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37th PARLIAMENT, 1st SESSION

Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs

EVIDENCE

CONTENTS

Tuesday, March 12, 2002

1535

The Chair (Mr. David Pratt (Nepean--Carleton, Lib.))

Vice-Admiral Ron Buck (Chief of Maritime Staff, Department of National Defence)

1540

The Chair

1545

Mr. Benoit

VAdm Ron Buck

Mr. Benoit

VAdm Ron Buck

Mr. Benoit

VAdm Ron Buck

Mr. Benoit

VAdm Ron Buck

Mr. Benoit

1550

VAdm Ron Buck

Mr. Benoit

VAdm Ron Buck

Mr. Benoit

VAdm Ron Buck

Mr. Benoit

The Chair

Mr. Claude Bachand (Saint-Jean, BQ)

Vadm. Ron Buck

Mr. Claude Bachand

VAdm Ron Buck

Mr. Claude Bachand

VAdm Ron Buck

Mr. Claude Bachand

1555

VAdm Ron Buck

Mr. Claude Bachand

VAdm Ron Buck

The Chair

Mr. David Price (Compton--Stanstead, Lib.)

1600

VAdm Ron Buck

Mr. David Price

VAdm Ron Buck

Mr. David Price

VAdm Ron Buck

Mr. David Price

VAdm Ron Buck

Mr. David Price

VAdm Ron Buck

Mr. David Price

VAdm Ron Buck

1605

Mr. David Price

VAdm Ron Buck

Mr. David Price

VAdm Ron Buck

The Chair

Mrs. Elsie Wayne (Saint John, PC/DR)

VAdm Ron Buck

Mrs. Elsie Wayne

VAdm Ron Buck

The Chair

Mrs. Elsie Wayne

1610

VAdm Ron Buck

Mrs. Elsie Wayne

VAdm Ron Buck

Mrs. Elsie Wayne

VAdm Ron Buck

The Chair

Mr. Benoit

VAdm Ron Buck

Mr. Benoit

VAdm Ron Buck

Mr. Benoit

VAdm Ron Buck

Mr. Benoit

VAdm Ron Buck

Mr. Benoit

VAdm Ron Buck

1615

Mr. Benoit

VAdm Ron Buck

Mr. Benoit

VAdm Ron Buck

Mr. Benoit

VAdm Ron Buck

Mr. Benoit

VAdm Ron Buck

The Chair

Mr. Claude Bachand

VAdm Ron Buck

Mr. Claude Bachand

1620

VAdm Ron Buck

Mr. Bachand

VAdm Ron Buck

The Chair

Mr. Stan Dromisky (Thunder Bay--Atikokan, Lib.)

VAdm Ron Buck

Mr. Stan Dromisky

VAdm Ron Buck

Mr. Stan Dromisky

VAdm Ron Buck

1625

Mr. Stan Dromisky

VAdm Ron Buck

The Chair

Mr. Dromisky

The Chair

Mr. Carmen Provenzano (Sault Ste. Marie, Lib.)

VAdm Ron Buck

Mr. Carmen Provenzano

VAdm Ron Buck

The Chair

Mrs. Elsie Wayne

1630

VAdm Ron Buck

Mrs. Elsie Wayne

VAdm. Ron Buck

Mrs. Wayne

The Chair

Mr. Carmen Provenzano

VAdm Ron Buck

Mr. Carmen Provenzano

VAdm Ron Buck

Mr. Provenzano

The Chair

Mr. Janko Peric (Cambridge, Lib.)

VAdm Ron Buck

1635

Mr. Janko Peric

VAdm Ron Buck

Mr. Peric

The Chair

Mr. Rob Anders (Calgary West, CA)

VAdm Ron Buck

Mr. Rob Anders

VAdm Ron Buck

The Chair

Mr. Rob Anders

The Chair

Mr. Rob Anders

VAdm Ron Buck

Mr. Rob Anders

VAdm Ron Buck

Mr. Rob Anders

VAdm Ron Buck

Mr. Anders

VAdm Ron Buck

Mr. Rob Anders

VAdm Ron Buck

Mr. Anders

VAdm Ron Buck

Mr. Rob Anders

VAdm Ron Buck

Mr. Rob Anders

VAdm Ron Buck

Mr. Rob Anders

VAdm Ron Buck

Mr. Rob Anders

VAdm Ron Buck

1640

Mr. Rob Anders

VAdm Ron Buck

Mr. Anders

VAdm Ron Buck

The Chair

Mr. Janko Peric

VAdm Ron Buck

Mr. Peric

The Chair

Mr. David Price

VAdm Ron Buck

Mr. David Price

VAdm Ron Buck

1645

The Chair

VAdm Ron Buck

Mr. David Price

VAdm Ron Buck

The Chair

Mr. Claude Bachand

VAdm Ron Buck

Mr. Claude Bachand

VAdm Ron Buck

Mr. Claude Bachand

VAdm Ron Buck

Mr. Claude Bachand

1650

VAdm Ron Buck

Mr. Claude Bachand

VAdm Ron Buck

Mr. Bachand

VAdm Ron Buck

The Chair

Mr. David Price

The Chair

Mr. David Price

VAdm Ron Buck

1655

Mr. David Price

VAdm Ron Buck

Mr. David Price

VAdm Ron Buck

The Chair

Mr. Rob Anders

VAdm Ron Buck

Mr. Rob Anders

VAdm Ron Buck

Mr. Rob Anders

VAdm Ron Buck

1700

Mr. Anders

VAdm Ron Buck

Mr. Rob Anders

VAdm Ron Buck

Mr. Rob Anders

VAdm Ron Buck

Mr. Rob Anders

VAdm Ron Buck

The Chair

Mr. Carmen Provenzano

VAdm Ron Buck

1705

Mr. Carmen Provenzano

VAdm Ron Buck

Mr. Carmen Provenzano

VAdm Ron Buck

Mr. Provenzano

The Chair

VAdm Ron Buck

The Chair

VAdm Ron Buck

The Chair

Mr. Claude Bachand

1710

VAdm Ron Buck

The Chair

Mr. Claude Bachand

VAdm Ron Buck

1715

The Chair

VAdm Ron Buck

The Chair

VAdm Ron Buck

The Chair

VAdm Ron Buck

1720

The Chair

Mr. Rob Anders

VAdm Ron Buck

Mr. Rob Anders

VAdm Ron Buck

Mr. Anders

VAdm Ron Buck

Mr. Rob Anders

VAdm Ron Buck

The Chair

Mr. Claude Bachand

VAdm Ron Buck

The Chair

VAdm Ron Buck

The Chair

CANADA

Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs

NUMBER 046

1st SESSION

37th PARLIAMENT

EVIDENCE

Tuesday, March 12, 2002

[Recorded by Electronic Apparatus]

¹ (1535)

[English]

The Chair (Mr. David Pratt (Nepean--Carleton, Lib.)): I'd like to call to order this meeting of the Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs.

We have with us today more witnesses from the Department of National Defence. On behalf of all the members of the committee, I'd like to welcome you, Vice-Admiral Buck, as well as your colleagues Commodore Gauvin and Chief Petty Officer 1st Class Serge Joncas. We're continuing our study of the state of readiness of the Canadian Forces. We're certainly looking forward to your comments here this afternoon.

You have the floor.

Vice-Admiral Ron Buck (Chief of Maritime Staff, Department of National Defence): Thank you very much.

[Translation]

Mr. Chairman, distinguished members of the committee, I'm delighted to be here today to discuss with you the role and mission of Canada's Navy.

[English]

Joining me today are Commodore Jacques Gauvin, my assistant, and Chief Petty Officer 1st Class Serge Joncas, who is the senior non-commissioned member of the navy.

My purpose today is threefold. First, I'm here to introduce myself, as I have not had the privilege of addressing this committee in my current capacity as Chief of Maritime Staff and Commander of Maritime Command. Second, I hope I will add to your understanding of the Canadian Forces by discussing the subject of operational readiness in the naval context. Third, using Operation Apollo as a context for our capability, I would like to bring some of the challenges that face the navy today to your attention.

Let me introduce myself. I joined the Royal Canadian Navy in 1967. I've enjoyed every minute of my time in the navy and in the Canadian Forces. I've seen first-hand the excellence of the men and women in Canada's armed forces. I have had the privilege of leading and working with some of the finest Canadians this country can produce. It has been an honour and a pleasure to serve Canada and the men and women with whom I work.

You are a very well informed committee and you have heard a great deal in some of your past sessions from many of my counterparts regarding the subject of operational readiness. Indeed, my predecessor, Vice-Admiral Greg Maddison, spoke to you on the structure of the navy. So I'm not going to concentrate on that piece today.

With this as background, I'm proud to say the navy meets its operational commitments and is seen as a valuable and credible force by our national and international operational partners. In accordance with planning guidance and doctrine, the navy was operationally ready to deploy an immediate reaction force within ten days, as required by the Government of Canada. As you know, this formed the first major commitment to Operation Apollo in October 2001. The navy was ready when called, and can deliver what the government expects.

However, it is also true that the navy has not committed this level of ships since the Second World War. Today our ships are setting new and amazing endurance records at sea. We are fully engaged in the campaign against terrorism, and have been so from the moment our ships slipped their jetties. Ours is not a token presence. As I speak, five ships are in or near the area of operations, two have just returned, and three more are preparing to depart. This is over half the major surface fleet. Sadly, however, I do not believe that most Canadians have a true appreciation for what their navy can do, and indeed, what it is doing around the world.

This level of operational readiness and commitment is possible because of the quality and commitment of our men and women, both uniformed and civilian. The navy is able to respond to events across a full spectrum of conflict, domestic surveillance, peacetime search and rescue missions, combat operations, and perhaps most illustrative of late, the navy is fully capable of meeting its obligations of deployability, as is seen with the ongoing commitment of the Canadian task group in support of the campaign against terrorism.

The navy is a very credible, but small force, second to none of comparable size. The navy is ready. But to continue to maintain this credible and flexible capability presents significant resource challenges. In part as a result of these resource constraints, the navy has adopted tier levels of operational readiness. Ships at lower levels of readiness are, however, fully capable of conducting a myriad of routine operations and surveillance missions. Ships that are proceeding on more complex and higher-risk duties receive a full spectrum of sophisticated training and readiness certification.

The challenge, of course, is in balancing and matching resources to these operational commitments. We meet these commitments through the use of tailored naval task groups. The composition of a task group is mission-dependent and will not always consist of the same mix of ships and aircraft. The task group provides the capability to command either national or combined forces, as was the case in the Gulf War and is now in the Arabian Sea. This allows for command control and execution of complex missions. It thus allows for a major international capability and role, which single ships alone cannot perform, thus providing flexible military contributions and a greater recognition of the Canadian role.

I believe it important that I also highlight some of the key challenges that the navy and the Canadian Forces face today. The immediate challenge we face, as a result of the ongoing commitment to Operation Apollo, is the matter of sustainment. Yes, the navy was operationally ready to be commited to Operation Apollo, and yes, the navy is capable of sustaining a task group in the long term, but this level of operational capability will require not only resources to train and maintain, but also capital investment to ensure that our ships and our aircraft continue to have the excellent operational capability they have today.

¹ (1540)

Modern naval operations demand sophisticated weapons systems and sensors, and our ships and aircraft are high-tech. To man these ships, we need educated, motivated, and adaptable personnel. You are no doubt aware, however, that the target audience is shrinking, and the navy is competing with industry that pays very well for these same personnel. So we are faced also with the challenge of attracting, recruiting, and retaining suitable personnel.

Another challenge arises from the capital-intensive nature of modern naval forces, which, while cost-effective once acquired, are expensive to replace. Striking an appropriate balance between sustaining the current fleet and building the next one is not easy, but it never has been. It is an investment that over the last century, and even more today, has allowed Canada flexible and effective options to protect its own interests, directly and in combination with our friends and partners.

[Translation]

In recent years, Canada's Armed Forces and Navy have had to deal with the daily reality of how to spend resources in such a way as to maintain optimum naval capability. We have adopted a rigorous approach to our activities. However, we have reached a stage where we can only cover the basics.

[English]

The Canadian Forces and Canada's navy are a symbol to the nation. Technically proficient and operationally credible naval forces provide the ability for a nation not only to take a stand on issues, but to demonstrate its commitment to contribute to the solution. I am committed to providing a navy that will serve Canada as a multi-purpose, credible, combat-capable, interoperable force worldwide. Further, I am committed to ensuring that the personnel in Canada's military have the tools, respect, and quality of life they deserve. That is what Canada has consistently required of her navy, and that is what I strive to deliver.

Mr. Chairman, distinguished committee members, thank you. I would be pleased to respond to any of your questions.

The Chair: Thank you very much, Vice-Admiral Buck, for that presentation. I would also like to congratulate you and your staff for the Leadmark document that was put out recently. I don't know if all the members of committee have had an opportunity to see it and read through it. I found it very helpful for understanding where you want to take the navy.

We've got Mr. Benoit for seven minutes.

¹ (1545)

Mr. Leon Benoit (Lakeland, CA): Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.

I would like, on behalf of the constituents I represent and, I think, Canadians, to thank you all and everyone in the navy for the work you're doing on behalf of our country. It means a lot to us, and I think many Canadians recognize that. So thank you very much.

I want to get to the issue of sustainability of the current levels of commitment and what you need by way of equipment, but I want to start by asking about the issue of government disclosure with the navy's involvement in the war on terrorism. Canadians, quite frankly, have been kept almost in the dark about the operation in the area of Afghanistan until quite recently, when, in a briefing, some information was given about the good work the navy's doing on behalf of Canadians. Do you believe it's necessary to keep Canadians so entirely out of the loop when it comes to issues like the capture of prisoners, apparently, and the interception of some goods that were believed to be used in raising money to fund terrorism?

VAdm Ron Buck: All the operations the navy has conducted in Operation Apollo in support of the campaign against terrorism have been made public, through briefings to members of the press or briefings given across the country. I myself have been quite active in doing exactly that.

Mr. Leon Benoit: Why is it, then, Admiral, that we only found out last week or the week before for the first time that the Canadian navy had been involved in capturing prisoners in the area of Afghanistan?

VAdm Ron Buck: The headline I believe you are referring to in the Ottawa Citizen took some statements out of context and implied that we had taken al-Qaeda and Taliban prisoners, when we had not. I never stated that we had. What I stated was that in the context of what are called maritime interdiction operations, we had stopped and detained a number of vessels. There were from time to time in the conduct of those operations, obviously, personnel in those vessels, and indeed, in some cases we also came across activities that were illegal. I could draw a comparison with some of the migration activities that happened on the west coast a few years ago. When we do that kind of work, effectively, once we have ascertained what the situation is in the vessels, the individuals in those vessels are turned over to the requisite civilian authorities of the countries in question. That's exactly what happened in this particular case.

Mr. Leon Benoit: That maybe explains the need for detailed briefings. You're saying you gave them, and the reason we didn't get that information is that it was inaccurate. That still does involve detaining people on board ship, I assume, maybe not on Canadian ships, maybe on the ships that were detained or that you had impounded. I think it is important that Canadians hear about detail, at least to that level, not in any way to jeopardize the operation. I think the importance may be primarily, in some cases, to show Canadians clearly just how important the work the navy is doing on our behalf is.

VAdm Ron Buck: I fully agree with you, and in fact, as I did state, I have myself over the past number of months been attempting, wherever I can, to make that information available and to provide it not just to the media, but also to community groups across the country, so that they do have an understanding of what their navy is capable of, what it is doing, and why it is important to this country.

Mr. Leon Benoit: And I think that's an important point, that the briefings and the information given shouldn't be only through the media.

VAdm Ron Buck: Absolutely.

Mr. Leon Benoit: I have some concern about Parliament not being kept properly in the loop on the briefings. I'm not pointing the finger of blame at anybody in the military. I think it's up to the government to arrange that, and it hasn't happened. During the Gulf War leaders of the opposition parties were sworn in to the Privy Council. They were privy to what was going on at quite a high security level, I understand. I think it gives Canadians some comfort to know that not only select members of the governing party, but also at least the leaders of the opposition parties are involved. I'm wondering why that hasn't happened. Maybe you can't answer that, it's up to the government to answer it. I guess I'd like your view on whether you feel that's important.

¹ (1550)

VAdm Ron Buck: As I've previously responded, we are very cognizant of the need to ensure that the Canadian public has a full understanding of what the Canadian forces are doing in this particular campaign, and we are making efforts to do so.

Mr. Leon Benoit: Yes, I guess that question should be directed more to government.

With the Sea Kings on board Canadian ships, I'd like you to tell this committee what type of detection, defence, response equipment is on those Sea Kings, compared to what was on them during the Gulf War.

VAdm Ron Buck: We have a mix of aircraft in the theatre at the moment in respect of their capabilities, because we are operating in a theatre of operations that is quite wide, that ranges from the north Arabian Gulf across the Arabian Sea. So some of those helicopters are fitted with what are called active anti-submarine systems, some are fitted with passive anti-submarine systems. As well, they are fitted with self-protection systems, and in most cases those systems are similar to or the same as those fitted in the Gulf War, though not necessarily in all aircraft, because in some cases the role and the mission are different.

Mr. Leon Benoit: How many of the Sea Kings would be equipped the same as the most heavily equipped during the Gulf War?

VAdm Ron Buck: I can get the precise figures for you, but I would estimate about half of them at the moment. But again, this is because the threat is different, not because the equipment is not available.

Mr. Leon Benoit: Thank you.

The Chair: Monsieur Bachand.

[Translation]

Mr. Claude Bachand (Saint-Jean, BQ): Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I too would like to welcome the Vice-Admiral and his two colleagues.

My first question is for the Vice-Admiral. What percentage of the Canadian fleet is currently deployed in the Persian Gulf?

Vadm. Ron Buck: Currently, 25 per cent of the fleet is deployed.

Mr. Claude Bachand: Given that 25 per cent of the Canadian fleet is deployed in the Persian Gulf, how does this affect our level of operational readiness here in Canada? Canada and Quebec are surrounded by three oceans. The Navy surely had certain responsibilities prior to the fleet's deployment to Afghanistan. With the remaining 75 per cent of its fleet, can it fully assume the responsibilities shouldered by the entire fleet prior to the conflict in Afghanistan?

[English]

VAdm Ron Buck: No. In fact, the 25% is major warships. Canada, of course, has twelve frigates, four destroyers, two reconnaissance ships, twelve defence vessels, and entering service, four submarines. We use a mix of all those vessels to do our routine surveillance tasks here at home. By committing 25% over time to this particular operation, we have not in any way jeopardized our standing commitments to surveillance and other defence tasks that relate directly to the sovereignty of Canada and to the defence of North America.

[Translation]

Mr. Claude Bachand: Are you saying then that in peacetime, when the Navy has no international responsibilities to shoulder, it could manage with only 75% of the fleet,? In other words, 25% of the fleet is currently surplus.

[English]

VAdm Ron Buck: No, not at all. The challenge, as I mentioned in my opening remarks, relates to ensuring that the navy is operationally ready, and therefore you need a mix and number of ships to effect that readiness. Ensuring that ships are ready is a complex mix of equipment, systems, personnel that require ongoing training, and this is a very lengthy process. For example, to prepare a task group takes approximately six months of training. This is true in any navy, not just our own. So this is an issue of maintenance cycles, personnel posting cycles, and ensuring that a very complex mix of people and systems is capable of doing a wide range of missions.

[Translation]

Mr. Claude Bachand: Now then, I'd like to draw a distinction between command and control. I would imagine that, given the whole question of interoperability, your forces are under US military command, but under Canadian control. Is that in fact the case?

¹ (1555)

[English]

VAdm Ron Buck: Canada always retains command of its forces, and in accordance with standard NATO procedures, other nations do the same. There are sub-pieces of command called control. First, a nation, in this case Canada, decides what, in this case, its ships, its maritime forces are capable of doing. So they will specify a Canadian mission for those ships. They will then build a set of rules of engagements as to what the ships can do and cannot do. Then control within that defined area will be passed to an operational commander, and it could be, and in this case is, an operational commander who is not Canadian. But at the same time, in the north Arabian Gulf and the Arabian Sea, what is currently called the Canadian task group, commanded by a Canadian, also has in it multinational forces, American, Dutch, etc.--it changes on a day-to-day basis--and those ships are under Canadian control. So control is a normal procedure that is used in the context of NATO, but command always rests in Canadian hands.

[Translation]

Mr. Claude Bachand: That's a very good explanation. This means that the rules of engagement are established and controlled by the Canadian government or by a high-ranking Canadian military officer.

I'd like you to explain briefly this mission to me. Some questions arose when the fleet was deployed to Afghanistan, a land-locked country. However, the importance of a naval presence to prevent al-Qaeda or Taliban supporters from fleeing the region soon became clear.

Has the mandate been extended to include drug traffickers and drug trafficking? I admit I was surprised on reading an article revealing that a commander had used a seized vessel for cannon practice. Was this part of the mission? I was under the impression that the mission was confined to controlling the Taliban and al-Qaeda, unless there is a connection between the network and drug traffickers.

Would you have the right to seize vessels, detain drug traffickers and sink their boats in the name of target practice? Is this all part of your mission?

[English]

VAdm Ron Buck: There are a number of missions we are performing. One consists of protection and surveillance activity around what are called high-value units. Those are normally aircraft carriers or amphibious-ready ships, where we build and maintain the picture and ensure that nothing comes in harm's way of those ships.

There is another mission known as leadership interdiction, which is specifically related to the campaign against terrorism. This is to ensure that maritime activity is not allowing either Taliban or al-Qaeda to exit the area or use maritime commerce to fund their activities.

Further, we also, under UN Security Council mandate, maintain UN sanctions against Iraq in the Arabian Gulf. With the ships you referred to, there have been a number that had drugs on board, in some cases oil, in some cases other contraband. That, in part, has been done under UN sanctions, which is also something that Canada has been doing for a number of years. In some cases on the high seas, when you come across illegal activity, you have the right to act, and that is what has been done in a number of cases. The incident you were referring to was a case where after the vessel had been seized, it was sunk, so that the contraband could not be used to commercial effect.

The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Bachand.

Mr. Price.

Mr. David Price (Compton--Stanstead, Lib.): Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Thank you very much for being here, gentlemen, and congratulations on the job you're doing. Mr. Bachand and I had a great opportunity. About a month ago we were in Tampa at the command centre and were able to see that particular day just where your ships were located, and we were quite proud of the fact. It stood out very well, particularly since we were with a NATO group of other countries, and the Canadian Navy stood up there.

I wanted to start off talking about the maritime helicopters on the backs of frigates. In the different missions you've had to do with the helicopters out there have you been missing any equipment that has made them incapable of performing a mission they were asked to do?

º (1600)

VAdm Ron Buck: No. In fact, the Sea King helicopters have been performing superbly. At last report, they had flown over 2500 mission hours. They have enjoyed very high availability rates, in the order of 96%. For the missions that have been conducted, they have enhanced our surveillance capability tremendously. So in the context of the series of missions we're doing and what they've contributed, they have done the job.

Mr. David Price: We did hear something about some kind of record set with the Sea Kings going off the Vancouver . Is that what you were referring to?

VAdm Ron Buck: No, the record I was referring to was the time ships spent at sea. Generally speaking, when ships deploy, they are at sea somewhere between two and three weeks. They would then go into port for maintenance, training, etc. Many of our ships today are at sea in the order of 72 days, the Vancouver record, which has been further beaten and is, I think, now 79. That's something approaching two and a half months from port to port. The United States is operating with 97% of their time at sea, Canada is operating with 92%. The next closest ally is in the sixties.

Mr. David Price: That takes me then to maintenance. As you said, you were definitely ready when called upon to go, and you say you're able to sustain that operation, but for how long?

VAdm Ron Buck: Under the current defence policy I am mandated to provide what is called an immediate reaction force, and that is one frigate or destroyer on each coast, plus, sustainable for a six-month period, a task group. We have already exceeded that and will be able to sustain a task group over time.

Mr. David Price: In sustaining, you're bringing ships back and other are going out. Your supply ship has been out there longer than any of the others. I guess it's HMCS Protecteur right now that's in a refit, the one that's getting ready to go out.

VAdm Ron Buck: HMCS Protecteur is getting ready. She's just coming out of a refit.

Mr. David Price: That refit was planned a long time ago, it had nothing to do with this. Will this be the complete refit that was originally planned, or have you had to cut back on that refit in order to get Protecteur out in time to do this replacement?

VAdm Ron Buck: It was the complete refit. We were already planning on bringing Protecteur forward, because she was committed to another operation, a major international exercise in the same timeframe.

Mr. David Price: Okay. Good.

Because you are the specialist in the coastal defence vessels, I was wondering if any changes are being made to them since September 11? And looking more closely at our coastal protection, since we have such a huge coast, is there anything else being done to these ships to better prepare them for, let's say, mine detection, anything like that?

VAdm Ron Buck: As you may be aware, as part of the project that acquired the coastal defence vessels, there was a very sophisticated route survey system acquired. At the time we bought four systems. It is, however, a system that is very expensive to maintain. So in fact, we have an activity under way at the moment looking at taking what is a very expensive system to maintain and achieving the same operational capability with more systems in a more cost-effective manner. That's one of their key roles.

As well, of course, coastal patrol and surveillance, as you've indicated, is done by coastal defence vessels, and that is a primary mission given to Canada's naval reserve. Those young men and women are out there doing that every day of the week.

As well, in a whole myriad of relationships we have, with the United States, with other government departments and other authorities, we are ensuring that the all that information that's out there is much better coordinated.

º (1605)

Mr. David Price: Is there any new type of detection equipment you're using to get that picture better?

VAdm Ron Buck: Not in relation to the coastal defence vessels at the moment, except with the plan to enhance their mine warfare capability.

Mr. David Price: How are you doing on recruiting?

VAdm Ron Buck: As you know, we have a very large push on with recruiting. At the moment the strength of the navy is approximately 9,000 regular force personnel and approximately 4,000 reservists. With the 9,000 regulars, we are between 600 and 700 trained individuals short. We are virtually at our 9,000 number of individuals, but of course, as you appreciate, though there are more junior individuals you can put into service more quickly, you then need to advance them in time and rank and experience.

In the recruiting campaign we've actually been quite successful in a number of our critical areas, in our junior officers, for example. Interestingly, a number of our technical trades are doing very well. A number of our trades and occupations where it's intuitively obvious what they do, as with a bosun, are doing extremely well. Some of our occupations have interesting names that don't resonate with the Canadian public, like naval combat information operator, naval electronics systems operator, things like that. What we are doing to ensure that we can turn the corner on those particular occupations is focussing our advertising precisely so that it's more understandable what these individuals do. But overall, the trend in recruiting from the navy's perspective is positive and heading in the right direction.

The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Price.

Mrs. Wayne.

Mrs. Elsie Wayne (Saint John, PC/DR): Thank you very much.

Vice-Admiral Buck, Chief Petty Officer Joncas, and Commodore Gauvin, it's nice to have you here. As you know, some of us have been speaking out on behalf of the navy, asking the government to give you more money to give you the tools to do the job that should be done. You're on camera, and I'm hoping that when we're through, they're not going to say Vice-Admiral Buck thinks he's got everything he needs.

A year ago, last spring, a report on procurement was tabled, the government's response came forward, and recommendation 30 stated:

That the Department of National Defence establish a procurement plan for Canadian ship construction...and move quickly to acquire new Canadian-built supply vessels to replace the ageing ships currently in inventory.

We have major concern. We know we need more supply ships, and we'd like to have them built here in Canada. I see in this note we got from the library the 12 Halifax frigates, but they were all built in Saint John, not Halifax. I have to say that we're very proud of those frigates, but when it's time for replacement, it's replacement of 12 at the same time. So there has to be a rotation. Do you not feel, Vice-Admiral, that there is a real need for us to have a national shipbuilding policy in Canada for ships for our navy?

VAdm Ron Buck: If I could speak to why they are called the Halifax class, indeed, nine were built in Saint John and three were built in Quebec, but they are named for the lead ship of the class, which, as you know, is Halifax.

As to your broader question, that is a government policy issue.

Mrs. Elsie Wayne: That we have a national shipbuilding policy here in Canada on a rotation basis and continue. So you support that fully?

VAdm Ron Buck: What I said is that it is an issue for the government.

The Chair: Mrs. Wayne, that is a question many people in the navy would say is beyond Vice-Admiral Buck's pay scale.

Mrs. Elsie Wayne: I see. Okay. I just thought that if he came out and said yes to it, we'd have a national shipbuilding policy tomorrow, no problem whatsoever, we're just waiting for it.

The four used submarines acquired from the United Kingdom have been plagued by a number of problems. Just recently, we all know about the HMCS Windsor. In fact, I had a question today, but I didn't get up, because some of the people talked too long in the House of Commons, and it was about the HMCS Windsor. What will be the impact of the cost of making the repairs that are required for all these submarines, which are in addition to the cost of modifying the subs with Canadian equipment, on the navy's budget and its ability to maintain and update all its warships?

º (1610)

VAdm Ron Buck: That issue is more rightly spoken to by the assistant deputy minister, materiel. The delivery of those submarines is a contractual arrangement with the United Kingdom, and we remain within the terms of that contract.

Mrs. Elsie Wayne: Parts from other ships, like the windows of the bridge of HMCS Regina, were borrowed in order to get HMCS Ottawa ready for its deployment. Is such borrowing of major parts from other ships becoming more and more prevalent in the navy, or is it only a temporary situation, driven by the need to get the ships ready for their deployment as quickly as possible?

VAdm Ron Buck: There's a technical term for it: you requisition something. It's actually getting less frequent, certainly as it relates to the frigates. But in relation to the timing, moving ships forward for Operation Apollo, often there are items, and bridge windows happen to be one, that are unique. You maintain a certain inventory of them, but you don't maintain an inventory for the full class. So where it is expeditious, you would do that, but it is not the norm with frigates.

Mrs. Elsie Wayne: If tomorrow the government said, we're going to build some ships, what would be the first ships you would request be built for the navy?

VAdm Ron Buck: As is noted in Leadmark and is in departmental plans at this stage, the first priority for replacement is the replenishments ships, the current HMCS Protecteur and HMCS Preserver.

The Chair: Thank you.

Mr. Benoit.

Mr. Leon Benoit: Thank you very much. I'd like to thank Mr. Anders for allowing me to have his spot, as I have to leave pretty soon.

On the Sea Kings, I want to follow up the questions Mr. Price asked. Just what's the range and age of our Sea Kings?

VAdm Ron Buck: They entered service, as you know, in the mid-sixties. By range, you mean what?

Mr. Leon Benoit: How old are the oldest Sea Kings in the fleet, how old are the newest, roughly?

VAdm Ron Buck: I believe they started to enter service in about 1963, but I'll get you the precise details. They entered service over a period of time.

Mr. Leon Benoit: You're saying they're working just fine, they're operationally safe, they're capable still for the type of work that you're doing, there's no problem running them another 10 years?

VAdm Ron Buck: Very clearly, we have a requirement for replacement helicopters. There is a project under way to that end. But they are safe. Two months ago I flew in four of them. I fly in them quite frequently.

Mr. Leon Benoit: Of course, their safety depends on what they're doing, but they should also be capable of doing what has to be done, not only in what's going on right now, the navy's involvement in the war on terrorism, but with other work they may have to do in the future.

VAdm Ron Buck: In recognition of the evolving requirement, there is a plan, which is very important, to replace those helicopters.

Mr. Leon Benoit: It seems to me that we're not going to get enough replacement helicopters for the Sea Kings for 10 years. Have you got concerns about the Sea Kings operating for another 10 years before the first replacement helicopters can actually be used?

VAdm Ron Buck: I believe the timing of replacements for the Sea Kings could be variable at this time. It will depend, of course, on how that project proceeds. At the current time the Sea Kings are not only safe, they are capable of delivering on their current missions. They are maintained to do exactly that. We do not fly unsafe aircraft that are not capable. Replacement depends on what dollars we wish to commit. Those decisions need to be taken, depending on the timeline of the maritime helicopter project.

º (1615)

Mr. Leon Benoit: I've seen information that shows that one of the potential replacements, the Eurocopter, would be less capable of doing the work needed than the Sea Kings. Have you any comments on that?

VAdm Ron Buck: I have no comment on that. I have seen nothing to indicate that.

Mr. Leon Benoit: I have. I'm very concerned about the possibility that we replace a capable helicopter with something less capable. It doesn't make any sense to me. It may be newer and may fly, but if it can't do the work that has to be done, you have to be concerned about it.

In the area of Afghanistan, 79 days you've had one ship out. How are they being supplied, entirely by Canadian supply ships?

VAdm Ron Buck: It's a combination, in fact. We could use HMCS Preserver, which is currently on station, to simply supply the Canadian task group, but she is doing yeoman service supplying many other ships as well. We've integrated ourselves into the logistics train so that we use a variety of replenishment ships to refuel and re-store our ships, just as we refuel and re-store other nations' ships.

Mr. Leon Benoit: You were talking earlier about the fact that you had detained other ships with people on board. Were any of those people brought onto Canadian ships? If so, what's the fine detail in terms of how people are to be treated if they're kept captive on their own ship, as compared to if they're brought onto Canadian ships, even though they're being turned over, I understand, to authorities from their own country?

VAdm Ron Buck: We are very careful in dealing with individuals, whether we are operating in the north Arabian Sea, on the high seas around the world, or in our own waters. They are treated well, all necessities are provided. I believe in one case there were some individuals who were quite ill and were dealt with using our own medical care.

Mr. Leon Benoit: Did you have detainees on Canadian ships?

VAdm Ron Buck: No.

The Chair: Mr. Bachand.

[Translation]

Mr. Claude Bachand: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I'd like to focus on the question of submarines because it is a matter of some concern. As I see it, it's only a matter of time before Quebecers and Canadians start wondering if purchasing submarines is a sound investment.

First of all, are you familiar with the submarine purchasing arrangements? As we speak, do you know if we have paid the British government in full for the four submarines?

[English]

VAdm Ron Buck: We have a contractual relationship between the Government of Canada and the Government of the United Kingdom, and again, for the details, it would be more appropriate to address that to the assistant deputy minster, materiel. But as in all contracts, there are phased payments as we receive value for money.

[Translation]

Mr. Claude Bachand: I see.

Recently, a rumour was floating around that the Navy wanted $300 million taken from the new federal budget, which allocated a minimum of $1.2 billion over the next five years, and the money used immediately to cover the cost of the submarines. Can you tell me whether or not there is any truth to this rumour?

º (1620)

[English]

VAdm Ron Buck: I have no knowledge of this rumour.

[Translation]

Mr. Claude Bachand: I see.

Now then, I'd like to focus briefly on these four submarines.

First of all, I understand that HMCS Victoria is still in dry dock. It's here in Canada, but it has not been out to sea since its arrival. I've also been told that HMCS Windsor was taken out recently, that it experienced a problem, that it made an emergency docking in Halifax and that it was also plagued by communication problems. The remaining two submarines are still in Britain and apparently, there are problems with the vessels' hulls. The engines are also apparently leaking diesel fuel.

I'm starting to wonder if Canadians may be paying a ridiculously high price for these four submarines, given their unreliability or, at the very least, their state of readiness. We are currently looking into the state of readiness of Canada's Armed Forces. As I see it, the submarines are far from being operationally ready. Can you answer these questions and at the same time, bring us up to speed on the repairs needed to make these submarines operationally ready and advise us as to the time frame involved?

[English]

VAdm Ron Buck: Introducing a new class of ship, whether it be a frigate or a submarine, is very clearly a complex issue. As it relates to the introduction of the Victoria class, there are two main pieces to the process. The first is a contractual arrangement with the Government of the United Kingdom to deliver the submarine in an operationally capable and safe condition. With the reactivation process, which is very much like certifying an aircraft as safe to fly, in this case safe to operate under water, all of what are called the class 1 systems in those submarines are inspected, and where required, it is ensured that they meet all quality assurance standards. That's the part in the United Kingdom. The second part of introducing those submarines was to remove some existing equipment in the submarines and replace it with Canadian equipment that was compatible with our weapons systems, specifically our torpedo systems.

As for Victoria, she is just now completing her Canadianization. She will do so probably late this month or in early April, at which point she will start the transition to trials and transfer from the east coast to the west coast. HMCS Windsor, the second of the submarines, arrived in Canada late last year. In trying to restore our submarine capability and train individuals, we have chosen to operate her for a short period of time, and in that period of time, as you have seen in the press over the last week or so, there have been some teething problems, but these are not unnatural in introducing any class of ship in any country. These submarines are a superb buy, as this continues to give Canada a full capability on, above, and below water for a fraction of what a program of new submarines would cost. As an example, without being specific as to country, another nation has designed some submarines and is introducing them into service. It actually has the submarines in the water. By the time it has an operational capability, it is reported, it will be 20 years from the time it signed the contract, and this is a very capable country. So in that context, these submarines are indeed effective. They are capable and will serve this country well.

The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Bachand.

Mr. Dromisky.

Mr. Stan Dromisky (Thunder Bay--Atikokan, Lib.): Thank you very much.

There are two areas I'd like to touch on. One is the navy's relationship with NORAD and what you can see for the future in the relationship between the two, especially if the Americans go ahead and have us involved in an outer space defence system.

VAdm Ron Buck: Those issues, of course, remain to be adjudicated by the Government of the United States and the Government of Canada. The navy has the capability, from a radar perspective, to operate and link with NATO.

Mr. Stan Dromisky: Is that just in Canadian waters?

VAdm Ron Buck: We have the capability to plug into a number of systems, in an interoperability sense, around the world, but by and large, as it relates specifically to NORAD, we would normally do that in the context of national sovereignty or surveillance.

Mr. Stan Dromisky: Okay.

The second area concerns the north. What does the navy really need to play a much more effective and sustainable role in the waters north of Canada?

VAdm Ron Buck: I spoke earlier, in response to Mrs. Wayne's question, about fleet replacement, in particular the replenishment ships. One of the capabilities we are planning to design into those ships is a limited first-year ice capability, so we'd have the capability to operate in the Arctic in a multi-role fashion. As well, we are testing some new technology on the east coast. It's what's called a surface wave radar capability, which we believe may have some applicability in the Arctic and, of course, as we move into unmanned aerial vehicles and, potentially, other space-based systems.

º (1625)

Mr. Stan Dromisky: So the type of ship you are referring is on your Christmas list.

VAdm Ron Buck: The replenishment ship is our highest priority naval acquisition.

The Chair: Do you have anything further, Mr. Dromisky?

Mr. Stan Dromisky: No, that's what I wanted to know. Thank you very much.

The Chair: Mr. Provenzano, do you want to take a couple of minutes of Mr. Dromisky's time?

Mr. Carmen Provenzano (Sault Ste. Marie, Lib.): Yes, thank you.

I have two questions. The first one relates to some of the comments you were making earlier, Vice-Admiral, concerning recruitment and how you need to find new terms to describe some of the jobs, because they just don't have the cachet or they're not readily recognizable as to what functions might be entailed. Would there be any special problems in recruitment? Are there areas where you're having a lot of difficulty recruiting people with certain skill sets, whether they be technical in nature or otherwise?

VAdm Ron Buck: Our technical trades, mechanical or electrical engineering personnel or technicians, were a problem area for us. However, in large part, we are now attracting those individuals, because there are some bonus programs and some other things in place.

The other skill sets I spoke about earlier that were less intuitively obvious, such as the naval combat information operator, who is somebody, by the way, who operates a radar display, are not ones you can go and buy. It is not a commercial capability you would see in industry. So by and large, in those areas we actually have to produce that capability ourselves, train people ourselves so that they, over time, have that capability. That's one of the challenges. There are a number, not just in the navy, but in a wider military context, of occupations that are unique in what they do.

Mr. Carmen Provenzano: What I'm thinking of, Vice-Admiral, is that there are, probably in many areas, shortages being experienced in the trades. If that's the case, you would assume it would spill over into your recruitment activities as well, so you'd be encountering those situations. Are you concerned about it, or are you satisfied that you can meet your recruitment requirements with respect to those critical skill sets, despite what you're saying?

VAdm Ron Buck: We are one year into a very aggressive three-year recruiting scheme. What we're now doing is fine-tuning our approach to ensuring that we attract the right individuals and then, which is just as important, retain them. It is too early to say, but I believe, as I said earlier, that the trends are in the right direction at the moment. What we must now do is continue to ensure that we actually can bring about that attraction. We're putting a number of bonus schemes in place. We are looking at what is called lateral entry, that is, some individuals who have some skills already could come in more directly. We are looking at facilitating the ablity to move from the reserve force to the regular force, to enhance that flow of individuals.

With a military, whether it be navy or army, you must continue to advance the individuals, because they move along and move through, and that clearly is where we are focused at the moment.

The Chair: Thank you, Admiral Buck.

I'm going to go to Mrs. Wayne now, and I'll come back to you, Mr. Provenzano; you have a couple of minutes left.

Mrs. Elsie Wayne: Thank you very much, Mr. Chair. I, like my Alliance colleague, have to leave to go to another meeting.

I have to say, Vice-Admiral, you are the first person I have heard since 1993 who referred to the Sea Kings as being safe, particularly in view of the fact that some lost their lives just outside my riding in one of the Sea Kings. Another one had to have an emergency landing. There was another problem in our area as well. I've had parents of the pilots who have to fly the Sea Kings get in touch urging me to help to get the replacement. So if you feel they're safe, I don't see why we should even bother any more going after the government and asking them to replace them.

º (1630)

VAdm Ron Buck: Mrs. Wayne, we've put a tremendous number of resources into ensuring that the Sea Kings are safe, that systems are replaced as required, that the essential maintenance is done. I will not put young Canadians at risk without ensuring that the risk is appropriate. I would not fly in those aircraft and I would not have young Canadian men and women fly in those aircraft if I did not think they were safe.

Mrs. Elsie Wayne: So what happened when they crashed and the lives were lost? They weren't safe.

VAdm. Ron Buck: I would suggest to you that the flight safety record of the Sea King is probably better than those of most commercial airlines.

Mrs. Elsie Wayne: Thank you very much.

The Chair: Thank you, Mrs. Wayne.

Mr. Provenzano, for a couple of minutes.

Mr. Carmen Provenzano: Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Interoperability is fundamental to our operations, it seems. Are there any technical problems you're aware of that manifest themselves in the interoperability capability of the force?

VAdm Ron Buck: In many ways the Canadian navy probably has the greatest level of technical interoperability with our allies, specifically with the United States, than any other nation has at the moment. What is always a challenge, however, is that technology moves, and it moves quickly. In a large navy, such as the United States navy, that technology moves at different rates on different ships in different classes, and so that is always a challenge. But we have demonstrated that we have the capability in the fact that we are given roles and responsibilities other nations are not given. We actually can replace U.S. ships one for one. We don't do that lightly, and we only do that because of a combination of technical interoperability, doctrinal commonality, trust, while at the same time ensuring that the role of Canada's ships is always a government-approved role. It is only for missions that are approved by this country and only within certain terms and conditions.

Mr. Carmen Provenzano: Thank you.

If we happen to be outclassed in some areas, is it important? Is it something this committee should be hearing about, so that it can address itself to that issue?

VAdm Ron Buck: The distinguished chair referred earlier to Leadmark. This was an articulation, within the context of the department's strategy, that laid out what the navy sees as the appropriate capabilities for it into the 21st century. There are capabilities this country at this juncture cannot afford and probably does not need. An example is in our own backyard. An aircraft carrier is a hugely expensive beast. It has 5,000 personnel on it, that's over half the size of the navy. Is that an area Canada as a navy should be involved in? No. But our core fleet and an enhancement to that core fleet in respect of our deployment capability, our lift capability, continuing to modernize our frigates, and ensuring the command and control capability we currently have in our Iroquois class destroyers, those are the key to our future. Ensuring that kind of capability, we can move on to the future.

Mr. Carmen Provenzano: Do I have time for one little one?

The Chair: In fairness to Mr. Peric, I'd like to go to him at this point, for two minutes, and we'll come back to you as well.

Mr. Janko Peric (Cambridge, Lib.): Thank you.

I've been hearing some comments within my own area, the Waterloo region,that Canadian soldiers are tired, that they are not well equipped for the job we are sending them to do. Could you comment on that?

VAdm Ron Buck: It really would be inappropriate for me to comment on what are essentially army issues. I can speak, however, to the naval issues, and I can assure you that the young men and women in Canada's navy have the tools to do the job.

º (1635)

Mr. Janko Peric: Are they overtired? How is morale in the navy?

VAdm Ron Buck: When I was standing on the jetties in Halifax as we were deploying ships--blustery, north Atlantic conditions--the spirit was sombre among both the members of the ships' companies and their families. But there was a recognition that this was a job that needed to be done. I was, approximately a month and a half or so ago, in all the ships, with the exception of Vancouver, in the Arabian Gulf area, and the morale was excellent. Our challenge over time is to ensure that as we rotate ships, there is a balance between the deployment schedules and an individual's time at home. That is always a balance.

Mr. Janko Peric: Do I have some more time?

The Chair: Actually, I'm going to have to get back to you after another round. I have Mr. Anders on the list right now.

Mr. Rob Anders (Calgary West, CA): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Admiral Buck, do you think it's acceptable that the project office to replace the Sea Kings opened in 1981, yet the government has still not ordered a new helicopter?

VAdm Ron Buck: There is a process, and the department is moving through that process.

Mr. Rob Anders: Do you think the process is acceptable, given that the office was opened in 1981?

VAdm Ron Buck: That is an issue there are many views on.

The Chair: Mr. Anders, in fairness, you're asking the Vice-Admiral some pretty political questions.

Mr. Rob Anders: I'm merely asking whether or not somebody thinks it's acceptable that 21 years after an office was opened, no helicopters have been procured.

The Chair: I think some questions are better left for the House of Commons, and that's one of them. But please continue.

Mr. Rob Anders: What's the most likely in-service date for the maritime helicopter replacement?

VAdm Ron Buck: There is a target of 2005.

Mr. Rob Anders: Do you think that's the most likely in-service date, though?

VAdm Ron Buck: I would suggest that you should direct that question to the assistant deputy minister, materiel.

Mr. Rob Anders: Okay, I think that's honest.

This is an interesting piece of information we got from one of the briefings here today. Parts from other ships, like the windows of the bridge of the HMCS Regina, were borrowed in order to get the HMCS Ottawa readied for its deployment. Is such borrowing of major parts from the ships becoming more and more prevalent in the navy?

VAdm Ron Buck: As I said in response to Mrs. Wayne's question earlier, as it relates to the frigates, no.

Mr. Rob Anders: Okay.

Can you tell me what the annual shortfall is in the navy's operational budget?

VAdm Ron Buck: Budgets are interesting things. We build an activity rate, and then we cost the activity rate. As you look at the available resources, you prioritize those things you do and don't do. We have prioritized our budget to ensure that the key thing we need to do, sustain our operational capability, we can do, and we've just demonstrated that we do that. That does not mean there are not stresses and strains, there are. It is an ongoing balance, it always has been, and probably always will be.

Mr. Rob Anders: It didn't sound like a number to me.

VAdm Ron Buck: It wasn't.

Mr. Rob Anders: I didn't think so. All right.

Can you describe the personnel shortages in the navy today?

VAdm Ron Buck: I did in my answer earlier. The shortages in the regular force navy of trained effective strength come to approximately 600 individuals. In absolute numbers, we're actually very close to our approximately 9,000.

Mr. Rob Anders: So how many would it take to operationalize the Huron?

VAdm Ron Buck: Three hundred and twenty-five.

Mr. Rob Anders: Are all your coastal defence vessels deployed?

VAdm Ron Buck: They are all manned, with the exception of those in major maintenance periods, where you would not expect to man them.

Mr. Rob Anders: So with 600 people, you'd be able to have all the ships afloat and you'd be happy?

VAdm Ron Buck: We would be able to fully man the ships. The challenge, of course, would be then to ensure that we trained people and that the capability of those ships was appropriate to the missions and tasks.

Mr. Rob Anders: So what you're saying is that even if you got 600 right now, it would actually take years for you to be able to get some of those things.

VAdm Ron Buck: No, I don't believe I did say that. What I said was that as I mentioned earlier, building an operational capability, particularly building a task group, with a certification process to ensure that those individuals and those ships are technically up to the mark, is a complex process and takes time. As I indicated earlier, to produce a task group takes about six months, and we do that on an ongoing basis.

º (1640)

Mr. Rob Anders: So it sounds like you don't want to commit yourself to years, but you're saying it will take time.

The navy wants four new operational support ships to replace our present two. Is there money in the budget to do that? What is the in-service target date?

VAdm Ron Buck: The long-term capital plan, as it's known, does reflect this project. That, of course, will depend on the outcome of the defence policy update or review later this year.

Mr. Rob Anders: I didn't hear a date in that.

VAdm Ron Buck: You didn't hear a date because what I was suggesting was that as we move through that review process, we would then be able to move forward with a confirmed long-term capital plan.

The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Anders.

Mr. Peric, for a couple of minutes.

Mr. Janko Peric: Vice-Admiral Buck, right after September 11 President Bush and the United States had great support from friends, including Russia, in the war against terrorism. The current situation in the Middle East is awful. As we know President Bush is planning to go a step further, that means the next country could be Iraq. The support is there, especially from some European countries. What does that mean for the Canadian Armed Forces, specifically for the navy? Will more of a load come to us, and are we capable and ready to accept it?

VAdm Ron Buck: I think it would be inappropriate for me to speculate.

Mr. Janko Peric: Thank you.

The Chair: Mr. Price.

Mr. David Price: Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Admiral, we did hear some negative comments about the fact that we're buying diesel-electric subs that are not going to be very practical for us, because they couldn't operate under the polar ice cap--that is, if we still have a polar ice cap in the near future. In 1997 we gave a contract out to Ballard Power to do R and D on hydrogen fuel cells that could make our subs operational under the ice cap quite easily. Do you have any more developments on that project?

VAdm Ron Buck: Our long-term plan included the acquisition of the submarines, which are very appropriate to most of our operational areas, but not, as you've indicated, under ice. We have had for some time in the long-term plan an intention that once we got the Victoria class into service, we would look to the future to enhance them with a form of air-independent propulsion, which would give them that kind of capability.

Mr. David Price: You must have a rough idea of when we should have the subs fully operational. At that point what will they be doing, what will be their main tasks, and in what areas would they be operating?

VAdm Ron Buck: The bringing of the submarines into operational service will be staggered. We will start with Victoria, we'll follow with Windsor, then Corner Brook, and finally Chicoutimi. I would anticipate that we will be seeing the first of the submarines, Victoria and Windsor, fully operational probably in 2003. They will actually start to operate later this year.

Once they are fully operational, they will be employed in both the Atlantic and Pacific oceans. In fact, Victoria, as I indicated earlier, will have Victoria as its home port. And they will perform a variety of missions. They will do some patrol and surveillance work in Canadian waters. They will do patrol and surveillance work at choke points. They will give support to our task group, and in fact, there are occasions where there would be a submarine deployed as part of that task group. And they will interact with a number of our other allies who operate submarines in both oceans.

º (1645)

The Chair: Mr. Price, I would like to interject a couple of questions along that line myself.

Vice-Admiral, do you see any new roles for the submarines? We're obviously now in a battle against terrorism. Do you see any special roles in that, or just in the whole area of litoral warfare?

VAdm Ron Buck: Very clearly, they have an excellent litoral capability. Also, we've been dealing with asymmetric threats for many years before September 11. I'm talking about illegal activities in the approaches to Canada. Clearly, they have a role in that area. We have used them in that area. And depending on decisions the government might wish to take with other warfare capabilities, the submarines could have some broader capabilities as well.

Mr. David Price: If we look at our submariners who are going to be operating these, how is the training coming for them, and where are we getting the extra ones we're going to need, because we've lost some of them?

VAdm Ron Buck: One of the truisms about renewing a fleet, whether it's a surface fleet, an air fleet, or a submarine fleet, is that as you are introducing the new fleet, your readiness takes a dip, as you take older vessels out of service, train those individuals in the new vessels, and then nurture them back into their capability. In the early nineties, as we were introducing the frigates, we were paying off our steam destroyers, and our ability to deploy at that time was significantly less than it is today. We're facing the same situation with the submariners. We actually have the numbers we need. What we now need to do is get submarines operating, so that we can undertake the essential basic training of those submariners. That is one of the reasons HMCS Windsor is at sea today, to try to bring that flow-through forward.

The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Price, we'll come back to you.

Mr. Bachand.

[Translation]

Mr. Claude Bachand: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I'd like to focus a little on the Sea King helicopters as I've yet to ask any questions on the subject. One thing has bothered me for some time now. All kinds of figures have been quoted. Can you tell me how many hours of maintenance are required to ensure one hour of safe flying on board a Sea King? Surely you must have some figures for me.

[English]

VAdm Ron Buck: The figure that is conventionally used at the moment is approximately 30 hours of maintenance per flying hour. Most Canadians would tend to think that means you have to do 30 hours of maintenance to put the airplane back in the air, but that 30 hours of maintenance is amortized over the life of the aircraft in respect of first-line maintenance, repair on the flight deck, second-line maintenance, and ultimately, depot maintenance. It is in some ways similar to the maintenance with ships. All aircraft have a maintenance cycle. The Sea King maintenance cycle is high. It is not as high as a number of other aircraft that are currently in service with a number of other navies. One of the advantages, in addition to the enhanced capability we seek, with the maritime helicopter replacement project will be, of course, to drive down through-life cost and those maintenance hours per flight.

[Translation]

Mr. Claude Bachand: You're saying that fewer maintenance hours are required today than 15 years ago to keep the Sea King flying for one hour. Is that correct?

[English]

VAdm Ron Buck: While there is some difference in the number of maintenance hours today, they are not significantly different from those when the Sea Kings originally entered service, because they were designed in an era where vessels and aircraft were more maintenance-intensive. A very good comparison would again be our steam destroyers and our frigates.

[Translation]

Mr. Claude Bachand: In your opinion, have these helicopters exceeded their life expectancy?

[English]

VAdm Ron Buck: No. The Sea Kings, as I indicated earlier to Mrs. Wayne, are fully capable and safe. Through all of our systems, as we move forward, we make those assessments and put in the resources to ensure that our weapons and our platforms are always safe.

[Translation]

Mr. Claude Bachand: How much longer will it be before we can say that the Sea King have surpassed their life expectancy and that it's time to replace them?

º (1650)

[English]

VAdm Ron Buck: It would depend on the number of resources one wished to commit to maintaining them.

[Translation]

Mr. Claude Bachand: Earlier, you mentioned 2005 as the target date for the new helicopters. Can we expect the Sea King helicopters to last until 2005?

[English]

VAdm Ron Buck: Yes.

[Translation]

Mr. Claude Bachand: I see. I'd now like to discuss recruitment with you, Vice-Admiral. We've talked about this subject at length. Earlier, however, you spoke of retention in passing and of the importance of retaining our naval personnel.

As I understand it, the Department of National Defence has announced sizeable bonuses of approximately $40,000 for personnel with degrees in engineering. I've heard that lengthy tours of duty at sea are rather hard on families. Yet, personnel who have been away for some time are seeing newcomers arrive with substantial bonuses in hand. Moreover, more qualified individuals also have an opportunity to advance more quickly in their careers than long-standing members. This could explain why some people are thinking about leaving the armed forces or have in fact already done so. They no longer see any opportunities for advancement.

Is the Navy concerned about ensuring equity among all personnel serving on board its ships? It's all well and good to recruit people and to offer them bonuses as a incentive to join, but if an equal number of people resign as a result, then we're back to square one.

What's being done to address the problem and to retain naval personnel that have been serving for 10 or even 20 years?

[English]

VAdm Ron Buck: There's always a balance as you introduce personnel policies and plans, in this case attempting to attract, while at the same time not disadvantaging those you already have. In this particular area retention is just as important to us as attracting. So we are looking at a number of areas where we can make it attractive for individuals who are currently in the services to stay with us. Part of it is monetary, but not all of it. It is the job satisfaction they get, the quality of life they have, the quality of working life, the balance between those two. So we're looking at a whole series of initiatives to ensure that not only the individuals we're attempting to attract at the moment, but those we have do wish to stay in the navy.

The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Bachand.

Mr. Price.

Mr. David Price: Thank you.

Just continuing where I was before on our subs--

The Chair: Before you were interrupted.

Mr. David Price: Did I say that?

By the way, thank you very much, Admiral. You're actually answering the questions, and you're not dragging on, so we're getting answers. This is very good. We're not used to that. I had to say that.

When we first decided to buy the subs, one of the reasons, the way I understood it anyway, was that we were getting diesel-electric so that we could do a lot of exercises with our American partners in particular, because they don't have them any more, they're a totally nuclear fleet now. Of course, a lot of the potential enemies, the real threats, were probably countries that didn't have any nuclear subs, so we would be good training partners in that. Is that still the case?

VAdm Ron Buck: That is something the United States is very interested in doing, and indeed, as part of their normal operations, our submarines participate. But that very clearly was not the primary reason we acquired submarines. In order to ensure that we have the ability to survey and control access to our maritime approaches on, above, and below, we need submarine capability. This particular class of submarine gives us a very effective and very cost-effective way of doing that, as well as giving us a very significant deployable operational capability that allows us to interact with our allies. From the United States' perspective, it is attractive to work with those submarines, but that is not the primary reason to acquire them.

º (1655)

Mr. David Price: As I mentioned before, I think one of the reasons too is that Canada is foremost in the field of hydrogen fuel cells and so on, and it's a good chance put that technology to use for ourselves.

With your wish list for ships down the road, and as you said, we're going to be looking at another defence review of some kind and we could be looking at changes, what are some of the ships out there with multi-functional roles today that you may be looking at? Of course, our Iroquois class destroyers have a command and control centre in them. They're also moving along in years. The Dutch just acquired one, and they have another one on the line, a command and control centre with a roll-on roll-off capacity. Have you put anything like that on your wish list, or are you looking at any other combinations that could be interesting?

VAdm Ron Buck: When we look at how we maintain our capability, we first develop what's called a requirement of capability, as opposed to a specific platform approach. We then look at the options on how we could deliver that capability, in combination with other roles, one particular platform versus another platform. With replenishment ships, what we are looking at is replacing the capability that currently exists in Preserver and Protector, as well as possibly enhancing it with a limited lift capability and, as I mentioned earlier, a limited first-year ice capability.

Our current thought is that there are only so many missions you can put in one ship, and it might not be cost-effective or appropriate to put your command and control capability in that ship. It is, however, an option we continue to look at. If that is the case, you need to do an analysis of how else you might provide that command and control capability. As you've indicated, there are a number of ship designs around the world that do offer those kinds of capabilities, and we do look at all of them.

Mr. David Price: I have another question on recruiting. Since we're using our reserves in the maritime coastal area, are we able to get those into our regulars? Is there a good recruiting base in those people?

VAdm Ron Buck: There is a very healthy flow of reservists into the regular force. However, there are some unnecessarily bureaucratic obstacles at the moment that make that sometimes longer and more difficult than it needs to be. That is an area where we're working very hard, as you should be able to move from the regular force to the reserve or the reserve to the regular force virtually seamlessly.

The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Price.

Mr. Anders.

Mr. Rob Anders: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Are you going to be able to replace your Iroquois class destroyers, and if so, where is the money going to come from?

VAdm Ron Buck: Again, I think that's a question that will be dealt with as we move forward through defence policy review.

Mr. Rob Anders: When do you expect you'll have all four Victoria class submarines operational, and how much is it going to cost to repair them?

VAdm Ron Buck: We are introducing the four submarines under contractual arrangements, as I indicated in answer to a question earlier. I would see the first submarines, the Victoria and the Windsor, being operational in late 2003, and with the remaining two submarines, it will depend on their delivery from the United Kingdom.

Mr. Rob Anders: How about cost?

VAdm Ron Buck: As I've indicated, that's a question that should be addressed to the assistant deputy minister, materiel, but at the moment we're within the terms of the contractual arrangements we have in place with the United Kingdom.

» (1700)

Mr. Rob Anders: Has the maintenance of Canada's warships suffered delays in recent years because of cuts in operating budgets in the 1990s, and will we face more readiness problems because of this?

VAdm Ron Buck: As you would be aware, there was a recent Auditor General's assessment of maintenance, across the Canadian Forces and as relates to the navy. The navy has reported for some time what is called a bow wave of maintenance, being that amount of maintenance, in theory, that you can't get done. We are working from a theoretical plan of how much maintenance should go into ships. When you build a ship design, the frigates in this particular case, there are theoretical analyses done that say, you need to do this amount of maintenance. The challenge, though, is now stacking what is actually a theoretical figure up against your practical experience figure.

So at the moment what we are doing is trying to analyse the bow wave, which exists. Is the bow wave growing? No, it's about steady, and it has historically been there as well. That does not mean that we do not make decisions on timing and sequencing of work. There is always an issue when you have to do major work on a warship, whether you do it in your own repair facility or contract it out. and you have the lead and lag time and size of work force needed. That is always an issue, as opposed to just a dollar issue.

Mr. Rob Anders: I want to follow up on a question Mr. Bachand was asking. I appreciate his line of questioning. If you had an EH101 helicopter, how many hours would it have in repair or maintenance for every one hour of flight time?

VAdm Ron Buck: I do not know what the maintenance profile on the EH101 is, but I can get that information for you, if you wish.

Mr. Rob Anders: Okay. I think it would be an interesting number, given Mr. Bachand's question.

The 12 Halifax class frigates were designed so they could be operated with fewer crew members than the old ships they replaced. Because of the problems the forces have had in recruiting all the personnel they need--you cite 600--are you examining the possibility of operating the frigates with even fewer crew members?

VAdm Ron Buck: We are always examining how we man ships and do things, not just for today, but for tomorrow. We look at doing things differently, ideally with fewer individuals, so we can actually drive our through-life costs of operations down. The frigates, as you've indicated, are less manpower-intensive than the generation of technology before them. Very clearly, where we go with the frigates will depend in part on what upgrades we make to them over time and where that takes us with maintenance profiles. But this is not driven by just maintenance profiles, some of it's driven by how we operate ships and do things. Clearly, we have to continually analyse how we do that, to make sure we are doing it as effectively as possible, while always balancing the issue of risk.

Mr. Rob Anders: To follow up on Mr. Bachand's question, you said that when the Sea Kings were acquired, the ratio of maintenance to working hours was acceptable, and you made a comparison between steam-driven ships and what they have today. So I'm going to ask you about that. What was the different in maintenance levels between steam-driven ships and the ones you have today?

VAdm Ron Buck: In a technological sense, the difference with ships is not so much in the hours comparison as it is in the air world, it is more the number of individuals who do the work. So if you were to compare a frigate technical department and engineering department with a steam-driven ship engineering department, you would see decrements in the order of a third or a half, that kind of range.

The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Anders.

Mr. Provenzano.

Mr. Carmen Provenzano: Vice-Admiral, there seems to be a problem at the federal level with recruitment throughout the public service. Some of the recruits, it appears, are leaving after one or two or three years. So recruitment has its own package of problems. Does retention have a similar package of problems for the navy?

VAdm Ron Buck: It doesn't have a similar package of problems, but it has a similar concern, in that you have to change your personnel policies, whether in attraction or retention, to deal with the changing demographics and expectations of the workforce, in this case Canadian society. As I've mentioned a few times, we must introduce much more flexibility in our career paths, so that we can make it much more attractive to the young individuals who are joining today.

» (1705)

Mr. Carmen Provenzano: Is retention a problem now?

VAdm Ron Buck: Historically, our figures have been about 4% of planned attrition, in other words, retirement, and about 4% of unplanned leaving. At the moment our attrition is lower than that.

Mr. Carmen Provenzano: It's not a significant problem.

VAdm Ron Buck: It's always a concern. It's a concern, of course, today in respect of operational tempo, balancing deployments against families, and those issues. It is always a concern and something you must pay attention to. If you don't, you could end up being very surprised.

Mr. Carmen Provenzano: Okay.

The Chair: Mr. Provenzano, if you don't mind, I'll take a couple of minutes from your time.

Vice-Admiral, on the issue of training, I'm wondering if you feel the navy is doing enough in the way of training with, say, joint exercises or combined exercises outside NATO. Are we doing enough in that regard?

VAdm Ron Buck: I will answer that question by referring to pre-September 11, then putting it in the context of September 11 activities.

Before September 11 we had a very aggressive combined training program, both in the Pacific and the Atlantic, with our allies, both in a NATO context and in the Pacific, on a multilateral and a bilateral basis. Those exercises are needed to ensure that the training and capability of not just ships, but task groups is maintained at the right level. Post-September 11, right now we are very much focused on doing the essential training, the essential surveillance, and sovereignty tasks, and preparing and certifying ships for the operations in the campaign against terrorism.

In respect of joint training with the Canadian air force and the Canadian army, we have been progressively walking down that road. But again in the context of post-September 11, we are very busy, and to a certain extent, that is on hold until we actually have the breathing room to reintroduce it.

The Chair: Thank you.

One of the things that struck me about the Leadmark document was that there seemed to be a fair bit of emphasis on the north, the strategic importance of the north, the possibility of the melting of the polar ice cap--we know it's been thinning over recent years. How in touch is the navy with research facilities that are doing testing in the north with respect to the ice cap. What sorts of problems and challenges do you see facing us over the next, say, 20 years in the north? I'm particularly interested as well in this possible ice capability that the supply ship replacements would provide. How much ice would they be able to cut through, for instance?

VAdm Ron Buck: The current design would allow for what we term a limited first-year ice capability, which is approximately 0.7 of a metre. We are not designing or building icebreakers by any stretch of the imagination, nor would it be our intent. Our intent would be, depending on the thinning of the ice cap, being able to have, as I've indicated, a limited first-year ice capability, with a number of surveillance capabilities that would allow us very clearly to know what is happening in the Arctic, then having systems, whether they be ships or aircraft, to respond to that.

We monitor the trends very closely, because this very clearly is an issue that the navy and the Canadian Forces must face.

The Chair: Thank you very much.

Monsieur Bachand.

[Translation]

Mr. Claude Bachand: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I have a question concerning maritime lift capacities. I hope that the interpreters are familiar with the equivalent term in French, namely capacité d'emport maritime.

I also have a related question for you. I recall the boarding of the Katie. I also know that you have boarded some vessels in the Persian Gulf - you admitted as much yourself - when you suspected them of carrying contraband.

First though, I have a question about maritime lift capacities. Do your briefing books contain figures on the strategic importance of having ships with this kind of capability?

Regarding the boarding issue, is there a special group of navy personnel specially trained to board vessels?I would imagine that in order to part of this group, it isn't enough to claim to have pirates as your ancestors. I would imagine some special skills are required. How do you go about establishing a special tactical group to carry out boarding activities?

That does it for my two questions concerning maritime lift capacities and boarding.

» (1710)

[English]

VAdm Ron Buck: To deal with the training of boarding teams first, we have been operating in the Arabian Gulf since 1997, and in that time we have developed a very effective capability for training boarding teams. Each of our ships that deploys has a minimum of one, but often there are two boarding teams trained in the procedures of maritime boarding. That will allow them to do a series of boardings. However, we do not board when the boarding is what is called opposed. That is basically when someone is armed. That is a capability you reserve for special operations forces. But up to and including what is called obstructed, where a ship doesn't want to be boarded, but is not shooting at you, we actually have one of the best capabilities in the world, so much so that a number of navies are looking at our training syllabus.

On lift, the department is looking at options for both strategic airlift and strategic sealift. Most countries who lift things have some strategic airlift, some strategic sealift, and they contract out the rest. We have this requirement to replace our replenishment ships, which is primarily the capacity to replenish ships at sea. However, for a relatively modest incremental cost, we have options that would allow us to lift, components of what today would be called the immediate reaction force. So that would give us some ability to have strategic sealift.

The Chair: You have a minute and a half, Mr. Bachand.

[Translation]

Mr. Claude Bachand: According to the reports I have here, you are thinking about replacing the Preserver, which is already in the theatre of operations, and the Protector, both of which are 30 years old. Some concerns have been expressed and if these vessels were replaced shortly, the impact would certainly be felt. The latter vessel can operate with half of its current crew complement. Is it current Navy strategy to have less personnel on board new vessels, a strategy which could resolve certain recruitment and retention problems, among other things?

[English]

VAdm Ron Buck: It is our desire always, as we introduce new classes of equipment, in this case ships, that we be able to bring down crew numbers and maintenance costs. That is very much what we are looking at, and in addition, as I indicated earlier, we are looking at doing things differently to generate smaller crews.

If I could give you another comparison, the Tribal class destroyers, which were introduced into service in the early 1970s, and the frigates, which were introduced almost two decades later, are very similar in size, but the Tribal has roughly 100 more personnel than the frigate. The advantage of looking at fewer crew is that if your through-life costs are lower, potentially, you could acquire more and give yourself more flexibility.

» (1715)

The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Bachand.

I'd like to ask you, Vice-Admiral, about the risk our navy faces right now in the job it's doing in the Arabian Gulf and the Arabian Sea. Can you talk about what, in your view, the greatest risks to our personnel are at this time?

VAdm Ron Buck: The risks in the north Arabian Sea have changed. As we were originally deploying, it was unclear how the campaign would unfold, and when we deployed to the region, we ensured that we had a full suite of capability for protecting ourselves from a wide range of threats. We still clearly have that in theatre today. The threat level today at sea has changed--I think that would be the simplest way to describe it. But we always ensure that the men and women we put in harm's way have the tools to do the job. Because you cannot always predict what will happen--September 11 being a tragic example--we ensure that we have a wide range of capability, not only to defend ourselves, but to be able to defend others in our ships. There are some capabilities in our ships that in detection of chemical and biological agents are world-class and exist nowhere else in the world.

If I could draw the committee's mind back, about a year and a half ago, when the U.S.S. Cole was tragically attacked in Aden, that was a turning point for how we operated as a navy. Four days before that HMCS Calgary was in the Arabian Gulf--I know, I was on board, flying a Sea King. That caused us to reassess the risks of everything we do everywhere our ships go, everywhere our men and women go, to ensure that we do a complete risk analysis of the threat. Of course, in many cases you're talking about being able to predict the unpredictable. We wanted to take measures that not only provided the ships and the men and women with greater security, but also represented a mindset change about how we operated and how we looked at the world.

The Chair: Also, could you give us a rundown on the life expectancies of the hulls of the Halifax class, the Tribal class, and the Victoria class subs?

VAdm Ron Buck: Ship design is an art, not a science, and ships are very complex vehicles. In normal design terms--and I am not a naval architect--you would plan for the life of a ship to be in the range of 25 to 35 years, but the reality of how long you operate that ship will really depend on how you use the ship and what investment you wish to make for maintaining those ships over their lives. We put a tremendous amount of maintenance focus on those ships, and we modernize them through their lives. The Tribal class destroyers are a good example. While the hulls entered service in the early 1970s, the command and control and weapons systems capabilities in those ships are as modern as in the frigates.

The Chair: Are there any specific problems you see as far as the submarines are concerned? Do they have a particular character of their own with respect to the life expectancies of the hulls?

VAdm Ron Buck: Each class of ship has a different maintenance profile. The Tribal class destroyers at multi-year points go into what is called a major refit, and that's normally a year-long maintenance activity done in a major shipyard. In fact, that is what Protector is coming out of, and she is of that same generation. The Halifax class ships are different, in that they have more frequent, but much shorter maintenance periods. They happen to be called docking work periods. With the submarines, the maintenance profile differs again. The submarines, because you need to certify all these safety systems, have a program on a multi-month cycle, wherein you effectively would zero the clock on maintenance over each of these cycles.

» (1720)

The Chair: Okay. Thank you.

Mr. Anders, do you have any further questions?

Mr. Rob Anders: Yes indeed, Mr. Chairman.

At present, we have two operational support ships--I know this has been touched on earlier today. One of those ships is in the Indian Ocean, but we obviously won't be able to sustain one support ship there indefinitely, because we usually have one on each coast. When will we be withdrawing our operational support ship from the Indian Ocean?

VAdm Ron Buck: The current ship on station, HMCS Preserver, will return to Canada in the next several months, and her sister, HMCS Protecteur, will sail from the west coast at approximately the same time to replace her. But as you've quite rightly pointed out, there will be a gap in that particular capability. That is why, as we look to the replacement of the AORs, we would hope, by reducing through-life costs, to be able to acquire more than just two hulls.

Mr. Rob Anders: Will we be able to sustain a destroyer there without having a support ship?

VAdm Ron Buck: Yes.

Mr. Rob Anders: Okay.

What capability that you don't have today would you most want to see added to the navy?

VAdm Ron Buck: I believe, as I've indicated, what we have today we need to augment for the future, and so the replenishment ship capability is high on our priority list, followed by modernizing the frigates, to ensure that they maintain their capability, while at the same time forwarding our command and control and air defence capability, which gives us that greater punch as a task group and gives us those command opportunities. There are a number of other areas related to some emerging technology, which I referred to earlier, that would allow us a greater presence in the Arctic, some fixed systems. Those are the key components.

Mr. Rob Anders: A few weeks ago at the Conference of Defence Associations meeting here in Ottawa you said your objective is to sustain three or four ships in the Indian Ocean as part of Operation Apollo. How long do you foresee sustaining that force in that region?

VAdm Ron Buck: I have the capability to do it. How long it will be required in an operational context remains unknown at this juncture.

[Translation]

The Chair: Mr. Bachand.

Mr. Claude Bachand: I have one final question. If we compare the Navy's current state of readiness with the situation a decade ago, would you say it is less ready, more ready or about the same as it was 10 years ago?

[English]

VAdm Ron Buck: Thank you for that question. Plus prête, sans doute.

The Chair: Did you want to elaborate on that?

VAdm Ron Buck: Approximately ten years ago we had the Gulf War. At the time we were just introducing the frigates and the Tribal class destroyers. In fact, they had not started to enter service, as you know. So we took equipment bound for those ships, put it in some of our older steam destroyers, and sailed one unmodernized Iroquois class ship, one steam destroyer, and one replenishment ship to the Arabian Gulf. That group of ships did a magnificent job. They were in charge of logistic support for the coalition at the time, but they were capable of looking after themselves with bolted-on equipment--just--and they were capable of a very specific mission.

The difference today is that when we go in harm's way, not only can we look after ourselves, we can look after others, and we can do the most complex missions, not just with the ships and the task group, but with the men and women and the commanders in those ships. I'm very proud of the navy we have today. The challenge will be ensuring that we have it for tomorrow.

The Chair: On that note, on behalf of the entire committee, Vice-Admiral and your colleagues, I'd like to thank you for being here today. It's been a very helpful exercise, and I'm sure at some point in the not too distant future we'll have you back.

Thanks very much.

The meeting is adjourned.