NDVA Committee Meeting

STANDING COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL DEFENCE AND VETERANS AFFAIRS

COMITÉ PERMANENT DE LA DÉFENSE NATIONALE ET DES ANCIENS COMBATTANTS

EVIDENCE

[Recorded by Electronic Apparatus]

Thursday, May 3, 2001

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[English]

The Chair (Mr. David Pratt (Nepean—Carleton, Lib.)): I'd like to call to order the meeting of the Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs.

We have before us today General Maurice Baril and several staff members from the Canadian Forces on the issue of the state of operational readiness of the Canadian Forces. With General Baril is Commander Dan McNeil, who is Director of Force Planning and Program Coordination; Colonel W.J. Natynczyk, Chief of Staff J3 International; J.J.L.M. Dessureault, Canadian Forces Chief Warrant Officer; and I guess that pretty much.... You have a few other staff members, but not at the table.

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General and members of the Canadian Forces, welcome to the defence committee again. General, you're no stranger to this committee room or this committee, and it's always a pleasure to have you in front of the committee. So perhaps we could get started with no further delay on your statement.

I would ask that members stick around for a few moments after the committee meeting's over at 5:30. There are one or two housekeeping matters that I would like to bring before the committee.

General, you have the floor.

General Maurice Baril (Chief of the Defence Staff, Department of National Defence): Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

[Translation]

Ladies and gentlemen, members of the committee, it is always a pleasure to appear before your committee. First off, Mr. Chairman, I'd like to welcome and congratulate the new committee members.

Over the years, I have come to greatly appreciate the role your committee plays in improving the quality of life of Canadian Forces members. Your contribution is an integral part of our efforts to equip our country with modern, combat-ready forces capable of honouring Canada's defence commitments.

[English]

Before we get to questions, I'd like to talk about some of the issues the Canadian Forces face in remaining ready to deal with future defence challenges. Let me begin by speaking directly to some of the issues raised during your hearings, or outside your hearings, concerning the Canadian Forces' capability and readiness to meet their defence commitment.

These commitments are clearly laid out in the 1994 defence white paper. The Canadian Forces must be prepared to perform a wide range of missions, from search and rescue, to collective security operations within the United Nations, NATO, or coalition. The Canadian Forces are ready and capable of meeting their defence commitments. They have demonstrated this time and time again, here at home performing surveillance and search and rescue missions; during the flood in the Saguenay and in Manitoba; during the ice storm and the Y2K rollover; and abroad, whether in Bosnia, in East Timor, over Kosovo, in the Arabian Gulf, or in Ethiopia and Eritrea.

The Canadian Forces have responded when they were called upon. They made and continue to make a difference both in Canada and around the world. Let me now turn to the concept of readiness.

You should be aware that the white paper also provides some specific guidance as to what our readiness level should be, and let me give you an example. In support of the UN, NATO, or coalition operations, the Canadian Forces must be ready to deploy any or all elements of its vanguard contingency force within 21 days. This means having two ships, a battle group of approximately 1,250 personnel, an infantry battalion of approximately 1,000 personnel, a squadron of fighter aircraft, a flight of tactical transport aircraft, a communications element, and a headquarters element ready for deployment within three weeks.

Three weeks means that our troops and equipment are ready to move to the point of embarkation from their garrison. In that context, the Canadian Forces define readiness as the level of preparedness for personnel and material to respond to the task described in a scenario or to the operation being considered—namely, the commitment outlined in the white paper.

To meet these commitments, all environmental chiefs of staff—that is, the commanders of the army, the navy, and the air force—have the responsibility to establish the most effective and efficient method to ensure that an appropriate number of units are ready when needed. In practical terms, the equipment, manning, and training level of a unit determines its overall readiness.

Clearly, the level of readiness maintained has direct cost implications—that is to say, costs increase and decrease with an associated increase and decrease in readiness. In terms of personnel, costs are tied to the authorized strength of the unit and its actual level of manning, rotation policy, operational tempo, training requirement activity, quality of life, administrative preparation—for example, medical vaccination prior to deployment—and the number of reservists to be deployed with the unit. As for equipment, costs are tied to the amount and type needed for a mission and to the level of maintenance required to keep the equipment available.

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I'm sure the three environmental chiefs will be able to give you much more detail on the operational readiness of their respective services when they appear before you. They're the force generators, while I commit and commend them in operation.

I would also like to address another issue that has been raised, namely the combat capability of the Canadian Forces. As I have stated before, I believe many elements of the Canadian Forces are more combat capable today than they were ten years ago. Let me illustrate.

Ten years ago Canada joined a coalition of countries to liberate Kuwait from Iraqi aggression. While valuable, our contribution was modest. It consisted of two aging warships and a supply ship, with bolted-on 40-millimetre Beaufort cannon and a troop of Blowpipe army operators from my own air defence unit in Gagetown, New Brunswick; a squadron of CF-18s equipped with unguided bombs for ground attack sorties and air-to-air missiles; an infantry company from Germany and a field hospital from Canada. Our combat contribution was clearly limited by the lack of modern technology and systems required to support international operations with coalition forces. However, all our personnel performed superbly, and as usual, squeezed the best out of what they had.

Since then we have made significant strides. We now have a command system that allows for the instantaneous transmission of a large volume of information, intelligence, and imagery anywhere in the world. The Canadian navy has twelve modern frigates and four upgraded distroyers. It has further refined its combat-related skill over the last few years through enforcing United Nations sanctions against Iraq in the waters of the Arabian Gulf. And by operating regularly as a fully integrated member of U.S. carrier battle groups, we have attained a level of interoperability with the United States navy that is second to none.

In 1999 our CF-18s, now equipped with precision-guided munitions and targeting pods, made a significant contribution to the NATO-led campaign over the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

The army has benefited from the introduction of sophisticated vehicles, such as the Coyote and the LAV III, with anti-armour, under armour, and mortar under armour. New communication systems and personal clothing and protection are also getting in service.

Our new operational commitments in support of peacekeeping and peace enforcement missions are now task-tailored to optimize the use of our improved capability and based on experience and confidence we have developed with like-minded countries. For example, our current contingent in Ethiopia and Eritrea is based on a LAV III company of approximately 250 people, augmented with the Coyote reconnaissance vehicle, operating with a Netherlands battle group and the rapid reaction brigade, the SHIR Brigade. This group is very effective in fire power, reconnaissance capability, protection, mobility, and command and control.

Let me add also that while the Canadian Forces had to reduce their personnel level, the senior leadership at the time made the right decision in preserving the Canadian Forces combat force by making the drastic required reduction in other areas to the extent possible.

While in many respects we're in a better position today, we cannot become complacent. We must keep up the momentum and adapt to new realities. That is why we're looking to the future and not back 15 years. We have developed a strategy to ensure that we remain ready to face the challenge of tomorrow. Strategy 2020 will guide and direct defence planning and investment into the next century.

[Translation]

As we progress toward the future, we must overcome three major challenges in order for Canadian Forces to remain in a position where they can honour their defence commitments. The first challenge is recruitment and retention of personnel. Clearly, if we fail to address this challenge, any decrease in personnel levels could impede our ability to meet our defence commitments. We must attract qualified personnel and take steps to ensure that they remain Canadian Forces members.

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With this challenge in mind, we have more than doubled the budget earmarked for our recruitment advertising campaign. We have simplified the enlistment application process, instituted hiring bonuses with a view to recruiting certain qualified candidates, and continued to subsidize education and training activities in fields that are in high demand, particularly computer technicians and doctors.

An equally important piece of the puzzle is personnel retention. Canadian Forces must create a climate more conducive to pursuing a rewarding career. To achieve this objective, we are seeking to improve working conditions, offering training opportunities, ensuring that our members get the equipment they need to do their job and offering family support as well as exciting challenges.

[English]

A second challenge is to enhance our operational capability. Our ultimate goal remains clear, to maintain a multipurpose, combat-capable force that is interoperable with our allies and globally deployable. The experience of the last decade has shown that this is critical to ensuring that the Canadian Forces are able to contribute to the full range of military operations, from peacekeeping to war-fighting. This means carefully selecting the kind of land, sea, air, and space capabilities we will need and tying them into our capital equipment priorities. To help us achieve this, we recently introduced a new approach to force development called capability-based planning. This means that we will define our structure in terms of the capability we will require to operate into the future security environment.

It also means integrating new technology, and we will have to make very hard choices. We just cannot afford to dedicate resources across the full spectrum of military capability. We also need to develop and test new concepts of how this new technology should be employed and integrated. To that the end, we are establishing a Canadian Forces experimentation centre, which will serve as a central point for assessing future Canadian Forces capabilities and doctrine.

Global deployability is also becoming a key operational capability for military forces. The recent conflicts in East Timor and Ethiopia and Eritrea have underscored that if Canada wants to remain an active player in world affairs, the Canadian Forces must be able to deploy quickly and efficiently anywhere around the globe. That is why we're developing options to enhance our deployability. We either acquire our own means or we continue to rely on sea and air charter service.

It is also imperative that the Canadian Forces remain interoperable with our key allies, especially the United States. The interoperability challenge and cost has increased significantly with recent advances in technology, and we will have to tackle it if we are to continue to participate in coalition operations.

Enhancing our operational capabilities also means using our resources more efficiently and effectively. That is why we are currently looking at how we can best contribute to peace support operations on the basis of an “early in, early out” approach, an approach already used for our deployments to Kosovo as part of KFOR, East Timor, and Ethiopia and Eritrea. This idea is not new, and is consistent with our defence policy.

By deploying among the first and turning over responsibility to capable regional countries and other forces when a conflict situation has been stabilized, we make a valuable and sought-after contribution. This in turn allows us to be ready to respond to government direction when needed. This is a role that Canadian Forces are particularly well qualified to play. The early employment of highly qualified personnel in the critical initial stage of an operation is something we do well. It would also ensure that our experience and our capability would be used in a way that will have the greatest impact.

[Translation]

The third challenge is maintaining our operations support capability.

Many Canadians do not realize that in order to support most peacekeeping operations, four Canadian Forces members must be mobilized for each member of the military deployed. This is what is known as the sustainability ratio. It ensures that Canadian Forces members have enough time to train for their mission, to serve overseas and to take leave and extension or advanced courses when they return to Canada.

Currently, some 3,000 Canadian Forces members are assigned to 19 missions around the world. If we apply the ratio of four to one, this gives the members of our military a minimum period of 18 months between missions. Our goal is a 24-month span between missions.

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We have recently adopted a number of measures with a view to easing the burden on our personnel. These include reducing and further targeting Canada's involvement in the Balkans, and promoting the increased participation of the private sector and its support for our mission activities. We have also made it clear to the UN that our participation in missions in Ethiopia and Eritrea would be limited.

[English]

While these measures have helped, the collective impact of sustaining a high tempo continues to be felt. We are therefore developing plans to further outsource an element of our combat support capability.

Finally, the restructuring of the land force reserve will also help to improve the sustainability of our operations. We are presently into phase one of this initiative, with a goal of increasing the size of the army reserve to 15,500.

Let me conclude. How well we respond to these challenges and others will in part determine how ready the Canadian Forces will be for the future. I believe we're well positioned. We have strengthened our foundations and accomplished much in recent years. Much remains to be done, of course, but we have identified where we need to focus our energies and resources. Our challenge now is to strike the right balance between today's needs and tomorrow's requirements, to ensure that the Canadian Forces remain an affordable and relevant multipurpose combat-capable force, as directed by the Government of Canada.

The support of your committee, Mr. Chairman, will be crucial as we work towards this objective. Ultimately we are all part of the same team. I wish you luck with your study, and look very much forward to your conclusion later on.

[Translation]

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[English]

The Chair: General, thank you for your comments.

Mr. Benoit, you're first up for seven minutes.

Mr. Leon Benoit (Lakeland, Canadian Alliance): Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Welcome, gentlemen.

My first question has to do with the comment I've heard you make, General, as well as others, over the past couple of years. That comment is that our military is more combat-capable now than they were ten years ago. Today I noticed you modified that. You said many aspects of our military are more combat-capable now than they were ten years ago. Are you backing off on what you said before?

Gen Maurice Baril: Is that the question?

Mr. Leon Benoit: Yes.

Gen Maurice Baril: No, I'm not backing off.

Mr. Leon Benoit: If that's the case, could you table for the committee today the study you used to base this statement on?

Gen Maurice Baril: I'm basing it on the experience of nearly 40 years of service. I have touched in my opening remarks on what I have seen, especially in the past 20 years, when I've had more experience and more responsibility. I was a battalion commander in 1980. I know what we had in 1990. I served in 1980 in operations as a unit commander in the only theatre we had.

Mr. Leon Benoit: So you're sticking by your statement that the military is more combat-capable now than ten years ago?

Gen Maurice Baril: You can probably find some places where we have diminished, and you can go just by straight mathematical personnel.

Mr. Leon Benoit: So there's been no study—just your experience is what you're basing it on.

Gen Maurice Baril: We've had studies all over the place, and opinion, and criticism. But you asked me my opinion, and I'm giving you my opinion.

Mr. Leon Benoit: Okay. So there's no study or studies you could table for this committee that would back up your statement that the military is more combat-capable now than ten years ago.

Gen Maurice Baril: Not a black and white study answering specifically that question. It would ruin the good debate we've had in the past five years.

Mr. Leon Benoit: Let's just have a look at this, though. It's pretty obvious, I think, why I would ask that question and ask for the study. If you look at things, there is a lot of awfully old equipment left. There are tanks 20 years old, 35-year-old design, Sea Kings approaching 40 years old. As my colleague said, they were launched the same time as Sputnik. That's kind of hard to believe, and we're still flying them. There are support ships 30 years old—we had three in 1991, only two now. Many C-130s are nearly 40 years old. I could go on and on. An awful lot of key equipment is getting really old. Pardon me for not just accepting that analysis you've given, that the military is more combat-capable today than it was ten years ago. With this evidence, it's kind of hard to understand that.

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Now, getting on to numbers, the 1994 white paper committed Canada to being able to deploy one brigade, 5,000 to 8,000 troops, plus one battalion group, which is 1,200 to 1,500, overseas within 90 days. Today, within 21 days you're talking 1,250 personnel, an infantry battalion of approximately 1,000. That's really not saying what the white paper committed committed to. It's not exactly backing up what the white paper committed to back in 1994.

Gen Maurice Baril: Can I comment on it?

Mr. Leon Benoit: That's the question.

Gen Maurice Baril: Mr. Chairman, you gave me 15 minutes only for my opening remarks. I could have brought in the 90 days, what we have provided in 90 days, but I understand this is in the public domain, and I didn't think it was right. I was using the vanguard as an example of what we could provide and what we're asked to provide in 21 days.

You have used some specific examples to say that we are less capable today than we were ten years ago. You have specifically used the tanks that we bought in 1977. In 1977, when it was brand new, it was using an image intensification firing system. Well, we're upgrading them. I don't know how many we have now. We have taken the Leopard, have bought new turrets with new sighting systems, changed the guns, new ammunition that has improved a lot, and it's quite a capable killing machine. It will allow us for the next ten years to decide in the forces what is going to replace this direct support machine.

You mentioned ships. We had four destroyers in 1990. We have still the four same destroyers, but they have been upgraded. They had no integral air defence before. And we have replaced all the steamships with the frigates, 12 of them. We have replaced some old wooden coastal ships with 12 of them, if not 14—12 maritime coastal—that we're using all across Canada.

Mr. Leon Benoit: Are those four destroyers you mentioned, if I could—

The Chair: Excuse me, Mr. Benoit. I would remind you to direct your comments through the chair at all times. Also, General Baril's in the process of trying to respond to your question, and I would you not to interrupt his response.

Mr. Leon Benoit: Mr. Chair, I just wanted to ask a follow-up question on one piece of information he gave.

Gen Maurice Baril: I haven't finished the answer. He raised the question—

The Chair: Please, please.

Mr. Leon Benoit: I just wanted to get a quick response to one particular of the question.

The Chair: Please.

Mr. Leon Benoit: The four destroyers—

The Chair: Mr. Benoit, please allow the general to respond.

Mr. Leon Benoit: No. Mr. Chair, come on. With all due respect, give me a chance to ask the questions as I choose to ask them.

An hon. member: You have no respect, Leon.

The Chair: General, please continue.

Gen Maurice Baril: Okay. On the F-18, we have precision-guided ammunition. The state of the airplane, as such, is the same as it was in 1990, but now it has targeting pods and the ammunition that goes with that. And of course we are in the contract to upgrade them.

The whole Hercules fleet is being upgraded. We have Airbus instead of the old 707 that we had at that time. Search and rescue is using the same helicopter that we have, but as you know, the new ones are coming in. On tactical aviation, we have 100 Griffons that have replaced three families of helicopters that we had before. But this is a question on its own, if you want to discuss it.

We had ten battalions of infantry before the Airborne Regiment was removed from the order of battle. Now, we have six mechanized battalions and three light infantry battalions that have served already in operations a few times, mounted on combat vehicles. Six of those battalions already have or will have the LAV III, which is a state-of-the-art vehicle. All reconnaissance platoons of the infantry battalion, the six battalions, have the Coyote vehicle. Infantry armoured reconnaissance have Coyote and upgraded Leopard. On artillery, we've upgraded our 109 with some systems in it, a new light howitzer that gave us flexibility. That's what is being deployed in operations now.

Mr. Leon Benoit: So are you sticking with your statement that the military is more combat-capable than it was ten years ago?

Gen Maurice Baril: That's what I'm saying, because—

Mr. Leon Benoit: Are you sticking with that?

Gen Maurice Baril: —you brought me a few numbers—

The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Benoit. Your time is up.

[Translation]

Mr. Bachand.

Mr. Claude Bachand (Saint-Jean, BQ): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

First of all, I'd like to state publicly again how very much I appreciated the presence of the Canadian Forces in my riding of Saint-Jean during the 1998 ice storm. I would like you to pass along my best wishes to the PPCLI people who were the ones assigned to my riding. International missions and training are all well and good, but when disaster strikes, whether it be a flood or an ice storm, nothing improves the image of our Canadian Forces like seeing them step forward in their own country to help people out. Therefore, I would appreciate your conveying my regards to PPCLI personnel.

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I could get into a lengthy discussion with you about the current capability of the Canadian Forces, since you are talking about improvements... You can always change the motor in a 1940 Chevrolet, but the body can still leave a lot to be desired. As I see it, there are a number of problems, the most serious one being the recruitment and retention of enlisted personnel. We can have the finest equipment going, but we can't disregard the human factor.

I read an article in this morning's edition of the Ottawa Sun in which you were quoted as having personally recommended to the Minister that he not deploy more than 97 people to Sierra Leone, the number originally requested. In my opinion, recruitment is a major problem. As you mentioned earlier, the White Paper recommended that forces levels not drop below 60,000. The figures may vary, but right now, we are clearly below the 60,000 mark. Therefore, it's extremely important to refocus on recruitment and I see that you have taken certain steps in this direction. For instance, it is true that over the next few years, you plan to increase the number of recruits from 3,000 to 5,000?

While the Chief of the National Defence Staff is here, I'd like to ask him if these new recruits will in fact train in Saint- Jean. As you know, it has an excellent training facility.

An hon. Member: That's a good idea.

Mr. Claude Bachand: It's an important consideration. We're known for the quality of our education and for our recruitment. The local newspaper had some very good things to say on the subject this week. I want to take the opportunity to thank you if the reports are true, because it does appear that some of the programs will in fact be transferred to the military college. However, that's another matter. First of all, can you confirm that the number of new recruits is set to increase from 3,000 to 5,000 a year?

On the subject of retention, it's all well and good to recruit, but if personnel are leaving... Some members of the military have said that while they are still in excellent shape at 42 or 43 years of age, they are hesitating about signing up for another tour of duty. If someone is in fine form at 42 or 43 years of age, why send them home when there is a shortage of personnel?

Another problem is members who return ill from a tour of duty. In my opinion, the Canadian Forces do not do enough to help these individuals. I have met a number of people suffering from Gulf War Syndrome. When they speak out publicly, it doesn't further the cause of the Canadian Forces. They believe their illnesses can be traced to exposure to depleted uranium or to the vaccine cocktails or pills they were made to ingest. Canadian Forces should follow the lead of the Americans and the French and do something to help these individuals. It should do something to help them, instead of denying that their problems are genuine.

But first, I'd like to hear your views on recruitment and retention.

Gen. Maurice Baril: Your question can be considered from the standpoint of human resources management. As I have often said, our most valuable assets are our human resources, that is the men and women who make up the regular and reserve forces in the three service branches. The future of the Canadian Forces is linked to the quality of our personnel. Considerable resources, financial and otherwise, and energy are being devoted to ensure that departing personnel are replaced. Many of the people who join up are not necessarily interested in the 35-year barrier. Many have careers spanning 20 years, while still others enlist for three years.

A vast majority of members enlisted at the age of seventeen. People didn't enlist at 17 to serve until the age of 57, and this is still true today. People enlisted because it was an exciting prospect and a fantastic challenge. Enlisting was an attractive proposition. Today's recruits join up because of the competitive environment, because of the challenge, or because they are unable to find employment elsewhere. Those who decide to pursue a career in the forces after the initial contract is up do so because of the competitive environment, because of the major challenges, because the job is interesting, or because they are unable to find employment elsewhere. That's the way it has always been in the Canadian Forces.

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You're asking me to confirm if indeed the number of recruits will increase from 3,000 to 5,000 or even 7,000 a year. Recruitment levels have always been tied to demand, i.e. the demand for certain trades, for new members, for quality, etc. We are currently monitoring the situation very closely. We have mechanisms in place to monitor on an almost daily basis the number of persons leaving the forces, the number who are ill or not effective, and the number of recruits needed.

The more people we recruit to train in your riding, the greater the resources required. Facilities such as the leadership school in Saint-Jean-sur-Richelieu and the military college in Kingston can no longer keep pace with the demand. We will have to look to combat units, to brigades and to other infrastructures in the three services. In order to fill out their ranks, these three services must either assign resources, or transfer them from operations to the training function. Certain initiatives have been taken. For instance, contract signing bonuses are awarded. We're looking at the steps we can take to retain personnel. Training a combat soldier for the first seven months is an extremely costly proposition. When we manage to retain these soldiers, we save money that can be earmarked for other purposes.

You alluded to a number of other problems we face. I would qualify PTSD as a new form of battle injury. Countries like England, France, Canada and Holland, as well as northern European nations have conducted studies and have discovered that the missions in which our members were involved were fraught with violence and psychologically damaging. Some medical experts believe that the trauma is physical, resulting in changes to the brain. If you have the opportunity to speak to General Dallaire during the course of your hearings, you will find that he is surely one of the greatest casualties of modern day conflicts.

During World War I, victims of similar trauma were shot. During World War II, they were labeled derelict in their duty and sent home. After the Vietnam War, Americans had no idea what to do with soldiers experiencing flashbacks. The disorder had yet to be labeled and people didn't know what was happening. Canadian Forces embarked on a number of major missions in the 1990s, beginning with the Gulf War. In 1995, the realization dawned that some members of the military were experiencing serious problems, although these had yet to be identified. Many of those affected hid their illness because of the stigma associated with PTSD sufferers.

It was obvious that leaders at all levels were not accustomed to seeing this type of injury and were quite intolerant. This prompted a kind of chain reaction. Sufferers did not want to be perceived or treated as wimps. Sufferers have a great deal of difficulty admitting that they have an injury, because it is one unlike any other. When a soldier loses an arm, that's an apparent injury. However, when the psyche is affected...

[English]

The Chair: General, I'm going to have to cut you off there. We have quite a number of questioners here. As much as we'd like to explore the issue with you further, I think we owe it to some of the other members to have an opportunity to ask questions.

Mr. Wood.

Mr. Bob Wood (Nipissing, Lib.): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General, around the middle of February, in my riding the North Bay Nugget published an article on the Canadian Air Force. The article, if I remember correctly, revealed the air force's fleet would be cut by 50%. If this reduction or downsizing is true, who will protect Canada's sovereignty? Who is going to assume the role of drug surveillance? Who is going to assume the role of search and rescue? How is this going to affect our agreements, sir, with NATO and NORAD?

I found the article was especially discouraging, since sitting on this committee for a number of years, I don't know where it came from. I think an announcement of this nature does grave damage, not only to the men and women, sir, that serve in the Canadian military, but also to our NATO allies.

Could you answer some of those questions?

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Gen Maurice Baril: Certainly, but not directly in response to the article that was written, because most of the time I don't have to read those.

Mr. Bob Wood: Yes, but we do.

Gen Maurice Baril: I prefer to go on my own information.

When we're talking of the straight mathematics, it can be very misleading to say the air force is cutting by 50%. It doesn't say we're cutting off the Tutors and are keeping only those to be used by the Snowbirds, that we're replacing them with a more efficient airplane that has a higher rate of reliability, or that this is under a contract with Bombardier. This is what makes a difference. We're taking out a fleet of airplanes that are not to be used any more because we can do the same thing.

And you were mentioning the number of hours on our surveillance airplanes. It is estimated that in the future, in about four to five years, when we have upgraded the CP-140 Aurora and have in place a very sophisticated simulator system, we will not have to spend so many hours flying to train our pilots to land and take off, and having the crews working on all those very sophisticated pieces of equipment. We can do these things on the ground. The evaluation is that we can do the same job, but can reduce the number of hours and therefore reduce the costs, and thus be able to reinvest in a better piece of equipment.

I think it's very misleading to say we're cutting so many pieces of equipment. We can probably keep the 121 CF-18s and not have any money to upgrade them. They'll be punching holes into the sky, but we won't be able to talk to anyone. If we want to invest in the future and have planes that are better and more capable, we can reduce the size and be better-performing.

If you go back a long time—and I know I saw them flying—I don't know how many Sabre aircraft we had in our inventory, or how many Voodoos and CF-104s replaced them. As we rolled in, I'm sure we bought fewer CF-18s in 1983-84, so we're going into an upgrade now. Because of the capability of those machines, I think we're reducing again. That's what we do with all our fleet. It makes sense.

We might have made a bad decision now that we will discover fifteen years from now. For example, we're discovering now that some orientation that was taken before was not right, but it was in the best interests of the forces, given the information that they had. So with the best evaluation and best capabilities that we have, this is where we're going.

Mr. Bob Wood: I think Lieutenant-General Campbell said they were going to mothball forty-some CF-18s.

Gen Maurice Baril: We're going to upgrade 80. I think we have exactly 121.

Mr. Bob Wood: Yes, that's about right.

Gen Maurice Baril: “Mothball” might not be the right word, as options are open.

Mr. Bob Wood: I don't know if you can answer this one, but I hope you can.

With the role of the missile defence system—which is obviously front-page news coming out of the United States these days—in the arena of operations readiness, sir, what do you see as being the strategic implications to the Canadian Armed Forces?

Gen Maurice Baril: For the national—

Mr. Bob Wood: For the missile defence system, if it goes into effect, which it probably will.

Gen Maurice Baril: I'm pretty sure the NMD decision by the U.S. will not be a military decision. The military will have input into the—

Mr. Peter Stoffer (Sackville—Musquodoboit Valley—Eastern Shore, NDP): But they're going to lobby.

Gen Maurice Baril: No, I say it will not be a military decision. It will be a political decision.

Mr. Bob Wood: Absolutely.

Mr. Peter Stoffer: That's what I'm implying.

Gen Maurice Baril: It will be the same thing in Canada. It's going to be a decision by the Government of Canada. What will be the attitude of my government? I think the debate has gone in now.

But you're asking what the impact will be on what we do. This is a rather interesting question. It's just as if you would have asked me thirty years ago what the impact of mutually assured destruction would be. For example, France went to nuclear weapons nearly exclusively until about 1975. Their approach to deterrence was, “Well, if you touch me, I have no choice but to fire a nuclear weapon at you.” So I'm very delicate.... “You might take my territory, but I'll really take a swipe at a couple of your cities.” That's what we had. They then changed, and we went to a much more flexible response.

This one will certainly have an impact in the future. It's not in place now, so I think the jury is still out on what the impact will be on what we can call the conventional forces that we have, on our conventional capabilities. But this capability certainly is all part of the high-tech RMA to come in the future. This is one of the weapons systems.

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The Chair: Anything further, Mr. Wood?

Mr. Bob Wood: I just have one little thing.

As you know, sir, a lot of us at this table sat in on the quality of life debate. At a time when we're doing everything possible to attract new recruits, I think maybe the least we can do is to offer affordable housing. I know that doesn't always exist, at least until the soldier has risen through the ranks enough to afford to live in the economy. I think you have to feel very sorry for young soldiers who are just starting out in life, and who are now faced with annual increases of up to $75 a month until they earn something like $33,000 or $35,000.

At one time, I believe there was a cap placed by Treasury Board. Is there any chance that it could be reinstituted—I think the cap was placed two to four years ago—at least to soften the blow, while still moving toward the base shelter value that they're trying to approve for the homes they live in? I think something has to be done in that category, sir.

You said you're going through with a very active recruiting program. There has to be something done for a young soldier who is just starting out, so that he can at least have a decent life while performing his duties in the Canadian Forces.

Gen Maurice Baril: This is a rather complex affair. We have pushed the envelope of the direction from Treasury Board to the absolute limit, but eventually we have to get in line.

Let's not forget that it's not all the new recruits who come in. About 30% of our people live in military housing across Canada, with some in Europe. It is not subsidized housing. It is housing that is lined up on the market. We have been able to prove to Treasury Board that it is housing that we require for operational reasons. It's not to subsidize our troops, because it's much easier for the Government of Canada to increase the salaries of the people. That's what they've done.

In whatever we do, when we work out the salary of our people, some housing is available. It's all taken into account in a very complicated formula. But this is not subsidized housing that we have. We are making those houses available to the families who are in need. But we have people who have joined the forces now who are not in need of a house at all. They don't have a family, they're single, and they have made quite a good salary for the past few years.

Increasing the cost of the house—and it seems it's always being announced at the same time as we announce a raise for the trooper—

Mr. Bob Wood: Absolutely.

Gen Maurice Baril: It's fine insulting, but is there any organization in our country that does not go through the same thing? The taxes increase for my house every time they come around. We are squeezing it to the absolute limit to which we are allowed by law, but eventually we have to follow the law.

The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Wood.

Mr. Bob Wood: Thank you, General.

The Chair: Mr. Stoffer.

Mr. Peter Stoffer: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

I first want to say, sir, that Irene McCormick wishes to say hello to you. You had gone down to Halifax and presented her family with an award for Sean, posthumously.

Gen Maurice Baril: Ah!

Mr. Peter Stoffer: Also, I couldn't help but remark that after forty years in the military, you have no grey hair. That's very good. That's excellent.

Anyway, let me get to my comments, sir.

How much of the current budget is spent on capital? Of the $11.2 billion or $11.3 billion, what percentage of that is allocated toward capital?

Gen Maurice Baril: It's a little over 18%.

Do you have the exact...?

Chief Warrant Officer J.J.L.M. Dessureault (Department of National Defence): It's about 19%—or 18.9%, to be more exact.

Mr. Peter Stoffer: Should that be higher?

Gen Maurice Baril: We're trying to raise it to 23%.

Mr. Peter Stoffer: Would that be because of new money or redevelopment or, for example, the elimination of forty CF-18s? You've also moved a base from Winnipeg to Shilo, so in essence.... The perception is that you're robbing Peter to pay Paul. Is that a fair statement?

Gen Maurice Baril: We're trying to be more efficient, and we're trying to find better ways of spending the money we have in our budget in order to be able to increase the money that is available for capital. For us, capital is the future, and this is where we should invest in the future.

• 1615

Mr. Peter Stoffer: Sir, when retired General Belzile was here, he said there were comments made by you, General Baril, to the effect that “we're more combat-ready than we were ten years ago.” You've repeated that again.

Gen Maurice Baril: Yes.

Mr. Peter Stoffer: He said, with all due respect, “I would put that statement into question”. Why would a person with that much military history, someone who is respected throughout the country, make that kind of comment in regard to your statement?

Gen Maurice Baril: Well, I think we raised the point before. I'm basing my judgment on what we have now versus what we had ten years ago, on how we perform today versus how we were performing ten years ago, and especially on the quality of the experience our leaders have had at all levels.

We have leaders now who have commanded while at the rank of corporal, and we have leaders who have commanded at the rank of a three-star level, and everywhere in between. We have a two-star general who is commanding now in Bosnia. It hasn't happened very often in our history since Korea that we have very senior people who have that experience. Eventually, the leadership from the Second World War and Korea disappeared, and it totally disappeared from our forces in the early 1980s. But this is what we have now: very experienced leadership.

I also base my judgment on my service of today. I'm still serving today.

Mr. Peter Stoffer: Okay. Sir, in your brief that you presented to us, you said:

Our ultimate goal remains clear: maintain a multi-purpose combat-capable force that is interoperable with our allies and globally deployable.

On the next page, you said:

We will have to make hard choices. We just cannot afford to dedicate resources across the full spectrum of military capabilities.

Do you not find a contradiction in there anywhere?

Gen Maurice Baril: No, I don't, because not very many countries in the world can have the whole suite of airplanes that can go from a C-5A Galaxy to attack helicopters. The U.S. can do that. The British can do a little bit on the side, but they are actually leasing C-17As, and they just bought some attack helicopters.

In Canada, it has been the same in the past. We never had the complete capability on the battlefield, because we have always gone within a coalition and with allies. We provide very valuable and very capable assets that complement what they're lacking, and they do the same thing for us.

In the Gulf War, for example, I believe the French light division—and I was talking to the division commander just after the Gulf War—had over 45% of its firepower provided by the Americans in the form of 200 American specialty attack helicopters and artillery support. So in a conflict, you always go as a team. We call that coalition our allies.

In Canada, I'd love to be part of a country in which you really can buy the whole thing, the complete gamut. But with the resources that are available to us and the hand that I have been dealt, we do not have the resources to do that.

Mr. Peter Stoffer: Okay, thank you.

With the reduction of the flying time for the Auroras, I believe it's not just important for Canadian people to understand that their military is combat-ready, but also that it can maintain sovereignty over our economic zones on the three coastlines that we have. With the reduction of the Auroras, and with the aging Hercules aircraft, there are many people who believe we can no longer maintain security on our coastlines against either drug smugglers, illegal fishing, illegal immigration, or any of the concerns that approach Canada almost on a regular basis. In your opinion, with those reductions, can Canada still maintain its economic and security sovereignty in this regard, in light of the recent cutbacks?

Gen Maurice Baril: We certainly can, to the level that is judged acceptable.

With the length of the borders that we have to the north, east, west, and south, our country will always be taking the risk that there will be openings for illegal fishing, drugs.... I don't think we can close those borders and turn Canada into a fortress. I think that would be dreaming.

I think what you're asking is whether we are reducing our capabilities. The answer is no. It's not by reducing the number of hours on one fleet of airplanes that we're reducing our surveillance capability. With satellite imagery, better electronics, the better radar that we have, and better simulators, it's important that we don't give the wrong impression by only looking at the number of hours. We will have reconnaissance missions and surveillance capability missions probably as much as we had them before. That's why we said that four years down the road we will be able to reduce the number of hours while maintaining the same surveillance. We're spending so much money that I'm sure we'll have much better capability and accuracy, with all the different means that we have.

• 1620

Mr. Peter Stoffer: I have another one.

The Chair: You have thirty seconds.

Mr. Peter Stoffer: I just wanted to thank you for your comments on the national missile defence system. When I was banging my desk here, that was in support of what you said, so thank you very much.

The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Stoffer.

Mr. Goldring.

Mr. Peter Goldring (Edmonton Centre-East, Canadian Alliance): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you for your presentation, General. It's very interesting to hear.

I wanted to mention to Monsieur Bachand that I did my RCAF training in Saint Jean in the early sixties, so I certainly contributed to the local economy of the area too. Things have changed considerably since that time.

The first part of my question is dealing with recruitment. At the time when I was in the Royal Canadian Air Force, there was a considerable number of women who were in training. My course number was 6221. One course in five was composed of women. Recruitment seemed to be no difficulty at all. As a matter of fact, there were probably lineups for recruitment at that time.

What has happened? We had a discussion on housing here, and you mentioned yourself a minute ago that perhaps there should be bonuses for re-signing and maybe housing could be a perk or a benefit for military people, which would be very easy to accommodate. After all, the houses have been owned for fifty years, so there shouldn't be a capital cost to that type of a thing.

The real proof in the pudding on recruitment and long-term sustainability of members of the armed forces perhaps might be in the number who do sign up again. Have we done a study on this, of how many completed their tour and signed on again? Have those numbers been moving considerably, and why?

Gen Maurice Baril: I don't have the numbers with me, but we can provide what we have to you. We're now able to track much more closely the number of recruits who show up at the office, those who are staying in, who leave during training, and how many of them will renew their contracts. You just can't manage such an extensive part of our resources as human resources without having absolutely bang-on data that we follow on a day-to-day basis.

But going back to why people don't join today, it's because companies are offering more than we do. We're in very heavy competition with industry. Gratefully, the industry of our country is very high, and south of the border too, so we have to fight for the good people.

In 1965 I was serving too. I was serving in 1961 also. In 1965 they were offering a $500 bonus to corporals and privates who were signing to stay in, so obviously the line waiting at the recruit centre was not very long for the army. For the air force, I don't know. But we were going down. We've had up and down periods all the time I have been serving, and of course a government organization like ours is always cumbersome in reacting to change. We're much slower than the companies, and we always lose. We will always lose our pilots to Air Canada, because if we increase pilots' salaries, Air Canada will double theirs, because their airplanes have to fly and we're not at war.

Mr. Peter Goldring: I can appreciate it for the higher level of skills of medical doctors and officers and pilots, but from a ground crew aspect—and I was a member of the ground crew—at that time the military was viewed as being a training place that I could access with limited education. Consequently, with my grade 11—I couldn't finish school—it was a method whereby I could go and join an organization and receive training. Have we raised the standards so that it is just not possible for people with limited background and education to be able to come into the military, fulfil their education, and contribute and maybe be a long-term member of the military too? Have we priced ourselves right out of the market by having the skill level too high or certificate level too high for entry?

• 1625

Gen Maurice Baril: No, because we have definite requirements, depending on whether you're getting in from military college, subsidized university, or different trades. And even different trades has changed.

You mention that a higher requirement would reduce recruitment, but oddly enough we've seen the absolute opposite with the military policy. In order to raise the standards and the capability and quality of military police, we have imposed for the past two years a college certificate. My God, in terms of recruiting we have people waiting at the door now.

We asked our specialists what happened all of a sudden. It seems that by raising the standard it means to the young who are looking for a career that it must be a quality employment because they're looking for high-quality people. When we're recruiting for infantry, radar tech, medical or what not, we will go with a different standard because we can't just impose an arbitrary requirement. We have to be able to justify it. We are still dealing with Canadians who are covered by the Charter of Human Rights.

Mr. Peter Goldring: That level for military police would have eliminated my military career, and for how many others would it have too? Is that a flat and hard and firm policy that should be handled? I realize you have had sufficient applicants in that area, but you have to have this flexibility across the board, I would think.

Gen Maurice Baril: I think it has to be based on data, on what is the academic requirement, what's the technical ability. We can't be a welfare organization that takes people in to give them education. We are in a pretty expensive business. We are only 58,000. There is no place to hide in the armed forces any more. Everyone is used and utilized, and unfortunately sometimes we're a bit abused by the number of operations we do and by the amount of training.

Given the amount of training and the level of sophistication of the training we're putting our people through, we have to have a basic quality and basic academic ability. Otherwise, it doesn't work.

Mr. Peter Goldring: That's great, but it's not the point.

The Chair: Actually you're well over your time, Mr. Goldring.

Mr. Peter Goldring: Thank you.

The Chair: Mr. Bachand.

[Translation]

Mr. Claude Bachand: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General Baril, when you were responding earlier, you neglected to talk about the mission to Sierra Leone that did not get off the ground. I would merely like to know if this was due to the lack of resources within the Canadian Forces.

You've been talking for a while now about improving the efficiency of Canadian Forces. I agree with this objective and one component is surely the quality of training. You broached the subject a few minutes ago. One person whom I admire greatly is Lieutenant General Dallaire who, as you know, served as Commander of the Collège militaire royal in Saint-Jean. This college was the most efficient, most bilingual and most competitive facility in Canada. Unfortunately, it has now closed.

As I see it, Lieutenant General Dallaire's views tie in with your approach. In his opinion, current peacekeeping techniques were developed during the Cold War era. At the time, soldiers were taught how to fire at enemy forces. Today, members of the military who are sent on peacekeeping missions—I went to Eritrea along with the minister—are trained to serve as mediators rather than to fire into the air or cause a disturbance.

Lieutenant General Dallaire seems to be saying that we need to rethink completely our approach to training soldiers for peacekeeping missions, meaning that we need to change the terminology used, the goals, training methods, etc.

How do you feel about the views of Lieutenant General Dallaire?

Gen. Maurice Baril: To respond to your question about Sierra Leone, I find it odd that when I recommend Canada participate in a mission, more often than not, I'm criticized for the decision and yet for once, when I decide that we should not send in soldiers because we are already spread too thin, I get criticized anyway.

I continue to base my recommendations on my own judgement.

Mr. Claude Bachand: I wasn't being critical, General.

Gen. Maurice Baril: The article in question was critical of my decision. Simply put, we didn't have the resources.

Mr. Claude Bachand: I wasn't being critical. I was merely asking a question.

Gen. Maurice Baril: I understand.

We are managing what resources we have and we are doing a good job of it. In the case of Sierra Leone, I recommended that we not send a mission because the cost in terms of human resources was too high. I'm deeply concerned about human resources.

As for the second issue you raised, we've just spent 10 years conducting operations that were quite different from the ones we normally train to carry out. For the purposes of these operations, we drew on the experience acquired in Cyprus. We are all marked by the Cyprus experience. Overall, we have managed quite well, despite a few minor mistakes. The quality of our leaders is recognized throughout the world.

• 1630

I agree it's important to provide proper training to all of our officers, particularly young ones. The corporal in Ethiopia who fires a shot from his vehicle is making a strategic decision, one that will have repercussions in the House in less than 10 minutes.

Mr. Claude Bachand: Exactly.

Gen. Maurice Baril: This corporal is different from his counterpart in World War II, Korea or Cyprus. He is a young leader who has been entrusted with a considerable amount of responsibility and because of this, we need to implement a professional development plan for our officers and NCOs, one that will ensure that today's 18-year-old recruit will command a battalion in 20 years' time.

It's too late for today's battalion commander. He has already been trained and he does his job well. However, a new direction must be taken in the future. General Dallaire is responsible for initiating and promoting changes in the professional development of officers.

I'm not certain whether this is news to you or not, but tomorrow afternoon, the Minister and I will be in Toronto where he will be announcing a new professional development plan for our officers. The work team that reports directly to me and that is under the direction of General Lemieux undertook four months ago to develop the same kind of plan for NCOs. Throughout our history, we have worked as a team and we must continue to do so.

An officer cannot learn solely through experience. He must take professional development courses. We need and we have the tools to do the job.

Mr. Claude Bachand: Can you give outline for us the training plan that will be unveiled tomorrow?

Gen. Maurice Baril: I can't...

[English]

The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Bachand.

Mr. Provenzano.

Mr. Carmen Provenzano (Sault Ste. Marie, Lib.): General Baril, you've put a lot of issues into that short presentation you made.

I was particularly caught up by some comments you made concerning the challenge of maintaining interoperability. You indicated that challenge is increasing because of the new technology and the cost of that technology, and that could possibly affect our ability to participate in coalition operations.

You made another statement, that it's imperative that Canadian forces remain interoperable with our key allies, especially the United States. I was just wondering, as a committee member, whether this committee should be aware or made aware of any particular policies or developments. I especially refer to new policies and new developments relating to the recently installed Bush administration, ones that might impact on us and present special challenges to the objective of maintaining interoperability.

Gen Maurice Baril: Interoperability with the new technology is extremely expensive, and forces like ours and those of some other countries our size have to make sacrifices to make sure that we remain compatible. Otherwise, we're going to be kind of second-class folks on the battlefield or in any operation, and I don't think that's what our country wants to do.

It is always difficult to exchange technology, but we have had long-standing cooperation and discussions with the Americans. This morning I spent a couple of hours with the Supreme Allied Commander Europe and also the U.S. commander of all U.S. forces in Europe. I always try to drive it home to them that while you're making your giant leap with your very expensive technology, think about your friends and your allies. Remember that you must allow us to kind of plug in. Make sure we remain connected. Otherwise, we will not be able to go into operations with you. We will not be able to contribute. Make sure that your advance in technology is compatible with what we do.

Of course, we have to be very selective in what we're going to invest in and where. Can we jump one improvement they make and remain compatible?

• 1635

I think we were in a very good position during the Kosovo air campaign. Our F-18s were still very much capable and very much compatible, but we knew at the time that it was about the last time we could go in unless the Americans made concessions and kept some of the equipment. Otherwise, we'd end up in a situation where we couldn't talk with them. Our sophistication is not there, and it is very difficult, as you know.

Now, to respond specifically, we don't see any change in the Bush administration vis-à-vis that, but it is always related to ITAR, the sharing of and access to technology. This is very delicate.

Mr. Carmen Provenzano: I have a supplementary, General.

There seem to be indications of new depths of commitment in the technology area. It's interesting to hear what you have to say, because it's like hockey: if you have a fast skater, you tell him not to burn his wingers. I think that's basically the message you're giving to our European and particularly our American allies: don't get so far ahead of us with your technology that we can't plug into the exercise any more.

I'm getting the impression, though, that this new administration is going to commit to new technology, to make serious commitments to bringing their military up to the technology of the day. Is that a fact? Are you aware of that? Should the committee be aware that if that happens, there will be new challenges in terms of our ability to remain interoperable?

Gen Maurice Baril: There's no doubt in my mind that the Americans will go exactly where you are saying. Oddly enough, they have just bought the same vehicle we bought two or three years ago—actually, we committed six years ago—the LAV III. They've just bought it, and they will start producing them.

We are compatible and interoperable with them in most fields. Right at this moment we have two of our most modern frigates in the gulf totally integrated into their carrier battle group operating in the gulf. Our airplanes are flying with them in Cold Lake in the Exercise Maple Leaf. We are working in Bosnia together. So it's always difficult. With other countries, most of them in Europe, it's the same. We've given the same message to the Americans: go ahead in technology, but when you move ahead, think about your allies and the fact that we don't have the resources and the capability you have.

The Chair: Thank you, General.

Mr. Stoffer.

Mr. Peter Stoffer: Thank you, again, Mr. Chair.

Sir, you had mentioned the responsibility of the people who are in the military, because that's what it really boils down to: men and women and their families. In many cases, they actually have unlimited liability, a term I heard just a while ago. It's a striking statement, that: when somebody joins the military, they have unlimited liability.

As a legislator, I like to think that the government should have an unlimited responsibility to care for them. That means providing proper health and dental care, proper homes, proper care for their children with proper day care facilities, and proper policies so they can stay in a community for a while and their kids can have an opportunity to at least get settled in a touch before they're moved around the country as they are.

A recent move to Shilo...maybe it was done as a cost-cutting measure, but it upset a tremendous number of families. You're asking them to move from a city to a rural area, and many people can't adjust to that. That's what happens, and I see it all the time from the phone calls we get, although they don't mention their names because they're not allowed to.

There are a lot of marriage breakups, and there are a lot of children wondering where mom and dad are and when they're coming home, saying, geez, you've only been home a couple of months, and now you're going again. This is the strain and the stress on our military families.

I know it's very difficult. You said officers are banging down your door, but recruiting is a very big challenge now for the military. I personally think that the military is a good career for men and women, but a lot of the young people don't believe that. There are all these concerns that are out there, such as housing. There's really no stability any more, and someone can get sick or, like Terry Riordon, die. That gets out and people are saying, boy, if I do service with the military and I get sick, they're not going to look after me or my family. That's the perception that's out there.

• 1640

I'd like you to get an opportunity just for a few minutes, if you wish, to clear up that perception and tell the people of Canada, the young people especially, why they should choose the military as a career with all these outstanding issues that are still out there. You can talk about technology, about equipment, about interoperability with our allies, but the reality is that it boils down to men and women and their families. That's what it boils down to. So why should they stick with the military, and why should young people join the military?

Gen Maurice Baril: It's certainly a personal decision whether you join or whether you stay. It's our responsibility—the leadership at all levels—to make sure that we are offering challenge, a quality of life that is acceptable both to the individual and to the family, and equipment and training that is safe, that will help them to fulfil the mission that they have, give them the proper professional development, but eventually....

You mentioned reliable liability. We are an army—armies, all three services—that is small and efficient, and we're demanding a lot of our people, just like any organization that there is in Canada. We have to answer to our country in what we do with the resources that were given to us, and we have to do it at an acceptable level.

It's not made for everybody to come in and live the excitement of three years and one or two missions and then raise a family in those conditions. I joined a long time ago, and I raised a family, and I'm very lucky because my family is still together. But you have to compare it to other very demanding professions that there are, from working on oil rigs to airline pilots and everything.

There is no hard statistic that says that we have more divorce, more suicide, more everything. That we have one is too much, and we're working very hard to take care of the family and to have programs to help the children when the parent has to go.

The structure of our military society has changed quite a bit. We are taking people that are older, more senior. They are more demanding. Many of them have families, actually, when they are coming in. Single parents join—we have never seen that before—and we have grandparents who are joining. So it is very difficult; it's very dynamic.

We have projects that have been put in place and that are being put in place, and that we're studying ahead to make sure that we're ahead of the parade. We're managing human resources that are so extensive, you just can't do it by putting in people who are not expert. We are moving into a very deliberate expertise of human resources managers that we have. But there will always be people who join and who realize that it's not their place and will serve the initial contract; there will always be people who are hurt or injured and who are killed. That's what unlimited liability is. There will always be families who cannot live the stress of military life.

As we go, and I've said it before, we are in a place now where quite a lot of people in the forces are going six months overseas, coming back for 18 months to 24 months, and going back in. It seems that during the First and Second World Wars, you'd fight the war, come back, and that was the end. You would never be called to go again. But now for the past ten years, you come back, and your worry is, when are you going to go back in? That's the life of the Canadian Forces people.

I just can't hire somebody and tell him, “You're going to serve six months in Bosnia, and then you'll be home for ten years”. How can I stand up in front of this committee in here and tell you I cannot commit my people more than once every five years, because it's too hard on their families? The chairman would be the first one to tell me, “Well, you should get a job somewhere else, because we want you to go”. Even 24 months we can't sustain; it's down to about 18 months now, and for some of the specialists it's 12 months.

We are very demanding, and it is very demanding on the people, and it has an impact. It will have an impact on what the Canadian Forces will look like in five, ten, and fifteen years. By the way, the armies of the world—not only ours, but most of the countries'—are moving to professional armies, and this is what is going to happen. You have to give quality of life, take care of the family, and give a salary that is competitive, because the people are going to go and work on the railway because it's paying more, or they'll go somewhere else.

So this is very difficult. We're spending a lot of time on this.

The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Stoffer.

Mr. Peric.

• 1645

Mr. Janko Peric (Cambridge, Lib.): Thank you, Mr. Chair.

General, in your opening statement you said that in support of UN, NATO, or coalition operations, the Canadian Forces must be ready to deploy any or all elements of one guard contingency force within 21 days. Is it possible to reduce that time, yes or no? If yes, what would it take? If no, why not? That's my number one question.

Number two, we know that in the last ten years the Canadian Forces improved technology, and probably the quality of life as well, but so did other countries as well. I have just a comment. Where would you compare our forces today to other countries—small countries, north European—like Norway or Sweden?

And the comment that I hear from you.... I'm not too happy with that comment, because I have my own son in the navy, and he did receive an increase in salary, but the next day he was served notice that the rent is going up.

General, the question is: is that how we are going to attract new members? The question is: how are we going to hold on to existing members in the armed forces today? We can serve them with the best equipment possible, but quality of life...and you cannot compare them to any other organization. They are the first ones to go, to defend our nation. They are the first ones to lay their lives on the line. So you can't compare air force pilots to Air Canada pilots or some other organization. An Air Canada pilot doesn't have to fly if there's an ice storm or storm; the flight is cancelled. But if there is a combat, our soldiers or members of our armed forces don't have a choice. They have to go.

So we have to treat them specially. The Canadian Armed Forces is a special organization, and we can't compare them to the private sector. How are you going to hold on to existing members? We are training; we are spending taxpayers' money; we're preparing them, and then we're losing them because we are not providing the most important thing to them—a quality of life.

Gen Maurice Baril: I really don't know how I could be able to provide for my people and give them competitive pay and quality of life if I don't compare what they do with the rest of the world.

We're in a competitive world out there, and when we try to hire a doctor to come in, we'd better be able to pay him the same as Sioux Lookout is paying one of them, otherwise he isn't going to come with us, whether he is the first in line or not.

So I think to compare our troops' quality of life, condition of living, and everything to other countries.... Maybe you should ask your son how he compares himself to other countries that he has been travelling with in operations and all over...how we in Canada fit. I see a lot of other countries, and I think we're pretty good because if we were not, I would be standing up hollering in here, demanding that you do the same thing you did two years ago. Because this committee made the Canadian people understand that we were hurting out in the field there, but at the same time you saw where we were four or five years ago, with frozen salaries since 1990. You know where we are now today.

Going back to the housing, I know it's insulting getting a raise, but at the same time it's not subsidized housing, and if they think that it's too high to be in, then they make the calculation, and they may have the capability to buy a house. So the idea is not to spend a career in the PMQ. It's to spend a stage in the PMQ, and then move into a house—smaller, not as luxurious and everything, but you just work on your down payment. That's what my driver did last Tuesday, and he is as happy as a pig in mud because he just bought his first house after eight years of service. He was living in a very small PMQ in Ottawa, but now he has bought his first house with his small family, and he has been in operation also all over the place.

So yes, it is insulting, but like I said, this is the law of the land, and it's calculated in.

• 1650

I cannot compare our forces to others. We're about the same size as Netherlands, Australia, and some other countries. I know the Netherlands more, because we've been involved in operations with them quite a bit. They are going through some pretty hard times too, reductions in budget, a volunteer army instead of a conscript army. They have an army that is unionized, which is another interesting thing.

Mr. Janko Peric: What about the number of 21 days?

Gen Maurice Baril: Of course, it can be reduced. We have troops who are on 48 hours notice to move, some of them on four hours notice to move, some of them on 90 days notice to move. It depends what the task is and how urgent it is. The DART, for example, would have the reconnaissance moving in 48 hours and the whole of them moving with seven days. GTF has hours, sometimes minutes, to move.

The Chair: Thank you, General.

Mr. Anders.

Mr. Rob Anders (Calgary West, Canadian Alliance): Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

I don't think I would want the job of our general today. I would have a tough time with a straight face bragging about how an army was recruiting grandparents and single mothers.

In your speech you talked about, for example, sustainability. One of the aspects of that is the ability to have appropriate troop transports. Based on the information I've got, whether it's the Hercules aircraft or even the Airbus strategic airlift, they're both quickly approaching rust-out. I'm going to ask you a series of questions, but one of the questions would be with regard to how sustainable our forces are if they don't have proper transport capabilities.

The irony, of course, is that even though we're approaching rust-out and some of these things, we're talking about Canada having “quick in, quick out” capabilities. I have a tough time buying into some of that logic when we have a reserve force that is smaller than our regular force, an aberration compared to the rest of the world. You yourself mentioned earlier in your comments that you thought there should be a four-to-one sustainability ratio. Maybe you're talking of regular forces sustaining regular forces, but I would assume the reserve forces are supposed to be able to sustain the regular forces and go in after the regular forces have been sent on an initial engagement. Yet we continue to see nasty things happen with that, even cannibalizing of the reserve budget.

I'll leave it at that and wait for your comments before going on to further questions.

Gen Maurice Baril: Let me go back to the first comment you madee about my being able to speak with a straight face when we recruit a grandmother. I'm saying that because I was there when it was done. It was not done two years ago, it was done in 1990. It was very surprising for little old me, who appeared there talking about the challenge when you're young, and somebody said there was a 39-year-old grandmother there. The daughter and the granddaughter were there. The lady finished first on the course, because she was as fit as anybody. We happen to live in a democracy where we have a Charter of Rights. When we have accepted standards to join the forces in a given trade, if you meet the standards you join. It doesn't say anywhere that you have to be 17 or 22. That's what we do. When a mother or father shows up at the recruiting centre with children, we don't turn them away. If we need them and they meet the standards, we will hire them. If they pass the training, we'll take them in. That's what we do. That's why I speak of it with a straight face. We deal with human beings in here, not with numbers.

As to the specific question you have, you mentioned air transport. The Airbuses we have are 15 years old. They are upgraded when required. They're the best strategic lift we have. They of course have limitations, because they're not C-17s, they're another kind of strategic transport. They are very versatile, because we have side doors on them and a long-range tank.

As for the Hercules, we're coming to the end of the retrofit of the complete optronics in them. Only a few are left to be done. So a Hercules at that price is good, with the quality that goes in all the Hercules fleet. There are some that were built probably yesterday and some that are 35 to 40 years old. That's probably the best type of that size of airplane that has ever been in the market. It's like any other fleet we have. We have always upgraded them, made them safe. They go from probably middle-1960 to the last one we bought, which was in 1997, I think.

• 1655

“Early in and early out”—and I think you used a different expression—is not new. And “early in” does not mean “first in and first out”. “Early in” means that when the Government of Canada decides it will make a contribution to a mission, as we have the experience, the capability, and the equipment—not in all the missions, but in the missions Canada wants to participate in—I, as the Chief of Defence, with my staff, will evaluate what the risk is, what the mission is, and whether we have the capability to do it? If we have it and we can move faster than another country with limited resources, I think it's appropriate to do it. It's very challenging for the people to go. We are good at planning, we're good at putting in place missions because of our experience of working. And “early out” doesn't mean you just pack it up and go and abandon the mission.

I was at the UN headquarters for a long time, and too many times missions were dumped in our hands. We were not ready, we were not capable. We had not the command and the logistics in place. So my personal view—and very emotionally—is that we give the mission back to the one who is going to keep on running it when they can do it. If it means we stay more than six months or less than six months or more than one year, we should stay. And we should make sure that whoever is going to take over from us is capable of taking it on. In the case of Eritrea it is the UN, and that's one of the concerns: they have to be able to take it from us and we have to be guaranteed that they take it from us, because that's a new experiment we're doing with the SHIR brigade, being there for six months, and they will face up.

As to reserve forces and sustainability, it's the Canadian Forces, full-time or part-time. The reserves are being structured. The commander of the army is a champion of the restructure of the militia, the land forces. He will appear in front of you, and I think you can have all the details in the plan, because he's been working on it personally for over a year. We now have a fully fledged project office in place, and he'll give you all the details.

The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Anders.

Mr. Grose.

Mr. Ivan Grose (Oshawa, Lib.): Thank you, Mr. Chair.

General, it seems I'm always talking about transport, and I was never in the motor pool—I was threatened with it once. I would take a little different tack from that Mr. Anders has taken. I don't have a problem with your 21 days. You're getting ready to go to the embarkation point, then you go to the embarkation point, then what happens? At the moment we don't have heavy-lift capacity. We can't lift our tanks by air. We've been in the embarrassing position of chartering Russian aircraft—I don't think a reliable source. We've also been embarrassed by chartering a ship that was reluctant to bring our cargo home. We had to go and get it. This is a situation I'm not happy with. Are you comfortable with it?

Gen Maurice Baril: I'm at the same comfort level as all my predecessors, because we never had this in the past.

Mr. Ivan Grose: That's right.

Gen Maurice Baril: And I'm not in the embarrassment business. I'm not embarrassed when we don't have it. There are only two countries in the world that can transport a tank and an airplane, the U.S. and the Russians—Ukraine is planning it. If we don't have the resources and I'm asked to deploy somewhere—and that's what I said—we have relied and we still rely on charter services for sea and air. We have always done that. The Americans are doing it. When we were going to deploy to Turkey last year the disaster assistance relief team, I had to commit us at noon precisely to having the Antonov, the huge Russian airplane, and commit half a million dollars to reserve the airplane, because the Americans were taking it.

Mr. Ivan Grose: You were in competition with the Americans.

Gen Maurice Baril: Yes, I was, because they were trying to deploy their force also to the area. And that's what we do all the time. So we're not the only ones. Everybody does it. If the Government of Canada wants to have this freedom, I don't think they will have total freedom by having a strategic air lift and sea lift unless we put in enormous resources. I think we'll be able to deploy about the size of a battle group quite quickly with our own means, but the asset will make two or three trips or we will still charter. And the KP is an aberration, because any commercial organization doesn't want to do it.

Mr. Ivan Grose: Yes. Thank you very much.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

• 1700

The Chair: Mr. Bachand

[Translation]

Mr. Claude Bachand: Judging from what you've told us, you already accomplish a great deal with limited resources. While everyone is demanding budget increases, you already manage to provide training activities. When disaster strikes in Canada, you're ready to assist. You participate in peacekeeping missions.

However, it seems the Prime Minister has added another element to the mix. I admit that this is all somewhat mysterious and I'd like to ask you some questions. I'm talking about the Office of Critical Infrastructure Protection and Emergency Preparedness. It's all quite mysterious because in addition to handling disasters and accidents, this office handles terrorist attacks and those perpetrated over the Internet.

I believe the Office was established to handle Y2K concerns at a time when interdepartmental coordination was the order of the day. However, as I understand it, the Prime Minister has just conferred upon the Department of National Defence responsibility for coordinating the Office's operations which touch on many areas including energy, transportation, security, services and government.

Personally, I find it all rather nebulous. There is also the responsibility of issuing national directives. You can understand that being from Quebec, I don't know if the Canadian army will protect Hydro-Quebec's transmission towers or whether I can even make this supposition. Could you tell me a little more about this rather mysterious office? Could you lift the veil of secrecy a little?

Gen. Maurice Baril: There is really no mystery here. It was announced several months ago that responsibility for the Office of Critical Infrastructure Protection and Emergency Preparedness has been conferred upon the Department of National Defence, under the direction of Associate Deputy Minister Margaret Purdy, who was already working in government. She is in the process of developing an action plan and budget and of identifying resource requirements.

The government's decision brings with it an added responsibility. This being said, I personally feel that this move was warranted. The Office belongs with National Defence, as it deals with national security issues. The two entities complement each other.

I'm certain that in the not-too-distant future, you will be hearing more about the Office's objectives, capabilities and resource requirements.

As I see it, we currently face multidimensional threats of a different nature which require IT technology. That is the way of the future. We can no longer rely on conventional means. Our friends to the South face a number of threats. We are so inter- connected with the United States of America that it is important to work together at the interdepartmental, interprovincial and international levels.

Mr. Claude Bachand: Then quite possibly, you could be asked to protect Hydro-Québec's transmission towers.

Gen. Maurice Baril: No. I don't think so. Possibly we could be called upon to protect bridges and railways. When the time comes, we will see what needs to be done.

Mr. Claude Bachand: The action plan hasn't yet been finalized, as I understand it.

Gen. Maurice Baril: Absolutely not. Emergency Preparedness Canada officials are the ones dispatched to the scene in the event of a flood or other kind of disaster. This unit will be expanded and will take on many additional responsibilities. We are part of the group given our unique resources. However, depending on the situation, we will be asked to do various things.

[English]

The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Bachand.

Mr. Provenzano.

Mr. Carmen Provenzano: Just continuing with the interoperability issue, our allies seem to be taking directions and making commitments with regard to using space for communications, navigation, and reconnaissance to a greater degree than in the past. I don't know what Canada's plans might be to upgrade its capabilities in space. We are dependent to some extent on the systems of our allies. Do we have any plans to upgrade our space capabilities for those purposes, and, in your view, General, is it a problem that we are reliant on our allies in that regard?

• 1705

Gen Maurice Baril: Like many other countries, we rely on our allies who have the capability to put up a satellite. At the same time, we're contributing in certain ways that guarantee us access to those capabilities, whether it's for navigation or observation. Space is a new area that absorbs a lot of resources, and Canada has committed resources for the future.

Maybe I can ask Commodore McNeil to touch on the details of our space project.

Mr. Carmen Provenzano: He could also address the aspect of whether Canada is comfortable with that level of reliance.

Commodore Daniel G. McNeil (Director, Force Planning and Program Coordination, Department of National Defence): In our analysis we have seen that in 2000 the commercial use of space exceeded the military use of space, and the trend continues. Countries are involved in detailed space imagery in the commercial sense, which you didn't see in the Cold War. You can see this on the Internet if you get out your charge card. You can go out in your canoe on the Great Lakes with a Canadian Tire global positioning system and get the navigation accuracy we didn't have in the Cold War. This is all part of the revolution in military affairs.

I would say that, being a very high-technology country, we're very comfortable with the Canadian Space Agency, a Canadian radar satellite in space, and our partnerships at a very high level. We do have future capital programs, which are partnership kinds of programs, that will utilize all aspects of the commercial and military use of space.

Mr. Carmen Provenzano: To put the question another way, are we in danger of lagging behind to the point where it could be uncomfortable to rely on our allies and it would perhaps affect our interoperability capabilities?

Cmdre Daniel McNeil: To continue with what I was trying to say, because the technologies are becoming more available commercially and because we are so high tech, even compared with our high-tech partners of Australia, Great Britain, and Europe, in Canada we're at the leading edge with industry and with our capabilities, and we know that's a good place to invest. So I think we are comfortable.

Gen Maurice Baril: We are as comfortable as we're willing to share in those projects. We have to pay our entry fees to be in those programs. This means we have to have in place a lot of resources for our programs. Then it's a matter of trust and agreement with the country that provides those services.

Mr. Carmen Provenzano: Thank you.

The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Provenzano.

Mr. Stoffer.

Mr. Peter Stoffer: You mentioned many times that the military is like other organizations. Call me crazy, but I always thought the military was a completely different organization altogether.

You mentioned the three arms of the armed forces. I always considered the fourth arm to be our civilian personnel, for example, the Union of National Defence Employees, who are attached to various bases throughout the country. You mentioned Kuwait. In 1990 we were in Halifax, and those civilian employees and some contractors worked 16 to 20 hours a day for six weeks straight to get the three shifts ready. It was remarkable that they could get things together that fast in that amount of time. The smiles on their faces when those ships went out of the harbour was the thing I'll never forget. It was quite something.

Their reward for this, of course, is alternate service delivery. Many of those who worked in those jobs are now going to be told that their job is going out to contract. The supply chain is one and the dockyards another. This is happening clear across the country. We know what happened in Goose Bay. It was a disaster public relations-wise and everything else. Gagetown was close, but they put a halt to that.

Sir, being the fourth arm of the military, a very important arm, although they're not military personnel, they're extremely proud of what they do in preparing the military to be ready at all times. Do you think that alternate service delivery is actually a good thing for these employees? Because it is not a cost-cutting measure when you look at it overall. They'll save money in the beginning, but in the end that contract will cost you a lot more, and you don't get the loyalty and you certainly don't get the service that you would get from loyal employees who are attached to it. So is alternate service delivery, in your mind, a good idea?

• 1710

Gen Maurice Baril: I'm glad you raised it, because there are a little over 20,000 people in this group of very dedicated employees and colleagues we have, and like us they went from around 40,000 to 23,000 in a very brutal way, as in any other organization. You know as well as I do that when business is bad it's pretty brutal. You can talk to Nortel, I guess. There are some 20,000 of them, and not only did they set such a good example during the preparations for the gulf, but also during the ice storm, especially in Montreal. They ran the big supply depot and maintenance shop. I think they left their unions cards at the entrance at the start and they picked them up after. They were proud, as you can imagine. We were so glad to have them at that time.

In terms of ASD, alternative service delivery, we have to also be responsible with the dollars that are given to us, and if we can find a better way of doing it I think we cannot be stuck to the past. It has to be done in consultation with the employees. As you follow that closely, you know that there are a lot of ways of doing it where the employees can take over and bid for the project. Built into the contract it will be stated that the company has to hire so many of them with the amount of money. Goose Bay is one of those.

You have a different opinion of the result from what I might have. You might have been closer. But it was something that was done. It's done always very carefully. It's a bit politically charged, as you mentioned, because it means a job that changes hands, or at least changes direction.

Our civilian employees are very close to us. I believe about 75% of the civilian employees of DND are answering directly to uniformed members of the department. We do a lot of outstanding work with them. But when there's a better way of doing it, either to save uniforms or not having people in uniform to do it, we have to go at it.

I was talking to a chief warrant officer who was in Bosnia, I think. As you know, we have replaced some of the people in uniform by contractors in Bosnia. We have about 140. He said “It's costing you more by having civilians work here.” And I said “You're missing the point. I'm not trying to save money in the operation; I'm trying to save you and your family by having you go on operation less often.”

So in one way we're trying to save the quality of life for our people who go too often and we're contracting civilian organizations, and in another way we're trying to save money to reinvest somewhere else.

Mr. Peter Stoffer: Perhaps I can have permission for one last question.

The Chair: Very quickly.

Mr. Peter Stoffer: Because Shearwater is in my riding, I'm extremely concerned about the future of that base. With the maritime helicopter project, one day we'll see a replacement for the Sea King, I'm sure. In your opinion, should the maritime helicopter program, which complements, by the way, our navy.... The airfield is right there, and the navy is right there, it's a great fit. There are always rumours going around that Shearwater is slated to be closed. These are just rumours; there are no facts behind them. But in your opinion, when the maritime helicopter project is done and they have the new replacements, should they be located as close as possible—i.e., Shearwater—to meet its naval concerns as well? In other words, will you help me keep Shearwater open forever?

Some hon. members: Oh, oh.

Mr. Peter Stoffer: Come on.

Gen Maurice Baril: This is where the Sea Kings are operating from now.

Mr. Peter Stoffer: Yes, sir.

Gen Maurice Baril: I think they will be operating from there for a little while more.

Mr. Peter Stoffer: But their replacement?

Gen Maurice Baril: I think with the replacement coming in we will have the time in between to make a business case as to whether they should be in Shearwater or Greenwood. I think there will be time to make representations on behalf of your constituents.

Mr. Peter Stoffer: Thank you.

The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Stoffer.

Mr. Wood.

Mr. Bob Wood: I have one quick question, Mr. Chairman.

General, with Canada's military gradually decreasing over the years, when is it going to get down to such a level, in your mind, that Canada will no longer be able to meet its contingency requirements? Where does it stop? Does it stop at at 55,000 people, 10,000? Where does it stop?

• 1715

Gen Maurice Baril: I think we'll always be in the dilemma of balancing technology and people. Ten years from now, will we be able to do the same thing that we're doing now with 5,000 fewer people? Of course it's always a place where we look for resources, because people are very expensive. They cost us nearly 50% of our budget. So if we want to cut somewhere and maintain the same capability, this is the kind of balance we have to do. Are we going to have a kind of throwaway UAV that does reconnaissance in the future? Are we going to have bombs that don't require an airplane to launch them, we can fire them from somewhere else? That will reduce a whole bunch of people.

I think it has been a constant struggle all the time. I'd prefer to have more people. It's much easier; you can relieve the pressure. But the squeeze on the people will always be there, because it is very expensive.

So, no, I don't have an answer. I told you in the opening remarks that what we're asked to do now we can do. In ten years, with the way we're following and the measures we're taking now, we will do it again. I don't know if the situation is going to change in five years, but with what we can see and what we can predict we're going the right way. But if the amount of resources does not change with the cost of doing business, somewhere it will have to give, and a hard decision will have to be taken.

Mr. Bob Wood: Thank you.

The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Wood.

Mr. Benoit, five minutes.

Mr. Leon Benoit: Thank you, Mr. Chair.

General, earlier, while talking about combat capability, you said that you didn't base your statement that the military is more capable now than ten years ago on any study, or any hard evidence. You did dwell on the upgrades to some very old and obsolete equipment, some of it obsolete. But I don't think that really demonstrates we're more combat-capable than we were.

In fact, Colonel Lewis MacKenzie, at a meeting about two weeks ago in Toronto at the Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies, said in regard to Canada-U.S. relations that it's extremely important that Canada be seen as being combat-capable, and that we are not. He said it that clearly: we are not seen as being combat-capable, nor are we combat-capable. He used something to back that up. He said the current commitment overseas is about half what it was in the early nineties. That demonstrates that we really don't have the capabilities we had ten years ago. Could you comment on that?

Gen Maurice Baril: In 1989, until the summer of 1990, or May 1990, we had more committed in Europe. In the Balkans we had two large battle groups at that time, over 4,000. We had ships sailing at that time and we were committed in Sierra Leone also. We did run the ice storm also during that time. So I don't know where he takes that.

I said that we were more compatible than we were in 1990, and that stands. If we're starting to count and judge combat capability by the number of heads we have outside the country, this is another game. I'm talking of the people we have outside the country with the means and the weapon platforms, and communication, experience, leadership and training that they have. I'm talking about their ability to work with the Americans and 15 other countries, and the experience they have.

So my judgment stands, and on his I cannot question him because he is using a different measure from other people.

Mr. Leon Benoit: So in determining capability, do you think that the number of people in the military really is important at all in that judgment? Also, you made a comment that we have about 58,000 serving now. The Conference of Defence Associations, which appeared before this committee on April 26, said that we have about half of what we had ten years ago. It's hard to really get a good handle on those numbers.

If you look at some of the literature we received, there's a document called “DND-CF overview, a SCONDVA briefing, March 20, 2001”. You see in there some numbers. They have the maritime forces at 8,911, the land forces at 20,396, and the air forces at 13,219. That adds up to about to about 42,526. First of all, how are the rest of the 58,000 made up?

• 1720

Gen Maurice Baril: I'll just have the expert give it here, because he gave it this morning to General Ralston, who is the Supreme Allied Commander Europe.

How do we count the 58,000 that we have? Let me go back. I think you said we went from 80,000 to 58,000. I also said that our predecessors, the leadership of the early nineties, did all they could to make sure that where we were cutting was not at the bayonet level, at the level of combat capability. They cut from medical, probably from postal corps, communications, and everything. They kept the fighting edge, and that's why I said we have the same number of armoured regiments and artillery regiments. We have nine infantry battalions, instead of ten. We had the Canadian Airborne Regiment before.

So the leading edge has not changed, but I'll ask Walt Natynczyk to tell you about the numbers, if he can remember them off the cuff.

Colonel W.J. Natynczyk (Chief of Staff J3 International, Department of National Defence): Sir, you just highlighted the environmental services of the land forces, maritime services, and the naval forces.

Using a number of 58,000, you'll find elsewhere in that package—because I think I briefed you on that same day—that, in looking at the operational capabilities or the manoeuvre organizations, in contrast to the infrastructure and headquarters, we have approximately 58,000 folks overall. About 25,000 of those are engaged in the manoeuvre elements. That is, they're the folks on ships, the folks in squadrons and the wings that support those squadrons, and the folks in the brigades and the bases that support those brigades. The other number are really in the training infrastructure, the headquarters, and those seconded to other tasks.

Mr. Leon Benoit: How many of them would be in headquarters?

Col W.J. Natynczyk: What's the slice in the headquarters? I don't have that at the tip of my fingers right now.

Mr. Leon Benoit: Aren't most people in headquarters figured in with the numbers? You have the maritime forces at 9,000 and land forces at 20,000. Wouldn't there be a lot of people—

Col W.J. Natynczyk: In addition to the 42,000 that you've indicated—

Mr. Leon Benoit: That's 42,000, yes.

Col W.J. Natynczyk: —there are other organizations—such as our human resources folks—and the central training institutions—such as the recruit schools that were mentioned earlier in St-Jean—that are not part of those three elements that you've highlighted there. And there are also the infrastructure personnel who are not in those numbers. So overall—

Mr. Leon Benoit: Those numbers, if I could very quickly—

The Chair: No, Mr. Benoit. Your time has expired.

Mr. Bachand.

[Translation]

Mr. Claude Bachand: Mr. Chairman, I've kept the most interesting question for last and I would like to direct it to the General.

People are often critical of the ratio of generals to soldiers in the Canadian Forces. I'm curious as to the exact figure. I've heard talk of one general for every 700 soldiers, whereas in the case of other armed forces, the ratio is much higher.

There is also the whole salary issue. I admit that I am somewhat envious. I'm not asking you to give me the figures immediately, but is information about the salaries of generals available from your department or from the Canadian Forces? How much does a four-star general earn? What about a three-star general, a two-star general or a one-star general? It is often rumoured that there is a freeze on the hiring or promotion of new generals or senior officers. However, since this decision was made, there have apparently been internal promotions. In other words, a one-star general has been promoted to the level of a two-star general. I don't know whether all of this is true, but since you're here, I'm asking you the question. I knew it would be a little harder for you to answer this particular question, but...

Gen. Maurice Baril: No. Look here,...

Mr. Claude Bachand: Do you have an attrition plan in place? Can you answer that question? Have you decided that as generals retire, you will not promote others from within the ranks until such time as the ratio , which is currently 700 to 1, reaches 800 to 1, 900 to 1 or even 1,000 to one?

Gen. Maurice Baril: Is there a similar ratio in place within the federal public service, in terms of the number of positions at the EX-1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 levels to the number of employees?

Mr. Claude Bachand: I don't believe so.

Gen. Maurice Baril: I think you should take a look sometime at the ratio of people at the Ex-1, 2 , 3, 4 and 5 levels to the number of public servants?

• 1725

There are a total of 64 generals in the regular branch of the Canadian Forces, including the chaplain, the Chief of Medical Services and my Chief Counsel. In fact, the real number is 70, but the federal government and the Minister of National Defence have decided to loan certain officers to other departments. A two-star general is on loan to the United States at my request to head up forces in Bosnia. Three generals are currently taking professional development courses at university and doing post-doctoral studies. This brings the total number to 70 generals.

Therefore, depending on the year and promotion dates, I may have 68, 69, 70 or even 71 generals on staff for several months, but the usual number is 70. If someone wants me to take on an additional position, I can ask my minister to authorize one more general position.

As for the report, it's crazy to say that we are reducing our personnel strength from 80,000 to 60,000 and that therefore, we should reduce the number of generals accordingly. That's not how things work. I need senior officers with considerable experience. It's somewhat irrelevant as to whether they command 752 or 1,152 soldiers.

It's a question of perception, as I've often told my minister. Why limit me to 70 senior officers, when the same rules don't apply to the rest of the department or to other departments? I don't need him to answer the question for me. The reason is because we wear our rank for everyone to see.

I could tell you how much I earn, but that would not be appropriate. The exact salaries that my generals earn are personal and need not be disclosed. However, I could tell you what their salary range is. I don't know how much you earn, for example.

Mr. Claude Bachand: I'm sorry, but that is public information. The Canadian taxpayers pay your salary and they are entitled to know how much you earn.

Gen. Maurice Baril: Let me explain something to you. There are certain components of your salary that we probably know nothing about because they are quite specific. In the Canadian Forces and in the public service, salaries always fall within a certain range. I believe this information is posted on the Web.

Mr. Claude Bachand: I see.

Gen. Maurice Baril: Anyone can find out what the salary range is. However, there is no way of knowing where a particular individual falls within this range. That information cannot be disclosed because it is based on performance. If we disclose the exact salary, then we are disclosing that individual's performance during the year.

[English]

The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Bachand.

[Translation]

Gen. Maurice Baril: It's the same for everyone. We're completely tied to the public service.

[English]

The Chair: General, we're going to have to cut you off there.

We have about two minutes, Mr. Stoffer.

Mr. Peter Stoffer: I won't need two minutes.

The Chair: Okay.

Mr. Bob Wood: That's hard to believe, coming from you.

Mr. Peter Stoffer: I just wanted to say I understand you will be leaving us soon, General Baril. On behalf of all the people in Nova Scotia, where I come from, thank you for your service to the country, sir.

Gen Maurice Baril: My pleasure. Thank you very much.

Mr. Peter Stoffer: What did I say?

The Chair: Mr. Anders.

Mr. Rob Anders: I never thought the day would come.

The question I have—

The Chair: I'm just enforcing the rules, Mr. Anders.

An hon. member: It's a dirty job.

Mr. Rob Anders: No, I understand.

General Baril, you were talking about how the Americans are now buying light armoured vehicles. In your response to my question, you also talked about how you deal with human beings. You said you judge them on a one-by-one basis and all that type of stuff, and that your job is to do the best for the forces, and blah, blah, blah. Maybe you can be very proud of the fact that the Americans are buying light armoured vehicles like the ones Canada has, but the fact remains that they also have M1 Abrams tanks. I bet you there are a lot of men in the infantry who would like to be able to have that protection against some serious direct fire, rather than some of the rust-outs that we have.

When the Americans approached us about loaning us M1 Abrams tanks at no charge—this is what I'm told by rear admirals in Calgary, and you can argue that they're navy men, but I think they know their business—we refused those American M1 Abrams tanks, while all we're buying right now are light armoured vehicles. Why would we refuse that type of hardware from a country that's willing to give it to us rather than mothballing it someplace?

• 1730

Gen Maurice Baril: I've never refused them, because I've never heard of what you're talking about. Maybe the navy in Calgary has heard of that, but I haven't.

Some offered to buy the Leopard 1 and Leopard 2 from countries that wanted to get rid of them. Maybe that's the reason they're offering their M1 Abrams to somebody else. They are too heavy and too expensive to maintain. They want to have a different kind of vehicle. The LAV III with the cannon and chain gun and also the 105 light gun will probably fill the gap for them. The Abrams is a pretty heavy machine, and it does not always go to places we're asked to go to. It's just too big and too heavy.

The Chair: Mr. Anders, you have another couple of minutes.

Mr. Rob Anders: General, you said that Canada can't be a fortress. We have the Arctic to the north; a rough ocean to our east, the Atlantic; the Pacific, which is the biggest ocean in the world; and only one border with another country. In that case, if Canada can't be a fortress, what would a country like Austria be, where it's surrounded by people on all sides? I think it's odd to hear a statement from one of our generals that Canada can't be a fortress when we're surrounded by oceans on three sides.

Gen Maurice Baril: I don't know what you mean. Are you implying that we should turn our country into a fortress because we're surrounded by oceans? It's pretty easy to penetrate our country from the sea and the air, unless we turn it into a fortress. I think we have evaluated the risk and put the means in place to protect our country and to have complete surveillance of the air space. Nobody moves into our air space without us knowing it through our NORAD alliance. We have control of our seas. We know what's going on through the different sensors and means we have. Turning it into a fortress means preventing people from coming in or knowing what's going on. So we—

Mr. Rob Anders: Isn't that your job, sir?

Gen Maurice Baril: When I say fortress, I mean preventing people from coming in. With the way we do business in the world, we have to know what's going on. If there's something that should not be taking place, we can intervene, such as boats that are carrying illegal immigrants or drugs. Let me assure you that we intervene quite often, in cooperation with other departments, with the very special means and capabilities we have.

It would be very difficult to make our country totalement impénétrable. I don't think it is possible. Our country is too big, and the cost of doing that would be prohibitive.

The Chair: Committee members, we're going to have to wind this up at this point. We're over our time, and there is that one housekeeping item we wanted to deal with.

On behalf of the committee members, General and the other members of the forces who are with us today, thank you very much for your comments. They were very instructive. We're certainly looking forward to having some of your colleagues come before the committee in the not-too-distant future.

The item I wanted to bring to the attention of committee members involves recently introduced changes to the Standing Orders. It's Standing Order 81(7), if you're looking for a number. It allows a committee to comment on the main estimates. The committee is also empowered “to consider and report upon the expenditure plans and priorities in future fiscal years of the departments and agencies whose main estimates are before it”.

We are required, again under the Standing Orders, to report our findings before the last normal sitting day in June, which means we have a deadline to work toward with regard to any report we may wish to prepare on this.

If you would like certain items to be included in a report that would be prepared by our research staff and submitted to the House, we could do that within the next number of weeks. If you're interested in supplying ideas and suggestions for future expenditures, please contact myself or Wolf Koerner. We'd appreciate them in writing. We will take them into account in terms of putting together a report on future expenditures. That report will come before committee. Hopefully, we'll be able to reach a consensus and send it off to the House.

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Mr. Stoffer.

Mr. Peter Stoffer: I'm sorry, Mr. Chairman, do you mean expenditures in terms of ideas for people we should have as witnesses?

The Chair: No, these are future expenditures. This is based on the estimates. There's a provision in Standing Order 81(7), which probably none of you have seen. I only discovered it a little while ago during a conversation with the House leader. I broached this idea with him in terms of the possibility of putting together some sort of effort in this regard. It's something that is within our authority to do, and I don't think we should miss the opportunity, quite frankly.

Are there any other questions?

Mr. Peter Stoffer: Could you give me an example?

The Chair: There are lots of potential examples in terms of future spending priorities, such as providing more money for the reserves, for the strategic air lift capability, etc. The list goes on, as I'm sure you know.

Mr. Peter Stoffer: Okay. Thank you.

The Chair: I wanted to bring that before the committee as quickly as possible so that we can get the suggestions in, prepare the report and present it to the committee, and then send it off to the House.

The meeting is adjourned.