FAAE Committee Report

This is not a time for finger pointing or scaling down commitments. Neither Western publics nor the Afghan people have boundless patience; their support will disappear if the drift is not halted quickly. Other than rhetorically, the international community has aimed too low in Afghanistan, pandering to patronage networks rather than respecting the wishes of ordinary Afghan men and women for accountability and more inclusive peacebuilding. While addressing their own shortcomings, the internationals must also hold the Kabul government accountable for its failings.

International Crisis Group,
“Afghanistan: The Need for International Resolve”,
Asia Report No. 145, February 6, 2008, p. ii.

While much has been accomplished since 2001, more remains to be done as we move from “Compact to Impact”. … When empowered with appropriate tools, skills, political support, and respect for human rights, the Afghan people—facilitated by their Government and international partners—will be the key to comprehensive recovery and a durable peace.

Islamic Republic of Afghanistan,
Afghanistan National Development Strategy (2008-2013)
Kabul, April 2008, pp. vi and 1.

Afghanistan is Canada’s top international priority and its costliest overseas military and civilian mission since the war in Korea over a half century ago. More than 80 members of the Canadian armed forces and a senior diplomat have lost their lives.

In order to meet the shared goals, benchmarks and timelines set out in the multilateral Afghanistan Compact of 2006, more Canadian engagement may be necessary over the long term in diplomatic, developmental and democratic governance efforts, including in regard to the achievement of sustainable security-sector and rule of law institutions (army, police, border controls, courts, prisons, etc.).

The Committee’s report concentrates on Canada’s contribution to the integrally linked three main pillars of the Compact: security and sustainable peace; reconstruction and long-term development; good governance, the rule of law, human rights and democratic institutions. We have heard evidence of progress being made, albeit more in some areas than in others.

While that is encouraging, the Committee also agrees with the many witnesses it heard from, the 22 January 2008 report of the Independent Panel on Canada’s Future Role in Afghanistan, and the 13 March House of Commons Motion, that the status quo will not suffice. Indeed, as Hon. John Manley bluntly told the Committee, “the status quo is going poorly. The commitment is inadequate. Afghanistan could be lost.[342] Improvements are needed and to that end the Committee has made 35 recommendations to the Government.

In the Committee’s view, a combination of realism and resolve is required to effect improvements that benefit ordinary Afghans. That does not mean minimizing the progress made to date or looking for early exits. It does mean facing up to the multi-faceted challenge that remains. Internationally, Canadian General Raymond Henault, Chairman of NATO’s Military Committee and a former Canadian Chief of Defence Staff, put both aspects well when he stated recently:

We are making progress in Afghanistan; there is absolutely no doubt of it. … It’s slow progress. This is not a military mission alone. We’re never going to achieve success with just military forces on the ground. … It’s not going to work until we get the right overall commitment by the international community on the civil side.[343]

What is needed is a comprehensive “big picture” view that aims for a stable democratic Afghanistan at peace with itself and its neighbors. But General Henault added that still on the military side, “the political level has not been able to agree on this comprehensive approach or even to give us the political elements of an effects-based approach – and that’s because of political differences [among allied governments]”.[344] Vigorous continued diplomacy will be required to overcome this weak point among troop-contributing countries and international donors to Afghanistan.

Inside Afghanistan, the legacy of so much war and destruction must also be overcome. And this will take time and patience. As a recent study of international intervention in conflict states concludes: “An extended donor presence … provides the space for the creation, sustenance, and maturation of institutions that are finally able to undergird the state from rolling back into state failure or donor exit.”[345]

Moreover, Afghanistan remains among the most difficult cases confronting the international community. The compound index in a new survey of state weakness in developing countries ranks Afghanistan behind only Somalia, and its score of zero on both the “security” and “social welfare” indicators is the worst among the 141 countries examined.[346]

As well, repairing so much damage entails an approach to conflict resolution and development for Afghans that goes much beyond counter-insurgency. As Nick Grono of the International Crisis Group summarized the situation of Afghanistan in April 2008:

The decades of conflict have damaged the country’s social fabric, undermining state and traditional resolution mechanisms. Without the institutions to tackle grievances the result is chronic local conflicts – not all, or even most of it directly linked to the insurgency itself. In fact, a recent, nationwide survey by Oxfam, following on from our own 2003 work on peacebuilding, found that the leading cause of conflict in Afghanistan was not the insurgency, but water, land and tribal disputes, in that order. (…) When it comes to tackling the pervasive insecurity in Afghanistan, the Karzai government and the international community need to hold their nerve and focus on institution building rather than quick fixes. In particular this must be those institutions central to the rule of law and driving service delivery. … by building such institutions we undercut Taliban legitimacy and their recruitment and support base.^[347]

The Committee agrees that making progress on security, development, and governance in Afghanistan is an interlinked process. We are convinced that Canada is capable of rising to the multi-dimensional challenges of this mission by pursuing a comprehensive public strategy for Afghanistan and by making appropriate improvements in our approach while adapting to changing circumstances as necessary. As long as Afghans need our help, we must not shrink from that responsibility.

Moreover, Canada is in a position to exercise leadership in international efforts to assist Afghanistan. As our ambassador to Afghanistan Arif Lalani told the Special Committee on the Canadian Mission in Afghanistan on May 28, “Afghanistan is a place where we are actually one of the leaders. One of the implications of that is that it’s not easy, and as Canadians we need to come to terms with that too. Leadership means that sometimes we do things that are tough and difficult, and I think we are doing that in Afghanistan.”[348]

In that spirit, the Committee’s report recommends ways that we believe can strengthen Canada’s contribution to Afghanistan’s long-term peace and security, development, and democratic governance. None of this will come easily. But we are confident that Canadians are up to the task.

Notes to Conclusion