My focus today will be on the political and security aspects of the situation in Syria as it has evolved since my director general, Mark Gwozdecky, appeared before you on December 3, 2013. Details on the humanitarian situation will be given by my colleague Leslie Norton. My colleague Isabelle Roy will update you on the international community’s response to the Assad regime’s use of chemical weapons in Syria.
The war in Syria continues to rage, and Syrians continue to die and flee their homes in horrific numbers. The death toll now exceeds 130,000. The regime continues to target fighters and civilian population centres indiscriminately. The humanitarian consequences and regional political implications are dire. The regime retains the military momentum in the conflict, but overall, neither the Assad regime nor opposition groups are in a position to militarily defeat the other in the medium term. It is not clear, however, that either side realizes that reality.
An increasingly noteworthy development has been the emergence of conflict between various opposition military groups. While the opposition fighters have never really managed to produce a united front, the war is now evolving into a series of different conflicts involving a variety of actors with different goals and shifting allegiances.
In addition to fighting the regime, elements of the opposition have begun fighting each other as al-Qaeda-affiliated groups, such as the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, or ISIL, seek to stake out territory. This is being resisted. Two separate al-Qaeda groups, ISIL and Jabhat al-Nusra, have even clashed with each other. The Kurds, meanwhile, have announced the establishment of a provincial government in northeastern Syria. Efforts continue to bring the various arms of the opposition under some form of coherent leadership control—excluding the al-Qaeda groups—but that remains a work-in-progress.
The Assad regime has taken advantage of these clashes and divisions within opposition-held areas to attempt to expand its terrain in and around the cities of Homs and Aleppo. These divisions on the battlefield mirror the cleavages that continue to exist at the political level in the opposition ranks. The Syrian opposition coalition is the main opposition political umbrella, but it continues to be divided and has little credibility on the ground inside Syria. It remains only partially representative of the myriad opposition groups on the ground.
In the meantime, the war continues to leak across Syria’s borders. Bombings and violence in Lebanon have accelerated. Echoes of the sectarian conflict between Shia and Sunni in Syria are being heard in Lebanon, fuelled in part by Hezbollah's intervention on the side of Assad. Both Jordan and Lebanon, but also Iraq, Turkey, and Egypt, continue to bear the heavy social and economic burdens of rapidly growing refugee movements. Free-flowing arms and the implantation and growing strength of terrorist groups in the Levant threaten the stability of the entire region. Despite these challenges, the spillover risks are, for the moment anyway, being contained.
In response to increasing needs, during his recent trip to the region announced additional Canadian assistance in response to the Syrian crisis. Canada’s total assistance to date now includes $353.5 million in humanitarian assistance, $210.6 million in development assistance to Jordan and the region, and $67.6 million in security-related regional assistance. My colleagues Leslie and Isabelle will discuss this assistance in greater detail.
Despite the carnage, the regional threats, and the military stalemate, the prospects for peace in the medium term remain dim, but a step in the right direction was taken with the convening of the Geneva II conference last month. Joined by 40 other countries, including Canada, the opposition coalition and the representatives of the regime met for the first time, face to face, in Montreux and later Geneva, Switzerland, to discuss Syria’s future.
Expectations going into Geneva II were very low, and the opposition coalition very nearly boycotted the conference entirely. Many members of the coalition opposed sitting down with the regime, and a number disavowed it entirely. Some extremist elements even threatened coalition members who did attend. In the end they came, but the episode reaffirmed the dysfunction of the opposition and renewed doubts about their ability to deliver their supporters in the event of any agreement short of regime surrender.
But the opposition did find a largely sympathetic room on the opening day in Montreux. Most countries blamed the Assad regime for the war and its consequences, while expressing support for the goals of the opposition. At the same time, they urged both sides to work towards a political solution that respected the rights and freedoms of the Syrian people.
As Minister noted:
Until the dignity and freedom demanded by the Syrian people are enshrined in a peaceful settlement and the institutions that will uphold it, this war will not end, the terrorist threat will increase, the human nightmare will continue, and the violence will threaten all of Syria’s neighbours.
In Geneva, the three main points of discussion were: prisoner releases, humanitarian access, and the formation of a transitional governing body.
The question of a transitional governing body was and remains the most contentious. It is the fundamental point of division. The Assad regime was not prepared to talk about a post-Assad era, while the opposition came to Geneva expressly to underscore that Assad and those close to him would have no role in the transitional period. In this, the opposition has wide support, including Canada’s.
The first round of talks ended on January 31 without agreement on any issue. They are scheduled to resume on February 10, but the regime has not yet agreed to the date. In the meantime, the war continues.
Thank you very much for the opportunity to speak to you today.
My colleagues will now provide an update on the humanitarian and chemical weapons situations in Syria.
:
Indeed, millions of Syrian residents are struggling to meet their basic needs, while millions of Syrians are trying to find refuge in neighbouring countries. The vulnerability of these populations is increasing more and more quickly, and their limited resources are diminishing rapidly. Neighbouring countries and host communities, for their part, are dealing with a great deal of pressure due to the arrival of such a large number of people in such a short time.
According to the United Nations, 9.3 million people need humanitarian assistance in Syria. As of January 30, more than 2.4 million people had registered as refugees, while hundreds of thousands of others chose, for various reasons, not to do so. In all, it is estimated that 3 million people—more than half of whom are children—are seeking refuge in neighbouring countries. The United Nations estimates that the number of refugees could reach 4.1 million by December of 2014.
The situation of children is of particular concern. Indeed, the conflict has caused immense suffering among boys and girls of all ages in Syria, both physical and psychological. Beside the direct threats of which they are the victims, such as violence, abuse, lack of safe drinking water, and inadequate nutrition, they whish becoming a lost generation as several million children inside and outside Syria are not attending school. We have to do everything in our power to prevent the loss of this generation of Syrian children.
[English]
Since your last briefing there have been several developments.
On December 19 outlined the details of our latest $45 million in Canadian humanitarian assistance. Through UN agencies, the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, and NGO partners, our contribution is focused on winterization activities to ensure that Syrians, whether they've remained in Syria or have sought refuge in neighbouring countries, have access to life-saving relief items and shelter to help them survive the very harsh winter conditions. Funding is also focused on prevention and response to sexual and gender-based violence as well as support for water and sanitation, food assistance, and medical interventions, including those in response to the polio outbreak.
Polio remains a major concern in Syria as several cases have been confirmed in the last months. The international community, led by the World Health Organization, was quick in responding to the situation and launched a mass vaccination campaign targeting 22 million children across the entire region. So far three rounds of vaccination have taken place, and the preliminary results are encouraging. We must, however, keep in mind that a substantial number of children have not yet been reached, and we must continue to advocate for the vaccines to reach children across the country, including in besieged areas.
In December, the UN launched revised appeals in response to the humanitarian needs stemming from the Syrian conflict. These appeals represent the largest request for humanitarian funding for a single situation in the UN’s history. The combined value of all humanitarian appeals in 2014, including the UN appeals and the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement appeals, is approximately $6.9 billion U.S., or approximately $7.7 billion Canadian.
On January 15, I accompanied Deputy Minister Paul Rochon to the Second International Humanitarian Pledging Conference for Syria in Kuwait. Donors pledged a total of $2.3 billion at the conference or $800 million U.S. more than last year. Canada used the opportunity to reiterate its commitment to remaining one of the leading donors to the Syria response.
Following the pledging conference, the travelled to Jordan where he announced additional support of $150 million in humanitarian assistance in order to respond to the increasing needs of conflict-affected people in Syria and in neighbouring countries. This brings the total Canadian humanitarian response to the Syria crisis to $353.5 million.
Of the $150 million announced, $100 million will be allocated to helping ensure that the basic needs of affected populations are met, by providing life-saving assistance such as food, safe drinking water, shelter, health care, and protection inside and outside Syria. As was the case with previous funding, this support will be provided through experienced humanitarian partners.
The remaining $50 million will be allocated to the “No Lost Generation” initiative that outlines education and protection activities for children in Syria and in the region. Led by UNICEF, in partnership with the UNHCR, Save the Children, World Vision, and other NGO partners, the strategy aims to address the hidden impact this long conflict has had on children, with practical investments to expand access to learning and psychosocial support, strengthen social cohesion and peace-building, and restore hope for the future to millions of children. The details of Canada’s support to this initiative are still being worked out. However, the $50 million allocation will help protect thousands of children and give them access to education.
[Translation]
As you learned during the committee meeting held on December 5, the United Nations Security Council published a presidential statement last October to urge Syria to grant immediate access to humanitarian organizations wishing to offer lifesaving assistance to people impacted by the crisis. In spite of this measure, and in spite of the great efforts made by United Nations member states and organizations, little progress has been made to improve humanitarian worker,s access in Syria.
Canada continues to press all parties for improved access for humanitarian personnel, who have routinely been targeted regularly in this conflict, and to ensure their security. Humanitarian access was in fact one of the issues discussed by representatives of the opposition and the regime during the Geneva II talks, which recently ended in Switzerland. Unfortunately, these talks did not lead to an agreement on improved humanitarian access.
Despite the challenges, significant results have been achieved by our humanitarian partners. I will be happy to answer your questions in this matter.
As the conflict drags on, humanitarian needs keep rising quickly and dramatically. Humanitarian aid, along with development and security assistance, is imperative to mitigate the disastrous consequences this conflict had, not only on the Syrian population but on the neighbouring populations as well.
Thank you.
Mr. Chair, committee members, it is with great pleasure that I speak before you today to give you an update on current developments regarding Syria's chemical weapons. You will remember that my director general, Ms. Sabine Nolke, briefed this committee on December 5.
[Translation]
At that time, we could but note the dedication and cooperation of Syria in meeting the objectives of the disarmament mission. It had met phases 1 and 2 of its obligations, i.e. 1- allowing the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) inspectors to visit and inventory every site related to Syria's declared chemical weapons program, and, 2- effectively dismantle all equipment to create and mix chemical weapons.
Today, phase 3, the actual destruction of remaining chemicals, should have been well on its way, but unfortunately, this is not the case. It is an unfortunate coincidence that we should be meeting on this day, Feburary 5, which was the date set by the Executive council of the OPCW by which all declared chemical agents were to have been removed from the Syrian territory. A deadline that is clearly not met.
The situation started to deteriorate in mid-December when fighting increased significantly around chemical weapons facilities and along roads which were to be used to move chemical agents to the port of Lattakia. There were other challenges external to the will of the Syrian government, such as customs problems in Lebanon, through which most of the equipment needed to transit from, and an unusual winter storm which blocked roads not only in Syria, but in the whole region for days.
[English]
All of these obstacles led to Syria not being able to deliver the chemical agents identified to be of highest priority to the port of Latakia by the benchmark date of December 31 for destruction aboard a U.S. ship, the MV Cape Ray.
The executive council of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, the OPCW, did not condemn this delay initially, as there were legitimate reasons for it. It is a well-known fact that the timelines set out in the U.S.-Russia framework agreement at the root of this process remain extremely ambitious, and leave little to no margin for unpredictable events.
Syria was finally able to make a first delivery to the port of Latakia on January 7, and a second one on January 27. These two shipments, however, represent only 53 tonnes of the approximately 700 tonnes that should have left Syria by the date of December 31. A total of 1,300 tonnes of chemical agents needs to be removed from Syria. Today less than 5% has been removed.
[Translation]
At the January 30 extraordinary meeting of the Executive council of the OPCW, Canada in coordination with the Western European and other WEOG countries representatives made a strong call on Syria to stop obfuscating and pick up the pace of transport of chemicals to the port of Lattakia. Syria replied that it is still committed to meeting its obligations. Its ally, Russia, continues to argue that Syria is working in good faith and will eliminate its arsenal.
In fact, just yesterday, Russia, through a statement by its deputy foreign minister Gennady Gatilov, offered assurances that Syria would complete the removal process by March 1.
[English]
Despite the delays, with the effective destruction of Syria's chemical weapons production, mixing, and filling facilities, even if Syria keeps hold of the chemical components, it is no longer capable of using these to make a weapon. Regardless, we are of the view that removing these chemicals must happen much sooner rather than later.
[Translation]
The US vessel MV Cape Ray left Norfolk on January 28 after a complete redesign to accommodate the destruction by hydrolysis of priority 1 chemicals. It should arrive at the Italian port of Gioia Tauro approximately 3 weeks after its departure, depending on crossing conditions.
Many countries stepped up with significant contributions to the OPCW-UN Mission to ensure that it was able to carry out the destruction phase. Denmark and Norway deployed two commercial vessels for the transportation of Syria's priority agents from the port of Lattakia to the Italian port of Gioia Tauro for their transfer onto the U.S. vessel, the MV Cape Ray, for their eventual destruction by hydrolysis in the Mediterranean.
Russia, China, Norway, Denmark and the UK have also provided frigates to ensure the necessary security for the maritime operations. The U.K. has offered to destroy a small portion of the first priority chemical agents on its own soil. Germany has offered to destroy some of the residue resulting from the hydrolysis process aboard the MV Cape Ray.
Significant financial contributions were also made by States Parties to the Chemical Weapons convention to the OPCW Syria destruction fund. Some as large as tens of millions from Norway and Canada to more modest amounts by smaller countries which normally do not contribute to such operations such as India: $1 million USD; Czech Republic: $518,000 USD; Belarus: 15 portable field kitchens. Such commitments reflect the breadth of the international consensus on eliminating Syria's chemical weapons program.
[English]
Of note, Canada has definitely stepped up its efforts in response to this crisis. As my colleague Dennis indicated, through the global partnership program, the stabilization and reconstruction task force, and the counterterrorism capacity building program, Canada has contributed $67.6 million in security-related assistance to the region to address the conflict in Syria more broadly, including programs and equipment related to weapons of mass destruction threats such as those posed to the region by a chemical weapons attack in Syria.
Specifically with regard to Syria, we provided $2 million in support to the OPCW to help it carry out the initial UN investigation on allegations of use in Syria, as you know. We also contributed in October 2013 the use of a Royal Canadian Air Force CC-177 to deliver 10 U.S.-donated armoured civilian vehicles to the OPCW UN mission, as you also know.
Also, the , during his recent visit to the Middle East, announced on January 24 a total contribution of $15 million to the UN-OPCW mission. Of this, $10 million will be allocated to the OPCW trust fund, and the remaining $5 million will be provided to the U.S. Department of Defense in support of their destruction efforts aboard the MV Cape Ray. This places Canada among the top five donors.
Canada and other like-minded countries have expressed deep concerns at the current delays and have firmly urged Syria to intensify its efforts. Our expectations remain that Syria will continue to follow through on its commitments.
We will continue to closely monitor the situation to ensure Syria carries out its obligation to meet the final deadline of June 30, 2014.
Thank you.
:
They are living with families and wherever they can find places to stay. In Jordan, a fair number are in camps, but a fair number are also living with the hosting communities. I think you're accurate in suggesting this has a potential destabilizing impact on these countries, particularly Lebanon and Jordan.
I'll leave Dennis to comment on those specific details of destabilization, but with regard to the capacity to absorb, I would say our humanitarian partners did ramp this up to what they call an L3 crisis. What that means is the United Nations has to bring all resources and personnel required. The A team is supposed to be brought in theatre to respond to this crisis.
Certainly, when we had our bilateral conversations with the heads of all the agencies in Kuwait, they were very clear that this is one of the top crises they are dealing with. I think we all know they were also dealing with the Central African Republic, South Sudan, and responding to the typhoon in the Philippines.
Just to say, the partners are aware. Resources are a big challenge for the partners. If, as an international community, we can continue providing resources, the United Nations, the NGOs, and the Red Cross movement can continue to help out to the best ability they can, but that will require neighbouring countries to keep, of course, asylum space open for those crossing the borders.
There will be a tipping point. I don't know what that is.
:
To follow up a little bit on the issue of the tipping point, I guess the problem and the risk is that nobody knows where that point is. If we had looked at the beginning of the crisis and said what would be the tipping point in terms of the kinds of pressures the neighbouring countries could bear, I think we would probably look at the numbers now and say that's probably about right, but they seem to be able to manage.
Certainly, the pressures on the individual countries vary depending on the country. We're not close to a tipping point in Turkey in terms of stability because of Turkey's size, it's capability, etc.
We and others are putting a lot of money into Jordan to try and make sure it's able to deal with the camps and the refugees who are there. This comes after years of Iraqi refugees flowing into Jordan as well, so they have had a double hit over the years. They seem to be managing that well. They are worried and concerned, obviously.
Lebanon seems to be on a tipping point constantly and seems to be able to manage. The regional assistants will be going to Lebanon and elsewhere to try and stabilize the situation, but as Leslie said, the situation of the refugee inflows into Lebanon are unique in terms of not going into camps. As I said earlier in my statement, there have been some sectarian reverberations in Lebanon that are a concern. It's always a delicate balance in Lebanon, and finding out where that tips is really unknown.
:
In terms of diplomatic initiatives, I think, frankly speaking, that all of our bets are on the Geneva process. It's really the only game in town at this stage. There were very low expectations going into Geneva. I was willing to bet that they wouldn't even last a couple of days, and they were there for more than a week, which was somewhat encouraging. Did they make any progress? No, not really, but they have agreed, at least in principle, to meet again.
Again, while expectations are low, the fact is that there are discussions ongoing. Perhaps there may be some breakthroughs on access, humanitarian access, or perhaps some localized ceasefires. That's I think probably at this stage the most we could hope for. Again, even for those, I think expectations are low.
Certainly, the Russians have been much more supportive of the regime. They remain so, but they did put a lot of pressure on the regime to go to Geneva, and to go back to Geneva, so they're playing a role in that regard.
The Chinese have had a much lower profile, a much lower role in this. It's really been very much, on the diplomatic front, an American and Russian initiative, and that's what got the Geneva process going. The rest of it, I think, is more sort of sideshows at this stage.
:
There is another parallel process under way. I would characterize it as diplomatic. Coming out of the October 2 presidential statement at the UN Security Council, the emergency relief coordinator, Valerie Amos, with Australia and Luxembourg, set up essentially what is called the high-level group on access with seven key sub-working groups. Really they are all focused on elements of access.
It is an attempt to bring together the key countries that have influence over Syria or the opposition forces to try to improve access. The working groups are either on cross-line access or access to besieged areas, for instance, or the demilitarization of schools and hospitals. These are the things that they are focusing on. They've broken into working groups, and a number of the interested countries have joined these particular working groups and they are trying to work to get some real results.
There is also one on the vaccination campaign. At the end of January, Canada hosted a meeting in the mission in Geneva, again bringing together some of the key partners in the UN as well as interested member states to try to find ways to facilitate improved access for the vaccination campaign. So that's a bit of a parallel process, but it's really focusing on improving access.
And now, the emergency relief coordinator will brief, as I've mentioned, the Security Council on February 12, trying to put forward some real actions that we can implement now, today, to try to improve the lives of people in Syria.
Thank you for your testimony today.
I want to go back to the issue of Geneva II, and the fact that very clearly the Assad regime is not prepared to remove itself so that this transitional government can take place. That's very clear, and unfortunately it's very discouraging because, as you point out, the two sides are unfortunately in a stalemate situation, and maybe don't even know it.
My colleague from the Conservative Party referred to Russia and China. I'd like to know more about that, if I can. Russia and China have obviously taken the side of the Assad regime, in the sense of telling the rest of the world to stay out of it. Obviously, as long as they have that support, it is some sort of legitimization for them, and perhaps also the source of considerable assistance of a military kind. Are we putting any pressure on Russia and China, to the extent that we can, to face the fact that this misery and the continued death toll are going to rise, that nine million people need humanitarian aid, and that this is going to continue this way?
:
Again, while the Chinese are sort of lumped in with that group, they're less of an issue in this than Russia.
Certainly, Russia is their major international backer—actually, they are along with Iran, and we can get into that later, maybe. But certainly Russia is a principal supporter. We have spoken to the Russians. I have spoken to them personally as well. They have very firm views. Their concerns—in some respects their interests, but also their concerns—relate largely to the spread of terrorism and the degree to which that may spread back into Russia. There are all sorts of reasons they give. There's also the whole issue of interference with internal affairs and Orange Revolutions and all of this sort of thing. We've spoken to them, the Americans have spoken to them, everyone has spoken to them. They're not moving.
That being said, they were very helpful in getting the regime around the table and in supporting the Geneva I communiqué, which sort of lays out various principles, including a transitional governing body—with mutual consent, I should add. So they're not completely obstructive on this. They are in support of a process that can somehow bring an end to this. So that's encouraging, and we've been supportive of that, and certainly the Americans who work very closely with them.... But efforts to try to get them to abandon their regime are going nowhere, really.
:
Thank you for your question.
As you indicated, there is the No Lost Generation initiative. It has been estimated that 6 million children do not have access to school and 3 million of those children are not protected. A UNICEF report entitled Education Interrupted was published last December 12.
The No Lost Generation strategy has a budget of $1 billion. It will help 2.2 million children in Syria who do not go to school. That means two thirds of the children. There are also another half-million children outside of the country who do not go to school.
In total, 5.5 million children are affected.
I am sorry, but I am getting the numbers a little bit mixed up
[English]
So it's $1 billion to reach the 6 million who are without access to learning and the 3 million who are without protection support. You have 4.3 million inside the country—1.2 million who are refugees—and they anticipate that more than 3.3 million have actually dropped out of school.
There is a need for long-term planning and host country support, and a need for international investment to be doubled. There is a need to scale up on innovative ways to reach children. Of course, they also need to come up with innovative ways to reach children who are in Syria, where the education infrastructure is completely devastated. A big chunk of this money is within the SHARP and the RRP, which are the appeals for inside and outside Syria. So a big component of that is within those particular appeals. It's being led by UNICEF. UNHCR is a large partner. World Vision, Save the Children, and a couple of other NGO partners have come together with regard to this campaign.
There is another initiative under way. I'm sure people have heard of Gordon Brown's initiative called Reaching all Children with Education in Lebanon. That is another initiative that is complementary to this initiative as well.
So they're looking at the needs across the region and trying to really have a campaign, a strategy, to address these needs.
:
Thank you for your question.
The last time, my answers in French were not clear. I will answer in English, to ensure that I am understood correctly.
[English]
As you all know, through our humanitarian assistance we support the provision of shelter protection, food assistance, health care, basic relief items, and education as well, within and outside Syria. I'm going to give you three examples of results to date because we do have extensive results.
More than 10 million crisis-affected people were provided with access to safe water in Syria in 2013.
Up to 3.8 million people in Syria and more than 2 million refugees in the neighbouring countries received food assistance through the World Food Programme and its partners each month in 2013.
Relief items were provided to 4.86 million people inside Syria in 2013.
We have a lot more examples if you're interested, but they're along that scale and our partners have been able to achieve these results with the help of Canada.
Refugees. We've accepted 1,300, I think 1,100 privately sponsored and 200 government sponsored. Considering the amplitude of this tragedy with millions in refugee camps spread over several countries, and considering we had many more from Bosnia, 5,000 I think, and Kosovo I think about 5,000, and a fairly large number from Uganda in the seventies, and the Hungarians, and the Czechoslovakians, and the Vietnamese, I have difficulty understanding and believing the thesis, which has been presented by the UNHCR and by the Canadian government, that just about everybody over there really wants to stay there because ultimately they want to go back to their country. They don't want to go to other countries.
The pickup by other countries has been very low so Canada is not at the bottom of the pile in this particular case. But can you really explain to me why our number is so low because we're seeing children growing up in these camps, and they may be there for many years to come. I'm sure their parents would jump at the opportunity in some cases to begin a new life with those children in a country such as Canada. Certainly the Syrian diaspora in Canada is saying we should be accepting many more.
Could you talk to me a little bit about that situation. What are the statistics? How many people are actually applying to be accepted by other countries? Is there a backlog?