SRID Committee Meeting

37th PARLIAMENT, 2nd SESSION

Subcommittee on Human Rights and International Development of the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade

EVIDENCE

CONTENTS

Tuesday, March 25, 2003

¹

1555

The Chair (Mr. Irwin Cotler (Mount Royal, Lib.))

Mr. John Schram (Canadian High Commissioner in Zimbabwe, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade)

Mr. John Schram

The Chair

Mr. John McNee (Assistant Deputy Minister, Africa and Middle East, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade)

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1600

The Chair

Mr. John Schram

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1605

º

1610

The Chair

Mr. Ernest Loevinsohn (Director General, Program against Hunger, Malnutrition and Disease, Canadian International Development Agency)

º

1615

The Chair

Mr. Michel Lemelin (Regional Director, Southern Africa Program, Africa and Middle East Branch, Canadian International Development Agency)

º

1625

The Chair

Mr. Deepak Obhrai (Calgary East, Canadian Alliance)

Mr. Keith Martin (Esquimalt—Juan de Fuca, Canadian Alliance)

Mr. John McNee

º

1630

Mr. Keith Martin

Mr. John McNee

Mr. Ernest Loevinsohn

The Chair

Mr. Yves Rocheleau (Trois-Rivières, BQ)

º

1635

M. John McNee

Mr. John Schram

º

1640

The Chair

Mrs. Karen Kraft Sloan (York North, Lib.)

The Chair

Ms. Colleen Beaumier (Brampton West—Mississauga, Lib.)

Mr. John McNee

Mr. Michel Lemelin

Ms. Colleen Beaumier

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1645

Mr. John McNee

Ms. Colleen Beaumier

Mr. Michel Lemelin

Ms. Colleen Beaumier

Mr. Michel Lemelin

Ms. Colleen Beaumier

The Chair

Mr. Svend Robinson (Burnaby—Douglas, NDP)

º

1650

The Chair

Mr. John McNee

Mr. John Schram

The Chair

Ms. Beth Phinney (Hamilton Mountain, Lib.)

Mr. Michel Lemelin

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1655

Ms. Beth Phinney

The Chair

Ms. Beth Phinney

Mr. Michel Lemelin

Ms. Beth Phinney

Mr. Michel Lemelin

Ms. Beth Phinney

Mr. Michel Lemelin

Ms. Beth Phinney

Mr. Michel Lemelin

Ms. Beth Phinney

Mr. Michel Lemelin

Ms. Beth Phinney

Mr. Michel Lemelin

Ms. Beth Phinney

Mr. Michel Lemelin

Ms. Beth Phinney

Mr. Michel Lemelin

Ms. Beth Phinney

Mr. John McNee

Ms. Beth Phinney

Mr. John McNee

Mr. Ernest Loevinsohn

Ms. Beth Phinney

Mr. Ernest Loevinsohn

Ms. Beth Phinney

The Chair

Mr. Bill Casey (Cumberland—Colchester, PC)

Mr. John Schram

»

1700

Mr. Bill Casey

Mr. John Schram

Mr. Bill Casey

Mr. John Schram

Mr. Bill Casey

Mr. John Schram

Mr. Bill Casey

Mr. John Schram

Mr. Bill Casey

Mr. John Schram

Mr. Bill Casey

Mr. John Schram

Mr. Bill Casey

Mr. Ernest Loevinsohn

Mr. Bill Casey

Mr. Ernest Loevinsohn

The Chair

Mr. Bill Casey

The Chair

Mrs. Karen Kraft Sloan

»

1705

Mr. John McNee

Mrs. Karen Kraft Sloan

Mr. Michel Lemelin

Mrs. Karen Kraft Sloan

Mr. John McNee

Mrs. Karen Kraft Sloan

The Chair

»

1710

Mr. Alex Neve (Secretary General, English Section, Amnesty International (Canada))

»

1715

»

1720

The Chair

Mr. Alex Neve

The Chair

Mr. A. John Watson (President, CARE Canada)

»

1725

»

1730

The Chair

Mr. Yves Rocheleau

»

1735

Mr. Alex Neve

The Chair

Mr. John Watson

The Chair

Mr. Bill Casey

Mr. Alex Neve

Mr. Bill Casey

Mr. Alex Neve

»

1740

Mr. Bill Casey

Mr. Alex Neve

Mr. Bill Casey

The Chair

Mrs. Karen Kraft Sloan

Mr. John Watson

Mrs. Karen Kraft Sloan

Mr. John Watson

»

1745

Mrs. Karen Kraft Sloan

Mr. John Watson

Mrs. Karen Kraft Sloan

Mr. John Watson

Mrs. Karen Kraft Sloan

Mr. John Watson

Mrs. Karen Kraft Sloan

Mr. John Watson

»

1750

Mrs. Karen Kraft Sloan

The Chair

Mrs. Karen Kraft Sloan

Mr. Alex Neve

Mrs. Karen Kraft Sloan

Mr. Alex Neve

Mrs. Karen Kraft Sloan

The Chair

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CANADA

Subcommittee on Human Rights and International Development of the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade

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NUMBER 003

l

2nd SESSION

l

37th PARLIAMENT

---

EVIDENCE

Tuesday, March 25, 2003

[Recorded by Electronic Apparatus]

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[English]

    The Chair (Mr. Irwin Cotler (Mount Royal, Lib.)): I'd like to welcome you all to the hearing referenced to us, consideration of the urgent matter of the humanitarian catastrophe in African states.

    Over the next three meetings of this committee, we'll be looking at humanitarian and other crises in that context, as follows. Today we'll be focusing on the situation in Zimbabwe. Next week, on April 1, we'll meet together with the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade, whose witness will be Stephen Lewis in the matter of HIV/AIDS in Africa. And on April 8, the Secretary of State for Africa, Denis Paradis, will give us a general political and humanitarian overview.

    That's the sequence and context until the Easter break.

    I regret that the hearing today has been somewhat delayed by a series of votes, including a vote on the budget, which accounted for our late start. But this hearing could not have come at a more timely, if not more urgent, moment. Indeed, I have been receiving, and I suspect members of this committee have been receiving, a series of cris du coeur communiqués, from within and without Zimbabwe, in the last days alone--with the opposition warning of mass action; with the government itself speaking rather ominously, as Mugabe warned the MDC on Friday that those who play with fire will not only be burned but consumed by fire; and with NGOs, both within and without Zimbabwe, warning of an explosive situation. I suspect we'll be hearing more in the testimony today.

    I am therefore pleased with the witnesses who are appearing before us today, including our Canadian High Commissioner in Zimbabwe, Mr. John Schram.

    It's fortuitous that your presence in Canada allows us to hear from you.

    As well, of course, we welcome John McNee, the Assistant Deputy Minister for Africa and the Middle East.

    I'll introduce the CIDA witnesses in due course, but we'll move directly into testimony from Ambassador Schram.

    Mr. John Schram (Canadian High Commissioner in Zimbabwe, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade): Can I move it right back, Mr. Chairman, to my boss? If I were to supersede my boss, I would be fired on the spot.

    Voices: Oh, oh!

    Mr. John Schram: So thank you for the great honour, but it would be short-lived.

    The Chair: I was following the listing or the sequencing of the witnesses as appearing on our agenda for the day.

    Mr. John McNee (Assistant Deputy Minister, Africa and Middle East, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade): Mr. Chair, thank you very much, and thank you for the invitation to come before the committee.

    The Secretary of State for Africa, the Honourable Denis Paradis, spoke to this committee about the situation in Zimbabwe over a year ago. We had hoped that we'd be able to inform you today that the situation in Zimbabwe had improved, but the reality is that the human rights situation has deteriorated steadily over the last few years and remains very poor.

    The Government of Zimbabwe continues to violate the principles of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other international human rights instruments, including the Commonwealth's Harare principles of 1991. To date, the majority of violations of human rights appear to be sponsored, abetted, or condoned by ZANU senior officials and government officials around President Mugabe.

    We are deeply troubled by continuing state-sponsored or state-condoned violence, harassment, and intimidation directed against members of the opposition parties and movements, as well as those suspected of supporting them, including representatives of civil society and the independent media. If anything, the situation has only worsened over the last several years.

    Repressive legislation, much of which was introduced around the flawed presidential election of March 2002, is now used to undermine freedom of opinion, expression, and association in Zimbabwe. The partisan application of these repressive laws has had a significant negative impact on freedom of association and expression.

    The Zimbabwean government's interference in the judiciary, including the intimidation of judges, threatens seriously to undermine its independence. The government has also circumvented unfavourable decisions of the courts and has publicly criticized the judiciary when such rulings are made.

    Canada has spoken out against these violations, and will continue to do so. The government has, as you know, already taken a number of punitive measures against Zimbabwe, including: the revocation of Zimbabwe's visa-free status in December of 2000; the suspension in 2001 of Zimbabwe's eligibility for future transactions with the Export Development Corporation; in 2001, a ban on new CIDA initiatives with the Government of Zimbabwe; in 2001, again, a reconfirmation of the existing policy barring all military sales to Zimbabwe and the suspension of Zimbabwe in participation in Canadian peacekeeping training courses; and on March 14, the Prime Minister announced a set of actions following the flawed election and election campaign in Zimbabwe. The Prime Minister also announced the withdrawal of all funding to the Zimbabwean government, and that members of the present government would not be welcome in Canada.

[Translation]

    In our efforts to improve this situation, Canada has taken its own bilateral actions, but we also strive to multiply their impact through the promotion of consensus in Zimbabwe in multilateral fora, particularly the United Nations, including the UN Commission on Human Rights, and the Commonwealth.

    Last year, Canada also co-sponsored an EU-led resolution on the human rights situation in Zimbabwe at the 58th session of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights in Geneva. The EU resolution, which had incorporated our own input, was regrettably placed on a “no action“ status.

    The Minister has decided to go forward again this year, co-sponsoring with the EU a resolution on the human rights situation in Zimbabwe.

    We have been engaged through the Commonwealth even before the flawed Presidential elections of 2002. As members of the Commonwealth Ministerial Action Group (CMAG), we raised the deterioration of rule of law in Zimbabwe at CMAG meetings, and Canada sent election observers in March 2002.

    That same month, the Prime Minister brokered a compromise within the Commonwealth that saw the creation of a Troika composed of the leaders of Australia, Nigeria and South Africa. The Troika suspended Zimbabwe from the Councils of the Commonwealth for a one year period, pending a review by the Troika of Zimbabwe's progress toward the restoration of good governance and rule of law. With this compromise, a split within the COmmonwealth between countries calling for Zimbabwe's expulsion and those favouring no punitive measures of any kind was averted.

º  (1600)  

[English]

    The Commonwealth Secretary General announced on March 16 that the suspension of Zimbabwe from the councils of the Commonwealth will be kept in place until the heads of government meeting in December 2003. Canada is pleased with this action by the Commonwealth, as we believe the Government of Zimbabwe had done nothing since its suspension to warrant its re-entry into the group's councils.

    In a moment, our High Commissioner will turn to some specific concerns about the current situation in Zimbabwe, but first, Mr. Chair, let me reiterate the government's view. Canada sees the current crisis in Zimbabwe to be one of a lack of good governance, democratic development, and sustainable economic policies. Our response must be targeted and carried out in cooperation with our Commonwealth, African, and other partners, and we must ensure that civil society in Zimbabwe retains the capacity to contribute to the renewal of good governance, the rule of law, and respect for human rights for all in Zimbabwe.

    Thank your, Mr. Chair.

    The Chair: Thank you.

    I understand we will now hear directly from Ambassador Schram.

    Mr. John Schram: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

    May I just make a personal comment about how much it means to guys like me to be included in a hearing like this, how much it means, when you're out there in the field, to know that there are people here who care about what's happening in Zimbabwe.

    As John McNee has just outlined, we view the current human rights situation in Zimbabwe as having a number of related but distinct dimensions. First is the shrinking of democratic space through the enactment of repressive legislation, and I'll come back to that in a minute.

    Second is the escalating misuse of police powers and the use of torture, which we've all been reading about, by Zimbabwe's state security forces or state-sponsored militias against the political opposition or those perceived as critics of the government and its policies.

    Third are the efforts by some local and national ZANU (PF) authorities to use diminishing government food resources as a political lever, in some cases resulting in the denial of food to those suspected of supporting the opposition.

    To go back to my first point, over the past 14 months legislation has been put in place that, in part, through its partisan enforcement by Zimbabwe security forces, severely limits freedom of expression, association, and opinion in Zimbabwe. The most important of these is the Public Order and Security Act, POSA, which was passed in January 2002, and the Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act, passed in March last year.

    POSA grants the police broad powers of arrest and seizure; imposes harsh penalties for the crime of insulting or engendering hostility towards the President; empowers the police to ban meetings for reasons of public order; and requires that police be notified of any gathering of more than four people.

    Most demonstrations or meetings by opposition politicians or civil society groups thus continue to be banned under POSA by the police, and as we've been reading, it's been used in recent weeks to prevent effective campaigning by the opposition MDC in the two upcoming byelections in constituencies near Harare.

    The Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act, AIPPA, severely limits the activities of foreign journalists; requires local journalists to be accredited by a government-controlled commission; and criminalizes the publication of any falsehood in the media. As you can imagine, the latter provision in particular has been used to harass journalists, editors, and publishers of non-government controlled media.

    Over the past three months, we've noticed a troubling escalation of arbitrary arrest, detention, denial of access to legal representation, and other human rights violations directed against members of Parliament, supporters of the MDC, and members of civil society who are perceived to be critics of the government and its policy.

    I'd just outline one or two that we read about in the paper today and yesterday. On January 13, the MDC Mayor of Harare and a number of others were arrested under POSA when they were holding a meeting in fact for Harare ratepayers to talk about water. They were held in difficult circumstances and released later. The High Court decided the arrests were unjustified.

    On January 14, an MDC MP, Job Sikhala, his lawyer, and three others were arrested, and they all say that they were subjected to beatings and electric shock.

    On Valentine's Day and again on International Women's Day, demonstrators, almost all women, and journalists were arrested in Harare and Bulawayo when they attempted to march against violence and on gender issues.

    We've just been reading now that military police and so-called green berets have staged a number of raids on MDC supporters' houses during the night. I haven't been there myself, but stories suggest that there have been beatings associated with those as well.

    Although the Zimbabwean judiciary and the public prosecutor's office have, on occasion, demonstrated remarkable courage in refusing to try accused persons arrested on arbitrary or manufactured grounds, independence of the Zimbabwe legal system has recently been disturbingly challenged.

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    In the summer of 2002, the Minister of Justice just ignored a conviction for contempt of court, and Zimbabwe police refused to enforce the warrant for his arrest. The judge who had convicted him was later arrested after he had retired from the bench. He was held incommunicado, without food, for more than two days.

    Since then, many of you will have read that another judge who had rendered some decisions that were not to the liking of government was also arrested in a similar manner.

    There's evident Canadian interest in ensuring that Zimbabwe's judiciary remains impartial and independent. Nowhere is this better exemplified than in the ongoing treason trial of the three MDC leaders for allegedly plotting to assassinate President Mugabe. I and my colleagues in the High Commission have spent some hours and are continuing to spend some hours in court to monitor this case, in part, of course, because it has a Canadian content, and we're interested in what's said. But more importantly, it's so that people know that we're watching. I must say, thus far the court has acted with encouraging probity.

    The Government of Canada has also responded, to the extent permissible by Canadian law, to all requests for information from the defence team. We have never received a request for information or assistance from the prosecution.

    My colleagues from CIDA will discuss Canadian responses to the current humanitarian crisis. I believe the Zimbabwean government's own policies in this regard have considerable human rights implications. In a period where over half the population is threatened with food insecurity, access to scare food resources and specifically the Zimbabwean government's efforts to maintain its ability to distribute food on a partisan basis have arguably become the most immediate human rights concerns in the country.

    All of these shortcomings suggest a pattern of disregard for Commonwealth and NEPAD goals. I and my colleagues have taken numerous opportunities to raise our concerns about this troubling situation with the government. Interventions on human rights, good governance, and food aid politicization have been made in meetings, even when I presented my letters, with both vice-presidents and a number of government ministers and governors. On several occasions, I understand, they've been raised with the Zimbabwe High Commission here in Canada.

    But we're also backing our words with concrete action through assistance to civil society on the ground, addressing the humanitarian situation, as you will hear from our CIDA colleagues. We also encourage political dialogue, promotion of human rights, and strengthening a transparent, impartial, and accessible legal system through dealing not with the government but with civil society.

    From our vantage point in Harare, we will continue to project a Canadian policy by engaging with civil society in Zimbabwe, continuing to press the Government of Zimbabwe to respect its own constitutional guarantees of civil and political freedoms and the rule of law.

    Thank you, Mr. Chair.

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    The Chair: Thank you, Ambassador.

    We'll now hear from our two CIDA representatives, Michel Lemelin and Ernest Loevinsohn. We'll move afterwards into question period.

    Mr. Ernest Loevinsohn (Director General, Program against Hunger, Malnutrition and Disease, Canadian International Development Agency): I'm Ernest Loevinsohn, and I'm director general of the Program Against Hunger, Malnutrition and Disease at CIDA.

    As in other countries in southern Africa, Zimbabwe's been hard hit, as you know, this past year--floods, drought, upheaval in the agriculture sector. There have been widespread crop failures; deterioration in the delivery of health and social services, as I'll be mentioning; and an increased reliance on humanitarian assistance by nearly 7 million people. The current humanitarian needs are further exacerbated, as we've heard, by the political situation and underlying poverty, and of course there's the high prevalence rate of HIV, which I'll be getting to, as a key issue.

    Zimbabwe was once the breadbasket of southern Africa and it now faces a food deficit situation. Less than 30% of the arable land has even been planted. The government recently declared a state of emergency in Matabeleland South because of drought during last year's planting season. Crop forecasts for the neighbouring countries look good, but the outlook for Zimbabwe remains bleak.

    In terms of Canada's response, over the past year CIDA has provided over $14.2 million through multilateral and non-governmental channels. Our response included $11 million for food and nutrition through such partners as the Canadian Foodgrains Bank and the United Nations World Food Program. We've also put in a further $3.2 million to support agricultural recovery, health, water, and sanitation.

    Overall, we're the sixth-largest donor to the World Food Program emergency operation in Zimbabwe, which is far higher than our overall rank as an aid donor.

    Since June 2002 the World Food Program has received pledges to cover 84% of the total food needs, and it's currently feeding about 4.7 million people. So the international response has been good.

    The food aid pipelines, in addition to WFP, also include CARE, Save the Children, and the Canadian Foodgrains Bank.

    On the other hand, the impact of drought on the health sector is not being given the same international response. The health sector is a key issue in famine and drought situations everywhere, but especially in Zimbabwe, where political events have resulted in the departure of over 30% of qualified medical staff. Access to services such as immunization have virtually collapsed. The HIV/AIDS epidemic has contributed to further eroding the already fragile health sector.

    In other words, you have a situation where the demand for health is higher because of HIV/AIDS, but the people who would provide such services have either left the country or are suffering from AIDS, in many cases. The UN estimates that close to one-third of the adult population in Zimbabwe is HIV-positive.

    As many of you know, the provision of humanitarian assistance in Zimbabwe has not been easy. The situation in terms of food security has been exacerbated by government policies such as price controls, misguided agriculture and land reform policies, and corruption. As a result of the so-called fast-track land reform process, more than one million farm workers have been left without a source of employment income.

    Our distinguished High Commissioner has alluded to the allegations of food aid being diverted or disrupted in districts known to be opposed to the government. Government food in Zimbabwe is distributed through the grain marketing board depots across the country and it's provided to people based on eligibility criteria that are filtered through political channels. I'd like to emphasize that no Canadian food, and in general, no donor food, is delivered through these government channels.

    To a much more limited extent, ruling party supporters have tried to manipulate donor-funded distributions through the UN World Food Program and non-governmental organizations. In all reported cases, these efforts have been identified promptly and acted upon by the World Food Program and its implementing organizations.

    CIDA and our donor colleagues in Zimbabwe remain concerned about the situation and will continue to monitor World Food Program delivery closely to ensure that it continues to reach those most in need. Over the next month, we expect to receive the official crop forecast as well as nutritional survey data. That should position us to determine humanitarian assistance needs for the coming year.

    Due to the unpredictability of the Zimbabwe government, the past year's humanitarian response has been largely ad hoc. Donors are increasingly looking forward toward a more coordinated approach to the upcoming agricultural season. Our colleague High Commissioner Schram and his colleagues in Harare are actively engaged with other donors to improve coordination. This is especially important in terms of emergency response to the health sector crisis, including HIV/AIDS, which of course will remain a broader issue beyond the scope of emergency programming.

    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

º  (1615)  

    The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Loevinsohn.

    Michel Lemelin.

    Mr. Michel Lemelin (Regional Director, Southern Africa Program, Africa and Middle East Branch, Canadian International Development Agency): Thank you for inviting me to appear in front of this committee to discuss how continued development programming is possible and necessary in Zimbabwe given the difficult circumstances just described by my colleagues from DFAIT and from CIDA.

    Canada has had a development program in Zimbabwe since 1961. In recent years the CIDA program in Zimbabwe has been working in the following main areas--HIV/AIDS, the environment, human rights, democracy, and good governance.

    Since 1998 we have also gradually oriented our programming away from the government and towards support to civil society organizations. This shift was predicated on the recognized capacity of this group to play an increasingly effective role in the development of their country. Compared to most other countries in the region, Zimbabwe has a well-developed civil society with a solid human resource capacity.

    As you know, the Government of Canada, in response to the declining rule of law, decided in May 2001 that CIDA would not undertake any new initiatives with departments of the Government of Zimbabwe.

    In March 2002, Prime Minister Jean Chrétien issued a statement following the flawed presidential election, announcing that Canada had withdrawn all funding directly to the Government of Zimbabwe. While these measures resulted in the closing or suspension of a number of projects, we have been able to maintain a significant bilateral program of direct benefit to the people of Zimbabwe through civil society, without channelling Canadian assistance through the Government of Zimbabwe.

    I believe you will agree that these measures announced by the Government of Canada were intended to promote improved governance and respect for human rights in Zimbabwe, not to hurt the people of Zimbabwe. In response to the ongoing crisis, it is essential that Canada continue to support the people of Zimbabwe, who are the unwilling victims of the current regime.

    In the current circumstances, the most appropriate and effective way to reach these people is through transparent and accountable Zimbabwean civil society partners, international NGOs and UN agencies. For example, Zimbabwean civil society has stepped in to deliver basic services to the Zimbabwean people in sectors such as health and education, as the role previously played by the government has declined.

    More than ever, civil society organizations need our continued support to maintain the pressure for social change and to attempt to hold the government accountable for its actions.

    This strategy proved successful during the apartheid era in South Africa, where Canada supports to civil society helped preserve the citizens' voices and to prepare the way for a democratic transition. We believe it can also work in Zimbabwe.

    Civil society organizations in Zimbabwe have managed to raise public awareness on key issues and provided a voice to Zimbabwean people, despite increasingly repressive measures and harassment imposed by the government. Their continuing success is due, in large part, to support from donors like CIDA.

[Translation]

    The current CIDA bilateral program in Zimbabwe is comprised of six operational projects. Four of these projects are responsive funds, through which civil society organizations can apply to receive financial support for their own initiatives: one focussing on gender equality; one on environment and food security; one on human rights, democracy and good governance; and the Canada Fund for Local Initiatives, better known as the little embassy fund.

    These funds are managed from the field by locally-hired fund managers working under the supervision of CIDA officials based in the Canadian mission in Harare. These funds are currently supporting over 100 non-government and community-based groups in Zimbabwe. Some of the results achieved through these responsive funds include:

    Environment Responsive Fund: through its support for the Mupfure Biosand Water Filter Project, CIDA is contributing to the improvement of the health of at least 25 families by providing means to locally develop and maintain clean household water supplies through water purification filters. Target beneficiaries for training in construction and use are disadvantaged groups such as women and school leavers. Immediate effects have included the reduction of diarrhea rates among filter users and reports at local clinics of a sharp decline in water borne diseases.

    Through its Gender Equality Support Project, CIDA is providing support to Veritas Trust to conduct action-oriented research aimed at identifying the gaps in gender sensitive reporting by various organizations on political violence. The results will be presented to and discussed with the stakeholders in a workshop. The sub-project seeks to develop the capacity in Veritas Trust and partner organizations to report comprehensively on and lobby for increased gender sensitivity to political violence victims. It plans to develop a reporting framework that will capture gender-differentiated data and thereby increase partners' capacity to lobby on gender and political violence issues within their respective constituencies.

    In connection with rights, democracy and governance, despite ongoing intimidation and repressive measures, CIDA's support to the Zimbabwe Electoral Support Network enabled it to develop a voter education program which resulted in increased awareness of voter registration procedures, the importance of voting, and the importance of tolerance and peaceful elections. The campaign included inserts and ads in newspapers over six months and distribution of 5,000,000 flyers, 500,000 pamphlets, 3,000 voter election guides, 500,000 posters, 2,000 t-shirts and 500,000 calenders. This was supplemented by 101 public meetings and 101 radio programs. There are some other examples given in the text, but I have skipped them to limit the length of my presentation.

    In addition to these four responsive funds, we also have a project with a local organization, the Legal Resources Foundation, to provide legal; assistance and rights education to disadvantaged Zimbabweans. This is related to the initiative mentioned by our DFAIT colleague, through which we are supporting a linkage between Canadian and Zimbabwean lawyers regarding test case litigation. We are also involved in a project with CARE Canada to strengthen a network of agri-business traders.

    Zimbabwe is also home to the regional offices of a number of CIDA-funded regional programs in southern Africa including HIV-AIDS programs such as the Canadian Public Health Association(CPHA) SAT III program, the IUCN Wetlands Management Program and the Agroforestry program managed by ICRAF, the International Centre for Research in Agroforestry.

    As well, there are more than 20 Canadian non-governmental organizations active in Zimbabwe which benefit from funding provided by CIDA's Canadian Partnership Branch.

    CIDA is closely monitoring its program in Zimbabwe through the Aid Section of the Canadian High Commission, where we have two Canadians and two locally-engaged professionals, and the Program Support Unit, which is almost entirely staffed by locally-hired professionals or support staff. CIDA employees are also involved on a daily basis in following up on various Canadian food and humanitarian assistance activities in Zimbabwe.

    Because of the rapid social and economic decline in the country, we assess on a continuing basis the effectiveness of our ongoing support for civil society, as well as opportunities for enhanced programming with civil society during this interim period in Zimbabwe's history.

    The current situation notwithstanding, we believe enhanced programming is possible and we are in the process of developing new projects with Zimbabwean and Canadian civil society organizations. One of these will address problems relating to HIV-AIDS, in particular the prevention of mother-to-child- transmission. Another, addressing the legal environment, will be carried out in conjunction with the Canadian Bar Association, and will provide training and support for litigation procedures. A third will involve the rehabilitation of community sources of potable water.

º  (1625)  

[English]

    In closing, I would like to remind you that by maintaining a development presence in Zimbabwe through programming with civil society, Canada is in a better position to address the current human rights and humanitarian crisis, including the HIV/AIDS pandemic, and to help prepare Zimbabwe and civil society for an inevitable turnaround of the political situation. However, CIDA firmly believes the key to future prosperity and well-being in Zimbabwe lies in a fundamental change that will make possible the reform of government and government institutions.

    Thank you.

[Translation]

    The Chair: Thank you, Mr.Lemelin. Now, moving to question period.

    Mr. Deepak Obhrai.

[English]

    Mr. Deepak Obhrai (Calgary East, Canadian Alliance): Mr. Chair, I'll give my time to my colleague, who is actively following the Zimbabwe issue.

    Keith, go ahead. I'll go in the second round, if we have a second round.

    Mr. Keith Martin (Esquimalt—Juan de Fuca, Canadian Alliance): Thank you, Mr. Obhrai.

    Thanks to you all, gentlemen, for being here today, and especially to you, High Commissioner Schram. You're working under exceedingly difficult circumstances. I hope you're careful over there, given what's happening.

    We all know what is happening in Zimbabwe. We know that about half the population is starving to death in a politically motivated famine. Just last Friday, 250 members of the Zwakwana human rights group were admitted into hospital with broken bones. Some of the women were raped with rifle butts...and I will not go into the gruesome details that you're all well acquainted with.

    We're watching, in my view, genocide in slow motion. Our position, I would submit, by working with the multilateral fora, has been an abysmal failure. The Commonwealth is a paper tiger. African leaders, I think fearful of pointing a finger for fear of having fingers pointed back at them, have done, at best, nothing, and at worst, have sided, bizarrely, with Mr. Mugabe.

    The question, in my view, is what do we do now? And I don't believe, in the words of James Morris, there's any negotiating ability with Mr. Mugabe.

    I ask you, would you support a special tribunal to indict Robert Mugabe and his cronies, such as Field Marshall Perence Shiri, responsible for the Matabeleland massacres in the early eighties? Would you support a special tribunal to try them for crimes against humanity?

    My second question is, will you redouble our efforts to call for a multilateral effort to meet the 45% shortfall in food that the Zimbabwean people are enduring right now? As I think Mr. McNee or Mr. Lemelin very articulately mentioned, 35% of the population is HIV-positive, with tuberculosis being rampant. If you piggyback malnutrition on top of that, the mortality rate goes through the roof, creating, I fear, a structural famine in the future as they gut the economic backbone of that country.

    Lastly, would you support a multilateral force under UN auspices to bring law and order back in the country, as alluded to by Mr. Lemelin? At the end of the day, a change in government is the only option, and with Zimbabwe army forces running amok, raping, pillaging, and looting, and murdering and torturing innocent civilians, I fear there is no other option but a strong and forceful involvement by multilateral force under UN auspices to solve this problem.

    Thank you.

    Mr. John McNee: Perhaps I could start, Mr. Chair, and then ask my colleague Ernest to respond to the second question put by Mr. Martin.

    As we have tried to explain, the efforts of the Canadian government have really been in four different areas: one, to meet the immediate humanitarian crisis; two, to find practical, constructive ways to help strengthen and reinforce civil society on the ground, as my CIDA colleagues have described in some detail in terms of those programs; three, to work within the Commonwealth, with our African countries within the Commonwealth and other leaders, to try to find ways to influence developments in Zimbabwe; and four is the declaratory policy, the policy position of the Canadian government.

    I say that by way of background to Dr. Martin's question. Of course, Canada was a leader in the foundation of the International Criminal Court, which doesn't afford us, in this instance, an instrument that would work, given that Zimbabwe is not a signatory to the statute.

º  (1630)  

    Mr. Keith Martin: And the special tribunal, going back to the eighties...?

    Mr. John McNee: I'm getting there.

    It certainly is something we could look at, but as I recited, we're trying to find ways that will have some influence. I'm not sure in the current circumstance whether or not that would be the most effective vehicle, but we'll take that as a representation and get back to you, Dr. Martin.

    With regard to a multilateral force, it depends on a couple of things. One is your analysis of the situation, but also this would have to be mandated by the Security Council under chapter 7. In other words, it would flow from analysis, from a starting point of whether or not there is a threat to international peace and security. I don't think there's any argument from us on the gravity of the human rights situation in Zimbabwe. It is a question of whether or not one could argue that the situation in the country constitutes a threat to the broader international peace and security.

    I'm not persuaded of that right now, but as I say, it would have to be subject to a resolution from the Security Council.

    Ernest.

    Mr. Ernest Loevinsohn: I think Dr. Martin is very right to point out the HIV-TB co-epidemic. It's a huge threat to Zimbabwe right now and to the future of Zimbabwe.

    We of course do support a massive international effort, and we've played a role, as I say, punching above our weight, a higher rank than our overall rank as a donor.

    Generally speaking, the food side, Dr. Martin, has been relatively well attended to; 84% is a pretty good response rate, and WFP does not lowball its estimates. If WFP says that such-and-such an amount is needed, that's their best professional judgment, and they have certainly a lot of effort going into that.

    On the other side, the health sector directly has definitely been undersupported, and of course in the first instance undersupported by the Government of Zimbabwe in both their direct budgetary policies and their other policies, which have driven so many health staff out of the country. Clearly, we the international community do need to do more on that side, and Canada does indeed support a massive international effort to do that.

[Translation]

    The Chair: Mr. Rocheleau of the Bloc Quebecois.

    Mr. Yves Rocheleau (Trois-Rivières, BQ): I have four questions for our witnesses. The first concerns the IMF.

    We know that the IMF imposed a debt restructuring program in the early 1990s. I would like to know your opinion as Canadian representatives on the role of IMF policies and their impact on the economy of Zimbabwe, particularly when a UN study has apparently reported a jump over the past decade of the percentage of Zimbabweans living in poverty from 40% to 75% of the population. That is my first question.

    My second concerns the Movement for Democratic Change. What is Canada's perception of the MDC, which as we know represents the black, capitalist wealthy minority and is supported and financed by British, American and German backing? During the visit to London by MDC leader Tsvangirai, a letter was published in the Times . It expressed support for the MDC and was co-signed by a number of high-ranking Conservatives, including Lord Howe, Lord Carrington, Lord Chalker of Wallasey, Malcolm Rifkind and Douglas Hearn, all former ministers under Margaret Thatcher, along with Chester A. Crocker, former American Secretary of State for African Affairs, and Evelyn de Rothschild of the Rothschild banking family, and others as well. What is the Canadian perception of the MDC's actions?

    Third, what is the Canadian reaction to the need for land reform in ZImbabwe, knowing that 3% of Zimbabweans own 50% of the land, the most fertile land in particular? Is this not an obvious carry-over from the way things were in the former Rhodesia?

    Finally, what explanation does Canada have for the fact that the African Union has always, to my knowledge, refused to criticize the Mugabe government and its actions, despite the faults of the Mugabe regime, while the Commonwealth has been quick to systematically criticize him? Is this not a relic of a kind of imperialism?

º  (1635)  

    M. John McNee: Mr. Chair, in connection with the first question, on economics and the IMF's impact, I must start out by saying that I am not an expert in this field. Perhaps my colleague Michel will want to add a few words, but what I would say generally is that we see the situation in Zimbabwe as a case of extreme bad economic management. In our opinion, it is the government's handling of the situation that is really responsible for the present situation, although it is of course aggravated by the drought and other problems. The fact that Zimbabwe is not reacting in the same way as some of its neighbours, who have had a better economic response, constitutes part of the problem.

    As for the MDC, I do not believe that the role of the Government of Canada is to pass judgment on political parties within another system. What is important for us is the respect for the principles of good governance and democracy, that is that the opposition parties in Zimbabwe and in other countries in Africa or elsewhere have every right to exist, to express their views, to associate, to organize meetings during election campaigns and so on. As the High Commissioner has explained, this is the area in which there is a serious shortcoming as far as the government of Zimbabwe is concerned.

    As for the matter of agrarian reform, I will ask John to handle that one.

    In connection with Mr. Rocheleau's last remark, we do not wish to make any comments on the African Union and its actions. As far as the Commonwealth is concerned, it must be kept in mind that there was a consensus among the Commonwealth leaders at last year's meeting to suspend Zimbabwe from its meetings and councils. This is a body comprised of nations at all different stages and levels, with people of different colours and races, and I do not feel that one can conclude that theirs is a seemingly imperialist response to a situation where there has been such a dramatic violation of human rights and of the underlying principles of the Commonwealth.

[English]

    Mr. John Schram: About the land, perhaps I can add a beginning comment, or a preamble, if you want. I'm always reluctant to talk about land, though, because the government has made land the issue, and that comes with a racial connotation of black versus white.

    Nobody disagrees that we need land reform in Zimbabwe. My understanding now is that of the 4,500 farmers who were there two years ago, there are now 2,500 still in the country. Of those, 1,000 still have their property, and of those, 660 are actually farming.

    There are some areas of Zimbabwe, particularly the Midlands province, where the land distribution has gone rather better than in others. In most it's been disastrous, not only for white farmers but also for all of the people of Zimbabwe who depend on agriculture for their food and for their exports.

    But our point should be to continue to hammer away at NEPAD goals, at the Harare principles, at sound economic policy, rule of law, and good governance.

    Thank you.

º  (1640)  

    The Chair: Karen Kraft Sloan.

    Mrs. Karen Kraft Sloan (York North, Lib.): I have colleagues who are ahead of me. I just want to be on the list at some point.

    The Chair: Okay.

    Madam Beaumier.

    Ms. Colleen Beaumier (Brampton West—Mississauga, Lib.): I think we all feel a great deal of frustration when we're discussing these issues. I agree with Dr. Martin about the failure of our societies and our governments to address these issues.

    I'm wondering if, when you look at Africa and you look at Zimbabwe--you have Congo, you have Sierra Leone--there is some sort of overall strategy that would perhaps be more effective. Do these leaders have the right to travel throughout Africa with impunity, or can they be arrested?

    I mean, we sit and talk...and we're all the converted here. Many of us on this committee are beginning to feel the exhaustion of spinning our wheels. So I would like to hear if someone has some better ideas or better strategies.

    Mr. John McNee: Mr. Chair, that's a big question. I think the overall strategy, and it's not so much an immediate one, is the one adopted by Canada and the others in the G-8 at the time of the Kananaskis summit, which is to try to, over the long term, put our emphasis on the principles of good political and economic governance and democracy, and build and reinforce our relationships with those countries and leaders who are working in that direction, without forgetting the people who suffer. As we've tried to explain today, the response to the humanitarian crisis is a very important one for the government.

    But the long-term way is really to differentiate amongst the African countries and their leaders. The main focus of Canadian development cooperation, for instance, will be to those countries that share those ideals and those principles, who therefore have a chance of making a better future for their people. In the long term, our hope is that this will lead to, by both precept and example, changes on the continent.

    But I agree, this is not a short-term fix for the problem you cite, Madam Beaumier.

    Mr. Michel Lemelin: I guess the line we're trying to follow on that is that these are African problems and they need African solutions. It needs to go through African initiatives, and we should be there to support what they themselves put forward. It needs a lot of patience on our side and it needs a lot of initiative on their side.

    Some have started--NEPAD is an example of that--but before we see the results of an exercise like NEPAD, through the peer review process and all these things, we need to be very patient.

    Ms. Colleen Beaumier: What percentage of African leaders have this initiative and this willingness to solve the problems, or does that change daily?

º  (1645)  

    Mr. John McNee: It is a good question. I think one indication is that following on the adoption of the NEPAD by the African Union, several African countries have come forward and put their candidacy to their peers, in this peer review process, so that their performance can be judged in terms of a series of criteria, of governance criteria. That will be a first step in recognition by the Africans of those elements that are important to determining whether countries are on the right path or not, and then that is a first step to helping define those countries that will be the prime beneficiaries of western donor assistance.

    Of course, things do change, and sometimes they change for the better, if we look at the recent election in Kenya, for example, and the events since then. They suggest that a corner has been turned. We're encouraged by that. We think the prospects have improved in that country.

    So I think there are some encouraging signs at the same time as there are some intractable problems.

    Ms. Colleen Beaumier: When these corners are turned, let's say in Kenya, are we in there assisting them so that what they have just sort of given birth to will have the institutions to support the changes and support the laws and the democratic institutions? Are we in there as well? Are we supporting them once they've turned the corner?

    Mr. Michel Lemelin: Yes, we are. If you remember what was selected as projects, or for allocation of the $500 million announced at Kananaskis, a lot of them are exactly to support these initiatives.

    There is one, for example, with the African Capacity Building Foundation. Basically, it's to help them build their capacity to face their own problems. In many areas that's exactly the line that all the donors are now starting to practice through the millennium goals and all the donor consensus that took place around DAC, the development assistance committee, of the OECD.

    Ms. Colleen Beaumier: So then basically, in Zimbabwe, you feel the Canadian government should just continue the humanitarian aid.

    Mr. Michel Lemelin: For the moment, yes, along with the support to civil society, because that is what we--

    Ms. Colleen Beaumier: What is civil society...?

    The Chair: Thank you, Madam Beaumier, you're past your time.

    I'll go to Mr. Robinson.

    Mr. Svend Robinson (Burnaby—Douglas, NDP): Thanks very much.

    I want to join in thanking the witnesses both for appearing before the committee and for the work they do on behalf of Canadians in this area, particularly, if I may say, those who are on the front lines there, as it were, the ambassador and others.

    I'm appalled by what's happening in Zimbabwe. I've never visited the country myself, but certainly I'm well aware of what's going on through the important work of human rights organizations and through the kind of twinning efforts that have been undertaken by Amnesty International with MPs and candidates in Zimbabwe.

    I have four questions, and I'll put them in the interest of time. Then perhaps those who are in the best position to answer them can do so.

    First, I wonder if we can get an update on what is happening with respect to efforts of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights to get a strong resolution condemning the very serious human rights violations taking place in Zimbabwe. As we know, and reference was made to last year, that resolution failed last year. I'm not sure if the European Union is putting forward another one. If not, is Canada prepared to lead on this issue and move ahead whether or not the European Union puts forward a resolution?

    Second, what efforts are we making to exert the maximum possible pressure on bilateral partners in Africa? I'm thinking here particularly of South Africa, of course, but also Nigeria and others, who may just have some influence on Zimbabwe, particularly, as I say, South Africa. One would hope that if there's any country on that continent that Mugabe may listen to, it would be South Africa. What are we doing in concrete terms to try to put that pressure on and to urge them to make our views known and to make their views known as well on this issue?

    Third, perhaps we could get an update on what monitoring is being done. I was pleased to hear that High Commissioner Schram was involved in the monitoring of the court proceedings. Are we doing any other monitoring out in the field, for example, on human rights concerns; getting out of the courtroom, out into civil society there; directly monitoring what's taking place?

    Just on a specific question, an issue that no one has raised yet, Mugabe is virulently homophobic. The society is virulently homophobic, but Mugabe is in particular. Serious human rights concerns have been raised in that area. What's Canada done on that, and are we supporting any indigenous human rights groups that are dealing with that concern?

    Finally, briefly, refugees--is there any rapid response mechanism in place to facilitate the exit from Zimbabwe of those who are under greatest threat, as there is in some jurisdictions, such as Colombia?

º  (1650)  

    The Chair: Collectively, you have two and a half minutes for a response.

    Mr. John McNee: Okay, I'll be very quick. Perhaps I'll try the first two, and maybe John could weigh in.

    On the CHR, yes, there will be another resolution this year. The EU will take the lead. It will be co-sponsored by Canada; Mr. Graham has decided to do that. Now, whether or not the result will be any different, we still think it's very important to use the CHR to highlight this troubling situation.

    Second, we are very much in agreement, Mr. Chair, that in terms of the neighbours and the other African leaders, if anyone will have influence with Mugabe, it'll be them. That has been part of our continuing dialogue within the context of the Commonwealth to try to reach consensus there. So this is something that continues very much so, the contacts we have with those parties, to try to reach the maximum common ground.

    You will have noted that recently SADEC decided not to allow Zimbabwe to take its turn as the rotating chair of the organization. It was a small step but significant, a signal that the neighbours are not in agreement with what's going on there.

    John, perhaps I could turn to you on the other two.

    Mr. John Schram: Monitoring--nothing I enjoy talking about more.

    Yes, we do. Between going off to Maputo and Angola, I made a point of stopping in Bulawayo on my way back this time, because I'd heard that Archbishop Ncube might be in trouble, David Coltart might be in trouble. We do travel around--I travel around a lot--to talk to people.

    I've read that while I was away, our political officer was out there looking at what was going on in these demonstrations. He went to the hospital to visit people, to see what actually happened to the people who were beaten up. We're reinstituting the sort of thing we used to do in South Africa, again in support of civil society.

    The one place I'll have to say that we haven't done anything is in regard to the homophobic statements by Mugabe. Since I've been there--I came in September, I guess--we have not been asked, and there hasn't been an incident. But what we should get out to people is that this is part of civil society. If there is something they would like us to be doing, something we could do to help, then there I am. We should get a proposal. Certainly there's no reason in the world that wouldn't fit in with everything else we do.

    On refugees, if you want to go back to that, yes, we have both white and black people who want to apply to emigrate to Canada who do, and are absolutely free to do it. I just had a question, not three weeks ago, I guess, from one of the members of Parliament on exactly this question. A fellow in the military was in trouble, and the answer was to get him down to the UNHCR as quickly as possible, as we do.

    The Chair: Thank you.

    Beth Phinney.

    Ms. Beth Phinney (Hamilton Mountain, Lib.): I'd like to know what Canada is doing with the money from Kananaskis that was to go to Africa to support the problems over there. Could you do a breakdown on where that money is going, and to what agencies, or is it all government agencies? Has any of it even been given yet, or is it just proposed money?

    Mr. Michel Lemelin: I think I need more than two minutes to reply to that.

    There are two things, basically. There is the $500 million fund. It was announced in Kananaskis what it would be used for. There is also the 8% increase that CIDA is receiving, 8% of our actual aid envelope--

º  (1655)  

    Ms. Beth Phinney: But I'd like to know...I mean, $500 million was for--

    The Chair: To the witnesses, if you feel you cannot answer a question in the allotted time, we would be pleased to have from you, and we invite you to give us, a written response.

    Ms. Beth Phinney: I'd just like to know what you actually have, and what's being done with that. I mean, $500 million wasn't given to you last year, I don't think.

    Mr. Michel Lemelin: Yes, we have it.

    Ms. Beth Phinney: You have the $500 million?

    Mr. Michel Lemelin: And we have the $8 million also--if you vote for it this afternoon.

    Ms. Beth Phinney: Okay. So can you tell us what you're doing with it, what's being done with it?

    Mr. Michel Lemelin: As I said, the $500 million is already almost entirely directed to the projects that were announced at Kananaskis. Half of it, 48%, is coming to Africa through multilateral channels and also through bilateral channels.

    Through bilateral channels, it's the “strengthening aid effectiveness” approach and policy being put in place. It's led mainly by concentration toward certain countries and certain sectors, to make a difference rather than spreading it all over the place and losing the impact that a more concentrated approach would give.

    You probably know that six countries have already been selected as being in a better governance situation, let's say, to absorb this additional money. And there would be more to come.

    Ms. Beth Phinney: I'm listening, but I don't feel that I know much more now than when I asked my question. I'm sorry, but perhaps I could get it in writing.

    Mr. Michel Lemelin: Yes, sure.

    Ms. Beth Phinney: I wanted to know, for instance, how many hundred thousand go here, how many hundred thousand go there.

    Mr. Michel Lemelin: It's a complex answer, though.

    Ms. Beth Phinney: Yes, I know, but I'd like an answer.

    Mr. Loevinsohn mentioned that we need to do more on the health side. That's one of the reasons I was asking you about the money. If we need to do more on the health side, can we take some of that money and put more on the health side, or is the money all used up and we can't do that?

    Mr. Michel Lemelin: That is what is under discussion now, what the money would be used for.

    Ms. Beth Phinney: I thought you said it was all used up, it was all assigned.

    Mr. Michel Lemelin: We received the money. The $500 million is already almost directed. But the 8% increase in our budget, which is additional to the $500 million, will give us the possibility on a multi-year basis to target.

    Ms. Beth Phinney: Are you thinking about putting more into health care, since that's what they need, before it's too late and there's nobody left alive who hasn't got AIDS?

    Mr. Michel Lemelin: That's certainly one of the sectors. In terms of sectors, it's mainly education, agriculture, health, and governance.

    Ms. Beth Phinney: Mr. McNee.

    Mr. John McNee: I was just going to add a footnote, Michel, that not long ago the minister responsible for CIDA announced, I think, a $50 million grant for HIV/AIDS vaccine research as one concrete step.

    I think it would be very helpful if we put together a package on this for the committee, because there's an awful lot to the response to Kananaskis, not only the $500 million. So I think we can work together on that.

    Ms. Beth Phinney: We need to have money in research, but we need to do something for the people right now.

    Mr. John McNee: Absolutely. That's very important to us as well.

    Mr. Ernest Loevinsohn: This is not a complete answer, but just one specific thing that was already announced in Kananaskis is a major support to polio eradication. That obviously will have a huge impact into the future indefinitely, and not only in terms of reducing polio but also reducing health care costs.

    Ms. Beth Phinney: Have they already started that?

    Mr. Ernest Loevinsohn: Yes. In fact, that's been an ongoing effort for some years, and we're now ratcheting up our support.

    That's not a complete answer to your question, but it's an indication of where we are.

    Ms. Beth Phinney: It's part of it, yes.

    Thank you.

    The Chair: Mr. Casey.

    Mr. Bill Casey (Cumberland—Colchester, PC): High Commissioner, I guess it was Mr. Martin who wished you well in terms of your safety. Do you feel at risk?

    Well, first of all, let's go back. How many people are at the High Commission? Do you feel at risk, and how does it affect your life on a day-to-day basis?

    Mr. John Schram: At the moment, no, I don't feel at risk. Canada has a good reputation. We're well known for our credibility in Africa. People, I think, on all sides are willing, at the moment anyway, to listen to us. They don't always do what we suggest, but I don't have the feeling, as we move around at these things, unless we go to specific demonstrations--we always have to do a bit of an assessment beforehand--that we're in daily danger.

»  (1700)  

    Mr. Bill Casey: All right.

    I was talking to David Coltart one day, and he was helping me understand the land reform. He was starting to tell me that the motives were much different from what the media were reporting in North America, and then we were cut off and I wasn't able to reconnect.

    Do you know what he was driving at? I gather he was saying that it was used for an excuse to achieve another goal.

    Mr. John Schram: Well, I wouldn't want to put words in his mouth, much less in my mouth, or in our government's mouth, but I suspect--I've read his statements to the same effect--that what he was suggesting was that it's part of a power struggle.

    Mr. Bill Casey: A power struggle between who and who?

    Mr. John Schram: Between the government and the opposition. But beyond that, I think you'd better ask David Coltart.

    Mr. Bill Casey: I'll try again.

    Mr. John Schram: I haven't discussed that particular thing with him, so I can't answer on his behalf.

    Mr. Bill Casey: Does the government acknowledge the reduction in food production, and do they have an explanation for it?

    Mr. John Schram: Yes, they certainly do. Ernest is probably more familiar with the broader recognition.

    We do have a meeting every two weeks under the auspices of the UNDP, where humanitarian donors meet with the Minister for Public Service, Labour and Social Welfare and whatever other ministers can come along. The general government opinion is that this is due to a drought, which they share with southern African countries. Our opinion, of course, on the donor side is that it's due in part, as John had said earlier, to the drought, but also in significant part to economic mismanagement, which includes the land program.

    Mr. Bill Casey: Do they admit that?

    Mr. John Schram: Not to the extent that we would hold them responsible for it, no.

    Mr. Bill Casey: Our briefing note says, “Over half of Zimbabwe's population is at risk of starvation by the end of March 2003.” Is that accurate?

    Mr. John Schram: Yes, I think that's an accurate, accepted UNWFP figure.

    Mr. Bill Casey: What does that mean, if half of the population is at risk of starvation?

    Mr. Ernest Loevinsohn: I don't think it means that, as we speak, half are at risk; it means that without international assistance, that would be the situation. As I mentioned, the response to the food appeal has been relatively good, so as long as that response continues to be good, they won't starve.

    But that also puts the onus on us donors, which is perhaps an odd situation given that Zimbabwe has the agricultural potential, if it weren't being mismanaged, to do much better. Right now, as long as the donors continue to provide that kind of food, you won't see mass starvation.

    Mr. Bill Casey: So the structure is there to deliver food to half the population. How is it done?

    Mr. Ernest Loevinsohn: Well, it's mainly done by the World Food Program, but they don't act directly. They usually work through non-governmental organizations. It's important to note, though, that they are working through non-governmental organizations, and not through the Government of Zimbabwe's distribution system.

    And, yes, the structures are there.

    The Chair: Your five minutes are up, I regret to say.

    Mr. Bill Casey: Okay, thank you.

    The Chair: Perhaps I can make a recommendation to members. As we will only be able to have a first round of questions if we want to hear the NGOs, those who have questions can submit them to the clerk, who would forward them to the witnesses. That way we can get some written replies and hear today from the NGOs as well.

    Is that acceptable? Okay.

    Karen Kraft Sloan.

    Mrs. Karen Kraft Sloan: Thank you.

    I was just wondering, what kind of role does the private sector play within NEPAD in terms of the implementation of NEPAD and what's planned?

    My other question has to do with the funding of NEPAD itself. If this was a decision that was made at Kananaskis with the G-8--and you'll have to forgive my ignorance on this--and it's going to go ahead, does it mean that all of the G-8 have to be party to the funding? Clearly, the Americans are a big part of the G-8, and given some of their recent expenditures, are they going to continue to have this kind of commitment?

    It seems as though, in some respects from some of the things we've heard, some of the commitments in Afghanistan are somewhat wanting, given the new distraction, if you want to call it that.

    So I'm wondering, can NEPAD go ahead without full partnership from all the G-8, and what role does the private sector play?

»  (1705)  

    Mr. John McNee: Mr. Chair, the economic development chapter of the Kananaskis Africa action plan is an extremely important one, and foresees a key role for the private sector and for trade in bringing development to Africa. So I think it's absolutely central, and there are a number of initiatives the Government of Canada is taking in that regard.

    Just to cite one of them, as announced by the Prime Minister, in a $100 million Africa investment fund the government will put in moneys, to be matched by private sector investors, to finance private sector projects in Africa. This is basically the theory that in economic development the real motor is the private sector rather than the government. This is an extremely important initiative.

    I should also mention the decision by the Canadian government to remove tariffs and quotas from imports from the least-developed countries, most of which are in Africa, which will greatly boost the prospects of private sector firms in Africa.

    On the funding of NEPAD....

    Sorry?

    Mrs. Karen Kraft Sloan: I apologize for interrupting, but I just want to make sure I can squeak this in.

    Are there going to be private sector partnerships in the provision of safe water, around water delivery systems, or anything like that?

    Mr. Michel Lemelin: There might be. I mean, the private sector is led by their interests.

    Mrs. Karen Kraft Sloan: Okay.

    Mr. John McNee: On the G-8 question, the G-8 is not, of course, a formal institution, so the short answer is, no, each country's own plans to implement its own program in Africa are not dependent on what the others do. Canada has been at the forefront of urging the others in the G-8 to make good on their commitments at Kananaskis, and that process has continued.

    In terms of the American response, of course, we can't speak for the American government, but the President did announce not long ago an extremely important initiative in terms of funding to fight the HIV/AIDS crisis. So the Americans may have other priorities, but since Kananaskis they have made a rather important commitment that will be of great benefit in Africa as well.

    Mrs. Karen Kraft Sloan: Thank you very much.

    The Chair: Thank you.

    On behalf of the committee, I'd like to thank the witnesses for your informed testimony, for sharing your experience and expertise, and also for being available to answer any written queries that may be put to you. Again, thank you very much.

    We'll now move to the NGO testimony. Of course, the witnesses are invited to remain, if they wish.

    Alex, I understand you will be beginning for Amnesty International. I'd like to try to get it started as quickly as we can, because there's going to be a vote and I want to use the time to hear your testimonies.

    The procedure will be 10-minute testimony for each of the NGO groups. CARE can divide it as it wishes. Afterwards, we will move to questions.

»  (1710)  

    Mr. Alex Neve (Secretary General, English Section, Amnesty International (Canada)): Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and good afternoon--almost early evening, I guess--to the committee members.

    My name is Alex Neve, and I'm the Secretary General of Amnesty International Canada's English-speaking branch.

    This subcommittee, of course, about a year ago recognized the alarming deterioration in Zimbabwe's human rights situation, in passing your resolution describing, amongst other things, President Mugabe's flagrant abuse of human rights during and after the March 2002 elections. Sadly, one year later that remains the most apt description of the state of human rights in the country. So while I regret the necessity to once again return to appear before you, I certainly welcome the opportunity to do so, as we did last year, and to share with your our concerns and recommendations.

    Let me begin by adding how important it is--and I can't stress this enough--that in these troubling times, with so much international focus on the situation in Iraq, this subcommittee continues to ensure, through hearings such as today's, that the very many other very pressing human rights concerns in the world today receive attention.

    I'd also like to begin by taking the opportunity to thank a number of the members of this committee who have been active participants in the twinning initiative that Amnesty International and Oxfam established last year, in the lead-up to the presidential elections. A number of you have been twinned with beleaguered opposition MPs in Zimbabwe. I know, from the feedback we continue to hear, how much those individuals very much appreciate that support, and rely upon it.

    In the interest of time, I'm not going to say as much about the human rights situation in the country as I had first intended to. Having listened to the discussion that preceded my testimony, I think much of that is already on the table.

    I want to share with you our concerns in four main areas. The first is the political manipulation of food aid, which has been referred to a number of times already. Just let me add our voice to that of the many who have already highlighted that, agreeing that this is a very significant human rights problem in the country right now. There's no doubt, in Amnesty International's view, that the Zimbabwean authorities and state-sponsored militia are denying access to food aid based on real and perceived political affiliation.

    Second, we want to share with you some concerns regarding arbitrary arrests, torture, and political killings in the country. There's much I could say. I could fill hours, the rest of your hearings, I'm sure, describing our range of concerns here. Just let me refer to the most recent, which I think many of you know, and that is that several hundred people, including many officials and supporters of the Movement for Democratic Change, have been arrested just in the past week. Some have been released, others not, and the whereabouts of many, alarmingly, remain unknown. The potential that there have been some disappearances, therefore, is a very real prospect.

    The arrests have included 60 MDC activists taken into custody in Harare on March 19, last week, which included three MDC members of Parliament, two of whom, Giles Mutsekewa and Austin Mupandawana, remain in detention. And that upsurge in political violence, an alarming and grim beginning this year to the human rights situation in Zimbabwe, only follows upon the very distressing year last year, in 2002.

    Just to give you a bit of a statistical feel for it, last year Amnesty International is aware of reports of 58 politically motivated killings and 1,050 cases of torture in the country. As we always say, that's all we know. For sure, the real number is much higher than that.

    The third area of concern is attacks on human rights defenders and the independent media. Again, much has already been said about this. There's no question there's an increasing campaign of intimidation, harassment, and arbitrary arrest of independent journalists and of staff from human rights organizations. This is indicative of the government's efforts to silence free speech and to prevent the documentation of human rights violations.

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    There are many angles to this. One is the web of repressive legislation that the government has in place and that is used to curtail the activities of journalists and human rights activities. The High Commissioner referred to some of these laws--the Public Order and Security Act, for instance, the Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act, and the Private Voluntary Organizations Act.

    We continue, on an almost daily basis now, to receive reports of harassment, death threats, attacks, and arbitrary arrests of individuals who are working at the front lines, very courageously, to expose human rights violations in the country and to report and share that information with other Zimbabweans.

    The last area of concern I would like to highlight is that of the erosion of the independence of the judiciary. Amnesty International has noted a continuing pattern on the part of the government to harass and intimidate magistrates and to force out judges who are critical of state policy. Judges who have shown signs of judicial independence have been threatened with investigation and disciplinary action.

    Just to give you one example, on February 17, about a month ago, High Court Justice Benjamin Paradza was arrested on charges of attempting to obstruct the course of justice. He was released on bail after spending two days in custody. Well, coincidentally, he is the very judge who a month earlier had intervened in the case of the Mayor of Harare, and had ordered that he be released from custody after he had been arrested for holding a meeting without police clearance. That's the case that the High Commissioner was referring to in his remarks as well.

    His decision was one that did not please the Mugabe government, and the government in general, and one month later that judge himself finds that he's now on the receiving end of repression.

    Let me move on to some recommendations of Amnesty International here in this country, in our recommendations to the Canadian government, and worldwide in what we share with the international community, other governments at large. A central recommendation is simply that we must maintain consistent pressure on the Government of Zimbabwe to curtail the ongoing grave human rights violations that prevail in the country. That means frequently and publicly raising with authorities concerns such as the ones I've just highlighted--politicization of food aid, human rights defenders, journalists, etc.

    That's a general point, but it's an absolutely key recommendation, especially in the current international climate. With so much of the world's attention turned towards Iraq, making sure that pressure is not only maintained but increased on the Mugabe government is absolutely vital for all governments to take very seriously on board.

    There are two other specific recommendations I'd like to share with you. We've raised them on a number of occasions with the government here and with governments elsewhere, and would certainly hope that the subcommittee lends its support to them.

    The first is monitoring. This has already come up in some of the earlier discussion. In a situation such as that prevailing in Zimbabwe, the international community playing an active role in monitoring the situation on the ground is vitally important. It was good to hear from the High Commissioner that he is endeavouring to do some of that. I guess my recommendation would be that there's an important need for that to increase, and for Canada to play a role in pressing other governments, like-minded and not, to follow that lead, and to perhaps to begin to do so in a coordinated fashion, where a number of embassies and high commissions begin to develop a coordinated approach to monitoring the situation on the ground.

    What might monitoring entail? The security situation allowing, certainly, it would mean that High Commission staff.... And here I might add that perhaps an important recommendation would be to consider allowing the High Commission to deploy extra staff so that Canada's capacity to do this kind of monitoring is increased.

    To continue, then, monitoring might mean that Canadian staff members, working along with staff with other diplomatic missions, maintain a visible and public presence in volatile, tenuous areas of the country, as well as at trials such as we heard discussed earlier, such as the ongoing treason trial of Morgan Tsvangirai and other trials. Political trials are clearly an important part of the landscape of repression in Zimbabwe.

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    A second aspect is that Canada needs to be prepared to provide protection to human rights defenders and others who are at risk in the country. That must include a commitment to helping at-risk individuals leave the country when necessary.

    This is a particular area of concern. As many of you are likely aware, Canada maintains a visa requirement for Zimbabweans who seek to reach Canada. That is very effective in obstructing access, making it difficult for individuals who need to access protection to reach here. Measures need to be put in place, therefore, to ensure that Canada is prepared to provide emergency access and evacuation to individuals who may need that.

    The second set of recommendations I wanted to stress is the importance of Canada working in concert with the rest of the international community. Clearly, Canada can not and should not go it alone, and working with other states, bilaterally and multilaterally, is the way forward here.

    It is vital, therefore, that Canada maintain bilateral pressure on African governments, such as South Africa and Nigeria, the best-known, but also Namibia, Angola, Malawi, and Zambia, all of whom are relatively supportive of President Mugabe.

    One very clear vehicle for doing so is to make use of the commitments to good governance, human rights protection, and peer review, which are at the heart of the NEPAD initiative and the G-8's recent promise to support NEPAD through its Africa action plan.

    The need for these African governments to be pressed to play a strenuous role in pushing for reform in Zimbabwe is of particular importance, given that the Mugabe government is so often impervious to criticism and pressure from Europe and North America.

    Also crucial is multilateral pressure in bodies such as the UN Commission on Human Rights and the Commonwealth. Canada has influence in those bodies and should use it, forcefully and persuasively.

    Let me particularly highlight the Commission on Human Rights, as it is in session presently and will continue until the end of April. It was good news to just hear--and that was the first I'd heard it--that Canada is prepared to co-sponsor a European Union resolution on Zimbabwe.

    I think the important thing now is to see that Canada invests some diplomatic capital in giving that resolution a good shot. In particular, that's going to mean some very thoughtful and creative lobbying of African members of the commission who were among those who were very reluctant and resistant to having the resolution go forward last year, and working with them to ensure that this year, finally, that critical international body turns its attention to one of the world's very pressing human rights concerns.

    The Chair: I'm sorry, I'm going to have to ask you to wrap up, in the interest of time.

    Mr. Alex Neve: Those were my final words.

    Thank you very much.

    The Chair: We'll now hear from the representatives of CARE.

    Mr. A. John Watson (President, CARE Canada): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

    I want to salute you and your colleagues on the subcommittee for devoting your time and attention to the humanitarian crisis in southern Africa. We who work in the region are heartened to know that the plight of the people of southern Africa is high on the agenda of the committee.

    In the brief time I have allotted to me today, I want to share with you information on what CARE is doing to address the food crisis in Zimbabwe, why our ongoing efforts to address this crisis have been successful, and why we must continue. In all of these briefings it's often hard to get a sense of the field, so I have brought some images from the field, which we'll toggle through as I make my presentation. Hopefully that will make it more real.

    Pre-famine conditions are tightening their grip on Zimbabwe. Throughout Zimbabwe, once the breadbasket of southern Africa, thousands of families now can't grow enough food to survive. Farmers have little food to sell in the country's markets, and the price, for what food is available there, is soaring. Even the game and wild fruits that rural Zimbabweans rely on when other food is scarce are fast disappearing. Many families, as a result, have been forced to sell their livestock and other possessions to buy food. This is only a temporary solution.

    Severe hunger, even starvation, threatens millions of Zimbabweans, particularly the most vulnerable--children, the elderly, and pregnant and nursing women. Today, more than 7 million Zimbabweans--just over half the country's total population--require food aid.

    Drought, disruption in the agricultural sector, lack of foreign exchange, HIV/AIDS, and the government's land reform policies are to blame for the Zimbabwean food crisis. These lethal elements, alone and in combination, have destroyed crops and disrupted supply, leaving no part of Zimbabwe unaffected.

    CARE and its close to 500 people on the ground in Zimbabwe are accomplishing a great deal in the face of these dire conditions. Our general food distribution effort, begun last April, reaches more than 1 million people. Think of that: in essence, that's the entire population of Ottawa, scattered over about one-third of the country.

    Our supplementary feeding program meets the nutritional requirements of a little over 180,000 children under the age of 5; 230,000 children between grades 1 and 7, i.e. elementary school; and a little less than 20,000 pregnant and lactating women through targeted supplementary feeding in nine districts of south Midlands and Masvingo province.

    In addition, 316 children in the pediatric wards of hospitals in project areas receive Nutrimeal, a corn-soya blend. Wet feeding with Nutrimeal is also available six days a week to children under five and for five days a week to elementary school children. and a month's dry ration is issued to pregnant and lactating mothers once every month.

    CARE's primary responsibility in this program is to procure and transport food to holding points within districts of operation. School and clinic authorities are responsible for the preparation and distribution of the food on a daily basis.

    We're also helping almost 150,000 needy farmers in ten districts of Masvingo and Midlands provinces to gain access to scarce or non-existent seeds and fertilizer, and we're working with 110,000 vulnerable small-scale farmers in seven districts of the same provinces to improve crop diversity and livelihood security by providing them with a variety of seeds and fertilizer.

    But we're not carrying out our life-saving work in a vacuum. The political atmosphere in Zimbabwe is highly charged, as members of this committee are acutely aware. In this kind of environment, major donors like the U.S., Britain, and Canada will not continue to supply food if it cannot be distributed impartially to those in greatest need. Agencies that distribute food on behalf of large donors therefore must keep impartiality keenly in mind as they decide who gets food and who doesn't.

    In Zimbabwe, CARE's aid priorities are calculated strictly on the basis of need. The humanitarian imperative comes first every time, all the time. Aid will not be used to further a particular political view or religious belief, and CARE will never act as an instrument of a host government's policy.

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    Need is our foremost criteria, never politics. We apply the criterion of need to everything we do, in every country in which we work. If a government prevents us from acting on the principle of need as we see it, we shut down our operations. We can never bend in this principle, and we never compromise on that issue.

    To ensure impartiality is no simple task. Impartial food distribution is a labour-intensive business. CARE staffers visit each Zimbabwean village and list recipients who are most in need of food, using several criteria: female-headed households; orphan-headed households; households that had either no harvest or a very low one; households with no livestock; households with no jobs or business income; and households with no remittances from family in other parts of the country.

    The lists are made openly, with all the villagers present. When influential people in districts occasionally attempt to add or delete names, CARE staffers return to the village with the completed list and verify the validity of the suggested changes with the villagers themselves. Here, too, we rely on our colleagues in the human rights area, such as Amnesty, to act as watchdogs. Whenever we are alerted to the possible corruption or manipulation of any aspect of our programs, we conduct a full investigation.

    This rigorous adherence to impartiality is the best way we know to ensure that only those in greatest need receive food aid. The success of our international disaster response programs in fact depends upon it. The underlying wisdom of impartiality has never been more apparent than in our efforts in Zimbabwe.

    Why do we protect this principle so fiercely? While the Government of Canada and others may look at Zimbabwe through the lens of politics, CARE can't afford that luxury. We must look for the positive, for the opportunity. We see only people who could benefit from our intervention--children who are dying, families who are suffering, elderly persons who are vulnerable--and we set out to help them. For 60 years now, we've been on the ground, around the world, doing just that.

    Our efforts have saved the lives of countless Zimbabweans, but the forecast for Zimbabwe over the next several months remains bleak. First and foremost, the weather has not cooperated. Until this month, Zimbabwe had unexpected months of drought, the worst in decades. When the rain finally did come, as it did earlier this month, it came, sadly enough, in the form of Cyclone Japhet. The cyclone's strong winds and heavy rain caused extensive damage to infrastructure, housing, and agricultural lands in the southern and eastern parts of Zimbabwe. Flash floods brought on by heavy rain then swept away hundreds of houses and vast quantities of crops, bringing further devastation to these ravaged lands.

    While most countries possess the resources to rebound quickly from the hardships brought on by the destructive forces of nature, the deliberate erosion of infrastructure in Zimbabwe means that recovery from the cyclone must be slow. As a result, the people of Zimbabwe will continue to suffer the harsh effects of the drought and the cyclone for many years to come.

    Our relief and support efforts in Zimbabwe, therefore, have never been needed more than they are needed right now, and that's why CARE must remain there and continue its work. The Government of Canada can play a vital role to ensure that we do just that.

    Mr. Chairman, I urge this committee to appreciate that public funds from Canada are making a significant difference in the lives of the poor of Zimbabwe. Further, I urge this committee to see that desperately needed funds are not lifted out of Zimbabwe and other countries in southern Africa to pay for other more media-worthy activities--amongst them, the reconstruction of Iraq. The critically important and demonstrably effective programs now under way in Zimbabwe must be permitted to continue.

    Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would be happy to address any questions committee members might have.

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    The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Watson.

[Translation]

    Mr. Rocheleau.

    Mr. Yves Rocheleau: Thank you, Mr. Chair. Good day, gentlemen and madam. I have a quick question, because there is a vote coming up shortly.

    I would like to know your thoughts, as foreign observers, on the historic involvement of the IMF in countries such as Zimbabwe. And what you think of the necessity, also seemingly historic, for major agrarian reform in Zimbabwe , where 3% of the population owns 50% of the best land. We know that, at the time of the Lancaster House agreements in 1979, the whole matter of naturalization of the lands, in response to a need, was systematically rejected in favour of articles protecting private industry. What is your view of that, as foreign observers?

    As for Amnesty International, I would like to know how many observers are in place, and what their nationalities are. Is there a bit of distribution there?

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    Mr. Alex Neve: Thank you for your questions. I am sorry but I prefer to answer in English.

[English]

    Let me begin with the last question, the most specific question for Amnesty. We don't actually maintain people on the ground on an ongoing basis in any country. We monitor from outside and then send in, as frequently as we can, research missions, who spend sometimes only a few days, sometimes several weeks, sometimes a few months at a time in the country.

    We did have a mission that was in Zimbabwe for about two weeks at the end of January and early February. It was made up of a Canadian, actually, a South African, and a man from Senegal. That was the team that was there. The next team may involve some of the same people, but the composition would change. It depends on what particular skills we're looking for in any particular mission.

    With respect to land reform, certainly there's no denying the fact that the issue of land reform forms a significant backdrop and context to the whole range of human rights violations that we've been discussing today. It's not part of our expertise or our mandate to make recommendations on what the land reform should or should not look like, but what we have insisted is that, in the context of land reform, human rights abuses not take place.

    For instance, there have been a lot of concerns about brutality and excessive violence in the context of evicting people from land. We've spoken out and condemned that, and demanded that it stop. Violence on either side, in the context of land reform, has been of concern to us. So that's where our focus has been.

    Third, with respect to the IMF, I would have to give you a promise to follow up on that. I'm not familiar with the IMF's work in Zimbabwe. I do have colleagues who would be able to provide more information on that.

    In a general sense, we're always concerned that whatever approach the IMF takes to a country, human rights concerns be at the centre of its initiative. We're often very disappointed in that regard and always feel that the IMF needs to do more to more properly ensure that their policies and initiatives promote and not undermine human rights.

    The Chair: You have two minutes, Mr. Watson.

[Translation]

    Mr. John Watson: The same goes for me. My answer will be clearer if I respond in English and then we rely on the professionals to translate.

[English]

    On land reform, I think everybody agrees that land reform is necessary. The issue is, what direction is it going in?

    Land reform that takes us back...from turning successful commercial farms into subsistence farms is not a step forward, but there are other cases where it's been possible to do land reform where you have had the commercial aspects of farming continue, the productivity stay high, etc. That takes a lot of planning and a lot of goodwill on both sides to make it work.

    Unfortunately, that hasn't been the case in Zimbabwe, so you're seeing the economy collapse, in essence, and agricultural productivity plummet as a result.

    The Chair: Mr. Casey.

    Mr. Bill Casey: Mr. Neve, you were talking about the independence of the judiciary. How are judges appointed now, how long do they serve, and to whom do they answer?

    Mr. Alex Neve: Those are all very good questions, and that's something else I will have to endeavour to get answers to and provide for you. I'm not up to date on the judicial appointment process in Zimbabwe.

    Mr. Bill Casey: It sounds like they're subject to pressure, though.

    Mr. Alex Neve: Oh, absolutely, and our concern in particular has been the pattern of threats, harassment, intimidation, and arrests, as in the case I was just referring to, of a judge who had just quite demonstrably exerted some important judicial independence and some important support for human rights and a month later found himself penalized.

    So there definitely, unquestionably, is that kind of pattern in the country.

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    Mr. Bill Casey: The judicial system is really the last line of defence, it sounds like, for a lot of people. If that's compromised....

    Mr. Alex Neve: Absolutely.

    The High Commissioner was talking about the fact that in the observations they've been making of the Tsvangirai trial right now, they've been seeing some robust judicial independence. Hopefully that can be maintained, because the pressure on judges, by virtue of the experiences that many judicial colleagues have experienced, to not demonstrate that kind of independence is considerable.

    Mr. Bill Casey: Thank you.

    The Chair: Karen Kraft Sloan.

    Mrs. Karen Kraft Sloan: Thank you, Mr. Chair.

    To Mr. Watson, Mr. Neve had pointed out a number of recommendations that the committee might consider in its deliberations on this particular study. I'm wondering if you have other recommendations you would like to put forward with regard to the humanitarian crisis in Zimbabwe.

    Mr. John Watson: I think the number one concern I have is that the committee understand the difference between the food programs. In the government-run food aid program, the government obviously has a duty to take care of its citizens who fall off the map, and they have purchased a significant amount of food. That program has been fraught with difficulties of the type that Alex was dealing with. So there's a difference between that program and the program of food that's coming through the WFP with NGOs in different sections of countries working on it.

    It's not that there aren't problems with the kind of food distribution that we're talking about, but it is important enough, and we are clear enough with the authorities on this, that we shut down the program in areas where there is funny business going on, or there are reports of it, and we follow up and indeed find political manipulation.

    In fact, even with the most terrible governments--basically because of our professionalism--we find that it is possible to deal with them in such a way to get assistance down to poor people who need it. And that's really what we have to concentrate on.

    That means, in turn--and I think the committee should be aware of this--when you invite me to speak on Zimbabwe, you will not have me listing a long range of human rights abuses, because in order to fulfill that role of doing the food distribution, we have to stay very low-profile on the human rights side. But we depend upon the human rights agencies to do their work and to indicate that there is a problem here or there or whatever, which we can then follow up on.

    That's basically my main message to you, that aid can be used very effectively even under repressive contexts. I know there is a tendency to say, “Gee, that government is so terrible, why don't we just cut off all dealings with it?”, but that would be a mistake. Unfortunately, where you have terrible governments you have citizens in massive need and massive danger of, in this case, starvation.

    Mrs. Karen Kraft Sloan: Do your workers find themselves in a situation where a list has been put together but there's some pressure on them to change the names on the list? Do they find themselves in a situation where they are concerned about their personal safety or security? Do they find themselves threatened about maintaining that list?

    Mr. John Watson: We don't want our workers put in danger. It's a number one principle. So if there are issues on a list, of course we will go back and talk to the villagers in the region. The number one element in terms of making sure the lists correspond to the criteria that I mentioned is transparency, going over the lists in public meetings, on who should be on it or who shouldn't be on it.

    If there is, say, a hostile element at those public meetings, then rather than pursue that we would go up the line, up to the provincial governor, and say, look, you have a problem with overly ardent people in that village, and we're not distributing food there any more; you'd better get on top of it and sort it out, because this is not appropriate that we cannot report that the food we're distributing is going to those people who need it most. And that's the one thing that's of concern to us.

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    Mrs. Karen Kraft Sloan: What happens to the individuals who get their names on the list so in fact they have been deemed needy and they fulfill the criteria? I guess I'm thinking of a couple of situations that would help in clarifying in my understanding.

    One, it must be very difficult to make the decision sometimes, because there's probably a lot more people who could be on the list if you had more provisions. This is probably a very difficult situation, because there are other people who should be on the list as well.

    Another situation would be where it's not so much the difficulty of choosing, but I'm wondering if there's any kind of reprisals for individuals who actually make it on the list.

    Mr. John Watson: No, for the lists that are put together, the criteria are not political, they're need criteria. So if it's general feeding, it's general household criteria of the type that I listed. If it's supplementary feeding, it's often anthropomorphic criteria--you know, from the size of the child's arm to his height, etc.

    As long as people understand that people are not on the list because of the political party that they follow, then there are no reprisals. They have to be, for instance, an orphan-headed household, or a family that doesn't have income coming from somebody who is working in the city, that type of thing. You have to do it. In a sense, it's like what we do with the publication of the voters rolls; people can contest what the list looks like. It's done in the open and it's discussed in the community environment. Often you have somebody piping up and saying, “They shouldn't be on the list, they have a son in the city who's working in an office and sending home money.” So they're not among the most needy.

    The choices are hard, but there's no way of not making the choices. If you have only so much food and you're giving it to one person, then, however sympathetic you are, you're not giving it to another person. The trick is to develop criteria that everybody understands are identifying those at the bottom of the pile who really need the food aid. If you do that well, and professionally, and stick to it, that's really your only defence in a highly politicized context like Zimbabwe.

    Mrs. Karen Kraft Sloan: Right. Well, I have constituents who want to apply for a program and they don't meet the eligibility criteria, and they're quite upset about that. It's very clear it isn't a political decision. The criteria are laid out.

    One of the criteria is “no harvest”. Clearly, if there is no harvest, there is no harvest, but a low harvest can be a relative situation. So is that then decided by the people in the community, what constitutes low harvest?

    Mr. John Watson: If you have a context or some cases, I'll happily fire them off, if it's in our area, to our--

    Mrs. Karen Kraft Sloan: No, no, I'm just talking in a very general way. I don't know very much about this. I'm a new person on this committee. I do a lot of environmental work. It's my first time dealing with humanitarian relief organizations. I'm trying to understand your process.

    Mr. John Watson: It's very much community-centred. If you go to any community in Africa, and Zimbabwe in particular, you might find there are some communities that have dams and some fields that are around the dams. Those families might have an 80% harvest whereas somebody even a hundred yards away will have had a 95% loss. And everybody there knows it, so if one of the families with their harvest tries to get on the list, everybody else is going to be screaming.

    Mrs. Karen Kraft Sloan: Yes. It's just that I was surprised that it comes down to lists on a regular basis. I didn't know that. That was new information for me.

    Mr. John Watson: Absolutely. It comes down to individuals and whether they are among the most needy or not, according to the criteria that have been developed.

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    Mrs. Karen Kraft Sloan: Right.

    The Chair: You have time for one more, with a quick response, and that will have to be it.

    Mrs. Karen Kraft Sloan: Well, probably not a quick response....

    I'd wanted to ask this earlier of the High Commissioner but ran out of time, essentially. In terms of some of the more progressive and more democratic leaders within Africa, do you feel that there are opportunities to work within these governments through your organization and other NGOs through the Government of Canada? I think you had mentioned putting some bilateral pressure on some of the other countries, and I'm just wondering if you could further expand on that.

    Mr. Alex Neve: Absolutely. We think that's vital here.

    It's quite clear that, as I said, the current government in Zimbabwe in many respects is resistant to pressure from many corners of the world, including Europe and North America, and that it's influential African voices who may have the best chance of promoting some meaningful reform.

    South Africa has to be first amongst the many African governments who could play a role here. We've frequently spoken out, quite publicly, to express our disappointment that South Africa has not risen to that challenge. The South African government has been much more muted and nuanced and sometimes even perhaps unhelpful in some of the initiatives it has taken with respect to Zimbabwe.

    So that's why, from our perspective, a key recommendation for Canada is, yes, maintain the pressure on Zimbabwe, but it may be more effective, if there's only so much diplomatic time, energy, and attention to go around, to really focus on pushing South Africa to move more assertively on Zimbabwe.

    Mrs. Karen Kraft Sloan: Well, if NEPAD is about finding solutions to Africa's problems by Africa, then....

    Mr. Alex Neve: Absolutely. This becomes a case study.

    Mrs. Karen Kraft Sloan: Exactly.

    Thank you, Mr. Chair.

    The Chair: I'd like to thank both of our witnesses, Alex Neve of Amnesty International and John Watson of CARE, for coming here and sharing your experience on the ground and your expertise in these matters. I'm sure the members of the committee have benefited from this. If, as a result of the questions put to you, you have any supplementary notes that you may want to submit to the committee, we'd be pleased to receive them.

    Again, thank you for being here.

    The meeting is adjourned. A vote awaits us.