TRGO Committee Meeting

STANDING COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORT AND GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS

LE COMITÉ PERMANENT DES TRANSPORTS ET DES OPÉRATIONS GOUVERNEMENTALES

EVIDENCE

[Recorded by Electronic Apparatus]

Thursday, November 1st, 2001

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[English]

The Chair (Mr. Ovid Jackson (Bruce—Grey—Owen Sound, Lib.)): Bonjour tout le monde, good morning, ladies and gentlemen. Pursuant to Standing Order 108(2), we're here to study airline safety and security in Canada.

Today we have the Union of Canadian Transportation Employees, Michael Wing, and from Nav Canada we have the president and CEO, John Crichton, and Kathy Fox, the vice-president of air traffic services. Welcome.

We'll start with Nav Canada, we'll have a short statement as well from our other witness, and then we will go into a round of questioning.

Mr. John Crichton (President and CEO, Nav Canada): Thank you. Bonjour, mesdames et messieurs. Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, thank you for inviting us to appear before the committee as part of your study on airline safety and security. I must say, I'm particularly pleased to be here today, as it is the fifth anniversary of the commercialization of the Canadian civil air navigation system. I see Mr. Alcock nodding his head, and I remember him as a member of this committee when it originally passed the legislation. On November 1, 1996, Nav Canada purchased the system from the federal government for $1.5 billion and assumed the responsibility for the system's operation.

Having said that, I would like to take a minute to outline who we are and what we do. Nav Canada is the private non-share capital company that owns and operates the second largest air navigation system in the world. We provide air traffic control services to domestic and international flights within Canadian airspace and in delegated international airspace, including half of the north Atlantic, the busiest oceanic airspace in the world. We also provide weather briefings, flight planning, and en route advisory services, and we maintain over 1,400 electronic aids to navigation, including radars, approach aids, and communications facilities.

Nav Canada's core mandate, and conceptually our only real product, is safety, and our safety performance is regulated at arms length by Transport Canada, as with the rest of the aviation industry. In fact, this new relationship with the regulator eliminated a structural conflict of interest wherein Transport Canada used to regulate itself. Separating the service provider and the regulator has now been accepted as a best practice by the International Civil Aviation Organization and is being emulated in countries around the world.

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Nav Canada is not in business to make a profit, there are no shareholders. Profits, when they occur, are recycled to reduce customer charges, pay down debt, or finance capital expenditures. As a private company, Nav Canada has two main sources of funds. For capital investments we rely on the public debt markets. Our operating funds are generated through service charges paid by our customers, the airlines and aircraft owners who use the system. These service charges replaced the former air transportation tax, which was charged on passenger tickets. That tax was repealed back in 1998.

All in all, our financial structure is extremely stable. This stable foundation has been recognized as such by the major credit rating agencies. In fact, our double A rating was recently confirmed, and we're the only aviation organization in North America that didn't suffer a decline.

Nav Canada is governed by a stakeholder board of directors. On the board there are four members representing commercial aviation, one member who represents general aviation, three members appointed by the federal government, two representing our bargaining agents—we have eight bargaining agents—and four independent members appointed by the board, and the fifteenth member is the president and CEO. I would ask the committee to note that no single group on the board holds a majority. This ensures an effective balance of interest among all the stakeholders.

Nav Canada has 5,400 employees across the country, working in over 150 staffed facilities. Our total payroll is in excess of $500 million per year, or about 70% of our operating costs and about 58% of our total costs. Our major facilities include seven area control centres, one terminal control unit here in Ottawa, 43 control towers, 76 flight service stations, about 50 community aerodrome radio stations in the north, a technical systems centre, and a national training facility.

The company is investing heavily in technology and infrastructure upgrades, including the construction of new control towers and the implementation of advanced technology systems that are now recognized around the world. Our capital investments have averaged over $125 million annually, with $600 million invested since 1996.

Along with the enhanced investment program, Nav Canada has also managed to reduce overhead costs. We are now operating the ANS for 35% less than the amount airlines used to collect under the former air transportation tax. This was achieved while we actually expanded our operational staff levels.

Today, five years after the transfer of the ANS to the private sector, I'm very proud of our successful record and the international attention that has been given to the unique commercialization model that Canada has pioneered. In May of this year the International Air Transport Association gave Nav Canada the prestigious Eagle Award as the world's most outstanding air navigation system.

At no time was the excellence of Canada's air navigation system more evident than in the wake of the terrible events of September 11. Let me quickly describe for the committee the role we played.

Upon learning that fateful morning of the events happening in the U.S., our first action was to increase security at all Nav Canada facilities across the country. This was followed at 10:45 a.m. by a decision to put in place a ground stop, ceasing all our departure services. At around 12:30 p.m. the Minister of Transport ordered, for the first time in history, the closure of Canadian airspace. This was enacted via a notice to airmen, or NOTAM, that gives Nav Canada the authority to restrict traffic.

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Later that day the Canadian military implemented emergency security control of air traffic, or ESCAT level II. Nav Canada undertook the significant task of recovering any aircraft flying and getting them on the ground as soon as possible. The only flights allowed were military, search and rescue, police, Medivac, and humanitarian flights, and these were coordinated with NORAD.

About 400 aircraft were operating over the North Atlantic at that time. Aircraft that had not reached a halfway point were turned back to their points of origin, and with those that had passed the halfway point, we began the task of rerouting and coordinating with pilots and airports for the diversions of those aircraft. In total, we recovered 239 aircraft destined for the U.S. and Canada.

The coordination effort required was significant, and I congratulate our employees and the many other parties involved, including Transport Canada, customs, airlines, airport authorities, and local emergency measures organizations. The diversion and landing of all aircraft happened safely and without incident.

The removal of restrictions on operations began to occur in increments, beginning late on September 12. Let me assure you that the coordination required for the restart of the system was every bit as challenging as that required to shut it down.

Since September 11 Nav Canada has continued to take measures to enhance security at operational facilities. We are in regular contact with appropriate agencies, and are reviewing security issues and the measures we employ on a daily basis to ensure that they remain appropriate.

Like all companies in the aviation industry, we have been financially affected by the recent downturn in passenger traffic and the resulting capacity cuts that the airlines have instituted. We've had to react quickly to mitigate what we anticipate will be a $145 million, or roughly 15%, reduction in projected revenues for this fiscal year. We have developed a balanced plan that includes $85 million in expense reductions, combined with expanded non-aviation revenue sources and the drawing down in full of our rate stabilization fund. We are also proposing an increase in our service charges of, on average, 6% through the removal of a temporary discount. At this time we are not planning layoffs. We have slightly adjusted our operational staffing to reflect reduced traffic volumes, and as a result, we are reducing our overtime costs.

Finally, Mr. Chairman, I must say that the Government of Canada has been nothing but supportive, especially with its response in providing temporary war risk insurance to Nav Canada and other members of the aviation industry when the insurance market withdrew this coverage. That was a very significant contribution, and very necessary, on the part of the government.

On that note, I'm pleased to take questions.

The Chair: I would like to hear from Mr. Wing as well.

I'm sure you'll have a short address before we get to questions. Thank you.

Mr. Michael Wing (National President, Union of Canadian Transportation Employees): Thank you, Mr. Chair.

As the president of the Union of Canadian Transportation Employees, I come before you today to express the grave concerns our members and I have with the issue of airport security in the post-September 11 era. While it may be difficult to find consensus on who should perform passenger screening at our airports, I believe there is consensus within the industry that having the airlines contract this work out to the lowest bidder is not the correct solution. We need to improve security and restore Canadian public confidence in the system. The question I bring to this committee is, who should perform this function?

The Canadian Airports Council, CAC, believes the airports should take over this responsibility. The Air Transport Association of Canada, ATAC, wants a not-for-profit organization built on the Nav Canada model. UCTE, along with other aviation experts around the world, believes this function should be the sole responsibility of the federal government.

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The CAC's position, having airports take over this function, might work for large class-one airports. On the other hand, I believe this not to be the case for some of the smaller airports, airports that were struggling for economic survival under privatization prior to September 11. Not all airports are equal. The CAC's solution does not address the potential lack of consistency of application.

Mr. Chairman, we need a national solution to deal with airport security. Passengers must be able to feel safe flying our skies, regardless of where they are boarding, at Pearson or at Deer Lake. The ATAC's idea of installing another not-for-profit organization such as Nav Canada is not a viable solution. As an organization that represents members at Nav Canada, we believe it's too early to tell whether the Nav Canada model has been successful or whether it should be duplicated.

This leaves the federal government to take over these functions. In yesterday's Ottawa Citizen Mr. Benoit, chairman of the CAC, put forward the argument that this would be a conflict of interest, something that may be as true for the airports as it is for the airlines. However, it is my belief, Mr. Chairman, that the government has no vested interest, no shareholders, no stakeholders. The only interest the federal government has is that of protecting and ensuring the safety and security of the Canadian public.

UCTE takes exception to the comments made by the CAC that the public service employee contracts would somehow compromise the job that needs to be done. It needs to be noted that public service employees are conscientious, dedicated, and professional workers, who within minutes of the planes crashing into the World Trade Centre stepped up to ensure Canadian public safety. Many of them worked around the clock to ensure that safety. Many still do. This knock against federal employees and what they are about or do is nothing more than a tired old stereotype that is no longer valid. In times of crisis the Canadian public has always relied on its leaders and the members of the public service. To suggest that public service employees are nothing more than slackers feeding at the public trough is to do them, as well as the Canadian public, a grave disservice.

Another area to be addressed is the need for increased staffing of inspectors at Transport Canada. Currently, there are approximately 50, who prior to September 11 ensured that federal regulations were followed in the fields of aviation, marine, rail, transportation of dangerous goods, and cabin safety. Because of the recent attention and urgent need to have people dealing with the crisis, most of these inspectors are now working on aviation-related inspections at the expense of other areas. The minister recently announced that 27 inspectors would be hired. Mr. Chairman, that does not even come close to the actual current requirements. Transport Canada has identified a need for an additional 80 inspectors to deal with the supplemental workload, but there are no plans to provide funding until next fiscal year. This is not quick enough to deal with the crisis we are now facing.

Mr. Chairman, on behalf of my members, I am strongly calling upon this federal government to shape a bill or framework that will allow it to take over responsibility for airport security and airport screening.

Mr. Chairman, with that I invite questions.

The Chair: Thank you very much, Mr. Wing.

Members of the committee, we'll start with the first round of questioning at 10 minutes.

Monsieur Asselin from the Bloc.

[Translation]

Mr. Gérard Asselin (Charlevoix, BQ): Thank you. Mr. Chairman. I am pleased to speak on behalf of the members of the official opposition. They are not here and do not really assume their responsibilities.

Mr. Chairman, the question I have has to do with the concern people have, particularly in the regions. Since Nav Canada took over the air traffic control from the federal government and Transport Canada, air traffic controllers disappeared from the regions, especially on the North Shore—but the problem should be the same in Lac-Saint-Jean and the Gaspé Peninsula.

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For example, in Baie-Comeau, the plane that crashed last winter was found by locals. The situation is the same in the Gaspé Peninsula.

Nav Canada has decided to install flight control centres and to close control towers in some regions. In Baie-Comeau, for instance, there are no air traffic controllers anymore; we come under Mont-Joli. We have not been feeling safe since the events of September 11 as we have neither air traffic controllers nor security guards at the airports, and since full time firefighters were abolished we have to call upon volunteer firefighters. And I mean volunteer firefighters who have other obligations and occupations instead of being there in case of an emergency. They work on a voluntary basis; the word “voluntary” says it all.

Therefore, since the air services have been reorganised, especially in the regions, we found ourselves without air traffic controllers, without security guards at airports, without firefighters. The events of September 11 taught us that terrorists could come through the regions. We know that Montreal is a hub. As some regions in Quebec feed into Dorval airport in Montreal, tourists could get to Dorval by going through those regions knowing it is like a sieve. People do not feel safe anymore, all the more so since regional airlines cannot secure their planes. It is the same for some airport managers because we know that in some airports security was transferred to private businesses or MRCs.

Air carriers like Air Alma cannot afford to pay people to enhance safety on board their own aircraft. Air Nova could maybe do it because the federal government, through the Minister of Transport, has decided to subsidise large airlines like Air Canada and Canada 3000. Maybe an air carrier like Air Nova, for example, will become an important competitor by offering enhanced safety on its flights, the result being an erosion of Air Alma's market.

I think that the subsidising of large airlines directly harms the private sector enterprise, the regional carriers. We know that large airlines have subsidiaries that provide services in the regions, like Air Nova or Air Alliance, a subsidiary of Air Canada.

I would like you to reassure me so that I can reassure my constituents in Baie-Comeau. The situation has not changed but what more do I have?

I went to visit the security facilities in Toronto but it is difficult to make a comparison, as I have not seen what was there before. I know what the facilities are like now but what where they before? I don't know.

In my region nothing changed except that people do not feel as safe when it comes to flying. To start with, the cost is very high, Mr. Chairman. Where I come from, the air carrier has a monopoly and they can now afford to have whatever schedule they wish, to have whatever departures and arrivals they wish and give whatever service they wish. Having taken over, they have become a predator that eliminated competition. When this happens, traffic goes down.

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The risk is that soon the number of movements will drop and the only decision left for the managers of Baie-Comeau airport, as it wont be as cost-effective given the drop in the number of customers, might be to close the airport.

[English]

The Chair: Mr. Asselin, you've finished your question? Thank you.

Mr. Crichton.

Mr. John Crichton: Mr. Asselin seemed to be directing his comments towards Nav Canada. Just briefly, many of the issues you raised are beyond the scope and mandate of Nav Canada. We are not involved in airport security per se or in search and rescue, other than with the alerting service. If we know an aircraft has got into trouble, we pass along the information to the appropriate search and rescue authorities. We certainly don't have any involvement in the business decisions of airlines as to where they fly, when they're going to fly, and matters like that.

You did mention the closure of the control tower at Baie-Comeau. That occurred prior to Nav Canada's taking over the system. The federal government made that decision, I believe, in 1994-1995. We do have levels of service policies that are published with respect to the type of airport where, according to the volumes of traffic at the airports, we'll have a control service rather than an advisory service, either on-site or remote. I believe Baie-Comeau is a remote advisory from Mont-Joli.

With the accident you referred to, my understanding is that the safety board's report with respect to that showed no involvement by Nav Canada. It was an issue involving the operation of the aircraft itself, some potential icing, and other issues. Nav Canada, when the aircraft went missing, performed in accordance with all the regulations about alerting the necessary people in search and rescue, but we had no real involvement in that.

We are very sensitive about providing service in all areas of the country, not just the busy ones, and in fact, we've been working very hard to enhance that service, and a lot of our investments are doing just that, introducing new services. Along the lower north shore we've worked very closely with the AQTA to try to address any concerns their members have in providing service.

[Translation]

Mr. Gérard Asselin: What extra measures did Nav Canada take since the events of September 11 regarding access to control towers and air traffic controllers? What safety measures did Nav Canada take for those who want to have access to those control towers, whether they are visitors or technicians? Were extra safety measures taken to restrict access to control towers?

That is another strategy they could devise. If they can take over a plane I imagine they can take over a control tower. What measures was Nav Canada able to take to protect its own equipment and its own employees and to make sure that air traffic controllers have good control at all times?

[English]

Mr. John Crichton: We have instituted a fairly comprehensive system of security controls, and they're in keeping with the current threat and risk factors that are provided to us on a regular basis by the RCMP and CSIS. All our facilities are locked down, access is strictly controlled, and we have in place varying degrees of fencing, access control systems, closed circuit television, alarms, 24-hour guard service, and so on. Most of our facilities are located either on or very close to airports, and they're subject to regular and routine additional security patrols by local police or the RCMP.

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We've also instituted very technical testing of our computer systems by having outside parties, including the RCMP, try to hack in and intrude, along with other companies, to test those and make sure our defences are up to scratch. And they are. We have advised all employees what to do with suspicious people and packages. We have instituted a mail checking system. So we are working very hard to try to protect our employees and that very critical infrastructure.

The Chair: I'll now move to Mr. Szabo of the liberals.

Mr. Paul Szabo (Mississauga South, Lib.): Thank you.

I will assume Nav Canada's position is that it has no direct responsibility for airline or airport security, but does have a security policy with regard to its own facilities and personnel.

We took a tour of Pearson International and became familiar with the components of security within the airport perimeter. I think that's quite the issue, that catering has some security responsibilities and airport cargo has some responsibilities. The airlines have some direct responsibilities through ticket sales and check-in and responsibilities on the screening. You've got the airport authority, which has security responsibilities with regard to the grounds, access to the buildings, etc. I'm not sure if I have them all but, I think you get the point. There seem to be a lot of security responsibilities that are not integrated or under a uniform command for continuity, synergies, or whatever.

Do you believe an airport would have a more secure overall comprehensive environment if the security responsibilities were, in fact, brought under a uniform command or umbrella covering all aspects, regardless of whether it's Nav Canada or catering or anybody else?

Mr. John Crichton: I would have difficulty answering that, because we are not involved in all those issues and I'm not familiar enough with all the various challenges facing those groups. We're certainly looking after our own security. We do interface with the airports and the RCMP, and that works quite well. I guess our main issue on security is security in the air, and I think that's worked very well. I think the way we worked with the military and the government on September 11 and afterwards shows that, and the military are quite happy with what we did. But I can't really comment on airport security. It's not something we do.

Mr. Paul Szabo: I'm going to ask Mr. Wing a question, but, Mr. Chairman, I'll just note that it's an area of concern to me, because regardless of the functionality of the different areas, every one of them has something in common, and that is people. People move into control areas, they move into catering areas, they move into secure areas, etc. And this issue of security clearance, of general good practices with regard to access to vulnerable areas I thought would have been a serious concern to Nav Canada, because all the people who have access to control tower areas and any other areas that Nav Canada controls don't work for Nav Canada and would apparently not come under the control. But I think we'll pursue that further.

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Mr. Wing—and I only have limited time—you weren't very specific, but I sense that you have more to say. You know about people working in the transport industry. Regardless of whether it's your direct responsibility, you may be able to give the committee some words of wisdom.

Arguably, one of the most important points of security within the airport environment is the passenger screening. It's the responsibility of the dominant carrier and the airport. It is often, I think, awarded to a contractor, like Wackenhut or other places that provide those security services, required to meet the standards prescribed by Transport Canada. We were told by other witnesses that the compensation level of people at this principal security screening point ranges from $7 to $9 an hour, that people were carrying two and three jobs, that the training was maybe 40 hours. We have evidence that there has been maybe a 20% failure rate in detecting stuff that should be detected going through screening. There's other anecdotal evidence, but I think the picture that's being painted isn't very comforting.

I wonder, from your perspective—since it's a people thing, it involves transport employees—whether the current arrangements, having people with no specific educational requirements and no specific experience requirements as principal security screeners, are of concern to you, and whether there is any area in which you have direct involvement in that particular function within airports.

Mr. Michael Wing: Mr. Szabo, just to explain, I am president of the Union of Canadian Transport Employees; we're a component of the Public Service Alliance of Canada. We represent workers at Transport Canada, we have about 3,000 members there. We represent workers at Nav Canada. We represent workers at the airport authorities across the country. They're the people doing administration, maintenance, runway clearing, firefighting at airports. We do not represent the passenger screening people, but I think the problems you've highlighted are well documented, and I would say you're right in having concerns about that primary security point. A security system is only as good as its weakest link, and I think that is certainly the weakest link in the airport, or one of the weakest links within airport security.

Mr. Paul Szabo: The airport authorities have suggested to us that serious consideration be given to an umbrella command for security within the airports, and that the airport authorities assume principal responsibility for security. I assume transport employees covered by your union, whether or not that happens, still are part of a functionality, i.e. safety and security, that has a weak link. Even if we don't go to an airport authority controlled situation, there are activities going on in an area where, if they're not doing their job properly, your employees are also at risk, because there is a community of people at the airport, all of whom seem to have a separate drummer to go to, because there's an Afghan, there's a caterer, there's an airline authority, a Wackenhut, etc.

Has that ever come up, a concern that the people within the community don't have the same protections, the same standards, or the same regulations? Is there anything in the history that you've identified, through your work as a union representative, that shows there are different classes of employees, different rules, different regulations, different working conditions, experience requirements, standards that make it difficult for everybody to rise to an optimal level of performance?

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Mr. Michael Wing: Mr. Szabo, I will only speak to what I have knowledge of. With CAC's idea that all security within and around the airport should fall under a single umbrella, to be honest with you, I've not given that thought. I will say that there are certainly differences in working conditions and how that service is provided, based on the various levels of security that are required at an airport. You mentioned most of them, I think. You talked about passenger screening, you talked about baggage check-in, ticket agents, you talked about the current responsibility of the airport for security of the airport property itself. With all those different groups, the working conditions, opportunities, the morale are very different.

I do not believe, though, that the answer is to lump that security under the responsibility of the Canadian Airports Council or its members. Where you may gain in security within a particular locale, you would lack in consistency across the board, given the resources and what is available within that particular airport. Obviously, Pearson is going to be able to provide more than some of the smaller airports.

The thing we have to keep in mind is that people can get into this system from anywhere in the system. You don't need to be coming into Pearson to be a security threat. You can be coming into North Bay and get into the system and be a security threat. That's what I think this framework and policy needs to address.

The Chair: Thank you very much, Mr. Wing.

Bev Desjarlais from the NDP.

Mrs. Bev Desjarlais (Churchill, NDP): Thank you. Just so we're clear exactly who you represent, Mr. Wing, your union would represent the inspectors who go into the airports, the inspectors of those people doing the security or inspectors that do the checks every so often, is that correct?

Mr. Michael Wing: That's right.

Mrs. Bev Desjarlais: Okay. And at present you have 50 inspectors?

Mr. Michael Wing: There are currently 50 security inspectors with Transport Canada, and there's the announcement of another 27.

Mrs. Bev Desjarlais: And that's for Canada overall, that's not just airport security, you're talking about.

Mr. Michael Wing: That's Transport Canada, all modes of transportation.

Mrs. Bev Desjarlais: Okay.

You mentioned well-documented evidence that there were problems within the systems. Had your inspectors or other members of your union brought those concerns to the Department of Transport previously?

Mr. Michael Wing: I am not aware of any, Ms. Desjarlais.

Mrs. Bev Desjarlais: Mr. Crichton, I've seen similar maps, and I guess I just didn't notice this gaping hole in northern Manitoba and Ontario before, where there are flight service stations and other Nav Canada operations. But what I do notice on this map, which again I don't recall having seen before, is this little box down at the bottom that has Arviat, Baker Lake, Cambridge Bay, Cape Dorset, Chesterfield Inlet, and Churchill, which obviously draws my attention, where they're operated out of an area by North Bay, Ontario.

Mr. John Crichton: North Bay is a northern air radio centre for what is now Nunavut; primarily, Arctic Radio and Baffin Radio work from North Bay. I'm pleased to advise you that in Churchill we're actually in process of constructing a brand new flight service station at the airport. We've developed a modular system, which, in fact, has been constructed at the Ottawa airport and should be going on the train to Churchill any day now.

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Mrs. Bev Desjarlais: Obviously, we'd had some concerns before over there about that big gap. I'd never realized there were quite that many areas that were being covered from way down here, especially since most of those areas are all up in here. So it just seemed it was not the best way to operate.

Mr. John Crichton: I've forgotten how many licensed airports there are in Canada, but it's something like 1,700. Many of those have very few aircraft movements, and in our business whether we're there having people on site is a function of how busy the movements are. If you only have two or three airplanes a day, you obviously don't need the service, and we provide the information for pilots to do that from a remote hub. In the case of Manitoba, it's in Winnipeg, we have a hub there. We provide all the flight information right down to the ground for the folks there.

Mrs. Bev Desjarlais: As I said, when you see it on this map, you see there's a very big area that they have to cover. I know the decision is based on how many flights go in, but you don't want to be the one of three flights where the information wasn't quite accurate, the weather changed really quickly, and somehow that didn't get relayed through the system. So I am glad to hear it was recognized that there should be something farther up north.

My other question is in regard to the type of security checks that would take place for Nav Canada operators, which I think came up in one of our other meetings. I think they're in a very high-risk area, or what needs to be a secure area.

Mr. John Crichton: All of Nav Canada's employees are provided with the same level of enhanced reliability checks now as they were when Transport Canada operated the system. We haven't changed that; we continue to do that with all employees.

Mrs. Bev Desjarlais: What would that entail? You hire them, you give their name to Transport Canada, and they do a security check? What happens?

Mr. John Crichton: The security check is provided through the government, and it's the same check that would be done if the person were seeking employment within the government in a sensitive job. The government actually does them for us, and I think we pay for it. It's the RCMP and CSIS who do them.

Mrs. Bev Desjarlais: Do you know what the length of time is before you get the security clearance? This is a question I have for each and every witness.

Mr. John Crichton: It's a condition of employment. I'm not exactly sure what the turnaround time is, though.

Mrs. Bev Desjarlais: Okay. Mr. Szabo is giving me hints here, because it did come up.

Would they ever work within the flight centre prior to getting that clearance, with some stipulations in place?

Mr. John Crichton: I don't believe so, because, certainly with the operational employees, they go through an extensive period of training at our institute in Cornwall, a period of months. So I would think by the time they get into an operational position, they'd have it. I'd have to verify that.

Mrs. Bev Desjarlais: I'll sneak one more question in. With those airports that don't have flight centres, but might have somebody there at a time when a plane is coming in—they're just working at the airport, but there's no flight service centre—is there any kind of training for those employees? You know, it's just someone to be at the radio who would relay what the weather is like or whatever.

Mr. John Crichton: We do have a program in northern Canada, in the three territories, called CARS, the community aerodrome radio stations. While these individuals are not employed by Nav Canada, we pay the bill under a contract with the territorial governments, and we provide them with their training. They're called observer communicators.

If we do not have employees at the other airports, it's usually a weather-observing service, but through remote communication outlets, called PAL stations, we can talk to the people on the ground, including the pilots on the ground—it's a very large web of communications facilities. So we have up-to-date weather through that.

Mrs. Bev Desjarlais: And you contract out that service?

Mr. John Crichton: In some places we contract out the weather observations, in other places it's our own people, if we have people on site, and in other places Environment Canada have people. So it will depend.

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Mrs. Bev Desjarlais: And this happens in the territories, no other place?

Mr. John Crichton: No, it happens right across Canada.

The Chair: Thanks, Bev. You're just spot on.

Mr. Crichton, if you are going to provide us with information with regard to these checks, how long it's done, and so on, it should come to the clerk of the committee, so that everybody will get it.

We move now to Marcel Proulx of the Liberals for ten minutes.

Mr. Marcel Proulx (Hull—Aylmer, Lib.): Good morning. Thank you very much for appearing this morning.

Mr. Crichton, I'm sure your staff has reported that we've had other witnesses at the same table earlier this week or last week, and there were some points that were brought out. I've got some questions.

Could you comment on the type and amount of training air traffic controllers are given with respect to clearing airspace and redirecting traffic, should an incident similar to the one that occurred on September 11 happen directly in Canada?

Mr. John Crichton: Thank you, Mr. Proulx. I'm going to ask Kathy Fox to reply to that.

Ms. Kathy Fox (Assistant Vice-President, Air Traffic Services, Nav Canada): The diversion of an aircraft for medical, mechanical, or other types of emergencies is not unusual, it happens regularly. We have long-standing procedures, and controllers are trained to deal with those types of diversions. Certainly, the events of September 11 were unprecedented in the number of aircraft that had to be diverted, but the same procedures applied for ensuring safe separation between aircraft and determining where the aircraft wanted to go, based on the fuel and the equipment on board the aircraft. Controllers are trained to handle those types of emergencies or unexpected situations.

Mr. Marcel Proulx: So you're comfortable with the fact that they have been trained, there's continued training, and there shouldn't be any problems.

Ms. Kathy Fox: I'm comfortable, because the proof is how things went on September 11, where there were no safety incidents. All the aircraft landed safely.

Mr. Marcel Proulx: We've been told Nav Canada has rebated considerable moneys to air carriers in recent years. Is this so? If your answer is yes, would you comment on your views? Would it not be better for Nav Canada to retain these excess funds for such other activities as further training, better equipment, whatever? Have there been such rebates?

Mr. John Crichton: Mr. Proulx, yes, but I think you have to understand that some people characterize it in a way that suits a different agenda. Nav Canada does not skimp on the system. We spend more money now on safety and training than the government ever did when they operated the system. We are a monopoly. We're a natural monopoly—you can't have competing air traffic control services. But as a monopoly, our structure was set up very carefully, particularly when it comes to charging. Of course, one of the dangers with a monopoly is that people don't like monopolies—oops, wait a minute, what are they going to charge me? How do I know I'm getting a good deal?

We try to establish our budget on a break-even basis. We estimate what the traffic will be, and so what the revenue will be. Then we look at our costs when we do our budget, and we allow for everything in those costs, including employee salaries and benefits, including what we think will be the outcome of labour negotiations. We put into the budget all the costs associated with training, and we do far more training now than the government did. We also have our capital budget. We're putting in far more facilities now than the government ever did, and we're doing it three times as fast at a lower cost, much more efficiently.

If there is money left over after we do that, either because the traffic was higher than we thought, therefore we got more revenue, or our expenses were a bit lower, because we were more efficient, or a combination of both, that money goes into what we call a rate stabilization account. At any time any excess in that account over $50 million we give back to the customers in the form of lower fees. In this year just finished—our fiscal year ended August 31—there was $75 million in the rate stabilization fund. That fund is now going to be used entirely to offset the impact that's happened to the industry, so it will go down to zero during the course of this fiscal year.

• 1155

We do not engage in rebating, in the sense that you've probably heard it, at the expense of the system. The evidence is very clear that in fact, the system is safer than it's ever been, and we are investing more money than has ever been invested in making it safer.

Mr. Marcel Proulx: Is Nav Canada subject to Treasury Board rules?

Mr. John Crichton: No.

Mr. Marcel Proulx: So you're on your own.

Mr. John Crichton: We're a private company, we finance ourselves. There are no government guarantees of any kind.

Mr. Marcel Proulx: We were told the other day by a witness that Nav Canada manufactures, assembles, or invents some of its equipment itself. Do you have a rule of buying Canadian? How do you do this? Is this the best price on the market, is it the best expertise? How does that work?

Mr. John Crichton: With technology we develop ourselves, obviously, it's largely Canadian. In fact, we do it out here at our technical system centre at the Ottawa airport. We do buy, we try to buy off the shelf, and we look around the world, including Canada. If the product is available in Canada and we think it's the best product to do the job at a competitive price, that's where we'll buy it. In fact, we buy lots of systems or components of them within Canada. But if we find there's a better product for our needs in another country, then we'll buy it there.

Mr. Marcel Proulx: In your experience, how do the Canadian products compare internationally as far as quality and safety are concerned?

Mr. John Crichton: Very well. We do a lot of buying in Canada. Canada has a good reputation in high technology and in the air traffic control systems world.

Mr. Marcel Proulx: So we're doing well as far as Canadian suppliers are concerned.

Mr. John Crichton: Yes we are, but it's important to realize that Nav Canada is becoming a major supplier itself. Some of the systems we have developed ourselves are attracting a lot of attention around the world. In fact, we're actively engaged in potential sales with a number of other countries right now.

Mr. Marcel Proulx: You're answering part of my final question: how do we compare to other systems, such as the American system or the European. As far as the equipment is concerned, we're ahead of the game, as you're supplying some. But with training, how do we compare with other systems internationally?

Mr. John Crichton: I think now we're seen in the air navigation systems world as one of the world leaders in technology.

Mr. Marcel Proulx: Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chair.

The Chair: Val Meredith of the PC/DR.

Ms. Val Meredith (South Surrey—White Rock—Langley, PC/DR): Thank you, Mr. Chair, and thank you, witnesses.

I'm going to follow up, because I understand Nav Canada is a not-for-profit organization. If you get into the business of selling systems around the world, I assume you're going to be making money on that. You're not going to be giving away the systems for nothing. How do you foresee that revenue going into your systems? Does that mean there will be lower fees to the airlines? Does it mean that will be passed on to the passengers? My understanding is that it's the people who buy the airline tickets who pick up the cost of the services you provide to the airlines.

Mr. John Crichton: We do have that type of revenue now. For instance, in Cornwall, at our training institute, we provide training to people from ANSs in other countries. That revenue simply is brought into the company. It goes against our costs, and it is there to reduce the fees, provide money to invest in additional services, and so on. It all comes into the same pot. If we we can sell some of those systems and get $50 million—and it's really the intellectual property rights—and we can use that to lower the cost of air navigation services of Canadians, that's what we're going to do. We're going to lever off the technology we have developed to bring some dividends back. The dividends eventually flow through to all the customers and down the chain.

• 1200

Ms. Val Meredith: We heard from two different witnesses two things. Safety of airline travel, when it comes to the airplanes being up in the air, is really the responsibility of Nav Canada. Terrorism isn't the only threat to the well-being of an individual providing those kinds of services through Nav Canada. I would imagine that the job is very stressful, with a lot of pressures, particularly when you have something like September 11. There was an issue of the lack of supervision, the lack of somebody assessing the stress level and being able to respond, because a lot of the supervisors are actually working on the—what do you call them?—terminals or whatever. Is this something you are trying to address, that you don't have supervisors there who can take the place of somebody who is maybe getting stressed out and needs to be relieved for an hour or two?

Mr. John Crichton: I'm going to ask Kathy Fox to respond. Kathy manages the day-to-day operation of the entire air traffic control system.

Ms. Kathy Fox: With respect to the supervision, at those facilities where we have a number of operating positions working simultaneously we do have supervisors, whose primary role is to ensure that people are assigned to those operating positions as the traffic ebbs and flows, because the traffic varies during the day. For example, early in the morning we may only need two or three controllers sitting down. As the traffic builds during the day, we might have five, six, seven, or eight. So the role of the supervisor is to assign people to those operating positions and make sure they are opened and closed on a timely basis, so that the workload is kept at a manageable level for each sector for each controller working. We also make sure supervisors rotate people through the positions and allow for sufficient breaks. As well, they provide coordination within their facilities.

Supervisors are operational controllers themselves. They're represented by their union, and they maintain currency. To do that, they actually work the positions, but usually there's another supervisor available to provide overview supervision, or the traffic is fairly light and other controllers are available in the break room to be called back if something untoward happens that requires them to assume the full stand-back supervision.

Ms. Val Meredith: So you don't think it's an issue that the supervisors may be actually working at the controls?

Ms. Kathy Fox: There are some occasions when, because of short staffing, they will sit down and work, but they're usually the last people to sit down and the first people to get up when it's busy. We want them standing back supervising. But in the majority of our facilities, in the situations where we have supervision, they are providing that overview, to ensure that the traffic and the workload is balanced among the staff available, or to take steps to constrain the traffic if, for whatever reason—weather, equipment problems, or short staffing—we have to reduce the traffic.

Ms. Val Meredith: Thank you.

I wasn't sure when I heard it if I understood what was being said, but I got the impression from another witness that Nav Canada is responsible for maintaining and fixing the screening equipment that's in airports. Did I hear wrong, or is that part of your responsibilities as well?

Mr. John Crichton: No, that's correct. We have a contract with the Air Transport Security Corporation, which owns the equipment, to provide the maintenance. Our electronic technologists provide the maintenance under that contract. That we inherited when we took over the system. The equipment used to be owned by Transport Canada before it was sent to the ATSC, and the ANS technologists who worked in Transport Canada used to maintain it. We agreed at the time of the transfer to continue to do that, and it has since become simply a commercial contract between the two corporations, because our people know how to do it and were trained to do it. We're all in the same location, so it works fine for both parties.

• 1205

Ms. Val Meredith: Because you're responsible for maintaining and fixing them, can you give us an idea of what percentage of those pieces of equipment that screen passengers would be down, not operational, at any point in time?

Mr. John Crichton: I couldn't give you a precise percentage. I do know generally that the Air Transport Security Corporation recently purchased new walk-through screening and X-ray machines. Their system is pretty modern at the moment, and the reliability rate is quite high. I don't think they have that many outage problems. I couldn't give you the exact figure, but as far as I know, it's a pretty good record.

Ms. Val Meredith: Being responsible for maintenance and that, do you go through a routine maintenance process or checking to make sure the equipment is functioning properly?

Mr. John Crichton: Again, I don't have all the details, but there is a very comprehensive maintenance program, a preventive maintenance program, where the equipment has to be tested, whether it's broken or not, at certain intervals. Our people do that, as well as responding to actual malfunctions. There is a pre-set schedule for each piece of equipment; it has to be tested at certain intervals.

Ms. Val Meredith: Thanks.

Mr. Wing, do you represent the air transport inspectors who actually inspect the airworthiness of aircraft?

Mr. Michael Wing: Yes.

Ms. Val Meredith: Do they go through the same screening? Do all the employees of Transport Canada go through the same screening process we heard about earlier?

Mr. Michael Wing: I don't know the level of the security clearance for inspectors. I know that generally speaking, there is a high level of security for government workers—enhanced reliability I think it is—but I'm not sure what the specific requirements are for the airworthiness people or the airport security.

Ms. Val Meredith: But would anybody who has access to the tarmac or the operational side of an airport go through the same process? You're saying you're not aware, but I would imagine somebody who is an airworthiness inspector would have access to the tarmac of airports, maybe not in Toronto—I don't know where they do that—but certainly in smaller airports, which then give you access to the larger airports.

Mr. Michael Wing: The inspectors are delegated the responsibility to certify the airworthiness of a plane. For airport security inspection, which is another part of the inspection community, they would have access to the ground site. Cabin safety inspectors would be flying on planes, ensuring that the federal standards are met on the planes. There would be a security requirement for them. I'm just not sure what it is.

Ms. Val Meredith: Could we maybe, chair, request that information from Transport Canada?

The Chair: We will be getting witnesses from Transport Canada, so you might want to hang on to that. All right.

We move to Mr. Shepherd.

Mr. Alex Shepherd (Durham, Lib.): Thank you.

I'm still trying to get something in my mind. The Air Transport Security Corporation is simply a holder of fixed assets. Is that correct?

Mr. John Crichton: It owns the walk-through metal detectors and the carry-on baggage X-ray machines at all the airports. It maintains them through a contract with us.

Mr. Alex Shepherd: That's all it really does. As I understand it, they originally got this equipment from Transport Canada and haven't really added that much to their inventory since they actually acquired it.

• 1210

Mr. John Crichton: My understanding is that they did add a significant amount of new equipment over the last two or three years.

Mr. Alex Shepherd: So why do we have to provide $92 million for new equipment?

Mr. John Crichton: I don't know anything about that, sir. I know, simply because we've been providing the maintenance, that the corporation invested its own money. I don't know the exact amount, but I believe it was over a million dollars in new equipment. All of its costs are charged directly to the air carriers. The airlines pay a fee for the use of the equipment. When it was in government hands, the government paid the cost of it.

Mr. Alex Shepherd: But we have had an announcement that the federal government is paying for $92 million worth of new equipment this company couldn't afford to purchase.

Mr. John Crichton: I can't comment on that. I can't speak for that company. I don't know what the government's doing right now, I'm sorry.

Mr. Alex Shepherd: It's okay.

You say your year end is August 31, and based on that, this rain fund you have has $75 million in it. I presume most of it will go to Air Canada. Is that correct?

Mr. John Crichton: The $75 million in the rate stabilization fund will be brought into our revenue during this fiscal year to offset the decline in traffic, to offset the loss of revenue we're having as a result of September 11. We aren't writing cheques and giving it to specific airlines. We're simply not having to raise our rates to produce another $75 million, which we otherwise would have had to do, because we can take that money out of the reserve account and put it into our revenue to offset the loss from the declining number of flights.

Mr. Alex Shepherd: Okay, I didn't understand. I thought you were going to actually disburse the funds.

That said, to some extent it must act as a cushion to Air Canada, because the normal economics of this would dictate that their rates would have to increase.

Mr. John Crichton: In the fiscal year we're in right now, if we didn't have that fund available and we had to raise our rates to offset it, instead of having a 6% increase on January 1, we'd probably be looking at about a 15% increase. The fund was very specifically set up for an economic downturn. When we set it up five years ago, we had no idea we were going to be faced with this terrorist thing, but the impact in financial terms is the same as an economic downturn.

It's important to remember that the money belongs to our customers. We've been holding it in trust for them as a rainy day fund, as you call it, in case it ever happened. Well, it's happened, and now we're going to have to use it. But from an accounting point of view, we just move it out of reserves and put it up on our income statement as revenue. Nobody gets a cheque out of that.

Mr. Alex Shepherd: Is it prudent to use all of that in one year? Are you under the presumption that a year down the road things are going to reverse themselves?

Mr. John Crichton: We don't know what's going to happen a year down the road, but our board certainly looked at this and we said, you know, if there ever was a rainy day for the civil aviation industry, this is it. This is the worst crisis it's faced in its history. So we made a decision as a corporation that given all the facts here, this is an occasion when we have to use that fund. Where we're going to be in a year from now we're not sure. Everybody's hoping the traffic and public confidence in flying will come back.

From Nav Canada's point of view, we are preparing contingency plans. If it doesn't come back, we'll have worse case scenarios, and we will manage through this from a business point of view, one way or the other. I don't have a crystal ball to tell you at this point where it's going to be a year from now.

Mr. Alex Shepherd: You're not predicting a deficit in your case. The $75 million will carry you for another year, is that what you're saying?

Mr. John Crichton: It's a combination of the availability of that money with other things. We're instituting a mitigation plan that sees about an $85 million reduction in our expenditures. We are increasing the rates, which on an annual basis will produce about $50 million in additional revenue. All of those things taken together, I think, will see us through this next year. Beyond that, we're looking at various scenarios going out another year, and those haven't been completed yet. Depending on what the scenario is, there'll be varying levels of challenges, from a business point of view, in dealing with that, but that's yet to come.

• 1215

The Chair: Thank you very much, Mr. Shepherd.

I'll go to M. Asselin.

[Translation]

Mr. Gérard Asselin: Mr. Chairman, this morning we have the opportunity to have a management representative on one side and a labour representative on the other side. I am not looking for a confrontation but the purpose of my question is to make sure that people relations, labour-management relations, are healthy as far as air transportation safety goes, for example.

I would like to start with the labour representative. The management representative will be able to confirm or adjust the answer if need is. Given the importance of highly qualified, motivated and dedicated staff to ensure air safety, what do you think of the labour-management relations these last few years and of employee motivation, of their job satisfaction and so on?

Do some air traffic controllers at Nav Canada still have to work three or four days in a row, sixteen hours a day, because they are understaffed, because the schedule is badly organised or because they have to work overtime against their will?

[English]

Mr. Michael Wing: I had not planned to discuss labour relations over at Nav Canada, sir, but you've asked me the question.

As Mr. Crichton pointed out, there are eight bargaining agents at Nav Canada, and we are but one of those bargaining agents. We represent the administrative workers and the labour group maintenance people as well. We have about 450 employees over there. We are part of a bargaining agents association, and we meet regularly. I would like to report that morale and labour relations at Nav Canada are healthy and strong, but that's certainly not the case. It is definitely a concern. I speak on my own behalf, and I would encourage the committee to invite some of the other bargaining agents to give their own perspectives. I really believe that labour relations are tempestuous, they're not good, and frankly, I don't see them improving any time soon.

[Translation]

Mr. Gérard Asselin: Can the management representative from Nav Canada confirm what the union representative just said? It is important. Those are your employees. And your employees are the ones who have to give us the service by working in the field. It is important that people who have the training have the desire to serve their employer well and the desire to work well and to work enthusiastically. It would reassure us, as customers and members of Parliament, especially those from the government, to know that people at Nav Canada, whether they are part of the management or of the staff, go to work with pleasure, with a desire to do a good job, in an exemplary security environment.

[English]

Mr. John Crichton: I can assure the committee that Nav Canada spends a lot of time on labour relations. I should point out that we are currently in bargaining negotiations with all eight unions. I suppose when one comments on the state of labour relations, it is very much something that is in the eye of the beholder. I certainly didn't come here today to talk about labour relations, but I will tell you that without exception, the employees at Nav Canada, to varying degrees, are far better off individually and in respect of their compensation and other issues of quality than they were five years ago. I believe the facts support that when one compares them with the other groups. I think there are perceptions here, and I respect Michael's perceptions, but I think it's for another forum to sort out those kinds of perceptions.

• 1220

[Translation]

Mr. Gérard Asselin: Do you still have at Nav Canada air traffic controllers having to work 16 hours a day, three or four days in a row, because of a shortage of staff?

Often, people doing that work are so tired that they are not able to concentrate as well on their job after having worked 16 hours a day four or five days in a row. It is humanly impossible.

In that case, could we not have more flexible working hours and additional staff so that it does not happen? An air traffic controller cannot be as efficient after 14, 15 or even 16 hours of work, four or five days in a row. That is not possible.

[English]

Mr. John Crichton: As far as I know, the only person who works 16 hour days four days in a row at Nav Canada is me. It's simply not true that air traffic controllers work the way you have described. I don't know where you got that from. There are very rare occasions—and it would be a dire emergency—where a controller might have to work up to 16 hours, but I think you could count on the fingers of one hand the number of times in the course of a year that would happen. In fact, I think 12 hours is the most, and even that has been reduced.

I think it's important to understand that air traffic controllers in Canada work a 36-hour week, while in the U.S. they work 40. In Canada they are scheduled about 220 days a year, in the U.S. it's 260. So when one looks at the facts, at what is really happening out there, one needs to be careful. Even with overtime—and we do have a considerable amount of overtime in our system—on average, the controllers work about a 40-hour week. So you needn't worry about people being stressed out and being worked to death in that regard. By any reasonable standard, it simply isn't happening.

The Chair: Mr. Byrne now for the Liberals.

Mr. Gerry Byrne (Humber—St. Barbe—Baie Verte, Lib.): Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.

I want to move to the technical side of international navigation systems. The first notification of an aircraft, once airborne, coming into trouble would be analysed by navigation personnel on the ground, in Canada's case Nav Canada. What systems currently are in place whereby, if an aircraft displays aberrant behaviour, Nav Canada alerts security officials on the ground, whether it be the military, the RCMP, CSIS, or whatever?

Mr. John Crichton: There are a number of systems. Kathy, do you want to answer?

Ms. Kathy Fox: An aircraft losing communication with the ground, its radar transponder becoming unserviceable, or a deviation from course are things that have happened in the past for very legitimate reasons, mechanically generated. When those things happen, there are procedures both the pilots and the air traffic controllers know, which are published, as to what the pilot is expected to do if they lose radio with the ground or what the controller anticipates the pilot will do. Certainly, as a result of the events of September 11, knowing now that people may use aircraft for means other than transporting people, the response time would be much quicker. But we've always had procedures in place whereby, when we knew that an aircraft might be in difficulty, we would advise either the military or ground agencies to look out for that aircraft, because of the suspected mechanical deficiency.

• 1225

What we would do now if we saw an aircraft that lost communications, or we lost radar contact with it, or we saw it off course, is try to communicate with that aircraft immediately to find out what's going on. If we were not able to establish that, we would immediately contact the military. In fact, we do have military liaison coordinators in a number of our facilities today as a result of the heightened awareness and for security.

Mr. Gerry Byrne: Of course, the military, even though they probably have duplicate technology, radar systems, Canada functioning with the North American Air Defence system and other things, wouldn't necessarily be able to analyse commercial airline traffic as a potential threat or displaying aberrant behaviour that could indicate a hijacking. That information would only be available to, say, Nav Canada, through the logging of a flight. Would that be correct?

Ms. Kathy Fox: We share radar data with the military. They have access to much of our radar information. They're normally not concerned with the commercial aircraft. As I indicated in my previous answer, if there were something untoward with an aircraft, they were indicating an emergency or a hijack, we would contact—and we have contacted them—the military to apprise them of the situation. We have immediate hotline communications with them.

Mr. Gerry Byrne: Even now, in hindsight after September 11, the more reasonable fit for tracking of commercial aircraft is Nav Canada, not the military. Would that be a fair statement to make?

Ms. Kathy Fox: Yes. We have the most direct, immediate, and complete information on the flight plans of all the aircraft that are operating.

Mr. Gerry Byrne: Nav Canada depends on radar technology. Satellite technology, of course, is also coming rapidly on stream, from both an efficiency and an effectiveness point of view. There's been some talk of placing real-time video recorders and other technology on aircraft. If there were a situation where that was either regulated or voluntarily implemented by airlines, it would obviously be Nav Canada that would facilitate that, that would actually administer that type of system. It's just been a concept thrown out by various pundits and those interested in the industry, stakeholders, about having black-box technology, real-time video data going to the ground about what's happening on board aircraft. Does Nav Canada have any thoughts about that?

Mr. John Crichton: No doubt the technology exists to do that, at least with airplanes in most locations. I suppose in some of the more extreme latitudes there may be some issues. That is for others to decide. I think that's a broader security issue for government in respect of protecting civil aviation, as opposed to a Nav Canada issue. Our job is navigation and air traffic control. That's something that would have to be decided, presumably, by Transport Canada, the FAA, and other regulatory agencies.

If the system went to that in the future, where should that video be received? Who should be receiving it? I would see some difficulty in saying it should be received by a controller. Controllers have a different screen of their own they're trying to watch. They're trying to keep all the aircraft separated and so on. I'm not too sure they would have time to be trying to monitor a video of the cockpit or cabin of an airplane. The receivers of that would probably be a different group. Maybe we would alert them that such and such an airplane, we think, has got a problem, and somebody else can then punch up a video of that airplane, if we ever get to the state where they can do it.

Mr. Gerry Byrne: Obviously, those data would have to be transmitted by satellite uplink in order to get them in real time. Of course, if you were to do that, you'd also be able to provide a larger set of data to the ground. Above and beyond the video link, you'd be able to provide all sorts of altitude data, directional data, general flight data to the ground.

• 1230

You use radar technology almost exclusively now, and visual elements. Is there an evolution towards satellites? Would the provision of satellite services be more effective in determining the status of an aircraft? Whenever we see these very tragic circumstances, there always seems to be a blank somewhere in-between. We know the aircraft is in trouble, and we know it actually crashes. We never really know exactly when it crashes, because once the radar goes off line, we don't know if the aircraft has just gone to a lower altitude. We don't know exactly where, unfortunately, it crashed. Would the use of satellite technology be more effective? Do you see that as an evolution in air traffic control systems internationally, providing more data, more comprehensive data? If so, what are Nav Canada's plans in that regard?

Mr. John Crichton: It is useful, and we are using it. About a year and a half or two years ago we introduced automatic waypoint reporting over the North Atlantic, which is done through a satellite, in some cases, or high frequency data link. The future air navigation systems in the modern aircraft, in fact, make increasing use of data link, either through satellite or through direct ground receiving stations, which is cheaper. A lot of our communications in Canada in air traffic control right now are done through these ground stations, the PAL stations I talked about, as opposed to satellite, but some are through the satellite, and we transmit a lot of our own data on satellite. That is definitely an area that is evolving very rapidly in the system, along with GPS, which is a satellite-based navigation system. So we're very much into it, and the systems are moving that way in the future.

Mr. Gerry Byrne: Nav Canada is now embarking on a cost reduction program. You're basically facing a $145 million deficit. You've indicated that you're going to have to dip into the rainy day fund and cut costs. What will be your ability to actually explore that technology? And what's the state of play in the rest of the hemisphere? Are other members of IATA investing heavily in this technology, and where does Canada fit in the mix?

Mr. John Crichton: The reduction in our costs that we have put together for this year really does not affect our capital programs to any great degree. We're continuing with those programs. We're continuing with virtually all the programs that involve new satellite technology and other control systems. I think we are seen as a leader in this area.

These systems produce their first, immediately tangible benefits over the oceans, because over the oceans you have a real problem. You can't have radar, you can't have ground PAL stations, and so on. You have vast distances where you don't have those normal aids. So we've been very innovative in developing, in cooperation with the airlines and the aircraft manufacturers—Boeing, Airbus—and other ANS providers, the FAA and so on, these systems, and all of our programs continue.

We see we're caught, and we all hope this is a short-term problem we're trying to deal with. Nav Canada is determined that we are not, in our desire to help out with this short-term problem, going to make short-term, expedient decisions that would harm the system in the long run. We're absolutely determined that we're not going to do that. We are going to do what we can to mitigate the problem in the short term, but as far as safety, service, and the long-term growth in traffic that we know will always be there are concerned, we are going to keep our eye on that ball and we're going to stay focused on it. Our programs are not going to suffer. We may defer things, move them to the right a little bit, to get through this hump, but we are as focused as we ever were on developing that technology and implementing it.

• 1235

The Chair: Okay. Thank you very much, Mr. Byrne.

That finishes this section. Thank you, Mr. Chrichton, Ms. Fox, and Mr. Wing. Thanks for your input.

I'll suspend for two minutes while we do our work plan.

[Proceedings continue in camera]