HEAL Committee Meeting

STANDING COMMITTEE ON HEALTH

COMITÉ PERMANENT DE LA SANTÉ

EVIDENCE

[Recorded by Electronic Apparatus]

Wednesday, April 4, 2001

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[English]

The Chair (Ms. Bonnie Brown (Oakville, Lib.)): I call the meeting to order.

Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen. Pursuant to Standing Order 108(2), today we are having an information session on food safety and the Canadian Food Inspection Agency.

We have representatives from both Health Canada and the Canadian Food Inspection Agency. I'm wondering if the witnesses have figured out who would like to go first, or should I just appoint somebody? From Health Canada we have Dr. Marc LeMaguer, Director General, Food Directorate, Health Products and Food Branch. Please go ahead.

Dr. Marc LeMaguer (Director General, Food Directorate, Health Products and Food Branch, Health Canada): Thank you, Madam Chair.

It is my pleasure to be here today. I am accompanied by Dr. Karen Dodds from the Office of Biotechnology and Science.

The responsibilities that Health Canada has vis-à-vis food safety relate to establishing policies and standards for the safety and nutritional quality of food sold in Canada. Furthermore, we carry out the risk-benefit assessment, weighing the health benefits that may accrue by consuming certain foods with an estimate of the risk of exposure to the hazards they may contain.

As part of these activities, surveillance is an important component of policy and standard setting. Investigations of food-borne illness outbreaks are also important in establishing policies and standards. We are also responsible for assessing the effectiveness of the agency's activity related to food safety in the enforcement area of the policies.

These responsibilities are laid out in section 2 of the Canadian Food Inspection Agency Act and include the checks and balances in the food safety system for their verification and effectiveness.

There is a memorandum of understanding that defines formally the relationship between Health Canada and CFIA. We work collaboratively to fulfil the terms of the agreement, we carry out food safety responsibilities to meet government policy objectives, and we work with all stakeholders to achieve a safe and nutritious food supply for Canadians. Furthermore, we ensure complete and timely information sharing between the two organizations, which of course is very important, and we implement working agreements as set out in the appendices to the agreement we have in place, the MOU. We cooperate in addressing new issues as they arise, utilizing the bilateral committee model as per the agreement that is in place, which in effect controls the relationship between the two organizations.

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The committee activity we have together must contribute to the protection of and improvement to health. That's the fundamental basis of our relationship. Food policy decision-making is based on a risk-benefit assessment and scientific evidence. The health and safety impact is paramount. The committee structure we have adopted leads to timely and accountable decision-making.

That's basically the framework within which we work very closely with CFIA in developing, on the one hand, policies, standards, and regulations, but on the other hand, we rely on CFIA for the application of these policies and standards in the field, and then verifying that.

Thank you, Madam Chair.

The Chair: Thank you, Dr. LeMaguer. Did you want Dr. Dodds to also speak at this time, or is she here to answer questions?

Dr. Marc LeMaguer: She is here to answer questions.

The Chair: Thank you very much.

We'll move on to the Canadian Food Inspection Agency team, then. We'll begin with Dr. André Gravel.

Dr. André Gravel (Executive Vice-President, Canadian Food Inspection Agency): Thank you, Madam Chair, and good afternoon to the members of the committee. I certainly appreciate the opportunity to appear today to provide the committee with information about the Canadian Food Inspection Agency. I will be brief in my opening remarks in order to allow plenty of time for questions.

With me today from the agency are Mr. Peter Brackenridge, vice-president of the agency's programs branch, and Mr. Bart Bilmer, director of the agency's office of biotechnology.

[Translation]

Canada's food safety system is built around effective food safety laws, the efforts of Health Canada to set safety standards, and the work of the Canadian Food Inspection Agency to enforce these laws and standards. At the CFIA, food safety is our first concern. It is of overriding importance in all we do.

The CFIA, in partnership with other levels of government, industry, and consumers, works very hard every day to make our food safety system one of the best in the world. Indeed, the Auditor General recently remarked that the system of food inspection on the whole has improved since the different activities that were carried out previously by different departments were brought together at the creation of the CFIA. The system's strength depends on the recognition that food safety is a shared responsibility. Everyone from the farmer to the family chef contributes to the safety of the food we eat.

The Agency inspects over 3,500 federally registered plants; our provincial and municipal counterparts inspect thousands of other food premises. Increasingly, we work as cross-jurisdictional teams, drawing on the expertise of safety experts across the country.

The CFIA is constantly on alert against food safety threats. Since its creation in 1997, the Agency has successfully handled 950 food recalls - and we continue to find ways to improve our response to food health and safety problems and to prevent them where possible.

[English]

We have worked extremely hard on our food emergency readiness, and with our food safety partners we continue to improve our responses by building on lessons learned from previous experiences. We have a public health and consumer protection mandate, and we take our responsibility very seriously.

At the CFIA, prevention is the first line of defence, but when things go wrong, the agency can and does use strict enforcement measures to correct problems. We are working very hard on improving our enforcement and compliance activities. For example, the agency created a centralized enforcement division that allows the CFIA to deal with enforcement and compliance in an effective, consistent, and fair manner.

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I'm pleased the Auditor General has acknowledged the important steps taken by the agency to improve the quality and consistency of its enforcement actions. These steps include the development of the agency's comprehensive enforcement and compliance policy. The policy establishes procedures for monitoring compliance, carrying out inspections, and conducting investigations. In addition, the agency has provided enforcement training to its inspection staff.

We have made some important progress over the past years in all three areas of our mandate: food safety, animal health, and plant protection. We've protected Canadians from risks to health and safety; we've caught problems before they happened; and, when problems have arisen, we've worked quickly and effectively to minimize the consequences.

[Translation]

On the food safety side, an example of progress is our continued efforts, as part of the Canadian Food Inspection System implementation group, to improve the coordination of food inspection activities across Canada.

We have continued to achieve success with our provincial/territorial partners in harmonizing inspection services - with, for example, a Government of Canada/Ontario MOU in October, and a partnership agreement with Alberta in March, to name but two. These partnerships are an important part of Canada's overall inspection and enforcement system for food safety - a system that utilizes the strengths of each participant to bridge potential gaps and minimize duplication of effort.

The Agency also continues to play a lead role on international standard setting organizations to maintain and promote the highest science-based food safety standards possible - to protect consumers.

[English]

Here at home, the CFIA has joined forces with Health Canada, Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada, and other organizations to form the Canadian Partnership for Consumer Food Safety Education. Now with 64 members, the group continues to build on the FightBAC! consumer awareness campaign, focusing on fighting the bacteria that can cause foodborne illness.

The agency has also made significant improvements in areas of concern to the Auditor General, including our progress with the implementation of HACPP, harmonized import controls, compliance and enforcement actions, and the management of our most important resource—our people. While HACPP is already mandatory in all federally regulated fish processing establishments, the agency wants to go further. It will, in consultation with the industry, implement mandatory HACPP in all federally registered meat and poultry establishments.

[Translation]

On the import front, the CFIA has developed a national import policy as a key component of its Integrated Systems initiative. The import policy will enable the harmonization of all Agency import control activities.

There are good reasons that Canadians and over 200 countries worldwide have confidence in the safety of Canada's food supply - probably the most important of these is the dedicated and highly qualified employees of the CFIA.

We recognize the value of our employees as well as the challenges we face - like many other government organizations - in ensuring we continue to attract and keep the best people now and in the future.

The Agency's Human Resource Strategy for 2000-2003 maps the way in which the CFIA will continue to ensure that our staff remain with us, that they continue to grow professionally, that they have the necessary tools to continue to contribute to the Agency's business objectives, and that the top-notch new entrants to the work force see the CFIA as an employer of choice now and in the future.

[English]

In closing, we are committed to contributing to the government's efforts to enhance the quality of life of Canadians. First and foremost, our commitment is to protecting Canadians. It's a responsibility we take very seriously. The CFIA recognizes that it must continue to devote a sustained effort to ensure our food emergency response system remains responsive to the food safety needs of consumers.

[Translation]

Without a doubt, the challenges facing us are complex and numerous. We know that our work is never finished because our mandate directs us to continuously enhance the federal food inspection system.

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[English]

It's an ambitious mandate, but it's one that answers the expectations of Canadians, one we will continue to strive for with professionalism.

[Translation]

Thank you, Madam Chair.

[English]

The Chair: Thank you very much, Dr. Gravel.

I should tell you our interest in your agency stems from two probable sources: a meeting we had with the Auditor General; and the current interest in foot-and-mouth disease, which has given rise to the concerns we all have over how to protect our livestock in Canada.

We'll begin a round of questioning now, and I'll begin with Mr. Merrifield.

Mr. Rob Merrifield (Yellowhead, Canadian Alliance): Thank you.

It is very interesting. It is absolutely true.

We have some questions with regard to both the Auditor General's report and food safety, in terms of foot-and-mouth and mad cow disease. To start with, though, the Auditor General dedicated an entire chapter on the lack of resources to handle food inspection. Are you dealing with this, and if so, how? What kind of risk does this present to food safety in Canada?

Dr. André Gravel: The Auditor General certainly looked at the CFIA and made some comments about the level of resources it had at its disposal to cover its many responsibilities.

The agency is dealing with its resource situation on the basis of risk evaluation. The mandate of the CFIA is very vast. As I mentioned, it deals with animal health, plant protection, and food safety. In fact we have 14 programs. We're present from gate to plate—and even beyond “gate,” because we're into feed for animals. We must look at our areas of priority and consequently deploy our resources.

I can't think of any government organization that has all the resources it needs. Over the past three or four years, the agency has used its resources very cautiously. We are coping. However, at present the Treasury Board is doing a review of our A-base, and we expect it to generate additional resources.

Over the last year the agency has received money from Parliament for two very important projects. The first, I'm sure, is of great interest to this committee. It's on biotechnology. The agency, along with Health Canada and other partners, has received new money to deal with biotech. The agency's contribution is about $30 million over the next three years. It's a good investment for us.

The second has to do with improvements in our residue-monitoring program—residue of veterinarian drugs, residue of antibiotics, etc.—again, $32 million this year and $21 million ongoing.

So we're not completely broke. However, as time goes on and all these crises are falling on us, it will be important that our level of resources is adequate for us to deal with them.

Mr. Rob Merrifield: I appreciate your comments with regard to those areas. I don't want to get into biotech. We will, but not right now.

What kind of risk does this present to food safety in Canada? It's the question I'm most concerned with, and you seemed to avoid it. We talked about human resources, and the money you have or don't have. But I'm more concerned about the food.

Dr. André Gravel: Madam Chair, I apologize for not being as precise as the member wanted me to be.

At the agency, we certainly don't feel the level of risk associated with our level of inspection creates a food safety hazard for Canada. As I mentioned, there are many areas of food inspection in which the agency is involved. Some have more priority than others. Over the years we've been trying to address those areas we think represent a higher risk.

We certainly don't feel the health of Canadians is at risk. Otherwise we would say something about it.

Mr. Rob Merrifield: That's interesting, and I appreciate that. I would hope you would.

It concerns me a bit when the Auditor General says you're understaffed and it could present a hazard to food safety. Then your own department suggests that mad cow disease could lurk in our food system—according to the Montreal Gazette, this comes from your department. That rings bells in my mind as to the kinds of risks there may be.

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Are they real? Are they fabricated? I'd like an explanation.

Dr. André Gravel: Certainly the risks are real.

However, what's happened in Europe has certainly increased the awareness of Canadians, and everyone else, in terms of food safety risks. Remember, mad cow disease is something happening in Europe; foot-and-mouth disease is something happening in Europe, not here. Remember that last year we had to deal with the dioxin problems in Belgium; that didn't happen here.

Even though the level of risk is increasing, our system has been good enough in many of these areas to mitigate the risks lurking on the horizon.

The agency cannot give a 100% assurance that foot-and-mouth disease, for example, will not come to Canada, of course, but we're doing our damnedest to make sure it doesn't happen.

Mr. Rob Merrifield: Okay. Hopefully, you are. I have some questions on that, too, but maybe my colleagues would have a question or two on that.

You say foot-and-mouth disease isn't here, mad cow disease isn't here—maybe, maybe not. Something that is here is CWD in the elk industry. I'm a little concerned about some of the reports I heard this morning with regard to Saskatchewan herds, the potential for the entire provincial herd being put down.

Can you tell me what's happening there?

Dr. André Gravel: Our approach on chronic wasting disease has been very cautious.

As you probably know, when dealing with transmissible spongiform encephalopathies, TSEs—of which BSE and chronic wasting disease is another and scrapie is another—the science is not the best. So our approach has been one of extreme caution.

Six or seven years ago, in England, the ministry of agriculture said, don't worry, BSE is not transmissible to man. Unfortunately, on the basis of the science they had at the time, it was true; it is no longer true.

In the case of chronic wasting disease, the agency doesn't want to take any chances. The agency has the support of the elk industry for the action it's taking to try to stamp out chronic wasting disease as much as possible.

The problem with all these diseases, these TSEs, is the lack of a reliable test we can use on live animals. All we have are symptoms, and when the animal is showing symptoms, it's too late. The second problem is that the test must be done on the brain of the animal. Unfortunately, we can't do that while the animal is alive.

So on chronic wasting disease, our approach to animals showing signs of disease, and contact animals, has been to take them out. The possibility of wiping out the whole Saskatchewan elk population is not on the table at the present time, because it's something we haven't considered.

Mr. Rob Merrifield: Yes. It's not on the table.

Dr. André Gravel: It's not on the table at this point.

Mr. Rob Merrifield: Is this spread genetically or by contact? Do you know that?

Dr. André Gravel: There's no clear science. However, I can tell you about the possibility of this getting transmitted through the environment. The U.S. has found that out the hard way.

Chronic wasting disease is something we imported, unfortunately, from the U.S. many years ago. They depopulated a herd in one area in particular, removing all animals, and leaving the farm empty for a year. That farm had a very high level of infection, over 10%. They reintroduced animals a year later, and these animals showed symptoms of the disease.

So there's a possibility the disease is transmitted through the environment, either through a common contact surface, or maybe through soil or I don't know what. We certainly don't have a route of transmission as clear as the one for BSE, where it is felt that the disease is acquired through the consumption of animal protein.

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In the case of chronic wasting disease, it's a little more vague. We don't know yet.

The Chair: Can you hold? You're at nine minutes.

Mr. Rob Merrifield: There's not much opposition here.

The Chair: I know.

We will go to Mr. Charbonneau, and then Mr. Hilstrom.

[Translation]

Mr. Yvon Charbonneau (Anjou—Rivière-des-Prairies, Lib.): At this time, I'd like to ask the CFIA to recall for us the circumstances leading up to the embargo on Brazilian beef. What prompted you to impose this embargo and then to lift it two weeks later?

Dr. André Gravel: Thank you, Madam Chair.

That's a very interesting question. I'm happy you asked it because it gives us the opportunity to shed some light on this matter. I know the Agency has been accused of making decisions for commercial considerations. Therefore, let me quickly give you an overview of the situation.

Canada's import policy with respect to mad cow disease is as follows: countries cannot export beef to Canada unless they have been declared free of mad cow disease. This policy change came about in 1998. Prior to that date, any country that had reported cases of mad cow disease could not export to Canada. Therefore, there has been a change in policy.

Canada let it be known that it would not be satisfied simply with the fact that a country had not reported any cases of the disease. It wanted exporting countries to prove, by answering a questionnaire and undergoing an assessment, that they in fact met the standards of the International Office of Epizootics and were clear of mad cow disease. Therefore, in 1998, all countries that export beef to Canada were sent a questionnaire to complete which would allow us to assess, based on the presence of BSE or mad cow disease, the level of risk they posed.

On numerous occasions between 1998 and 2000, Canada reminded Brazil that it had yet to received any information about mad cow disease, that it was important for it to respond and if it failed to do so, the consequences would likely be quite severe. We were not overly concerned because up until then, no cases of mad cow disease had been reported in Brazil. Our concerns were, therefore, relatively minor.

What set off our warning bells and prompted us to take action quickly was an FAO report announcing that quite possibly, mad cow disease has spread beyond Europe's borders. This meant that first, there could be cases of the disease elsewhere and second, quite possibly, animal based meals had been exported from Europe to other countries.

We verified some of the data and discovered that Brazil had imported some high risk products. Later, we also learned that contrary to what it had said, Brazil had in fact imported over a ten-year period leading up to 1999 over 7,000 animals from various European countries, including France which has reported cases of mad cow disease. These two key pieces of information increased our level of concern. It was then that a decision was made to temporarily suspend exports of Brazilian products to Canada.

Only two types of Brazilian products are exported to Canada: corned beef and beef extracts, that is concentrates used in the preparation of OXO bouillon cubes and so forth.

Our colleagues at Health Canada decided to assess the risk involved and determined that because the information required to do a proper assessment was lacking, the products should be taken off the Canadian market. That is in fact what happened.

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It quickly became clear that Brazil was outraged by Canada's actions. It accused us of using the Bombardier case to take retaliatory measures against it. I can assure you that that wasn't the case at all. In fact, I find the charge somewhat ironic because Canada had received permission from the World Trade Organization to take retaliatory trade measures totaling $450 million against Brazil. What interest would the Agency have in using a roundabout way of penalizing Brazil on the trade front?

We did, however, come to the realization that the cooperation of the Brazilians was essential if we were to get the information we needed. A decision was made to send a tripartite mission - Canada/US/Mexico- to Brazil to gather the information needed to do a risk assessment. Officials proceeded to travel to Brazil.

We were most interested in learning the destination of the animals imported into the country. Another warning bell was sounded when the director of Brazil's veterinary services informed the country's media that he had no idea where these animals had ended up and asked farmers for their help in locating their whereabouts. We felt that if the country's veterinary services had no idea where to find the animals, then they could well have gotten into the food chain and been processed into meat meal. Given the lengthy incubation period of mad cow disease - five or six years - it's quite possible that even though Brazil had not reported any cases of the disease thus far, cases could come to light at a later date. I have to say that we got Brazil's attention when we took these measures. Shortly after we suspended exports, we received the information we had requested.

The multidisciplinary team that traveled to Brazil gathered the necessary information to do a risk assessment, the findings of which enabled us to move quickly to lift the embargo. As I said, our aim was not to impede trade. Rather, we were concerned about protecting Canadian consumers, not about trade figures. Once we had the information we needed, we quickly moved to make some decisions with the help of our American and Brazilian partners.

Subsequently, armed with the risk assessment data collected, we forwarded the file to our Health Canada colleagues who in turn did an assessment to determine whether the products could be put back on the shelf. Ultimately, that is what they decided to do.

The embargo was lifted, on condition Brazil meet certain requirements during the interim period and until such time as it located all of the animals in question. It should be remembered that initially, Brazil claimed to have imported 4,500 animals. Two days later, that figure had risen to 5,000 animals and still later, to 6,000 and finally to 7,000 animals. We were genuinely concerned about the situation. Personally, I wouldn't want to be the one to have to explain three years down the road that a case of mad cow disease in Canada was due to negligence on the part of the Agency. Our concern was the motivating factor in this decision.

Mr. Yvon Charbonneau: Thank you for these explanations.

From the outside looking in, it would seem that this explosive issue was just as rapidly diffused. Are there any, or should there be mechanisms in place to avoid having to take such radical steps on the basis of such flimsy evidence? Are there no warnings that can be sounded first? You dispatched a tripartite mission to Brazil. Could you not have sent it to collect the information a week earlier? Brazil seems to have been very cooperative. It's a vast country and you seem to have gotten the information you wanted about food, animals and so forth in the space of a few days. Brazilians are highly organized and things moved very quickly. Incidents like this are very disruptive to trade relations between nations.

You discussed the Brazilian situation because I put a question to you. Are there similar problems outstanding with other countries? Could we face a threat of some kind from countries like Argentina? Incidents of this nature generate considerable unrest and seriously undermine economic and political relations between nations. And, the whole matter was resolved as if nothing had ever happened.

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Is there something that could have been done or that we should consider doing to avoid this kind of uproar?

Dr. André Gravel: As I was saying, I have been working in this field for 28 years. I've extensive experience at both the provincial and federal levels in the field of food inspection and animal safety and I can say that in the course of my career, I've witnessed on a number of occasions cases where measures like the ones seen here were taken against other countries that failed to comply with food safety and animal health standards. The real change has been the growing awareness of consumers, politicians and government agencies of food safety issues.

I realize that it's not easy to come to a decision like this, but I asked myself one question. There is a known risk and this country did import animal meal as well as live animals. Do I wait a week or two, or maybe even one month? The answer was very clear to me. I would have had a difficult time defending my decision had I chosen to wait a little and to give them the benefit of the doubt, knowing full well that they had imported animals. Had we not taken action, we would have been harshly criticized for knowing a threat existed and for not taking the necessary steps to deal with the situation.

As for procedures in place to deal with mad cow disease, only a handful of countries are authorized to ship beef to Canada. They are: the United States, Argentina, Australia and New Zealand. I'm sorry, forget Argentina, because cases of foot and mouth disease have been reported in this country. However, once it has dealt with the situation, it will again be allowed, along with the four other countries mentioned, to export beef to Canada.

Is there any preventative action that we can take? In most cases, we have no choice. For example, when the decision was made to slap an embargo on Britain because of the outbreak of foot and mouth disease, we had a matter of hours to react. We had to do so very quickly. When the decision was made to extend the embargo to include all European Union countries because cases were being reported in France, Holland and Ireland, again, we couldn't sit back and wait. We needed to act quickly.

I realize that decisions like this can cause serious trade rumblings and that businesses in foreign countries suffer as a result. I also realize that certain Canadian businesses suffer as well. Canadian importers depend on foreign products. During last year's dioxin crisis, I was hounded by Canadian chocolate importers because an import ban had been imposed. I realize that circumstances aren't always pleasant for everyone, but as I mentioned in my presentation, our commitment, first and foremost, is to protecting the health of Canadians.

[English]

The Chair: Mr. Hilstrom.

Mr. Howard Hilstrom (Selkirk—Interlake, Canadian Alliance): Thank you very much.

I certainly want to see us explore foot-and-mouth and the relationship between Health Canada and CFIA, but I have a series of questions, some of which you've answered, with regard to how the departments operate when it comes to this BSE issue.

Health Canada sets the safety standards and CFIA enforces them, right?

Now, you mentioned that CFIA met with Health Canada before the ban of Brazilian beef was put in place. Who met?

Dr. André Gravel: Very clearly, the agency does not operate alone in a case like this. Suspension of importation is a decision that the agency can take itself. Brazil was not meeting our import policy requirements for exportation, or importation, in our case, of beef, so we could say “No longer, stop importation”.

Mr. Howard Hilstrom: But what criteria did you use? Did you base the decision on Health Canada's criteria, the standard set, or did you use your own criteria, the CFIA set?

Dr. André Gravel: The criteria we use come from OIE, the Office international des épizooties, which is the world's animal health standards-setting body. They have a policy on how to define freedom from BSE. This is the guideline we use for the control of importation of live animal meat.

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Given a country that has BSE, Health Canada has to decide, with regard to the assessment of which products could represent a danger, which do represent a danger and which do not. This is Health Canada's decision.

Mr. Howard Hilstrom: Okay.

In this decision-making process, CFIA went ahead and made this decision. You didn't consult Mexico or the United States. You didn't have to talk with Health Canada. You used an international standard to do this.

Why wouldn't you have talked to the United States and Mexico before you made this decision? Was it Dr. Evans who made the decision? He's been given all the credit for it. Why weren't the United States and Mexico talked to before this decision was made?

Dr. André Gravel: Thanks for asking the question, because there's something I forgot to mention. Even though I said it's a joint process, the decision-making process is clear in this case. We have an agreement with NAFTA partners that we share evaluation of countries' BSE status. Canada has South America and the U.S. has Europe. So it's up to whoever has the responsibility to make the decision.

We did consult with and inform the U.S. and Mexico in terms of our conclusion, and they agreed with it. So it's not really unilateral.

Your second question was about Dr. Evans. Dr. Evans is Chief Veterinary Officer of Canada, and these types of decisions are delegated to him from the minister. The minister is ultimately responsible for CFIA to Parliament. However, he delegates to certain civil servants the responsibility for certain actions.

Mr. Howard Hilstrom: Is it not true that the United States had no choice when presented with your conclusions, because Canada had already banned Brazilian beef? Is that not true?

Dr. André Gravel: Well—

Mr. Howard Hilstrom: Now, be careful, because Canada banned first, then the conclusions were presented to the United States. Is that how it happened?

Dr. André Gravel: I don't know how well you know our neighbours to the south, but over the last 30 years I haven't been able to influence too many of their decisions. It's pretty hard for us to say “I'm sorry, U.S., do this”.

Clearly, the reason they made that decision is that they agreed with it, not because Canada said “We made it and you have no choice”. I mean, the U.S. is a sovereign country.

Mr. Howard Hilstrom: As I understood it, the technicalities of NAFTA forced the United States to do it. Is that not true?

Dr. André Gravel: Oh, it's not as clear-cut as that.

Mr. Howard Hilstrom: Okay.

With BSE, has Health Canada come up with a standard or with scientific evidence about BSE—how it's transmitted, what standards our food supply should have in that regard—or do we just rely on this OIE? Does Health Canada have their own standard in regard to BSE?

Dr. Marc LeMaguer: The answer is that from the policy point of view, Health Canada has had in place for quite a few years now what we call the TSE team, which has a science team and a policy team. This works as well in collaboration with CFIA.

When you approach this kind of problem—and I'll get to the answer to your question—you're looking at two types of measures. The first is preventing BSE from getting in the country, because we do not have BSE in Canada, and, two, measures, when there are other types of products that can enter the food chain, to stop them along the food chain. So some of these measures have to do with animal health and import restrictions that have been in place for many years in combination with CFIA, which is the import restriction side.

The second one is to carry out, from the science point of view, an assessment of the risks that may be carried into the country by imported products if they come from BSE-affected countries.

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In here we have two categories of products that we consider. The first category would be the ones that have been directly linked from an exposure point of view and proven from a scientific perspective to be able to transmit that risk to humans, and that's the case of BSE through eating meat that would have been contaminated. Particularly, this has to do also with what are considered high-risk materials—that is, the brain and the spinal cord and very specific areas—because there were studies done from a risk assessment point of view by WHO, so at the world level, indicating that some categories of these products were not a risk when the evaluation was done. However, for the other part, as I said, the direct risk and exposure and the transmission of BSE and the resultant variant CJD, the measures in place at this time are the import measures to prevent the entrance to Canada.

Mr. Howard Hilstrom: Do you see where the member from the other side and I, and others, are so concerned about this having been a political decision as opposed to a standards decision? Corned beef does not come from any of those parts of the animal you've just mentioned. It comes from the muscle of the animal, and as a result, there doesn't appear to be any reason to have stopped that. You certainly haven't mentioned herd health as a reason.

The other thing I'll mention, seeing as my time is up, and then you can answer, is the fact that France and Britain, which are not BSE-free, have continued to send us different products that have a beef component to them. Plus we have in Canada right now water buffalo that come from a BSE-country, and they're still here. There is no banning of anything from those countries—we're trying doing it under the hormone beef issue. But do you not see that this decision to ban Brazilian beef is not being applied equitably across the BSE situation around the world?

The Chair: That's an opinion, not a question.

Mr. Howard Hilstrom: But it is a question. Is it being applied to every country that has BSE, so that we take zero cheese from France, zero lipstick from England, and zero vaccines from Britain? Is that what you're telling us?

Dr. Marc LeMaguer: What I'm telling you is that there is a list at this time, as approved by WHO, of what I call exempt products. These would relate directly to milk and milk products, and tallow and other products that may be used in the cosmetic area. As I said, these were on the exempt list, and therefore they are allowed to enter under very specific conditions, one of which is that they should not contain protein. There are all kinds of conditions attached to those.

The risk assessment that is carried out at the international level is evaluating the risk that this category of exempt products may carry as the science evolves. There is nothing at this date, no evidence related to these particular products that links them to BSE cases or variant CJD occurring in humans.

The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Hilstrom.

We'll move to Ms. Wasylycia-Leis.

Ms. Judy Wasylycia-Leis (Winnipeg North Centre, NDP): Thank you, Madam Chairperson.

The concern we raised in the past with respect to the Brazil situation has more to do with the perception and the belief that Canada in fact may not be taking the most stringent methods possible to prevent BSE or the virus that leads to mad cow disease or Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease in Canada.

My questions pertain to issues we've tried to raise before at this committee, which have not been answered by Health Canada officials and were referred to officials with the Canadian Food Inspection Agency.

I'd like to begin by asking about the first question I posed, to which I received a written answer, having to do with the World Health Organization recommendation around prohibiting the use of ruminant tissues in ruminant feed then being fed to live farm animals.

• 1625

The response you sent suggested that a 1997 amendment to the Health of Animals Act covered this requirement or this recommendation from the WHO. My reading of it doesn't leave me with that impression, and it suggests to me and to others that in fact Canada hasn't dealt with the issue of ruminant tissues fully, and that in fact we haven't taken measures to prohibit the use of tissues, blood, gelatin, or rendered fat to be put into feed that is then fed to live animals, which creates the problem, or the possibility, or the potential of mad cow disease.

I would like a further explanation and an indication as to whether or not we will be looking at following, to the letter of the law or the recommendation, the WHO guideline.

Dr. André Gravel: The World Health Organization recommendation of 1997 was certainly followed by the Canadian Food Inspection Agency in its ban. It's now illegal in Canada to feed ruminant protein back to ruminants.

There are two exceptions that have to do with animal protein being fed to ruminants. These animal proteins are pig and horse. Of course, birds are not mammalian; therefore they're exempt from the ban.

I know the EU has gone much further than that in terms of banning the use of animal protein to be fed back to animals. The main reason is that they have a big BSE problem, and I think they had big enforcement problems in terms of respecting the 1997 ruminant-to-ruminant ban. All the WHO is asking is that you don't feed cattle ruminant protein. We've done that. So clearly the agency has done its mandate in terms of that.

Whether we have to go further, clearly that is something we have to look at. As I mentioned, the science on this is very fluid. The agency is certainly willing to look at the exceptions we have now to determine whether they are still adequate protections. The WHO is still saying this is the way to go.

Ms. Judy Wasylycia-Leis: I wonder if I could pose the same question more directly.

The WHO recommendation of December 2000, as you quote in your answer back to me, says that all countries must prohibit the use of ruminant tissues in ruminant feed, and must exclude tissues that are likely to contain the BSE agent from any animal or human food chain.

From what you've told me, I don't understand that this is the case in Canada. In fact, when we're talking about any agent that could convey or transmit BSE, we are talking about the possibility of blood, gelatin, and rendered fat. We are talking about the possibility of this being carried in other animals not listed here or mentioned by you. Would it not make sense to apply the full spirit of this recommendation and take the absolute most precautionary approach possible to prevent the possibility of the spread of BSE?

Dr. André Gravel: You read it, and it's very clear that they're saying no ruminant protein being fed back to ruminants, neither bone meal nor other products that can transmit BSE.

Ms. Judy Wasylycia-Leis: Yes.

Dr. André Gravel: Dr. LeMaguer just mentioned a few minutes ago that there are products that are classified as being high risk, and those are banned from importation and from being fed to animals, and there are products that so far haven't been proven to be susceptible to transmitting BSE. So as long as the science is not evolving, we have to be guided by World Health Organization recommendations.

However, as I mentioned, we're not saying we're never going to do it. With this type of disease, you have to have a very open mind in terms of new science discovery. If there's a consensus in science that we need to go further, we certainly will. We're not closing the door to it.

• 1630

Ms. Judy Wasylycia-Leis: I hear that. I'm still worried because we know we're dealing with something that's very risky in terms of human health. We've learned that much from Great Britain and other countries.

Would it not make sense, rather than waiting for something to be proven to be the case, to take precautions now, until the science is developed to determine one way or the other? That's the precautionary approach. I'm making an appeal to you and wondering if that is in your decision-making processes now, if there's a possibility that in fact you might make this kind of decision based completely on the precautionary principles.

Dr. André Gravel: Thanks for the question.

The agency, as well as Health Canada, has a transmissible spongiform encephalopathy advisory committee. Our president established that committee about six months ago. Its goal is to guide us in terms of what science exists and what we should be doing in terms of modifying our policy. They were given the mandate to examine all our current policies on importation and to determine whether the agency should be going further.

The bulk of the research on BSE is done in Europe. We have to be guided by what they're finding out there. In regard to the issue that was raised by Mr. Hilstrom on transmission by cheese, as an example, I know that the U.K. is now redoing research to determine, or to prove again, that BSE cannot be transmitted by milk.

So in terms of precaution, as I said, we're open to this. However, I have to tell you that when we act with too much precaution we get people very upset, Brazil being a case in point. What we did in Brazil was use the precautionary principle to its limit, and we were very heavily criticized by the media and by everybody else in Canada. So we have to strike a balance between being cautious on the basis of science—and in the case of Brazil I explained what we had—and cautious for the sake of being cautious and not having anything to support it.

The Chair: We'll go now to Mr. Dromisky, please.

Mr. Stan Dromisky (Thunder Bay—Atikokan, Lib.): Thank you very much, Madam Chairperson.

I apologize to the committee for being drawn out to do something else in another committee and then returning. Maybe the kind of question I'm going to ask has already been addressed, possibly in your statement, and I apologize if the answer has to be repeated.

It's regarding the Auditor General's report and the kinds of statements he made regarding the efficiency of the inspection process, and so forth. You have your non-federally registered sector and you have the federally registered sector. Could you explain to the committee what that really means.

In the brief you presented on behalf of Health Canada, you talk about assessing the effectiveness of the agency's activities related to food safety. When I read everything, I get quite confused. Where do lines end? Where are the boundaries? There seems to be so much that's overlapping. I'm coming to the conclusion, possibly, that when it comes to assessing the effectiveness of the agency's activities, it's like me looking in the mirror and saying to myself how wonderful I am.

Am I going too far in my opinions here regarding how this effectiveness is being judged, when there's such great overlap in so many areas that have been identified for food inspection, especially when you talk about those that are federally registered and non-federally registered? Am I making sense?

Dr. André Gravel: Absolutely. You're making perfect sense, and I'm glad that question was asked in terms of what is the difference between registered and non-registered. This is the only thing we disagreed on with the Auditor General in his report, the business of what the agency's mandate was with regard to coverage of registered and non-registered establishments.

• 1635

The agency has acts and regulations to guide its activities. An example is the Meat Inspection Act. The Meat Inspection Act is a trade and commerce act that allows the agency to register establishments and to provide inspection service on the basis of meeting certain standards. As an example, the temperature in meat processing rooms has to be 10 degrees centigrade or below. This is a requirement of the regulations. So our inspection has to do with making sure that all of the specific regulations are met, and on that basis we register it and we maintain it as a registered establishment. This plant is now allowed to ship interprovincially and internationally. This is a requirement under the confederation of Canada.

The non-registered sector is a bit different. Under the Food and Drugs Act and regulations, the agency has a mandate that goes beyond the registered establishments. We're responsible for inspection at the retail level and we're responsible to take action in the case of emergencies. A recall is an example. If the agency, through its inspection of bakeries, or through consumer complaints, finds out that there is, as an example, an allergen in a product, the product has to be recalled, regardless of the origin of that product. Whether it's registered or non-registered, the agency has the responsibility and we do it.

The basic difference is we have no mandate in our legislation, from the Food and Drugs Act, the Meat Inspection Act, the Fish Inspection Act, the Canada Agricultural Products Act, or any of the acts, to register facilities that are not registered. If a facility is non-registered, we have no legal mandate to go there and inspect and maintain a registration process.

So our activity there has to do with, first of all, emergency management. If there's a problem, we're going to take action. Secondly, we evaluate the risk in certain areas and focus our limited inspection to those establishments that we think represent a high risk. As an example, there were quite a few cases of E. coli 0157:H7 in fermented sausage in B.C. The agency has changed its policies for registered establishments to take care of that to make sure these bugs are eliminated, but we also put that as a priority in the non-registered sector. So in the limited number of non-registered plants we're going to be inspecting, we will focus, as an example, on plants that do fermented sausage because we consider that to be a high risk.

In terms of the thought that the agency has a mandate to inspect each and every one of these facilities, we don't know how many there are, first of all. This is somebody who is curing ham in his basement in Toronto. This is somebody who is selling hot dogs in front of the liquor store on Rideau Street. This is somebody who is stuffing sausages in his garage. This is someone who has a bakery operation. There are tens of thousands of these establishments, and we think that if the agency were to take over an inspection program that is as intense as what we have for registered establishments, I think we'd have to take over the whole civil service, and that wouldn't be enough.

There's another element of responsibility in that file and it's provinces. Provinces have the responsibility for inspecting food establishments that do not enter into interprovincial trade. So clearly they have a responsibility, and we cooperate with them. We're developing codes with them. We have, as an example, a dairy code we developed in conjunction with the provinces that gives a baseline inspection standard. Provinces are free to adopt that by reference, and it results in the milk being produced in Saskatchewan being of the same safety as milk produced in Quebec or Ontario, etc.

So we have a mandate there to encourage the development of these things, and this is the second initiative after the creation of the agency. The agency was created, one, to put all the federal inspection together, and, second, to develop a relationship with provinces so that there's a uniform level of inspection in all provinces.

• 1640

Mr. Stan Dromisky: Is that only for products that have crossed the border?

Dr. André Gravel: No. A product that crosses the border is coming from registered establishments only.

Mr. Stan Dromisky: Okay.

Dr. André Gravel: However, as I said, the milk code and the meat code were developed in conjunction with the provinces so that they would have a guide that eventually would result in a uniform level of safety.

With regard to your question about Health Canada and the CFIA and saying we all look good, I agree with that. I like to look good myself.

However, I think it's very clear what the difference is, and that existed even before the agency was created. Health Canada has always been the standard setter on food inspection. The creation of the agency changed nothing in that. What it has changed is that Health Canada also had some inspection resources that they were using to cover the non-federal registered sector. We imported those resources and shipped to Health Canada the resources we had, for example in our Guelph lab, which was doing food safety research. So there's a clear delineation between who the standard setter is and who the deliverer is.

Health Canada is also evaluating the effectiveness of the agency, and they've done that on many occasions since its creation. They've looked at fish inspection and the way we do recalls. They're in the process of completing an assessment on fresh fruit and vegetables, aquaculture, etc. The objective is that, apart from the Auditor General, who also has a mandate to look at our efficiency and effectiveness, there's someone who is independent, a standard setter, looking at how effective we are in delivering our system.

Mr. Stan Dromisky: Thank you very much. That was a very comprehensive response.

The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Dromisky.

We'll go to Madam Ablonczy now, please.

Mrs. Diane Ablonczy (Calgary—Nose Hill, Canadian Alliance): I understand the difficult position the agency is in. Very often you're kind of damned if you do and damned if you don't.

You're probably well aware, as we are as elected representatives, that there's a high degree of anxiety in cattle-producing country about the possibility of foot-and-mouth disease striking somewhere in Canada. Of course, the agriculture sector has already been devastated by low grain prices. If we have a mass slaughter of our cattle, as has happened in Britain, it would not be a pretty picture.

As my colleague already mentioned, we know that the Auditor General is suggesting that there's not adequate resourcing in the department to do the inspections and the oversight that would be necessary in light of this threat. This is the Auditor General's opinion, and we do take him seriously. We also know that this is a disease that's very easily carried, and people move in and out of our country massively.

As someone who was elected to represent people in this country, many of whom have written to me and to members of all parties, I want to ask, how confident are you that you're able to protect us from this? Is there anything you can say to set these very serious concerns at rest so that we won't find ourselves in the kind of tragic situation we see in Britain and other countries now?

Dr. André Gravel: Thank you for the question. I've already covered briefly the issue of resources, but maybe I should go over again what I said and maybe add a few nuances. Remember that the Auditor General's office did its audit two years ago. The findings that are reported now are on the basis of what happened about a year and a half or two years ago. Since the creation of the agency, we've increased the number of front-line staff by about 11%.

Mrs. Diane Ablonczy: Just one minute. I understand that the report was released in December 2000, so it was more recent than two years ago.

• 1645

Dr. André Gravel: Yes, but remember that the report itself is done on the basis of an audit that had to be done before that. The report was tabled then, but the actual audit of the agency was done a year and a half before that.

Mrs. Diane Ablonczy: Okay, I understand. Thank you.

Dr. André Gravel: In 1997, at a meeting of the Standing Committee on Agriculture, our president said, and I agree with him, that we had increased our front-line staff by about 11%. It's not the end of the world, but it is still significant.

The issue of whether we have enough resources to deal with foot-and-mouth disease if it comes here is an important one. It's very difficult to staff an organization at a level of the biggest emergency. You're going to have a lot of firefighters playing cards and reading the papers while there is no emergency. So we have to find the balance between how many resources we need to deal with the majority of emergencies, without having too many people sitting idle waiting for that to happen, and where we draw the line in terms of whether we are too low and that represents too much of a risk.

We feel that at the present time we're okay. Keep in mind as well that if foot-and-mouth disease were to enter Canada, which we all hope it won't, we could count on partners, for example, private practitioners. We've established contact with the Canadian Veterinary Medical Association to make its membership aware of what foot-and-mouth disease is, because, potentially, they will be the first to discover it. A practising vet goes on a farm and he sees the lesions. Not many of the vets I know have seen foot-and-mouth disease. The last time we had it here was in 1952, so we'd need an awfully old vet to still remember that, and we don't have too many of those, except for me. Sending that information to them to make them aware that this is coming and here are the lesions and all that is a way for us to expand our resource base.

Mrs. Diane Ablonczy: Have you done that?

Dr. André Gravel: We have done that. We've also communicated with the provinces in terms of what role the veterinarians in the provinces could play on the file. So there is some help there.

As I mentioned, the agency is in the process of being reviewed by Treasury Board for its A-base resources and whether we have enough resources to do everything. We're hoping this will result in additional resources for the agency.

I know that foot-and-mouth disease is dangerous, and I know that agriculture is very important for Canada's economy. I also know that agriculture is very important for the producers and the farmers.

Some of our staff have been over there, and one of them will testify tomorrow before the Standing Committee on Agriculture in terms of the impact this has had on a farming community. It's just awful. It's devastation. One person committed suicide not too long ago. The poor person had a beef herd and it got BSE. His whole herd was wiped out. He said, “I'm not going to get caught at this again. I'm going to start raising sheep.” His sheep got foot-and-mouth disease, and that was enough. The devastation caused by that disease is not only economic. Some of these animals are pets. Think how you would react if somebody said, “We're sorry, but we're going to have to take your dog away.”

I know all that, and everybody in the agency knows all that as well. That's why we take that very seriously and are doing everything we can, along with our partner organizations, DND, Customs and Revenue Canada, Citizenship and Immigration Canada, and every partner, to make sure we do as much as we can on that.

Mrs. Diane Ablonczy: Thank you, Madam Chair.

The Chair: Thank you, Madam Ablonczy.

Mr. Castonguay.

[Translation]

Mr. Jeannot Castonguay (Madawaska—Restigouche, Lib.): Thank you, Madam Chair. Thank you as well to our invited guests.

I sympathize a great deal with you, given the difficult job you have to do. In your field of expertise, there are no absolutes. Often, the risks are theoretical and people are looking for scientific proof.

How do you weight theoretical risk versus scientific proof? Surely you rely on weighting factors. How do you proceed?

• 1650

Dr. Marc LeMaguer: I'll use the example of mad cow disease to illustrate how we approach the problem from a scientific standpoint. We do so in two ways. On the one hand, we have the animal, and on the other, the human being. We try to determine how the disease is transmitted, either to animals or to humans, or from one to the other. While we work in three different fields of scientific knowledge, the main thing we try to determine is the transmission vector.

As such, it's possible to arrive at a number of conclusions based on scientific evidence, which is fairly clear in the case of the animal. As a result, measures were taken to deal with the way animals are fed. Thus, we were able to manage part of the problem.

As far as humans are concerned, a similar process was followed at Health Canada. A number of measures were taken to address the problem of blood transfusions or direct human contact, not contact between animals and humans, but between humans. We were able to put in place measures to prevent contamination from humans who might have been carriers. This still has to do with the way the disease is transmitted.

Persons who have spent time in England or in France are restricted when it comes to donating blood in order to reduce the risk of transmitting the disease through blood transfusions.

Another preventative measure involves surgical instruments. As you know, there are different categories of CJD. There are classic strains, which are normally present genetically in the general population, as well as variants. A patient in a hospital may exhibit symptoms and since this is a communicable disease, certain procedures are followed. When a patient is identified as a carrier of the classic strain, preventive steps are taken to treat and decontaminate everything that has come in contact with the person in question. Arrangements to handle this situation are already in place.

In transplant cases, some material may have come into contact with a carrier of the disease. Not only must it be treated, but any surgical instruments that may have been used must be discarded.

All of these measures have been put in place. We didn't wait to act. On the animal side of the equation, steps have been taken to prevent infection of the livestock through feed sources.

In terms of transmission of the disease from animals to humans, scientifically speaking, cases of transmission are not documented. All we know right now is that there is a link between high risk products and persons who consume these products.

Furthermore, from an epidemiological standpoint, if you consider the number of infected animals in Europe and the number of humans who have been infected, you will see that the contamination rate is extremely low. Therefore, it would appear that the disease is not transmitted that easily. Nevertheless, since those infected face sure death, we mustn't let our guard down. It's not so much the exposure to risk as it is the fact that the disease is fatal. These two factors are very different.

• 1655

From that standpoint, science is not as advanced as it is on the animal side of the equation. I'm talking about vectors for transmitting the disease to humans through contaminated products. To address the issue of risk, we took steps to prevent the transmission of the disease from one human being to another. As far as animals are concerned, we looked at a range of products that are likely transmission vectors and took appropriate action. However, as things now stand, we do not have the scientific evidence to make statements with clear certainty. Therefore, we have put in place temporary measures in order to manage the situation.

There are two separate sides to this issue, animals and human beings. The critical issue is the interface between the two. However, we have little documented proof of transmission of the disease from animals to humans, except in the case of BSE from meat or contaminated products.

Mr. Jeannot Castonguay: I have a question for Dr. Gravel. You stated the following in your presentation:

We have continued to achieve success with our provincial/territorial partners in harmonizing inspection services [...]

Further on, you specifically mention a Canada/Ontario MOU signed in October and a partnership agreement with Alberta signed in March. Where do things stand with the other provinces? Has any progress been made in harmonizing services to avoid duplication and to ensure that no one falls between the cracks? Can you give us an overview of the current situation?

Dr. André Gravel: With your permission, I'd like to ask Peter Brackenridge to field that question.

[English]

Mr. Peter Brackenridge (Vice-President, Programs, Canadian Food Inspection Agency): Thank you, Madam Chair.

Yes, I think we've made very good progress with a number of provinces. Dr. Gravel's statement makes reference to the Canadian food inspection system, which is our effort to develop national standards. Starting from east to west, we've had an agreement signed with Prince Edward Island. We've had discussions with New Brunswick, Newfoundland, and Nova Scotia, and there are active discussions going on now. We have a very strong document, an MOU, created with the Province of Quebec. Ontario was already mentioned. Discussions are ongoing with Manitoba. We have a signed MOU with Saskatchewan and Alberta, and with British Columbia there are discussions going on as well.

Part of the complexity is that, depending upon the province, it can sometimes be the ministry of agriculture and sometimes the ministry of health that is involved—sometimes both. So we have really deferred to the province to indicate to us which groups they would like to be signatories to these arrangements. But the intent is very much as the member has stated, to try to avoid having things fall between chairs when it comes to responsibilities. It's quite a complex area, but we've been very appreciative of the cooperation that's been received from the provinces.

The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Castonguay.

The final speaker in the first round will be Mr. Lunney. When that is finished, I have a couple of instrumental issues to talk to the committee about, and I have three people who would like to participate in a second round. I would like to put the organizational message on the table between the first and the second rounds, if you don't mind.

Mr. Lunney.

Mr. James Lunney (Nanaimo—Alberni, Canadian Alliance): I wanted to pick up on an earlier comment regarding exceptions made with pig and horse. Was it that pig and horse are actually used in ruminant feed as well? Are they exceptions that are allowed?

Dr. André Gravel: They're allowed to be used, yes, and that's on the basis of a recommendation from the World Health Organization. These types of proteins so far, as Dr. LeMaguer has said, have not resulted in the transmission of BSE.

Mr. James Lunney: It's kind of surprising in a way. It makes you wonder when we're feeding ruminants animal products. The mad cow disease, I understand, started with sheep and eventually came into cows, and we fed them ground-up sheep protein. It makes you wonder about the wisdom. Viruses are very specific for their species, but if we continue to feed them products from other animals, of course, they are able to adapt eventually. It makes us wonder if we're not cultivating other disasters in the future by doing this. But I thank you for clarifying that.

• 1700

With the BSE, there were questions raised that we slaughter our animals in Canada at an earlier age than they do in Europe, for instance, and that perhaps we're missing animals, because we slaughter them before clinical science comes on. Could you comment on that? Is that a factor?

Dr. André Gravel: The majority of cattle in Canada are beef cattle—that's your roast beef, Sunday night type of beef. These animals die at approximately 24 months of age, so it is true that normally you wouldn't see signs of BSE in these types of animals. That's the vast majority of Canada's cattle production. There is, however, another segment of cattle production that is the dairy sector—and dairy cows tend to have a longer life—and also animals in the beef sector involved in reproduction. The fathers and the mothers of the meat animals live longer as well.

In our sampling for BSE—because we do sample brains of animals—we focus on those older animals. So in theory, if there was BSE in Canada, the likelihood of finding it in a two-year-old or an eighteen-year-old steer is very remote. However, in that animal's parents, if they're five, six, seven, or eight years old, you have a chance of finding it. You'd also have a chance of finding it in dairy cattle at the end of their milking career.

Our sampling focuses on animals that show nervous symptoms. As an example, any brain sample of an animal that is sent for rabies—rabies is a nervous system disease—but doesn't show rabies, has something else wrong with it. We test them for BSE. We also test what we call donor animals, animals that can't walk or something like that, because it is in those older, diseased animals that you're going to have a chance of finding it. We're also expanding now into “normal looking animals”, older animals, just to make sure these animals are not incubating the disease and haven't started showing the disease.

Mr. James Lunney: Thank you. Can you give us an indication of the number of inspections being done of brains of slaughtered animals currently?

Dr. André Gravel: The OIE—that's the world standard-setting organization in animal health—recommends that a country the size of Canada take between 500 and 600. So far, in combination with our provincial partners, we have tested anywhere between 900 and 1,200 per year.

Mr. James Lunney: A final question on this in this round is to do with Health Canada's role in regard to vaccines for foot-and-mouth disease for the animals. Does Health Canada have a role in approving them, or is that done through the Department of Agriculture or somebody else? Does Canadian Food Inspection do it?

Dr. André Gravel: Health Canada reviews applications for veterinary drugs. The bureau of veterinary drugs licences drugs used in animals, whether they're hormones or antibiotics. The agency reviews applications for vaccines—what we call veterinary biologics and test kits. So it's our responsibility to review and approve these types of vaccines.

Mr. James Lunney: Thank you.

The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Lunney.

As promised, I'd like to bring a couple of things to the committee members' attention, and I would ask our guests to give us these few minutes.

I want to remind you that tomorrow from 10 a.m. until 12 p.m. in room 200 we will be having Dr. Hudson as a guest speaker—this was arranged by the Alliance Party, and they invited all members of the Standing Committee on Health and the Standing Committee on Industry, because it is about reproductive technology. Seeing that we know we're going to have to do some work in that area, we felt this might be a good introduction for everybody. Our meeting has been shrunk to one hour. It will begin at 12 p.m. in this room, so you'll just have to come down the hall and probably through that room behind us. To remind you, it is the second meeting of our estimates review. We're going to go over the plans and priorities of the government. We will have people from Health Canada to take us through that.

• 1705

I have a little problem in that we have not yet passed a motion for our next bit of budget money with which we need to operate. We did not have a sufficient quorum today to pass that motion. So I'm going to alert everybody that at 12 noon tomorrow at the outset of that meeting we will do that budget motion. I did go to the liaison committee and they were kind enough to...it says “That the Standing Committee on Health be granted an operational budget in the amount of $37,900.00...conditional to the approval by the Committee....”

So they approved our budget prior to us. We have to pass it by the end of this week for their motion to hold.

Just one more little report. There have been some complaints there about the way some committees have been handling things. I asked if we were on the list and they said no. So I'm grateful. Thanks very much.

Mrs. Diane Ablonczy: Nothing controversial here so far.

The Chair: No, maybe that's it. I don't know, but whatever it is, I want everybody to have a good time.

Now we have Mr. Merrifield, Mr. Charbonneau, and Ms. Wasylycia-Leis. They have asked to have another go at these witnesses. It's 5:05 so we don't have too much time. I ask you to keep it fairly brief.

Mr. Merrifield.

Mr. Rob Merrifield: Well, we're having a great time, but this is a very important issue that we're dealing with. I want to go back to foot-and-mouth. You're suggesting to us that we're doing everything possible to avoid this disease coming into Canada, which I certainly hope we're doing.

I was speaking with a pharmaceutical company that deals strictly with the vaccines. I asked them whether they felt we're doing an appropriate job of it, because they deal with attacking viruses all the time. Their number one comment to me was that if we're doing a foot bath at the airports, it certainly should be done on the other side of the ocean before they get on the plane rather than on this side. There should be complete sterilization of the clothing coming through the airports.

I certainly do have some questions. I have a tremendous number of constituents who have phoned and commented to me about their experience coming across the ocean in this last month or so. Can you assure me that everything possible is being done? An ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure at this stage of the game.

Dr. André Gravel: Thanks for the question. We think we're doing everything we can. There's always a possibility of doing better. However, I agree with you that if we could have foreign countries do the disinfection in the country of origin before travellers come here, that would be much better. However, the agency certainly doesn't have the legal mandate to impose that. It's something that would increase our developed protection.

Mr. Rob Merrifield: Just on that, have you asked for that?

Dr. André Gravel: No, we haven't. It's something we can consider doing. As I said, we have a task force that's looking at improving the system. Certainly it's something we can do.

People see the foot bath as being the only measure that is in place, and they're saying, oh my God, if that's all there is, then what about the other shoes in their suitcase, and what about the rest of it. The foot bath is just a cherry on the cake. Underneath that you have a big cake of import prohibitions of animals and animal products coming in. You have the whole public relations campaign that the agency is doing in terms of making sure the public knows there's a danger of bringing the disease here. You have the agency's recall of certain products that it considers to be products at risk. You have the detector dogs at the airport that verify the luggage of people coming in to ensure they're not carrying—whether inadverently or not—products that are susceptible to carrying the disease.

• 1710

You have as well the precautionary measure that the agency has taken with the military people, for example. You all know we turned back a boat yesterday. The boat left because we were not satisfied that the conditions that we had indicated were being met. So the foot bath is there, but there are many things underneath.

We're planning to have ads in the papers to warn people who are going to Europe about foot-and-mouth disease. We're going to have cards to be distributed by customs officers when people are coming in. We're developing videos to be shown on planes when people are landing. We are putting in place many measures to ensure that the disease does not come in.

Can we do more? Maybe. This is what we're trying to find out. We're constantly improving the way we're handling this. As I said, we have many partners on it.

Mr. Rob Merrifield: Okay. I guess it concerns me that some of these measures you're talking about are just being implemented now. This disease has been there since February. Some of the people who have talked to me who have come over have had absolutely no indication that there was a disease or a problem whatsoever.

The thing that concerns me.... That's fine, we're trying to work together. This isn't a partisan issue whatsoever. Believe me, if this gets into Canada, it's something—and I don't have to tell you. You can tell me the devastation it could cause.

Have you harnessed up the communication necessary to have the ability to stop this right at the farm gate as a final defence? Because those are the people who are talking to me saying nobody has contacted them and they don't know what to do. To me, that's our best defence in a sense. It shouldn't be our first defence, but it should be a plan B. I don't see it happening yet.

Dr. André Gravel: You mean speaking to producers and so on? I know in Alberta, as an example, the agency is and will be participating in town hall meetings, to which producers will be invited. Through the producers' associations, we're disseminating as much as possible the information about the disease itself. There's always something more you can do. But as I said, we're doing our best at the present time to ensure that the message gets carried to the producers.

Previously, I said the vets would be the first to find out. In fact I lied. The producers would probably find out before. So it's important that these people have the information. We're planning to do our best to put it in their hands.

Mr. Rob Merrifield: Yes. So what you're suggesting is that it's just now starting—to have a series of meetings in Alberta.

Dr. André Gravel: Yes.

Mr. Rob Merrifield: I'm wondering whether it's too little too late—or could potentially be—at the speed this thing is going, and whether we should be much more aggressive in the communication. I happen to live in Alberta. I haven't heard of this yet. As a member of Parliament, I find that it makes me uneasy if I haven't heard about it, and I'm getting phone calls probably more than anyone on this.

Dr. André Gravel: I take your point certainly. We're going to try to expand as much as possible our public relations.

As I said, we have something planned. Something I forgot to mention is this. Foot-and-mouth disease didn't come to the surface in 2000-2001. Foot-and-mouth disease has been around for an awfully long time. Canada has had a trading relationship with Europe before this fear of foot-and-mouth disease. China, Taiwan, and the Netherlands—all these countries had foot-and-mouth disease.

So what we're doing now is way beyond what we used to do in terms of mitigating the risk of introduction of that disease into Canada. We've been doing it for years and nobody knew about it. As an example, people would come to the airport and we would seize a little bit of sausage. They'd say “Well, why are you doing that? I'm German and my grandparents ate that stuff. It's not dangerous. It's perfectly safe. I've been raised on it.” They would not understand that we're doing it for animal disease reasons.

So all these things were done below the surface somewhere without public awareness. What precipitated it to the surface is the extent to which it's happening in the U.K. But we've done stuff before; we're not starting now.

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Mr. Rob Merrifield: No, and I understand that. I don't want to cut you off, but I have only a few minutes and I want to make the best of it.

I hope you're trying to do everything you possibly can. You're assuring Canadians that you are, and I'm sure you're trying to. I would encourage you to do even more. I see areas that are falling through the cracks, and I've addressed that.

If it happens that we get it—let's go to that stage—are we prepared to address the problem here? What I see happening in England, where they scorch the carcass and bury it in a massive grave, makes me very nervous. I see all the body fluids and so on potentially getting into water sources, and I'm very nervous about that type of approach to dealing with the problem.

I don't know, can you see a problem with that? What would you do if it happened here?

Dr. André Gravel: Is that a broad question or a very specific question about the burying of animals?

Mr. Rob Merrifield: I would like to hit them both.

The Chair: Short answer, please.

Dr. André Gravel: The short answer is that there are two ways to dispose of animal carcasses. We can burn them or we can bury them. The U.K. has had a significant problem in terms of burying some animals. I think two days ago they had to take them out because of what you just said, a leaking into the phreatic nap. You have to be very careful.

Are we ready if it came here? We are. I'm not saying we could control it very easily, or that it would be a piece of cake. I can't say that.

Last fall we had an exercise with the U.S. and Mexico to determine how ready we are. It was a theoretical exercise to find out whether we had the right connections with everybody and could solicit the participation of the RCMP, DND, and Emergency Preparedness Canada.

So we do have a plan. From that standpoint, we're ready. We have a good plan.

How will this thing play? It's hard to tell. Britain lost it because of the sheep. This thing started at a pig farm, and pigs are known to cause great multiplications of the virus. A pig can produce millions of viral particles in a day. All of this is sent into the environment.

Sheep movement in Britain is totally uncontrolled. Sheep are all over the place. A sheep that is in London today could be somewhere else tomorrow. As well, sheep don't show signs of the disease. You could have a sheep that has the disease but no sign of it, and they move. Sheep moved from here to there to here, and by the time they found out, it was all over the place. We're fortunate in Canada not to have a big sheep population in close proximity to farms, but we do have high concentrations of animals in many areas.

The Chair: Thank you, Dr. Gravel

Do you have a short question, Mr. Charbonneau?

Mr. Yvon Charbonneau: Yes.

The Chair: A short answer, please.

[Translation]

Mr. Yvon Charbonneau: I'd like to know if the Agency has any jurisdiction over genetically modified organisms. Does it have responsibility for monitoring GMOs? Pesticides are used on the fruit and vegetables imported from various countries around the world. How do you monitor the situation to ensure food safety here in Canada? Do you travel to these countries? Do you monitor these products upon their arrival?

[English]

Dr. André Gravel: Madam Chair, I'll answer the first part of the question,

[Translation]

and, if I may, I will ask Peter Brackenridge to provide a brief response to the second part of the question.

To begin with, the Agency is responsible for evaluating genetically modified organisms in terms of their impact on the environment and in terms of how they are used for farm animals. Health Canada is responsible for evaluating the risk GMOs pose to human health.

[English]

Mr. Peter Brackenridge: Madam Chair, with regard to pesticide monitoring, we have quite a comprehensive system for monitoring fruits and vegetables coming into Canada. We've averaged in the neighbourhood of 10,000 samples a year.

We have three phases to the approach. One is the monitoring approach to determine basic levels of compliance with the standards as set by Health Canada.

If there's a problem there, we could move into a surveillance phase, which means we would check the next five loads if we found any residues that were beyond the standards set for Canadian product.

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Then we would go into a compliance phase whereby the importer would have to demonstrate to us compliance with Canadian standards from a recognized laboratory, if we found that degree of problem.

But we've had a very high compliance rate. I believe compliance with federal standards has been in the neighbourhood of 98%.

The Chair: Ms. Wasylycia-Leis, a very short question. We have about two minutes.

Ms. Judy Wasylycia-Leis: I have four short questions and just need answers of yes or no.

One, did Canada import British meat and bone meal in the 1990s, after it had been identified as a likely cause of mad cow disease?

Dr. André Gravel: No.

Ms. Judy Wasylycia-Leis: Could Dr. Dodds, or someone from Health Canada, table for us a copy of the Health Canada study that raises concerns about the length of time for incubation of mad cow disease, as recently reported in the media?

Dr. Marc LeMaguer: Yes.

Ms. Judy Wasylycia-Leis: Thank you.

Three, is it possible that deer and elk now killed on our highways are actually slaughtered, rendered, and entered into the feed that goes to live animals?

Dr. André Gravel: There's a very remote chance.

Ms. Judy Wasylycia-Leis: Is it now possible, under present regulations, for cow blood to actually get into the feed that goes to live animals?

Dr. André Gravel: Yes.

Ms. Judy Wasylycia-Leis: Finally, relating to the question asked by my colleague around pigs and horses, have you looked at a study that was done in Britain, and reported by Michael Hansen with the consumers' union in the United States, I believe, documenting how a pig injected with brain material from a mad cow contracted TSE?

Dr. André Gravel: I haven't seen the study, but I'm sure our TSE experts in the agency have seen it.

Ms. Judy Wasylycia-Leis: Thank you.

The Chair: Thank you very much, ladies and gentlemen, with a special thank you to our guests. You really answered a lot of questions today and gave us a lot of content to think about.

This meeting is now adjourned.