UN Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon stated in his most recent report on Afghanistan to the Security Council that: “Preparations must begin immediately on voter registration and planning for the next elections. This requires decisions by the Afghan authorities on electoral dates and the adoption of electoral legislation. The international community will need to begin mobilizing funds to support these vital processes, especially that for voter registration, which must start in the summer of 2008 in order for elections to be held in 2009.”[323]

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The comments on this subject by Hon. John Manley, Chair of the Independent Panel on Canada’s Future Role in Afghanistan, also deserve citing in full:

… I want to underscore the importance of the upcoming election, in part because one of the things we’re trying to instil is democratic institutions, but also because the past elections are a benchmark for how these elections will be run. By every measure, I think they were remarkably successful, given the state of affairs at the time; they will be a reference point for the 2009 elections, which I think a lot of people hope will combine both presidential and parliamentary elections. If they don’t go well, it’s going to be a serious problem, not just for Afghanistan, but also for the international community. So it’s right that these should be focused on.

Canada actually has some history of involving ourselves with those. Elections Canada was very involved with the last round of elections. Therefore, we ought to be heavily engaged, whether it’s through UN agencies or the OSCE, or wherever that coordination comes from. This is one of the things that we do quite well and should be contributing to.[324]

Other witnesses also pointed to the upcoming elections process and Canada’s role in supporting that. Grant Kippen, who most recently monitored Pakistan’s February 2008 elections, and who was Chairman of Afghanistan’s Electoral Complaints Commission for the 2005 parliamentary and provincial council elections[325], told the Committee that: “One election does not a democracy make. We have to stay for the longer term. We have to facilitate that understanding, education, and build up the capacity. I think there are a lot of expectations from the international communities about what they would like to see Afghans do in terms of their own governance, etc., but I think we’ve been woefully inadequate in providing the skills and the knowledge and the capacity to make that happen.”[326] He added that “there’s a tremendous opportunity for Canadian parliamentarians and the Government of Canada to develop professional working relationships with the new parliamentarians, both at the national assembly and at the provincial assemblies, particularly in Beluchistan, which borders, as everyone knows, on Kandahar province. I think the time is short and I think the opportunity needs to be grasped very quickly in order to do that.”[327]

Elections by themselves are not enough without follow through in developing and sustaining effective legislative governance institutions, and that links back to the broader prospects for enhancing the legitimacy and stability of the state. As Marc André Boivin explained to the Committee: “The presidential and legislative elections in 2004 and 2005 were clearly a great success. Among peace consolidation specialists, the consensus is that the second and third elections are the decisive ones. In addition to the symbolic success of holding elections, patience is required in establishing structures and institutions that can support a political system that excludes violence as a means to an end.”[328]

As well, Derek Burney introduced a note of practical realism and caution when he told the committee that “sometimes when you sow the seeds of democracy, you don’t get a pristine verdict from the electorate. There may be many reasons why some of these people are elected by their local people, but it’s very difficult for the international community to go in and impose a standard of democracy that suits our interests, as opposed to what they see as being in their interest.”[329]

In sum, the Committee heard that more could be done to accompany Afghans in their journey towards realizing the goals of free and fair elections, multiparty democracy, effective legislative institutions, and accountable democratic governance overall. But we cannot presume to know what is best for them. This is a learning process on all sides and one that must be continued over the long term.

Recommendation 32

The Government of Canada should examine ways to increase its support for the development of both the national legislature of Afghanistan and elected subnational governance institutions, building on lessons learned from work that has already taken place in this regard. This should include additional support tailored to the needs of women parliamentarians. Furthermore, Canadian assistance to legislative and other aspects of democratic development must ensure that this is a sustainable Afghan-led process that respects Afghan priorities and strengthens Afghan capacities for democratic representation and oversight. At the same time, Canada should help Afghanistan to build its democracy in a way that fulfills Afghanistan’s international human rights obligations.

Recommendation 33

The Government of Canada should immediately examine how best to provide support for Afghanistan’s next democratic elections in 2009-2010 in coordination with the relevant Afghan authorities and international partners. The Government of Canada should also foster professional working relationships between Canadian parliamentarians and Afghan legislators at the national, provincial and local levels.

The Future Role of Canada’s Strategic Advisory Team-Afghanistan (SAT-A)

One of the most innovative components of Canada’s support to good governance has been “Operation Argus”, instituted by the Canadian Forces in the summer of 2005 and comprising a team – know as the Strategic Advisory Team-Afghanistan or SAT-A – of about 15 military (out of uniform) and civilian members based in Kabul in order “to help the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan develop key national strategies, and mechanisms for the effective implementation of those strategies.”[330] According to official Canadian government information, the SAT-A includes: “a small command and support element, two teams of strategic planners, a defence analyst, a strategic communications advisor, and a development expert. … [It] cooperates closely with Canada’s Ambassador Arif Lalani and Head of Aid George Saible at the Canadian Embassy, and a senior representative of the Afghan government, to provide direct planning support to government ministries and working groups responsible for development and governance. To date, the SAT‑A has worked extensively with the Afghan government’s Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development, and with working groups on national development strategy, public administration reform, and gender equity policy in the Afghan Civil Service. The members of SAT‑A planning teams bring a wide range of training, education, experience and strategic planning skills (both civilian and military) to bear on complex civil problems. They embed with Afghan government ministries and agencies and work under Afghan direction to help Afghan government officials integrate the substantive ideas of international experts and their own national leadership into cohesive strategic plans.”[331]

As the SAT-A’s first commander Colonel Mike Capstick, now retired from the Forces, told the Committee in March 2008, SAT-A members were involved in the intense effort to produce the Afghanistan Compact and the interim Afghanistan National Development Strategy (IANDS) in time for their approval by the London Conference in early 2006 which he attended.[332] One of our witnesses, Professor Robert Jackson, was very positive about the role that the SAT-A as constituted has played in providing appropriate support to the Afghan government. As he explained the context and nature of the role to the Committee:

There will never be success in Afghanistan until a strong and capable government is set up in Kabul. Of course eradicating the poppy fields, building a few roads, educating more people, and fighting the Taliban are important, but they will never be successful if the democratic institutions and state bureaucracy are not powerful enough to counter the fragmentation caused by powerful warlords.

Canada’s Strategic Advisory Team has been helping with this vital task, and the government, in my opinion, should put more funds and more people into this effort. Canada’s armed bureaucrats punch above their weight in Afghanistan. They are only 16 officers in number, but their influence in Kabul is impressive. Recently they have been embedded in the departments of education, justice, public service reform, transportation and aviation, and rural rehabilitation and development, and the office of the special economic adviser to the President. They are obviously not included in the department of defence, as their work is not in the security field. This small group consists of dedicated planners and strategic analysts who are bringing their skills to the Government of Afghanistan. They work to bolster the capacity of the government to receive and spend the funds they have and to develop coherent public policies from the centre. When I was there, Afghan government officials, ministers and otherwise, unanimously told me that SAT is doing necessary and excellent work and should be continued.[333]

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However another witness, Paul Heinbecker, a former Canadian ambassador to the United Nations, questioned whether the SAT-A should be run as a Canadian Forces operation. He argued to the Committee that “SAT is a very good idea, but if there were ever a case for a whole-of-government approach to something, this would be it. It’s not perfectly obvious to me why this should be done by military planners, especially when the ground rules are that they don’t do military activities. What I would have said on SAT is that there’s been some controversy over how it’s being managed. There’s no reason that operation should not be part of the overall Canadian operation, and it should be run like every other part of the Canadian government.” [334]

While he did not address the issue of the planners being serving members of the Canadian Forces operating under Operation Argus, Professor Jackson disagreed on the following grounds: “These SAT people work for Afghan ministers. Let’s assume an American diplomat was on secondment in the Department of Foreign Affairs here in Ottawa. Would we want that person to report back to Washington, or would we want him to report to his minister here in Ottawa? Of course we’d want him to report to his minister in Ottawa. The whole point about this staff is that they need to work for what the Afghan ministers want them to do, and not for what Canada wants them to do.”[335]

The Committee heard from witnesses that the important work of the SAT-A should be continued, and that it should be enhanced as warranted by circumstances, on a basis that is mutually satisfactory to the governments of Canada and Afghanistan. Appropriate reporting relationships should be reviewed as part of developing and finalizing the comprehensive Canadian public strategy for Afghanistan that we recommended in the Introduction.

Recommendation 34

The strengthening and extension of the mission of the Strategic Advisory Team-Afghanistan in Kabul should be reviewed by the Special Committee on the Canadian Mission in Afghanistan. On the basis of this Committee’s recommendations, the Government of Canada should consider whether or not to enhance the Advisory Team’s mission and strengthen the Team through the addition of more civilian members. Subsequently, and in consultation with the Government of Afghanistan, appropriate reporting relationships should be reviewed as part of developing and finalizing the comprehensive Canadian public strategy for Afghanistan called for in Recommendation 1.

Achieving Canadian and International Coordination of Assistance to Good Governance in Afghanistan

Inadequate coordination of assistance to Afghanistan, both military and non-military, and both at the domestic and international levels was a problem repeatedly raised by witnesses before the Committee. As Professor Douglas Bland, Chair in Defence Management Studies in the Queen’s University School of Public Policy Studies, told the Committee: “We can have slogans like three Ds, and that’s all they are – slogans. We need the other slogan, ’whole of government approach,”‘which some of us have talked about for a long time, to bring the efforts of … all the parts of the government together so they work in a coherent way under a strategy. … We haven’t adjusted the Canadian bureaucracy to the steady piece of the commitments to NATO and UN peacekeeping. … So we need to think about how we are going to handle that politically, bureaucratically, and with all the instruments of government.”[336]

The need for a better system within Canada was also underlined in the January 2008 Report of the Independent Panel on Canada’s Future Role in Afghanistan, and has resulted in some Canadian “whole-of-government” measures being implemented in terms of the Afghanistan Task Force within the Privy Council Office and the creation of the Cabinet Committee on Afghanistan. Parliament has also moved forward with the creation of the Special House Committee on Afghanistan according to the terms of the motion passed by the House of Commons on 13 March (see Appendix 1).

The Committee is encouraged by these developments and believes that these will strengthen the elaboration of a comprehensive Canadian public strategy for Afghanistan that includes regular reporting to Parliament and better communication with Canadians on goals and progress towards results.

 In the area of governance, Nipa Banerjee told the Committee that: “The international community’s response to institution building is totally uncoordinated. Despite the rhetoric of coordination by addressing the Afghanistan Compact benchmarks, it is quite clear that the international community has no shared vision, much less a common strategy.”[337] Yet as clearly observed in a report on the situation in Afghanistan released the same day in March by UN Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon to the Security Council, that is precisely what is needed, now more than ever. To cite the report:

To meet the security challenge and stabilize Afghanistan, a common approach is needed that integrates security, governance, rule of law, human rights and social and economic development. The partnership between the Government, ISAF, the United Nations and the international community remains essential to this approach, which must also be aimed at implementing, under Afghan Government leadership, the shared vision of the Compact, with parliamentary, civil society and private sector support.[338]

Canada should do all it can internationally to promote the common approach advocated by the UN Secretary General. Domestically, there are also still further measures that should be considered. Col. (ret.) Mike Capstick welcomed the PCO Afghanistan Task Force, the Cabinet Committee on Afghanistan, and the Special House of Commons Committee on Afghanistan, He also made several suggestions to the Committee in this regard which he has subsequently raised in the April 2008 issue of Policy Options. As the former commander of Canada’s SAT-A in Kabul told the Committee:

These positive steps must now be supported by the development of a comprehensive public strategy that defines Canadian objectives in Afghanistan—the ends; specifies the organizations, methods, priorities, and benchmarks required to achieve these ends—the ways; and quantifies the necessary commitment of human and financial resources—the means. This strategy must accord with the compact and serve as the authoritative guidance for Canada's “whole of government” effort. It would permit you as parliamentarians to monitor progress and at the same time fully inform Canadians of our goals in Afghanistan and our plan for achieving them. Taken together, the new cabinet committee, the task force, the special parliamentary committee, and a public Afghan strategy can only improve our national strategic coherence.[339]

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Colonel Capstick made an important point to the Committee about the need to improve domestic Canadian government coordination. [340] More specifically, he proposed a new position to oversee the implementation of such a comprehensive, coherent and coordinated Afghanistan strategy. As he argued before the Committee: “Despite the strong diplomatic skills of our foreign service officers, the leadership and management of a complex, multi-dimensional operation such as the Afghan mission is simply not a core competency of Canada's ambassadors, nor is it an appropriate role for senior military commanders. To overcome this, the Prime Minister should appoint a prominent and experienced Canadian as a special envoy. This envoy should have the authority to act as the head of Canada' s “country team” in Afghanistan and a specific mandate to ensure that Canada' s Afghan strategy is coordinated. Reporting to the PM, the envoy should be supported by a strategic coordination team of approximately four people. They should have experience in Afghanistan and expertise in security, governance, and development, as well as proven planning and coordination skills at the strategic level. To ensure their independence from the natural bureaucratic pressures that would certainly affect their judgments, the members of this team must not be serving soldiers or public servants. This team would advise the prime minister's envoy, review all projects and activities, ensure strategic coherence, and act as the envoy's eyes and ears throughout the country.”[341]

Recommendation 35

The Government of Canada should increase its efforts towards achieving the improved coordination of Canadian government efforts in Afghanistan linked to the implementation of a comprehensive public strategy. In that context, the Government  of Canada could consider appointing an experienced Canadian coordinator for Afghanistan. Furthermore, the Government’s approach must be field tested and coordinated with those of Afghan authorities. At the broadest strategic level, the Government should use all diplomatic means to push for the improved international-Afghan coordination that will be required to meet the commitments which all parties have made under the terms of the Afghanistan Compact.

Notes to Part III