FOPO Committee Meeting

37th PARLIAMENT, 2nd SESSION

Standing Committee on Fisheries and Oceans

EVIDENCE

CONTENTS

Friday, May 9, 2003

·

1315

The Chair (Mr. Tom Wappel (Scarborough Southwest, Lib.))

·

1320

Mr. Keith Paugh (President, P.E.I. Fishermen's Association Ltd.)

·

1325

The Chair

Mr. Rory McLellan (Executive Director, P.E.I. Fishermen's Association Ltd.)

·

1330

The Chair

Mr. Sandy Siegel (Executive Secretary, Maritimes Fishermen's Union)

·

1345

The Chair

Mr. Sandy Siegel

The Chair

Mr. Sandy Siegel

·

1350

·

1355

¸

1400

The Chair

Mr. Peter Stoffer (Sackville—Musquodoboit Valley—Eastern Shore, NDP)

Mr. Keith Paugh

Mr. Rory McLellan

¸

1405

Mr. Peter Stoffer

Réginald Comeau (Provincial Coordinator, Maritimes Fishermen's Union)

Mr. Peter Stoffer

Mr. Keith Paugh

Mr. Peter Stoffer

Mr. Keith Paugh

Mr. Sandy Siegel

The Chair

Mr. Ron Cormier (President, Maritimes Fishermen's Union)

Mr. Peter Stoffer

¸

1410

Mr. Sandy Siegel

Mr. Peter Stoffer

Mr. Sandy Siegel

The Chair

Mr. Jean-Yves Roy (Matapédia—Matane, BQ)

The Chair

Mr. Bob Wood (Nipissing, Lib.)

Mr. Rory McLellan

Mr. Bob Wood

Mr. Rory McLellan

Mr. Bob Wood

Mr. Rory McLellan

The Chair

Mr. Bob Wood

The Chair

¸

1415

Mr. Rory McLellan

The Chair

Mr. Rory McLellan

The Chair

Mr. Sandy Siegel

The Chair

Mr. Sandy Siegel

The Chair

Mr. Reginald Comeau

The Chair

Mr. Reginald Comeau

Mr. Sandy Siegel

The Chair

¸

1420

Mr. Peter Stoffer

Mr. Sandy Siegel

Mr. Peter Stoffer

The Chair

Mr. James Jones (Regional Director General, Gulf Region, Department of Fisheries and Oceans)

¸

1425

¸

1430

The Chair

Dr. Mikio Moriyasu (Head, Snow Crab Section, Gulf Region, Department of Fisheries and Oceans)

¸

1440

The Chair

Dr. Mikio Moriyasu

The Chair

Dr. Mikio Moriyasu

¸

1445

¸

1450

The Chair

Mr. Jean-Yves Roy

Dr. Mikio Moriyasu

¸

1455

Mr. Jean-Yves Roy

Dr. Mikio Moriyasu

Mr. Jean-Yves Roy

Dr. Mikio Moriyasu

Mr. Jean-Yves Roy

Dr. Mikio Moriyasu

Mr. Jean-Yves Roy

Dr. Mikio Moriyasu

Mr. Jean-Yves Roy

Dr. Mikio Moriyasu

Mr. Jean-Yves Roy

Mr. James Jones

¹

1500

Mr. Jean-Yves Roy

Mr. James Jones

Mr. Jean-Yves Roy

Mr. James Jones

Mr. Jean-Yves Roy

Mr. James Jones

Mr. Jean-Yves Roy

The Chair

Mr. Bob Wood

The Chair

Mr. Peter Stoffer

Mr. James Jones

¹

1505

Mr. Peter Stoffer

Mr. James Jones

Mr. Peter Stoffer

Mr. James Jones

Mr. Peter Stoffer

Mr. James Jones

Mr. Peter Stoffer

¹

1510

Mr. James Jones

The Chair

Mr. James Jones

The Chair

Mr. James Jones

The Chair

Mr. James Jones

The Chair

Mr. James Jones

The Chair

Mr. James Jones

¹

1515

The Chair

Mr. James Jones

The Chair

Mr. James Jones

The Chair

Mr. James Jones

¹

1520

The Chair

Mr. James Jones

The Chair

Mr. James Jones

The Chair

Dr. Mikio Moriyasu

The Chair

Dr. Mikio Moriyasu

The Chair

M. Jean-Yves Roy

Dr. Mikio Moriyasu

Mr. Jean-Yves Roy

Dr. Mikio Moriyasu

Mr. Jean-Yves Roy

Dr. Mikio Moriyasu

The Chair

¹

1525

Mr. Michel Arseneau (New Bandon Fishermen's Association)

The Chair

Mr. Michel Arseneau

¹

1530

¹

1535

¹

1540

¹

1545

The Chair

Mr. Paul Jagoe (New Bandon Fishermen's Association)

The Chair

Mr. Paul Jagoe

¹

1550

The Chair

Mr. Peter Stoffer

¹

1555

Mr. Michel Arseneau

Mr. Peter Stoffer

Mr. Michel Arseneau

Mr. Peter Stoffer

Mr. Paul Jagoe

Mr. Peter Stoffer

Mr. Michel Arseneau

Mr. Peter Stoffer

Mr. Paul Jagoe

Mr. Peter Stoffer

Mr. Michel Arseneau

º

1600

Mr. Peter Stoffer

The Chair

Mr. Jean-Yves Roy

Mr. Michel Arseneau

Mr. Paul Jagoe

Mr. Michel Arseneau

The Chair

Mr. Bob Wood

Mr. Michel Arseneau

Mr. Bob Wood

Mr. Michel Arseneau

Mr. Bob Wood

Mr. Michel Arseneau

º

1605

The Chair

Mr. Michel Arseneau

The Chair

Mr. Michel Arseneau

The Chair

Mr. Michel Arseneau

The Chair

Mr. Michel Arseneau

The Chair

Mr. Michel Arseneau

The Chair

Mr. Michel Arseneau

Mr. Paul Jagoe

The Chair

Mr. Paul Jagoe

Mr. Michel Arseneau

The Chair

Mr. Michel Arseneau

Mr. Paul Jagoe

The Chair

Mr. Mark Butler (Marine Co-ordinator, Ecology Action Centre)

The Chair

Mr. Mark Butler

º

1620

The Chair

Mr. Mark Butler

The Chair

Mr. Peter Stoffer

Mr. Mark Butler

Mr. Peter Stoffer

Mr. Mark Butler

Mr. Peter Stoffer

The Chair

Mr. Bob Wood

º

1625

Mr. Mark Butler

The Chair

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CANADA

Standing Committee on Fisheries and Oceans

---

NUMBER 039

l

2nd SESSION

l

37th PARLIAMENT

---

EVIDENCE

Friday, May 9, 2003

[Recorded by Electronic Apparatus]

·  (1315)  

[English]

    The Chair (Mr. Tom Wappel (Scarborough Southwest, Lib.)) I apologize for the delay.

    We have the P.E.I. Fishermen's Association Ltd. as we continue our study of Atlantic fisheries issues. We have Mr. Rory McLellan, executive director, and Mr. Keith Paugh, president.

    From the Maritime Fishermen's Union we have Mr. Ron Cormier, Sandy Siegel, and Reginald Comeau.

    Welcome, everyone.

    I guess we'll get you to lead off. Thank you.

·  (1320)  

    Mr. Keith Paugh (President, P.E.I. Fishermen's Association Ltd.): Good afternoon, honourable members of Parliament, ladies and gentlemen. We are the P.E.I. Fishermen's Association and we represent the 1,300 core fishermen who fish from our shores in small boats.

    We are the ancestors of the immigrants who settled this land following the voyage of John Cabot in 1497. While there was no journal of their discoveries, he is reported to have been fishing what was deemed to be an inexhaustible supply of cod that could be harvested from baskets over the side of his vessel. Inexhaustible it may have been, and if the basket technology or the later hook and line had continued, we may have hit a resource that could have sustained the Atlantic fishermen forever.

    The cod fishery and its subsequent collapse are lessons of what happens when our technology and our greed take over our common sense. We know now we have the technology to overcome nature. In the early seventies, we used this technology with predictable results. We developed expensive deep-sea trawlers that could scoop up the sea bottom, landing millions of tonnes of cod while systematically destroying the sea bottom.

    To build these ships, the corporations, with the approval of the federal government, required capital investment, and it poured in from central Canada as well as from offshore interests. These investors saw the cod fishery as another investment similar to oil exploration, except for one thing--we knew the fish were there. There was no risk. Indeed, there were so many fish there the federal government invited foreign governments to send in their vessels to participate in what could only be called gluttony.

    Today, much of Canada's oceans are deserts, void of sea life. Canadians today are witnessing what Richard Cashin called “a disaster of biblical proportions”, a sea so destroyed it lacks the ability to regenerate itself. We see generations of young people with no hope of following their forefathers, and little hope for their communities, their families, and friends.

    It is in this context that the Minister of Fisheries and Oceans has called for an Atlantic fisheries policy review. We agree with the minister that the time is right to take a long, hard look at what we have done, how we have managed our fishery and our oceans. We agreed to sit on an external advisory board. It gives advice to the policy review and will hopefully make a difference. This team of federal officials has met for the last three years and is now in the process of writing its final report.

    There are many positive aspects to this report, particularly the aspect of the report that involves the fishermen and their organizations taking a more active role in the decision-making process. This is the basis of professionalization of the industry, and we, with our colleagues in every fishing province, support this.

    There are two aspects to this report that are very disturbing, and it is these we wish to discuss today: the fleet separation policy and the owner-operator policy.

    The fleet separation policy has always been the cornerstone of Atlantic fishery policy. Simply stated, it means that fishermen fish and processors process fish. It restricts processing interests from owning fishing gear.

    If processors were permitted to own fishing operations, they would control not only the fishing efforts--the when, where, and how of the fishery--but also the price paid for the product. This would lead, and indeed has led, to a vertical integration of the fishing industry--the loss of the independent owner-operator. Such a phenomenon has happened in agriculture and we have witnessed the near collapse of the family farm, resulting in small towns closing, railway lines being abandoned, and in short, the destruction of rural Canada. This must not happen in our fishing communities of Atlantic Canada.

    In the late sixties and early seventies, then fisheries minister Roméo LeBlanc instituted, fought for, and defended the owner-operator and fleet separation policy as being fundamental to the continuing prosperity of Atlantic Canada. Today, we join with our colleagues across this country in asking you, our members of Parliament, to have the same vision as Roméo LeBlanc and to fiercely defend our rights to exist as a viable small business in rural Atlantic Canada.

    To do this, you must convince federal fisheries minister Robert Thibault that those seeking what they call “flexibility” in the owner-operator policy have a secret and separate agenda, and that is to control the fishing industry in this country, on the Atlantic coast in much the same way as they do on Canada's west coast.

    The erosion has already taken place. Private agreements have already allowed the Barry Group of Newfoundland to purchase four of the five seiners that fish in the gulf. We have reason to believe they control the fifth seiner through a secret trust agreement.

    Trust agreements are being used to allow rich crabbers and corporation interests to buy numerous lobster fleets at various locations throughout the gulf. What is most alarming is that the minister is saying he will allow some flexibility on this issue. We are saying, put an end to the flexibility that already exists. Make it possible for my son or daughter to follow in my footsteps without having to compete with a corporation for the control of licences.

    Thank you.

·  (1325)  

    The Chair: Thank you.

    What about the rest? Please go ahead.

    Mr. Rory McLellan (Executive Director, P.E.I. Fishermen's Association Ltd.): Thank you, Mr. Wappel.

    I want to return to some of the issues raised by our president. The first and most prominent is the recent struggle by inshore fishermen to secure crab quota.

    Using the Department of Fisheries and Oceans' own estimates, which were released Wednesday of this week, the average so-called traditional crabber can expect an annual gross income in excess of half a million dollars. This estimate is very conservative, given that most of these crabbers own the crab processing plants where the crab are sold and profits for these operations are not made public.

    The annual income was calculated at the revised TAC--total allowable catch--which was lowered by 10% when the crabbers refused to provide the funds necessary to estimate the biomass and thereby further increase their quota. On the suggestion that the minister share 15% of this quota with 5,000 small-boat owners who had no access to crab, a calamity of events took place.

    The meetings held in Quebec City to discuss allocations turned into a disruptive demonstration, with busloads of plant workers--paid for by the crabbers--on hand to destroy the meeting. When the plan was announced, a riot took place in Shippegan, leaving a trail of destruction. P.E.I. fishermen were told their sharing arrangement would be 110 tonnes of the 17,000-tonne global quota. For Island fishermen, this means a 64% decrease from what we received last year.

    We now have enough to give 5 tonnes each to 19 of our 1,300 fishermen who were lucky enough to win a lottery. We claim this is grossly unfair and speaks loudly to the need for a fisheries policy review, but it would appear no one is listening.

    Our president spoke on the need to protect the owner-operator and fleet separation policies so the fishery can be managed to sustain small-boat operations in rural communities, not a small group of millionaires.

    Another example of this consolidation for fishing rights is the gulf-based herring seine fleet. Brought here in the late sixties from the west coast, these seiners--whose catch capability was over 10 times the amount of the inshore boats they competed with--came here to the Atlantic coast to fish. You have heard these words before, what was termed an “inexhaustible supply” of herring.

    This inshore food fishery was shamelessly transformed into a large-capacity fishery, where 27 reduction plants were built to transform thousands of tonnes of herring into high-protein meal for animals and for fertilizer. The herring was no longer sold by the pound but rather by the tonne. The inshore fishermen were largely put out of the herring business, until the seiners had depleted the resource to the point where all 27 plants were closed and most of the seiners left, as they had left the west coast.

    Through the eighties, the stock has shown some signs of recovery. The seiners were reduced to a dozen vessels, with a cap of 20% of the overall quota and with severe restrictions to stay out of many inshore zones where they had previously wiped out the biomass. In fact, the practices of these vessels was such a great concern that special clauses were put into regulations. I quote from the Canada Gazette, May 1983. Under the heading, “Designating Ports of Landing for Atlantic Herring Seiners”, it says: “Statement of Problem--Stringent measures are required in order to control the misreporting of herring catches by seiners. This leads to underestimation and ultimately to stock collapse.”

    Throughout the gulf, inshore fishermen lobbied the federal government for the protection from herring seiners, and seiner exclusion zones were created in every province. Two years ago it became apparent that the line protecting Island herring stocks off the northeast coast of P.E.I. had mysteriously been moved by a bureaucratic blunder. And we hope that is why it was moved. There are some reasons to suspect that it wasn't just a blunder, that perhaps the blunder had been aided and assisted.

    This caused great concern to our local inshore fishermen, who demanded a number of times that the mistake be corrected. It is clear that this stock of herring is once again on the verge of collapse, and the corporation, who will “take the money and run”, simply doesn't care.

    In closing, we wish to indicate that we do care. We care about the future of herring, the lobster, the snow crab, and all the other species we've fished for generations. We care about the owner-operator and fleet separation policies. We want them protected. We hope and pray that you care as well, and we thank you for your time.

·  (1330)  

    The Chair: Thank you very much, gentlemen.

    We'll hear from the MFU, and then we'll proceed with questions.

    Mr. Sandy Siegel (Executive Secretary, Maritimes Fishermen's Union): I just want to apologize for not being able to appear yesterday. We were there to speak about owner-operator and fleet separation with some of the other groups, but the crisis in crab prevented us from being there. So we apologize for that, and we gave our space to some of the other groups.

    Briefly, we presented you with a packet, as well as a short outline of what we're going to be saying about the crab fishery. I saw Mr. Wappel on CPAC mentioning how he would be coming this way to get the other side of the story. Unfortunately, we don't have a lot of time, but we will do our best to present that other side of the story momentarily.

    In the pack, though, we have some letters we presented to Senator Gerald Comeau's committee on fisheries around owner-operator. He sent a letter to Mr. Thibault. We've included that letter for your information, as well as one letter I sent to Catrina Tapley of the Department of Fisheries and Oceans; and the letter of the Canadian Council of Professional Fish Harvesters--and we're a signatory to that--sent to Mr. Thibault in January on owner-operator and separation of fleet.

    We don't want to spend too much time; we wish we had more. We're in full support of the campaign to stop the flexibility that seems to be proceeding in the Atlantic fisheries policy, which we feel is the death knell of thousands of inshore communities in the Atlantic region.

    In terms of the loopholes, we are taking our place looking for legal standing in court cases to basically speak for the Atlantic inshore fishery, legally, in terms of closing those loopholes. We support it, and basically we have an organization that will do whatever it has to in relationship to this Atlantic campaign to get it across that flexibility has to be stopped.

    So that's my only point on that, and I'm sure you've heard plenty about it. We're in concurrence with most of the inshore groups who have already spoken.

    The second point I want to raise--because I didn't get a chance yesterday--is that we would support the Sierra Club. Mark Dittrick spoke to you yesterday, I think, on oil and gas. We saw your press release as well, Mr. Stoffer. We fully agree with what you had to say.

    Basically, I've included in the packet two letters that were written--one by me and one by Ron Cormier, the president--to Monsieur Thibault asking him to put a moratorium on oil and gas exploration around Cape Breton and the southern gulf. We explain the reasons why there.

    Myself, I worked for the MFU in the eighties in southwest Nova Scotia. We were founding members of NORIG, the first fishermen's organization that stopped Georges Bank drilling in the late eighties. That moratorium has kept going to the present day.

    My only point would be that DFO officials have said the Cape Breton and St. Lawrence area is more sensitive and more diverse than Georges Bank; there's no reason we should be doing what we're doing there. That's my point on that. Hopefully you'll read our correspondence and the struggle will continue.

    Having said that, then, let's move to crab. We've included in the packet we've given you an outline of our proposal to the Department of Fisheries and Minister Thibault for the permanent sharing. It's in the packet. It's entitled “Maritime Fishermen's Union: A Proposal for a Permanent Gulf-New Brunswick Inshore Snow Crab Fishery”. It's just the executive summary, but we've also included certain tables from a PowerPoint presentation we presented to Minister Thibault and to other ministers and politicians in January. That's for reference.

    What I'm going to try to do around our position on snow crab is to go through the outline, which is the smaller handout you have, read through it as quickly as I can, and refer at some points to some of these handouts around crab, to give you at least a picture of what's involved for the New Brunswick inshore fishery around this very difficulty and complex struggle.

    I'm referring now--and I'll read from it and explain as quickly as possible--to the document called “MFU: Presentation to the House of Commons Standing Committee on Fisheries and Oceans”. It's the section on the background and context for the permanent sharing.

    There are three dimensions here. The first is the background and context of this permanent sharing. I think it's important, and we want to point out to you that this isn't something that just happened in a year or two years. We've been struggling for over 10 years for a permanent share of this snow crab fishery. We're not johnny-come-latelies, or whatever, to this process, however it's been characterized.

    The other important point is that 25% of the snow crab in parts of area 12 are in what we would call inshore zones--in other words, they are close to shore--and catchable, in terms of adjacency, by inshore fleets.

    This is where we came up with our 12.5% of the TAC that we asked for originally in the proposal. It was related to the amount of snow crab that lay in inshore zones, and has historically. We certainly didn't get that amount, but we thought it was fair to ask for it on that basis. It wasn't simply a number pulled out of the air.

    In relation to that, we launched a fairly significant campaign with Quebec inshore groups in 1988 and 1989 calling for, with Quebec, an integrated inshore zone taking in the western southern gulf. We did that on the basis of being able to have inshore control over inshore crab and what was left of cod and other species in that zone to enhance the habitat and the various stocks, and to actually take some control over the inshore fishery for the hundreds of communities in that zone. That was related to our struggle around having a fair share of the crab fishery.

    What happened is the government, in the end, deemed it to be too high a level of “implementability”. That is the word they used. It was too difficult to implement on the part of the DFO, so we were refused. But it's important to put that history before you.

    Since 1995, we've been involved in a sharing process on a temporary basis. Out of the last eight years, from 1995 to 2001--because that was the instituted sharing program--we shared in five out of those eight years.

    This isn't the first time we've had trouble around the crab fishery, riots and difficult situations socially. In 1996 there was a similar situation around the sharing between various sectors, temporary and permanent sharing arrangements. My friend Mr. Comeau here, who's been in the inshore fishery in New Brunswick for 30 years, had rioters at his home. He was confronted in his own driveway by people who wanted to attack him about this issues. So it's not the first time we've had these problems.

    What the provincial government did, at the last moment--and we felt it was a sellout of the inshore, but that was our point of view--was to institute a sharing arrangement based on a $500,000 threshold, meaning that the midshore crabbers would be able to have a gross value to each of their vessels of $500,000 out of the TAC. On that basis, anything that was left would go to other groups, such as ours. We didn't agree with that kind of formula, but it was imposed that New Brunswick would have a share, with other groups, of whatever was left after the $500,000.

    The bottom line was that we didn't get into that sharing until that threshold had been reached. As a result, we did not share any crab in 1998, 1999, and 2000. We were shut out. We did share in 1995, 1996, 1997, and 2001.

    The average New Brunswick inshore share, if we average it historically over the four years that we did share during sharing arrangement, was about 8% of the area 12 TAC. In other words, when we did share, that's what we shared, at a level of 8%.

    In 2001 the sharing arrangement ended. The department or the minister did not institute a new sharing arrangement. The quota was at a peak of 22,000 metric tonnes, because it peaks and it valleys; it's a cyclical fishery. Basically, we shared only 4.5% of that TAC at its peak last year. We won't get into why that happened, but we were not the beneficiaries of the largesse of the minister--the midshore crabbers were--in terms of that very high quota.

    That's the history. We've been at this a long time. It has not been easy, and this year is an example of how difficult it continues to be around being able to be a participant on behalf of 1,300 inshore fishers in New Brunswick in this fishery.

    So we prepared for this year. We knew the sharing arrangement was up for grabs. We very carefully prepared a plan, a study, and a proposal to the minister. That's number two: “2003 Proposal for a Permanent Share of the Gulf of New Brunswick Inshore Fleet”.

    We tried to come at this in a way that was careful, reflective, and made sense in terms of the whole industry. The first thing we knew, our multi-species fleet...and multi-species is important because we don't make our living by any one species, although a species can become predominant. Based on the realities of the stocks, we survive by fishing any species we can and adding that together for an income. In New Brunswick we knew we needed to enhance our viability, reduce pressure on lobster stocks, and offset the loss of traditional cod. Our members hold 700 midshore, mostly fixed-gear, cod licences, but there's no cod. So we were in danger of losing our multi-species viability on many fronts.

    We attempted to put forward a plan that spoke to improving conservation, diversifying fishing opportunity for our fishermen, and creating an industry-driven capacity reduction program, particularly in lobster, which essentially meant we needed to find a way, as an industry, to reduce the number of fishers that were involved in the fishery, because there wasn't enough resource for everyone to make a viable living. There are tables in the handouts that speak to that reality.

    The current allocation policy in area 12 is the next point. As far as we're concerned, it is inequitable. That's the basis of most of our argument, and we think that's the basis of this fight.

    Conservation has been raised; the department says conservation is not really the issue. Extra effort has been raised; it has also been said by the department not to be the issue. The issue is equity and sharing.

    From our point of view, we feel that we deserve to have some share of this lucrative resource. On the part of others, they feel that what they have is what they want to keep. It's as simple as that, but that's the problem and that's the point of conflict.

    So when we say we feel that it's inequitable, which Rory has mentioned and I'll mention it very quickly.... There's a handout here called “Concerns”. What do we mean by “inequitable”? Here's our take on what that means. We'll try to be specific.

    Will an equitable inshore allocation, a fair share to us, reduce the viability of the area 12 midshore fleet? By their own studies, there's a financial break-even threshold for midshore vessels, conservatively estimated at $400,000 total in revenues. It includes $50,000 for the captain, some $29,000 for each crew member, costs, and an 11% return on investment--which is considered in the industry to be quite fair and quite reasonable.

·  (1345)  

    The Chair: Excuse me, which one are you referring to, exactly?

    Mr. Sandy Siegel: There are a whole number of handouts that relate to tables. It's the second from the last, entitled “Concerns”.

    The Chair: I've got it. Thank you very much.

    Mr. Sandy Siegel: The study is basically saying--and there are studies done that are available publicly--the break-even threshold is $400,000. It can be a little bit more for the cost of co-management and for the solidarity fund, but that no longer exists. But $400,000 in the area is fair.

    The only point I was making is that for our inshore fleet in 2001 figures, for gross revenue for all their fisheries--and they fish more than two months; they fish as long as there's water to be out on--their average gross income for the whole east coast of Gulf-New Brunswick was $58,000. That's the average. That's what they gross.

    The crabbers' average revenue per vessel last year was $750,000 gross, above the $400,000 threshold. It has been put forward by the department there will be stable landings projected over the next several years.

    This is information that DFO put out yesterday or the day before yesterday. In 2003, with an expected price between $2.50 and $3 per pound, the average landings will be from $550,000 to $600,000 for New Brunswick traditional crabbers with the fishing plan presented by DFO. This is without co-management fees, because there's no co-management agreement. If there was, it would be less than that, to some extent. But this is from DFO.

    The average landed value per vessel for the traditional crabbers between 1994 and 2002, eight years, was $616,000. That's also from DFO yesterday, sent out in their communiqués.

    When we say there's inequality going on, that's what we're talking about. We're talking about these figures, and we're talking about an average of $58,000 gross for inshore fishermen on the east coast of New Brunswick.

    The problem is that it has long been a source of conflict in the communities themselves and has created instability in the fisheries management plan. So we're stuck with a problem that doesn't go away, which is why we came forward with what we thought was a reasonable plan for some kind of permanent sharing.

    The struggle by inshore fishermen for more equitable sharing has resulted in only limited and temporary concessions. All we have is, when we've been able to get in beyond their threshold of income, we've gotten in, but it's difficult to plan. It's difficult to know how snow crab can be a part of our economic viability in terms of a multi-species fishery.

    New Brunswick inshore fishermen have been heavily impacted--this is another key point that isn't often raised--by the Sparrow and Marshall decisions. In fact, 50% of the coastal native communities in Atlantic Canada are on the east coast of New Brunswick, whether it's Burnt Church or Big Cove, or the issues that have been in the press before and since Marshall, or the Sparrow decision, which came in on the east coast of Canada in 1993. In Miramichi, the issues around the food fishery and Sparrow have been operating since 1993.

    When we went to the panel that the minister set up for the Miramichi last February, we estimated in our brief that 4 million pounds, or $16 million worth, of food fishery lobster had been extracted without any kind of compensation or covering in terms of licences bought out--4 million pounds in 10 years, from 1993 to 2002. That's 4 million pounds at $4 a pound, the average price over that 10 years, $16 million that has not been compensated or even recognized by the federal government.

    We've worked hard to deal with that, and not in a violent way. As we speak, there are people working for the MFU who are on the Neguac, Tabusintac, and Burnt Church wharfs helping Burnt Church fishers enter the spring commercial fishery for the first time under the new fisheries agreement. In Big Cove, we've set up mentoring programs for snow crab with the native fishermen. We've helped develop their fisheries organization, which was in the news yesterday, which basically called for the meeting between all parties to resolve the crab dispute. So we've done our share, but we've been impacted.

·  (1350)  

    Communities like Neguac, Richibucto, and Richibucto Cape, in a way, barely survive as non-native fishing communities today because of the licence transfers. We're not saying we don't have to live with Marshall; we're saying there have been real costs from Marshall.

    So when we get to the point that there's been rapid development in the snow crab fishery in native communities, it becomes a source of concern, because there are 1,230 inshore owner-operators who continue to be left out of the snow crab fishery as inshore fishermen. So you can appreciate after Sparrow and Marshall and lobster, now that we're watching snow crab going to native communities--rightly so, under Marshall--it's a little difficult to feel we have no share whatsoever in that resource over and above when other people have already made their money.

    New Brunswick is the only province in Atlantic Canada that does not have a substantial and permanent inshore snow crab fishery. Just look very quickly at the back of our document. It's a list of inshore snow crab allocations for 2001. I'll quickly move through it.

    What we want to show you here is the breakdown of inshore permits or licences held in snow crab in the Atlantic-Gulf region, Scotia-Fundy.

    For Nova Scotia-Gulf, it's 3,800 metric tonnes, 141 fishers--and this is the key column--27 tonnes per licence. For P.E.I., it's 637 metric tonnes, 28 fishers, 23 tonnes per licence. For Quebec, it's 60 tonnes per licence, 7,900 metric tonnes by 133 fishers. Newfoundland is key, at 57,000 metric tonnes, approximately 3,200 fishers, and 17.7 tonnes of snow crab per fisher. For Scotia-Fundy, the allocation is 20 to 24, 121 fishers, at 36 tonnes.

    Now, go back to spring 2003, New Brunswick. These are our fishers--1,300. We got 1,103 tonnes in the end--6.5% of the catch came to us out of this war over permanent sharing. We have 1,103 tonnes, but with 1,300 fishermen, it's 0.8 tonnes per fishermen. And we're going to try to live with that and make it work.

    Big Cove First Nation, which is fishing for the second time in snow crab, has 350 tonnes, 48 fishers, for 7.3 tonnes per fisher, and they fish right next to our fishermen. We have to live with that and work with that, and we have to help them.

    So we don't think we're being particularly outrageous when we argue we should have some share of the snow crab resource. Every other inshore fishery has it in every other province. As yet...well, now we're in.

    Next, under temporary sharing, the New Brunswick core fleet, we developed a successful and efficient fleet-based management approach in snow crab. We've been at it since 1995. It abides by the existing conservation and management regime set for the industry. We're going to continue to do that under permanent sharing. We're not going to change the way we fish; we're going to improve it.

    Also under temporary sharing, the New Brunswick inshore fleet used some proceeds, through a charter fishery of snow crab, to invest in programs for the benefit of the entire fleet, and--this is one key point--it will continue to do so under permanent sharing.

    Because we operate with a fleet management approach, it doesn't just go to individual fishers. It goes to individual fishers, but we manage it through partnerships and a draw. We've been able to finance a health program for inshore fishermen and their families through the crab--a joint sharing program they wouldn't be able to afford if we didn't have that program. We're not rich fishermen at $58,000 gross revenue per year. We've been able to develop a professional development fund and a resource enhancement fund.

    In terms of the permanent sharing, we're proposing to set up a fleet management investment fund to promote conservation and overall fleet viability. An industry-driven fleet capacity reduction program is the first priority for the use of this fund. Fishermen will participate directly in the development of this program.

    The bottom line is we're in trouble in the lobster fishery. We have too many fishermen and the resource is too small. We're not looking for the government to give us $40 million to buy us all out because we're in trouble. We're looking to take some of the resource we fish from the crab, set up a fund, and find the most imaginative, workable ways to begin to have the industry itself deal with the overcapacity.

·  (1355)  

    We're going to France, Norway, and the Shetland Islands in the fall to look at how it's done in those countries, because we want to know how to reduce our effort and maintain our viability without having to end up saying, we're out of it, we're getting older, we have nothing to fish, give us money. We don't take that approach. We're interested in finding our own solutions to our own problems, and to do that we need a fleet-based management approach, not just individual licences given out.

    The New Brunswick inshore fleet is proposing a fleet management approach for a permanent Gulf-New Brunswick inshore snow crab fishery that is consistent with current DFO policy and fishery management practices. The bottom line is that we're not against all of the new fisheries policy by any stretch, and we come under their guidelines. This management plan will include agreed-upon plans for managing any extraordinary decline in landings or landed value to protect the stock and to reduce pressure on them when they're vulnerable.

    We're not looking to destroy the stock, because we're coming into the fishery. We have only a percentage, and it's under quota. If the percentage goes down because the quota can't sustain it, our share goes down, just like everybody else's. We're quite willing to look at any measures necessary to protect that stock if we run into problems. We're no different in terms of conservation in all of our species--herring, lobster--from how we would be in snow crab.

    This management plan will also include agreement to respect established industry patterns with regard to processing and marketing of area 12 snow crab. We're extremely sensitive to the fact that the peninsula traditionally depends on that snow crab for employment of its workers. We have done it in the past, and we'll continue in this plan to do everything we can to make sure the largest majority of snow crab possible, given the averages in the province, will be processed there. We have no problem with that. We signed on to that in December, and we've been doing it every year of our temporary sharing.

    So we've made a proposal. It relates to the rationalization of our multi-species fishery, beginning with lobster, and it includes beginning to fish snow crab in a planned, permanent way. We got 6.5% of the TAC. Our historical average was 8%. We wanted 12.5%; we got 6.4% or 6.5%. We'll live with it.

    Let's talk about now, and then we'll end.

    The Gulf-New Brunswick inshore fleet is far from satisfied with parts of the snow crab plan. We worked hard, and at the end--Mr. Farrah isn't here--politics, as it was deemed, meant we didn't get what we had hoped we would get. But we're prepared to live and work within the plan. The plan must be upheld if confidence is to be retained in the rule of law with regard to the implementation of Canadian fisheries policy, especially in light of the events over the last week. If we don't hold to this plan, we're lost.

    For the same reason, any increase to the area 12 TAC...because there's talk that inherent in the plan were 4,000 tonnes that would be made available if the trappers signed a co-management agreement. If that is to be so, and they do--and we hope they do--all we're saying is that 4,000 tonnes should be shared according to the sharing formula in the plan. If there's any political push from the province or anywhere else to give all that crab to the crabbers to get them back on the water, we won't agree with that in any way, shape, or form. All that does is condone some of the things that have been going on, regardless of who did them. And we don't blame the crabber associations, but if there's going to be more crab--and we hope there's going to be a co-management agreement--share it among all the stakeholders.

    We met with the native fishermen in Big Cove yesterday. We believe government and industry should look at whatever is possible to compensate for the loss of the MNS, that crab vessel that was burned, and to ensure they have at minimum a replacement vessel to get out there and fish, because they're going to lose the season. The fish on that vessel go to the community and to single-parent families, and when it comes, it's really needed. If they've lost that, that's wrong and we should do something about it.

    All involved stakeholders in New Brunswick crab fisheries should confirm or reaffirm their commitment to maintaining traditional patterns. We've said that. It's important to listen to the situation of people who are poorer than you. The plant workers certainly are in even worse situations than we are.

    Second last, steps must be taken. We want the minister and his department to get talks going. We don't care if they're alone with each party or in a group eventually, but get something going to get this conflict resolved, because we' re losing it. What is it? It's a six-week fishery and we have a month left.

    Last, on the basis of the above, the minister and his department have to ensure, as soon as possible, a safe and speedy access to the snow crab fishery for all participants wanting to fish. We're not fishing now.

    Let me end by saying we're not fishing because we're scared to fish. We're being held from fishing basically because the crabbers would like us to change the program that gives us a permanent share, so we're not allowed to fish in order to destroy what we fought for. So we're not going out to fish. There's a lot of intimidation going on up in Tracadie and Shippegan and Caraquet, but someone has to come in who has the authority to resolve this so the people who want to fish can fish.

    This is going to get worse; it's not going to get better. We're hearing signs that the crabbers are ready to go fishing and we just pray that those rumours are right, because it's enough of this. Holding a province's fishery to ransom is really something I've never experienced. We've had our fights with the seiners in southwest Nova. We've had our struggles between gear types. I've never seen anything like this, and if it doesn't end, it's going to get dangerous.

    That is our position. Hopefully we haven't taken up too much time.

    Thank you.

¸  (1400)  

    The Chair: No, you haven't, indeed. Thank you very much.

    All right, we'll have questions with both groups. We will start with Mr. Stoffer.

    Mr. Peter Stoffer (Sackville—Musquodoboit Valley—Eastern Shore, NDP): Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

    My first question is posed to both of you, if you can answer briefly.

    We heard from the permanent crab associations earlier that there should be dockside monitoring on lobster landings. We also heard that yesterday in Halifax. I'd like your point of view on what you would think about dockside monitoring and weighing of lobster catches when they come in.

    Mr. Keith Paugh: We don't think very much of it. This has been discussed many times around our fishing groups. We're a licensed fishery. We have controls, trap limits, and we're seasonal. We've only a short season, and it's something that we don't figure is needed or called for.

    Mr. Rory McLellan: It's also interesting that this would emerge from a crisis where a riot takes place and property is destroyed. We now have a document from the crabbers saying that there should be regulations to judge quota on a fishery that doesn't have a quota. I believe it is very much a red herring.

¸  (1405)  

    Mr. Peter Stoffer: But in defence of the crabbers, not that I want to choose sides here, we've heard it from other organizations as well.

    Réginald Comeau (Provincial Coordinator, Maritimes Fishermen's Union): As you know, we don't think that dockside monitoring was instituted for individual quotas. We don't have quotas on lobster. We have no way, or no science, that proves to us that we can have quotas, because it's all uncertain to date. We have measures. We have seasons, trap limits. Dockside monitoring would be good for Revenue Canada. I don't know how it would be good for the conservation of the stock.

    Mr. Peter Stoffer: My next question is to the P.E.I. guys mostly.

    The last time I was here I heard from groups that they were concerned--and we also heard it this morning from an organization--about the Confederation Bridge and that it has an effect on current shellfish stocks and herring stocks in the Northumberland Strait. We spoke to science and they said they hadn't been informed about this in Ottawa. I'm wondering. It's only anecdotal evidence that I have. The reason I'm asking is that this has tweaked me, and I want to get to the bottom of it. Indeed, in your opinion, are you raising opinions to DFO officials that you suspect that bridge may have an effect on fish stocks?

    Mr. Keith Paugh: I'll answer that, Peter.

    It's a good question. We are not only very concerned about the bridge, which may have some effect on it, but we do have processing plants that are dumping their waste into the Northumberland Strait. There's also, in the process, a meat packing plant being proposed for P.E.I. that's going to be using the same system. We have no stage four larvae showing up in lobsters in the central strait. It's actually a dying area, and we have great concern that there is something causing that.

    We certainly would like DFO to look into that as soon as possible.

    Mr. Peter Stoffer: Have you asked them?

    Mr. Keith Paugh: We haven't. I'm actually attending a meeting next week. I was informed yesterday on P.E.I. that they have formed an environmental group--and those people are involved--affecting federal-provincial fisheries, industry, and hopefully from there we'll be able to work for something towards this.

    Mr. Sandy Siegel: On that subject, what I've heard is that one of the issues around that bridge is that the heat coming from the bridge is basically heating up the water. That's one of the issues they are dealing with in terms of the increase in the water temperature and the difficulties of various species like scallops and whatever being able to live in that kind of temperature. It's one of the complex issues that are coming up.

    In terms of the environment, we're facing it there, with our members, right at the bridge, and we're facing it in every area right up to Dalhousie, in terms of Belledune and the smelter, the fish plant and its effluent, aquaculture and its difficulties. We've formed a committee. We're working with Inka Milewski, who we think will be speaking here.

    Environment is becoming for the inshore fishery one of the most obvious and difficult issues. There is also information now that herbicides and pesticides that are used in agriculture can be shown to kill lobster larvae, and Inka will probably speak to that. It's probably one of the major threats we're facing in the southern gulf at this point.

    The Chair: Mr. Cormier, do you want to say something?

    Mr. Ron Cormier (President, Maritimes Fishermen's Union): Maybe, if I may add, Mr. Stoffer, on the bridge itself, I'm more or less convinced today that it did have an impact. That area was a huge, rich area for lobster and scallop beds and oyster beds, and after the strait crossing came out there and dredged and disrupted a huge portion of that body of water underneath, the stuff disappeared. There were huge oyster beds just covered with silt. I remember in 1985 there were huge lobster catches.

    Mr. Peter Stoffer: The reason I asked that is there are folks in Canso who believe part of their problem started with the causeway.

    Mr. Siegel, there is one thing that you and the crabbers agree on, which is that the decision was not based on conservation; it was based on equity and how we share the resource. That's basically the fight right there. I'm glad you said that, because we have information, or at least I have, from DFO that it was a conservation decision, which I never believed because this is the minister who allowed dragging off 4Vn, as you know, around Cape Breton during a moratorium of a winter fishery, which I know your organizations did not support. I am still upset with them over that.

    But my question, Mr. Siegel, is this. You said that New Brunswick is the only province in Atlantic Canada that does not have a substantial and permanent inshore snow crab fishery. I was in Cape Breton last year when there was a blockade in Glace Bay. Those were the exact same problems, and those temporary guys are saying they want to have a permanent access to it.

    Is it not true, then, that Cape Breton also has the same problem that was experienced here with you in terms of allocation of the resource? Because there was a blockade in Glace Bay last year, it was the same situation. The permanent guys were going to go out, and the temporary guys blockaded their boats from going out because they did not get an access to temporary quotas. They did not get any access to it, and they blockaded it, and they shut it down. You said that you're the only province without it, but in Cape Breton they say that they don't have a permanent access either, in a temporary sense.

¸  (1410)  

    Mr. Sandy Siegel: I'm not familiar with that. I know there's an adjacency issue around different...depending on where you are, there has been crab given out in a whole bunch of different ways in Cape Breton. So if that qualifies as certain people not having some....

    But the point we were making is that in Nova Scotia there are whole areas and zones, 18 and 19, where snow crab have been allocated permanently. In the gulf and in area 12 we have never had that kind of permanent share. That was our only point. There is permanent inshore crab allocated in Gulf-Nova Scotia.

    Mr. Peter Stoffer: My last statement, not a question, is that I do agree with you that the minister himself should come down here as soon as possible and have everyone sit down around a table and resolve this issue for the short term.

    Thank you.

    Mr. Sandy Siegel: Can I make one comment? There is something you said that I'd like to clarify.

    What I said was that conservation is not at issue here in terms of the inshore being allowed to enter this fishery. Conservation is not an issue because it's not in question. Whether or not it's shared twice or two ways, or the crabbers have the crab, or we have a share of the crab, it's a quota fishery. We've been fishing it in the same way as the crabbers have been fishing it since 1995, dockside monitoring, on-water observing, quota fishery. There's no difference. There's no negative impact to this stock because we get a share of the fish. That's what I'm saying. Is that clear? It's not exactly what you said, Peter.

    The Chair: Thank you.

    Mr. Roy.

[Translation]

    Mr. Jean-Yves Roy (Matapédia—Matane, BQ): I'm fine, Mr. Chairman. The two briefs seem clear enough to me and Mr. Siegel has just provided the clarification I was seeking.

[English]

    The Chair: Mr. Wood.

    Mr. Bob Wood (Nipissing, Lib.): I have one question to the P.E.I. Fishermen's Association. In their brief they say they agreed to sit on the advisory board to give advice to the policy review and hopefully make a difference, and they wanted to take a more active role in decision-making, and then farther down in the brief it says they have a problem here about the fleet separation and owner-operator policy, and there are a couple of aspects of that report that they find very disturbing.

    My question to you two gentlemen is what kind of influence, or what kind of input, did you have in defending this or keeping the status quo and keeping this? Obviously you think there are going to be some changes.

    Mr. Rory McLellan: Yes. On the external advisory panel there were groups of fishermen from right across the country, and every single one of them, to my knowledge, put forward the proposition that they were in favour of the owner-operator and fleet separation policies, yet emerging from the final draft is this concept of flexibility.

    I'm sorry, that notion wasn't put forward by anybody, right from British Columbia to the north, to the Great Lakes to the Lake Winnipeg fishermen, to every one on the east coast. Every single person said we have too much flexibility, what we need is less, and then you pick up the document and it says “flexibility”. Where did this come from? We think the only place it could have come from is some of our corporate friends, who were also given shares on the panel, who weren't very talkative.

    Mr. Bob Wood: That's disturbing.

    Mr. Rory McLellan: Also, if I may, as Canadians we look with horror at what's happened in British Columbia, where you now have one guy, and one corporation, owning about 60% of the salmon. The fishery has been destroyed. Whole towns are shutting down. That's what happens when the owner-operator policy fails. What we knew as a fishery in British Columbia doesn't exist anymore.

    Mr. Bob Wood: So do you have any recourse? Do you have another move you can make, or do you feel it's a fait accompli that this is going to go through with those recommendations that you people don't agree with?

    Mr. Rory McLellan: I got you.

    The Chair: Is there anything else, Mr. Wood?

    Mr. Bob Wood: No.

    The Chair I have a couple of questions for the P.E.I. Fishermen's Association on something you didn't mention. We heard a lot about the adjacency principle in Newfoundland. I wanted to have your comments on that as compared to the equity.

¸  (1415)  

    Mr. Rory McLellan: This is the external review panel on access review. My understanding is that adjacency certainly is an important component to judge particularly new access. Clearly we are not looking for allocations of Arctic char and so on, so adjacency is important.

    But I would think that the panel has found, and I believe the panel has pointed this out, that it's not in order, that equity would be equally important to adjacency, so in the case of tuna, gulf snow crab, and so on....

    We now have vessels that are capable of going.... These gentlemen here all have vessels now with which, because they have to, they can fish quite long distances from shore. So adjacency is not the issue that it once was. It's an issue that is raised by our colleagues in Newfoundland for reasons that some might consider self-serving.

    The Chair: The point was made, to us anyway, that nobody in Newfoundland saw Alberta sharing its resources with Newfoundland.

    Mr. Rory McLellan: It's called the national energy policy. They do share their resources with Newfoundland.

    The Chair: I suppose they mean literally.

    I want to ask the Maritime Fishermen's people this. We heard today from the Botsford Professional Fishermen's Association, and we found out that you get 15% of the total allowable catch, or the gross value or something, that you take 15% of something from each boat. Did I understand the evidence correctly? They think that's too much. What do you do with that money?

    Mr. Sandy Siegel: Are you talking about snow crab?

    The Chair: I'm talking about rock crab and snow crab.

    Mr. Sandy Siegel: It's not rock crab, it's snow crab.

    The Chair: Whatever. That's the title of the presentation.

    Mr. Reginald Comeau: That's an administration cost. The cost of the licence is very high. Depending on the price that you could get, there is the cost of the dockside monitoring, the cost of the observers at sea, and also the administration cost in itself. If you add up all of these costs, you're pretty near 15%. If some fishermen would like to do it differently, they will have to pay on their own. Also, the dockside monitoring companies and observers at sea prefer to deal with an organization or a group rather than individual fishermen.

    The Chair: Okay. Does the union itself have an allocation?

    Mr. Reginald Comeau: Yes. We have part of an allocation that we are using for our health fund. Also, we put some money toward an enhancement fund, like the scallop enhancement, and now we're trying to put on a program of lobster enhancement.

    Last year we had a quota of around 900 tonnes. Of that a percentage was taken by our fishermen, and the profit from that was used to build up the health fund and the enhancement fund. Just the cost to our members per head for the health insurance was $1 million. It's very costly to run a health insurance program. We have more than 1,000 members, and the money was used for that.

    This money is publicly known.

    Mr. Sandy Siegel: I might add that one of the resource enhancement projects we run is we have a company called Pecten Inc., which is involved in the development of the sea ranching of scallops. It works with co-ops of fishermen in our organization along the whole New Brunswick east coast. The Botsford Fishermen's Association is also trying to do that work. We have used our resources from that fund and in our work, which is fairly successful, to give them a hand over the years as well. That's an example.

    The Chair Great.

    I also want to thank you for the comprehensive comments you've made--both groups--and in particular as it relates to the crabbing issue, because we did want to hear both sides, or if there are more sides than two, from at least two, if not more. So I want to thank all our witnesses.

    We're all in on the questions? No comments. Question?

¸  (1420)  

    Mr. Peter Stoffer: We heard today from the crabbers. They didn't say they had total support, but they may have had leanings of support from the provincial government here in New Brunswick. Have you had discussions with the Province of New Brunswick on this specific issue? And to the P.E.I. people, I say congratulations on your McLeod’s Ledge solution.

    Mr. Sandy Siegel: I'll speak very quickly to that. We've had a very difficult time in the crab with the Province of New Brunswick. They essentially came out against a permanent share to the inshore. We have since had apologies from the provincial Minister of Fisheries over the lack of consultation that actually took place with inshore fishermen.

    Mr. Peter Stoffer: Thank you very much.

    The Chair: Why am I not surprised that even with the provinces we hear lack of consultation?

    Thank you all, gentlemen, for your evidence.

    I will now call for, as my clerk says, the third side of the triangle: the Department of Fisheries and Oceans, James Jones and Dr. Moriyasu.

    Welcome, Mr. Jones and Dr. Moriyasu. We've heard a lot about crab, but obviously we're not going to be limited to crab. But I'm sure our members will have some questions and look forward to hearing what you have to say.

    Please go ahead.

    Mr. James Jones (Regional Director General, Gulf Region, Department of Fisheries and Oceans): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

    As you say, the focus of our comments and presentation today will be on snow crab. Again, if there are questions on other issues, we'll try our best. We came prepared to talk about snow crab—what we do in terms of snow crab science and snow crab management—and to give the committee some history of the issue that surrounds the southern gulf snow crab.

    We had passed around a series of slides that we will be talking to. I trust that everyone has a copy of these.

    Essentially, the second slide is a description of the snow crab zones 12, 25, and 26 and, as well, the other zones that are within the southern Gulf of St. Lawrence. You will see that a number of different zones have been created. There is the large area, zone 12. There's 25 and 26, which are zones around Prince Edward Island that are essentially incorporated into the traditional zone 12 today. There were the inshore zones 18 and 19 in western Cape Breton, and there are, as well, the exploratory zones around the Magdalen Islands, along the Laurentian Channel, which are exploratory zones 12E and F.

    There are other sets of zones relative to zone 12 on the northern side of the Gulf of St. Lawrence, northern side of the Laurentian Channel, zones B, C, and D. These generally were not considered as historic parts of zone 12 or where the traditional zone 12 crab fishermen have fished. It has generally been in the southern part of the Gulf of St. Lawrence, not, for example, in the northern part of Anticosti Island or along the lower north shore of Quebec. They are part of zone 12, the way zone 12 was defined years ago, when it included essentially all of the Gulf of St. Lawrence.

    The next slide shows the fluctuation in landings since the late 1960s. The fishery really began in the mid-1960s as an experimental fishery in different parts of the southern gulf. The landings since 1969 have fluctuated between 5,000, 6,000, and 7,000 tonnes up to a high of 31,000 in 1981, down to about 7,000 or 8,000 in 1989-90. Since then, with our science program that looks at the biomass survey, which Dr. Moriyasu will talk about, we've seen in the last 13 or 14 years fluctuations around 10,000 or 11,000 tonnes, up to 20,000 tonnes, down to 12,000 tonnes, back up to 22,000 last year. The quota for this year was set at 17,000 tonnes.

    The next slide shows the value of these landings in the last 20 years or so since 1984. Of course, I think everyone's aware the value depends upon the level of the landings and the price received in the marketplace. Again, we can see there's great fluctuation in the overall value of the zone 12 crab fishery.

    One of the issues I draw your attention to is the 10-year period from 1984 to 1993 where the average gross landed value was about $33 million. If I compare that to the value in the nine years since 1994, we'll see that the average landed value is $94 million. That's three times what it had been in the previous 10-year period and that is essentially one of the key elements of why sharing is an issue in this resource. That, I think, probably demonstrates why sharing's an issue more than anything else. In the last decade, the value of the landings are three times what they have been in the previous decade.

¸  (1425)  

    Again, the following slide shows what the average landed value per vessel would be. You see the same kinds of distinctions showing, where in the 10 years from 1984 to 1993 the average landed value of a midshore vessel would have been about $250,000, and in the nine years since 1994 the average landings have been over $600,000--about $616,000, to be precise. Again, that's net of any sharing that has taken place since 1994.

    As well, you have no doubt heard about the co-management approach that's in place within the crab fishery. Co-management is essentially an agreement between DFO and the various participants in the crab industry to look at how we do our science, how we do our management and our protection.

    A number of industry-funded activities are part of that co-management agreement. Historically, they include the trawl survey so that we can estimate the biomass. They include scientific research on population biology. There's a comprehensive monitoring of soft-shell crab to minimize mortality; and in-season monitoring, including enhanced enforcement, air surveillance, vessel patrols, and market research and price determination.

    Dr. Moriyasu will go into more details on those aspects and how the science for snow crab is done.

    The last slide I'll talk about looks at the issue of sharing of the resource. As I say, this has really been an issue since 1994-95. It shows that we've had sharing in place in some form or another, beginning in 1994 at various levels, with the exception really of 1998, 1999, and 2000. What you see as well is, since the year 2000, the larger integration of the aboriginal communities into the snow crab fishery as a result of the Marshall decision. One of the things the 2003 plan does is try to regularize that sharing in some manner by making it permanent as opposed to temporary.

    That's the history of the levels of sharing within this resource. Obviously it's part of the issue that faces the industry today.

    With that, maybe I'll ask Dr. Moriyasu to go through some of the issues around snow crab science and stock assessment.

¸  (1430)  

    The Chair: Thank you.

    Dr. Moriyasu.

    Dr. Mikio Moriyasu (Head, Snow Crab Section, Gulf Region, Department of Fisheries and Oceans): Thank you.

    My section has been assessing the snow crab stock in the southern gulf since 1985, and we've been doing the same type of work on the Scotian Shelf since 1997.

    Our intensive snow crab stock assessment and related stock research was initiated under AFAP, the Atlantic fisheries adjustment program, when the stock in the southern gulf experienced an almost near-collapse situation in 1989. At the end of this project in 1995, the snow crab industry appreciated the type of work that we had introduced, and they decided to share in this project financially. So since 1995 we have been doing the same type of research and assessment activity in collaboration with the snow crab industry.

    Our target, as departmental biologists, is to maximize the exploitation--meaning more quota, if possible--but at the same time ensure the health of the stock. These two components are opposite, and once we try to increase the quota, the risk of overfishing increases automatically. So we have a very narrow threshold of danger and health, and for this work we need robust research. To do this, a co-management agreement with industry is prerequisite.

[Translation]

    The map on page 5 shows the location of our trawl survey stations. Each year, after the fishing season closes, we take samples at over 250 stations.

    Of course, we use a commercial vessel for this purpose and we always work very closely with the fishers.

[English]

    The next slide shows the results of the last 14 years of our research in terms of stock fluctuation. As you can see, the stock fluctuates on the basis of an 8- to 10-year cycle. Scientifically speaking, it's premature to say this is cyclic. We just covered about one and a half cycles, so it's very difficult to say this is a cycle. But for the moment, everybody considers that the stock is fluctuating in a cyclic manner.

    In 1988, when the stock was almost in a situation of collapse, we started the trawl survey. Since 1990, the quota was set for the first time based on the trawl survey. The trawl survey gives biomass. Biomass is the tonnage available for the fishery.

    So from 1988 until the end of this one cycle, which is 1999, we, in collaboration with the industry, took a very, very conservative approach so that this stock could be rebuilt. I think I can fairly say we have succeeded very well in this objective.

    The stock reached its highest abundance in 1993. This is a totally natural manner, so that even if we do not touch the stock, the stock goes down, and the stock went down towards 1999. Again, we had a good recruitment, new baby crab coming in, and the stock is now in a growth phase.

    But the conservative approach taken from 1988 until 1999 resulted in a good amount of reserve. You will see a red bar; those are the reserves of crab after the season. The green bar is the new recruits.

    As you can see, in the last three or four years--I put this bar in black--the remaining biomass after the fishery is not as much as it was before. That means the exploitation strategy has been a little bit aggressive in the past three or four years.

    The next slide shows that we know very well the distribution of exploitable crab. This type of information is provided to fishermen so that fishermen can plan their fishery before the fishing season, so they know where the concentration of crab is before the season. This concentration pattern changes from year to year, so it's very important to do the assessment annually.

[Translation]

    The next map shows exactly the same thing, except for crab which during the course of the fishing season, becomes soft-shelled crab. This particular type of crab is very fragile and not highly valued by the industry. Therefore, it's important to avoid taking this type of crab.

    Information of this nature is also distributed to fishers so that they can avoid landing this type of crab, which will serve to replenish stocks for the future.

[English]

    The next slide shows that our estimate--this is an independent estimate from the fishery; we compared with what fishermen are observing--and the fishermen's appreciation of the fishery corroborated very, very well. It means our biomass estimate is fair enough to be used for setting a quota.

[Translation]

    As I mentioned earlier, it's critically important to protect soft-shelled crab to protect future stocks.

    During the fishing season, we also send observers on board commercial fishing vessels to gather information about events that transpire during the season.

[English]

    The next slide shows that based on this--

¸  (1440)  

    The Chair: Excuse me. In that previous slide, the relationship between biomass index and CPUE, what's CPUE?

    Dr. Mikio Moriyasu: It's catchper unit of effort, which means the kilograms of crab caught by a trap hole, observed by fishermen.

    The Chair: Sorry to interrupt you.

    Dr. Mikio Moriyasu: As you can see in the next slide, to avoid the waste of soft-shell crab, the future recruitment, we close the small portion of the fishing grounds where the fishermen find a high incidence of soft-shell crab that is not marketable. This measure is to protect a small portion of the fishing grounds where there are not too many good crabs and to allow fishermen to complete their fishery. So it's cutting the finger to save the body. That works very well.

[Translation]

    The next table shows that in 1989, there was no such arrangement in place and the fishing season had to be shut down early because of high levels of soft-shelled crab that was not marketable.

    Since 1997, we have stringently enforced this kind of arrangement, and as a result, soft-shelled crab stock levels have remained low.

    The dotted lines represent the hypothetical level of soft-shelled crab stocks had this type of arrangement not been in place. We believe we have taken the proper steps, along with industry, to protect stocks.

[English]

    The next slide shows the future recruitment. As the biomass fluctuated in a cyclic manner, the future recruitment also fluctuated in a cyclic manner. The highest abundance of future recruitment was found in the mid-nineties and went down towards the end of the nineties, and actually the abundance is increasing. So this is good information, good news, for the industry that in the future the crab abundance will increase.

    Finally, page 18. This is a summary of what's going on in the southern gulf snow crab fishery. This fishery began in the mid-sixties. There was no comprehensive management regime and there was no quota. With the development of the industry, the catch increased very rapidly and reached its highest level in l981. Afterwards, we observed a sharp decline. This is clearly showing that without any management regime this fishery is very fragile, and it was in an almost collapsed situation in 1989.

¸  (1445)  

    Since then, as I mentioned, we started an intensive research program and set the quota with a very precautionary approach. The stock recovered towards 1993, reaching the highest level, and again going back down to the bottom, which is observed in 1999. But if we compare the lowest biomass periods in 1989 and 1999—10 years after—there is about a 20,000 tonne difference. Although the biomass was at its lowest level at the end of the nineties, owing to good management and using a biomass estimate-based quota system, we could survive the lowest biomass period, and now the biomass is increasing.

    I would like to mention the health of the stock. Short term, there's a strong recruitment, and the biomass will increase until 2004 or maybe 2005. But this fishery is always fluctuating in a cyclic manner. It's a kind of four-year baby boom, followed by a four-year lack of babies. So it's clear this biomass will decrease toward 2010.

    We are now getting smaller and smaller crab--25-cent size--and those small babies will be commercial size in 2015. It takes about 12 to 15 years for babies to become fishable size. This is a very long life cycle for an invertebrate.

    So, short term, the stock condition is very good, but on the other hand, we are getting signs of stress in the stock, such as the biomass depending more and more on the newly recruited crab. This is one alarming sign. The catch per trap, CPUE, has been decreasing gradually but continuously. This is not a very good sign. Also, we are observing a high mortality of soft-shell crab because of the high abundance of new recruits. This is also an alarming sign. Since 1997, the mean size of commercial crab has been decreasing. This is also not a very good sign. Last year, we saw some local overfishing effects.

    So those signs are alarming. Also, we've found the mature females have decreased by about 30% compared to 10 years ago.

    We don't really know what this means, so we are again intensively doing our research to look at the behaviour of the stock vis-à-vis commercial fishing. Again, we are on the threshold of danger in the health of the stock. This is totally natural and normal, because we are trying to optimize the commercial fishing for the industry. The only way of ensuring this works is through co-management, so that we can continue our robust science.

    Thank you very much.

¸  (1450)  

    The Chair: Thank you very much, Doctor.

    Now we'll go to questions. We'll start with M. Roy.

[Translation]

    Mr. Jean-Yves Roy: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

    You've pretty well answered my question, Mr. Moriyasu. I'm a layman, not a scientist. However, if one considers current conditions, fundamentally, a number of the criteria you employ are in the negative range.

    Could even the slightest bit of overfishing cause a much faster than anticipated decline in stocks?

    Dr. Mikio Moriyasu: I believe that's possible. As I see it, it's like driving a car down the highway at 140 km per hour in a snowstorm, or at night, without headlights. All we can do is continue our research.

    If ever the signs point to stocks being in danger, we can adjust catch levels, with the industry's cooperation. That's what happened this year. We suggested that quotas be adjusted downward. The industry totally agreed with our position. Even though stocks are increasing, we have maintained quotas at low levels.

¸  (1455)  

    Mr. Jean-Yves Roy: What exactly do you mean by local overfishing? Are you referrring to specific sectors?

    Dr. Mikio Moriyasu: Yes, in des Chaleurs Bay, for example, catches exceeded somewhat the available biomass in this sector.

    Mr. Jean-Yves Roy: Zone 12, for example, is divided into sub-zones. You're saying that overfishing is currently going on in zone 12.

    Dr. Mikio Moriyasu: Precisely.

    Mr. Jean-Yves Roy: Thank you. Perhaps I'll come back to this subject a little later.

    As you know, there's a problem with the crab industry. You work in this field. We've long been grappling with the issue as to whether 1,300 additional crab fishers -- I believe that's the current estimate -- in this zone would endanger the resources. This morning, crab fishers were armed with a table showing an increase in the overall number of fishers since 2002. Would an additional 1,300 fishers increase the possibility of overfishing in this zone?

    Dr. Mikio Moriyasu: That's a very difficult question, one that cannot easily be answered. To so do, I would have to speculate a great deal.

    Mr. Jean-Yves Roy: I know that there are people seated behind you who are interested in my question.

    Dr. Mikio Moriyasu: Once the quota has been met and all of the new fishers act in the same manner as the traditional fishers, then the overall number of fishers, boats or traps will not affect the health of the stocks to such an extent.

    Mr. Jean-Yves Roy: What do you mean by “to such an extent”?

    Dr. Mikio Moriyasu: However, when snow crab are plentiful on the seabed, the presence of a larger number of traps certainly results in a higher mortality rate. Therefore, it boils down to what I was saying earlier. If all fishers behaved in the same manner as the more experienced ones...Generally speaking, experienced fishers, or those with some experience, know how to avoid catching this type of crab. If everyone abides by the rules, then from a scientific standpoint, there is no impact to speak of.

    Mr. Jean-Yves Roy: Thank you.

    I have another question, but this time, for Mr. Jones. Would you care to add to that answer, Mr. Jones?

[English]

    Mr. James Jones: Yes, I was going to add something to the answer Mikio gave to your question.

    I think one of the things to look at in crab is that it's not a fishery that's managed just on the basis of a quota. We harvest only males, not females, in this fishery. We have a series of strict controls. And I think if you look at the question of whether the number of fishermen is a key to whether or not one can sustain the activity, it's not just on the basis of a quota that we manage. As I say, we have the white crab protocol, which, if we adhere to it, if we do the enhanced science and the co-management with the industry, with all of the industry, so we will be able to predict what the recruitment will be in coming years, it will give us the time to adjust.

    If you look at the slide that shows the level of landings, especially since 1989 when we began the biomass survey, you'll see that the quota that's harvested each year fluctuates up and down depending upon a set of factors that includes recruitment, how we're doing on things like white crab, and the state of the stock. It's not just strictly based on a quota, with the quota being the only basis for management. It is a complicated question to answer. It's a fishery that's managed, I think, differently from how a lot of our traditional groundfishes have been in the past, where it was just a number and everybody fished to that number.

¹  (1500)  

[Translation]

    Mr. Jean-Yves Roy: Mr. Jones, if I'm not mistaken, your responsible at DFO for this sector. Correct?

    Mr. James Jones: That's correct.

    Mr. Jean-Yves Roy: I have a question for you that is somewhat puzzling. How is it that the media were advised of the fishing plan before the industry itself? Is that standard procedure for the department? As a rule, shouldn't the industry be informed first?

[English]

    Mr. James Jones: No, and I think it was a little unfortunate.

    One of the things that happened was that the minister did say, in answering some questions outside of the House last Friday, yes, he'd made a decision on the crab plan and he had released it. The work to get a final press release ready had not been done. There were some final changes, and there is translation always to make, so the final copies of the official version in two languages were available only at about 5 o'clock or 5:30 in the afternoon. I think that's where some of the confusion came from.

    Our aim is to be able to have a press release that goes to industry, to media, and to our own staff in real time. Sometimes that's not always possible. In a situation like zone 12 crab, we have to try to get this press release to hundreds of different media outlets, groups, provinces, and our own staff. Some of it takes time, and some people do get it before others. There's no doubt about that.

[Translation]

    Mr. Jean-Yves Roy: I guess the communications system short-circuited, so to speak.

    You spoke briefly about co-management of the fishery. There is no longer a co-management agreement in place in zone 12. You're the Regional Director General. How did the co-management arrangement work out for DFO employees? Were they satisfied with the results? Did everything go smoothly? Would you like a new co-management agreement to be concluded quickly, so that work can proceed jointly with the industry?

[English]

    Mr. James Jones: Absolutely.

    The co-management covered a lot of our enhanced scientific efforts, our enhanced monitoring and enforcement efforts, as well as management and some market research efforts. I think most of our staff in the region, here in the gulf and in Quebec, which is implicated as well, would say they very much appreciated the additional resources and cooperation with the industry under co-management. I think, without a doubt, most people would see that as the means to continue for the future.

[Translation]

    Mr. Jean-Yves Roy: Thank you.

[English]

    The Chair: Mr. Wood.

    Mr. Bob Wood: No, thanks.

    The Chair: Mr. Stoffer.

    Mr. Peter Stoffer: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

    Thank you, Mr. Jones, and Doctor, for your presentations.

    I have all kinds of questions. The first one I'm going to ask is on P.E.I. They have 1,300 core fishermen. Last year, in a temporary sharing allocation of crab, they received 221 tonnes. This year, with the permanent sharing, they receive 110 tonnes. I guess the question is why such a reduction? I have it here as a 62% reduction from a temporary share to a permanent share. Just by the numbers, it looks as if they would have been better off with a temporary share. Why the reduction?

    Mr. James Jones: As you know, fisheries is a very complicated issue. When we began the temporary sharing in 1995, we had a special fund that was in place in 1994, but we began in earnest the temporary sharing in 1995.

    There are a couple of factors always at play in the fishing industry. In many of these stocks, with the fleets from the different provinces, the provincial governments themselves argue that one of the bases for future decisions in this industry should be historic shares by fleet or by province, or what have you.

    When the sharing was done initially in 1995, we did not follow those historic shares, in part because P.E.I. and Nova Scotia were in zone 12 at that time and would have received very little. So for the temporary sharing done in 1995, we allocated additional amounts to P.E.I. and Nova Scotia, with the explanation that because it was temporary sharing we would not follow the historic shares existing in this industry. It is certainly a point that the fleets in the provinces of New Brunswick and Quebec have raised continually since 1995. The resulting discussions indicated that we were doing this because it was temporary. If we were making a permanent decision, we would try to follow more closely the historic shares. This is the situation with Prince Edward Island, where we're essentially following the historic share.

¹  (1505)  

    Mr. Peter Stoffer: So it's based more or less on historic applications, not conservation issues.

    Mr. James Jones: Absolutely.

    Mr. Peter Stoffer: Okay.

    My second question is about the PEIFA, which made what I thought were some very serious allegations in saying that trust agreements were being used to allow rich crabbers with corporate interests to buy numerous slots or fleets at various locations throughout the gulf.

    As the person responsible for fisheries activities in the gulf, are you aware of any trust agreements between corporate interests, like crabbers, for example, buying up lobster licences? I just pick crabbers for sake of example. In essence, they would have what we heard yesterday exists in Nova Scotia, where there are 200 trust agreements going on. The reason I raise this is the fear that the large corporate sector, or those with deep pockets, will eventually control lobster licences in ever-increasing numbers, thus going to an ITQ system in some way or the other.

    First of all, are these trust agreements legal? Do they in fact exist and are not just rumours? If they do exist and are not legal, I'd like to know what you're doing about them; and if they are legal, are they the trend for the future?

    Mr. James Jones: Again, it's a difficult question to answer.

    We issue licences to individuals, especially for vessels of less than 65 feet.

    Like many others, I've heard rumours that many of these individuals have civil contracts or, as you say, trust agreements with bankers, for example, or with people who finance their activities. I've heard rumours that there are fishermen who have civil contracts with others to control a number of licences. I've heard rumours that crab fishermen control other licences, and I've heard rumours that lobster fishermen themselves control multiple sets of licences. But in terms of hard data on this, no, we don't have any.

    We essentially provide the licence to an individual. Our view is that if the civil contracts become an issue, there's a process in this country to deal with civil matters. But our view is that we provide the licence to an individual.

    Mr. Peter Stoffer: Of course, the other concern that I've raised on numerous occasions is the possibility that the Confederation Bridge may have an impact on fish stocks in that area. Have you heard those concerns? If indeed you have, have you raised them with people in Ottawa to at least undertake a review or a study of what effect that bridge may or may not have on fish stocks?

    I say this because all the information I have is anecdotal; I don't have any scientific information saying it is one way or the other. But have you heard those concerns, and have you brought them to Ottawa's attention for review?

    Mr. James Jones: Yes, I've heard the same concerns expressed by different people and groups from time to time. Our science people have as well. What we've said is, okay, can we try to collect some basic information?”

    When you ask us to do research on this, the first question is, well, what is it one would study? I listened to you ask the same question to the representative of the Prince Edward Island Fishermen's Association, and they talked about other factors that were in play as well, which is the difficulty when you look at.... The fact is that in the central part of the Northumberland Strait there have certainly been significant declines in lobster, and some declines are showing in other species, scallops in particular. It essentially coincides with the construction of the Confederation Bridge, but is it a direct cause and effect? That's very, very difficult to establish.

    Mr. Peter Stoffer: I have two very quick questions.

    I ask you this every time, Jim, and you give more or less the same answer. But just for the record, we've heard a lot of people say there certainly aren't the people or the resources within the science branch of DFO to do an effective job at what people would like to see done in terms of meeting the responsibility to protect fish and fish habitat.

    Second, with the situation in Shippegan and the concern about crabs in New Brunswick, have you made recommendations to the minister or advised him in the last few days to come down here himself to address a meeting of all the stakeholders, to come up with a very quick, short-term solution to get people fishing, and then to address the long-term concerns?

¹  (1510)  

    Mr. James Jones: In response to your first question on science, I'm not sure that we ever have enough money to do the kind of research on all of the issues affecting fish, fish habitat, and oceans that are confronting us. We try to prioritize as best we can what we should study with our clients, universities, and provincial governments.

    But do we have enough to do everything effectively? The answer is no. Would we ever have enough? I'm not certain. But clearly, I think everyone agrees there are an increasing number of issues confronting us from a science perspective or in just understanding all of the interaction. I guess the short answer is, no, we don't have enough funds to do everything, and I don't think anyone ever would.

    On the other issue, the minister indicated from the day he released the crab plan that he's willing to sit and talk with the industry on these issues. He's still prepared to do that. I know there was some written correspondence to the crab industry, probably going out late last night or this morning. It reiterated the minister's willingness to sit down and talk through some of these issues with the industry.

    The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Stoffer.

    Mr. Jones, I don't know if you know this off the top of your head, but what was the snow crab quota in 2000?

    Mr. James Jones: In 2000 it was something like 15,000 or 15,500.

    The Chair: Roughly.

    And what was it in 2001?

    Mr. James Jones: In 2001, it was 13,800.

    The Chair: And in 2002?

    Mr. James Jones: It was 22,000.

    The Chair: And this year?

    Mr. James Jones: The quota is set at 17,148.

    The Chair: Okay.

    Now, in this slide that the doctor talked about, “Review of Stock and Fishery”, the 10-year trend shows his arrows going up at a sharp angle. If the arrows are going up, why is the quota coming down?

    Mr. James Jones: Mikio, maybe I could try to answer that, and you could maybe fill in some of the technical pieces I may be lacking.

    As Dr. Moriyasu identified, I think one of the things we had in place is increasing recruitment in this fishery. In terms of what are called zones 12, 25, and 26, which include the P.E.I. zone, the scientific advice this year was to have a maximum harvest mortality not exceeding 20,000 tonnes. It's a little complicated, because in the 2003 management plan we also included area 18, or one of the coastal areas in western Cape Breton, in the zone. So we have to add that biomass as well. But I'll just limit my explanation to zones 12, 25, and 26 for now.

    So the scientific advice was to limit the harvest mortality to a maximum of 20,000 tonnes. In the past six or seven years, we've had the enhanced science of the biomass survey, or the enhanced monitoring, and the soft-shell crab protocol. What it did was to limit very greatly the mortality from the harvest of soft-shell crab, or the crab that have just moulted. In the absence of an agreement with the industry, we do not have the soft-shell crab protocol in place.

This is the one where we divide zone 12 into 10-mile by 10-mile grids. We analyze daily what the landings would be, and we close these small grids when soft-shell crab start to appear. This avoids the harvesting of soft-shell crab and mortality.

    Without that agreement, we've had to estimate there would be a larger mortality associated with harvesting and handling of soft-shell crab. It could be more than 3,000 tonnes. For example, if we set the commercial quota at 20,000 tonnes and we also had another 3,000 or 4,000 tonnes in mortality from the harvesting and discarding of soft-shell crab, the total mortality would be 24,000 tonnes, which is above the scientific advice. As the scientific advice was for a maximum harvest of 20,000—and it's a little higher when I add in area 18—and in the absence of the white crab protocol, we set the commercial quota at 16,000 or 17,000, giving ourselves an allowance of up to 3,000 tonnes or so, which would be the mortality from the harvest of soft-shell crab. In this way, we can stay within the conservation limits recommended by science.

    So this is essentially why the quota was set at a very conservative level.

¹  (1515)  

    The Chair: I wonder if it would not then have made more sense to announce: the quota will be 17,000, in the absence of a co-management agreement, because we have to have proper conservation; if we have a co-management agreement, it is clear that the quota will clearly be higher. Couldn't we have said it that simply?

    Mr. James Jones: In hindsight, you're probably correct that we should have been much clearer.

    The Chair: All right. I'm a little disturbed by your graphs, which show apples and oranges that are hard to compare.

    I'll give you an example. You have data for snow crab landings from 1969 to 2002. The next graph is of snow crab landings in terms of money, yet it doesn't go from 1969 to 2002; instead, it goes from 1984 to 2002, with no explanation. Then you also have the average landings per vessel going from 1984 to 2002, with no explanation. So we don't know what happened from 1969 to 1984.

    It just looks like figures have been picked to back your argument.

    Mr. James Jones: I could give you a very simple explanation, if you want.

    The Chair: Let me just finish, though.

    Then you have your biomass fluctuation in area 12. It says area 12—which isn't area 25, which isn't area 26, which isn't Cape Breton, but area 12. You have it running from 1988 to 2002 as opposed to 1968 to 2002. And your last graph, “Review of Stock and Fishery”, starts in 1968, not 1969, when the first graph started. It then goes to 2002. Then when you gave your evidence on the total allowable catches and the average landing value, you didn't even refer to the graph; instead, you pulled out the years 1994 to 2003.

    How are we to make sense of all of this, if each graph is different?

    Can I ask you, what is the average snow crab landing in metric tonnes from 1968 to 2002?

    Mr. James Jones: If I could give you an explanation, the landings graph is shown from 1969 onward because we feel we have solid data for those landings in the early years.

    When we go to the landed value, we start in 1984 because we're essentially less confident that we have good price data prior to 1984. If we go back to 1969, 1970, and 1971, we're not confident we have really good data on what prices were paid to fishermen, to give us the overall landed value. That's why 1984 was chosen. We're very confident in the price numbers since 1984. So we simply felt that it might have been a little misleading to try to put a value on the years from 1969 to 1984, when we really didn't have much confidence in the price estimates we were getting.

    In terms of your question on the slide showing the biomass estimates starting in 1988, the answer is that year was the first year we had the biomass survey. In the years prior to that, there was no biomass survey, so there was no possible way to estimate that.

¹  (1520)  

    The Chair: There has to be, because you had a catch in 1983 of close to 35,000 metric tonnes. If you caught that many, there had to be more than that in the ocean.

    Mr. James Jones: I think the issue is that in the years prior to 1988, the survey Dr. Moriyasu described was not in place. Yes, we had quotas set and we had very large catches, but our science was not based upon a biomass survey; our science was based simply on analyzing commercial data from the previous years, which is the case in many other fisheries.

    The biomass survey allows us to be much more precise, by estimating the numbers of crab on the bottom. It only began in 1988.

    The Chair: I'm not going to try to get into a debate with a scientist on graphs, but as a layman, I would say from my own observations that we're now hitting our third peak. One of the peaks isn't shown, because there clearly had to be a lot of crab in the ocean if you could catch 35,000 metric tonnes, and there wasn't a huge decline in the species immediately thereafter.

    I think it's clear that everybody agrees it's cyclical, but the issue is just the figures you're using to justify whatever you're doing.

    Mr. James Jones: Mr. Wappel, I will get you the figures as soon as I can calculate what the average landings would have been from 1969 on. I just have to calculate them.

    The Chair: Don't bother, as I just used that as an illustration. But I wouldn't mind seeing the figures from 1980 to 2003 as an average.

    Having said that, isn't the industry in this particular case funding most of the science?

    Dr. Mikio Moriyasu: Yes.

    The Chair: In the absence of a co-management agreement, it's funding none of the science?

    Dr. Mikio Moriyasu: Very basic points that we can ensure, and it's not enough.

    Let me explain. In 1987, just before this stock almost collapsed, my research document said there was no sign of danger to the stock, so we could keep going. That was my suggestion to industry, because we only had the capability of making catch data estimates. It clearly shows that without having intensive research programs, as we now actually do, we cannot ensure the health of the stock.

    The Chair: I don't want to go on too long, which I'm sorry I have done. I have many more questions, but they'll have to wait.

    Thank you very much.

    Monsieur Roy.

[Translation]

    M. Jean-Yves Roy: Are the trawler survey stations shown on page 5 permanent?

    Dr. Mikio Moriyasu: Yes, these are permanent stations. Each year, surveys are conducted at the same stations.

    Mr. Jean-Yves Roy: Therefore, if you were to alter your stations in some way, you might obtain different results.

    Dr. Mikio Moriyasu: The statistical technique that we currently employ provides the best possible estimates.

    Mr. Jean-Yves Roy: Sort of like positioning yourself at a street corner and counting the number of passing automobiles.

    Dr. Mikio Moriyasu: Exactly.

[English]

    The Chair: Thank you so much, gentlemen.

    Could we now have the New Bandon Fishermen's Association, and Paul Jagoe, Michel Arseneau, and Gerald Haché.

    Welcome, gentlemen. Let's start the presentations.

¹  (1525)  

    Mr. Michel Arseneau (New Bandon Fishermen's Association): Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It's nice to see you again.

    The Chair: It's nice to see you, as well.

    Mr. Michel Arseneau: As you know, we are a group of class B fishermen. I want to first explain what a class B fisherman is and then I'll come back to the restrictions of 1976. There are lots of people here, some of our brothers who are fishing, who have heard a lot of things, rumours about sharing and things like that. But I don't think they have ever shared with the B fishermen, though we have asked them to share. You will see from the representation, especially from the group previous to Mr. Jones.... They were supposed to look after all fisherman as per the legislation, but they have never done so.

    We'll come to that, but first, our group is the mandated committee for the New Brunswick Fishermen “B” Association.Mr. Paul Jagoe, Gerald Haché, and I, Michel Arseneau, are proud to accept your invitation to the session of the Standing Committee on Fisheries and Oceans here today.

    We would like to bring forward a list of injustices that are still pending with your department. You know what we are asking for when we met in Rimouski. The minister answered us, and his answers were, as Mr. Jones explained a while ago, that you don't know where you are. There are rumours. The committee was told by Mr. Stoffer that we had.... Accountability was not good in Parliament over the last 30 years. We have never had a conscientious answer for this.

    That's why we're here today, to bring forward the injustices and to try to clarify item by item where the injustices have been pending. From 1968 onward.... This is not in the paper; I'm just trying to give you the format.

    Before 1968, there were some “B” fishermen, like me and everybody else here, who were bona fide, and as far as we're concerned, we're still bona fide. But with all the mismanagement of the fisheries in this region by Ottawa, we were more or less dragged down into the “B terminal effect” syndrome. We have enough evidence to bring it to court, if we have to. We've been trying, through lobbying and political issues, to bring it to the stand so that it's thrown out.

    The first thing is that we don't agree with the minister's answer to the standing committee in Rimouski. His answer referred to 1976, which is not true. That wouldn't stand a minute in court.

    Second, we don't agree with his verbal answer in Caraquet. He and his secretary were supposed to meet with us alone. He had somebody from the Moncton office, plus the gentleman, Dominic LeBlanc, with him. We didn't feel at ease, and he didn't do much to help us either.

    Third, we don't agree with the decisions made behind closed doors by DFO officials on our future in the fishery. We had absolutely no input as Canadian citizens to argue those behind-closed-door decisions. We are annexing pending documents complete with DFO file numbers. Number 1, if you refer to the paper, explains.... And you won't see the name of Gerald Haché, Paul Jagoe, or me on it; it's clearly a list of people in my area, a document as such from DFO, and we're not in there.

    Then if we go to item number 2, we had a guy come meet us there. We had a meeting in Memramcook. District 7C was the hardest hit, with 79 B licences. Throughout our area, from Tabusintac to Dalhousie, there were 303 fishermen comprising the North East Amalgamated Fishermen's Association. That association was completely bona fide. Out of those 303 fishermen, 79% were against the new policy coming up, and they never listened to us.

    From then on--you can see there, if you look, that it says that the old B licences were those that had been categorized as such back in 1968. The new ones after 1968 were supposed to be terminal, because we had three or four traps and they gave them 375 traps. That way there was a glut of people, and you would have sold the licences that the minister mentioned in his letter had been bought, because you had only four traps, and finally, you were given a paper that mentioned you had 375, but you had never acquired the rigging to fish. You sold for $12,000 in 1976 something equivalent to $200,000 today. All this is to say that it was a mix-up.

    I heard Mr. Cormier and they had a very good presentation a while ago. But in their constitution--if you go to number 3, the last paragraph, it is from their own constitution and it's marked: “I want to explain why the deduction of dues for all fishermen (members and non-members) is so important. The companies know very well that it will be the end of M.F.U. if we don't collect these dues.”

    Well, we were bona fide then, and they never approached us. They say “When we negotiate, we must represent all fishermen...”, but when they were talking today they were not representing me. They have been trying to get us off the boats for a long time. We have a share in those resources as well, but they don't share.

    We asked them to share one time, to take three traps out of the 375 traps. We made a stepladder graph and sent it to Minister Siddon, Minister Dhaliwal, and Minister Tobin, asking them to bring the number down from 375 to 372. They could have brought all the B fishermen back in slowly, five at a time, and also integrated the Indians. What did they do? They saw our graph. They went down to 300 traps and they left us out. You call that sharing? Never.

    But to finish this, they say, “all fishermen and not just union members. This is required by legislation.” If this group here had to talk like they talked today--and they can get away with it, that's the trouble. We're Canadians, and if they want a royal inquiry for the crab, we'll have a royal inquiry into something else, too. This is to no end.

    Now they have the gall to say an average of $58,000 for fisherman who fish scallop, crab, herring, mackerel, groundfish. They had some groundfish last year. In 1978 we asked them to curtail all codfish nets and they were supposed to be doing the conservation. We had that in our brief that we sent to Ottawa. We asked for hand online only. At home two of the members came up with groundfish draggers. Everything goes against what they are saying.

¹  (1530)  

    If you make an inquiry into...if you don't have any weigh-in at the wharves, how can you give any statistics? Mr. Jones couldn't give the true statistics a while ago, because they don't have any. They are taking Canadians off the sea instead of taking 40%, as Mr. Thibault wanted to do, with the approval of DFO and the union or whatever is backing it up. If you instigate a weigh-in at the wharves, I would say within three years you could put some more young fishermen at sea because you would have true statistics on the landings.

    Also, they tried to evade income tax a while ago. Look at that very closely. We're fishermen here; we're not supermen. These gentlemen caught 6,600 pounds with 90 traps last year. What's the average? I would say the average is about... They declared, in our statistics for districts 23 and 25, a 6,500-pound average for last year. It's amazing. It's amazing how we can't suffice...and have a group of elite fishermen who want to have the resources for themselves, and then pay the crabbers, to have some money to buy licences, because they want to have two or three licences. And they said they're against company buying. They want to have bigger licences themselves. It's an unending thing.

¹  (1535)  

    If you go to number 4, we have something from Mr. Conan in there, who was then a biologist for the Department of Fisheries and Oceans. Under the heading on page 5 where they talk about conservation, they didn't have any follow-up on that. We've marked the line, “Mr. Conan said that his department doesn't have any information on lobster migration”. That was in 1984-85, and they still don't have any now. They still don't have any weigh-in at the wharves, no true statistics.

    How can they go and impede somebody else? First they should share with us. They want everybody else to share. They never want to share with us. They want us out of the water. That's what the answer is.

    Then, if you go to page 9, we had Ron Louden--that's why I explained the ladder a while ago--who “informed the committee that 32B fishermen in the involved zone would be an increase of 8,000 traps”. He went on to say that he personally didn't think they would all go up to a bigger licence in the same year.

    Anyway, that's why I tried to explain a while ago that we had a ladder. We put everything forward. We are Canadian citizens. We pay our own tax and we declare all our fishing, because with a limited fishery.... We were at 30%, and this was supposed to be to the end of our time, they said. But all of a sudden they started cutting down and they cut us down too.

    We had 113 traps. Since 1996, the DFO or whoever made that move owe us at least $5,000 per year for fish not coming in. We had to curtail... [Inaudible—Editor They've cut the industry and all that.

    Then to follow the presentation, we'll go to number 5. I want to get through it because we don't have too much time.

    In number 5 we refer to a memorandum from Maurice Levesque to Alphonse Cormier. All this was done behind closed doors. We were never told that we had one year to be able to come up to bona fide. We were still class B, as mentioned there: “At this moment the only section in Atlantic where there is lobster fishermen Class 'B' is in the East of New Brunswick. I am not too aware for the moment of...having licenses of Class 'B' terminal”,because eventually they'll be phased out. But it clearly says here that the “Class 'B' will...become Class 'A'”.

    You see right there that this defies and destroys Minister Thibault's answer to us in his letter. He said we could not upgrade since 1976. That's all rumours and hearsay, and they don't have anything concrete. If we go to court with that, we'll win. But for our own sake, we want to settle it and we've asked for a settlement.

    We had this statement in 1985. We had a year to say, and we could have frozen our licences then, as they do right now. All the core fishermen could freeze their lobster licences, go out to work for five years, and then come back to fishing after five years. What is the trouble with this department? We were working 40 hours a week. They could work 35 hours a week and still fish.

¹  (1540)  

    You see, it's discrimination by an elite group that wanted the sea for themselves. There are 33,000 commercial fishermen in Atlantic Canada, and 1,300 are running it. Is that democratically right? I don't know where the ending is to this.

    Personally, I propose all class B fishermen be given notice that lobster fishing is reserved for bona fide fishermen. We could give them a year to decide if they want to fish lobster or go to work in the industrial-type fishery after this period. That's from a confidential paper we obtained from the department. We have to go confidential for everything like that, and this was never told to us.

    Every year we went to the office in Tracadie or Moncton, and they'd say, no, you're not upgradable. This defeats this. We went from 1976 on. We have things to cover it, and we have more to defend ourselves.

    This last one contradicts the first one. It was issued in 1984 in Tracadie, before Alphonse Cormier put that one out. That still was discrimination. We went to the Tracadie office and asked to be upgraded--it was no, no. They told us in 1984 we couldn't.

    In 1985 Alphonse Cormier, who was the director general, told us we could have a year to see. They never told us. It was behind closed doors with somebody...what do they call them now? Partners. We went to the province. They said they couldn't do too much because the group was in partnership with the province. They said they talked about projects a while ago, with money from the province and federal money.

    We're in between the bark and the tree, but we're asking again, this is what we have. We couldn't explain it in Rimouski because the agenda had been made prior to that. Now this is what we're asking the minister and we don't agree with either of his answers. I hope you people can do something about it and open his eyes.

    We're not asking to take everyone the sea. There are 4,500 traps of class B fishermen left against 450,000. It's not hard to make a graph of that.

¹  (1545)  

    The Chair: Mr. Jagoe, are you going to want to say something?

    Mr. Paul Jagoe (New Bandon Fishermen's Association): I just want to have a couple of words.

    First of all, there's been too much political interference and stuff going on behind closed doors, along with the fisheries minister of the day. First of all, he's not a negotiator; he's a dictator. We went to Caraquet, New Brunswick, and we tried to negotiate with the man. We got into the room, and it was just, “No, no, no, I'm going to run the fishery to suit myself, not you and not anybody else”.

    DFO in Ottawa is partners with the Maritime Fishermen's Union, along with the province. They're handing millions of dollars over to the Maritime Fishermen's Union to run the fishery. They're getting back false statistics on the lobster catches. They have no idea what the true catches are. They have allowed four-entry-point lobster traps into the system, which is double the size of our traditional traps, with still only one tag on them. So in essence, instead of having 300 traps in the water, these bona fide fellows have 600 traps in the water.

    The Maritime Fishermen's Union said they weren't happy with their 7.7% of the crab quota. If we were to get our full status back as commercial A fishermen, as we should have in the first place, it would only be 0.008%--not even 1%--to introduce us all back into the fishery again. They don't want us in the fishery, yet they want their crab quota.

    On top of that, these people have split up our communities, they've ruined our churches. They've interfered so heavily in this, with poor information and no statistics.

    The Chair: Who are “these people”?

    Mr. Paul Jagoe: The Maritime Fishermen's Union and DFO. We have DFO down here feeding wrong information to the Minister of Fisheries. And whether we wrote letters to Mr. Dhaliwal or Mr. Thibault, or whoever the minister of the day was, the letters were all done in the Moncton office here and sent off through the halls up there to have the minister's signature put on them. The minister has no idea. Mr. Dhaliwal, back in his time, didn't know a lobster trap from a mouse trap, and I'm starting to wonder about Mr. Thibault.

    If you have somebody who has that much power in the country...I think that gentleman holds too much power. After the uprising in Shippegan, New Brunswick, he said he was willing to negotiate. The only time he wanted to negotiate was after the burning and the uprising. The only thing he seems to understand is confrontation like that to get his attention. Now he's willing to negotiate, but prior to that he wasn't.

    So what does the east coast have to do? Do the cod fisherman from Newfoundland and the class B fishermen across Atlantic Canada, along with Shippegan, all have to join forces and have another unbelievable uprising in the country to get this man's attention? I think he should have a watchdog watching over him, because he certainly isn't running the fishery properly, nor were the ministers prior to him, because they were getting misinformation from down east.

    On top of that, when you go back to the days of Roméo LeBlanc.... Now his son Dominic comes and sits in on our meeting in Caraquet. He's from the Beauséjour riding. He had no business sitting in on our meeting with the minister down there, but he just has to find out everything that's going on, and what does he do? He winds up taking most of the crab quota from down there to his riding here in Richibucto or Shediac. It's all political; that's what it is.

    We have politicians in Ottawa who have business interests in fish plants down here, business interests in fishing boats, and it's political interference right from the top that's controlling this fishery. It's “you slap me on the back, and I'll slap you on the back”. There are too many politicians with their noses in these fish plants and in the Maritime Fishermen's Union, and they're calling the shots.

    The average guy on the street who's trying to make a living.... I have my father's fishing gear--my father hasn't been able to fish for the last five or ten years; he's had cancer. So while Jim Jones was going to the University of Moncton, I was in the boat with my dad. I've been on the boat since I was eight years old. And now these people are telling me that when my father dies the licence is gone. I have 90 traps. I make a small living from them. If my father passes away during the season, I have three days to bring the lobster traps in off the water, along with preparing for and going to a funeral--in three days they want me off the water, and I'm done fishing.

    This has been my historical and traditional right from back in the early 1900s, when my family started fishing lobster. We took our trap reductions and we put up with the bull from the MFU and from these departments, and we're not putting up with it anymore.

    Then, on top of that, DFO has come around now.... If my father went back to sea again next spring, if I could get him well enough to go on the boat, I would be able to get another five years. But because I've done that once, this winter they turned around and made new policies again, so once the five-year term is up, that's it. I'm off the water.

    When I applied for my operator's licence to operate my dad's boat this spring, they sent me this big long form they wanted me to sign, stating that after the five years is up this licence is going to be terminated. I don't have the form here with me, but there was a whole bunch of tricky things to sign. So I called up the DFO office and asked where the new policy was, because this had to do with the new policy. They said, you just go ahead and sign it. They said they couldn't show me the policy yet because they had finished their meetings just two or three months ago and they didn't have the new policies down on paper yet, so would I please go ahead and just sign it.

    So I did up and signed a letter of protest by Paul and Raymond Jagoe. How can you sign something when these fellows are going behind closed doors again, drawing up policies, wanting you to sign stuff without your seeing the policy?

¹  (1550)  

    The Chair: As you've been speaking, your testimony has been coming back to me from Rimouski. I believe Madame Tremblay was here at that time.

    You were there, Mr. Stoffer. Do you have any questions?

    Mr. Peter Stoffer: Is it your proposal, then--because I didn't actually hear you say it, but I'd like to get it on the record--that all lobsters brought in should be weighed and monitored?

¹  (1555)  

    Mr. Michel Arseneau: Yes, they should be weighed and monitored so you would have true statistics that would enhance the data, and that would give a chance to all Canadians. Right now, we cannot build infrastructure with that. They do everything more or less to close the eyes of the people who don't know much about it.

    Mr. Peter Stoffer: I can understand why.

    Your contention is that it's not just the MFU but also DFO that wants you off the water. It's not just one group; it is both, right?

    Mr. Michel Arseneau: It looks like that. There seems to be a partnership somewhere.

    Mr. Peter Stoffer: Okay, in your perception, then, you're saying it's not just the MFU but also DFO that wants you gone.

    Mr. Paul Jagoe: I spoke with Jim Jones two weeks ago. I said, “Jim, we've come to loggerheads now. No more fighting. Let's sit down and talk this out reasonably.” I asked him if he would send a letter or talk to the minister on our behalf so we could settle this without any more trouble.

    He said, “You seem to think I have a lot of control on the east coast fishery, and I really don't. If I speak to the minister or not, it's really not going to make any difference.” I said fine, that I was just asking and I didn't want any more arguing.

    The next day I called up Janet Smith, who is in charge of licensing and swings a lot of weight with Jim Jones. I told Janet I had talked to Jim the day before about helping us out and maybe making some recommendations to the minister. I said that we're not looking for the world; we just want to stay involved in the fishery, with our historical attachment to it, and make a small living out of it.

    She said she had spoken to Jim about it the day before, that he had told her I had called, and she said, “Absolutely not. I will have nothing to do with speaking with the minister or helping you people out in any way.” Those were her exact words. She said, “I am in charge of licensing, and those are the decisions we came up with in times gone by and there is no opening the doors”--even though it was done behind closed doors.

    Mr. Peter Stoffer: As you mentioned, you've been to three or four ministers already and you more or less got the same response, I would assume, from each minister. You've said twice, sir, that this would not hold up in court. Have you sought legal advice at all for your concern?

    Mr. Michel Arseneau: We are doing so. We're trying to come to a stand with the ministry to have a decent ending on this. They could put their cards on the table. We're Canadians.

    Everybody else has been compensated except us. Right now they want to put out $30 million to get the salmon back into the river. Just lately--last year--one of my friends, whose father died 15 years ago, received a cheque for $55,000 for salmon.

    When do the salmon fishermen declare income tax? They were selling nearly everything in cash. We declare all our revenues. We're called moonlighters because we went to moonlight the industry. I had a family. I had a licence from my father in 1953. That's 50 years this year. I have a licence that was a legacy to me from my father. We were paying 25¢ then for a paper, and everybody assumed the paper was reliable. We had 750 traps, 2 riggings. I fished 440 traps.

    Mr. Peter Stoffer: Okay, my last question for you is this. When the Marshall plan came out and there was a buyback program for licences, was your classification considered for the buyout plan? Did they come to your organization and ask if any of you folks would like to be bought out? You have 90 traps.

    Mr. Paul Jagoe: They could have bought 3B licences and given them to the natives if they had wanted to, because a lot of gentlemen would have sold out. But no, there was no offer. The MFU has targeted us as--

    Mr. Peter Stoffer: The buyout authorization originates from DFO in Ottawa, along with DIAND.

    So you were never considered at all for a buyout package? If they had wanted to get rid of you, why not buy you out, move those conditions--you have 90 traps, etc.--over to the aboriginal community? Were you never considered in that equation at all? Have you asked? What was the answer as to why you weren't?

    Mr. Michel Arseneau: Not at all. Plus, there are a lot of young guys just starting in the fishery with herring who would be happy with a licence for 90 traps to meet both ends.

    If the department and what I call the cartel were gentle enough, they would be able to buy, let's say, three licences. But that was not the first thing. Our status was supposed to come back, as you see, as I mentioned, our full status. At full status, we should have been integrated at 375 traps. That was said not by me but by Mr. Alphonse Cormier, the regional director general over here. That's DFO.

    Why that was curtailed and put under is because we were not there to be able to discuss it, as I told Minister Thibault in Caraquet. He said I had a window-making shop. I made the decision, and I sold it myself. Yes, he could make his own decision because he was the one negotiating for himself, nobody else. We're Canadians. okay?

º  (1600)  

[Translation]

    Mr. Peter Stoffer: Thank you very much.

    The Chair: Mr. Roy.

    Mr. Jean-Yves Roy: No, that's fine. I'm quite familiar with the file.

    I don't know if you mentioned this, but further to the meeting in Rimouski, we added an item to our agenda, namely a study of the way in which DFO issues and revokes fishing licenses, and so forth. However, since the committee did not meet until early December, this is now considered future business, in conjunction with the study of the Atlantic as well as the Pacific fishery.

    Therefore, it's only a matter of time for the committee. Given the circumstances, the committee wasn't able to meet before the beginning of December and it had considerable business to attend to at the time. However, this will be on the agenda for future committee meetings.

[English]

    Mr. Michel Arseneau: It's time for the Department of Fisheries, or the Government of Canada, or National Revenue, which I was dealing with a while ago.

    It's right here. I got it from the transcript from Moncton. It was asked by a certain group of fishermen if they would fill in...what do you call it?

    Mr. Paul Jagoe: A logbook for their lobsters.

    Mr. Michel Arseneau: A logbook, the TVQ. Revenue Canada would know what they're catching.

    As far as I'm concerned, it was a meeting of DFO. It should go to the ears and eyes of the government. We're all Canadian. I don't see why they put that there, but it's there for everybody to see. But that means, if they make a statement like that and it comes to a gross of $58,000, as they said, with all fishing a while ago, there's still another dilemma there. They want to stay in the high bracket, and that means, without having the right proof.... How are you going to get the proof without having weigh-in?

    The Chair: Mr. Wood would like to ask a question.

    Mr. Bob Wood: Mr. Arseneau, you've talked about compensation. What kind of compensation are you talking about?

    Mr. Michel Arseneau: As I just said to Mr. Stoffer, according to Mr. Cormier, we were bona fide before 1968. We were bona fide right through our negotiations, and the door was closed, always slammed on our noses, because we were not there to negotiate. We had the same deal and status, and more than some who are in the fishery today. That was 375 traps.

    Whatever the government pays on what they call an A licence or core licence, that should be the starting point in negotiations, and from there we should see.

    Mr. Bob Wood: Do you have any idea, moneywise? Did you mention $5,000?

    Mr. Michel Arseneau: No.

    Mr. Bob Wood: I thought I heard you say something about $5,000 a year, or whatever.

    Mr. Michel Arseneau: Last week, a friend of mine got $248,000 for his licence, but we'd like to sit down and have a negotiation. If there were negotiations and a buyback, I'll bet you that any animosities on the sea would be of no matter, because there is always animosity. Hearsay will be gone, and if they want to do their fishing that way.... But if they don't put in the weigh-in, it will be a disaster anyway.

º  (1605)  

    The Chair: Mr. Arseneau, you did meet with Mr. Thibault to make your case.

    Mr. Michel Arseneau: Yes.

    The Chair: I believe you met with Mr. Dhaliwal? No, you didn't, but you met with his officials to make your case.

    Who was the minister before that?

    Mr. Michel Arseneau: It was Mr. Anderson.

    The Chair: Did you make your case to Mr. Anderson?

    Mr. Michel Arseneau: We made our case to Messrs. Anderson, Siddon, Mifflin--

    The Chair: You've made your case to numerous ministers, and none of them have agreed?

    Mr. Michel Arseneau: Yes, but in making the case, it's not like the standing committee.

    The Chair: I'm not saying anything about the standing committee. I'm just asking, because some people we hear never get a chance to make the case. But as I understand it, you've made it to numerous ministers or their officials.

    Mr. Michel Arseneau: Yes, but the thing is, how good was the answer? I say, and I say it out loud--

    The Chair: There's no good answer unless they agree with you, right? Anything short of an agreement is a bad answer.

    Mr. Michel Arseneau: Just the signature changes, but it's the same format.

    I'll bet you that if you go to Mr. Thibault's office, there is an answer to all fishermen, and he just signs it. It's the same format. If I meet you next time, I'll give you 12 of them: De Bané, LeBlanc, Siddon, Dhaliwal, Thibault--everybody.

    It's not that we have anything against our fishermen friends, but we have something against the way it's instigated. They are members of the MFU. The MFU doesn't have any beef down there, but they take the crap from a few who just bring something that they want to see for themselves.

    The Chair: Just so I understand it, you don't want the money. You want your beef to be made into hay. Isn't that right? That's the bottom line.

    Mr. Michel Arseneau: If it were made into hay, we could sell whenever we wanted.

    Mr. Paul Jagoe: Either-or.

    The Chair: Which is it?

    Mr. Paul Jagoe: Actually, we'd like them to be made into hay, and at the very least, if they are not going to do that, at least make a beef licence saleable, or transferable from family member to the next family member.

    Mr. Michel Arseneau: But the first negotiation is, there is no backing out with that, as per Mr. Cormier. We were bona fide, and we should have that status. Nobody can take that away from Canadians. Then we'll see.

    The Chair: Thank you, gentlemen. I appreciate your coming down and reminding us about what you told us in Rimouski.

    Mr. Michel Arseneau: Thank you, sir.

    Mr. Paul Jagoe: If you see my name on a ballot there in Ottawa, I want you to be sure to keep me in consideration.

    The Chair: Very good.

    Our last witness of the day, but by no means our least witness, is the Ecology Action Centre, with Mark Butler.

    Welcome, Mr. Butler. Are you ready?

    Mr. Mark Butler (Marine Co-ordinator, Ecology Action Centre): Perhaps you shouldn't have turned over your list of presenters.

    The Chair: On the contrary, since you were kind enough to wait, then we'll certainly be ready, willing, and able to hear you. Fire away.

    Mr. Mark Butler: I have provided you with a couple of handouts, which I perhaps won't refer to directly but are good reading for the airplane ride home.

    It is late in the day of a long day, so I will try to keep this short and snappy. If you have questions about a particular area, then you can pursue that.

    I work for the Ecology Action Centre. It has been around for 32 years. We have approximately 600 members. I work on marine issues for the Ecology Action Centre.

    I'd like to speak briefly on the Atlantic fisheries policy review on seismic testing off Cape Breton and a couple of words about a quarry in Digby Neck.

    There is one point that I want to make about the Atlantic fisheries policy review . We should not forget that this is an internal review, hence its value is quite limited. It's not an outside objective review of what has happened and what is happening again. It's DFO reviewing itself. It has some value, but it's limited. After the collapses, the economic pain, and the ecological pain that we've felt in the fishery in Atlantic Canada, that there is still no outside review of what happened, why it happened, and what the solutions are, is sad.

    One thing that the government, as we've seen, is good at is closing something when the scientists say that things look bad. What they are not so good at is fixing it or getting at the fundamental causes for the collapses and failures. A lot of the problems in fisheries reside with science, to some extent, but mostly with fisheries management.

    My experience is not with the gulf region fisheries management, but with Scotia-Fundy fisheries management and the crew there. Their policies do a lot to damage the reputation of the entire department. They also have a lot to do with the fact that fisheries, whether in Atlantic Canada or not, has a bad name. When the average Canadian thinks about fisheries, they think about problems.

    It doesn't have to be that way. It is really sad because there are lots of good people in the department. It's sad because the fisheries could be much more than they are if they were managed with a different way of thinking and approach, both to the people in the fishery and to the ecosystem.

    There are fisheries that work in Alaska and Norway. Actually, we don't have to go that far to find fisheries that work. Think of the lobster fishery. Nothing is perfect, but relative to the other fisheries in Atlantic Canada, it functions well. It functions well ecologically. You heard about some problems with class A and class B, but it functions well overall in distributing the wealth from a public resource to Canadians. It is also relatively efficient in getting the most lobster out of the ocean. All the small boats fishing for lobster up and down the coast do a very good job at getting the most lobster out of the ocean. It is efficient in that way.

    The lobster fishery is a “how, when, where” fishery. We control how we fish it with traps. We control where and we control when we fish. As you know, we're very interested in the “how” part of a fishery. We're actually involved in a court case right now with DFO to get it to pay attention to a part of the Fisheries Act that says thou shalt not destroy fish habitat. Yet it allows, or facilitates through the issuance of licences, unrestricted dragging over the ocean floor that is damaging to physical and biological features on the ocean floor.

    We have focused on the groundfish fishery. If we consider the lobster fishery, we don't drag for lobsters. Why not? Why don't we drag for lobster? The obvious answer is that it doesn't make sense. It would be totally destructive. Common sense gives us the answer.

    We're seeing now that science is starting to kick in on the impact of dragging in a big way, both DFO's own science, to a lesser extent, and also internationally. There is a study that came out from the U.S. National Academy of Sciences on the impacts of dragging. It basically says that we have enough information to say that it is damaging and we must take measures to restrict the impact of dragging.

    The lobster fishery is a good mirror in which to perhaps view what's happening in the other fisheries. The lobster fishery is not a quota fishery; you can catch as many lobsters as you want. We just control other things around that fishery, including how we fish, when we fish, and where we fish.

    I just came back from a DFO science meeting in Montreal, but on the way up I was wondering why decision-makers, or DFO ministers of fisheries, would want to have quotas. When you have quotas every year, or practically every other year—except when they're going up, though they're usually going down when the minister is announcing bad news, or staying the same—these quota fisheries put one in the position of having to announce every year, or at least 50% of the time, bad news. Yet when was the last time we had riots around quota levels in the lobster fishery? It doesn't happen.

    When I went to Montreal, a lot of the scientists were saying that the cost of stock assessment is really high and that it is something the department can't bear. They were asking how they could cut that cost, which is crippling the other science they need to do around ecosystem impact, etc. We should remember that we never do a stock assessment in the lobster fishery, and we don't have all of the stuff you were talking about with Dr. Mikio Moriyasu. We don't have those kinds of discussions about what the biomass was this year or that year. It's another way to cut costs.

    You were having some discussion with him about 17,000 versus 20,000. Frankly, given all of the variability around their numbers and their models, it's very hard to justify whether the quotas this year should be 17,000 or 18,000 or 16,000. There are some real problems with the methodology, and it's hard to defend those numbers, particularly when you have the kind of situation that you now have in, say, New Brunswick.

    Then, of course, in the quota fisheries you have to have dockside monitoring. In the lobster fishery that's not necessary at all. It doesn't matter how much is caught, because we control the other things.

    Despite all of that, the trend in fisheries and the interests of fisheries managers seems to be toward putting quotas on more and more fisheries. It's too bad, and it's unnecessary, and I don't think it's the ecologically right thing to do.

    I'd like to just say a couple of things about seismic testing off Cape Breton. I think you know enough of its history. I do want to draw to your attention to the fact that we're again at a critical juncture with seismic testing off Cape Breton. The petroleum board will be making some decisions about it in the next few months, but prior to the public review a couple of years ago, DFO scientists came out and said something that is very important. When we went to the scientists and asked for the science, they said, “This is a biologically diverse area where sensitive life stages of marine organisms are present throughout the year”. When they say “sensitive life stages of marine organisms are present throughout the year”, the scientists are basically saying there is no time in the year you can do seismic testing. That is about as strong a statement as scientists will come up with.

    In January of this year, Arthur Popper, an acoustic scientist from the University of Maryland, did some research on the impacts of seismic testing. He put fish in cages and brought seismic vessels toward those cages, and then moved them away again. His research showed that seismic testing has an impact on the ears of fish; he found that there was mid- to long-term damage of the hair cells of fish. He noted it was the first time that had been shown: “Our study shows for the first time that exposure of fish to seismic air guns can result in significant damage to the ears of fishes”. This research is really critical, given the recent announcement about the status of cod in the gulf and off Cape Breton in the Laurentian Channel.

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    As I understand it, the Petroleum Board, on March 6 of this year, gave conditional approval for the seismic surveys off Cape Breton. I think they abused the process they set up, the ad hoc review process. As understand it right now, they have not received the complete applications from the companies Corridor Resources or Hunt Oil. When the applications come in, they will have to go to DFO. The entire application should go, but at least part of the application is required to go to DFO for approval. I think that DFO should reject the applications at the present time.

    There are a number of conditions that were put on the seismic surveys regarding whales--ten kilometres, and the date when it could be done. I think the conditions have very little value. I would be happy to discuss the reasons why I think that.

    Finally, Sandy Siegel mentioned Georges Bank. If there is any ability for governments to be consistent after what scientists have said about the importance and sensitivity of the waters off Cape Breton compared with Georges Bank, I do not see how we can open one area up to oil and gas and close another area for 12 years to oil and gas. You have to have some consistency in your policy; otherwise it makes a mockery of the policy.

    Finally, there is the quarry on Digby Neck. I know some of the individuals there wanted to speak to you about the quarry. Suffice it to say that I think we're seeing more applications for the removal of non-renewable resources from this part of the world. A lot of communities are concerned about this. We should listen to those communities. We should think about this trend and what it potentially could do, if we don't start saying no, to the landscape of this place and to the long-term value of this place for tourism.

    Thank you very much.

    The Chair: Thank you very much, Mr. Butler.

    We did hear from groups yesterday on that very issue. They made their case eloquently. More than one person was talking about it, in fact.

    Mr. Mark Butler: Good. I'm glad.

    The Chair: Thank you very much for your comments on all of the issues.

    Mr. Stoffer, would you like to comment?

    Mr. Peter Stoffer: I would, very quickly.

    Mark, your organization works with the Conservation Council of New Brunswick and those in P.E.I. as well. Is that right?

    Are they of the same mind in terms of a dragging type of testing? Are there differences of opinion among the groups?

    Mr. Mark Butler: Ten to twelve years ago, for instance, we had discussions with the Conservation Council of New Brunswick on the issue of dragging. They said maybe the big draggers, but not the small draggers. The science is now so overwhelming, with a number of studies, it's very clear that it has an impact. There is a lot of agreement and concern around those issues.

    Mr. Peter Stoffer: Would you agree or disagree that lobsters brought into the dock should be weighed or measured, as we've heard from previous witnesses?

    Mr. Mark Butler: It's not a quota fishery. That's the beauty and the joy of that fishery. It requires less science, it requires less monitoring, etc., if you control everything else. If there are problems around tax evasion or something else, don't deal with it by putting in dockside monitoring. It's only going to increase the cost to the fishermen. It's not an efficient way to deal with it.

    It is a very efficiently run fishery, it's a relatively equitable fishery, it's an ecologically sound fishery, and it's not a quota fishery. I don't think the people in DFO are in love with quotas. They are in love with the idea of ITQs and how that can rationalize the fishing industry in Atlantic Canada in a way that we vehemently disagree with. I don't see a need. It doesn't make sense at all.

    Mr. Peter Stoffer: Thank you.

    The Chair: Mr. Wood, do you have any questions?

    Mr. Bob Wood: Could you elaborate on the whales? What are your comments on how they will be affected?

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    Mr. Mark Butler: The short answer is we don't know. I actually did bring some recordings of seismic activity recorded adjacent to the Sable Island Gully, and it sounds like thunder. These recordings were about 20 kilometres from where the seismic was taking place, and it sounds like thunder. There was a thunder clap every 11 seconds for two or three weeks. You can use your own imagination to some extent.

    But relatively speaking, there is very little research on what happens. It's amazing that nobody has put fish--I have a quote that came from a study on the impact of seismic testing on fishing--in a cage and then brought a sound source up to, as in this case, 15 metres of the cage and gone away again, then killed the fish and dissected them to see what their ears looked like. That's the first time this was done, and when they did it, it showed damage.

    We know that most whales, in the presence of seismic, do move away from it. It depends on how close they are, but we don't know what kind of physiological impact it has on their hearing system. We have to remember this sound every eleven seconds would be like--and perhaps you've heard this already--somebody shining a bright light in your eyes every eleven seconds. We're visual animals. Everything in the ocean finds food and gets around through the use of sound.

    So I would think having a loud sound suddenly be part of their environment would interfere with their space.

    The Chair: Thank you very much for waiting around and giving us your evidence. We do appreciate it. And thank you for the papers. We will have time on the aircraft to have a look at them. I do appreciate that very much.

    I have two things to say on the record. One is on behalf of us. I'd like to thank our staff very much for the hard work they've done and the long hours they've put in on this trip.

    Finally, I just wanted to let you know my research indicates that this was a relatively slow day in the history of the world, and really the only thing I could find of moderate noteworthiness was that Lorenzo the Magnificent of Florence died today in 1492 at the age of 43.

    I adjourn the meeting.