AAND Committee Meeting

STANDING COMMITTEE ON ABORIGINAL AFFAIRS AND NORTHERN DEVELOPMENT

COMITÉ PERMANENT DES AFFAIRES AUTOCHTONES ET DU DÉVELOPPEMENT DU GRAND NORD

EVIDENCE

[Recorded by Electronic Apparatus]

Thursday, November 19, 1998

• 0924

[Translation]

The Chairman (Mr. Guy St-Julien (Abitibi—Baie James—Nunavik, Lib.)): We will get our meeting underway.

Seated on your left are the members of the Liberal Party, and on your right, the members of the opposition parties. The representatives of the Bloc Québécois apologize for not being here this morning. They had other meetings scheduled. They asked me to apologize to the people from Nunavik.

The order of the day reads as follows: Pursuant to Standing Order 108(2), a study of Aboriginal economic development.

Today we will be hearing from our Inuit friends from Nunavik, which is located in northern Quebec. These people represent a great community, one that is really involved in the economy of Quebec and Canada. The Aboriginal people are genuinely involved in the economy, because everything that goes to Nunavik is purchased in the south.

• 0925

We are pleased to welcome today from the Makivik Corporation, Pita Aatami, Johnny Peters, second Vice-President and Robbie Tookalook. Johny Adams and Jean Dupuis will also take part in the meeting. Pita, are there any other people seated behind you, who are also from Nunavik, whom you would like to introduce?

[English]

Mr. Pita Aatami (President, Makivik Corporation): I will quickly introduce you to some of the people who are going to be speaking today who are not in the front: Sam Silverstone, our lawyer; Mark T. Gordon; George Koneak; Tommy Cain; Davidee Niviaxie; and Michael Gordon. And we're going to have two people translating for our two unilingual Inuks who will be speaking today in front of the standing committee. Also with us is Serge Déry. Those are the people who are going to be speaking today in front of you.

[Translation]

The Chairman: Robbie Tookalook and the interpreters may sit with you.

[English]

Sit down just over there. Take a chair.

Mr. Pita Aatami: Anthony is also our treasurer for Makivik Corporation and he's also mayor of one of our communities. He's going to be translating too.

[Translation]

The Chairman: Pissiti marialuk. That means superstar in English. Is that correct, Jean?

A voice: That means he is good.

[English]

The Chairman: Do you have a statement, Mr. Pita Aatami?

Mr. Pita Aatami: Thank you very much.

As you said in your introductions, I am Pita Aatami, newly elected president of Makivik Corporation, representing 8,884 people. There are 8,885 of us up there, but I'm here today representing the Inuit. I'm also going to be working in conjunction with people from KRG when we make our presentations.

Thank you for giving us this opportunity to speak to you about our concerns, about the issues we are going to be addressing today. We're going to be talking about six issues that affect us today, which we have been working on for the last twenty years basically. Some issues are new. These issues we're going to be talking about were signed off on in 1975 as obligations by the federal government under the James Bay agreement, but up to today we haven't been successful in implementing these different issues we're going to be talking about.

We're going to talk right through the six issues first, and as we talk through the six issues we would like you to take notes if you want to ask questions after we've first made the six issues known. What we're thinking is if I go on housing, it may take an hour, and a half-hour question period, so I want to be given an opportunity to speak about all the issues first before there are any questions. That way we get all our issues known.

As you are MPs here representing different parties, I am also representing the Inuit. As you all know, we have issues that affect us on a day-to-day basis. You also have these problems. But as committee members appointed to look at the concerns of the aboriginal people you have a mandate to look, to listen, and make recommendations that could make these issues a reality for us, so that we can finally start seeing something out of the James Bay agreement on housing, for example, or marine infrastructure or taxation. These are issues that were signed off on in 1975, that were an obligation made by the federal government, but up to today there hasn't been any movement on them. That's why we're appearing in front of your committee to get help from you, to make sure the different ministers are aware of these problems.

• 0930

We've travelled a long way to come and make this presentation. We don't take why we're here today very lightly. We know that you can make the difference through your committee for what we want to work on. As I said, it's been a long time that we've been working on these issues.

When you sign off on an agreement, you expect somebody to implement that agreement. But up to today, we've had a hard time getting the agreement implemented. We've had to spend our own money to make sure that what was signed off on is implemented. We end up spending our own dollars to try to convince the government.

As a lot of you probably know by now, Inuit are taxpayers like any other Canadian living in Canada. At the time of the signing of the James Bay agreement, the Inuit had the option of going through the reserve route, but they opted to go for the municipality route and be able to pay taxes, thinking that they would have more strength being taxpayers. But we don't see that today. We see our fellow natives, who are non-taxpayers, getting all the benefits, taking the governments to court and reaping all the benefits—getting the housing program, for example.

So there are two different societies, two native societies: one is a taxpayer and one is a non-taxpayer, and one is benefiting more in not being a taxpayer. We just envy our fellow natives that they are non-taxpayers. We just wish we had that opportunity. Unfortunately, we don't.

As I said, there are going to be ten people speaking in front of this committee. What we're going to be talking about is housing, the housing crisis we're in today; marine infrastructure that we had signed off on, and we'll give you a brief history of where this is now; offshore claims; taxation; the Kuujjuaq airport; the year 2001-2002 and the NAV CANADA fees. These are the six we want to talk to you about today.

As I said, you're MPs, and when you're elected you have usually a platform you work on, so you well understand what we're talking to you about. As I said, you are committee members appointed by the government to hear the concerns of aboriginal people and to make sure the recommendations you come out with are implemented.

I won't talk that much further, but I would just want to say one other thing. The Inuit, historically, have been federalists. We've always voted in all the federal elections and we've always tried to show the Canadian flag. But we wonder sometimes if we are doing the right thing when we're never heard. We don't even have a presence of a federal office in our part of the world. We are part of Canada, but we've been left out all this time.

I want to make sure you understand the situation that, as I said, we are taxpayers, we are Canadians, we also have problems such as every other Canadian has, but it's doubly so where we live. The harshness, the climate.... And when you look at the little economy we have up there, as Guy said, we are helping out the Canadian economy. For anything that happens up there, I'd say 99% of it goes back to the Canadian economy, and most of it to the southern economy. Everything is imported to our world. There's nothing produced up there, so we have to bring everything from the south. People might think they're spending too much on the native people, but we don't see it that way. All this money is spent here, but all the benefits go back down south. So we don't buy this argument any more that natives are benefiting from this.

As I said, we are taxpayers. I'm going to keep reiterating that we are taxpayers like you people here today, and I want to make sure that everybody knows it in Canada. We're always lumped together with our fellow natives as non-taxpayers, but it's not the case.

There are two or three different Inuit groups in Canada: the Labrador Inuit, the Nunavut Inuit, and the Nunavik Inuit. I want to make sure you understand the distinction between Nunavut Inuit, which is Northwest Territories, and Nunavik Inuit.

• 0935

You've probably been hearing a lot about April 1, 1999. There's going to be a new Nunavut government. Unfortunately, we are not part of that. We envy the people. We're happy for the people who are going to have their own government. That is something we're also striving for.

I'm getting a little bit too far, so I'm going to start by introducing Johnny Adams, the chairman of KRG, who's going to be speaking about housing. He can introduce other people who will be speaking about housing.

Thank you very much for giving me and our corporation the opportunity to be able to make a presentation to you today.

The Chairman:

[Speaks in witnesses' native language]. Johnny.

Mr. Johnny Adams (Chairman, Housing, Kativik Regional Government):

[Witness speaks in his native language]. Thank you.

Like Peter, I'd like to thank you for giving us the opportunity to address areas of concern for us. I'm going to be talking about a subject that just won't go away until it's been addressed. We've repeated our concerns about our housing shortage situation over the past few years to many ministers and bureaucrats, and basically have got nowhere.

I'd like to give you a brief history of the social housing situation in Nunavik. In 1981 the Standing Committee on Aboriginal Affairs initiated what was called a catch-up program in our region whereby social housing units were built, replacing substandard housing that didn't have any running water. People were using honey buckets for toilets and just basically dumping the waste near their houses. But from the mid-1980s to the mid-1990s it was basically a catch-up program whereby we were brought into the 20th century from third world conditions.

This was a good program. My only observation on that program is that the native people weren't involved in the construction of those houses. Basically, southern contractors came up and built the houses for the people. There were menial jobs, such as picking up garbage, for the people during the construction phase. It's interesting to note as well, with all the money that was spent to build those social housing units, not one Inuk graduated with a journeyman licence in the carpentry, electrical, or plumbing trades. In a way it was a success, but at the same time it was a disappointment, because we weren't involved.

I'm sure some of you have visited our area and might have noticed that everything is trucked in. Water is trucked into each house and then sewage is pumped out. It was too costly to build a piped sewage and water system in the north, so we went the inexpensive route. Each household has to get water trucked in and the sewage is taken out and dumped out on the land, because we don't have sewage treatment facilities.

We're in such desperate need of more social housing because we have a very young population that's growing at a very alarming rate, with 60% of our people under 25 years of age, and it's not getting any better. Last month our immediate need was for 425 units of social housing. It's not getting any better, and it's not going to get any better until we do something about it.

• 0940

The problem in Nunavik is that we don't have any alternatives. There aren't any apartment blocks we can go to and rent apartments for the people. At the same time, there are no trees to cut to build houses because it's basically the tundra. So we're at the mercy of the government to do something about it.

We know the Canadian government has not only a moral but a legal obligation, under the James Bay and Northern Quebec Agreement, to provide social housing to the people. We see the government building social housing units in reserves. I think a few weeks ago Mayor Anthony Itooshat used an example in his own community where they're building across the road in the reserve, and on the other side of the road there hasn't been any construction for the past number of years.

I don't think the James Bay and Northern Quebec Agreement was put in place to give to one group and deny the other through policy changes. We signed together with the James Bay Cree. There's a similar wording in the agreement that the programs that apply to the Inuit should apply to the Cree, and vice versa, but in our case there have been criteria established to exclude our people from accessing these programs. It would be a lot easier if we had alternatives, but at the moment there aren't any alternatives.

We recently signed a framework agreement with the provincial government where they are going to be initiating a private home-ownership program, but that's going to involve a limited number of units, not anywhere near what our immediate needs are. It's a start, but it's not going to be enough. The vast majority of the people in our region cannot afford to build their own houses. You are well aware of the astronomical costs of building in our territory. So it will be for a very limited few.

The last point I would like to make is that Makivik, in conjunction with KRG, has attempted repeatedly to have DIAND respect the James Bay and Northern Quebec Agreement and address our concerns regarding social housing, to no avail. We were forced to go to the dispute resolution mechanism whereby we supposedly should receive an answer within 60 days. We initiated that through Makivik in May of this year, and we're still waiting for an answer. We're still being stonewalled on that issue. We're concluding that the notwithstanding obligations in the James Bay and Northern Quebec Agreement—notwithstanding the 1990 implementation agreement—put in place a process to resolve disputes other than by going to court. If DIAND, representing Canada, will only live up to their obligations if forced to by a court action, with due respect, an attitude like that is disgraceful. We shouldn't have to go to that to have the government live up to its obligations under the James Bay and Northern Quebec Agreement.

I'd like to turn the table to Dr. Serge Déry, who is the director of public health for Nunavik Health and Social Services.

[Translation]

The Chairman: Could you confirm for me that Quebec government employees and Hydro-Quebec employees, as well as teachers and professors, all have very good housing?

• 0945

[English]

Mr. Johnny Adams: On the social housing situation in Nunavik, the government employees do not pay any rent for housing in our region. Some pay very little, but the majority do not pay any rent. So there really isn't a housing market when one group gets housing for nothing, or a few dollars per year, and at the same time, in the same community, the Inuit are being forced to pay rent.

There is a proposal to increase rents starting July 1, whereby 25% of the household income of the two top earners will be calculated to pay monthly rent, but at the moment there aren't any alternatives for our people to seek other avenues. So there is that discrepancy there as well.

Mr. John Bryden (Wentworth—Burlington, Lib.): I have a point of order, Mr. Chairman.

[Translation]

The Chairman: Go ahead, Mr. Bryden.

[English]

Mr. John Bryden: I wonder if I could ask the witness, for the benefit of the record, to make a comment on what I found in his written submission on the application he made to Minister Gagliano. From what I read here, he went from the Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development, on her recommendation, to the Minister of Public Works. For the record, I'd like him to tell what happened in that situation, if he would.

Mr. Johnny Adams: As I said in the beginning, we've been talking with ministers and bureaucrats, starting with Minister Irwin and Jane Stewart. In one of the meetings we were asked specifically by Minister Jane Stewart to talk to Mr. Gagliano, who is the chairman of the CMHC. When we met with Mr. Gagliano, we were told to see Minister Jane Stewart.

You start to realize you're getting the runaround from everyone. It's unfortunate, but that's the type of environment we're dealing with. We go to one, they tell us to go to the other, and then we're told by Mr. Gagliano he does not comment on the treaty and we have to go back to Minister Jane Stewart. We've been getting the runaround, for sure.

[Translation]

The Chairman: Mr. Aatami would like to comment.

[English]

Mr. Pita Aatami: I want to clarify what I said earlier. If we can deal with the six issues we have on the table, I would recommend the committee members take notes and ask these questions after we've made the six issues known. If you want to give us all day to do it, fine, but we want an equal amount of time for each issue we have on the table.

[Translation]

The Chairman: That's a very good strategy, Mr. Aatami. Mr. Dupuis.

[English]

Mr. Jean Dupuis (Base Manager, Air Inuit Ltd.): Because our briefs contain a lot of information and we have many of them, I would like to request that one of the members make a motion to inscribe our briefs in the minutes of the commission hearings here today.

Mr. Peter Adams (Peterborough, Lib.): Mr. Chairman, I would certainly so move.

[Translation]

The Chairman: Mr. Adams moves that we attach to today's proceedings all the briefs you presented today, in French and English. Is that in fact what you want?

[English]

Mr. Jean Dupuis: That's it, thank you.

[Translation]

(The motion is carried)

• 0950

The Chairman: Mr. Déry.

Mr. Serge Déry (Publich Health Director, Nunavik Regional Health and Social Services Board): I would like to mention that the housing problem is one of the priorities of the Nunavik Public Health Branch. Among the documents we distributed, there is one, in Appendix 9, which describes the situation as regards the housing crisis and its effects on people's health.

Various national and international organizations have made recommendations about the definition of proper housing. When we look at the current housing situation in Nunavik, we find that many of the conditions are not met in the case of a high percentage of the houses in Nunavik.

A number of indicators can be used to define overcrowded housing. For example, in 1992, the SHQ did a study that showed that at that time, 26% of the social housing in Nunavik was considered overcrowded.

The other way to measure overcrowding is to determine what percentage of the houses are occupied by more than one family. The 1996 census showed that in Nunavik, 5.5% of the housing was occupied by more than one family, whereas the figure for the rest of Quebec was 0.7 percent. According to data collected at the end of October, 1998, there are currently 428 families in Nunavik, throughout the whole territory, who are on the waiting list for housing.

Demographic projections indicate that unless there is a social housing construction program, conditions will worsen significantly over the next five years. We can expect that by the year 2003, if no housing is built, given a demographic growth rate of 2.8%, the figure for Nunavik, 40% of the social housing will be considered overcrowded.

Overcrowding causes well-known health problems, such as tuberculosis. The incidence of tuberculosis in Nunavik is 20 times higher than in southern Quebec and in the rest of Canada.

I am on a national committee to eliminate tuberculosis in Aboriginal communities. The committee comes under the Medical Services Branch of Health Canada. One of the recommendations we made last week was that the Department of Indian Affairs pay particular attention to the problem of overcrowding in Aboriginal communities and its connection to the incidence of tuberculosis. As I said, tuberculosis is very widespread in aboriginal communities.

The Chairman: Could you send our committee a copy of your committee's paper on this?

Mr. Serge Déry: Yes.

The Chairman: We would appreciate it if you could send us that later.

Mr. Serge Déry: Certainly. There are a number of other infectious diseases whose incidence is very high in Nunavik. It can be demonstrated that these diseases are related to the overcrowding problem. A study was recently done in a village in Nunavik, in which it was shown that chronic tubal ear inflammation is a very significant problem among our children and sometimes results in deafness. The study shows that this problem occurs more frequently when more than one or two children are required to sleep in the same bedroom. That is true of a number of houses in Nunavik. The study clearly shows that the greater the number of children sharing the room, the greater the danger of chronic ear infections. That is to be expected. Diseases of this type are transmitted through contact with others. It has been shown that a whole series of infectious diseases occur more frequently in our communities. We believe there is a direct link to the overcrowding problem.

From the point of view of public health, we are very concerned that the various psychological and social problems we see clearly in Nunavik are also related to overcrowding. The problems include violence, domestic violence and suicide among young people. Our rates are 20 times higher than the rates among young people in the south. We can demonstrate that overcrowding is a significant stress factor among our people.

• 0955

Overcrowding and a lack of housing give rise to psychological and social problems, but also make it harder to deal with these problems.

Let me give you an example. In the case of family violence, if you want to give people a break and remove one of the spouses from the situation, the problem is there is no housing available. There are no other housing options. That makes it more difficult for social workers to deal with cases of this type.

In conclusion, the housing and overcrowding problems are a major public health risk for the people of Nunavik. If no concrete steps are taken in the very near future to deal with this problem, there is absolutely no doubt that it will quickly worsen.

The demographic projections for Nunavik show that there will be approximately 1,200 more people over the next five years, which amounts to about one extra person for each housing unit. That means that 40% of the housing will be overcrowded. We think this should be seen as a significant danger and a priority area for public health action. Thank you.

The Chairman: Thank you, Mr. Déry.

[English]

Mr. Pita Aatami: Excuse me. The next person who is going to be speaking is Robbie Tookalook, mayor of one of our communities, Umiujaq. I believe he made a presentation to you already.

I forgot to mention when the Hudson Bay mayors made their presentation that I thank the committee for trying to get DIAND to appear in front of you. At that time you answered that we were going through the dispute resolution mechanism that Johnny mentioned earlier. But that shouldn't be something to hold us back from trying to alleviate the housing problem.

So I introduce Robbie Tookalook, with Anthony Ittoshat, who is going to be translating on his behalf.

[Translation]

The Chairman: I should tell you, Mr. Aatami, that the officials will be coming back to appear before our committee again soon.

[English]

Mr. Robbie Tookalook (Board Member, Makivik Corporation) (Interpretation)): Thank you, Mr. Chairman and committee members, for giving me this chance to speak and to address the committee.

I was here on October 28 to speak on behalf of my people about the problems of social housing. I know the problems of the people of Nunavut, being a Kativik Regional Government councillor, Makivik representative, and I am aware that the problems in the 14 communities of Nunavut are quite similar.

Although I was given something like ten minutes to speak last time, I went a bit beyond that. This time I will try to keep to a shorter version.

• 1000

I'd like to take this opportunity to thank Nancy in particular for sitting in on this round. She was not here in the week of October 28, when the mayors made their presentation.

You, as a committee, have the responsibility to hear the concerns of all 14 communities in Nunavik.

I would just like to use myself as an example. When Dr. Déry spoke to you about the illnesses and the overcrowding of houses in Nunavik, I am a good example, having 14 people live in my household. With a recent new addition of a grandchild to my family, we are now at a total of 15.

The federal government has the responsibility to respect the James Bay agreement, and I am here again today to sensitize the federal government to its responsibilities.

We have made presentations. We have spoken out. We have made our concerns heard in every possible way we can, and we want to be heard. We sometimes wonder when we will finally be heard. When will we finally get their attention?

• 1005

In your question to Johnny Adams, you touched upon one part of my presentation in regard to government employees' housing—for example, teachers. I just wanted to remark that the houses that are allocated to teachers and other provincial employees are very well maintained. They have no problems whatsoever. Where Inuit houses are concerned, however, we seem to have less attractive houses, poorly maintained houses. There seems to be no commitment to improve that situation.

On top of that, the employees who come up north to live in these houses in some cases do not pay any rent at all. In my opinion, that's a double standard, and it should be looked at very carefully. It should be noted.

Furthermore, speaking of double standards, the James Bay Cree are having new houses built on a yearly basis. That is unacceptable to us—being treated differently. The federal government should live up to its responsibilities. It should start caring for its people. They represent all the people of Canada, every living person in Canada. And the Inuit of Nunavik have been left behind for far too long. It's time they start paying attention to the Inuit of Nunavik.

As I want another fellow community member to speak as well, I will end my presentation here. But before I do I would like to ask a few questions in regard to our presentation in October.

• 1010

You told us you would have some answers rather rapidly. Up to now we have not had any answers or response. We feel it's important that you hear our presentations and respond rather rapidly, if at all possible. We know you have that responsibility. I'm aware that sometimes these things take time.

Now, getting back to the housing issue, I advised some people that I would be coming down to speak to the standing committee. I received a call from a community member in Inukjuak asking me to point out that there are pensioners back in Nunavik with so many grandchildren, so many offspring, and so many people living in their houses, and they are, in some cases, the sole income-earners with their pension cheques. This community member wants the government to look at giving the pensioners a special rate, because when pensioners do in fact pay their rent it seems to go back to the same source they received it from.

Mr. Pita Aatami: As Robbie said, the next person is going to speak about the crisis that he himself is experiencing in his community, which is Umiujaq. He is an Inuk person who is in a crisis situation because of the shortage of houses.

Yes, it takes time for you to come up with recommendations and so forth for these things, but we have a very short sealift season that we have to think about and start preparing for.

We are in a crisis, so we're going to keep reiterating the crisis we're in. I'm just emphasizing once more that there has to be something done about the housing situation.

I'm going to introduce you to Davidee Niviaxie, from Umiujaq.

Mr. Davidee Niviaxie (Governor, Makivik Corporation) (Interpretation): I apologize that I cannot address you directly. I am unilingual and I did not have a chance to learn the English language in a school. On the other hand, I also thank you for this opportunity to address you. This being my first time addressing anybody from the government, I just wanted to point out that the first time I ever heard there was such a thing as a government was back in the 1950s.

• 1015

I want to advise you about or sensitize you to the hardship I encounter back home. In my house there are at any given time 18 people living in the same house. I'm living in a four-bedroom duplex. The kitchen is very small. The living quarters are very small. My youngest child is 15 years of age, and my oldest is 35 years of age. Out of all these 18 people who are living under one roof, out of all my kids, there's only one who actually lives in another place. That in itself creates problems within the household. They sometimes have to come to an agreement as to who is going to stay where and when. In some cases, some of the kids end up sleeping on the floor because there are only four bedrooms, and only so much bedroom to go around.

I figure that the federal government, the Quebec government, and CMHC have a responsibility, including the health board, to help address these problems. There has to be a unified approach to the housing issue.

The big housing corporation that we hear about so often—I refer to CMHC in this case—keeps telling us that we're not getting any houses, or they have representatives coming telling us that we're not getting any more housing units. On the other hand, the health board is telling us that you can't have too many people living in your house; it's going to create health problems, health risks. In that sense, you feel as though you're stuck between a rock and a hard place. Who do you listen to? What can you do?

I will finish my presentation on that issue, but I has another item I would like to address to the committee.

I would like to bring to your attention that during the summer sealift, the big ships that come in and deliver all the goods to the region usually ship everything in wooden crates. When these wooden crates became available for disposal in my community, there were three men who were practically fighting over these wooden crates so they could possibly build some sort of dwelling unit for themselves. Of these three men, only two were able to get anything at all, and the third man struck out, so to speak.

To add a little bit to that, I also saw some of these same men taking some barrels and making woodstoves out of them.

Thank you.

[Translation]

The Chairman: Nakurmiik, Mr. Davidee Niviaxie. You have my respect. Pita.

[English]

Mr. Pita Aatami: Thank you, Guy.

Our next speaker who's going to speak very briefly on the housing issue is Jean Dupuis.

Mr. Jean Dupuis: Thank you, Mr. Adams, Mr. Chairman, honourable members.

Before Mr. Adams concludes on the issue, I would like to mention the fact that in the early 1980s, after the transfer from Canada to Quebec of the responsibilities in housing, there was the Tait report, which followed a working group negotiation between the Inuit and Canada. That work was meant to demonstrate that in the last years of the presence of Indian Affairs in Nunavik, there was reduced spending.

• 1020

We had a situation similar to today in regard to overcrowding. In addition to that, the housing was substandard. It took a few years' worth of negotiations to demonstrate that Canada had an obligation to transfer to Quebec a housing park that was up to a certain level of standard. Many millions of dollars were injected into housing by the federal government to replace all of those old houses and to build some additional houses.

Soon after that time, Quebec and Canada signed a transfer agreement in respect to article 29.0.40 of the James Bay and Northern Quebec Agreement. The Inuit were not party to that transfer agreement between Canada and Quebec, and they never agreed to it. Subsequently, today we find ourselves in a situation in which Canada and Quebec are playing ball with us. We're being sent from one place to the other. We are again the victims of a situation that we do not control, and we are living with the consequences.

As Mr. Niviaxie mentioned, today, again as in the late 1970s, even though there are many nice houses that meet Canadian standards, we are seeing more and more people moving into shacks on the sides of the river and along the beach. They're building houses from leftover crates. This situation is again created by the fact that Canada lumped us in with the rest of southern Canada when it completely discontinued the construction of social housing.

We are talking with Quebec at the same time. Quebec is showing signs that if Canada transferred to it the same revenues for housing that Canada is injecting into the national envelope, the province would develop a social housing program for Inuit in Quebec. The Quebec government is telling us that the provincial input into social housing is about 23% or 24% of the national envelope, and that, in turn, Canada only wants to give back to Quebec approximately 17% of that envelope to manage social housing in the province, including the Inuit. Quebec says that if Canada agreed to give back the same amount that the province is paying into the national envelope, there would be no difficulty in finding sufficient dollars to have a social housing program for Inuit in order to alleviate the situation that is rapidly deteriorating and affecting Inuit society in general.

On the situation we are facing—being stuck between a rock and a hard place—we feel it's not our problem to find solutions to this. We feel that both levels of government have an obligation, according to the James Bay and Northern Quebec Agreement, to find ways to deliver in Nunavik, to stop trying to pull us into a discussion after the fact while having us invest into the development of capital projects for housing. It's been clearly demonstrated that we do not have the money to do so, and it's a government responsibility.

Thank you.

The Chairman: Thank you, Mr. Dupuis.

Mr. Aatami.

Mr. Pita Aatami: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Johnny Adams will make the closing remarks on the housing file.

Mr. Johnny Adams: Once again, I think you've had a chance to hear from everyone. I don't think we're asking for very much. We're not asking for swimming pools, libraries, or elders' houses. We're asking for the very basic need of any human being, and that's shelter.

• 1025

I think the government has an obligation to find a way out of this. We feel the government, through DIAND, has been dealing in bad faith on this issue by creating criteria to exclude us from the program. Therefore, we're asking the standing committee to help us to find a solution to the problem we're facing, because it's not going to go away. This issue is just going to get worse until we do something about it together.

Thank you very much.

The Chairman: Thank you, Mr. Adams.

Mr. Bryden.

Mr. John Bryden: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Is this a question round at this point?

The Chairman: Monsieur Aatami.

Mr. Pita Aatami: As I said earlier, when I made my opening remarks, I would much prefer it if we could do all the issues. If you can just take a note of the questions you want to ask, we can go back to them. As I said, we have five other issues we have to deal with. If we can get back to the questions after we've dealt with these five other issues, we'd thank you.

Mr. John Bryden: Mr. Chairman, I would like to address at least the remarks that we just heard by putting a motion on the floor, because it may be lost if we wait until the end of all the presentations. The motion I would like to present to the committee is that this committee hold a special meeting as soon as is practical to discuss the housing problems of Nunavik and make recommendations forthwith.

I am touched by your remarks. You have come here and you need a response, and I believe this committee owes it to you to make that response forthwith.

That is the reason for my motion, Mr. Chairman, and I believe Mr. Wilfert will second it.

Mr. Bryon Wilfert (Oak Ridges, Lib.): That's correct.

The Chairman: Is there any discussion?

Mr. Derrek Konrad (Prince Albert, Ref.): I just have a quick question. Are we going to call in further witnesses, like CMHC, to find out what their response is, or are you just talking about a meeting among ourselves?

Mr. John Bryden: I said as soon as is practical, so if we feel compelled to talk to other witnesses, we should do so. But I think we have to give this the highest priority and deal with it while it is fresh in our minds and before this committee.

Mr. Derrek Konrad: Just as long as we can call in some witnesses, because I'd like to see some here.

Mr. John Bryden: Whoever you like.

[Translation]

The Chairman: Thank you, Mr. Konrad.

Mr. Iftody.

[English]

Mr. David Iftody (Provencher, Lib.): On a point of order, Mr. Chairman, we don't have a proper quorum. Unfortunately, then, we owe an apology to the presenters, because we don't have the numbers needed in order to pass a motion. As you can see, outside of the distinguished gentleman from the Reform Party, we have no opposition members here today at all, which creates a problem, of course.

Perhaps without passing a motion—

Mr. Derrek Konrad: I would agree.

Mr. David Iftody: —maybe what we need to do is to proceed with the testimony in order to put it on record, since there is obviously a lot of work to be done on this.

I think the motion is problematic at this time, although, Monsieur Dupuis and Mr. Aatami, I think the members on this side of the bench—and this is not the first time they've mentioned it—are certainly acutely aware of and feel very deeply about the presentations that were made here about two weeks ago and here today. I'm convinced of that. And that has been conveyed to the minister as well, so it's not falling on deaf ears.

May I continue just for a moment to suggest to our presenters, to all in this room, and to the chairman as well, that I believe there is a dispute resolution process currently going on at this time. It was activated by both parties dealing with the crisis in housing. This dispute resolution process is a legally binding one that allows remedies to the respective courts if either one of the parties is unsatisfied with the agreement. I understand that those negotiations are currently going on. The appearance of the group before the committee falls outside of that process, I believe. I was wondering if you could perhaps comment on that.

• 1030

My understanding, Mr. Chairman, is that these negotiations are going on, and if the affected parties are unhappy with the outcome of those negotiations there are legal remedies available to expedite a much more satisfactory solution for the communities.

So on those two questions, to summarize, if we don't have a quorum, we cannot of course proceed with Mr. Bryden's motion, although it's a very, very good one and I think is understood as being necessary and very meaningful. I know he's being very genuine in expressing this. However, I don't think we can deal with that if we don't have a quorum.

Outside of that, I was wondering if we could perhaps inform the rest of the committee members about what's happening with the disputes process, and if there's any way, perhaps in this forum that's been set up and agreed between the department and Makivik, in which we can be helpful in conveying to the minister and to the department, to the government, your unhappiness with the process itself, or elements of it. Or do you want to scrap it entirely? We understood that there was an agreed-upon negotiating process, and we were waiting for the outcome of that process.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[Translation]

The Chairman: Thank you. Before giving the floor to Mr. Aatami, I wish to tell the parliamentary secretary that we have an excellent motion on the table. It is true that we don't have a quorum. Earlier, I told Mr. Davidee Niviaxie that he'd earned my greatest respect and as chair of this committee, I have the power to call officials to come before a committee.

Members of the committee, I do want to say that even if we don't have a motion, even if we don't have a quorum, we will ask the officials to appear as soon as possible. There's just one small point I'd like to mention. When we had the ice storm crisis in the south, people were compensated. Governments earmarked millions of dollars for that, because people ended up being 15, 20 and even 22 in the same house. That was dealt with immediately. It was a crisis.

Today, there is a housing crisis in Nunavik. If there is no economic development, it's because of that crisis: social problems, health problems.

Mr. David Iftody, tell the minister that we will once again ask the officials who work in the area of housing in Nunavik to appear before there is a serious crisis, because this is too important.

I told Mr. Niviaxie that he had my respect. We will remain respectful toward children, families, grandparents and you. That's it. There won't even be a motion. I will ask that these officials appear here as soon as possible to examine this crisis.

Is there anyone against my argument? Are you in favour? Thank you.

Mr. Bryden.

[English]

Mr. John Bryden: Mr. Chairman, I would like to point out that when we do have a quorum, I'm prepared to submit the motion again, just to ensure that everyone is satisfied that this committee does intend to act upon this forthwith.

The Chairman: Mr. Wilfert.

Mr. Bryon Wilfert: Mr. Chairman, a point of clarification. Further to the presentation by the mayors of the region back at the end of October, it was my understanding that we had a motion that asked the department officials to respond to those issues as quickly as possible. Mr. Bryden's motion essentially reinforces what we had already agreed to at the end of October.

I wanted to clarify as to what I had thought you had said—and hopefully you were wrong—that there had been some reluctance on behalf of the department to respond. That obviously could not be the case. I'm hearing basically what I heard, with all respect, three weeks ago. I expected that the officials would have been here before today in order to address those issues. Whether we have it in a full meeting of the committee or in camera, I would have expected that those issues that were raised by the mayors at the time would have been addressed by now. I'm just wondering as to the status.

[Translation]

The Chairman: As chairman of this committee and as member of Parliament for one of the largest ridings in Canada, I will tell you what the real situation is. The process has started. It is true that officials were supposed to come here and appear before the committee. I was asked to delay the appearance of the officials in order to hear the people from Makivik and Kativik today. That's why I'm perfectly comfortable with this decision.

• 1035

However, I am uncomfortable toward the Inuit people because there really is a crisis and we have a human responsibility as members of the Parliament of Canada. There are 301 of us here in the House of Commons. Regardless of the various political stripes, we are experiencing a crisis. I have a great deal of respect for the parliamentary secretary and I think he's on our side heart and soul. Regardless of the procedure, the officials will be here as soon as possible. We must find a solution through dialogue with the departments. Let's go on to something else now.

[English]

Mr. Iftody.

Mr. David Iftody: Thank you.

The way it was explained to me, Mr. Chairman, from the department is that there is an agreed, and I thought respected, negotiated process that was going on between the Government of Canada and the leadership of the communities. Perhaps there's another version of this. I would be very eager to hear about what's happened to these negotiations, why everyone—and maybe I'm assuming here—is very unhappy with it. Perhaps they could enlighten the committee members about their views of these negotiations.

[Translation]

The Chairman: Mr. Aatami.

[English]

Mr. Pita Aatami: Thank you.

I just want to say briefly that this question that Mr. Iftody is asking will be answered by Johnny Adams.

We just heard from Mr. Wilfert that when the mayors were here there was going to be something done. Mr. Bryden just reinforced what they were supposed to do. I was going to recommend that when you have a quorum you go through the process Mr. Bryden was trying to go through. That would be my recommendation. And thank you for recognizing the crisis we're in right now.

I'm going to give the table to Johnny on the question Mr. Iftody asked about DRM.

Mr. Johnny Adams: On the dispute resolution mechanism, that was a very, very last resort. Makivik has never used that avenue before. For the past three and a half years we've been stonewalled. We felt we had no other option but to go that route. And that process in itself can drag on for a few more years. In May, when it was presented, the government had 60 days to respond to it, but they've been asking for delays and delays and delays. As of today, there is still nothing with this process.

If we can get out of that and get back to solving the issue, that will be the route for us. But at the time we felt we had no other avenue left for us, because we were being given the runaround wherever we went.

[Translation]

The Chairman: Thank you. Before we continue, we will read the motion because it will be tabled. We'll get back to it later when we have a quorum.

In closing, I would like to get back to the issue of housing. It's strange how history can occur. We have people in the north of Nunavik who are struggling with a housing crisis. We saw that crisis last summer. The Inuit cannot block the roads because there is no road to go to the North. There was a crisis among the Mi'gmak of Restigouche, who set up a road block, and the federal government immediately gave Ronald Jacques, the Chief of the Listuguj reserve, 16 brand new houses. Our Inuit friends are prepared to take this battle to court. We know that there's a rumour that you're going to go before the UN because of this crisis if it continues.

The clerk will read the motion and we will go on to other subjects.

Could you read it?

[English]

Clerk of the Committee: It is moved by Mr. John Bryden that this committee hold a special meeting as soon as practical to discuss the housing problems of Nunavik and make recommendations forthwith.

[Translation]

The Chairman: Fine. It's a notice of motion. Thank you. We'll go on to something else now.

Mr. Aatami.

• 1040

[English]

Mr. Pita Aatami: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The next item we want to discuss is the marine infrastructure. For this one, Mr. Jean Dupuis is going to be speaking on our behalf to give you a little brief of where we've gone with this marine infrastructure file.

I wanted also to say that you were given briefs in advance on all the issues we're talking about today, so I hope the committee members had a chance to go through them so they could enlighten themselves on the different issues we're tackling today. Thank you.

Jean Dupuis.

Mr. Jean Dupuis: Thank you.

The second issue for us today, the Nunavik marine infrastructure program, is the second item on which we feel the Government of Canada is again not living up to its obligations under the James Bay and Northern Quebec Agreement. For that, I will read you article 29.0.36 of the James Bay and Northern Quebec Agreement:

Canada and Quebec shall, together with the respective Inuit communities, undertake, as soon as possible, and in accordance with the funds available, studies respecting the establishment of seaplane bases and public wharves, airstrips, navigational aids and docking facilities, including access roads and streets in each community. Such studies shall involve the Regional Government as soon as it is established.

In 1998 we find ourselves 23 years later. The regional government was established in 1978 and we are still going around in circles on most of those issues.

For more than 12 years after the agreement was signed there was absolutely no activity by either level of government on this issue. The reason it is part of the James Bay agreement is because it's important for Inuit to have marine infrastructure. The 14 Inuit communities in Nunavik are coastal communities. Inuit depend on marine wildlife for the majority of the subsistence food, and we spend a lot of time on the water.

In Nunavik we have some of the highest tides in the world. We are doing some evaluations to compare our tides to the Bay of Fundy. The results so far have proven that there are only about 12 to 14 inches variation between the two places. So you can imagine that 30-, 35-, 38-foot tides are very high. And for a people who spend so much time on the water, we do not navigate with daylight, as many other peoples do. We have to go with the tides and often have to travel during the night. So access to our communities can be very difficult. That's why it's very important for us to get this issue looked at.

Pursuant to the signing of the agreement in 1975, it took until Canada and Quebec signed the Canada-Quebec subsidiary agreement on transportation development to see any movement in the region. In 1988 the Government of Quebec initiated the construction of very small wharves in two Inuit communities, which caused somewhat of a reaction by the people in our region. Following this reaction, these two construction projects for very minute wharves were halted. Quebec had stated at the time that they felt that by doing these very small wharves, even without consultation as to their needs, they were living up to their obligation under the agreement. We did not agree. So everything was halted.

It took until approximately 1990-91 for an implementation agreement to be signed between the Government of Canada and the Inuit of Nunavik on the implementation of the agreement, in which there is an annex that deals specifically with marine transportation. This annex is part of the brief that was presented to you. Soon after a working group was put together with representatives of both parties.

• 1045

Some studies were initiated for some of the communities, even though in the first couple of years mandates were not very clear for the federal representatives. So again it was just the “going around in circles” process that went on until such a time that the people finally agreed to undertake the studies in the communities. Three communities were selected to do in-depth analyses of their needs. Even during the same period, consultations were held in all of the communities.

Following the first round of consultation, government civil servants who are experts in developing and conceiving wharves and all that made plans, made small-scale models of what could be implemented in Nunavik. These first plans translated into a program costing $120 million. The infrastructure that was proposed by these experts at the time was again a little bit large for the small communities, and maybe not as practical as the people wished. Nonetheless, by travelling around the communities and showing these scale models and that, they really raised the hopes of the people in our villages. Not too long after, this program was scaled down to an $80 million program. Those plans were scaled down to be a little bit more realistic, to really meet the needs of the communities. This was done after more input from our villages.

By the end of 1994 we had a program in mind that could be implemented on which everybody on the committee agreed. All the federal representatives, as well as the ones from our region, agreed on process and everything. Not too long after, there was money identified, a few million dollars. Even though the $80 million program was not fully approved by the federal government, DIAND still managed to pull out a few million dollars in order to do final plans and specifications for construction in three communities. This was in accordance to the $80 million program. The work went ahead. The people in those communities participated up until the final work.

Then in December 1997 we were called to a meeting with DIAND, at which time the officials there informed us that it would be impossible to fund an $80 million program. Only $30 million would be available, and possibly another $10 million could be gotten from the Federal Office of Regional Development for Quebec if we could demonstrate the economic development benefits for the region. Again, it was a process that our region had to justify.

Within the next month it was an “under the gun” process. The then president of the Makivik Corporation, Zebedee Nungak, was given an ultimatum. He had so many days, I think less than ten days, to agree to this $30 million program. Otherwise, in the future the money may not be available any more. So again under the gun the people in Nunavik agreed to sign the acceptance of the $30 million, but with a specific mention that this would be only to do only partially the $80 million program that is necessary to fulfil the needs of our communities.

• 1050

The problem we have is that the James Bay and Northern Quebec Agreement is quite clear about the need for wharves, for marine infrastructure in our region. Even though in some places we find the words “studies”, “program availability” and so on, we do not interpret this as if there's something available that year, you're lucky, you might get something. We interpret this in a way that the government is to put into its programming the need for funds to be allocated for a specific program to be developed for Nunavik.

So again, as in housing, we should not be just brushed aside because we don't meet existing criteria in other programs. We've included in our kits small maps that show the Canadian ports across Canada. We have a larger version an the wall, but it's difficult to see where they're situated. As you can notice, there are ports everywhere across Canada, even in the middle of Saskatchewan and Manitoba. And for us in Nunavik, where we have 14 coastal communities, where the Government of Canada has an obligation to provide us with this infrastructure, there is nothing, zero.

So again, on this issue, as in housing, we feel Canada cannot pass the buck to Quebec. We feel that Canada has to recognize its obligation and go ahead and find the necessary money for us to implement the construction program that has been developed together with the Department of Fisheries and Oceans, Transport Canada, Indian and Northern Affairs, and ourselves.

This infrastructure does have a large economic impact on our region. The construction will bring jobs to our region, because everything has been designed for our municipalities, our communities, to participate in the construction phase of this infrastructure, contrary to what happened in housing, where billions of dollars were spent by the Government of Quebec using federal funding, and after ten years of construction using southern work crews and southern companies, not one Inuk—or one, but he's passed away—not two Inuit were trained and qualified to do any construction work, recognized construction work. The Inuit in Nunavik only benefited from janitorial jobs, and we did not even get a percentage of a percentage of those benefits in construction.

In this program we feel that we can go and get at least 80% of the benefits in our region. And the impact subsequently will benefit the Government of Canada and the other governments by having better facilities for the delivery of cargo during the very short sealift season, which barely lasts three months and in which everything is done on a rushed basis. And living with the situation we have with tides now, it takes double and triple the time to off-load ships. This time is precious, knowing that winter comes back to the region quite rapidly at the end of September.

One last point I'd like to touch on in regard to the issue of marine infrastructure, because when these problems occur it's often related to water, is search and rescue. We feel that having these facilities, we would have access more often to water.

• 1055

Another point I did not mention is the protection. We need protection from the elements in our communities. As I mentioned, we live in coastal communities. Right now almost everybody has some kind of embarkation—small canoes, small boats, larger community boats. We have no protection from the elements. Every year some of our communities lose very expensive assets due to storms, because we cannot be protected by marine infrastructure from those elements.

We do not have that much money. People work very hard to have the money to buy canoes, outboards, and hunting gear, which is often left in boats and lost when incidents occur. The cost of living being so high, when there are losses it's very difficult. Sometimes it could take years for a family to re-equip itself. The situation is not being helped by the government not living up to its obligations here.

On search and rescue, again we have difficulties in initiating local search parties when incidents do happen with hunters and fishermen. Sometimes we lose very precious time because we have to wait for water for hours and our boats are sometimes 10 or 20 metres away from water and unable to float, when we could be spending hours conducting search and rescue activities.

On that, I would like to add something that is maybe not connected with the marine infrastructure on search and rescue, but it's the process we have in living in Quebec and being able to access National Defence search and rescue support. We've been working with our partners in Canada and in Quebec and regionally over the years at establishing a process when we're in need of support.

Right now, the way we work is that when there's a need for search and rescue, it's the mayor of our communities who sort of coordinates all the activities. He does that jointly with our own regional police force, which is then in contact with the Quebec provincial police. We absolutely need to involve the Quebec provincial police immediately in order to facilitate their calling Public Security Quebec, which is the only body that can call National Defence.

Sometimes in this process, because these people are not in our region—they're outside forces—but they have a second-guessing position in regard to many of the things we do regionally, or they do not trust us, we have to involve them from the first minute into our operations in search and rescue processes in order for them to make this call to National Defence. Sometimes it can take up to 24 or 36 hours before they are convinced it is justified.

We live in Nunavik, we deal with these operations from the very first minute, and we don't agree with having to justify to outside forces at different levels of bureaucracy that it's urgent, it's important, and yes, we need to call them now. It takes less than one minute for our public security authorities to pick up a phone to call on the Government of Canada, National Defence, for rescue operations to come and support us. but instead of taking minutes, it can take hours and days before the SQ is convinced it is justified. Then, if we have a civil servant in Quebec who is concerned that, gee whiz, we might get a bill later, and I don't know if I have the budget—we may end up facing a civil servant in Quebec who will not agree because he doesn't find it justified.

• 1100

The perfect example of that, Mr. Chairman and honourable members, came a few years ago in the community of Umiujaq, when the municipal garage burned down. All of the community's municipal services equipment burned. It's a community where there's a lot of snow accumulation around the houses, anywhere from five to ten feet, and the houses are sometimes buried.

In Akulivik, another community, the same thing happened. The garage there burned down in January. We have no sea lift operation by ship before July. In fact, it's usually August by the time the ice is gone. We therefore declared this to be an emergency situation. At the very same time, in the weeks that followed, the Canadian Rangers were conducting training operations. We have Hercules transports that bring the troops up. We requested that a Hercules stop in the community of Inukjuak, which was willing to loan a water truck and a sewage truck to Akulivik so that it could do municipal services and ensure a quality of hygiene to the Inuit population of that community, and it was refused. Canada was willing to do it, but it was refused because a civil servant in Quebec who was comfortable in his government offices and in his home decided that it was not an emergency. That community had to suffer, and we had to do all kinds of acrobatics to be able to ensure that the community was able to provide services to the houses.

Pre-1980, all of the houses had honey buckets for toilets—it was a plastic bag that you put outside—and water delivery was ice melted in containers. Right now, we have proper houses with standards and running water and so on, and we cannot live that way any more. We need the up-to-date equipment and facilities in order to provide our services.

Anyway, to get back to search and rescue, we need to ensure that there is a direct link between our region, our public security authorities, and National Defence. We don't need to have to go through this other bureaucracy—which is just a burden of justification—when it often means saving lives.

Watson Fournier is one of our engineers at the Kativik Regional Government. He has participated in the development of this program with Canada, and I would like him to speak to you on this issue.

Mr. Watson A. Fournier (Department Head, Municipal Public Works, Kativik Regional Government): Thank you, Jean, Mr. Chairman, honourable members.

As was mentioned, the Inuit were struggling to get this program for some sixteen years before we were able to sit down and start thinking of what concretely had to be done. We had the resources of different government agencies that explained to us what we would need as far as quality and components in these structures were concerned. The Inuit know what they need to do their hunting and fishing and all of that, but for the actual engineering work we used the services of the federal government. After listening to their counsel, we got the components. They told us what we needed, and then they said to find out what it would cost. That's how we arrived at the amount of $120 million. It's a very high amount, but it's from government officials who said this is what would be needed.

While arriving at what we would need, these civil servants were removed from committees and new ones came on. They said this is ridiculous, that this amount of money is way too high. We said to these new civil servants that this is what we were told we would need.

The point is that we want something that is adequate for our needs, something that is safe, so that we can arrange for people to have safe harbours they can travel out of and into when they come back with their families and their supplies. Reasonably speaking, the region would be satisfied with the $80 million. We'd have our fair share.

As Mr. Dupuis mentioned, all across Canada there are these infrastructures. They were given during the times when the governments felt they could give them to everybody. But we were still negotiating. We negotiated for sixteen years. When the negotiators have finally agreed that we should have some as well, other levels are saying there are no funds left.

• 1105

I think you should seriously give this consideration. Discuss it with the appropriate levels of government, the appropriate departments. Get this program officialized and get the adequate funding that is needed in order that we can build these things so that the people can have safe and reliable services.

Thank you.

[Translation]

The Chairman: We talked about housing and health. Now there are members who have to leave us because they have other meetings to attend elsewhere in Parliament. We could have a first round of questions and then continue on the three other subjects, and then go on with another round of questions, because I get the impression we're going to lose two or three members who have other meetings scheduled.

Mr. Aatami.

[English]

Mr. Pita Aatami: Just before you go to questions, Mr. Chairman, I just want to know something. There are supposed to be sixteen or eighteen members on this committee. I only see five in the room here, so I wonder where the other eleven are.

[Translation]

The Chairman: Mr. Aatami, the problem we have right now is that we don't have control over members of Parliament. On the government side, the Liberal Party, things are fine, on the Reform Party side, things are fine, but sometimes the unexpected happens. Today, it's an opposition day for the Bloc Québécois, as provided for in our procedures. Usually, we always have two members of the Bloc Québécois, but today they are attending other meetings. The same is true for the NDP and the Conservative Party. That's the problem of members of Parliament: some of them are members of two or three committees at the same time. Sometimes in committees, we have four or five members when we start. That's the problem here in the House of Commons, Mr. Aatami. They did apologize. It's the same thing for the Bloc Québécois: they had other meetings. Usually they are always present, but this is what happened today.

It's unfortunate that it's happening today, but the Bloc Québécois researchers are present and they are taking very good notes. Normally, Mr. Bachand is always present at this committee. That's what usually happens.

That's why I thought we could have a round of questions immediately before other members leave for other meetings. We do apologize. We have 16 members and usually we're always eight or nine around the table. The others are associate members who can replace those who must be absent for reasons of illness, death in the family or attendance at another committee. We really do apologize, Mr. Aatami.

[English]

Mr. Pita Aatami: Okay, thank you, Mr. Chairman. I trust the other members will be informed of the issues on which we're making our presentations today. As I said earlier, we had given advance copies of the brief we were making our presentations on. I hope the committee members who are here today had a chance to go through them.

We can go to the questions now, since we're going to be losing one more member. Right after that, we'll be going on to the other issues. Unfortunately, I wish the other members could have been here to hear the issues that are very important to us. With your chairmanship, though, I believe you will inform the other committee members.

[Translation]

The Chairman: We can begin the first round of questions immediately. Mr. Aatami, when we talk here, many people are present; in the department in Ottawa and in offices, many people are listening to us.

• 1110

The officials are aware of the concerns that you have expressed here since they can listen to our proceedings in their offices. Even if they're not present in this room, there are people here on Parliament Hill and elsewhere who are listening to what you have to say. Please rest assured that your message is being heard.

[English]

Mr. Pita Aatami: Before we go to the questions, Jean Dupuis is going to conclude on the marine infrastructure.

The Chairman: Monsieur Dupuis.

Mr. Jean Dupuis: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I'll be very brief.

In closing, the James Bay and Northern Quebec Agreement was one of the first comprehensive land claim settlements in Canada, and the second in North America. It was signed more than twenty years ago. It is not perfect. It's lacking a lot of elements that we see in other land claims agreements being signed in 1998. But we very much feel that for what is included in the 1975 James Bay and Northern Quebec agreement, the government should live up to its obligations.

We feel there are some shortcomings that are difficult to come back to twenty-some years later, because both levels of government may not be willing to come back to the table. But at least for the elements for the articles that you have signed and for which you have evident obligations, we would like you to live up to those obligations by delivering and implementing what you have agreed to.

Thank you.

[Translation]

The Chairman: Thank you very much.

Mr. Konrad.

[English]

Mr. Derrek Konrad: I've just tried to keep fairly good notes so that I know where we've been. Just to get a couple of things on the record here, Robbie Tookalook said he had fifteen people living in his home at the present time. I just wonder if Mr. Tookalook would tell us if members of his family are suffering some of the problems that were described by Mr. Serge Déry—the tuberculosis, ear infections, stress-related illnesses, and things like that. Are these kinds of things happening, and is it causing more of an outlay of his income than would ordinarily be required to look after fifteen people if they were in their own homes?

• 1115

Mr. Robbie Tookalook (Interpretation): To begin with, we're not the only family that is overcrowded. I am aware of a family in Umiujaq with 23 people living in the same house.

To respond to your question, yes, we do have the problems as described by earlier presentations. In fact, two of my grandchildren who live with me have been diagnosed with respiratory problems related to the lungs. I'm not exactly sure when they first contracted this problem, but it's quite obvious that it's due to overcrowding, and it can go beyond to the point where, if somebody catches a cold and gets over it, and then somebody else catches it, it's a never-ending circle. It just keeps going. We are passing the cold back and forth to each other because there are so many people living in our house.

If the health officials were to conduct a study as to exactly how many people are suffering from overcrowding-related problems, such as these respiratory problems, tuberculosis, and so forth, I'm sure they would come up with a lot more concrete results, if they haven't done so already.

I thank you for asking that question.

Mr. Derrek Konrad: Thank you for the answer. My reason in asking it is to demonstrate that community leaders suffer the same problems, that there is no escape from this for anyone. I thank you, and I didn't mean to put you through any personal pain or embarrassment on that question.

If I have any time left, I have a question now for someone on this marine infrastructure program.

December 23, 1997—At a meeting with Department of Indian and Northern Affairs (DIAND) officials in Hull, Makivik was presented with a draft Agreement for $30 million, to build facilities in only three communities, payable over a 10-year period. The Agreement was a two-page document with a blank one-page Annex for which Makivik had to identify the three communities.

I have just quoted from your backgrounder. What possible reason was given for reducing a previous $120 million identified, and $80 million, I think, agreement in principle, ending up as being a $30-million program deliverable over 10 years? What rationale were you given, or is this it?

Mr. Jean Dupuis: As I said, the major reason was that it was engineers from Transport Canada and DFO that worked on the initial project, and they just designed wharves for our communities along the same standards as they would do for Seven Islands, or Halifax, or something like that. But in a community of 350 or 600 people, it doesn't sit too well. So when they were brought back to reality, the $80-million program was more in line with the actual practical needs of our communities.

Mr. Derrek Konrad: That wasn't the point. The point was you had agreed, then, to an $80-million design program, but when the thing was delivered it didn't look anything like it, and most of your communities were left out. You say you were presented with a take it or leave it: Here's $30 million. Did they give you any reason? Why in the world would they cut $50 million off your program without consultation?

Mr. Jean Dupuis: That was because there were insufficient funds available from the Government of Canada, and that's it.

Considering the economic—

A witness: But we hear there's a surplus there.

Mr. Jean Dupuis: That's true. We hear that you now have surpluses you're building up in your little nests for the future.

Mr. Derrek Konrad: We'll talk to people about that. Thank you. I was hoping there would be at least some rationale given here.

[Translation]

The Chairman: Thank you, Mr. Konrad.

Mr. Bryden.

[English]

Mr. John Bryden: I have just a couple of questions, because your testimony is very comprehensive and, if I may say, very well presented.

To recapitulate a point that seems to be a theme running through your testimony, under the James Bay treaty you opted as a group for municipal and corporate status rather than reserve-type status. I note from one of your documents here that the intent was to deal with administrative issues and public services to non-ethnic regional institutions. I take it from this that what you are doing, in effect, is opting to be Canadians first and to act in the same sense as Canadians across the country govern themselves in their municipalities and wherever else, rather than a special status that one might find on reserves.

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Do you now, for all practical purposes, feel that it was a mistake to try to work as Canadians first under the James Bay treaty—for practical purposes?

Mr. Pita Aatami: The obvious answer would be yes, a lot of people regret that they didn't go through the reserve route instead of the route they took, the municipality route. When they see the discrepancies that are in place now, yes, they regret it. In a way it's good, too. But I would say the majority of them regret that they didn't go through the reserve-status route.

Mr. John Bryden: May I make then just a simple observation, Mr. Chairman?

I'm increasingly under the impression that governments of the last decade or two, the federal government, have been more or less incapable of dealing with Canadians in any other terms than their special interests, or special demands or ethnic character. We seem to have failed to deal with Canadians who are simply wanting to be Canadians. And I regret that.

Thank you.

The Chairman: Mr. Aatami.

Mr. Pita Aatami: I'll just add that we keep mentioning the James Bay agreement, that there are responsibilities for the federal government. But there are also responsibilities under the Constitution under section 91.24. It's not just for the James Bay agreement that the Government of Canada has fiduciary responsibilities.

Mr. John Bryden: Then I'll follow up on your remark. I see it in entirely another way, actually. I regard people like the people in Nunavik as serving a very large purpose, because you are the Canadians who choose to live on our frontiers. And if you did not so choose to live on those frontiers, they would be empty. I feel that the ultimate responsibility of the nation is to make sure you can live on those frontiers in a healthy and decent manner, and that we have a fundamental responsibility not to provide you with social housing or these other things, but to provide you with assisted housing, because you obviously are not a people who have been appearing before this committee because you feel that you are in poverty. You feel that you are at a disadvantage because of your region, and you need legitimately the assistance of the federal government if the federal government is going to expect to have people in those regions.

Mr. Jean Dupuis: I have a comment about what you are saying. You're absolutely right, you know. As in society anywhere else, we do have some people who are very much in need and we have some people who are capable of fending for themselves. The major problem is the inequity in government-delivered services in education, health, and other areas, where in housing the poor people or the people who are capable of paying are paying, and then we have these civil servants not paying anything. A perfect example is you may have somebody from Nunavik living in one house, paying the mortgage, electricity, the fuel and so on, costing $1,600 and $2,000 a month, and you have the school teacher next door paying $150 a month, so they can afford the snowmobiles when they can, the boats and all that, and they can live a totally different type of life.

So we're creating different levels of society within small communities. These things have to change.

Mr. John Bryden: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman: Thank you.

Nancy.

Mrs. Nancy Karetak-Lindell (Nunavut, Lib.): Thank you.

First all, I'd like to thank you for coming, and my apologies for missing the last meeting. But as the chairman was saying, most of us are on more than one committee, and sometimes we don't exactly have an easy time trying to divide ourselves among three committees.

I would like to understand, because I'm not that familiar with the James Bay agreement.... I know that the agreement was signed between the people of Nunavik and the Government of Canada. Is it because you chose the municipal route that you have to deal with the provincial also? If the agreement is between the James Bay Inuit and the federal government, wouldn't you have the same relationship that we currently have in my region and other land claim areas where you have a direct working relationship with the Department of Indian and Northern Affairs? Because I know that the land claims settlements in a province have unique problems, which are different from my area, Nunavut. Could you clarify that one for me?

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Second, I seem to recall there were about three communities that were not signatory to the agreement. Are you now representing the Kativik Regional Government, all the communities now, because they have come on stream? I seem to recall that some communities did not want to sign.

So those are the two. It's almost a shame that we have to bring graphic details of what is happening in the personal lives of people to open the eyes of the rest of Canada as to what kind of conditions people are living in in parts of Canada.

Again, as an Inuit and a member among 301 members, I always feel it's my role to try to make the other members understand what we're dealing with in our regions, which are so remote. One thing that always comes across no matter where our hearings are is that the people just want to be treated the same way and have equal access to services that are available to other other people in Canada. We don't ask for much. That's a thing I hear all over, wherever the hearings are, that they just want to be able to have fair and equal access to what is available to other people in Canada. That's something I see over and over again.

Thank you.

The Chairman: A good question. Mr. Dupuis.

Mr. Jean Dupuis: To answer your first question, prior to 1978 when most of the Inuit communities in Nunavik were incorporated into municipalities, there were Inuit communities incorporated under federal charters, and the federal government was providing funding for schools, for housing, for municipal services and for electricity. Hydro-Québec was not there. The Government of Canada assumed the responsibility for just about everything. In the last years of its presence it started to decentralize a tiny bit the administration of budgets for delivery of water. But in those days everything was done by the federal government.

Following the signing of the agreement in 1975 and 1978, most of the communities incorporated as municipalities and thus became provincial entities. Since we live in Quebec as a provincial entity, only SHQ, the Quebec housing corporation, could deliver housing programs. In the region, we could not afford to put in place immediately a non-profit housing corporation because we did not have the financial capacity locally to pay the percentages required to manage programs and the administration and so on. That's when we became subject to provincial control, and the case remains today. We are struck between federal and provincial policies for implementation of programs in our region.

Sometimes we can benefit from certain programs, but in the majority, such as in the case of housing, we are victims of the policies that are developed in this case.

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We feel there are some discussions going on with Quebec and Canada about the management of certain programs. Today we mentioned that there are not too many Canadian flags any more in Nunavik, and that is partly because implementing the James Bay agreement called for the Kativik Regional Government to be the body of choice to provide, implement and deliver programs, either federal or provincial, in our region, and the Government of Canada has decentralized to us at the regional government much of the management and delivery of programs for human resources, employment and training, and others. Quebec is doing the same thing. So in the same breath, there are not too many more provincial entities in the region either, but that's another issue that needs to be addressed.

But for the three communities you were talking about that were not signatories to the agreement, actually there were two and a half. The communities of Puvirnituq and Ivujivik were not signatories. They did not do any land claim selections, land category selections. The community of Salluit was sort of split in half and they did do a category I and II land selection.

At the time of the transfer from Canada to Quebec.... The way it works is that in the whole territory above the 55th parallel, Nunavik, also known in the Kativik act as the Kativik Region, the regional government assumes the responsibilities and powers of a supra-municipality for all of the territory that is not elected as a municipality.

So for a few years following the incorporation of our villages and of the region into municipalities, we acted as a municipality for those villages and they had no say as to how budgetary allocations were done in their villages. We were just signing financial contribution agreements with them for delivery of services, and they figured out quite rapidly that this was not benefiting them and that by incorporating as municipalities they would become more autonomous and decide on the fate and the development of their communities.

So today all of the communities of Nunavik are incorporated as municipalities, and every one of them participates in the regional council and they have representation at the Kativik Regional Government.

[Translation]

The Chairman: Thank you.

Mr. Wilfert, followed by Mr. Konrad.

[English]

Mr. Bryon Wilfert: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Very quickly, gentlemen, the brief you presented on marine transportation, about the James Bay and Northern Quebec Agreement, talks about section 29.0.36, that it should be implemented as soon as possible and there's a 12-year gap. I'm not patient by nature, and I would say that 12 years is absolutely ludicrous.

But I notice that DIAND can move when it wants, and I notice that on December 23, 1997, there was a meeting with your corporation and DIAND about the $30 million of which you spoke. Then I see on January 5, 1998, a letter from the minister's office saying, basically, take it or leave it in four days. You were being too generous when you said less than 10 days.

Either we need to—which is probably too far-fetched—amend the agreement...because obviously you're like a tennis ball between the Government of Canada and Quebec on some of these implementation issues.

But I guess what most disturbs me is your page 10, and I've outlined a number of things here. I see the words “failed”, “inordinate delays”, “bad faith”, “misled”. I don't deny that's probably true, from what I'm hearing, although there are always two sides to the story, but clearly it shouldn't take 23 years to do all this.

Clearly, Mr. Chairman—and we don't have a quorum—we need to have a heart-to-heart with the minister very quickly. We have only a couple of weeks left before we're recessed until February 1, 1999, and unless the clear direction and will of the committee is expressed to the minister, nothing is going to happen. Mind you, in the context of 23 years, I guess a month and a half doesn't appear to be an inordinate amount of time to continue to wait.

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I think we need to have the minister clearly know the concerns that the committee has. We've heard many of these issues before. The question is how to implement things. Obviously, whether or not it's the responsibility of the federal government in concert with Quebec, the fact is that there are issues here that need to be addressed. I want to find out more information about how we arrived at the $30 million so quickly, and I'm asking for your response.

Mr. Chairman, if these issues occurred in my riding, or if they occurred in Mr. Bryden's riding, Mr. Finlay's riding, or Mr. Konrad's riding, I can tell you that we wouldn't have been patient for 23 years, nor would the residents have been patient for 23 years. Let's quit fooling around here. Either we are prepared to live up to the obligations of the agreement to which the Government of Canada and the Government of Quebec were signatories, or we scrap the whole thing and start over again. I would suggest that it's a lot easier to implement in good faith what we had agreed to.

As I say, I am certainly familiar with some of those communities from my past days as president of the Federation of Canadian Municipalities, and I know that the mayors who were here three weeks ago spoke very eloquently of those issues. I have a lot of respect for mayors in this country, Mr. Chairman, and I would suggest that bureaucrats probably aren't going to do the trick here. They normally don't anyway. The mayors have indicated their concerns. The minister has to clearly be made aware of the deep concerns that we have as a committee, and I think we want to express the concerns in a way that will get this ball rolling very quickly on some of these issues.

On housing issues, shelter is a basic human right, and we have to deal with that. There's the sanitation issue. I know you gentlemen could go on for a long time, but I've certainly read enough about these things and know that they need to be addressed quickly.

I'm suppressing my own frustration over these things. We're doing other agreements across the country with aboriginal peoples, but if we can't deal with the one that was signed 23 years ago.... Anyway, Mr. Chairman, I want the minister to be—

[Translation]

The Chairman: I appreciated your excellent testimony, Mr. Wilfert. You'd make a good witness.

Mr. Bryon Wilfert: Thank you.

The Chairman: Mr. Aatami.

[English]

Mr. Pita Aatami: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I just want to thank Mr. Wilfert for those words.

Yes, we have been patient. As I said in my opening remarks, when somebody signs on to an agreement, we expect it to be implemented, but we've been waiting for 23 years in these cases now. We have gotten houses and airports, but they have to come up with another program because the years are moving on, more people are coming out. So I'm very happy to hear that you do recognize the problems that we have within Nunavik right now, and I'm very happy that you went through the briefs we had given to you in advance. At least we are starting to get the recognition that we do have a crisis on our hands.

Thank you.

[Translation]

The Chairman: Thank you, Mr. Aatami.

Mr. Konrad.

[English]

Mr. Derrek Konrad: Thank you.

Going back to the housing thing, while it's not economic development, it's certainly one of the more important issues that we're looking at here today. I have some questions.

First, how long do houses last up there? Secondly, how much do they cost? What's needed here? Is it about $50 million, or more? In terms of how things can be done up there, how many homes can even be built annually? I ask that last question in the context of employing local people and training them to do something as they go, rather than shipping in tonnes of people from the south who are already trained to build houses and then having them leave, with you basically left on the sidelines throughout a building construction project. I just want the committee to know so that when we talk to other people, we can say this is the actual....

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[Translation]

The Chairman: Mr. Fournier or Mr. Aatami.

[English]

Mr. Pita Aatami: Watson Fournier will answer the other questions. I just want to say briefly that I myself have built a house, so I'll use myself as an example. I built it for $150,000. If the government had brought people in from the south to do it, it would have cost $350,000, so there's something wrong there.

I'll let Watson Fournier answer the other questions that you threw out.

Mr. Derrek Konrad: Did that include shipping and all of the rest?

Mr. Pita Aatami: That's everything.

Mr. Derrek Konrad: Okay, thank you.

Mr. Watson Fournier: As Mr. Aatami mentioned, depending on the size, the cost of a house could be up to that price of $350,000. That includes the engineering, the transportation and the construction. It brings in all outside labour, and those labourers have to be lodged and they have to be fed.

Mr. Derrek Konrad: Where does that happen up there?

Mr. Watson Fournier: The Quebec housing corporation has a construction camp in each community. There are cooks and cleaning people who come in to take care of the workers. Due to the unions in the construction industry, that implies all kinds of costs. That means the price of the house could be from $250,000 to $350,000.

On your other question about how many houses could be built annually, depending on the amount of money, we would divide it by those numbers. For sure, the houses could be built in the north and they could be built by the people there. The scheduling would be different, because when contractors come up to the north, they're away from their families. They're interested in doing seventy to eighty hours a week in order to get the work done and to go back home. The people who are from the communities have their family life, though. Once they've put in their fifty or sixty hours, that's enough. They have family responsibilities. So when you come up with a construction program, you have to adapt it to the local reality. The local reality is that there's a shorter work week.

There's a sea lift that does not help the scheduling and logistics of this. We lose the good months of June and July because the ship only arrives at the end of July. If materials could be purchased beforehand and could be brought up at the end of the year, people could start working then. They could start building it themselves, could shut down the operation when it gets too cold, and could start up again the next May or June. There is a way of adapting the construction schedule, other ways of planning, other ways of doing it. Given the way it is now, though, it's designed so that 100% of the operation is from the south, and it's planned accordingly.

Mr. Derrek Konrad: You're 425 houses behind. How many years do you think it would take to even catch up while using the second model, which would not be strictly driven by the south?

Mr. Watson Fournier: That's a good question. The hundred houses a year that SHQ, the Quebec housing corporation, used to do was an enormous undertaking even with all its resources. To do it quickly increases the cost. In terms of the speed-up factor, you have to pay for that speed-up factor. More realistically, doing it in the north means that probably in the area of maybe thirty to fifty houses a year could be done locally. But as we mentioned, we'd always be chasing our tails just to keep up with the demographics.

Mr. Derrek Konrad: So you're talking about a fifteen-year program just to catch up.

Mr. Watson Fournier: Unfortunately.

Mr. Derrek Konrad: That's wild.

Okay, that's what I wanted to know.

[Translation]

The Chairman: Thank you, Mr. Konrad. Mr. Bryden.

[English]

Mr. John Bryden: I wanted to follow up on Mr. Konrad's remarks, if I may.

Are the houses that we're talking about built from scratch?

Mr. Watson Fournier: Yes.

Mr. John Bryden: So raw lumber is brought in.

Mr. Watson Fournier: That's right.

Mr. John Bryden: I'm probably one of the few people on this committee, or even in this room, who has actually travelled widely in Greenland. In Greenland, they build houses from kits. I ask you, can you foresee a situation that might solve a lot of these problems if a non-profit corporation was set up—maybe one already exists—to negotiate with the federal government to purchase housing kits that could be shipped up there and could be built by the people? Has that plan ever surfaced, and can you comment on it if it has?

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Mr. Jean Dupuis: I'll comment on that.

We've been describing the social housing situation and the overcrowding. We've done pilot projects in Nunavik over the past few years to try to provide for an alternative and to develop a housing market. Over the past few years, we've made it possible for a few people to work on this private home ownership program in which the Government of Canada helps to subsidize, in proportion, the difference in costs when comparing a house from the north to the south. That basically means the mechanical room, the transport and so on, and that cost is translated into a subsidy to people who have higher revenues and means and can maybe pay for their own homes.

Because there are no other alternatives, Pita Aatami and I, along with other people here, agreed to vacate social housing and to be part of this pilot project. We built our own homes, and we are now paying our mortgages and so on. We are paying an average of $1,500 a month, after vacating houses for which we were paying $250 to $300 a month, in order to make room for the people in need.

And, yes, we bought kits. The kit is maybe 30% of the house—the structure, the doors, the windows and so on. If I had to redo it today, I would not buy a kit. All it is is your sixteen-foot or twelve-foot two-by-six already cut to a ten-foot, but setting up a jig and having a good carpenter cut it for you doesn't take that much more time. We could probably have saved an additional $10,000 to $15,000 if we had not bought kits. That way, you can shop around for your own windows, for the different parts and components of the house, rather than taking a kit from a manufacturer when what is provided in that kit is fixed and set.

So we've tried it, but I recommend to people to just find good plans according to their personal needs, to hire good people—and there are lots locally—and to select all the components themselves according to the specific needs of their region.

Mr. John Bryden: I have one last question on that, very briefly, then. We have to find an answer that's practical. We can't wait all these years. Is the answer to provide the materials—pre-cut if necessary—and the plans, and to then let the people built it? Where can the government do it?

Mr. Jean Dupuis: We did three years of pilot projects, and we've now gone through the trial and error aspects. We have a final program on the table at SHQ, at the Quebec housing corporation. It was created by us at the regional government in terms of how we want to manage it—and we do want to manage it. By that, I mean that we will do the selection of the candidates according to their capabilities and capacities to pay mortgages and so on. We'll also provide technical assistance to those people in getting organized to shop and to build at the best possible price.

Right now, in terms of your question, there's not much you can do to help us other than to make sure the Government of Canada provides funding for our program to develop an alternative to social housing in the region.

[Translation]

The Chairman: I will allow two brief questions because we must go on to the examination of the other three topics on the agenda. Time is passing.

[English]

Mrs. Nancy Karetak-Lindell: Part of the question was answered because of his question, but it's amazing how much pride people take in building their own homes and how well they build them. We had that program in Nunavut, but you received the package and you built it yourself under our program. If you lived in it for five years, that was your equity. The fact that you built it yourself...and the government provided the material, because it was just too expensive for people to build their own homes. But I see that is the kind of program you have with the mortgage system.

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Because it's the provincial government, it's a little bit different from our arrangement, but I find that home ownership again is one avenue of convincing people to leave social housing. I'm sure you have people who can afford to be in their own homes who are taking up social housing. You're saying it's the funding.

Do you have access to CMHC or other groups, such as aboriginal business banking, that would provide the capital to set up these mortgages? I'm not sure what avenues you have, but have you thought of those options?

Mr. Jean Dupuis: First, we do not have access to CMHC directly. We have to go through Quebec because we don't have our own non-profit housing corporation.

As far as aboriginal banking is concerned, it's been cheaper.... We have our regional equivalent to the aboriginal financial institution that is managing some federal funding for economic development, but it's cheaper to go through the regular financial institutions.

The Chairman: Merci.

Mr. Finlay.

Mr. John Finlay (Oxford, Lib.): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The discussion this morning, gentlemen, has been very helpful, because we're dealing with our own economic development, and we're hearing again the same complaints we've heard...as Mr. Bryden, Mr. Wilfert, and so on have mentioned. We heard the Cree-Naskapi Commission and we heard about the James Bay and Northern Quebec Agreement.

It seems to me we're all aware of Nunavut. One of the big features of the Nunavut planning before next April was to train Inuit people to take on the government jobs, the jobs in the running of a modern government, but there were also commitments, I believe, that if economic development occurred, there were going to be jobs for Inuit in those circumstances. Was that not part of the James Bay and Northern Quebec Agreement, or was it just talked about and never agreed to, or was it supposed to be integrated or instituted by the co-management agreements that the people in northern Quebec would be involved in training and so on?

We travelled in the Inuit area, and, Jean, that's your area. I'm sure you must have employees who have been trained, and that's a fairly technical operation. Can you enlighten me?

Mr. Jean Dupuis: Well, Nunavut is one thing; Nunavik is another, which we're arguing. The agreement talks about the transfer of responsibility for, management of, and delivery of services and programs. It took until 1994-95 before we were able to convince the federal government to decentralize those responsibilities to us. Prior to those dates, Canada was spending less than 50% of its employment and training budget in our region doing training. From the day we started managing it, we spent more than 100% of the budget. Our training budget today exceeds $8 million, which we get from HRDC, and today we've managed to turn around employment practices in our region to where we give a priority of employment to Inuit.

We have more and more Inuit now graduating from high school, doing college-level studies, going to university. At the regional government we have this policy where people from outside the region only have two-year renewable contracts. Every time there's an Inuit who is finishing school or ready to enter the job market, with the competence and qualifications...the people from outside do not mortgage the jobs. Right now, we've gone from 25% Inuit in the regional government to over 70%, as a whole, of Inuit-held jobs.

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These practices and policies that we are developing are being very helpful, but it takes time to implement them and things have to go according to the evolution of the education system.

[Translation]

The Chairman: Thank you. We will continue the examination of the three other subjects and we'll discuss them with Mr. Aatami.

We had planned to adjourn this session of the committee at 1 p.m. so that members can attend Question Period, participate in other committee meetings and have time to have lunch.

As you can see, Mr. Aatami, the members are very interested in the question period. They'd like to ask questions to find out more about your area. That's why we will proceed immediately to study the other three points.

[English]

Mr. Pita Aatami: We're going to speed up the four other topics that we still have to deal with. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I'm going to turn over the chair to Johnny Peters, our second vice-president, who works on the offshore file with our lawyer, Sam Silverstone. Also, our corporate secretary, George Berthe, will be translating to Johnny Peters' speech.

Mr. Johnny Peters (Second Vice-President, Offshore, Makivik Corporation) (Interpretation): Thank you, my name is Johnny Peters. I am the second vice-president of Makivik Corporation, and the co-chief negotiator in the Inuit offshore aboriginal treaty negotiations, which include the offshore area surrounding Quebec inland, and offshore of Labrador.

As you are aware, unlike the rest of Canada, Inuit—and especially the Inuit of Nunavik—are the main users of the offshore area around Quebec, and including the northern region of Labrador. Eighty per cent of our food staples come from the said offshore area.

We have seen two ministers now during our process. We've been negotiating with the rest of Canada for four years. Our mandate was to be finished the negotiations within a three-year period, and we've obviously exceeded this deadline.

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This negotiation parallels the previous agreements that were signed in the past. It's unlike the James Bay agreement, which has only territorial boundaries. It's a very unique negotiation, and it's stalling and taking too much time.

We are prevented from reaching a treaty with Canada by the federal government's refusal to treat Nunavik Inuit in the same way as it treats other aboriginal claim groups, like NTI—Nunavut Tunngavik—and the Nisga'a Nation, with respect to cash compensation, and social and cultural and economic programs. There are similarities. We are aboriginals, like these other said groups. However, we can clearly see now that there are different respect levels in this negotiation process.

The federal government also makes us fight with the Labrador Inuit and the Nunavut Inuit over overlapping interests, instead of finding a peaceful and fair way of allowing us to share our interests. We are cousins, we are sisters, brothers. We are related to these other fellow Inuit and we recognize our relationships. However, the government has played a role in instigating fights amongst us over boundaries.

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DIAND is supposed to find solutions to problems. Instead it would like to create problems for aboriginal peoples. It seems that it's the reverse of what it was set out to do. We observed this.

No aboriginal group is Canada gives certainty to the government in treaties without receiving a whole range of rights and benefits, including cash compensation, so why should Makivik be different? We want parity with other aboriginal groups who are making treaties with Canada. Some examples are Nunavut and Nisga'a. We're Canadian and we're aboriginal, so why are Makivik and the Inuit of Nunavik being treated differently?

We've met many ministries. We've met the standing committee on more than one occasion. We've met DIAND. I think the people we've met, the ministers we've met, are trying to play games with us. They're not serious about making a treaty with Makivik. If so, Makivik will go to court. Then the ministries, DIAND and the government, will not laugh any more. We've very serious about our discontent, and the delays we see and the stumbling blocks that have been put forward by the government mean that we're not happy.

I appreciate your giving me the opportunity to speak before you. I thank you.

Now Sam will speak on behalf of Makivik.

Mr. Sam Silverstone (Legal Counsel, Makivik Corporation): Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, my name is Sam Silverstone. I'm a legal counsel for Makivik Corporation. I'm a co-chief negotiator on the Nunavik Inuit offshore and Labrador comprehensive land claims that are presently under way.

I'd just like to add a few comments to what we've said in our brief on cash compensation and to the comments Mr. Peters just made. The brief we tabled basically explains the main stumbling block to the Nunavik Inuit now reaching an offshore treaty with Canada. In your kits, you should have a map that depicts the Nunavik marine region, which is around the shores of Quebec but which also, as of April 1, 1999, will be within the territorial jurisdiction of Nunavut, which is presently within the GNWT jurisdiction.

The brief sets out the main stumbling block, but what I think is important for this committee to appreciate is that these negotiations, which have been going on for four years now, provide a very interesting case study and insight into the inefficiency, unfairness, and bad faith with which the Department of Indian Affairs and the Minister of Indian Affairs conduct themselves with respect to Nunavik Inuit files.

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We feel there are two main reasons why we haven't reached an offshore treaty after four years of negotiations. Our claim was accepted back in 1992. The federal government entered into a framework agreement with us in 1993. The framework agreement provided for a list of subject matters to be negotiated. These were subject matters that are standard in any comprehensive land claim settlement. There were things like certainty, compensation, land title, overlap arrangements, and resource management regimes. That's just to give you an idea of some of them. There's nothing very esoteric. These are things that are included in probably all modern land claim settlements in Canada today, so why after four years of negotiations are we still far apart on a major issue like compensation?

The only thing we can conclude after dealing with this for a number of years is that DIAND uses ad hoc policy-making and selective policy implementation to get its way. Our feeling is that they make up policy on an ad hoc basis. In most cases, it's probably not even policy that's sanctioned by Parliament. It's not debated by Parliament. It doesn't result in legislation that the House and Senate have to review. DIAND applies the policies they have on an arbitrary basis, and then DIAND ignores policies when this suits them.

I think this thesis could answer a lot of the questions that were put on the other issues, such as housing and marine infrastructure, as to why it's taken the government 23 years to deliver on this obligation and 12 years on that obligation. Why doesn't the government do what it's supposed to do?

We find that when there's some financial aspect to an obligation, the government develops a policy that it uses to preclude us from achieving the benefits to which we're entitled.

In some cases, DIAND has a policy of having no policy. They create a policy vacuum, so no one knows what to do. That's the situation Mr. Peters was referring to in Labrador, where Nunavik Inuit have overlapping claims as well as a separate and distinct claim in Labrador. DIAND is faced with a situation where they have to deal with the Labrador Inuit and Quebec Inuit in the same geographic area of northern Labrador. They have no particular way of doing it, other than some vague policy where they're supposed to deal with overlapping claims prior to the so-called main group or resident group getting its claim settled, but they choose to ignore that policy. For years, they interpreted that particular policy as meaning they cannot proceed to settle with one group to the exclusion of another until they've dealt with the other group's overlapping claims.

The new way DIAND chooses to interpret that policy, in particular in Labrador now, is through “best efforts”. If you can make a deal with the overlapping group, fine. If you can't, well, it's not really going to preclude the other group, in this case the Labrador Inuit, from reaching a settlement. So again, it's arbitrary policies and policies that are implemented on an arbitrary or selective basis.

I can go on and on and give you many examples of this. There's the old first come, first served policy now, whereby we're told that to settle our claims in the offshore we have to mirror the Nunavut type of regimes that have been set up in the offshore area as part of the Nunavut settlement. As a matter of fact, the Nunavut settlement area, you might be interested to know, does not come up geographically to the shores of Quebec. So there was an area there where the Nunavik Inuit from Quebec had an opportunity to set up their own co-management regimes with respect to resources.

What did DIAND do? DIAND has facilitated the extension of the Nunavut regimes into our area through pieces of legislation that may in fact come before this committee. One is the Nunavut Surface Rights Tribunal bill. Another is the Nunavut Water Board. There are a number of pieces of legislation that in fact came from an arbitrary decision by the Government of Canada to extend them from the Nunavut settlement area into where we have our aboriginal claims.

• 1215

So the attitude there—this is a policy that Indian Affairs has made up—is that whoever is first to the table is the one who gets served first.

There's nothing in the Constitution that talks about that. There's nothing in the Supreme Court of Canada—this is the reference case where our group intervened and where the Supreme Court talked about aboriginal rights—that makes a distinction based on first come, first served. They talk in an equitable manner about all aboriginal claims, and all the section 35 type of treaty rights or aboriginal rights.

In terms of compensation, again, there's another arbitrary policy established by Indian Affairs. They simply do not want to pay compensation on our claim. Instead of saying that, they come up with a series of arguments that we set out in our brief.

The first argument was that they couldn't pay us because we had already been paid under the James Bay and Northern Quebec Agreement. We and their own legal counsel pointed out to the minister that this was an impossibility because that agreement only applied to the part of the Inuit traditional territory within Quebec, which is this yellow area. It never was intended to apply to offshore or to our claims in Labrador. As a matter of fact, these subject matters, particularly the offshore issue, were the subject of a letter of undertaking signed by the federal government at the same time as the James Bay and Northern Quebec Agreement, indicating that this was never settled as part of that agreement. It remained an unfinished type of business.

So that didn't work. We didn't accept that argument. We pointed out to them that people like Mr. Peters, who signed the James Bay and Northern Quebec Agreement, were under the impression that the agreement only applied to our territory in Quebec. So you can't now unilaterally extend it beyond Quebec and say that the compensation was intended to cover everything.

They moved to another argument. This held that a group could not break up their traditional territory into five pieces and expect to receive compensation for each.

So these are all arbitrary arguments; they're not found anywhere in the stated comprehensive claims policy. Many of them come out of the minister's mouth, from a lot of her representatives in the department who spend time coming up with these arguments. Under the guise of policy, this is fed to us, and we're expected to accept it.

A few years ago, we were speaking to a former deputy minister at Indian Affairs. We confronted him on this issue of how policy is used in such a cavalier manner by Indian Affairs and that it doesn't seem to be used that way in other departments such as National Defence, which has to debate its policies before Parliament, etc. This particular deputy minister said that policy is a wonderful thing. He said it's one of those things they can arrange to have it mean whatever they want at any point in time. He said that in one case it can have the weight of a press release, and in another case it can have the weight of a piece of legislation or a regulation. He said that was the beauty of policy.

Well, that's what we're confronted with in this claim. The arguments we've been given as to why we don't have parity with other groups on this claim are simply couched in these phony types of policy statements.

Here's another point. I think you may appreciate this as some of you may have played some role in this discussion. This is the issue of certainty. For many years, Indian Affairs have been talking about coming up with alternatives to surrender and extinguishment. They like to use the word “certainty”. They now like to provide certainty in a treaty.

We do want to provide certainty in a treaty for all the parties. The government should know that the title to the land is secure for development and other purposes, and the aboriginal groups should know that their rights are secure.

Well, there's still no alternative to extinguishment. We're now trying to enter into a treaty on the offshore in Labrador, but we're confronted by the same statement that there is no alternative, so we're stuck with the same old policy of surrender and extinguishment. As for TFN, NTI, and Nunavut, when they signed their agreement, there was a surrender provision in their treaty, and that's a modern treaty.

So by 1993, the government still hadn't come up with an alternative. Nunavik Inuit entered into surrender and extinguishment in 1975, which they said they would never do again.

The government said we wouldn't have to do it again because they were working on alternatives. They had Mr. Justice Hamilton establish a special fact-finder. He did an excellent job. He printed an excellent report. It sits excellently on our shelf now gathering dust. It gives all types of options. It did find lots of facts for the minister to act on.

At the time, Mr. Irwin was the minister. He wasn't satisfied with what Mr. Hamilton found, so he set up his own internal committee. They still haven't come up with anything.

So there's again another policy issue in which they don't want to move. So we're stuck with this so-called old policy when in fact the courts—the Supreme Court and the Federal Court—have moved beyond that now and talk in different ways about enshrining and protecting and promoting aboriginal rights as opposed to surrendering them and extinguishing them and stamping them out forever.

• 1220

That's one theme: ad hoc policy-making and implementing it on an ad hoc or selective basis whenever they feel like it, outside the purview of these types of committees and of Parliament. We've seen it even in negotiating sessions and even in meetings with the minister, where policy seems to be made up at the spur of the moment in a note passed to the minister. When the minister has to answer a question, a note is passed, and suddenly the minister has a policy to answer our problems with.

I don't mean to belabour this, but the other issue that's been confronting us in these last four years of negotiations—and I'm not optimistic now about the result because of this—is something I refer to as treaty process tampering by the minister. Now, you've all heard of jury tampering. You all know what that is. You know it's illegal and it consists of an illegitimate interference in a legal process. Well, what we call treaty process tampering is where the minister agrees to negotiate a claim with us in the offshore and in Labrador and then the minister proceeds—particularly the most recent minister—to do everything in her power to tamper with that process.

It got so bad this year that the Nunavik Inuit were forced to go to court twice. We had to go to court in Labrador, where we were trying to negotiate our claims in northern Labrador, while at the same time the Government of Canada, through Heritage Minister Sheila Copps, was trying establish the Torngat Mountains National Park. How could you think of anything more ridiculous? The Minister of Indian Affairs has agreed to negotiate a treaty with Nunavik Inuit in northern Labrador, and another federal department—surely they must talk to each other—another federal cabinet minister has her people busy working away establishing a national park. Everyone knows that if you establish a national park the territory is transferred. Inuit harvesting is limited, and Inuit commercial rights are limited. Inuit had desires to select land there and they couldn't do so. Inuit wanted to manage the resources of that territory and they couldn't do so.

Heritage Canada took the time to negotiate with the mining companies to exclude vast areas of northern Labrador that were valuable for mining. But they didn't take the same time to talk about our rights. That's treaty tampering. You enter into a process. If they didn't want to enter into a process, they shouldn't have signed the framework agreement.

The same thing happened with our commercial fishing rights, of which we have many in zones adjacent to Quebec and adjacent to our traditional territory. We had to go to court to reverse a lower court decision, and we were successful. The lower court had basically given all the rights exclusively to the Nunavut Inuit. In this interpretation of the Nunavut agreement, admittedly, we had to intervene in the case and go and get that judgment reversed, so that now we get the same special consideration as the Nunavut Inuit get in zones in Hudson Bay and off Greenland, between Baffin Island and Greenland, zones 1 and 2, where we have similar types of commercial fishing interests.

Did the federal government help us on this? No. The federal government was busy appealing the decision for other reasons, because they didn't like what the lower court had said about the word “consultation”, that consultation means you really have to listen to people when you consult with them. That's what the federal government was concerned about. They weren't concerned about our rights.

These are the very subject matters that were being dealt with at our offshore treaty table: adjacent fishing rights. At the table the chief negotiator, Tom Malloy, said “I'm sorry, I have instructions. I can't discuss this any further. It's before the courts. If you want to change it, go to the courts.” We did that, and it cost us money, and we reversed the decision. But is that the way you negotiate a treaty?

Now, in your kits, in addition to the brief, we submitted what's called supplementary annexes. They're simply for your convenience; it doesn't make the most exciting reading. As a matter of fact, for the most part it's a series of correspondence between the premiers of Labrador and us denying our rights, and it also contains the Torngat case that went to the Federal Court. In that case the judge, Mr. Justice Richard, makes it very clear that this type of treaty tampering will not be tolerated, that the federal government has an obligation to make treaties. It doesn't matter who interferes with that process, the federal government has to carry through on its undertakings. It's a legal obligation to make treaties and to do a treaty process.

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Now, despite that, we've still had no response from the minister. We've just had to write a letter to the minister explaining to her what the decision means. We've included a copy of that decision.

In any case, just to summarize, I can go on and give you many examples of the treaty tampering process, but they've done everything in their power to divert us from the table. Instead of focusing on the treaty table and getting the work done, and not wasting the time and money of government and ourselves, they've done everything to slow the process down and not to live up to the framework agreement they signed in 1983.

Our conclusion on that basically is that we want parity with other groups. That's what the claims policy talks about, that there has to be equity and parity between land claim settlements in Canada. That's what we want, and Mr. Peters made that point. We don't want to be treated as second-class citizens. We want the same treatment as other groups are getting when they make these settlements.

The other point is that we want DIAND policies to be fully debated. We want them to be reviewed by Parliament, and we want them to be consistent with the recent judicial decisions coming out of your own Supreme Court and Federal Court, rather than five, ten or fifteen years behind the times.

The final point is that we want DIAND not to enter into framework agreements if they're not serious about negotiating with us. We take these agreements as very solemn promises. We don't commit our signature to any document, any undertaking, any memorandum of understanding, in a frivolous manner. I don't know on what basis DIAND enters into them. I'm really beginning to wonder why they sign these things if they really don't intend to carry them through.

The final point—and this is underlined by the recent case we took in Torngat—is that it's made very clear that the crown has a fiduciary duty to negotiate in good faith, and they're not doing that. They're fooling around, they're wasting time and money, and they're making a farce out of the treaty process, which is supposed to be a very serious and dignified process, according to your own courts.

Anyway, I thank you for the time, Mr. Chairman and members. Anything else we have to say is in our brief.

[Translation]

The Chairman: You are always very interesting to listen to, Mr. Silverstone.

[English]

Mr. Sam Silverstone: We're not happy.

[Translation]

The Chairman: You know your subject and you are well prepared.

What is the area, in square kilometres, of this maritime territory?

[English]

Mr. Sam Silverstone: The maritime territory, I believe, is about 300,000 square kilometres, but the total surface area of all the islands is probably only about 6,000 square kilometres. But the zone we're talking about is between 300,000 and 310,000 square kilometres, I believe, all around the coast of Quebec.

[Translation]

The Chairman: What is its population?

[English]

Mr. Sam Silverstone: It's that dark blue area.

Mr. John Finlay: No, it's green.

Mr. Sam Silverstone: That includes the waters, the seabed and the islands, and Labrador.

The Chairman: Okay. Thank you.

Next, Mr. Aatami.

Mr. Pita Aatami: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The next item we're going to start on is the taxation issue.

We did make a presentation during the time you were up in Kuujjuaq, on May 19, to come up with a fair and equitable taxation regime for Nunavik. So we did make that presentation already, but since it's a very inequitable issue, we want to make sure we bring it out again. So there will be three speakers—me, Jean Dupuis and George Koneak—on how this taxation regime has affected us.

You have heard already about the high cost of living in the north. It's doubly so with the taxation problem we're in. After hearing our concerns at the hearings, one of the committee members, namely Mr. Claude Bachand, wrote to the Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development, Jane Stewart, with copies to the ministers of finance and revenue, urging the creation of a working group to examine the effect of tax legislation in Nunavik. So we thank Mr. Claude Bachand for listening to our concerns at that time on the taxation issue and doing something about it.

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After that letter was sent, Jane Stewart wrote a letter stating that she was awaiting documentation from Makivik and that once that was received her department would contact the proper officials on the federal side regarding the creation of such a working group. But I hope it's not going to be a working group that is similar to the one for our James Bay agreement. After 23 years, some issues haven't been resolved yet. I hope it's not something similar that's going to drag on forever, because we are very unfairly taxed.

All of the relevant documentation was forwarded to the minister's department. We heard last week that she sent a letter back saying they would be creating a group to discuss this mandate.

Given the high cost of living in the north, the Inuit of Nunavik pay, on average, $182 for the same goods that are sold for $100 in the south. Instead of paying a combined 15.25% sales tax on these goods, we end up paying 27%.

There is one example that we want to give you of inequity. The government spends millions upon millions yearly on subsidizing farmers and fishermen in the south. Meanwhile, most of the hunters and fishermen in Nunavik, who rely heavily on country food for survival, cannot afford to purchase the equipment necessary to feed their families, given the sales tax and transportation costs.

What we said in the presentation we made to you in May is still the case: we still have a problem. Yes, we're here and there's going to be a committee set up, but how long is it going to take for this to be implemented? As I said, it's a lot harder to live in Nunavik. On average, a family earns $32,000. The average family size is 4.5 people. The average spending on food per year is $11,600 in Nunavik. If I look at the southern areas, an average family earns $45,000, the average family size is 2.61 people, and average spending on food per year is $5,960. So when you look at this, you see that what we have to spend up there is double because of the high costs and the tax regime that's in place right now.

We have to come up with a system that's acceptable for both parties. As I said in my opening remarks, we are taxpayers. Unfortunately, I can say to you today that we regret that we didn't go to the reserve status at the time we had the option, but since we are taxpayers, we just want to come up with something that's equal to what's done in the south. If you have it for $1, we'd like it for $1 up there also, not $2. That's just an example.

I'm trying to make my presentation short, so I'll pass the floor to Jean.

Mr. Jean Dupuis: Our presentation on taxation is very short anyway, and I'll try not to repeat too many things.

Pita said that the average family income is $32,000. Actually, the median income in the region is only $10,000 per year, so it's not very high. Pita's explained the situation to you in regard to the burden of the taxation system and the need for Nunavik to have its own tax regime.

In 1993 we made a presentation to a parliamentary commission in Quebec, to the parliamentary committee on budget and administration, in which there were ten recommendations affecting taxation issues. One of the recommendations was the creation of a working group to focus on the issues, and they agreed to that rapidly. Months after that a working group was created, and to this day, five years later, the working group is still sitting on a regular basis to review issues and we have resolved five of the ten recommendations. On that working group we have Treasury Board—people you usually never see participating in any discussion—the ministry of revenue, aboriginal affairs, and the ministry of finance. So we are progressing not too badly with Quebec.

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But there is a need to address the same issues with the Government of Canada. As Pita said, following the interventions and the presentations we made in the spring, the committee here has written to Minister Jane Stewart. But even though the minister was provided with all the technical information and information about all the work we've been doing with Quebec, we're still getting only letters of acknowledgement saying, yes, it would be a good idea to sit together to look and see what we could possibly do, and maybe define mandates.

We find these are lame excuses to just go around in circles again. We know what we want. She knows what we want. We just want the minister to designate people to come and sit down and deal with the issue, and design and appoint people from different federal government ministries to come to a working group and look at the issues.

We're still repeating. We're going back now. On every issue, we come back to the Nunavik people's capacity for spending. Our dollar value in Nunavik is almost three times less. Our person power is two to three times less than elsewhere in Canada. That's important for us. We need answers. We need the issues addressed now. It took 23 years from the signing of the James Bay agreement to get this far. We don't want to take another 10, 15, or 20 years of bureaucratic exchanges to address the issues. It could be done very rapidly. That's the support we are asking of you. Make the necessary recommendations and apply the necessary pressures so we can get on with the business.

Thank you.

The Chairman: Merci, Monsieur Dupuis.

George Koneak.

Mr. George Koneak (Governor, Makivik Corporation (Interpretation)): My name is Governor George Koneak. I'm from Kuujjuaq. I am a hunter, a fisherman, a father, and also Inuk. I'm speaking to you today. I believe this is the right forum and the right group of people to speak to. I'll be speaking on behalf of myself and my fellow Inuit in Nunavik.

To live in the north, to live in Nunavik, is extremely difficult today. It's tough. When we lost the fur industry, our economic base at the time, we lost a lot of our economic abilities. So it is a very tough and hostile place to live financially today.

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Today, we pay both federal and provincial taxes, and there are a lot of other taxes; for example, simply buying food orders from the south. You pay the tax when you initially pay for this food. You transport it up here, and on top of that, there's another tax for the transportation.

Here's another reality that's very tough for us. As you may know, our main food staple, our livelihood, comes from the land, and we must harvest in order to survive. We need tools to harvest mammals from our region. We have to therefore purchase bullets, snowmobiles, canoes, outboard motors, and clothing, and on those items there is a tremendous tax.

We are giving up. It's too much. We're being penalized. Our fellow aboriginals, non-Inuit aboriginals, don't pay taxes. They're reaping the benefits of taxpayers. We see this as perhaps one alternative now, that we don't pay taxes, and benefit as much or even more.

Thank you.

The Chairman: Mr. Aatami.

Mr. Pita Aatami: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Just to elaborate further on the skidoos and canoes that he mentioned, which we have to purchase in order to survive in the environment we live in. To go after those animals today, we need this equipment.

What we're looking for in that particular field is some kind of program similar to what they have for fishermen in the south, or the farmers' subsidy, the tax breaks they get. We want to be able to get something very similar to that when we purchase skidoos, canoes—any hunting equipment. We buy these for the purpose of surviving. The cost of living is so high up there already, but with these added costs it's even that much harder. That's one example of something we would want implemented as soon as possible.

I think that's it on the tax issue for now. As I said earlier, we did make a presentation on it, and you have briefs on it already. So we'll move on to the next item.

Thank you.

Mr. John Bryden: I have a point of order, Mr. Chairman.

[Translation]

The Chairman: Excuse me, Mr. Aatami.

[English]

Mr. John Bryden: Will we still have time to ask questions after these briefs? Sometimes it is more valuable for the members of the committee to ask questions and get answers than it is to hear the briefs in their entirety, because we can read the briefs. I do have a question I'd like to follow up on, and I ask your direction, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Konrad might have a question as well.

[Translation]

The Chairman: We still have to debate the issues of the airport, First Air and NAV CANADA. Perhaps we could agree to divide up the time into two five-minute periods and go on immediately to the questions. I admit that it's fine to table a brief, but we should have the opportunity to discuss it.

• 1245

[English]

An hon. member: There are only fifteen minutes left, though.

The Chairman: We'll go to questions immediately, and go five and five.

Mr. Pita Aatami: We'll try our best.

Michael Gordon, the mayor of our community of Kuujjuaq, is going to be speaking about the airport issue. Also, in conjunction with Jean Dupuis, hopefully Tommy Cain will be able to speak on this issue. After that, Mark T. Gordon will be speaking about the last issue, NAV CANADA, and he'll be the only speaker on that issue.

Mr. Michael Gordon (Mayor, Municipality of Kuujjuaq; Board Member, Makivik Corporation): Thank you. I understand that you have a brief from KRG regarding the Kuujjuaq Airport. My name is Michael Gordon, and I'm mayor of Kuujjuaq. I'm going to read a short brief that I wrote recently, and I have some papers that your clerk might want to pick up. The issue of our community airport goes with the other problems that our people are facing in Nunavik, some of which you heard this morning.

We have another problem on the horizon that threatens to compound these problems. It is a short-term problem that may have long-term effects. The issue is of immediate concern for the community and the region of Nunavik. This is regarding the airport. It is not just about the mechanics of making improvements to an airstrip. Rather, different departments within the federal government, along with the people of Nunavik, stand to lose a great deal in this endeavour.

Kuujjuaq, as you may know, has two airstrips. The first is a 6,000-foot asphalt runway used for jet service, running east to west. While the second is a 5,400-foot gravel runway running north-south. Our community welcomes the Transport Canada project to improve the asphalt runway. It is a four-year project to work on the foundation, as well as the actual asphalt runway. The first two years would consist mainly of stockpiling 60,000 tonnes of aggregates or crushed rock that will be used for the foundation. In the years 2000 and 2001, work on the asphalt on the airstrip will take place. The asphalt will be stripped and resurfaced for two whole summers. As it stands now, Kuujjuaq, being the transportation hub of the region, will be without jet service for a total of eight months. The main supply line, the artery, will be severed. Air transportation costs of goods, as well as people in the form of airline tickets, will be impacted negatively. An increase of approximately 27% is being forecasted.

The Kuujjuaq Airport is the only link for the Ungava region to domestic and international transportation networks. This will also be negatively impacted. For example, an individual travelling from Montreal to Salluit has to go through Kuujjuaq. Barring any weather-related complications, that can presently take one day. If the project proceeds with no changes, this trip may end up taking four days.

The Kuujjuaq Airport also plays a vital role in sustaining and stimulating economic development in the region. As I mentioned earlier, it is a transportation and administrative centre for the region. Tourism alone generates $12.1 million to the region annually. A vast majority of this is from American tourists who use the Montreal-Kuujjuaq corridor to access the exotic caribou hunts offered in the region. Access to the region will be compromised and tourism in Nunavik may even be non-existent for years afterwards in the highly competitive environment of operating outfitting camps. In effect, that tourism will be devastated.

• 1250

We feel the federal government does not understand the gravity of the situation. This is why we're here. The closure of jet service to Kuujjuaq, even for eight months, will literally devastate the economy of Nunavik.

Let me turn to our recommendation. At present, we are in contact with Transport Canada civil servants in order to have work done on the gravel runway. However, priorities as such with the federal government make it impossible both for the adequate amount of money and for the initiative to be made available. We see no alternative but to have our gravel runway upgraded—in effect, extended and given IFR instrumentation. If not, economic compensation to the businesses affected, as well as to the consumers in Nunavik, will have to be seriously looked at.

We call upon Transport Canada to provide a comprehensive funding proposal, based on these objectives, to upgrade the gravel airstrip in order to maintain daily jet service to Kuujjuaq, to compensate the region directly for any increases to the cost of transportation resulting from the project, and to ensure the region will not have to participate financially in the upgrade and renovation. The loss of this crucial link will otherwise result in a severe hardship for Kuujjuaq and the communities it serves.

Thank you.

You said you'd give me five minutes. I'm not sure I've reached that yet, but there's also Tommy Cain left to speak.

Mr. Tommy Cain (Governor, Makivik Corporation; Councillor, Kativik Regional Government) (Interpretation): Hello, I am Tommy Cain, from Tasiujaq. I am also the president of the Nunavik Tourism Association. What Michael spoke of a few moments ago is very true. We have very serious concerns.

We have a very busy tourism season. During our tourist season, we handle a lot of people going through the Kuujjuaq corridor. This issue is going to have a very big, very negative impact on our abilities to host and entertain these tourists who come up each summer and fall.

• 1255

The Nunavik Tourism Association helps to alleviate social problems through the creation of jobs, through economic development, and through the spinoffs that come from tourism. Revenue comes into the region. Foreign dollars, in the amount of $12.1 million, come through this corridor. We have to take into serious consideration how this will be affected, how it's going to benefit us in the future and how it has benefited us in the past.

I hope you have understood my presentation. I would really want you to understand our situation, and I thank you for giving me this opportunity to speak.

The Chairman: Mr. Dupuis.

Mr. Jean Dupuis: I'll be very brief.

When they presented it to us, the people who designed the project gave us the option of using a shuttle service from La Grande to Kuujjuaq for our passthroughs and cargo. This would be a zero-dollar impact to Transport Canada, but the cost to the region would be $7.8 million dollars each year in terms of additional costs for transportation. That means a 27.5% increase in costs.

We also had an option two. If Transport Canada spent $2.2 million to renovate and harden the gravel airstrip, we would still be able to land 737 aircraft with reduced payloads. That would also be an additional cost of $3.9 million to the region, which would represent a 12% increase in cost to us. But Transport Canada also wanted us to pay for the $2.2 million required to renovate the airstrip, so this option is not very appealing.

The third option, the one we favour, is an investment of $3.5 million by Transport Canada to extend and upgrade that gravel airstrip, in which case the increased cost to the region would only be $600,000 per year, or an increase of approximately 2%. We feel this is the effort that has to be made by Transport Canada in order to ensure that all of the investments made by local entrepreneurs and business people are not flushed away by killing off our tourism industry clientele, who will just go elsewhere. It will take years and years for us to get them back. By that time, everybody will have gone bankrupt for lack of revenue.

I'll stop on that right now.

The Chairman: Thank you.

Mr. Pita Aatami: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The last issue that Mark is going to be talking about is the NAV CANADA fees.

Mr. Mark T. Gordon (Third Vice-President, Makivik Corporation): I'll be brief.

We made our presentation to you before, when you were in Kuujjuaq. This is an issue that's very important to us, so we're presenting it again. This issue is NAV CANADA.

As you know, NAV CANADA replaced Transport Canada as the country's provider of civil air navigation services. As there are no roads between the communities or to the south, the Inuit are totally dependent on air service for passenger or cargo movements for twelve months of the year. During the short summer season, each community receives about two ships per year.

In the south, when you want to travel or send parcels or cargo, you can choose your method of transport. This can be done by car, train, aircraft or ship. Depending on the urgency, people will choose the lowest-cost method. However, we do not have this luxury that you take for granted. We are totally reliant on air for all passenger transportation, food, and everything else.

As NAV CANADA takes over the navigation services, the airline is going to be charged approximately 3.5% to 4% of gross revenues. In phase two, once it's implemented, we will see a new daily charge of $1,500 per flight for the HS748. The HS748 carries about 40 passengers.

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Here's my example of the increase in the cost of the HS748 for a medevac flight from LG 2 to Kuujjuarapik, a distance of 120 miles. The normal cost is $3,000. With NAV CANADA's daily rate of $1,500, this flight will now cost $4,500. For your information, we have about 300 HS748 flights per year. The $1,500 daily charge will be implemented next year.

As you may be aware, we have very limited economic opportunities in the north. We already have high transportation costs, which prevent businesses from succeeding or new businesses from starting. The increases from NAV CANADA will handicap us in trying to succeed in starting up new business enterprises.

With the cost of living as high as it is already, we cannot absorb even any small increases. We estimate that NAV CANADA charges will increase the cost of sending food, materials, and passengers to northern Quebec alone by more than $1 million per year; in the the north, including the NWT, it will cost more than $10 million per year. However, in the south, the savings to air carriers and passengers are roughly $150 million, as reported by the Government of Canada.

As a result of these efforts, a southern family of four will realize a reduction on air travel in the neighbourhood of $24 per year. In contrast, a family of four living in Nunavik will now suffer a surtax in the order of $500 per year.

If NAV CANADA were obliged by the Government of Canada to shift only 10% of NAV CANADA's published southern savings to the northern sector, that southern family of four would still pocket $21.60 per year, while a northern family of four would be left unaffected. That very small increase of 10% to the north would eliminate the extra charges that would be put on us while the southern sector would be nearly unaffected. The Inuit do not have alternative means of transportation. We do not have alternative sources of funds or jobs available to pay for the new increases.

NAV CANADA is a non-profit organization, but as stated, it already made a profit of $30 million.

As stated earlier, the new charges for the north are in excess of $10 million per year. We cannot absorb the new cost. We cannot afford it. Our people do not have the money for it. A lot of our people are unemployed. They can barely put food on the table the way it is.

We have vast distances to travel, no roads, a sparse population, remote locations, a total dependency on air for essential services, and a lack of transportation options. In my view, the federal government should be assisting the north in economic opportunities and helping us to get ahead and make a living ourselves. But by being insensitive to the north's actual needs, they are putting obstacles in front of us that are preventing us from succeeding. Even though our livelihood is difficult, we believe that the federal government should be sensitive to our needs. It should realize that an increase overall in the north of in excess of $10 million, even though it might sound small in the southern sector, is going to have an enormous negative impact in the north.

Also related to operating an airline, there are new CARS regulations and duty-time restrictions that limit our pilots to being on duty for not more than 14 hours per day. Duty time is not flying time, it's when a pilot gets prepared for a flight that may or may not happen.

This duty time has had a tremendous impact on our ability to respond to medical evacuation emergencies. Many times, our pilots will receive a call at night to airlift a critically ill or injured person to a hospital. On several occasions, we could not do the flight because the duty time of the pilot was already up.

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We corresponded with the minister responsible and officials many times for waivers, but we have not been successful. This duty time must be changed so that we can respond to medical emergencies. We were able to perform these flights safely in the past, and we feel that we can still do them safely now.

In closing, the Civil Air Navigation Services Commercialization Act was meant to recognize the special circumstances of the north. Paragraph 35(1)(g) of the act provides that charges for designated northern or remote services must not be higher than those for similar services utilized to a similar extent elsewhere in Canada.

Since the purpose of this committee is to act on both aboriginal and northern development issues and since our participation in NAV CANADA's consultation process was unsuccessful, we now urge you to revisit this legislation and enforce the interpretation provision of paragraph 35(1)(g) of the ANS Commercialization Act to mean that the impact per capita of these charges will not be substantially greater for northern Canadians than for southern Canadians. We urge you to shift this 10% to the north. I think you'll understand that we who live in the north who have limited economic opportunities want the government to help us and not be an obstacle to us, as it is today.

The Chairman: Thank you, Mr. Gordon.

Mr. Pita Aatami: This is just to add what Mark mentioned about the $30-billion profit that NAV CANADA made. They deferred the increase they were going to put on the table until March 1999. Why would they still want to have an increase when they're supposed to be a non-profit organization? They made a profit of $30 million already. How much more profit are they going to make with this increase they're talking about in March? This is going to put a dent in our wallets, which are already empty. This is something we can't understand. They're saying they have a profit already. How much more do they want to make with the new increases they're going to implement?

There's a very big discrepancy between the south and the north again. There are savings in the south, but extra costs in the north. There's something wrong.

Mr. Mark Gordon: On another note, when the government transfers some work to the private sector, it's with the impression that the private sector will do it better and cheaper. But in this case, we're paying for the same services—there are no increased services—and it's going to cost us much more money that we don't have and can't afford.

[Translation]

The Chairman: Mr. Dupuis, followed by Mr. Konrad.

[English]

Mr. Jean Dupuis: Very rapidly, I think everything was said by Mr. Gordon and Mr. Adams. As for the surpluses, we've been making a lot of representations to NAV CANADA, but to no avail. It's like talking into deaf ears. We haven't given up putting pressure on them and writing and so on.

Recently, in a review they did, we thought they might give us a little bit of a break considering that some of the people there at very high levels are very familiar with our operations. They made decisions that we feel are almost punitive. The taxation part of the Hawker-Siddeley 748 operation has been increased by 25% rather than reduced. Also, we've been requesting to participate in cross-Canada hearings that NAV CANADA was supposed to hold, but these hearings have been delayed.

On the medevac issue that Mr. Gordon spoke of, Mr. St-Julien, you communicated our concerns there to the Minister of Transport. We did receive a reply, but their position is firm that for safety reasons their regulation will stay as it is.

There may be the possibility of being invited to discuss the issue. We really insist Transport Canada designate some people to sit down with us to review the situation, because what we are talking about is not.... We're not looking for leeway in order to benefit financially, we're looking to be able to fly to save people's lives. In over 20 years of operation in Nunavik, Air Inuit has had a perfect record, so this issue cannot be shelved just because of the practices of other small companies in southern Canada, where there's been negligence.

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This is not a factor in our case, so we'd like the people in NAV CANADA and Transport to sit down with us and review this situation that they're bluntly turning a blind eye to.

Thank you.

The Chairman: Monsieur Konrad.

Mr. Derrek Konrad: First, I want to thank you for the well-prepared presentations. It's been a long haul, but I've been interested throughout.

I just want to dispel a couple of myths. I am from the prairies, so I know something about the farm economy and the lack of support out there, which we've been calling on the government to take another look at. So things aren't all wine and roses out there either, nor in a lot of places in Canada where it's less populous.

I found some of your comments very interesting, and it occurred to me that Ottawa or Toronto would not put up with a reduction in air service that would hurt their economies for eight months. I think that's something that has to be looked at.

In regard to the establishment of a working group on taxation, your map on Canadian ports here shows a lot of remote areas, and I think it would do for the government to create a group to look at taxation in remote areas across Canada. We are, after all, not only Indian Affairs, but Northern Development, and I think that's an interesting concept that could be followed more.

I don't really have any questions for you. I just wanted to say I thought that was an interesting concept and one that could well be followed up.

The Chairman: Merci, Monsieur Konrad.

Monsieur Wilfert.

Mr. Bryon Wilfert: Mr. Chairman, on June 11 I put a motion on the table, and because we were one or two members short, we adopted it, although we didn't officially.... We sent a letter to the Minister of Transport after NAV CANADA was here. One of the things I brought to the attention of the committee was an emergency resolution from the Federation of Canadian Municipalities, the Yukon Association of Communities, and the Northwest Territories Association of Municipalities complaining and indicating that there were grave concerns about the whole process with regard to NAV CANADA and those meetings that were held. We wanted the minister to respond in writing with regard to many of the concerns raised then on June 11. I've had that motion forth, and we've heard them, may I say, again today.

My point is, unless I have been asleep at the switch, I have not seen a letter back. This of course just reminded me I haven't seen a letter back from the minister. We had all-party support; all the parties who were here did support the motion. I am asking either you or, through you, the clerk if there has been a reply, and if so, what did it say?

The Clerk of the Committee: There was a reply from the Minister of Transport on the question of the NAV CANADA increase in user fees. That has been distributed to the members. There was no reply to the question of the regulations of the medevac response, but I understand the minister did send a letter to the Inuit regarding that. But there was no direct response to the chair's letter.

Mr. Bryon Wilfert: Well, there are two of us here at least who haven't seen the letter, so maybe that could be forwarded. But again, it's another case that NAV CANADA.... I was at the FCM meeting in June in Regina where they discussed these concerns, and I can tell you none of the mayors or officials I saw there seemed to be at all happy with exactly what you've again raised with Mr. Gordon, which others have also raised today.

[Translation]

The Chairman: We have reserved the possibility of asking NAV CANADA to come before our committee again this year, after we have heard witnesses.

Mr. Finlay.

[English]

Mr. John Finlay: I have just one brief question, Mr. Chairman.

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If your suggestion of the alternative regarding the runways at Kuujjuaq was accepted, would that mean that jet service could continue, or would it only be in emergency situations that it would continue?

Mr. Jean Dupuis: It would continue on a regular basis, like we have today, a seven-day service to Kuujjuaq.

Mr. John Finlay: And today they land on either runway?

Mr. Jean Dupuis: They land on the paved runway 99% of the time. The gravel strip will only be used in emergencies or when there are very high crosswinds.

Mr. John Finlay: But if you don't have the paved strip available—

Mr. Jean Dupuis: Then we have a major problem.

Mr. John Finlay: They'll have to use the gravel?

Mr. Jean Dupuis: Right now the gravel airstrip does not meet the standards required to have jet aircraft land on it.

Mr. John Finlay: Right. I'm just trying to get it straight.

Mr. Jean Dupuis: If the paved strip was to be closed today, there would be no more jet landings in Kuujjuaq at all.

Mr. John Finlay: So what you have to do is improve the gravel strip—

Mr. Jean Dupuis: First.

Mr. John Finlay: —first and then tear up the—

Mr. Jean Dupuis: That's right.

The Chairman: Thank you, Mr. Finlay.

Mr. Bryden.

Mr. John Bryden: This is an odd final question. It may sound a bit out of place.

I wonder how your communities would react, if it didn't prejudice some of your other requests, to a government-sponsored program to return sled dogs to your community. We heard from another witness on another occasion that the government had proposed years ago to remove sled dogs, and I guess there aren't very many sled dogs in the community. But I'm aware that in other northern communities—and again, I cite Greenland—there was a deliberate government program to maintain the availability of sled dogs in the eventuality that the Danish ships—because of course Greenland is a Danish colony—didn't arrive. Thereby the people who survived on the hunt would still retain the means if they couldn't get gasoline.

I wonder if this is something that would find sympathy in the community, provided it wasn't a program that took away from the need for ammunition and that kind of thing, or taxation? How would you react to that?

Mr. Pita Aatami: That's something we've never thought of. The dog issue was brought up by the mayors of the Hudson Bay communities because in the fifties there were some dogs killed off under the orders of the government at that time. The Inuit lost part of their livelihood—

Mr. John Bryden: Exactly.

Mr. Pita Aatami: —what they needed to go hunting. That's something we are looking into right now to see what we can do. Something was taken away and there was nothing to replace it. They were not given anything in replacement for what they lost.

As for your question, it's something that's hard to answer. It won't solve our problems. Bringing back the dog teams is not going to solve any of our problems. You still have to feed those dogs.

Mr. John Bryden: But I point out to you, and this is from experience travelling in Greenland and other parts of the Canadian north and even Alaska, that the dogs run on the fuel of the hunt. They don't run on gasoline. They are not like snowmobiles.

In Greenland there were absolute requirements that some aspects of the hunt had to be done by dogs in order to maintain a presence of dogs. You still use snowmobiles and these other motorized vehicles, but there was a deliberate program.

This is no longer a question, but I will say to you that if there were favour in your communities for bringing back sled dogs as an alternative means of pursuing the hunt in case there is an emergency, the airplane doesn't come or whatever, if there were some interest in that, I for one would certainly be willing to try to pursue that with my own government to see if we could get this program back in place.

Mr. Pita Aatami: In general, the dog team is coming back anyway. A lot of people are starting dog teams. We have dog team excursions and people are starting to use dog teams. After having used skidoos for 30 years now, you get adapted to what you're used to getting. It's kind of like bringing it down a little bit lower than what you have now. It's something that could be looked at, but I'm not saying it could solve the problem.

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Mr. John Bryden: But it's an alternative.

Mr. Mark Gordon: Yes. And we have been in contact with Greenland and they've indicated to us that they would help us with a pure sled dog that they have in their community, because the dogs we have in the north are mixed. We already have contacts in Greenland who would be willing to supply dogs to whoever wanted to start a new dog team.

Mr. John Bryden: Again, if this is something the communities want to do, I think this is something that at least an individual MP would be willing to press the government for assistance for, separate and outside perhaps the other requests that you bring forward. But I could never do that without a request from you.

The Chairman: Madam Longfield.

Mrs. Judi Longfield (Whitby—Ajax, Lib.): Just briefly, my question is more to you, Mr. Chair, and an apology to those who made presentations. I always regret when I can't get here at the beginning. I always send a staff member who briefs me very thoroughly after I read through your briefs, and again, I apologize for not being here in person.

Mr. Chair, I was very concerned the last time we heard these issues, and I wrote a rather lengthy letter to the minister asking that a ministry official be sent to come and address the concerns. I'm told that earlier in the meeting that motion was made again that ministry officials come. I guess I want to know how quickly they're going to come. I think these are issues that need to be addressed, and I'm particularly concerned when I hear about how protracted all of the discussions and resolution situations are becoming. If we don't keep on top of it, it's going to be another month, two months, six months. I think this is urgent. We can't have these people consistently telling us the same stories and as a committee not trying to do everything in our power to move things along.

I guess I'm asking—and again, I apologize because I wasn't here before—if we have a timeframe and if can we send the strongest message that we want to see it as quickly as possible.

Also, I think it would be helpful, particularly on the transportation issues, if we could expedite presentations, interventions, by our friends from the north to the transportation committee. It's hard for one standing committee to recommend to another standing committee, but perhaps in the spirit of knowing and being able to discuss this with other chairs, on our behalf you could try to arrange something with the Standing Committee on Transportation. I think if two committees are dealing with it we have a greater force.

[Translation]

The Chairman: In response to the last point that you raised, Ms. Longfield, it's no problem because the chairmen can write to each other. As for calling officials to appear immediately, I'll eat quickly and I'll go to the House of Commons at 2 o'clock, where I will meet with Mr. Gagliano and Ms. Stewart, and I will communicate to them the demands of the Inuit of Nunavik and the concerns of all the members.

I have appreciated the patience shown today by Mr. Konrad, of the Reform Party, and the members of Liberal Party attending here. I'll try this afternoon to get confirmation regarding the date on which the officials will appear. I'll ask the minister to arrange it for next week at the latest.

I believe that Jean would like to append some documents.

[English]

Mr. Pita Aatami: I will have some closing remarks about the day we had with you after Johnny Peters and Jean have spoken.

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Mr. Johnny Peters (Interpretation): Thank you.

All career people, all employed people in Nunavik do get taxes deducted, and it's always nearly half of what they earn from their paycheque. They cash their paycheque, go to the store, and again they're taxed on what they purchase. I have observed that at the end of the year there are a lot of people who end up owing money to the government, and then when they refuse or do not pay these amounts they're threatened with court action, a collection agency, etc.

There are serious differences that we can see now between the non-taxpaying aboriginals and us. They're enjoying benefits from the government; we're not, and we're taxpayers. I just want to reiterate the fact that we do pay taxes and we're benefiting less than our fellow aboriginals, namely the Indians, in Canada.

Thank you very much.

Mr. Jean Dupuis: Last, I would like to thank all the members for listening to us today. I really look forward to continuing to work with you on some of these issues, but again, as I did at the beginning, I would like to ask for support from the members. I'd like to ask one of you to pass a motion that all of the briefs and documents we've tabled here today be appended to the minutes of this hearing. It's been done earlier, but you don't have quorum, and I would like to make sure it's done.

Thank you very much.

[Translation]

The Chairman: You have raised a good point.

Mr. Aatami.

[English]

Mr. Pita Aatami: Thank you, Mr. Chairman and committee members. We've had a long day with you, and we thank you for taking the time to listen to the problems we have in Nunavik.

Since you've heard our concerns and the problems that we have, and you have the briefs, I'm hoping we'll be able to hear soon from the Government of Canada about what steps will be taken to resolve the issues we have, hopefully before Christmas. You might think I'm dreaming, but that's something I want to see just before Christmas—that we can have a nice Christmas like the rest of the Canadians in the south, who don't have these kinds of problems that we have in the north.

I would also especially like to thank Guy St-Julien, who happens to be the MP for our riding, for taking the time to try to help us out within our region, and also for always coming up to visit his constituency, for taking the time to see the people he represents. Mr. Guy St-Julien, we thank you for the work you've done for us so far, and we hope you keep doing what you've been doing for us.

Thank you very much, committee members. I hope to see these issues resolved in the very near future.

Thank you once again.

[Translation]

The Chairman: In closing, I'd like to say that people from the south have for years been travelling to and working in Nunavik. They have gone to work in airports, build schools, do home maintenance, operate outfitters and work in the fields of transportation, education and health. The people who are only passing through—whether it be for hunting, fishing or business—don't have time to become aware that the Inuit people are suffering in silence.

Today, we have had the opportunity to welcome people from Nunavik, mothers and fathers, friends. They have told the members of the Liberal Party of Canada and the Reform Party present here about their concerns, their problems and the pain felt by their children and their families.

I would like to tell you that our committee will do everything possible to bring your rights to the attention of the Canadian government and its ministers, including the Minister of Indian Affairs, the Minister responsible for the Canada Mortgage and Housing Corporation and the Minister of Transport, and to urge them to find solutions to the problems being experienced by the people of Nunavik.

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I would like to thank the members for their presence and their patience.

The meeting is adjourned.

APPENDICES

HOUSE OF COMMONS

STANDING COMMITTEE ON ABORIGINAL AFFAIRS AND NORTHERN

DEVELOPMENT

BRIEF RESPECTING SOCIAL HOUSING IN NUNAVIK

Makivik Corporation Kativik Regional Government November 19, 1998

INTRODUCTION

On May 19, 1998, Makivik Corporation (hereinafter "Makivik") and the Kativik Regional Government (hereinafter the "KRG") had the opportunity to present to this Committee their concerns regarding CanadaÌs failure to respond to the issue of the lack of new social housing in Nunavik.

Since then, Makivik has, pursuant to section 3 (Consultations) of Annex "H" of the Agreement Respecting the Implementation of the James Bay and Northern Québec Agreement between Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada and Makivik Corporation (the "1990 Implementation Agreement") entered into on the 12th day of September, 1990 [Exhibit 1], instituted by letter dated June 11, 1998 from Zebedee Nungak, then-President of Makivik, to the Honourable Jane Stewart, Minister of DIAND (Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development (hereinafter "DIAND"), the Dispute Resolution Mechanism (hereinafter the "DRM") regarding the following dispute: namely, that Canada has a legal obligation to provide social housing to Inuit of Nunavik. (see Annex 12) Although the timeframe foreseen in the DRM for resolving a dispute through consultation is sixty (60) days, to date no meetings with DIAND have taken place on this issue, with Canada twice asking us to grant delays.

In 1981, it was the actions of the House of Commons Standing Committee on Aboriginal Affairs and Northern development following hearings with Makivik representatives and those of the Crees that helped "kick start" the process that led to the James Bay and Northern Québec Agreement Implementation Review Report of February 1982 (hereinafter the "Tait Report") [Exhibit 2] and ultimately the "catch-up" program of housing in Nunavik. However, this catch-up phase has now been completed since 1995 and for the last three years no new social housing units have been built or renovated. We hope once again that this Committee can assist us to spark action on behalf of Canada.

Our request is simple. We want Canada to live up to its obligations toward Inuit of Nunavik. We want Canada to contribute on an ongoing basis to solving our social housing needs.

THE ISSUE

In February 1996, Makivik formally requested through the Federal Implementation Forum established pursuant to the 1990 Implementation Agreement that either DIAND or the Canada Mortgage and Housing Corporation ("hereinafter CMHC") participate in a working group composed of the Société d'Habitation du Québec (hereinafter "SHQ"), KRG and Makivik, to develop a new social housing program for Nunavik. SHQ had at the time already indicated its willingness to participate in such a group.

This request stemmed from the fact that as of 1995, no further social housing was foreseen to be built in Nunavik; notwithstanding that there was a recognized need for such housing. In fact, it was hoped that such a working group would work on a number of issues relating to housing including not only social housing but such issues as private housing, rent regulation, "old age" homes, etc.

Our request to Canada was based not just on a moral obligation but on the legal obligation that under the James Bay and Northern Québec Agreement (hereinafter "JBNQA"), specifically under sections 2.12 and 29.0.2, programs that were applicable to Indians were to be made applicable to Inuit. As Canada continued to maintain a social housing program for Indians, we considered that a like program should be made available to Inuit beneficiaries of the JBNQA. Sections 2.12 and 29.0.2 of the JBNQA read as follows:

Section 2.12 of the JBNQA "Federal and provincial programs and funding, and the obligations of the Federal and Provincial Governments, shall continue to apply to the James Bay Crees and the Inuit of Québec on the same basis as to the other Indians and Inuit of Canada in the case of federal programs, and of Québec in the case of provincial programs, subject to the criteria established from time to time for the application of such programs."

Section 29.0.2 of the JBNQA "Programs, funding and technical assistance presently provided by Canada and Québec, and the obligations of the said governments with respect to such programs and funding shall continue to apply to the Inuit of Québec on the same basis as to other Indians and Inuit of Canada in the case of federal programs, and to other Indians in Québec in the case of provincial programs, subject to the criteria established from time to time for the application of such programs, and to general parliamentary approval of such programs and funding."

The response of the federal government to date reflected in letters received from both Jane Stewart, Minister of DIAND (letter dated January 5, 1998) [Annex 1] and from her predecessor, Ron Irwin (letter dated December 16, 1996) [Annex 2)]is that Canada has no legal obligation in this regard.

The request was made by our Inuit Negotiator,¹ to Mr. John Sinclair, Assistant Deputy-Minister of DIAND, then responsible for the ongoing federal organization and structure foreseen in the 1990 Implementation Agreement, at a meeting held on February 22, 1996. At that time it was believed that we would be given a response by March 22, 1996. Soon thereafter a meeting was held between our Inuit Negotiator and representatives of DIAND and an exchange of documents regarding "Chronology of Events re: Housing in Nunavik" prepared by DIAND [Annex 3] and a report entitled "Housing in Nunavik" tabled by Makivik [Annex 4] were exchanged on March 1, and March 6, 1996, respectively. This latter report was based primarily on the relevant portions of a report regarding housing in Nunavik that was submitted to the Government of Québec by Makivik and KRG in 1994 as part of the ongoing provincial implementation of the JBNQA.

As noted in the chronology prepared by DIAND, in 1981, Canada and Québec entered into a Transfer Agreement between Canada and Québec dated February 13, 1981 [Annex 5], whereby Canada transferred, among other infrastructure, ownership and responsibility for housing to Québec.

Canada took the position at that time that this was the only way to satisfy the "unified system" foreseen in section 29.0.40 of the JBNQA.

Section 29.0.40 of the JBNQA reads as follows:-

"29.0.40. The existing provision of housing, electricity, water, sanitation and related municipal services to Inuit shall continue, taking into account population trends, until a unified system, including the transfer of property and housing management to the municipalities, can be arranged between the Regional Government, the municipalities and Canada and Québec."

Makivik, on behalf of Nunavik Inuit, opposed the Transfer Agreement as a unilateral act by Canada, arguing at the time that Canada should have required Québec to maintain specified level of services and housing construction as a condition of the transfer and that the Inuit should have been a formal party to the Agreement. Moreover, Makivik believed that the "unified system" referred to in section 29.0.40 did not necessitate Québec assuming responsibility for the programs and services previously provided by Canada. In fact, we believed that Québec's participation was intended to accelerate and enrich ongoing federal programs, not replace them.² KRG also declined to support the execution of the Transfer Agreement.

Subsequent to the Transfer Agreement, Québec then entered into administrative agreements with the Nunavik municipalities whereby each of the municipalities acted as the "housing authority" in the respective communities. (For a model of such agreement, see Annex 6).

In discussion with federal representatives during March and April of 1996, it was their position that Canada had satisfied the provisions of section 29.0.40 of the JBNQA through the Transfer Agreement.

We maintain that the Transfer Agreement did not satisfy the terms of section 29.0.40 of the JBNQA and does not constitute a "unified system". Moreover, it is interesting to note that in the 1990 Implementation Agreement, while Inuit of Québec acknowledged, in section 9 of the 1990 Implementation Agreement [Annex 7], subject to conditions therein contained, that Canada had fulfilled or was fulfilling certain provisions of section 29 of the JBNQA, no mention whatsoever is made to section 29.0.40.

Following the Transfer Agreement in March 1981, Makivik, along with the Crees, presented a whole series of grievances to the House of Commons Standing Committee on Indian Affairs and Northern Development, central among them being the issue of housing. As a result of the hearings, the Standing Committee took the extraordinary step of drafting a special Statement to the Ministers of Indian Affairs and National Health and Welfare in which they endorsed the claim of the Native parties that Canada and Québec had failed to implement major provisions of the JBNQA. In response to this, the then Minister of DIAND, John Munro, along with the then Minister of Justice, Jean Chrétien, agreed to conduct a joint review of certain of Canada's outstanding obligations under the JBNQA. This resulted in the "Tait Report" and pursuant to recommendations made to Cabinet in conjunction with the Tait Report, to the "catch-up" program. It is clear from the Tait Report that Makivik had not accepted the Transfer Agreement as being the creation of a "unified system" nor as the fulfillment of Canada's ongoing obligations towards Inuit under the JBNQA in this regard.

It should also be noted that the first sentence of subsection 2.1 of the 1990 Implementation Agreement reads as follows:

"It is the express intent of the Parties to this Agreement that nothing herein be considered an amendment to, modification of, or derogation from the JBNQA and, without limiting the generality of the foregoing, that nothing herein affects the application of paragraphs 2.11 and 2.12 of the JBNQA.-"

and that section 29.0.2 of the JBNQA, to all intent and purpose, repeats subsection 2.12 of the JBNQA. It is our contention that specific provisions like section 29.0.40 are in addition to the general provisions of the JBNQA, such as section 2.12 which provides that the Inuit and Cree communities remain eligible to receive all applicable ongoing programs provided by Canada and/or Québec. It is the reason why we are arguing that if Canada provides a social housing program to Indians it should provide the same to Inuit of Nunavik.

As indicated in the "Housing in Nunavik" Report [see Annex 4], the population of Nunavik is younger and growing more rapidly than the Québec or Canadian population in general. Almost all housing was and remains subsidized in one way or another by the public, para-public or even private sector. There are only a dozen or so homes under private ownership in the region, most of them in Kuujjuaq. As of March 1998, there were 1,673 social housing units in Nunavik comprising new construction since 1981 as well as the renovation and replacement of those houses transferred from Canada to Québec pursuant to the 1981 Transfer Agreement.

Based on the actual number of social houses presently in Nunavik and a population projection foreseen to year 2006 of almost 11,000 people made up of over 3,000 families, it is projected that there will be a need for approximately 1,400 new houses in Nunavik by that year.⁴ At the present time (October 1998), there are 425 families waiting for new houses in Nunavik. [Annex 8]

While we recognize that the "catch-up" program was a success, it's intent was to bring us up to date. As indicated above, as population grows, our existing housing becomes more crowded. We have, for example, situations again arising where three or four generations are living in the same house. It is clear that over-crowding leads to poor health and social conditions. Over-crowding makes studying and homework for children more difficult and has been linked with substance abuse, family violence and increased suicide rates. For a more in depth analysis of the public health aspect of the housing situation in Nunavik, please see the attached report prepared by Dr. Serge Déry, Public Health Regional Director for the Nunavik Regional Board of Health and Social Services, entitled "The Housing Situation in Nunavik: A Public Health Priority" [Annex 9].

Subsequent to the tabling of these reports, on March 26, 1996 we were told by DIAND representatives that they would need a delay of approximately one (1) month to respond to our request in order to clarify certain issues with CMHC.

On July 25, 1996, Mr. Sinclair, Assistant Deputy-Minister, DIAND, sent a letter to our Inuit Negotiator in which he indicated the following [Annex 10]:

"With regards to the Housing in Nunavik file, we are attempting to gain a better understanding of the position being taken by Central Mortgage and Housing (CMHC). We still have to clarify certain elements with CMHC as it pertains to interpretation of certain documents and key policy areas. We hope to conclude our discussions very soon so that we might begin to engage in preliminary talks with you regarding this matter."

At meeting with representatives of DIAND, both before and after this date, it was made known to us that DIAND and CMHC were at "loggerheads" over this issue and could not form a consensus to give a response. It was also clearly implied to our representatives at these meetings that while DIAND representatives agreed with our position, CMHC did not. It was even suggested that we should deal directly with the CMHC regarding this matter.

By letter dated October 28, 1996 from the then Makivik President, Zebedee Nungak, to the then Minister of DIAND, Ron Irwin [Annex 11], Mr. Nungak responded regarding this issue and the suggestion that we deal directly with CMHC as follows:

"Notwithstanding the consultations that have taken place between our negotiator and yours, including the mutual preparation in March 1996 of a "historic" regarding social housing in Nunavik, the issue remains to date unresolved. We had been led to believe by representatives of your Department that the fault lay with the Canada Mortgage and Housing Corporation (CMHC) which refuses to acknowledge the federal obligation in this regard. It was even suggested at one point that we should deal directly with CMHC by writing to its President. Such an approach was not acceptable to us. It is the Department of Indian Affairs that represents Canada in matters related to the JBNQA and the Implementation Agreement and therefore your Department, on behalf of Canada, should be in a position to respond to our request reflecting an obligation of Canada."

In response to this letter on December 16, 1996 (See Annex 2), the then Minister of DIAND, Ron Irwin, indicated to Mr. Nungak by letter that:

"On the third matter, my departmentÌs position is that the Government of Canada has no obligation under the James Bay and Northern Québec Agreement (JBNQA) to provide a program of social housing to the Inuit of Nunavik. Under paragraph 29.0.2 of the JBNQA, CanadaÌs obligation in this regard is made subject to the criteria established from time to time for the application of such programs, and to general parliamentary approval of such programs and funding. These conditions currently exclude the Inuit of Nunavik from access to Canada's social housing programs, with the exception of the Remote Housing Initiative. There is no plan to establish a new social housing program for Nunavik residents. Rather, I urge the Makivik Corporation to engage the Central Mortgage and Housing Corporation in a discussion of how existing housing programs may serve Nunavik's needs."

Following the 1997 federal elections, two meetings were held between the President of Makivik and the present DIAND Minister Jane Stewart, which dealt, among other things, with the issue of social housing. However, Minister Stewart took the same position as her predecessor, Ron Irwin, and in almost identical wording reiterates his position in her January 5, 1998 letter (See Annex 1) to the then President of Makivik, Zebedee Nungak:

"Regarding housing in Nunavik, I would like to confirm the position of my predecessor, the Honourable Ronald A. Irwin, in his letter of December 16, 1996 to Makivik that Canada has no legal obligation to provide a program of social housing to the Inuit of Nunavik. Under paragraph 29.0.2 of the James Bay and Northern Québec Agreement, Canada's obligation in this regard is made subject to the criteria established from time-to-time for the application of such programs, and to general parliamentary approval of such programs and funding. These conditions currently exclude the Inuit of Nunavik from access to Canada's social housing programs. There is no plan to establish a new social housing program for Nunavik residents. Rather, I would urge Makivik to discuss with the Canada Mortgage and Housing Corporation how exiting housing programs may serve the needs of Nunavik Inuit."

Finally, and somewhat reluctantly, given that we believed that it is DIAND who represents Canada regarding Native issues, representatives of Makivik and KRG, including its then Chairman, Jean Dupuis, met with Minister Galliano, Minister of Public Works, responsible for CMHC on May 15, 1998. We had clearly been led to believe by DIAND Minister Jane Stewart that the social housing issue in Nunavik had been raised by her with Minister Galliano. However, when we met with Minister Galliano, he seemed to be surprised that we were bringing this issue to his attention and indicated to us that that he thought this was an issue that should be dealt with by DIAND. We realized that we were literally being sent from "pillar to post and back again".

With all political alternatives apparently exhausted, we then initiated the DRM.

As noted in our June 11, 1998 letter to Minister Jane Stewart, instituting the DRM, the condition (criteria) that she refers to in her letter of January 5, 1998 (see Annex 1) is that the social housing program available to Indians only applies to Indians living on reserves. In consequence, this criteria eliminates the possibility of applying the program to Inuit who do not and have never lived on reserves. We cannot believe that Canada would use such a clearly erroneous argument to justify the non-application of a social housing program to Inuit.

Yes, there may be criteria established for such programs: such as old age, income level, etc., in order to be eligible from among a group; but criteria should not be used in such a way as to exclude everyone in the group.

The intention of the wording in sections 2.12 and 29.0.2 of the JBNQA (similar wording is found in the 1974 Agreement-in-Principle which led to the JBNQA) is to ensure that the benefits being provided by the JBNQA were in addition to and not in replacement of existing programs, and that existing programs would continue to apply. One of these existing programs is social housing. Canada is presently providing social housing to Indians on reserves and is providing social housing to Inuit north of the 60th parallel through funding of the Territorial Government.

The position taken by Canada is a reflection we believe of the policy position enunciated by federal officials at a Conference of Federal, Provincial and Territorial Ministers on Aboriginal Affairs and Leaders of National Aboriginal Organizations on May 20, 1998, in Québec, whereat Canada indicates the following policy position in the press release from such Conference:

"For its part, but without prejudice to the position of any party who holds a contrary view, the Federal government restated its longstanding position that it has primary but not exclusive responsibility for First Nations on reserve and Aboriginal peoples north of 60?, and that provinces have primary, but not exclusive, responsibility for off-reserve Aboriginal peoples."

Not only does this policy violate Canada's constitutional obligations to aboriginal peoples under section 91(24), it is a clear violation of the letter and spirit of the JBNQA.

Moreover, it should be noted that sections 2.1 and 2.2 the 1990 Implementation Agreement provide as follows:

"2.1 It is the express intent of the Parties to this Agreement that nothing herein be considered an amendment to, modification of, or derogation from the JBNQA and, without limiting the generality of the foregoing, that nothing herein affects the application of paragraphs 2.11 and 2.12 of the JBNQA. The Parties to this Agreement expressly agree that nothing herein constitutes a supplementary amending agreement within the meaning of Section 4 of the James Bay Native Claims Settlement Act (S.C. 1976-1977, c.32) and of paragraph 2.15 of the JBNQA. The Parties hereto further agree that this Agreement constitutes a contract between the Parties for the implementation of certain provisions of the JBNQA.

"2.2 The ancillary or related agreements contemplated by this Agreement shall not constitute an amendment to, modification of, or derogation from the JBNQA and, without limiting the generality of the foregoing, shall not affect the application of paragraphs 2.11 and 2.12 of the JBNQA. The related or ancillary agreements contemplated hereby shall not take the form of a supplementary amending agreement within the meaning of Section 4 of the James Bay Native Claims Settlement Act and paragraph 2.15 of the JBNQA."

The Inuit of Nunavik entered into JBNQA with one of the major conditions being that the Agreement was to be in addition to and not in replacement of ongoing obligations of the federal Crown towards us. This condition is contained in sections 2.12 and 29.0.2. Canada now appears to be trying to renege on this major condition.

Moreover, it should be noted that the wording of section 29.0.2 of the JBNQA, which applies to Inuit, reflects the same wording as section 28.1.1 which applies to Crees:

"28.1.1    Programs, funding and technical assistance presently provided by Canada and Québec, and the obligations of the said governments with respect to such programs and funding shall continue to apply to the James Bay Crees on the same basis as to other Indians of Canada in the case of federal programs, and to other Indians in Québec in the case of provincial programs, subject to the criteria established from time to time for the application of such programs, and to general parliamentary approval of such programs and funding.

The foregoing terms, conditions, obligations and criteria will apply to all federal programs referred to in this Section."

It is inconceivable that the parties to the JBNQA by using identical wording in the two sections, had in mind that "criteria" could be used to include one group in a Native program and leave out the other. For example, imagine if the federal government established a program that only applied to off-reserve Indians and then found themselves arguing that such program was applicable to Nunavik Inuit but not to the Crees.

How a distinction can be made to apply to us as "off-reserve" as compared to "on-reserve" is ridiculous. Applying a criteria that differentiates between those Indians who live "on-reserve" and those who do not, is itself suspect. Applying this standard to Inuit who have never lived on reserves is even more suspect; as "never living on-reserve" is different than "on reserve" or "off reserve" status as applied to Indians.

Even our instituting the DRM has been met with apparent reticence by DIAND. The process was instituted on June 11, 1998 [see Annex 12]. Under the terms of the 1990 Implementation Agreement (see Annex "H" thereof), the first step of consultation is foreseen to be done within sixty (60) days. In early August, 1998, we received a reply dated July 22, 1998 to our June 11, 1998 letter asking for a further delay. [Annex 13]. We replied, through letter of our then President, on August 19, 1998 [Annex 14] indicating that we were prepared to extend the timeframe until October 15, 1998. On October 9, 1998, the Minister wrote to our then President requesting that our representatives touch base with Mr. Jeff Moore, Director of the James Bay Implementation Office, in order to determine an appropriate timeframe for the consultations [Annex 15]. We were taken aback. The very process that had been established to resolve disputes was now becoming itself an issue: respect for the mechanisms established by agreement.

This treatment is not one that we would expect from a government that has a fiduciary responsibility to assist Native people and contractual obligations to respect with them. It should be noted that in several recent decisions of the Court, the judges have indicated the level of duty and responsibility that should be borne by the federal government in dealing with Native peoples.⁵

— In Simon v. The Queen, [(1985) 2 S.C.R. 387 at 401-02 and 410], Mr. Justice Dickson found that a treaty process was entered into for the mutual benefit of both the Crown and the aboriginal peoples, and should therefore be solemnly respected. Treaties need to be recognized as source of protection for pre-existing aboriginal rights.

— In R. v. Sioux [(1990) 1 S.C.R. 1025 at 1044], Mr. Justice Lamer concluded that a treaty is characterized by the intention of the parties to create mutually binding solemn obligations.

— In R. V. Van Der Peet [(1996) 2 S.C.R. 507 at 536], the Chief Justice determined that the relationship between the Crown and aboriginal peoples, and the dealings between the parties should be given a generous interpretation in favour of the aboriginal peoples. Because of the nature of the relationship, the Crown has a fiduciary obligation to aboriginal peoples where the honour of the Crown is at stake. It is because of this relationship and its implications, subsection 35(1) and other statutory and constitutional provisions protecting the aboriginal interests, that a generous and liberal interpretation must be applied.

— In R. v. Badger [(1996) 1 S.C.R. 771 at 794], Mr. Justice Cory opined that the honour of the Crown is at stake in its dealings with the Indian people; that it is always assumed that the Crown intended to fulfil its promises and that no appearances of sharp dealings will be sanctioned.

Recently, on October 21, 1998, the Government of Québec and KRG entered into a Framework Agreement concerning the Kativik Region [Annex 16] which addresses, among other things, the issue of housing. This Framework Agreement foresees the possible creation of a regional housing structure under KRG to administer the Nunavik housing program for SHQ that would replace the administrative arrangements presently existing between SHQ and the municipalities. It provides for the promotion of home ownership in Nunavik through programs to subsidize new home owners or those willing to acquire an existing social house. It is foreseen that the money collected through the privatization of public houses as well as the money collected from existing rent arrears would be used and doubled up by SHQ to provide potential funding to build new social houses.

While this initiative is welcomed, it is not foreseen as sufficient to address the required new social housing needs of Nunavik, as there are no guarantees that many Nunavikmiut will be able to afford to buy a new or existing house or that given present income levels the problem of rent arrears can be more than partially addressed.

The arrangement suggested in the Framework Agreement between Québec and KRG might, if the federal government played its role and became a party, be a way to finally address the specific issue of section 29.0.40 , the creation of a "unified system", as well as to respect the general obligation Canada has, pursuant to section 29.0.2, to apply its programs to Nunavik Inuit.

CONCLUSION

As indicated in the foregoing, Makivik, in conjunction with KRG, has attempted repeatedly to have DIAND respect the JBNQA and address our concerns regarding social housing: to no avail. Finally, we were forced to resort to launching the DRM on this issue. Yet even here we have been stonewalled. We are concluding that notwithstanding obligations in the JBNQA and notwithstanding that the 1990 Implementation Agreement put in place a process to resolve disputes other than by going to court, DIAND, representing Canada, will only live up to obligations if it is forced to by court decision. With all due respect, such an attitude is disgraceful.

We have presented today our concerns to you in the hope that this Standing Committee can do what its predecessor of 1981 was able to accomplish: to "kick-start" the Government of Canada to live up to its undertakings respecting the letter as well as the spirit of its JBNQA obligations. To such end, we would ask this Standing Committee to strongly recommend to DIAND that it must, on behalf of the Government of Canada, participate with the Inuit parties (Makivik and KRG) and the Government of Québec in solving Nunavik's social housing needs and that such participation be based not just on moral grounds (which alone would be sufficient) but in respect of Canada's ongoing legal obligations to Inuit under the JBNQA.

FOOTNOTES

_________

1 As defined in the 1990 Implementation Agreement, "Inuit Negotiator" means the person appointed by Makivik on March 8, 1988 to represent the Inuit of Québec for purposes of the JBNQA Implementation Negotiations, or his successor, presently Bernard Pennee.

2 See pages 29-30 and 40-44 of the Tait Report.

3 See page 43 of the Tait Report.

4 See Annex 4 of the Makivik/KRG "Housing in Nunavik" Report attached as part of Annex 4 hereof.

5 See also the Decision in Nunavik Inuit (as represented by Makivik Corporation) and The Minister of Canadian Heritage and the Attorney General of Canada and Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Newfoundland (Federal Court of Canada, Trial Division) in the Torngat National Park case and the principles enunciated by Justice John Richard therein.

Prepared and Submitted Without Prejudice Brief Respecting Social Housing in Nunavik Presented to the Standing Committee on Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development November 19, 1998.

B R I E F

TO

STANDING COMMITTEE ON INDIAN AND NORTHERN AFFAIRS

REGARDING

TAXATION IN NUNAVIK

Presented By: Makivik Corporation -and- Kativik Regional Government November 19, 1998

TAXATION IN NUNAVIK

The negotiations leading up to the James Bay and Northern Quebec Agreement (hereinafter the "J.B.N.Q.A.") provided many political, administrative and taxation options for the Inuit of Nunavik. With the view of working with governments on the basis of cooperation, the Inuit of Nunavik opted in the J.B.N.Q.A. for municipal corporation status respecting community lands as opposed to Indian type reserve status as well as to deal with administrative issues and public services through non-ethnic regional institutions.

The political and administrative options chosen by Nunavik Inuit reveal a largely ignored reality; the residents of Nunavik, including the Inuit, are full-fledged taxpayers, like almost every other Canadian.

Unfortunately, however, the tax regime, as it currently exists does not take into consideration the isolation, the climate and the high cost of living in the region which distinguishes it from other parts of Canada. As a result, residents of Nunavik are forced to bear a much heavier tax burden than their counterparts in the more southern parts of the country.

The population of Nunavik is in excess of 8,700 persons, of which approximately 94% are beneficiaries of the J.B.N.Q.A., who live in fourteen communities scattered along the coasts of the Hudson and Ungava Bays and Hudson Strait. There are no roads linking the fourteen communities of Nunavik either to each other or to the south. With the exception of a short period during the summer months when the communities are accessible by sea, residents of Nunavik are almost entirely dependant on air transportation as their sole link with the south.

Air transportation is a very costly means of transporting essential goods and food items and one of the main contributing factors to the high cost of living in the region. Climate is another important factor influencing the cost of living in Nunavik. Moreover, construction costs in Nunavik are twice that of Montreal and maintenance costs are three-fold that of the south.

According to a study on the cost of living in remote areas of the province of Quebec undertaken in l989 by the Bureau de la statistique du Quebec (BSQ)¹, with a base rate of 100 for the Montreal region, the average rate for those communities of Nunavik located along the Hudson Bay coast was 212 while the average rate along the Ungava Bay coast of Nunavik was 151. The community with the highest cost of living (247) was Ivujivik, located the furthest from Montreal.

These findings were confirmed in a study prepared by D.I.A.N.D.² in l996 which revealed that the cost of a nutritious basket of food for a family living in certain communities in Nunavik was more than twice that of a family living in Ottawa.

Moreover, the population of Nunavik is young with more than half of its residents aged 20 years and less. Comparatively, this age group is almost twice as numerous as that of the province of Quebec. Moreover, according to Statistics Canada, 1991 Census of Population the average family size in Nunavik is 4.4 individuals as compared to 3.1 for the rest of Canada. Given the high number of dependants and resulting lower percentage of active persons (ie. persons aged between 15 and 64 years), there is a heavier economic and financial burden on the people of Nunavik than on other Canadians living in the south.

Other than the introduction a number of years ago of the Northern Residents Deduction, a deduction from income based on the number of days a person is residing in remote regions of Canada, the government has not recognized the flagrant cost of living disparities through its taxation system. Moreover studies have shown that to receive any benefit from the deduction, based on the average number of dependants per family in Nunavik, the individual's revenue must be $30,000. or greater (according to the 1991 census conducted by Statistics Canada, average income of the Inuit population of Nunavik was $l4,755.).

In fact, the introduction of certain taxes such as the Goods and Services Tax has had a magnifying effect on the inequalities that exist between taxation of residents in the north versus the south. For example given the fact that Nunavik consumers pay on average 82% more for the same product purchased by the southern consumer, when one applies the combined federal and provincial consumption tax of l5.03% to the cost of goods in the region, Nunavik consumers pay a consumption tax of 27.35%.

Both Makivik Corporation and the Kativik Regional Government, representing the residents of Nunavik, have made numerous presentations to both the federal and provincial governments regarding taxation in the region. While the federal government has yet to address any one of the numerous taxation issues plaguing the region, the provincial government has taken concrete steps towards alleviating some of the burdens on Nunavik residents.

In January l993, Makivik and the Kativik Regional Government submitted a joint Brief to the Quebec National Assembly Committee on the Budget and Administration on the subject of taxation. This resulted in the creation of a Working Group consisting of representatives from the Quebec Treasury Board, Ministries of Finance and Revenue and the Department of Aboriginal Affairs, Kativik Regional Government and Makivik Corporation. The Working Group formulated a number of recommendations with a view to ensuring fair and equitable taxation in Nunavik (see Annex A entitled Report of the Working Group on Taxation in Nunavik).

Of the ten recommendations contained in the Report, five have been implemented to date, including the introduction of a refundable tax credit for residents of Nunavik thereby recognizing the high cost of living in Nunavik which distinguishes it from the rest of Quebec as well as the exemption from taxation of transportation subsidies granted to Nunavik students by the Kativik School Board in order to enable them to attend post-secondary education institutions outside of the region (see Annex B excerpts from the 1998-99 Quebec Budget). It is anticipated that the other five recommendations contained in the Working Group report will be implemented sometime during the coming year.

CONCLUSION:

On behalf of residents of Nunavik we urge the Standing Committee to recommend to the Department of Indian and Northern Affairs, the Ministries of Revenue and Finance as well as Treasury that a Working Group or Task Force be established with representation from Nunavik organizations, whose mandate it would be to examine the effect of tax legislation in Nunavik and to make recommendations towards implementing a fair and equitable tax regime for the region.

FOOTNOTES

___________

¹ Bureau de la Statistique du Québec. Indice de vie chère des quatre-vingt-quatre localités isolées du Québec,1990.

² Lawn, Judith - Air Stage Subsidy Monitory Program: Phase I - Food Price Survey: Interim Report, Department of Indian and Northern Affairs Canada, 1993.

HOUSE OF COMMONS

STANDING COMMITTEE ON ABORIGINAL AFFAIRS AND NORTHERN

DEVELOPMENT

BRIEF RESPECTING REQUIREMENT OF CASH COMPENSATION AS PART OF THE NUNAVIK INUIT OFFSHORE LAND CLAIM PROCESS AND TREATY

Makivik Corporation November 19, 1998

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PAGE

INTRODUCTION, ...... 1

A., THE PROBLEM, ...... 2

B., CANADA'S POSITION, ...... 2

(i) Compensation already paid to Nunavik Inuit under the JBNQA, ...... 3

(ii) JBNQA was a model land claim settlement followed subsequently by all other federal modern treaties, ...... 3

(iii) That Nunavik offshore claim is a transboundary claim, ...... 4

C.,  NUNAVIK INUIT POSITION  ...... 4

(i) The spirit and intent of the JBNQA, ...... 4

(ii) Policy context, ...... 5

(iii) Monetary compensation in the JBNQA, ...... 8

(iv) Nunavik offshore claim is not a transboundary claim, ...... 9

(v) Canada's position suggests fraudulent misrepresentation on the part of the Government of Canada during the negotiations leading up to the JBNQA, ...... 10

(vi) The federal position constitutes bad faith negotiations in the context of Nunavik Inuit treaty negotiations respecting Labrador and the area offshore of Labrador and Québec, ...... 11

RECOMMENDATION, ...... 20

ANNEXES    Annex :, Map depicting the Nunavik Marine Area.

Annex 2:, Negotiation Framework Agreement entered into between the Inuit of Northern Québec, as represented by Makivik Corporation, and Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada on the 19th day of August, 1993 [English and French versions].

INTRODUCTION

Makivik Corporation represents Nunavik Inuit (Inuit of northern Québec). Makivik's predecessor, the Northern Québec Inuit Association, was a signatory to the James Bay and Northern Québec Agreement ("JBNQA") executed on November 11, 1975. Nunavik Inuit also assert rights and jurisdiction in the areas offshore of Québec, and Labrador and onshore Labrador and negotiations on these matters are underway with the Government of Canada. Nunavik Inuit are in the position of having part of their Territories covered by treaty and part not yet subject to treaty. The present Brief addresses specifically the current main impediment to offshore treaty negotiations with the Government of Canada, namely, the issue of cash compensation. (See Annex 1 to this Brief for a Map depicting the "Nunavik Marine Region" which is the offshore area under negotiation pursuant to the Makivik offshore treaty negotiation process.)

A., THE PROBLEM

The negotiations towards achieving a treaty concerning Nunavik aboriginal rights, titles and interests to an offshore area surrounding Québec and Labrador are being frustrated by the position of the Chief Federal Negotiator, on behalf of the Government of Canada, that Nunavik Inuit are not due any direct financial compensation. All that may be offered by Canada is an amount in the region of Makivik's negotiation costs as financed through their loans from Canada. The stated rationale for this position is that the financial compensation paid to Nunavik Inuit under the JBNQA satisfied any financial obligations of Canada regarding the entire traditional territory of Nunavik Inuit.

B., CANADA'S POSITION

More particularly, Canada has advanced three arguments to justify its refusal to include cash compensation as part of the Nunavik Inuit Offshore Treaty.

(i), Compensation already paid to Nunavik Inuit under the JBNQA

Canada argues that Makivik has already received compensation money (approximately $90 Million) pursuant to the JBNQA of 1975. More particularly, Canada argues that unwritten DIAND claims policy dictates clearly that an aboriginal group cannot divide up its "traditional territory" for the purposes of receiving compensation. Nunavik Inuit traditional territory includes areas of Labrador, the Labrador offshore, the offshore area surrounding Québec and the Québec territory itself. Although the JBNQA was a treaty addressing only Nunavik Inuit claims in that portion of Nunavik territory included in Québec, Canada argues that Makivik cannot multiply cash compensation on a per capita basis for every part of its "traditional territory" unsettled by the JBNQA.

(ii) JBNQA was a model land claim settlement followed subsequently by all other federal modern treaties

Canada argues that the JBNQA and all the rights and benefits provided thereunder to the aboriginal signatories including cash compensation set a bench mark for all federal comprehensive land claim settlements that followed and for that reason, Canada cannot now retroactively increase compensation payable to Nunavik Inuit for parts of their traditional territory not yet settled through treaty. That is, Canada argues that the cash compensation received by Nunavik Inuit in the context of the JBNQA is equal to the amounts of cash compensation received under other modern land claim treaties. To now provide "additional" compensation to Nunavik Inuit for the unsettled offshore area around Québec and for their unsettled claims in Labrador and the Labrador offshore would create an "imbalance" in the compensation paid to Nunavik Inuit under the JBNQA in comparison to the amount of cash compensation paid to other aboriginal groups under other modern land claims settlements.

(iii) That Nunavik offshore claim is a transboundary claim

The Nunavik Inuit offshore claim (and by reference the Nunavik Inuit Labrador claim) is no more than a transboundary land claim. There is no precedent for federal payment of compensation monies for a transboundary claim. In support of this argument, Canada points to sections 42.1.1 and 42.1.2 of the Nunavut Final Agreement which specifically provides for no compensation to be paid for Nunavut Inuit aboriginal claims in and to the Province of Manitoba.

C., NUNAVIK INUIT POSITION

(i) The spirit and intent of the JBNQA

(a) The territorial purpose of the JBNQA

The JBNQA was intended to be and by its terms clearly was a modern treaty covering only those portions of the Province of Québec annexed through the 1898 and 1912 Boundaries Extension Acts. The Preamble includes the following:

WHEREAS it is desirable for the Province of Québec to take measures for the organization, reorganization, good government and orderly development of the areas within the purview of the 1898 Acts respecting the Northwestern, Northern and Northeastern Boundaries of the Province of Québec and the 1912 Québec Boundaries Extension Acts;

(...)

WHEREAS, in particular, it is expedient to agree upon the terms and conditions of the surrender of the rights referred to in the 1912 Québec Boundaries Extension Acts;

The Territory covered by the JBNQA is defined clearly in terms of the Boundaries Extension Acts. Par. 1.16 reads:

1.16 "Territory": the entire area of land contemplated by the 1912 Québec boundaries extension acts (an Act respecting the extension of the Province of Québec by the annexation of Ungava, Qué. 2 Geo. V c.7 and the Québec Boundaries Extension Act, 1912, Can. 2 Geo. V c.45) and by the 1898 acts (an Act respecting the delimitation of the Northwestern, Northern and Northeastern boundaries of the Province of Québec, Qué. 61 Vict. C.6 and an Act respecting the Northwestern, Northern and Northeastern boundaries of the Province of Québec, Can. 61 Vict. C.3).

(b) The litigation purpose of the JBNQA settlement out of court

The negotiations resulting in the JBNQA commenced as a result of the legal proceedings brought against the first James Bay hydroelectric project and the JBNQA was in large measure a settlement out of court of those proceedings (see par. 2.4 of Section 2 JBNQA). This distinguished it from other modern treaties and suggests that the compensation paid was at least in some measure connected to "buying the peace" through an out-of- court settlement.

(ii) Policy context

(a) No federal claims policy applicable at the time of the JBNQA

The JBNQA was not negotiated within the framework of a federal claim policy. It was not initiated as a land claim; it was not pursued as a land claim; aside from the litigation purpose referred to above, the JBNQA was seen as an attempt by Québec to fulfil its obligations under the 1912 Boundaries Extension Act.

The Act provided that Québec would:

"recognize the rights of the Indian inhabitants in the territory above described to the same extent, and will obtain surrenders of such rights in the same manner, as the Government of Canada has heretofore recognized such rights and has obtained surrender thereof, and the said province shall bear and satisfy all charges and expenditures in connection with or arising out of such surrenders; (See s. 2(c) of the federal legislation and s. 2(c) of the schedule to the provincial legislation; See also Sub-Section 2.5 of the JBNQA)".

In R. v. Sparrow, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1075 the Supreme Court of Canada while commenting on the lack of a substantive federal government aboriginal claims policy, made specific reference to the Northern Québec situation (at 1103 & 1104).

By the late 1960s, aboriginal claims were not even recognized by the federal government as having any legal status. Thus the Statement of the Government of Canada on Indian Policy (1969), although well meaning, contained the assertion (at p. 11) that "aboriginal claims to land are so general and undefined that it is not realistic to think of them as specific claims capable of remedy except through a policy and program that will end injustice to the Indians as members of the Canadian community". In the same general period, the James Bay development by Québec Hydro was originally initiated without regard to the rights of the Indians who live there, even though these were expressly protected by a constitutional instrument; see The Québec Boundaries Extension Act, 1912, S.C. 1912, c. 45. It took a number of judicial decisions and notably the Calder case in this Court (1973) to prompt a reassessment of the position being taken by government.

(b) Claims policy applying to Nunavik Inuit offshore negotiations

In 1986, the federal government adopted a revised Comprehensive Land Claims Policy. As one of its objectives, the Policy states that:

In this process (the settlement of aboriginal land claims) the claimant group will receive defined rights, compensation and other benefits in exchange for relinquishing rights related to the title claims over all or part of the land in question. (emphasis added)

The Policy continues:

Monetary compensation may comprise various forms of capital transfers, including cash, resource revenue-sharing, or government bonds. Where applicable, the amount will be clearly defined in the agreement, and no advance on the monetary compensation components of settlements will be provided before final settlement is reached. The amount of compensation may be adjusted depending upon other arrangements negotiated in settlement agreements. For example, the amount of cash compensation may be reduced in accordance with arrangements concerning resource revenue- sharing. Outstanding debts owed by the claimant group to the federal Crown will be deducted from final settlements.

The Policy further states:

In addition, an equitable application of the policy means that the overall fairness of settlements must be ensured.

This approach was reinforced at the negotiating table where it has been stated by federal officials that parity and equality among claims is required. In addition, Makivik Corporation has been told at the negotiating table that money obtained by an aboriginal group through other processes, such as impact and benefit agreements, is not taken into account when compensation for their comprehensive claims is considered by government.

There has not been a comprehensive land claims settled under this new policy absent cash compensation. There is no policy basis to argue that this claim not benefit from cash compensation at least equivalent to the levels paid out in other comprehensive land claims settlements across the country.

(iii) Monetary compensation in the JBNQA

(a) Canada's minimal monetary contribution

The JBNQA was not negotiated or concluded pursuant to any federal land claims policy. The federal government, in fact, played a minor role in negotiating the treaty save for matters affecting directly federal jurisdiction such as Category IA lands of the Crees under Sections 4 and 5 of the JBNQA and the Cree self- government legislation under Section 9 of the JBNQA.

Specifically, on the matter of monetary compensation paid under the JBNQA, of the first $75 Million, Canada paid only 43.6% (see par. 25.1.4 and Schedule 1 to Section 25). Canada paid none of the second $75 Million, this being paid by the James Bay Energy Corporation and/or Hydro-Québec (see par. 25.1.7). Once again, Canada paid none of the third $75 Million, this being paid by Québec in respect of royalties and other benefits and revenues derived and resulting from the development and exploitation of the territory (see par. 25.2.2). Canada, therefore, paid only approximately 14.5% of the total amount of compensation paid under Section 25 of the JBNQA. One third of that compensation was paid by the proponents of the James Bay Project, clearly for the purpose of settlement out of court or "buying the peace".

(b) Comparability with modern treaties

Makivik has already explained at the negotiation table on numerous occasions that the amount of compensation monies payable under the JBNQA are in no way equivalent to those paid under subsequent modern land claim treaties in Canada. The main JBNQA cash compensation included no interest factor and no factor for inflation as part of the cash compensation settlement. More particularly, Nunavik Inuit received approximately $90 Million paid out over 20 years commencing in 1975 with no interest factor payable and with no factor payable to counteract the effects of inflation during that period. In sharp contrast to this, the Nunavut Final Agreement provided for in its subsection 29.1.2 payments of TFN cash compensation over a 14-year period including a factor for interest and inflation during that period resulting in a total cash compensation of $1,173,430,953.00.

BNQA (1975) Nunavut Final Agreement (1993)

Total compensation paid (approx) $90 Million * $1.173 Billion

Period over which paid 20 years 14 years

Population 4,500 (in 1975) 17,500 (in 1993)

Interest paid by governments on cash compensation 0 $593 Million

Compensation per capita (approx.) $20,000 $67,000 * *

* * Nunavik Inuit portion of the approximately $225 Million compensation paid to Crees and Inuit under Section 25 of the JBNQA

* * * With interest calculated

(iv) Nunavik offshore claim is not a transboundary claim

The Nunavik offshore claim and claim to Labrador is not a transboundary claim. It is an assertion of rights to Nunavik Inuit homeland.

Many Inuit of Nunavik were born on the islands offshore of Québec and continue to live on and consider those islands and Arctic waters to be their homeland. The offshore area is an integral part of Inuit life and culture. Inuit of Nunavik extensively use the Arctic waters and depend for subsistence on the resources in such waters. These waters are a substantial source of food for Nunavik Inuit with at least 75% of the food consumed by Nunavik Inuit coming from the sea. Marine resources are central to the continuance and long-term stability of Inuit subsistence economy and culture.

The example raised by Canada in the Nunavut Final Agreement 1993 dealing with transborder claims of Nunavut Inuit in Manitoba is not applicable to the JBNQA situation. In the Nunavut Final Agreement, Canada explicitly excluded any compensation payable to Nunavut Inuit for the land claims in and to Manitoba. The language of the Nunavut Final Agreement is explicit:

42.1.1 Notwithstanding anything in the Agreement, Section 2.7.1 shall not apply in and to lands and waters in Manitoba.

42.1.2 Inuit shall not be entitled to seek or secure from the Government of Canada any consideration other than a definition of Inuit wildlife harvesting rights in Manitoba in exchange for any Inuit aboriginal claims, rights, titles and interests in and to the lands and waters in Manitoba.

The JBNQA has no such language with respect to Nunavik Inuit claims to the offshore area or Labrador. In fact, the federal letter of undertaking in favour of the James Bay Crees and Nunavik Inuit dated November 15, 1974 (Schedule B) makes it clear that the JBNQA does not contain any treatment of aboriginal claims in and to the offshore area, but in fact suggests it remains as an outstanding matter to be dealt with posterior to execution of the JBNQA.

(v) Canada's position suggests fraudulent misrepresentation on the part of the Government of Canada during the negotiations leading up to the JBNQA

Fraudulent misrepresentation occurs either actively (stating information which one knows to be false) or passively (deliberately omitting information) in an attempt to induce someone to do something.

Any position by Canada suggesting that Nunavik Inuit have already been paid cash compensation for their aboriginal rights and title in the offshore areas and Labrador through the compensation monies paid to them under the JBNQA raises the question of the validity of the JBNQA. It suggests that the consent of the Nunavik Inuit signatories to the JBNQA was not “informed consent”. Nunavik Inuit understood that they were agreeing to treaty terms and conditions relating to the “Territory” as defined and not areas of their traditional use and occupancy beyond the "Territory" as defined. For Canada to now take the position ex post facto that compensation monies were to address all Nunavik Inuit claims, whether settled or unsettled, whether within Québec or outside of Québec, whether onshore or in the offshore area, suggests fraudulent misrepresentation on the part of Canada vis-à-vis Nunavik Inuit.

Federal negotiators during negotiations leading to the JBNQA never mentioned the fact that the minimal federal monetary contribution (14.5%) constituted monetary compensation for Inuit or Cree interests outside of Québec and nothing in the written terms of the JBNQA would suggest such a result. If this indeed was the intention of the federal government at the time of the JBNQA, it was not disclosed and this would constitute fraudulent misrepresentation.

(vi) The federal position constitutes bad faith negotiations in the context of Nunavik Inuit treaty negotiations respecting Labrador and the area offshore of Labrador and Québec

(a) The offshore treaty commitments

The Nunavik Inuit claim to an offshore area surrounding Québec and Labrador was submitted to the Federal Office of Comprehensive Claims on June 25, 1991 in accordance with the Comprehensive Land Claims Policy. There was conditional acceptance of this claim by the federal government offered on January 7, 1992. Pre-negotiation discussions on timing and process were authorized on June 23, 1992. Acknowledgment from the federal government that the conditions had been fulfilled was received by Makivik Corporation on November 27, 1992. The claim was formally accepted by the federal government on January 7, 1993 and Cabinet approved a negotiations mandate on June 23, 1993. A Framework Agreement was signed by the parties on August 19, 1993 (See Annex 2 to this Brief). Compensation was identified as one of the several subject-matters for negotiations.

The Nunavik Inuit offshore claim is, and always has been, separate and distinct from the JBNQA. It was submitted and accepted as such. The then Minister, Pierre Vincent, wrote to the President of Makivik on June 23, 1993 as follows:

On January 27, 1992 Minister Siddon wrote to you indicating that the Government of Canada accepted for negotiation the claim submission of Makivik Corporation to aboriginal rights in certain offshore marine areas. I am pleased to inform you that the Government of Canada has approved a mandate for this negotiation and wishes to move into substantive negotiations ... The federal government is committed to resolving land claims as expeditiously as possible in a fair and reasonable manner.

The contention of Makivik is that in refusing to negotiate a compensation component to the proposed Nunavik Inuit offshore treaty, Canada is in breach of its duty to negotiate in good faith and in breach of its fiduciary duty towards Nunavik Inuit.

(b) Duty to negotiate in good faith

The Crown, having agreed to negotiate with Nunavik Inuit in regard to treaty arrangements respecting Nunavik Inuit rights and interests in the offshore areas including the signing of the Negotiation Framework Agreement on August 19, 1993, engaged the duty of the Crown to negotiate in good faith. Indeed, the Negotiation Framework Agreement itself provided inter alia in its preamble that the parties were undertaking the negotiations in good faith.

Recently, Chief Justice Lamer writing for the majority in Delgamuukw v. British Columbia, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 1010 said this about the importance of good faith negotiations:

"As was said in Sparrow, at p. 1105, s. 35(1)" "provides a solid constitutional base upon which subsequent negotiations can take place". Those negotiations should also include other aboriginal nations which have a stake in the territory claimed. Moreover, the Crown is under a moral, if not a legal, duty to enter into and conduct those negotiations in good faith. Ultimately, it is through negotiated settlements, with good faith and give and take on all sides, reinforced by the judgments of this Court, that we will achieve what I stated in Van der Peet, supra, at par. 31, to be a basic purpose of s. 35(1) ? "the reconciliation of the pre-existence of aboriginal societies with the sovereignty of the Crown". Let us face it, we are all here to stay.

Delgamuukw, supra, par. 186 at p. 1123

In his concurring judgment in Delgamuukw, Justice La Forest explained (at para. 203) the content which the Crown must give to the accommodation of the aboriginal peoples' interest:

This accommodation must always be in accordance with the honour and good faith of the Crown. Moreover, when dealing with a generalized claim over vast tracts of land, accommodation is not a simple matter of asking whether licences have been fairly allocated in one industry, or whether conservation measures have been properly implemented for a specific resource. Rather, the question of accommodation of "aboriginal title" is much broader than this. Certainly, one aspect of accommodation in this context entails notifying and consulting aboriginal peoples with respect to the development of the affected territory. Another aspect of accommodation is fair compensation. More specifically, in a situation of expropriation, one asks whether fair compensation is available to the aboriginal peoples; see Sparrow, supra, at p. 1119. Indeed, the treatment of "aboriginal title" as a compensable right can be traced back to the Royal Proclamation, 1763.

(...)

Clearly, the Proclamation contemplated that aboriginal peoples would be compensated for the surrender of their lands; see also Slattery, supra, ["Understanding Aboriginal Rights" (1987), 66 Can. Bar Rev. 727] at pp. 751-52. It must be emphasized, nonetheless, that fair compensation in the present context is not equated with the price of a fee simple. Rather, compensation must be viewed in terms of the right and in keeping with the honour of the Crown. (emphasis added)

Thus, fair compensation for the access to and use of aboriginal territories is an essential part of the Crown's fiduciary duty towards aboriginal peoples under the Constitution Act, 1982, s.35(1).

(c) Refusal to discuss a basic or standard term

Every Crown aboriginal treaty dealing with aboriginal title or aboriginal rights throughout the long historical treaty process in Canada has involved, as one component, monetary compensation paid to the aboriginal signatories.

In this instance, the Crown's refusal to include such a component in a Nunavik Inuit offshore treaty constitutes refusal to discuss a term which is basic and standard in similar treaties or agreements. In the context of labour negotiations, the Supreme Court of Canada has held that such conduct constitutes a breach of the duty to bargain in good faith. Royal Oak Mines v. Canada (Labour Relations Board) (1996), 133 D.L.R. (4th) 129 (S.C.C.)

In Royal Oak Mines, Justice Corey writing for the majority had this to say at pp. 146-147:

"There may well be exceptions but as a general rule the duty to enter into bargaining in good faith must be measured on a subjective standard, while the making of a reasonable effort to bargain should be measured by an objective standard which can be ascertained by a board looking to comparable standards and practices within the particular industry. It is this latter part of the duty which prevents a party from hiding behind an assertion that it is sincerely trying to reach an agreement when, viewed objectively, it can be seen that its proposals are so far from the accepted norms of the industry that they must be unreasonable".

"Since the concept of "reasonable effort" must be assessed objectively, the board must by reference to the industry determine whether other employers have refused to incorporate a standard grievance arbitration clause into a collective agreement. If it is common knowledge that the absence of such a clause would be unacceptable to any union, then a party such as the appellant, in our case, cannot be said to be bargaining in good faith".

If a party proposes a clause in a collective agreement, or conversely, refuses even to discuss a basic or standard term, that is acceptable and included in other collective agreements in comparable industries throughout the country, it is appropriate for a labour board to find that the party is not making a "reasonable effort to enter into a collective agreement". If reasonable parties have agreed to the inclusion of a grievance arbitration clause in their collective agreement, then a refusal to negotiate such a clause cannot be reasonable . "In those circumstances it would be reasonable for a board to infer that no reasonable union would accept a collective agreement which lacked a grievance arbitration clause and that the employer's failure to negotiate the clause indicated a lack of good faith bargaining." (emphasis added)

Continuing with the analogy of labour law, the content of the duty to negotiate in good faith would exclude such conduct as refusing to follow through on matters already agreed to¹ or changing conditions throughout the negotiation process.² This is exactly what Canada has done with respect to the compensation issue. Compensation was one of the matters agreed upon through the Negotiation Framework Agreement. If Canada intended to exclude this vital and common component from the treaty process, that should have been dealt with and agreed upon at the time of the conclusion of the Negotiation Framework Agreement.

(d) Fiduciary Duty

It is now well established law that there exists a fiduciary relationship between the Crown and aboriginal peoples from which fiduciary duties flow.

The Supreme Court has identified the direct link between the legal relationship of the Crown to aboriginal peoples and an appropriate and principled way of analyzing and interpreting the effect of section 35(1). That link is established through the fiduciary character of the Crown relationship with aboriginal peoples and the resulting duties that flow from that relationship.

In Van der Peet, the Chief Justice wrote:

The Crown has a fiduciary obligation to aboriginal peoples with the result that in dealings between the government and aboriginals the honour of the Crown is at stake. Because of this fiduciary relationship, and its implication of the honour of the Crown, treaties, s. 35(1), and other statutory and constitutional provisions protecting the interests of aboriginal peoples, must be given a generous and liberal interpretation: R. v. George, [1966] S.C.R. 267, at p. 279. This general principle must inform the Court's analysis of the purposes underlying s. 35(1), and of that provision's definition and scope.

The fiduciary relationship of the Crown and aboriginal peoples also means that where there is any doubt or ambiguity with regards to what falls within the scope and definition of s. 35(1), such doubt or ambiguity must be resolved in favor of aboriginal peoples" (emphasis added)

R. v. Van der Peet, [1996] 2 S.C.R. 507 at pp. 536- 537.

In the light of a consistent historical pattern of including monetary compensation as part of treaty arrangements, the continuing representations in federal claims policy that compensation is an integral element of modern treaties as well as the explicit undertaking by Canada in the Nunavik Negotiation Framework Agreement of August 19, 1993 that compensation was a subject- matter for negotiations, there certainly should be no ambiguity on the matter. Should anyone suggest that there is, however, the Supreme Court's direction in Van der Peet leaves no doubt that section 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982 requires good faith negotiations on the part of the Crown and this in turn requires the Crown to include compensation as an integral part of treaty- making.

The obligation of good faith incumbent on the Crown in its treaty process with aboriginal peoples is similar to that found in international law during negotiation of an agreement.

"but the reality of the obligations (to seek by negotiations terms of an agreement) thus undertaken is incontestable and sanctions can be applied in the event, for example, of an unjustified breaking off of the discussions, abnormal delays, disregard of the agreed procedures, systematic refusals to take into consideration adverse proposals or interest, and, more generally, in cases of violation of the rules of good faith (Tacna-Arica Arbitration: Reports of International Arbitral Awards, vol II, pp. 921 et seq.; Case of Railway Traffic between Lithuania and Poland: P.C.I.J., Series A/B, No. 42, pp. 108 et seq.).

Lac Lanoux Arbitration (France v. Spain), [1957] I.L.R. 101 (Arb. Trib) at 128 (emphasis added)

Moreover, treaty partners, as Nunavik Inuit and Canada are under the JBNQA, owe each other a duty of utmost good faith. In New Zealand Maori Council v. Attorney-General, [1987], 1 NZLR 641, Cook P. referred to the fiduciary duties of treaty partners (at 664):

What has already been said amounts to acceptance of the submission for the applicants that the relationship between the Treaty partners creates responsibilities analogous to fiduciary duties. Counsel were also right, in my opinion, in saying that the duty of the Crown is not merely passive but extends to active protection of Maori people in the use of their lands and waters to the fullest extent practicable.

The recent position of Canada in regard to its position on the compensation arrangements under the JBNQA amounts to a breach of the fiduciary duty of a treaty partner in revealing 25 years after the fact a position that we never disclosed and never discussed at the time of the negotiation of the treaty.

(e) Monetary compensation as one of the few new elements in the treaty relationship

Treaty provisions largely concern the mutual acknowledgment by the parties of pre-existing conditions. The Supreme Court of Canada has referred in several recent decisions to the important role of section 35(1) in reconciling aboriginal claims with Crownís sovereignty. In Delgamuukw the Chief Justice wrote:

Ultimately, it is through negotiated settlements, with good faith and give and take on all sides, reinforced by the judgments of this Court, that we will achieve what I stated in Van der Peet, supra, at par. 31, to be a basic purpose of s. 35(1) ? "the reconciliation of the pre-existence of aboriginal societies with the sovereignty of the Crown". Let us face it, we are all here to stay.

Delgamuukw, supra, par. 186 at p. 1123

One author has referred to treaties as "the first constitutional remedies" and the primary means for definition, clarification and enforcement of aboriginal rights:

"the first constitutional remedies were treaties negotiated between aboriginal peoples and then between aboriginal people and representatives of colonial governments. The Royal Proclamation of 1763 recognized this treaty process by stating that aboriginal rights could only be ceded to the Crown. A treaty-making or consensual political process remains the primary means for definition, clarification and enforcement of aboriginal rights."

Kent Roach, "Constitutional Remedies in Canada", Canada Law Book 1997, p. 15-2

In Delgamuukw, the Supreme Court of Canada characterized aboriginal title as a right in land. It is more than the right to engage in specific activities which may be themselves aboriginal rights. Rather it confirms the right to use land for a variety of activities, not all of which need to be aspects of practices, customs and traditions which are integral to the distinct cultures of the aboriginal societies. The land may be used for a variety of modern purposes not just traditional activities.

When one examines the subject-matters dealt with in treaty negotiations and usually included in modern treaty instruments, especially in light of Delgamuukw, the fact of the matter is that the vast majority of these matters do not involve the Crown conferring rights or benefits on the aboriginal signatories but rather involve the Crown recognizing and securing pre-existing rights. Monetary compensation is one of the few treaty elements where something new is being provided by the Crown. It, therefore, takes on a special standing among the usual range of subject-matters for inclusion in treaties.

For the Crown to refuse to include compensation as an element in the Nunavik Inuit Offshore treaty negotiation is, therefore, a particularly serious breach of its constitutional duties.

RECOMMENDATION

That the Standing Committee support a speedy resolution of the Makivik offshore treaty negotiations which will include an adequate cash compensation component.

FOOTNOTES __________

¹ Nolisair International Inc. (Unreported) September 29, 1992, CLRB 796.

² DeVilbiss (Canada) Ltd., [1976] 2 Can. L.R.B.R. 101 (Ont. at 114-115).

Prepared and Submitted Without Prejudice Brief Respecting Requirement of Cash Compensation as part of the Nunavik Inuit Offshore Land Claim Process and Treaty Presented to the Standing Committee on Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development November 19, 1998.

Kuujjuaq Airport

The Kuujjuaq airport serves the population of Kuujjuaq and seven other communities on Ungava Bay and the Hudson Strait, which represent 54.8% of the region's total population. It is the major port of entry and departure for passengers traveling between the south of Canada and the eastern portion of Nunavik. As well, it serves as the transshipment point for most of the air cargo for Kuujjuaq, and a significant percentage of air cargo for the other seven communities.

The airport itself has two runways - a 6,000 foot asphalt runway suitable for jet service, and a 5,400 foot gravel runway.

It operates 24 hours a day, seven days a week. First Air, a wholly-owned subsidiary of Makivik Corporation, offers a daily jet service using Boeing 727s between Montreal, Kuujjuaq and Iqaluit. Another Makivik subsidiary, Air Inuit Ltd., has scheduled flights 6 days a week serving the Ungava Bay and Hudson Strait communities using turbo-prop aircraft - Hawker Siddley 748s and DeHavilland Twin Otters.

In addition, two other Inuit companies base their operations from the Kuujjuaq Airport - Atai Air Charters and Nunavik Rotors. The Quebec Government's air ambulance jet also uses this facility.

To understand the crucial importance of this airport to the region, it is important to recognize three essential facts:

a.    Air transportation is the main, if not only practical means of transporting people and goods to, from and within the region, due to its remote location. There are no road or rail links with the south, and the summer sealift is only suitable for the bulk goods it now handles;

b. The Kuujjuaq Airport serves as a hub for air transportation networks and the Hudson Strait and Ungava Bay regions, and is the only link for these communities to domestic and international air transportation networks;

c. The Kuujjuaq Airport has a vital role in sustaining and stimulating economic development in the region.

Transport Canada is planning major repairs to the asphalt runway, which is the only one currently capable of receiving jet service. These repairs are scheduled to occur during the months of June, July, August and September in the years 2000 and 2001. For these periods, the asphalt runway will be closed to all flights.

In January of this year, the business community and other local and regional interests met to discuss the impacts of closing down the asphalt runway and to make recommendations concerning how best to deal with the situation. They concluded that the gravel airstrip should be extended and given IFR instrumentation so that a Boeing 727 with a full payload could be accommodated. It was further noted that Nunavik has been unfairly affected by the introduction of Nav Canada fees, and any additional transportation costs resulting from the asphalt runway's closure would be very difficult for the region to accommodate.

Transport Canada's has described the full upgrade and extension to the gravel airstrip as prohibitively expensive. It has also stated that it does not have the obligation to maintain jet service into Kuujjuaq.

Two other options are to upgrade the gravel strip to accommodate specially equipped Boeing 737 aircraft with a reduced payload, or to divert all jet service to either La Grande, some 600 miles distant on the James Bay coast, or to Iqaluit, and that passengers and cargo be shuttled to Kuujjuaq via turbo- prop aircraft. For reasons explained below, this scenario places such a high burden on consumers and passengers alike so as to make it completely unacceptable.

Although First Air would realize some savings on its scheduled jet service if it was diverted to LaGrande, the additional costs of chartering turbo-prop aircraft and engaging a third-party luggage and handling at LaGrande will result in an annual increase of operating costs of $3.9 million. The increase would be even higher using Iqaluit as a turnaround point.

Additionally, since turbo-prop aircraft can accommodate only one third the passengers and cargo payload of a Boeing 727, its is likely that some passengers and cargo would have to overnight in either LaGrande or Kuujjuaq. And for those passengers traveling north to Ungava Bay and Hudson Strait communities, it is conceivable that a journey between their home community and Montreal could take three days to complete. With hotels averaging $130 per night, and with high associated expenses such as food, this is an untenable situation for travellers especially in a family situation.

In order to absorb the additional costs of operation, First Air estimates it would have to increase its fares and cargo rates by 27.5%. In a region with such a high cost of living already, it is patently unacceptable that consumers in the region would have to swallow these increases, which are directly added to their cost of living since most of the cargo is essential goods.

The region, together with both levels of government, has invested substantially in developing the tourism industry, which now accommodates some 2,100 clients who travel through Kuujjuaq to hunting and fishing camps in the southern Ungava Bay region. Direct financial benefits to the region in 1998 totaled over $12.1 million dollars, a figure which does not include purchases of Inuit art and handicrafts which represents the livelihood of many individuals in Nunavik, or other spin-offs.

Since the outfitting industry operates exclusively in the months of July, August and September, we can foresee the virtual collapse of this major economic component. Outfitting is a highly competitive market, and very price sensitive. Industry figures believe that its clientele would not be willing to pay the increased costs of a package, and would look to other regions to spend their money. Moreover, the 2-hour direct jet link between Kuujjuaq and Montreal has been a major selling proposition for regional outfitters. Adding, potentially, another day's travel in each direction would render outfitting packages unfeasible for a clientele on a tight schedule. It is the nature of the outfitting industry that once a destination has been closed down, if only for two years, it is extremely difficult to build the traffic back up again.

Due to the egregious increase in the cost of living, hardships to the traveling public and the devastating effect on key elements of the regional economy, Nunavik will not submit to any plan involving the diversion of jet service to La Grande or Iqaluit. It is simply off the table for any further discussion.

Returning to the scenario of improving the gravel airstrip for Boeing 737 service, First Air still predicts an increase of costs in the neighbourhood of $1.7 million per annum, primarily due to the reduction of capacity of the Boeing 737 operating on a gravel strip compared to a Boeing 727 on asphalt. Incidentally, the cost of improving the gravel strip for Boeing 727 service is $3.5 million.

Let's now compare who is actually losing money by making improvements to the gravel strip at the Kuujjuaq airport. The following figures represent the cost implications for the two-year duration of the project.

Jet service to LaGrande

Scenario*uf shuttle to Kuujjuaq 737 service to Kuujjuaq 727 service to Kuujjuaq

Cost to Transport Canada $0 $2.2m $3.5m

Cost to region $7.8m $3.9m $.6m

Other economic impacts

Loss of tourism indus-Reduced negative Significantly reduced try; increase of related economic impacts negative economic travel expenses impacts

Therefore, it is grossly unjust that the region should have to bear the brunt of the repairs to be performed on the asphalt runway in Kuujjuaq without any upgrade to the gravel airstrip. It is important to stress that repairs done to the gravel strip will become part of the permanent infrastructure at the airport, and will allow for safer use of this airstrip by conventional classes of aircraft in the future.

When the Standing Committee on Aboriginal and Northern Affairs met Nunavik's regional organizations in Kuujjuaq during May of this year, Kativik Regional Development Council president Jean Dupuis pointed to the absence of a federal/provincial funding agreement for economic development such as exists elsewhere in the country. Were such an agreement to exist, it would be easier to fund projects of this magnitude.

Transport Canada is now acting in a vacuum without any guidance from the federal government from the perspective of regional development. Canada Economic Development (formerly the Federal Office of Regional Development - Quebec) has conducted many studies and prepared many reports concerning development in the Northern Quebec region: however, judging by the way Transport Canada has handled the Kuujjuaq Airport file up to now, these studies and reports have only served those who prepared them, and not the region nor the people living within it.

This experience closely parallels the implementation of Nav Canada policies in the region, which has not recognized the unique circumstances of Nunavik nor the adverse socio-economic impacts resulting from applying the same policies and structures as the south of Canada. We now call upon Transport Canada to provide a comprehensive funding proposal based on these objectives: to upgrade the gravel airstrip in order to maintain daily jet service to Kuujjuaq; to compensate the region directly for any increases to the cost of transportation resulting from the project; and to ensure the region will not have to participate financially in the upgrade and renovation.

The loss of this crucial link will otherwise result in a severe hardship for Kuujjuaq and the communities it serves.

Attachments:

Annex 1 - Technical Study (Rheaume Allard, Kativik Airports)

Annex 2 - Letter from Robert Davis, president, First Air

Annex 3 - Letter of Support from local businesses

ANNEX 1

KUUJJUAQ AIRPORT MAJOR REPAIR - RUNWAY 07-25

TECHNICAL STUDY

The Kuujjuaq airport serves the population of Kuujjuaq and of seven communities on the Ungava and Hudson Strait coasts. It is made of two runways oriented 07-25 and 13-31. The asphalt runway, 07-25, is 6,000 feet long while the gravel runway, 13-31, is 5,400 feet. Major works will be done on runway 07-25 in years 2000 and 2001 thus disrupting airport operations, since that runway will be closed for two periods of four months each.

The asphalt runway (07-25) is the only one that can receive large jet aircraft such as B727 and B737. The gravel runway, because of its physical characteristics can only accommodate turbo prop aircraft such as Convair 580, HS748, Twin Otter, etc. However, during the winter season, as some characteristics improve, the ground being frozen, it can accommodate B737 with weight restrictions and B727 with more severe weight restrictions. These weight restrictions are due to the length of the runway (5,400 feet) and to its longitudinal slope.

The Kuujjuaq Airport can receive aircraft 24 hours a day, seven days a week, under visual flight rules (VFR) and instrument flight rules (IFR). The minimum visibility is a _ mile and the decision height for runway 07 is 283 feet and 500 feet for runway 25. Category 1 instrument landing system (ILS) precision is available on runway 07. A non-precision approach with back course is available on runway 25. Runways 13 and 31 are equipped with non-precision approaches. The minimum visibility for these two runways is also _ mile while the decision height is 600 feet for runway 31. Therefore, runway 07-25 provides a better level of service. A pilot can land his aircraft on runway 07 when the ceiling is at 283 feet. Landing on runways 13 or 31 is possible only when ceiling is above 600 feet.

The Kuujjuaq Airport is regularly used by two airline companies: First Air and Air Inuit. First Air provides a 2-hour B727 jet service from and to Montreal on a daily basis. Air Inuit gives services to other Ungava Bay and Hudson Strait coasts communities such as Kangiqsualujjuaq, Tasiujaq, Aupaluk, Kangirsuk, Quaqtaq, Kangiqsujuaq and Salluit. Air Atai, which is a charter company operating mainly Navajo and Aztec aircraft, has its operating base in Kuujjuaq. The airport is also used by the Quebec government's ambulance airplane (Challenger). Various helicopter companies mainly carrying out mining exploration also use the airport.

The functions of the Kuujjuaq Airport are to

a) recognise air transportation as the main, if not only, means of transporting people and goods in the region due to its remote nature;

b) serve as hub for air transportation networks in the Ungava Bay and Hudson Strait region and permanently link the region to national and international air transportation networks;

c) permit access to the region for commercial, industrial and tourism activities.

Major construction work must be done in Kuujjuaq airport main runway (07-25) during summer 2000 and 2001. This runway will be closed to all traffic during June, July, August and September of year 2000 and for the same period year 2001. This will leave the airport with the secondary gravel runway oriented 13-31. In its present condition, repetitive jet aircraft landings are not possible on this runway. Improvements must be made to runway 13-31 to allow B737 frequent landings during an extended period of time. Transport Canada claimed that there are no funds aivailable to proceed with such improvements. Costs are estimated at $2.2 millions.

If these improvements are not made to runway 13-31, the community of Kuujjuaq and the other communities served by the Kuujjuaq airport will be left with a level of service which is not acceptable and will be detrimental to the economic life of the region. He airline serving the airport would have basically two options. The first one would be to take passengers and cargo from Montreal to La Grande and then transfer on turbo prop aircraft for the portion La Grande Kuujjuaq. The second option would be to do the same transfer in Iqaluit. The two-hour flight would become a five to six hour fligth with possible overnight in La Grande or Iqaluit, depending on the availability of turbo prop aircraft.

In both of these cases this represents, for the airline, additional expenses estimated at $XXXXXXXXXX. These costs cannot be assumed by the airline and would be charged to the users.

Moreover, this type of operation will most probably kill the tourist industry. Over the past few years, lots of efforts have been made to develop fishing and hunting aspects of that industry. The months of July, August and September represent the peak of tourism season. In a competitive market, the two-hour jet flight from Montreal is a convincing argument. The alternative we are left with, connection in La Grande or in Iqaluit, will discourage the majority of our clientele. This important economic activity would be affected not only for years 2000 and 2001 but also for many years to come. This industry, so sensitive to the quality of air transportation in Nunavik, would most likely never recover from this reduction of quality of service during two consecutive years.

As we can see, it is essential to improve runway 13-31 in order to maintain jet service during the time runway 07-25 will be closed.

Two options for improving runway 13-31 have been looked at up to now: improvements needed for a Boeing 737 and for a B727. Improvements for B737 are estimated at 2.2$ millions while improvements for a B727 are estimated at 3.5 millions. In the first option, daily maintenance would be required to maintain the runway in safe operational conditions. Weight restrictions would apply. In the second option (B727), severe weight restrictions would apply. Despite a runway daily maintenance program, it is probable that B727 landings will not be possible during extended rainy weather period.

It is our recommendation that runway 13-31 be improved to accommodate Boeing 737 aircraft. Even then, this type of aircraft will be submitted to weight restrictions this meaning additional costs for the airline and ultimately for the customers. Aircraft will have to be rented by First Air. A limited number of B737 cargo exist in Canada. A decision must be made in 1998, so that First Air can undertake negotiations with other companies to ensure availability of that type of aircraft in May 2000.

Even with a jet service, costs for cargo and passenger tickets will increase. We do believe it is Transport Canada responsibility to assume these additional costs since they are a direct consequence of the Transport Canada project. Transport Canada should reimburse the consumers directly or subsidise the airline.

Carp, 9 November 1998

The Honourable David M. Collenette Minister of Transport Place de Ville - Tower C 29th Floor 330 Sparks Street Ottawa, Ontario K1A 0N5

Dear Sir/Madam,

On 23 June 1998, Transport Canada issued a news release regarding a project to upgrade the paved aircraft manoeuvring areas of the Kuujjuaq Airport.

First Air has been advised by Transport Canada that this project will close Runway 07/25 to substantially all aircraft types for the months of June through to September for the years 2000 and 2001. We have also been informed by Transport Canada that the load bearing surface capability of Runway 13-31 is suitable for heavy jet transport category aircraft under summer temperature conditions. This situation effectively prohibits First Air from utilising B737 and B727 type aircraft to provide scheduled air service to the community during the above noted period.

As a result of this project, First Air's operating cost will increase dramatically during the two-year construction period. In order to maintain reliable scheduled air service First Air must, unfortunately, pass on any increases in cost to the service users. However, given the relatively small number of service users, these cost increases will have a significant impact on the local economy and residents of the community. We would like to work with the community to address this problem as the responsibility for recovery of these cost increase should not lie solely with the community of First Air but rather with Transport Canada.

In order to initiate this process, First Air is providing the following two possible scenario to quantify, through a preliminary estimate, the additional costs which will be incurred to maintain an acceptable level of scheduled service.

Scenario 1

This scenario involves the rerouting of all First Air regularly scheduled jet flights so as to terminate at La Grande, Quebec and transferring all freight, mail and passengers to Air Inuit HS748 turboprop aircraft for furtherance to their final destination of Kuujjuaq. This scenario would result in some cost savings to First Air as a result of the reduced jet flight tine and the introduction of new costs for the Air Inuit HS748 as well as for third party handling.

The approximate additional costs for this scenario are as follows:

B727 scheduled service savings (First Air Montreal/La Grande vs Montreal/Kuujjuaq) $(630,000)

HS748 charter costs (Air Inuit La Grand/Kuujjuaq) $4,260,000

Handling (third party - estimate) $270,000

Total additional cost per annum $3,900,000

Scenario 2

This scenario involves the exclusive use of B737 combi/gravel-equipped aircraft to provide service as is currently flown and assumes that Transport Canada carries out at their cost the necessary upgrades to Runway 13/31's load bearing surface. First Air currently utilises a combination of gravel and non-gravel-equipped B737 aircraft, B727- 100 aircraft and B727-200 aircraft based upon projected and actual loads. First Air would experience an increase in operating costs as a result of the exclusive use of the B737-200 aircraft due primarily for the need for additional flights to provide the required lift.

The approximate additional cost to maintain B737 service during the four-month period would be as follows:

B737 additional lift capacity schedules flights (Montreal/Kuujjuaq, primarily tourist traffic) $960,000

B737 additional lift capacity cargo flights (Montreal/Val d'Or/Kuujjuaq freight, mail, traffic) $690,000

Total additional cost per annum $1,650,000

The above scenario are based upon a number of assumptions including:

1. All costs are in current dollars, without profit and under current regulatory requirements. Future changes in costs or the regulatory requirements have not been considered.

2. Total lift required is based upon current data for passengers, freight and mail.

3. It is assumed that Air Inuit will supply the HS748 lift with its existing fleet. Costs may well be higher to mobilise the short term, high volume operation as outlines under Scenario 1.

4. First Air presently owns one non-gravel-equipped B737, which operates in the Eastern Arctic and leases two gravel-equipped B737 aircraft, which operate primarily in the Western Arctic. The leases on the gravel-equipped aircraft expire in September 1999. Scenario 2 assumes the availability of a gravel-equipped aircraft. In the event that an aircraft had to be gravel-equipped, it would cost approximately $600,000. This cost has not been included in Scenario 2.

5. All costs are approximate and subject to further review once the situation regarding the status of Runway 13/31 is finalised.

The net effect of Scenario 1 will result in an increase to all First Air passenger, cargo and mail fares of approximately 27.5%. Under Scenario 2 and considering that Transport Canada assumes all costs for Runway 13/31 upgrades, First Air rates would have to increase by approximately 12% in order to simply recover additional operating costs.

Although the runway surface of 13/31 will be upgraded, it is important to note that the length of this runway (combined with the gravel surface an slope) places very severe payload limitations for both B727 and B737 aircrafts. Maximum payloads cannot be carried particularly under landing conditions for B727 aircraft and take-off conditions for B737. This payload restriction is the primary reason for the higher cost of operation.

As you can see, the additional cost to the community is alarming under either of the above noted scenarios. Given a choice, it is obviously in the best interest of the community to ensure that scheduled jet service be continued in order to mitigate additional costs and to maintain acceptable levels of passenger comfort and expedience.

First Air provides an essential service to this community given the absence of road, rail and a limited marine transport season. The residents of this community for not have the luxury of alternative transport choices, as would any resident of a similar southern community. For this reason, Transport Canada must be responsible for the recovery of any additional cost to provide reliable, essential, scheduled air service.

The community is still feeling the severe effect of Nav Canada imposed fees which will continue to increase through the year 2000. This downloading of this previously supplied government service through privatization will add approximately 10% to the cost of cargo transportation alone when fully implemented. First Air firmly believes that the distribution of Nav Canada fees is unfair and to now exacerbate this situation by increasing costs as a result of runway surface improvements is totally unacceptable.

We would like to meet with you at your earliest convenience with the appropriate community leaders to discuss this important problem of Nunavik.

Yours truly,

FIRST AIR

Robert (Bob) Davis President & CEO

cc. Mr. J. Adams - KRG Mr. G. St Julien - MP Mr. P. Aatami - First Air Mr. P. Horsman - Air Inuit Mr. D. Allard - Makivik Mr. B. Myers - DIAND Mr. H. Gordon - Canada Post

B R I E F

TO

STANDING COMMITTEE ON INDIAN AND NORTHERN AFFAIRS

REGARDING

NUNAVIK MARINE TRANSPORTATION INFRASTRUCTURE PROGRAM

Presented By: Makivik Corporation -and- Kativik Regional Government November 19, 1998

NUNAVIK MARINE TRANSPORTATION INFRASTRUCTURE PROGRAM

The James Bay and Northern Quebec Agreement (hereinafter the "J.B.N.Q.A.") signed twenty-three years ago almost to the day by the Government of Canada and representatives of the Inuit of Nunavik contains an entire chapter devoted to Inuit Economic and Social Development. Included in this chapter is a section relating to marine infrastructures for each community in Nunavik, namely:

"29.0.36 Canada and Quebec shall, together with the respective Inuit communities, undertake, as soon as possible, and in accor- dance with the funds available, studies respecting the establish- ment of seaplane bases and public wharfs, airstrips, navigational aids and docking facilities, including access road and streets in each community. Such studies shall involve the Regional Govern- ment as soon as it is established."

More than twelve years elapsed from the signing of the J.B.N.Q.A. when, pursuant to the 1985-90 Canada-Quebec Subsidiary Agreement on Transportation Development, without any consultation with the Inuit of Nunavik, Quebec commenced the construction of small off-loading pads in two communities of Nunavik to facilitate the government's own sealift operations. The construction of these "quasi-wharves" was halted in l988 at the request of the then Chairman of the Kativik Regional Government who had been informed by Quebec government officials that such construction would fulfill any obligation they may have had under section 29.0.36 of the J.B.N.Q.A.

As a result of these protestations, a "Canada/Quebec/ Inuit Marine Transportation Committee" was created, which committee toured all fourteen communities of Nunavik in February 1989, meeting with and interviewing mayors, councilors, members of Landholding Corporations, hunters and fishermen as well as other interested parties such as shippers, carriers, store managers, etc. The findings of the Working Group were collected in a Report authored by Mr. Jacques Brouard from Transport Canada and published in June l989.

The concerns of Nunavik residents were uniform throughout the fourteen communities. The provision of a marine infrastructure program for Nunavik must ensure:

a) improved navigational safety conditions in a region where marine navigation remains an essential mode of transportation;

b) improved conditions of access to water for villages where large tidal fluctuations impede the capability of residents to navigate most of the time;

c) improved sealift operations and facilities in villages totally dependant on the sealift for the delivery of dry goods and heavy supplies;

d) improve the economic outlook of coastal villages in terms of wildlife harvesting, tourism development, and inter-community trade, etc.

While the Working Group continued to meet following the issuance of the report by Mr. Jacques Brouard, neither the federal nor the provincial government representatives to the Working Group were mandated to resolve the marine infrastructure needs of residents of Nunavik.

On September 12, l990, an Agreement respecting the Implementation of the James Bay and Northern Quebec Agreement (hereinafter referred to as the "Implementation Agreement") was signed between Canada and Makivik Corporation on behalf of the Inuit of Nunavik. Among other items, the Implementation Agreement contained an annex specifically relating to Marine Transportation (see Annex A attached). The said annex provides for the establishment of a Northern Quebec Marine Transportation Infrastructure Program including an implementation schedule, which program was to become effective no later than October l, l994.

Notwithstanding the terms of the Implementation Agreement, the appointment of a federal representative took time. A new "first" meeting of the Working Group was called on January 24, l 199l however federal officials still had no specific mandate and no budget within which to act, not even funding for travel. As a result the federal representative withdrew from the Working Group on April 3, l99l.

As a result of the lack of mandate of government representatives, a lack of funds to ensure adequate studies could be carried out, changes in personnel, shifting of responsibility for the marine infrastructures within departments and the failure of the federal and provincial governments to come to an understanding on funding for this project, two full years elapsed. It was not until January 1993 that Makivik was assured that studies to be funded by both the federal and provincial governments would take place to design the appropriate infrastructure on a community -by -community basis. Makivik was further assured that the federal and provincial departments were now fully involved in this work and that the study phase should lead directly to the implementation of the program.

Actual consultations and studies commenced during the summer of 1993 on three communities identified as representative of the marine conditions found in the other eleven communities in Nunavik, the communities selected were Quaqtaq, Puvirnituk and Kangiqsualujjuaq. The remaining eleven communities were to be studied during the summer of l994 with a final report tabled to the Working Group in April 1995.

During this entire period, at various meetings with government representatives and consultants, the Inuit of Nunavik had been presented with computer enhanced models and maquettes of the type of facilities being proposed. Nunavik residents were led to believe that the entire program costing approximately $120 million plus or minus 25% would most likely be implemented over a period of ten years or less.

Needless to say, through these community consultations, expectations had been raised not only of finally receiving the marine infrastructures foreseen in the J.B.N.Q.A. but also of the employment and economic development benefits such construction would have for the region.

Notwithstanding the extensive pre-feasibility studies which took place and which recognize the need for the construction of marine infrastructures in each of the l4 villages of Nunavik, implementation of the program was once again delayed. The Inuit party was informed that program funding for the construction of the marine infrastructures which had been available at the time of the signing of the Implementation Agreement was no longer available. While the parties had acknowledged that there was no guarantee as to the level of funding of the marine infrastructure program, there was an implicit acknowledgment through both the negotiations leading up to the Implementation Agreement and in the years subsequent to the implementation thereof that there would be some level or degree of federal funding to enable creation of a marine infrastructure program for all of Nunavik.

It was not until May 1996 that the Working Group was effectively re-convened and whose mandate it would be to review the technical studies prepared for each of the fourteen communities with a view to reducing the cost of the program as well as to draft an Agreement between all parties with regard to the implementation of a marine infrastructure program for Nunavik. This mandate resulted in the scaling down of the marine infrastructure program from a cost of approximately $120 million to approximately $80 million in 1996 dollars plus or minus 25%. Moreover, throughout the balance of 1996 and until the summer of 1997, draft Agreements-in-Principle were prepared by the parties. The draft Agreement-in-Principle provided for the construction of an $80 million program over a ten year period and contained key provisions with regard to the financing of the program, project management, hiring of Inuit enterprises and workers to carry out the construction work, amongst others.

Concurrently with the re-convening of the Working Group, a special finance sub-committee was created regrouping various departments and/or ministries of the federal government under the direction of the Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development. The mandate of the sub-committee being to elaborate various scenarios and recommendations as to securing the actual funding required to meet the construction costs.

Once again, the Inuit party's expectations of obtaining adequate marine infrastructures and the hope of employment and economic benefits to the region were raised. In fact, so as not to lose an additional construction season and although the terms of a final Agreement-in-Principle had not been reached, the federal government approved and secured funding in excess of $2 million towards the commissioning of technical studies, final drawings and specifications as well as environmental studies for the three communities initially studied, namely Kangiqsualujjuaq, Quaqtaq and Puvirnituq.

Funding for the technical studies was made available in equal parts through the Department of Fisheries and Oceans, Transport Canada and the Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development. These three departments recognizing their obligation to the Inuit of Nunavik to proceed on the Marine Infrastructure Program agreed to inject $l million each year for a period of ten years (ie. a total of $30 million). Further efforts were to be made to secure additional funding from other federal departments or agencies.

Throughout 1997, discussions with the federal representatives on the sub-committee regarding finance were based on the implementation of an $80 million program. Negotiations continued with regard to the terms and conditions of an Agreement- in-Principle based on an $80 million program, the draft form of which was eighteen pages, covering all the various aspects of the program as previously mentioned.

It was not until December 23, l997 that representatives of Makivik Corporation were convoked to a meeting with representatives of the Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development and were presented with a two page Agreement to fund construction of marine infrastructures in communities to be determined for a total amount of $30 million payable over a ten year period. The representatives of Makivik were informed that no additional funding was available and if not accepted, there was little doubt that the funds would not be available in the future.

The meeting of December 23, l997 was followed by a letter from Minister Jane Stewart dated January 5, l998 addressed to the then President of Makivik Corporation indicating that the Corporation had until January 9, l998 to accept or refuse the terms of the December 23, l997 agreement. The Minister did, however, recognize in her January 5, l998 letter that the level of funding was insufficient to complete all of the projects identified in the program and indicated that her Ministry would continue to use its best efforts to identify additional funding.

Given the "take it or lose it" ultimatum, on January 19, 1998 amidst the power outages resulting from the ice storm of the century, the Inuit indicated its acceptance of funds as sufficient for the construction of marine infrastructures in only three of the fourteen communities of Nunavik. The Agreement was signed in separate parts in the month of June 1998.

Makivik has, with the support of the Department of Indian and Northern Affairs Canada applied for funding in the amount of $l0 million to the Department of Regional Development for Quebec. While this process is ongoing, even if successful in obtaining such funding, same would be insufficient to complete the program.

CONCLUSION

The Inuit of Nunavik are a marine people who have traditionally and continue to this day depend on hunting and fishing as an important part of their diet. The extensive pre-feasibility studies conducted clearly demonstrate the need in all fourteen communities for improved navigational safety and access to water; improved facilities for sealift operations all of which will serve to improve the economic outlook of these coastal villages. It is unacceptable that only three of the fourteen communities will see their needs for marine infrastructures met.

The provision relating to marine infrastructure in the James Bay and Northern Quebec Agreement formed part of an entire chapter regarding Inuit Economic and Social Development. In a region of high unemployment and facing tremendous barriers for economic development, the realization of a complete marine infrastructure program is essential. The job creation potential and economic spin-offs of the program are far-reaching.

It is our position that the Government of Canada has failed to fulfill its obligations regarding marine infrastructures for Nunavik as contemplated by the Implementation Agreement signed in l990. It is our position that the inordinate delays in implementing a complete Northern Quebec Marine Transportation Infrastructure Program within the timeframe foreseen are solely the fault of Canada. The Government of Canada has acted in bad faith and has mislead the Inuit of Nunavik since the signing of the Implementation Agreement with regard to the level of federal funding to enable the creation of a marine infrastructure program for all of Nunavik.

On behalf of the Inuit of Nunavik, we urge this Standing Committee to recommend to the Department of Indian and Northern Affairs that it must, on behalf of the federal government provide sufficient funding for the Inuit of Nunavik to ensure that a marine infrastructure program in accordance with the revised cost estimates prepared in l996 of $80 million plus or minus 25% is realized. The Inuit of Nunavik cannot accept a marine infrastructure program of "haves" and "have nots".

Air Inuit Ltd

With respect to Air Transportation issues, we would like to first express to you our appreciation for this committee's prompt issue of two letters of inquiry to the Minister of Transport in June, letters concerning Medevac and Nav Canada charges in Nunavik, which were made in response to our petitions to you on these subjects in Kuujjuaq, May 20, 1998.

In spite of your interventions however, we are to report to you that the conditions wh9ich inspired our original petitions remain essentially unchanged. Today, we wish to formally revisit both issues. We will propose to you a solution to the problems Nav Can's current charging design brings to Nunavik for, hopefully, your renewed and more vigorous action.

1. New duty-time regulations and our inability to respond to all medevac's in Nunavik.

Following Guy St. Julien's letter of inquiry in June, the Minister of Transport declined to issue Air Inuit an interim restricted duty time waiver for twin turbine, two-pilot response for life threatening emergencies in Nunavik. It was requested that we participate in Trans-Canadian meetings with the Ministry on this subject, which were scheduled for late summer or fall. We have recently been advised that they have now been postponed until the New Year.

Given the importance of this issue, not to mention the proud, internationally recognised history of bush aviation in Canada, we are extremely disappointed that the Ministry is unable to accord medical emergency response in Nunavik a higher priority on their agenda. In the manner of the forementioned tradition established by our professional ancestors, we would have thought that this issue would warrant immediate and energetic efforts on behalf of the Minister's officials, regardless of their conservative position on duty times.

Since our meeting in May, there have been a number of cases in Nunavik where severely ill people were obliged to hold overnight in outpost stations waiting for an aircraft; luckily, none were fatal.

In view of the above developments, we again request that this committee petition the Minister for an interim waiver, in accordance with operational protocols to be defined with our Regional Office in Dorval, for Air Inuit.

2. The disproportionate impact of Nav Canada charges on Northern Canadians and particularly Nunavik.

In order to appreciate the severity of the negative impact of these new costs on the inhabitants of Nunavik, some familiarity with the socio-economic context of our region is required. Briefly, the population of Nunavik is roughly 8,500 souls, 8,000 of which are Inuit. The emerging local economy is extremely fragile; disposable income is practically non-existent in the majority of the population. It is obliquely important that our studies continue to indicate that economic activity in the area to the southern infrastructure and the southern workforce.

By our calculations, and indeed Nav Can's own predictions, Nav Can's new charges, as they are proposed to be applied, will still cost the residents and the economy of Nunavik more that $1,000,000.00 annually. This comes on the heels of other increases in our airline's costs of some $3,000,000.00 over the last 36 months, all due to Federal initiatives (CARs, duty-time, and the like). Our users simply do not have the requisite income to absorb these levels of increase. Our efforts at local development will suffer a severe blow as a result of them.

Since these new costs come from different offices of the government, we seriously doubt if any one person in the Ministry of Transport, or the Ministry of Finance for that matter, is aware of the cumulative economic impact of these Federal initiatives on Nunavik.

Nav Canada's latest version to their proposed charges lays claim to consideration for the north by the following items:

1. By delaying phase 2 implementation until November 1, 1999 for the "north".

But, they define "north" as the area "north of the 60th parallel" which excluded our main bases in Nunavik.

2. Nav Canada required by legislation to burn off its accumulated 1997 surplus of some 30 million dollars, did delay phase 2 implementation for all areas until March 1, 1999.

But, this strategy does not result in any deduction in costs for our region, only a delay of a few months until their imposition.

3. Nav Canada's latest revision to their proposed charges includes alleviation for fire fighting in the north.

But, we do not have any trees in Nunavik and the area is covered in snow or ice for most of the year.

4. We invested and participated in Nav Can's "consultation process" particularly in arguing against the disproportionate charges for the main aircraft type we fly. Nav Can did reassess the charges by aircraft type.

But their revised plan, while lowering costs for other aircraft, increased the charge for our HS748 by 25%.

We sincerely hope that this four point "good news script" imposed by Nav Canada is nor a punitive response to our vigorous protestation of their northern charging program.

In the interests of brevity we are excluding here our fundamental arguments against Nav Can's design for the north they are included in the accompanying appendix and we are confident that you will find them sound upon review. We wish to persuade you to endorse the following proposal since we are regretfully convinced that legislative intervention will be required to realize it.

In his letter of response to Guy St. Julien's letter of inquiry this summer the Minister of Transport, David Collenette, establishes for us all that Nav Can has saved air carrier and users roughly $150 million dollars. By the program's design these savings, which are admirable and to Nav Can's managerial credit, fall uniquely upon the large southern carriers and southern Canadians:

As a result of these good efforts a southern family of four will now realize new pocket money in the order $24 per year. In contrast, a family of four living in Nunavik will now suffer an after tax surcharge in the order of $500 per year.

If Nav Can were obliged by the Government of Canada to shift only 10% of Nav Can's published southern savings to the northern sector (Nunavik and NWT), that southern family of four would still pocket $21.60 per year while the northern family of four would be left unaffected. In the long view, it is critical to also note that our efforts to enhance northern development would not be dealt a delibating blow.

In it's current Phase 2 design, Nav Can's program will fall upon an area where,

1. The median annual income for Inuit adults is $10,114.

2. Where 57% of the Inuit adult population earn less than $10,000 per year.

3. Where, in a community like Umiujaq, the cost of a nutritious basket of food for a family of four for one week was already, prior to Nav Can, $254, compared to $125 for Ottawa, $130 for Winnipeg.

Since at the same time the median income for a white northerner exceeds $35,000 per year, we are obliged to point out that Nav Can's current design targets Inuit citizens particularly severely. We consider this highly regrettable given the contemporary Canadian context.

The ANS Commercialisation Act meant to recognise the special circumstances of the North, its vast distances, its sparse population, its remote locations, its dependency on air transport for essential services, and its lack of transportation options. Paragraph 35(1)(g) of the Act provides that "charges for designated northern or remote services…must not be higher than charges for similar services utilised to a similar extent elsewhere in Canada."

Since the purpose of this committee is to act on both Aboriginal issues and Northern Development issues, and since our participation in Nav Can's consultation process was unsuccessful, we now urge you to revisit this legislation and enforce the interpretation of provision of paragraph 35(1)(g) of the ANS Commercialisation Act to mean that "the impact per capita of these charges will not be substantially greater for northern Canadians than for southern Canadians — we urge you to shift that 10% north."

Thanks for taking the time to hear us.

APPENDIX A: NAV CAN AND NORTHERN AIR TRANSPORT

We argue that Nav Can's fee design penalises the north for the following reasons:

1. Canadian taxpayers, including the Inuit of Nunavik, have already paid for the navigation infrastructure through their historical contributions to the Federal Government. Now, the Government is selling the infrastructure to "Nav Can" and, in effect, getting paid again for it through these elevated new fees. This is double dipping - a claim that is supported by a recent article in the Globe and Mail that notes: "Members of the Federal Committee on Air Policy Issues say that Ottawa is taking hundreds of millions of dollars (from the aviation industry) every year as it transfers operations from Transport Canada to private sector non-profit corporations"

2. Nav Can's present formula for charging included a "gross weight of the aircraft" parameter. This shouldn't be directly applied in our case since, in view of the runway lengths, even if the HS748 (a common aircraft in the north and the mainstay of our fleet) has a gross weight of roughly 45000lbs, we are obliged by new Air Regulations to leave at less weight due to the runway lengths at a number of locations. Also, in view of our geography and other factors, such as the availability of alternate airports and the amount of fuel we must carry, we further suffer decreased payloads vis a vis southern operators. If we are being charged the same as the south we should have had, at the outset, the same quality of infrastructure. And, an important final point in this regard: with respect to runway lengths we differ from the NWT: ours are largely 3500 while the NWT's are 4000. Northern residents, particularly Nunavik, are thus unfairly affected.

3. The Nav Can charges were designed to be offset by the elimination of the old ticket tax and they are, in the south. The old tax, however, only applied to passengers, not cargo. In the south, most traffic is passenger. As a result a carrier like Air Canada, and their southern passengers, cone out as net savers. Nav Can's formula however, failed to consider the north's universal dependency on air transport particularly in the cargo dimension.

4. Citizens in the north receive all of their basic commodities by air. Road or rail as an alternative means of transport are not available in Nunavik. If a northern family finds air travel costs too high, they cannot opt for Via Rail or Greyhound. In a geographical area where the volume of cargo transportation exceeds that of passenger, the entire sector has now become subject to the new fees.

5. Unlike running an aircraft between Ottawa and Montreal, or Calgary and Vancouver, northern cargo operations run northbound full and southbound empty. Fees for both directions must thus be made up on one payload, which redoubles their impact. Here again, northern citizens are bearing a disproportionate fiscal burden.

6. The population in Nunavik is roughly that of Arcola, Saskatchewan. The entire population of the NWT approximates that of Sault Ste. Marie, Ontario. It is inconceivable that a Federal Government initiative concerning air transport would result in the extraction of 1 million dollars per year from a town like Arcola or 11 million from a town like Sault Ste. Marie. That is hits Nunavik this hard is, we trust, contrary to the Canadian way.

NAV CANADA

NAV CANADA has replaced TRANSPORT CANADA as the country's provider of civil air navigation services. As such, NAV CANADA co-ordinates the movement of aircrafts in Canadian domestic airspace and international airspace assigned to Canadian control.

Under the Civil Air Navigation Services Commercialisation Act, NAV CANADA, a private sector company, is enabled to charge for air navigation services.

As of March 01, 1998, "phase 1" of the NAVCAN charges came into effect. At the same time, "ATT" (Air Transportation Tax) was decreased to a maximum of $30 a ticket from the previous maximum of $55 a ticket.

Unlike "ATT" which the airlines were collecting on behalf of the government, and remitted directly to the government, "NAVCAN" charges are charged to the airlines (rather than the passenger). The airlines are now forced to increase their fares to recuperate the NAVCAN charges.

The passenger, therefore, when reviewing his ticket, sees a tax reduction in ATT and an increased fare from his airline service provider.

On November 01, 1998, ATT has been phased out completely; the $30 maximum per ticket is eliminated. At this time, "phase 2" of NAVCAN was to come into effect, with a further significant increase in the NAVCAN user fees.

However, with NAVCAN being a non-profit organisation, and after review of their revenues to-date, phase 2 has been postponed to, currently, March 01, 1999.