Introduction

On 3 March 2022, the House of Commons Standing Committee on Procedure and House Affairs (“the Committee”) received a letter sent jointly from Greg Fergus, the member for Hull–Aylmer, and Yasir Naqvi, the member for Ottawa Centre.

In it, Mr. Fergus and Mr. Naqvi asked the Committee to re-evaluate the boundaries of the parliamentary precinct and consider expanding them to include Wellington and Sparks streets in Ottawa, and Laurier Street in Gatineau. In their view, such a revised designation of the precincts “will allow for more robust safety protocols to be put in place.”^[1]

The letter refers to the Freedom Convoy protest that took place on Wellington Street, and other nearby streets in Ottawa’s downtown core, from 28 January 2022 until ending around the third week of February 2022.

At its meeting held that same day, pursuant to its mandate under Standing Order 108(3)(a)(i) and 108(3)(a)(ii), the Committee agreed to commence a study on expanding the federal jurisdiction for the operational security of the parliamentary precinct to include sections of Wellington Street and Sparks Street.^[2]

The Committee’s first meeting on this study was held on 28 April 2022. Over the course of its study, the Committee heard from 35 witnesses during seven meetings. The Committee wishes to extend its sincere gratitude to all witnesses who participated in this study for their insights and valuable contributions.

Background

A.   The parliamentary precinct and Parliament Hill

1.    Parliament Hill

The Parliament of Canada Act (PCA) provides two identical definitions of the geographic area called Parliament Hill in sections 79.51 and 80(1)(a). According to the PCA, Parliament Hill is the area of ground “in the City of Ottawa bounded by Wellington Street, the Rideau Canal, the Ottawa River and Kent Street.”^[3]

At Confederation in 1867, the rights to the property of Parliament Hill were transferred by the imperial government to Canada.^[4] This property was classified as “ordnance property,” and had been held by the Crown for public purposes (i.e., for defence or generally) since 1823.^[5]

Section 108 of the Constitution Act, 1867, provides that certain enumerated public works and properties of each province became the property of Canada. Among these enumerated properties is item 9, which is property transferred by the imperial government, and known as ordnance property.

Under the Department of Public Works and Government Services Act,^[6] the minister of Public Works and Government Services, currently styled as the Minister of Public Services and Procurement, exercises control of the grounds of Parliament Hill and construction, repair and maintenance of its buildings.^[7] Meanwhile, the landscaping and upkeep of the grounds and Parliament Hill are the responsibility of the National Capital Commission (NCC).

However, it should be noted that under parliamentary privilege, both the House of Commons and the Senate possess the right to regulate their own internal affairs. This right includes “overseeing those areas occupied and used by Members to assist them in performing their parliamentary functions […].”^[8]

In addition, decisions regarding the use of Parliament Hill are made under the authority of the committee responsible for Parliament Hill^[9]. This committee is co-chaired by the Sergeant-at-Arms of the House of Commons and the Director of the Corporate Security Directorate of the Senate. The Committee is also composed of representatives of different federal departments.^[10]

2.    Legal definitions of the parliamentary precinct

The PCA was amended in June 2015 to create the Parliamentary Protective Service (PPS) and make it responsible for all matters relating to physical security throughout the parliamentary precincts and the grounds of Parliament Hill. Section 79.51 of the PCA provides a definition of the parliamentary precinct; however, that definition is for the purposes of the sections in the PCA on the PPS. According to section 79.51, the “parliamentary precinct” is:

the premises or any part of the premises, other than the constituency offices of members of Parliament, that are used by the following entities or individuals or their officers or staff, and that are designated in writing by the Speaker of the Senate or the Speaker of the House of Commons:

• (a)    the Senate, House of Commons, Library of Parliament or Parliamentary committees;
• (b)   members of the Senate or the House of Commons who are carrying out their parliamentary functions;
• (c)    the Senate Ethics Officer or the Conflict of Interest and Ethics Commissioner;
• (d)   the Service; or
• (e)    the Parliamentary Budget Officer.

The practice has been for the Speaker of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Commons to table before Parliament a joint designation of the areas considered to be the parliamentary precinct.^[11]

In Parliamentary Privilege in Canada, 2^nd ed. (1997), J. P. Joseph Maingot defines the “parliamentary precincts” as

the premises that the House of Commons occupies from time to time for its corporate purpose. It includes the buildings where proceedings of the House of Commons and its committees take place, and where Members’ offices are located.^[12]

As such, the parliamentary precinct is not limited to particular buildings, may vary from time to time, and is not limited only to buildings located on Parliament Hill. A map of the parliamentary precinct can be found in Appendix A.

It may be worth noting that the term parliamentary precinct, in these above definitions, refers to the interior of the physical envelope of a given building occupied by Parliament for its corporate purposes. Meanwhile, the physical area surrounding the parliamentary precincts (i.e., roads, sidewalks, etc.) is not, at present, considered part of the precinct. To that end, the grounds of Parliament Hill have not been considered part of the parliamentary precinct.^[13]

Despite legal or historical definitions, many people, including some witnesses who appeared before the Committee, colloquially refer to the whole of Parliament Hill and its surroundings as the "parliamentary precinct.”

B.   Police jurisdictions on and around the parliamentary precinct

1.    Jurisdiction of the Parliamentary Protective Service

The PPS took over responsibility for all matters relating to physical security throughout the parliamentary precinct and the grounds of Parliament Hill as of June 2015. The creation of the PPS was a response to an incident that demonstrated a need for better coordination among security forces.

Prior to the establishment of the PPS, physical security was carried out inside the Parliament buildings by the Senate Protective Service and the House of Commons Security Services, and by the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) on the grounds of Parliament Hill.

Under section 79.52(2) of the PCA, the Speaker of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Commons are responsible for the PPS. This is in keeping with the role of the Speakers as custodians of the powers, privileges, rights and immunities of their respective houses and their members.

The Director of the PPS, who is required by the PCA to be an officer of the RCMP, is responsible for the control and management of the PPS and leads the integrated security operations throughout the parliamentary precincts and Parliament Hill, under the joint general policy direction of the Speakers of the Senate and the House of Commons.

The power or right that Parliament possesses to provide security for the parliamentary precinct, and in particular, for parliamentarians, parliamentary staff, the public, and outsiders with business in the precinct, is an exercise of the parliamentary privilege held by the institution of Parliament to regulate or manage its own internal affairs free from outside interference.

Maingot explains that the parliamentary precincts “[i]ncludes those premises where each House, through its Speaker, exercises physical control to enable the Members to perform their parliamentary work without obstruction or interference.”^[14]

Security for parliamentarians, staff and the general public is essential, rather than incidental, to enabling Parliament to conduct its work. Without adequate security, Parliament would be greatly impeded in its core functions of legislating, debating and holding government accountable.

2.    Jurisdiction of relevant police services

Parliamentary privilege provides that each House has the power to control and regulate the proceedings within the walls of their respective precincts. As such, outside police forces are not permitted within the parliamentary precincts on official police business unless they have first either obtained permission from the appropriate Speaker or have been invited to enter by Senate or House of Commons security staff.^[15]

However, should events arise inside the buildings of the parliamentary precinct that require additional policing assistance, the PPS or relevant security staff will ask for and receive assistance from the RCMP and/or the city police.^[16]

In addition, the RCMP also assumes special security duties as the national police force, notably protecting Canadian dignitaries, such as the prime minister, as well visiting foreign dignitaries.

Meanwhile, the streets surrounding Parliament Hill come under the jurisdiction of the Ottawa Police Service (OPS). Further, other security forces, such as the Service de police de la Ville de Gatineau (SPVG), the Ontario Provincial Police (OPP), and the Sûreté du Québec (SQ), may also have responsibilities in certain situations.

Summary of Witness Testimony

A.   Evidence from Parliamentarians

1.    Appearance of the Minister of Public Safety and Minister of Public Services and Procurement

a)   The Long Term Vision and Plan for the Parliamentary Precinct

The Honourable Filomena Tassi, P.C., M.P., Minister of Public Services and Procurement, provided the Committee with information about, among other things, Parliament’s ongoing Long Term Vision and Plan (LTVP) for the parliamentary precinct, which launched in 2001.

According to Ms. Tassi, an overall goal of the LTVP was to “restore, modernize and preserve the heart of Canada’s democracy, and to ensure that it can be enjoyed by all Canadians for many years to come.”^[17] She noted that restoration work on one of the most important heritage sites in Canada was an enormous undertaking.

Ms. Tassi indicated that the restoration of heritage parliamentary buildings would result in a modern workplace for parliamentarians, and create a welcoming, safe, accessible, and inviting space for Ottawa residents, people across the country and those around the world.^[18] The buildings would also move towards carbon neutrality and climate resiliency.

In the context of the Committee’s study, Ms. Tassi noted that by 2030, about 50% of all parliamentary offices will be located on the south side of Wellington Street. In that respect, she told the Committee that “Wellington will no longer serve as a border for Parliament but will, instead, run right through its core.”^[19]

b)   Jurisdictional Matters: Control and Care

Ms. Tassi told the Committee that the work being conducted to carry out the LTVP has brought into focus three long-standing questions about the parliamentary precinct and the lands that surround it: ownership and control, security, and governance.^[20] She told the Committee that the parliamentary precinct was a “complex environment involving many stakeholders with varying and overlapping areas of accountability.”^[21]

Ms. Tassi noted that the parliamentary precinct extended beyond Parliament Hill, to include, for example, parts of the three city blocks that face the Hill and the Senate of Canada Building.^[22]

In terms of enumerating partners who share jurisdictional authority on the parliamentary precinct, Ms. Tassi noted that first and foremost there was Parliament itself. Further, Public Services and Procurement Canada (PSPC) was the custodian for precinct and responsible for its operations and funding. The (NCC) has jurisdiction over federal land use and design, and was responsible for the visitor experience along Confederation Boulevard.^[23] The City of Ottawa held responsibility for all municipal infrastructure, including city streets. The geographical area also housed the Prime Minister’s Office and the Privy Council Office.^[24]

Ms. Tassi recounted to the Committee that in 2012, the Auditor General reported that

the complex governance and the lack of clarity pertaining to the roles and responsibilities for the parliamentary precinct posed a significant risk for the implementation of the Long Term Vision and Plan.^[25]

She indicated that the Committee’s study represented an opportunity to provide input on clarifying accountabilities, simplifying the operational context, and streamlining decision-making.^[26] Further, Ms. Tassi stated that PSPC’s approach to undertaking work on the LTVP was to have collaborative and coordinated approach among partners and stakeholders.

In response to a question from a member of the Committee about plans to propose changes to the jurisdiction over Ottawa’s interprovincial bridges, Ms. Tassi stated that any such proposal would be studied, along with its potential impacts.^[27]

c)    Jurisdictional Matters: Security

The Honourable Marco Mendicino, P.C., M.P., Minister of Public Safety told the Committee that the law enforcement partners responsible for policing the parliamentary precinct, and its near environs, include the PPS, the RCMP, the OPS, the OPP and other law enforcement partners^[28] through the RCMP’s national capital region command centre.

Mr. Mendicino told the Committee that the PPS’ primary mandate was protection for all those on the grounds of the precinct, but not enforcement of the law. He said PPS’ role was to ensure safety but not to charge and arrest those who break the law.^[29] As such, during emergency situations, there needs to be interoperability and coordination between the PPS and the police of jurisdiction so that there can be enforcement.

In the case of the police response to the Freedom Convoy, there was real-time operational coordination among all partners, using an integrated command centre to develop and oversee a joint enforcement plan under the leadership of the OPS.^[30]

Mr. Mendicino encouraged the Committee, during its study, to carefully consider how the different police mandates work, separately and in concert, in order to achieve the highest levels of communication, coordination and interoperability.

d)   Invocation of the Emergencies Act

During the appearance by Ms. Tassi and Mr. Mendicino, some members of the Committee asked questions about the invocation of the Emergencies Act. In particular, it was asked which police agency asked for the Emergencies Act to be invoked?

In response, Mr. Mendicino stated that

there was a very strong consensus among law enforcement that the Emergencies Act was necessary as stipulated in the letter from the Canadian Association of Chiefs of Police who said, and I quote “that the unprecedented acts of civil disobedience preceded the invocation of the Emergencies Act.”^[31]

2.    The Honourable Vernon Darryl White, Senator

The Honourable Vernon Darryl White, Senator, who has subsequently retired, appeared before the Committee as an individual.

Prior to his appointment to the Senate, Senator White served as Chief of Police with the OPS and the Durham Regional Police Service. He also worked for the RCMP for nearly 25 years. He has chaired the Senate Speaker’s Advisory Committee on Security since 2015.^[32]

Senator White emphasized the importance of good relations between the various law enforcement and security jurisdictions. He said that, with the National Capital Region straddling the border between two provinces and being the seat of the federal government, an understanding of jurisdictions is key to sustaining a law enforcement model for the people who work and live there.^[33]

According to Senator White, there is one particular issue that needs to be addressed when contemplating an expansion of the parliamentary precinct: the vehicular traffic that is permitted on Wellington Street and the west side of Elgin Street, next to the National War Memorial. Senator White noted that, in the wake of the shooting incident at the memorial and on the Hill in 2014, a concerted effort was made to increase security in the precinct. The potential for a catastrophic event on Wellington Street was discussed.^[34]

The Senator pointed out that many upgrades were made to security on Parliament Hill following the events of 2014, but virtually nothing was done to improve the security of Wellington Street during the same period. He warned that, as long as direct vehicular access was permitted to the street in front of the parliamentary precinct or the Langevin building^[35], the risk existed for a car bombing like the one in Oklahoma City in 1995. In this attack, more than 300 buildings were damaged and 168 people killed with a single car bomb. The Senator asserted that, as long as vehicles have direct access to Wellington Street, the risk of them being used to deliver explosives and cause a disaster remained high.^[36]

In his opinion, the best way to immediately reduce this threat was to remove all vehicular access from Wellington Street and the section of Elgin that fronts the side of the Langevin building, thus allowing for a buffer zone to be pushed as far south as Sparks Street and maybe beyond.^[37] He reiterated that, while not a part of the parliamentary precinct, the Langevin building houses the Office of the Prime Minister and for that reason constitutes a high-risk target.^[38]

Senator White stated that lessons needed to be learned from the experience of the Freedom Convoy. He noted that, while Ottawa hosts 250 protests a year, what occurred in January and February 2022 was unprecedented in terms of scale. In his opinion, nobody could have accurately predicted the scale of the Freedom Convoy. Referring to testimony heard previously by the Committee, he also stated that the information collected on the Freedom Convoy provided insufficient warning for police in the National Capital Region to be fully prepared. However, the information collected from Ottawa allowed other cities to better manage subsequent protests.^[39]

In response to a question about holding a national summit of the various actors involved in public security to enable a coordinated response, Senator White agreed that a more sustained dialogue would be helpful for dealing with this type of event. In his opinion, the RCMP needs to take a more forceful stance nationwide in dealing with events with national security implications.^[40]

B.   Evidence from Officials from the House of Commons

The Committee heard the testimony of several officials of the House of Commons. Michel Bédard, Interim Law Clerk and Parliamentary Counsel of the House of Commons, testified publicly on 27 October 2022. For their part, Michel Patrice, Deputy Clerk (Administration) and Pat McDonell, Sergeant-at-Arms, appeared before the Committee in camera on 28 April 2022.

1.    Michel Bédard, Interim Law Clerk and Parliamentary Counsel, House of Commons

Mr. Bédard stated to the Committee that the PCA designates the PPS as being responsible for all matters respecting physical security throughout the parliamentary precinct and Parliament Hill. He noted the following two definitions under the PCA:

• Parliament Hill is the grounds within the City of Ottawa bounded by Wellington Street, the Rideau Canal, the Ottawa River and Kent Street; and
• the parliamentary precinct includes the premises used by the House of Commons, the Senate, their members and other parliamentary entities, and are designated in writing by the Speaker of the Senate or the Speaker of the House.^[41]

Mr. Bédard indicated that PPS’ security mandate is circumscribed and location-based; it includes only Parliament Hill and the parliamentary precinct. However, it would be possible, should Parliament desire to do so, to expand the geographical area over which the PPS is mandated to provide security to parliamentarians. This area could include part of Wellington Street and potentially other streets.^[42]

Mr. Bédard stated that this expansion could be accomplished by amending the definition of Parliament Hill that is found in the PCA. Parliament Hill could be expanded to include a larger geographical area, including streets currently owned by the City of Ottawa. He noted that should these streets become incorporated into the geographical area of Parliament Hill and become federal property, this would, in turn, extend the PPS’ mandate to provide physical security over those areas.^[43]

C.    Evidence from Current and Former Police or Security Service Representatives

As part of its study, the Committee heard from representatives of various police or security services with responsibilities on or around the parliamentary precinct. These witnesses were Michael Duheme, Deputy Commissioner, Federal Policing, RCMP; Carson Pardy, Chief Superintendent of Police and Commander of the Northeast Region of the OPP; Steve Bell, Interim Chief of the OPS; Trish Ferguson, Acting Deputy Chief of the OPS; Luc Beaudoin, Director of the SPVG; Superintendent Larry Brookson, Acting Director of the PPS; and Patrick McDonnell, Sergeant-at-Arms and Corporate Security Officer of the House of Commons. The Committee also heard from Peter Sloly, former chief of police for the OPS, who appeared before the Committee as an individual.

All of these witnesses spoke to the current jurisdictional boundaries between the various police or security forces around the parliamentary precinct, as up to six services can have some responsibilities in this zone. The importance of cooperation and ongoing communication across the different services was a recurring theme.

These witnesses also shared their thoughts and perspectives on the Freedom Convoy in Ottawa in January and February 2022. Most described the event as “unprecedented.”^[44]

Potential measures to enhance the security of the parliamentary precinct and its immediate vicinity were also addressed by most of these witnesses. Among the proposed options were expanding the parliamentary precinct and closing Wellington Street to vehicular traffic.

The suggested expansion of the parliamentary precinct and, by extension, of the PPS’s jurisdiction, did not elicit the same response from all witnesses. According to Mr. Bell, even in an expanded parliamentary precinct, the jurisdiction of the PPS under its current mandate would continue to be limited to security issues. The OPS would remain the police force responsible for Criminal Code^[45] offences committed on the parliamentary precinct, and the OPS–PPS partnership would need to be maintained.^[46] However, Mr. Sloly proposed amending the Ontario Police Services Act^[47] and relevant federal statutes to provide the PPS with full policing powers in the parliamentary precinct, including for calls involving mental health, substance abuse, sexual assault and gang-related activity.^[48] For his part, Mr. Brookson stated several times that the PPS is not a policing organization,^[49] and that service would continue as is with regards to services to citizens and 911 operations.^[50]

1.    Deputy Commissioner Michael Duheme, Federal Policing, Royal Canadian Mounted Police

In his presentation to the Committee, Mr. Duheme focused on the Freedom Convoy and the jurisdiction of various police forces.

a)   Jurisdictions and Inter-force Cooperation

Mr. Duheme told the Committee that the OPS, the PPS and the RCMP all have different responsibilities in Ottawa. The OPS is the police service with overall authority in this jurisdiction: it investigates, makes arrests and lays charges under the Criminal Code and provincial and municipal laws, even within the parliamentary precinct. The PPS, in turn, provides physical security on Parliament Hill and in buildings designated by the Speakers of the Senate and the House of Commons. Finally, the mandate of the RCMP in the National Capital Region is police protection and investigation, which includes protecting certain government officials and investigating threats related to national security, serious international crime, organized crime and cybercrime.^[51]

Mr. Duheme also clarified the role of the RCMP in relation to the PPS. He explained that the operational head of the PPS is a member of the RCMP, but that the PPS remains an independent and separate entity that takes its direction from the House of Commons and the Senate. Frontline RCMP resources have been demobilized from the PPS, and its current director is the only remaining RCMP member.^[52]

Despite the arm’s length relationship between the PPS and the RCMP, the two services collaborate as needed.^[53]

b)   Freedom Convoy

Mr. Duheme emphasized that during the Freedom Convoy protest, the RCMP worked closely with its partners through its National Capital Region Command Centre. This centre, which marshals representatives of the RCMP, the OPP, the PPS and the OPS, among others, promotes “real-time, effective operational coordination” among the various partners during major events and emergencies.^[54]

In addition, during the convoy, the RCMP, the OPP and the OPS established an integrated command centre to better cooperate and coordinate to end disruptions quickly and safely. Mr. Duheme believes that this goal was attained and thanked the police officers and forces involved in the operation.^[55]

Mr. Duheme also stated that, to his knowledge, no building in the parliamentary precinct was “occupied” during the convoy. He further added that communication with the acting director of the PPS was excellent, and that Mr. Brookson conveyed information on to the sergeant-at-arms.^[56] During the convoy, members of the House of Commons and parliamentary staff were kept informed by means of communiqués, and the RCMP provided police escorts to the parliament buildings.^[57]

In response to a question about whether, during the first two weeks of the Freedom Convoy protest, the RCMP denied or ignored requests for technical capacity from the OPS and the PPS, Mr. Duheme stated that he was not aware of any such request.^[58]

c)    Potential Measures to Improve the Security of the Parliamentary Precinct and its Immediate Vicinity

Mr. Duheme stated that the topic of the expansion of the parliamentary precinct for operational security had been discussed for some time, even in 2015 when he was Director of the PPS.^[59] He speculated that additional resources may be required for the PPS to fulfil its mandate if the parliamentary precinct was enlarged.^[60]

2.    Chief Superintendent Carson Pardy, Regional Commander, Northeast Region, Ontario Provincial Police

In his testimony, Mr. Pardy discussed the role of the OPP in the nation’s capital and its experience with the Freedom Convoy protest.

a)   Jurisdictions and Inter-force Cooperation

Mr. Pardy told the Committee that the OPP has a dual mandate of providing frontline policing services to 328 municipalities across the province, and also providing specialized assistance and support to municipal departments as needed.^[61]

Mr. Pardy emphasized that the OPP is not the police of jurisdiction in Ottawa, and that it has no responsibility for security in the parliamentary precinct. The OPP supports and backs up its partner, the OPS, when necessary.^[62]

b)   Freedom Convoy

On the subject of the freedom convoy and the “associated illegal blockades,” Mr. Pardy told the Committee that the OPP’s intelligence office began reporting to its partners on this matter as early as 13 January 2022. As of 22 January, daily intelligence reports tracking the progress of the Ottawa-bound convoy and various planned protests in Ontario were shared with over 35 police forces, law enforcement and security agencies.

According to Mr. Pardy, from the time the convoy crossed the Manitoba–Ontario border, until its arrival in Ottawa on 28 January, OPP officers performed their duties professionally and without incident. Mr. Pardy further reported that throughout the duration of the Freedom Convoy protest, an increasing number of OPP officers were mobilized to support the work of the OPS while responding to other events taking place simultaneously. Several municipal police forces asked the OPP for help, and the OPP, along with about 20 other police forces across the country, worked collaboratively to address “public order emergencies that were unmatched in recent history.”^[63]

Mr. Pardy further stated that the OPP, the OPS, the RCMP and other partners worked collaboratively to develop a “sustainable and integrated operational plan” based on the lessons learned and practices adopted in previous high-risk events. Notably, the operational plan accounted for the availability of police resources and the concurrent and emerging demands in Ontario.^[64]

Finally, Mr. Pardy indicated that the powers granted under certain provincial regulations, as well as the federal Emergencies Act, were “effective supplementary tools needed” to ensure the protection of infrastructure, the delivery of essential goods and services, and the maintenance or restoration of peace, order and public safety.^[65]

3.    Steve Bell, Interim Chief, Ottawa Police Service and Trish Ferguson, Acting Deputy Chief, Ottawa Police Service

During his appearance before the Committee, Mr. Bell discussed the OPS’s jurisdictional scope and the lessons learned from the Freedom Convoy protest. He also provided comments on some measures that could potentially enhance security around the parliamentary precinct. For her part, Ms. Ferguson, who is responsible for overseeing information, investigations and serious and organized crimes at the OPS,^[66] discussed the need to clarify jurisdictional boundaries and outlined infrastructure and resources needs.

a)   Jurisdictions and Inter-Force Cooperation

Mr. Bell and Ms. Ferguson both reminded the Committee that, currently, the OPS is the police of jurisdiction in downtown Ottawa, including on Wellington Street. Mr. Bell stated that he understands the importance to Canadians of this sector’s security. He said it was crucial for Canadian democracy that the capital remains “free, open and peaceful,” available for residents and visitors to fully enjoy.^[67]

In the matter of jurisdiction, Mr. Bell reminded the Committee that Ottawa is a city with several law enforcement agencies and that the OPS has a long history of collaborating and cooperating with other services.^[68]

Ms. Ferguson affirmed that while the OPS was used to dealing with jurisdictional issues, relying on cooperation and collaboration with other law enforcement agencies, the “occupation” experienced in February 2022 confirmed the need to clearly define and even reconsider jurisdictional boundaries within and around the precinct. She further indicated that collaborative strategies and responsibilities also need to be clarified, to ensure that the statutes, regulations and authorities are understood by all parties, especially in situations where events “spill over” established boundaries.^[69]

b)   Freedom Convoy

Regarding the Freedom Convoy, which he described as an “unlawful protest” and “unprecedented,” Mr. Bell said that the OPS has already put measures in place to prevent a recurrence, including tightening police control of demonstrations and other events in the city centre. In collaboration with the City of Ottawa, the OPS is working to identify exclusion zones where demonstrations and events with vehicles will no longer be permitted. According to him, this approach proved successful at the subsequent “Rolling Thunder” protest.^[70]

As the Freedom Convoy moved across the country, the OPS, the OPP, the RCMP, and other police forces formed a unified intelligence group. About a week after its creation, this unified intelligence group evolved into an integrated command centre involving the OPS, the RCMP and the OPP.^[71]

Mr. Bell said it was important not to trivialize the impact the convoy had on the City of Ottawa and its people. Although there were no incidents of demonstrators entering the Parliament buildings, what started as a protest turned, he said, into an “occupation” of the streets of the city centre, with people “terrorizing” the community.^[72]

A member of the Committee asked Mr. Bell whether the OPS had received any requests from the Sergeant-at-Arms or the PPS prior to the arrival of the convoy to prevent trucks from parking on Wellington Street. Mr. Bell said he did not receive any requests to permit or ban parking on Wellington Street, but stated that he would not have expected such a request, as the street was fully under the authority of the OPS. During the convoy, the OPS also blocked a number of streets to ensure public safety. Among the lessons learned by the OPS following the convoy was the importance of having go-betweens who can communicate directly with the organizers and demonstrators during such events.^[73]

When asked about the invocation of the Emergencies Act by the federal government, Mr. Bell stated the OPS had had conversations with its partners and political ministries, but did not directly request that the Act be invoked.^[74]

c)    Potential Measures to Improve the Security of the Parliamentary Precinct and its Immediate Vicinity

Mr. Bell indicated that the OPS has policed Canada’s capital since the 1800s. However, he stated that policing today was more complex than ever. Mr. Bell said that the OPS has adapted over the years, and has identified three potential areas for improvement: skills, infrastructure and resources.^[75]

While indicating no preference on whether the parliamentary precinct should be expanded, Mr. Bell stated that it was an important conversation to have, particularly to determine what Canadians want.^[76] From his perspective, any changes in law enforcement responsibilities within Ottawa would need to be clearly delineated, notably the scope and boundaries of each department’s jurisdiction and responsibilities, and how to proceed when an incident crosses established boundaries. Furthermore, he stated that any changes to the current legislative framework should define jurisdictions and authorities.^[77]

In Mr. Bell and Ms. Ferguson’s view, should the parliamentary precinct be expanded yet remain under the jurisdiction of the PPS, this would only affect the provision of security. The OPS would remain the police force responsible for Criminal Code offences committed in the parliamentary precinct, and the OPS–PPS partnership would need to be maintained.^[78] Ms. Ferguson affirmed that the OPS “craved” a delineation of jurisdictions and statutes for roles and responsibilities of the different services.^[79]

With respect to infrastructure, Mr. Bell reminded the Committee that millions of tourists visit the national capital every year. He stated that Ottawa should be an accessible, welcoming and modern city for visitors and residents alike. However, both Mr. Bell and Ms. Ferguson indicated that police services must have the infrastructure in place to protect key locations and people in the event of emergencies and threats. Mr. Bell pointed out that, in the absence of infrastructure that can be quickly adapted to secure locations for the duration of a threat, the OPS is forced to resort to ad hoc measures, such as using heavy trucks and buses to block roads, which is both less effective and more disruptive.^[80] Ms. Ferguson stressed that such events as “Rolling Thunder” and Canada Day stretch the OPS resources thin, in part due to a lack of adequate security infrastructure^[81]. Changes in infrastructure would need to respect parliamentarians’ rights to freely access the precinct, allowing freedom of movement while also giving capability to quickly and efficiently restrict access in response to the security threat.^[82]

As for resources, Mr. Bell told the Committee that while it is impossible to predict the exact nature of the next emergency that will occur, the OPS must be prepared to maintain public safety and protect citizens. This requires adequate resources, including staff, to respond, assess threats and liaise with the various agencies involved.^[83]

Ms. Ferguson stressed that the OPS must be prepared to maintain public security and protect residents for events of all scale, and cannot continually depend on resources from other jurisdictions across Ontario. According to her, the demands placed on the OPS in the past year have strained the service members and highlighted the need for adequate resources to respond to community needs, make intelligence led threat assessments and enhance inter-agency collaboration.^[84] She mentioned that ideally, the OPS would be able to position officers at both ends and on gaps along Wellington Street, but it was not something the service would be able to sustain on the long term.^[85]

As to the desirability of closing Wellington Street to vehicular traffic, Mr. Bell said that would improve the safety of that area by reducing its exposure to any risk or threat from a vehicle.^[86]

For her part, Ms. Ferguson explained that certain vehicles are required on Wellington for property maintenance or city purposes, but that the OPS was aware that the area is not entirely a safe or secure space at this point in time. She was looking forward to the Committee’s recommendations and clarification on this regard.^[87]

In response to a question, Ms. Ferguson explained that the OPS could potentially rely on best practices from partners around the world, especially in capital cities. In the past, PPS changed its responses to larger demonstrations based on other countries’ experiences.^[88]

4.    Luc Beaudoin, Director, Service de police de la Ville de Gatineau

Mr. Beaudoin provided testimony on the impact that major incidents on Parliament Hill can have on the SPVG’s policing operations and, more generally, on the City of Gatineau and its residents.^[89]

a)   Jurisdictions and Inter-force Cooperation

Mr. Beaudoin told the Committee that Gatineau is the fourth-largest city in Quebec, with 290,000 inhabitants. The territory policed by the SPVG covers over 342 km². It is the fifth largest municipal police force in Quebec, with more than 700 employees, including 390 authorized police officers and approximately 85 temporary police officers.^[90]

Five interprovincial bridges connect Ottawa and Gatineau, with one falling under the jurisdiction of the Sûreté du Québec and the rest under the jurisdiction of the RCMP. Due to the proximity of the interprovincial border with Ontario, and since “crime has no borders,” the SPVG works closely with the OPS. The two organizations support each other in preventing and solving crimes and in overseeing special events.^[91]

Mr. Beaudoin stated that the SPVG has the duty to supervise protests that occur in Gatineau, to ensure the safety of both the public, and the participants who are exercising their fundamental right to protest. In doing so, the police must balance the right to protest while maintaining the flow of traffic in accordance with municipal regulations and provincial laws.^[92]

To attain this balance, particularly near an interprovincial border, it was essential to maintain a constant dialogue with the demonstrators, and also with other partners and stakeholders, whether public, private or community organizations.^[93]

b)   Freedom Convoy

Mr. Beaudoin stated that the Freedom Convoy protest quickly degenerated into an “illegal occupation.” When asked about this choice of words, Mr. Beaudoin clarified that he called it an “occupation” since a group of protesters in Gatineau appropriated a parking lot belonging to the city. He said he could not comment on the appropriate terminology for the events in Ottawa.^[94]

The Freedom Convoy gave rise to several operational meetings, as well as meetings with all affected police services, in order to establish a plan of action. Mr. Beaudoin also stated that many hours were invested in advance on communications to ensure team coordination and consistency in messaging.^[95]

Asked whether the SPVG was able to manage the disruptions in Gatineau caused by the Freedom Convoy, Mr. Beaudoin indicated that it was able to do so, in particular thanks to the collaboration of its partners and the coordination centre.^[96]

c)    Potential Measures to Improve the Security of the Parliamentary Precinct and its Immediate Vicinity

According to Mr. Beaudoin, whether or not federal jurisdiction over operational security in the parliamentary precinct was extended, the events that occur in the precinct have undeniable collateral impacts for the entire City of Gatineau, and require collaboration between security and policing partners. The SPVG must be involved from the first stages of planning to be able to fulfil its mandate at both the strategic and operational levels.^[97]

Mr. Beaudoin predicted that due to the current social climate, the speed with which social movements can mobilize, and the use of increasingly divisive rhetoric, the National Capital Region will experience further major disruptions similar to the Freedom Convoy. In his view, this kind of event requires that the police be transparent and accountable to the community if public trust is to be maintained.^[98]

5.    Larry Brookson, Acting Director, Parliamentary Protective Service

Mr. Brookson appeared before the Committee three times in the context of this study, twice in public. He discussed policing jurisdictions and collaboration among the various services, the Freedom Convoy, and measures that could be taken to improve the security of the parliamentary precinct. He also briefly addressed the police intervention on 11 June 2022 that required the parliamentary buildings to be locked‑down.

a)   Jurisdictions and Inter-Force Cooperation

Mr. Brookson told the Committee that PPS is responsible for the physical security of everyone who works on Parliament Hill and in the parliamentary precinct, including parliamentarians, employees and visitors. PPS is also responsible for the security of the physical assets on the Hill and the precinct. Mr. Brookson stated that, in order to fulfill this mandate, PPS must continue to be proactive in how it builds partnerships with its security and law enforcement partners.^[99]

Mr. Brookson clarified that PPS is not a policing organization and does not have a policing mandate. The recruiting that PPS undertakes is to ensure that all requirements are met when delivering its mandate of protecting parliamentarians, staffers and members of the public.^[100]

Mr. Brookson stated that the relationship between PPS and OPS is “extremely strong” and is stronger now than when he first took up his position in 2019.^[101] Questioned as to whether the PPS is treated as an equal partner in contrast to police services, Mr. Brookson underlined the efforts PPS undertook in receiving recognition as to its role, and he stated being “very comfortable” with the intelligence and information it is receiving from its partners. According to him, an important amount of work towards multi-jurisdictional responses has been undertaken in the last three years.^[102]

b)   Freedom Convoy

Mr. Brookson stated that the relationships PPS has with its corporate parliamentary security partners and with external organizations were key to its response to the Freedom Convoy. He added that this spirit of collaboration will be pivotal to PPS’ operational readiness in the future.^[103]

Mr. Brookson stated that PPS started to prepare for the Freedom Convoy “a few weeks prior” to its arrival in Ottawa. During the week before the convoy’s arrival, the PPS held discussions with its policing partners, including OPS and the RCMP. He indicated that within the PPS, there was a sense “that this was going to be much bigger than us.”^[104]

Mr. Brookson stated that approximately one week before the convoy’s arrival, he was made aware of the plans related to traffic control and security posture. He stated that he raised concerns about vehicles being permitted to park in front of the Centre, East and West Blocks. However, Wellington Street is not part of his authority. Without the power to make decisions, all Mr. Brookson could do was raise these concerns. He told the Committee that he was unable to share the OPS response to the concerns he had raised.^[105]

Mr. Brookson stated that he did not think anybody could have predicted that the protests would go on for as long as they did. He noted that policing organizations were responsible for designing the operational plan for dealing with the Freedom Convoy protest, on Wellington Street and the outskirts, and that the PPS was kept informed about the plan’s context as it related to the PPS.^[106]

Mr. Brookson noted that the PPS requested to have situational awareness on the vehicles that were parked on Wellington Street. A request for CBRNE (chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear and explosive) sensing was made to the National Division of the RCMP. Mr. Brookson stated that, “[u]nfortunately,” the RCMP did not have the technology to carry out sensing operations.^[107]

When asked if the PPS had requested the invocation of the Emergencies Act in February 2022, Mr. Brookson answered no. He noted that there was no benefit whatsoever in the invocation of the Emergencies Act for PPS, because it is not a policing organization, so it received no additional powers through the Act.^[108]

Mr. Brookson stated that he was “extremely concerned” about the harassment some members of the House of Commons and staff experienced during the Freedom Convoy protest. He noted that some parliamentarians expressed the same concerns. Further, he also indicated that some members walked through the crowds of protesters and PPS had no situational awareness of this.^[109]

In response to questions from Committee members, Mr. Brookson provided a timeline of certain incidents that occurred during the convoy protest. These were:

• On 17 February 2022, PPS erected an eight-foot-high construction fence along Wellington Street. When asked if that had ever happened in the past, Mr. Brookson answered that it had not, as far as he was aware.
• On 18 February 2022, in consultation with PPS, the Speaker of the House of Commons and House leaders agreed to suspend the sitting day. When asked whether this was the first time that a sitting had had to be suspended for security reasons, Mr. Brookson noted the October 2014 shooting incident.
• On 19 February 2022, a Committee member had to make his own way through the group of police officers on site in order to reach the House of Commons. About 15 PPS officers were standing at the Bank Street entrance to protect what the member referred to as a “makeshift opening.” When asked whether such high security measures had been used at any other time in the past to protect the Parliamentary Precinct, Mr. Brookson answered no.^[110]

From the date of departure of the convoy, the various security partners shared information; PPS was alert to such information and commenced its preparation accordingly, within the limits of its specific mandate.^[111]

Mr. Brookson stated that all security partners involved in the convoy protest had learned lessons. He stated that he felt “much more comfortable” about where OPS and the RCMP were in their preparations for Canada Day 2022. He noted that he had “significant influence with the City of Ottawa” in the preparations for the Canada Day festivities, especially with regard to making sure Wellington Street was adequately protected. He stated that he was “extremely comfortable” with the fact that Wellington Street was still shut down to traffic. He also noted that certain barriers that had been put on Wellington Street did not meet his standards of protection and that he was concerned about sidewalks and the prospect of a truck finding its way through.^[112]

c)    Incident on 11 June 2022

A member of the Committee noted that on 11 June 2022, a police operation put Parliament on lockdown. Mr. Brookson stated that he received a call about the incident just before noon. The RCMP and OPS had received information that suggested the potential for a serious threat. Mr. Brookson explained to the Committee that the PPS’s threshold for responding is “much lower than what would be found in the criminal element of the mandates for policing services.” That being the case, due to the threats that had been received, Parliament was shut down “without hesitation.”^[113]

Mr. Brookson confirmed that OPS was leading the investigation, as PPS has no mandate to do so under the Criminal Code. He did not anticipate that PPS would be involved in the investigation of the incident. Mr. Brookson also had no information to share on the cost of the lockdown, but he noted that PPS “definitely” brought in additional resources to secure the parliamentary precinct.^[114]

d)   Potential Measures to Improve the Security of the Parliamentary Precinct and its Immediate Vicinity

Mr. Brookson noted that the PPS strove to continuously improve its security service. He stated that there are lessons to be learned from every situation. He informed the Committee that, in 2020, when he was chief operations officer in the PPS, he created a unit dedicated to ensuring that PPS operations were provided with mechanisms for proactively applying lessons learned. He stated that that team, called the “operation evaluation and continuous improvement unit,” today plays a key role in PPS’s ability to learn from its response to any complex event and helps to ensure that findings are integrated across the service. Activities like scenario-based training and tabletop exercises help achieve that objective.^[115]

Mr. Brookson also discussed the PPS’ multi-layered approach to physical security. He stated that physical security was the triangulation of erecting barriers, training protection officers and deploying advanced technology. He noted that the PPS could improve its response capacity by putting in place effective physical barriers and deploying technology to ensure situational awareness.^[116]

Mr. Brookson told the Committee that it would be feasible for the PPS to provide security in expanded physical jurisdiction. He agreed that an expanded precinct would better optimize parliamentarians’ security. In that vein, he noted that it was hard to imagine “somebody being responsible for a protective mandate when the largest artery that runs through their precinct is outside their control.” Mr. Brookson also agreed with the sentiment expressed by Senator White, that the biggest gain in parliamentarians’ security would be to shut down Wellington Street. In fact, he believes that the street should be closed to all traffic, including bus service.^[117]

Mr. Brookson stated that the main challenge for PPS is that it has no authority to intervene once a parliamentarian leaves parliamentary grounds and goes onto Wellington Street. He stated that the PPS would nevertheless engage if any parliamentarian found themselves in distress and would deal with the consequences later. However, in his view, that jurisdictional barrier should be eliminated so that the PPS does not run the risk of overstepping its legal boundaries. He noted that the PPS would be in the best position to respond when critical incidents occurred on Wellington Street, given the PPS’s proximity to it. Mr. Brookson indicated that the collaborative efforts between the PPS, OPS and RCMP, and even the OPP, ought to be formalized through a memorandum of understanding.^[118]

Mr. Brookson expressed a preference for PPS officers to have jurisdictional authority on Wellington Street. He noted that the PPS would better be able to protect parliamentarians if it had jurisdiction on Sparks Street, part of Elgin Street, and the streets around the Senate of Canada building and the Langevin building^[119]. He also stated that, even with an expanded precinct to monitor, the process of arresting an individual would proceed the same way it does now. That is, if a PPS officer arrested or detained an individual, a call would go through the PPS Operations Support Centre to its counterpart at the OPS. The PPS can make arrests under subsection 494(1) of the Criminal Code, but only OPS officers would be able to release individuals.^[120]

Mr. Brookson told the Committee that an analysis and assessment would need to be completed before he could ascertain the number of PPS officers and other funding required to provide security on an expanded parliamentary precinct. He stated that such an assessment was under way, but he was not permitted to discuss it in public.^[121] In his second public appearance before the Committee, Mr. Brookson specified that, generally, investments would be required in order for PPS to accomplish its mandate over an expanded precinct.^[122]

Further, in order for PPS to be successful, it needs its various police and security partners to also be in a “healthy position,” especially the OPS. Mr. Brookson stated that he “didn’t know where [he]’d be without” the work of the OPS in helping the PPS deliver its services, and that a global approach to investments was needed.^[123]

Mr. Brookson was questioned as to whether the current closure of Wellington Street had made fulfilling the PPS’s mandate easier. To this, Mr. Brookson indicated that the current set up of Wellington Street will only prevent entry to law-abiding citizens; it is wide open to anybody with a nefarious intent. He mentioned that while he appreciates the reduced traffic on the street, access is still “extremely porous”.^[124]

On unauthorized vehicles entering the closed area, Mr. Brookson further clarified that the City of Ottawa, not the OPS, governs all traffic and the safety measures on Wellington Street, and that the PPS has been working with the city as the barriers in place get maneuvered. Since OPS does not have resources to put officers in that area, he indicated that the PPS was prepared to take on a resourcing requirement from the OPS if needed. He further stressed that is what not appropriate for the safety of parliamentarians to be at risk when crossing Wellington.^[125] Asked what changes would be made were the precinct to be expanded, Mr. Brookson stated that there would be an immediate deployment of PPS marked vehicles on Wellington Street, as well as a “considerable shift” in human assets on site.^[126]

The Committee heard from Mr. Brookson that the PPS did not plan or want to “put fencing and barbed wire” around the precinct, as it does not wish to impede or obstruct parliamentary work. Mr. Brookson informed the Committee that PPS has an important number of cameras that feed into its operational support centre. Mr. Brookson also indicated he is working with Public Services and Procurement Canada in order to receive a list of vehicles authorized to use Wellington Street; this would permit PPS to know, looking at licence plates, whether there is an unauthorized vehicle on that street. Unauthorized vehicle owners would be contacted, and the OPS would respond accordingly.^[127] In response to a question, he agreed that restricted private vehicular access, combined with additional intelligence tools such as cameras and additional officers on the street, would increase security for the parliamentary precinct.^[128]

Questioned on resource limitations were the precinct to be expanded, Mr. Brookson indicated that for parts of the precinct that are outdoors, human resources would only go so far, and that technology would be used to increase PPS’s capability. Such technology could take the form of cameras as well as other effective barriers. Mr. Brookson further outlined his biggest concern, which is that of vehicles being weaponized. While he thinks there are “enough” guns on the Hill, other measures would help.^[129]

On the subject of public transit, Mr. Brookson specified that he’s prone to work with partners and understand the service deliverables for Parliament. Specifically on buses or a tramway line, he affirmed he would be working with partners so vehicles are checked before they come through.^[130]

Questions arose about the PPS’ relationship with Indigenous groups seeking access to the parliamentary precinct to visit sacred sites or to protest. Mr. Brookson stated that he was proud of the work of the “advanced planning and management unit” and the outreach that PPS has done on these matters. He stated that PPS keeps open communication lines with Indigenous groups to make sure they have ready access to Parliament Hill. Mr. Brookson stated that Parliament Hill ought to remain an open and free environment. He assured the Committee that, when Indigenous groups come to access Parliament Hill or to protest, PPS proactively accommodates and facilitates these requests. Issues related to restricted access ought to be brought to the attention of the office of the director of PPS, so they can be dealt with as swiftly as possible.^[131]

6.    Patrick McDonell, Sergeant-at-Arms and Corporate Security Officer, House of Commons

Mr. McDonell provided information on the collaboration between security and police services on and around the precinct, and their jurisdictions, as well as his experience during the Freedom Convoy protest. However, he stated that he would be cautious in speaking about matters involving security on and off the Hill, noting that security matters discussed before the Board of Internal Economy were held in camera in accordance with the PCA.^[132] Mr. McDonell also appeared in camera before the Committee on 28 April 2022.

a)   Jurisdictions and Inter-force Cooperation

The Office of the Sergeant-at-Arms and Corporate Security of the House of Commons is responsible for ensuring safe and secure access to the parliamentary precinct for members of the House, their staff and House Administration employees. Mr. McDonell highlighted the close collaboration between the Office of the Sergeant-at-Arms and Corporate Security and its partners, adding that this collaboration was necessary for providing a secure environment for members, employees and visitors. He stated that the organization recognized that prevention and early intervention can defuse threats and dangers to members.^[133]

b)   Freedom Convoy

In his testimony, Mr. McDonell stated that he had known since 11 January 2022 that the Freedom Convoy was heading for Ottawa.^[134]

A Committee member stated that he encountered a locked gate when accessing the House of Commons for the debate on the Emergencies Act. The member asserted that this had compromised his parliamentary privilege, because he was prevented from entering Parliament. Mr. McDonell responded that the gate should have been unlocked upon the approach of the member. He also stated that the incident was an oversight and that it should not have happened.^[135]

Mr. McDonell stated that incidents of harassment occurred during the Freedom Convoy protest on a daily basis, and that his office had communicated with members of the House and their staff who had felt harassed coming through the crowds. Some felt anxiety, while others had their cars banged on and blocked when seeking to enter the parking lot at the corner of Lyon Street and Wellington Street.^[136] He also gave two examples of incidents that occurred during the convoy:

• One individual would block certain employees’ cars every day. If it was a female employee, he would bang on their car before moving aside. Mr. McDonell stated that he was “flabbergasted” that such a thing could happen not once, but on multiple occasions. He noted the incident was reported every day and that a police car was within viewing distance.^[137]
• A female employee coming up the steps off Wellington Street was accosted by a man who tried to throw a bag at her of what appeared to be human feces. Another employee “pushed the assailant to the ground,” and both employees were able to get away.^[138]

7.    Peter Sloly, Former Chief of Police, Ottawa Police Service, As An Individual

Mr. Sloly was the OPS chief of police during the Freedom Convoy protest. He discussed his experience during the protest and recommended ways to improve security on the parliamentary precinct. He also discussed the collaboration that occurs between various police and security services, as well as their jurisdictions.

a)   Jurisdictions and Inter-force Cooperation

The parliamentary precinct covers roughly two square kilometres and represents the most visible, accessible and politically critical public space in the country. It is also the most secure area in Canada, with six police forces protecting those using that space. Mr. Sloly informed the Committee that these six police agencies primarily cooperate through two formal bodies – Intersect and the National Capital Region Command Centre. These two bodies enable the different actors to engage in intelligence sharing, training, event planning, integrated command operations and after-action review.^[139]

b)   Freedom Convoy

According to Mr. Sloly, the events surrounding the Freedom Convoy represent a paradigm shift in how protests are organized, funded and carried out in Canada, as well the response that they evoke. He stated that police representatives who had appeared before parliamentary committees had all suggested that this protest had amounted to an unprecedented national security crisis and that the institutions involved were not fully prepared. However, Mr. Sloly said that national security agencies, police forces, government institutions, elected officials, community leaders and ordinary Canadians all had worked together to end the crisis without loss of life or serious injury.^[140]

Mr. Sloly told the Committee that he was informed that a convoy was setting out from British Columbia during the week of 13 January 2022, and that he had received documents to that effect from the federal and provincial governments during the week leading up to the convoy’s arrival on the 26^th, 27^th and 28^th of January. However, he stated that the extent of the threat and the subsequent volatility of the protest was not known at the time of these communications.^[141] He also pointed out that the lessons learned in Ottawa allowed other cities experiencing similar events to more fully understand the nature of the risks and threats, and thus respond differently.^[142]

Asked about the support sought from the federal government during the convoy, Mr. Sloly indicated that he had conversed, on an almost daily basis, with a wide range of deputy ministers and, in some cases, ministers. Discussions included staffing needs, mediation efforts and the use of tow trucks. Mr. Sloly reported that he was assigned additional officers from provincial and federal agencies, thus meeting the OPS’ greatest need during the crisis.^[143]

Mr. Sloly stated he had requested a reinforcement of 1,800 additional police officers. The OPS’ regular complement is approximately 1,200 officers. His request was presented to the police board chair and the mayor, and they signed a document that was sent to provincial and federal governments. The verbal response from both levels of government was positive, and efforts were made to provide the requested officers and resources, although it took time for the personnel to be fully deployed.^[144]

Mr. Sloly stated that he did not ask the federal government to invoke the Emergencies Act. He was not aware of anyone making that request in the OPS.^[145] He also confirmed that he did not request the technical capacity to detect explosives in parked trucks, although he was involved in a number of discussions on general intelligence capabilities.^[146]

Mr. Sloly stated that the invocation of emergency measures at the federal, provincial and municipal levels yielded tangible benefits during the convoy. He reiterated that his primary need was for resources, but that other factors, including emergency powers, contributed to a successful resolution of the crisis.^[147]

Mr. Sloly was asked by a Committee member about the protests during the 2010 G20 in Toronto. At the time, Mr. Sloly was working for the Toronto Police Service. He stated that approximately 10,000 officers were on duty between Muskoka and Huntsville during those protests. However, he cautioned the Committee against comparing the scale and complexity of the Toronto G20 events with the Freedom Convoy. He stated that it was not a comparison worthy of the discussions that need to be had to prepare the nation’s capital for future events of this kind. In his view, the events of 6 January 2021 in Washington, D.C., were a more apt comparison.^[148]

c)    Potential Measures to Improve the Security of the Parliamentary Precinct and its Immediate Vicinity

Mr. Sloly stated that the Freedom Convoy highlighted some long-standing structural shortcomings that need to be formally assessed and addressed to improve public safety in Canada. In his view, expanding the boundaries of the parliamentary precinct was only one aspect of this response.^[149]

Mr. Sloly raised several issues that he felt should be given particular attention by the Committee. First, crime prevention through environmental design. He stated that consideration should be given to changing the physical environment of the parliamentary precinct to improve its security, including changing its boundaries, closing roads to create a pedestrian mall, and installing bollards and barriers to limit vehicle access.^[150] He stated that changes to the physical environment were the easiest and most cost-effective steps for improving security.^[151]

He also raised the topic of budget and resources. He stated that increased resources for Intersect and the National Capital Region Command Centre should be considered to improve the ability of the various police forces to respond to threats, including physical and online threats.^[152]

Mr. Sloly also asserted that potential changes to the jurisdictional and legislative mandates of the police services involved could be considered. He cautioned, however, that such changes would not be easy to deliver, nor would they alleviate all of the problems inherent in multi-agency and intergovernmental operations,^[153] including problems of communication, coordination and collaboration.^[154]

In his view, while a boundary change would be relatively easy to achieve, jurisdictional modifications would require, among other things, the involvement of the Attorney General and the Solicitor General of Ontario to remove some policing authority from the OPS, and legislative changes that would allow the PPS to assume full policing authority on the parliamentary precinct. The PPS would also need to receive sufficient resources to handle all the calls currently fielded by the OPS in this zone.^[155]

Mr. Sloly also expressed the hope that the Committee’s work would lead to further solutions to prevent and mitigate the risk factors that underpinned the Freedom Convoy, including disinformation campaigns on social media, polarization, ideological extremism and the public’s lack of confidence in democratic institutions.^[156]

Finally, Mr. Sloly expressed the belief that the greatest long-term threat to security and safety to Canada’s democracy and within the parliamentary precinct will be around the declining level of trust people have in our institutions and in the information shared by sources like the OPS, the RCMP and the PPS.^[157]

8.    Cherie Henderson, Assistant Director, Requirements, and Newton Shortliffe, Assistant Director, Collection, Canadian Security Intelligence Service

a)   The mandate of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service

Cherie Henderson, Assistant Director, Requirements, Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS), explained CSIS’ role in Canada’s national security system. She stated that CSIS investigates threats to the security of Canada. Threats that CSIS is authorized to investigate include espionage and sabotage; foreign interference; terrorism and extremism; and subversion.^[158] Further, CSIS provides advice to the government of Canada by producing intelligence assessments and reports.

Ms. Henderson noted that CSIS is prohibited from investigating lawful advocacy, protest, or dissent except when it is carried on in conjunction with activities that constitute a threat to the security of Canada.^[159]

b)   Freedom Convoy

Ms. Henderson told the Committee that the on-going impact of the COVID-19 pandemic has made the current threat environment unpredictable and, in some cases, has exacerbated threats. She noted the threat from ideologically motivated violent extremism (IMVE), which is “fuelled by extreme views around race, gender and authority” and “thrives on division and festers in the online space.”^[160] With respect to the Freedom Convoy, CSIS was concerned with the threat of IMVE and the potential for serious acts of violence.

Newton Shortliffe, Assistant Director, CSIS, told the Committee that “in the lead up” to the Freedom Convoy, CSIS closely monitored known IMVE threat actors to assess any threat of serious acts of violence.^[161] However, Ms. Henderson noted that during the duration of the Freedom Convoy, CSIS’ Integrated Terrorism Assessment Centre (ITAC) assessed the threat level in Canada at medium. Indeed, ITAC’s threat level for Canada has remained at medium since 11 September 2001.^[162]

Ms. Henderson noted that large gatherings and protests offer IMVE actors opportunities to carry out acts of violence and recruit like-minded individuals. She stated that CSIS was concerned about the threat posed by lone actors during the Freedom Convoy. As such, Ms. Henderson emphasized that CSIS remained engaged with the RCMP and other law enforcement partners, in January and February 2022, to ensure the timely sharing of information.^[163]

Ms. Henderson also noted that CSIS continually monitors and investigates “anything that could be a potential threat to the security of Canada we constantly and regularly engage with the RCMP and our police partners.”^[164]

Further, as the Freedom Convoy was considered a major incident, law enforcement agencies created an incident group comprised of different partners. Mr. Shortliffe noted that incident groups allow information and intelligence to be shared. Further, he stated that CSIS has an excellent relationship with the PPS as well as with the RCMP.^[165]

D.   Evidence from Municipal and Community Advocates and Representatives

1.    France Bélisle, Mayor of Gatineau

France Bélisle, Mayor of the City of Gatineau, told the Committee that Gatineau is an entirely separate entity within the National Capital Region, and that the federal government, through the NCC, is the largest landowner in the region. The NCC manages nearly 11% of the national capital region on both sides of the Ottawa River. She also stated that Gatineau is the francophone half of the capital, and noted that it is the workplace of thousands of federal public servants and home to tens of thousands of others.^[166]

Ms. Bélisle stated that the City of Gatineau supports the proposal to expand the parliamentary precinct to improve the security of this area. She indicated that a high level of cooperation currently exists between the various relevant police forces, as demonstrated by the management of cross-river traffic during the pandemic and the Freedom Convoy. In her view, having a unified command centre during an emergency was important to ensure the effective management of events affecting various police operations.^[167]

Ms. Bélisle told the Committee that Laurier Street in Gatineau is part of Confederation Boulevard, which forms a loop connecting the downtowns of Ottawa and Gatineau. This ceremonial route passes in front of Parliament, heritage sites and museums. The NCC oversees the visual identity and urban design of Laurier Street through management agreements with the City of Gatineau. Ms. Bélisle emphasized that, if the parliamentary precinct is expanded, there will be an expectation of additional federal funding for a makeover of Laurier Street. Similarly, current management agreements could be improved.^[168]

However, Ms. Bélisle stated that an expansion of the parliamentary precinct had ramifications beyond security issues. In her view, proceeding with the expansion would set the stage for decisions on “smooth and consistent” development of the National Capital Region. In this regard, she wanted the federal government to “fully assume its leadership” in interprovincial transport and, through the NCC, to become the main representative in this area.^[169]

Ms. Bélisle also told the Committee that the population of the Ottawa–Gatineau region had nearly tripled since 1970, and that even greater growth is anticipated. However, no interprovincial transportation capacity had been added to the capital region in the last 50 years. She underscored that the city’s public transit system, particularly the tramway project, would need to run on the Portage Bridge and likely on Confederation Boulevard, on both sides of the river.^[170] According to her, the NCC has indicated that was in favour of the tramway running on the surface of the Portage Bridge and on Wellington. She stated that, from a security perspective, the tramway was an excellent way to manage traffic volume in the zone.^[171]

She also noted that the NCC had plans to create a public transit office, which would examine the plan for potential interprovincial tramway links between Gatineau and Ottawa. In her opinion, cross-river transit was closely linked to an expansion of the parliamentary precinct. This would be an opportunity for the national capital to join other capitals around the world in relation to security concerns and an “integrated vision of active and public transit.”^[172]

In response to a question from a committee member, Ms. Bélisle stated that the City of Gatineau did not declare a state of emergency during the convoy. In addition, she stated that, in Quebec, discussions were needed with Public Safety Canada and the Government of Quebec for emergency measures to be ordered.^[173]

According to Ms. Bélisle, during major events people tend to converge on places with symbolic value, such as the Parliament buildings, but that there was always spillovers onto the Gatineau side. She stated that any proposed expansion of the parliamentary precinct needed to take into account the entire region, including Gatineau.^[174]

2.    Catherine McKenney, Municipal Councillor, City of Ottawa

Catherine McKenney is the city councillor for the Somerset ward in the City of Ottawa, which includes Parliament Hill and many federal buildings. The Councillor stated that ward residents, and business owners and their employees, suffered during the Freedom Convoy demonstrations. In describing the events that took place on Wellington Street during the convoy, they said it was “disorder,” “pure chaos” further south from Wellington, and that residents of downtown experienced daily acts of aggression, which made life unbearable for many people.^[175]

Councillor McKenney stated that many residents left their homes during the protests, and that some families sent their children to stay with relatives.^[176] They also stated that several residents encountered racism, anti-Semitism and homophobia during the protest. Further, an estimated $264 million were lost in wages and another $72 million in business revenues.^[177]

On a personal level, they told the Committee that their daughter was forced to stay with friends, this after they received direct threats that identified their home.^[178]

Councillor McKenney noted that, during the convoy, OPS officers concentrated their attention on protecting Parliament Hill. In their opinion, the City of Ottawa does not have the capacity to protect federal property and patrol residential areas simultaneously during major events. The Councillor stated that, during the Freedom Convoy, they wrote to the Prime Minister and the RCMP Commissioner asking them to take control of the parliamentary precinct, in order to lighten the burden of enforcement by the OPS throughout the downtown area.^[179] Councillor McKenney affirmed their support for expanding the parliamentary precinct to include Wellington Street and Sparks Street.^[180] According to them, an integrated response to the protest was necessary during the events of January and February to allow for a freer flow of information.^[181]

Councillor McKenney told the Committee that parliamentary precinct security has been a long-standing issue. In 2012, the Auditor General of Canada tabled a report in the House of Commons, on parliamentary precinct security. The recommendations included the creation of a unified security force to prevent jurisdictional conflicts. The Councillor also gave examples of incidents that occurred on Parliament Hill that resulted in changes to security protocols. These included:

• in 1989, an assailant commandeered a bus and forced it to be driven onto Parliament Hill;
• the added security following 11 September 2001; and
• the murder of Corporal Nathan Cirillo, followed by the gunman entering into Centre Block in 2014.^[182]

Councillor McKenney also stated that Ottawa City Council passed a motion in February 2022. The motion proposed that the city work with its partners in the Government of Canada and the OPS to permanently transfer, to federal security forces, the security responsibility for the parliamentary precinct, including a section of Wellington Street. In their view, the decision was significant as the City of Ottawa’s hesitancy to relinquish responsibility for the parliamentary precinct was one of the reasons that no action has taken place to date.^[183] However, they did state that, in their view, the expansion of the parliamentary precinct would not necessarily “push out” the possibility of major demonstrations.^[184]

Councillor McKenney stated that closing the blocks on Wellington Street between Elgin Street and Bank Street would make it possible to increase the space open for all Canadians to walk, cycle, take photos and show their pride in their country. They stated that the downtown area has ample capacity to absorb vehicular traffic routed away from Wellington Street.^[185] In addition, converting Wellington Street into a pedestrian zone open to the public would allow increased activity in front of the parliament buildings, such as ball hockey tournaments or temporary rinks on the street.^[186] However, while they indicated that pedestrianization of this area would improve security, they do not see how it would eliminate the need for a demarcation of responsibilities between the OPS and the federal authorities.

Councillor McKenney expressed support for the proposed tramway on Wellington. They also noted that they presented a motion to City Council to close Wellington Street to automobile traffic, yet preserve public transit, which was consistent with the tramway project.

Councillor McKenney stated that they supported the federal government’s invocation of the Emergencies Act, as by the third week of the convoy protests, it had become clear that without the powers granted by this Act, it would be difficult to imagine a resolution to the protest. However, in their opinion, a parliamentary precinct expanded to include Wellington Street and part of Sparks Street, “would have certainly mitigated much of the chaos” and there might not have been a need to invoke the Act.^[187]

3.   City of Ottawa

a)   Wellington Street: Its Use, Closure and Discussions About a Potential Transfer of Ownership

Steve Kanellakos, City Manager, City of Ottawa provided the Committee with a description of Wellington Street. He noted that it was:

• a highly recognizable and iconic street in Ottawa;
• used by residents of both sides of the Ottawa River, as well as millions of tourists every year;
• as a major arterial road that was travelled by 56,000 motorists on an average day (pre–COVID‑19 pandemic); and
• connected to the Portage Bridge, which is one of five interprovincial bridges linking Gatineau and Ottawa and a bridge that is crossed by 19,500 vehicles each day.^[188]

Mr. Kanellakos stated that since its closure between Bank Street and Elgin Street, in February 2022, approximately 19,500 daily motorists have had to find a new route to get across this section of the city.^[189]

Also in February, following the end of the Freedom Convoy protest, City of Ottawa officials began investigative discussions with representatives of Public Services and Procurement Canada about the future function of Wellington Street, as well as its potential to transfer of ownership. These discussions included the potential transfer of other streets, with a view of creating a more cohesive management of federal assets in the parliamentary precinct.^[190] In a response provided in writing to the Committee following his appearance, Mr. Kanellakos further noted that the City of Ottawa receives approximately $118.7 million annually from the Government of Canada under the payments in lieu of taxes program.

Mr. Kanellakos told the Committee that these discussions will take “some time to conclude.”^[191] He noted many issues needed to be considered, including the impact on traffic circulation through the downtown; access to the city’s existing underground infrastructure for maintenance; securing Wellington Street as a key corridor in the city’s wider cycling network; and the assessment of the real estate value of Wellington Street.

Further, he stated that Ottawa was very supportive of active transportation (i.e., non‑motorized transportation based on human activity). The city council has active transportation in its strategic plans and were “pushing very much for this.” However, Mr. Kanellakos noted that the city needs a balanced transportation network. He stated that finding that balance was the challenge with the Wellington corridor.^[192]

Mr. Kanellakos indicated that the closure of Wellington Street has brought “some complaints” as it had disrupted the historic traffic flow. However, people were adjusting, and taking other near streets.^[193] He later informed the Committee in writing that, from 2011 to 2020, there were 958 motor vehicle collisions on Wellington Street.

Mr. Kanellakos was asked whether the city had conducted any studies on the financial implications of a tramway line on Wellington Street for businesses near Wellington Street. He indicated that the city had not and had no plans to conduct such a study at this time.^[194]

b)   Potential Interprovincial Tramway Line

Mr. Kanellakos stated that in 2020, Ottawa City Council approved Wellington Street, along with Sparks Street, as potential corridors for the Société de transport de l’Outaouais (STO) to study in their planning to construct a tramway line. He noted that the Council preferred the option of tunnelling under Sparks Street. However, tunnelling had higher capital costs than the surface-level option along Wellington Street.^[195]

With respect to ownership and jurisdiction of Sparks Street, Mr. Kanellakos noted that it was owned by the City, managed by the Sparks Street Mall Authority, programmed in part by the Sparks Street Business Improvement Area, and surrounded by properties owned or leased by PSPC, the NCC and others.^[196]

c)    Invocation of the Emergencies Act

Mr. Kanellakos was asked by the Committee whether the OPS had requested the invocation of the Emergencies Act. In response, he stated that he was not aware of any such request.^[197] Further, he was asked whether the City of Ottawa and the OPS used the invocation of the Emergencies Act to put an end to the Freedom Convoy protest. In response, he indicated that Ottawa “did use the act to put an end to the occupation.”^[198] To that end, he stated that “at that point of the occupation, those powers were very beneficial.”^[199]

4.    Evidence from the Algonquin Anishinabeg Nation in Ontario

a)   Ottawa Resides on Unceded Indigenous Land

Veldon Coburn, assistant professor of Indigenous studies, University of Ottawa, told the Committee that the City of Ottawa was built on traditional and unceded Algonquin territory. He stated that the Algonquins were the rights‑holders and that a treaty process has been underway since the early 1990s between the provincial and federal Crown and the Algonquin peoples of Ontario.^[200]

Mr. Coburn told the Committee that the Algonquin people want to ensure that there are no restrictions on their mobility on their territory, and no restrictions on their ability to access certain sites. These sites included Akikodjiwan and Akikpautik, which are also known as the Chaudière Islands, and are considered by Algonquins to be sacred.^[201] He noted that access to these sites was considerably constrained by the protesters during the Freedom Convoy.

He noted that the Algonquin people understood that protests frequently occur in Ottawa but that these should never interfere with their access to particular sites where they might carry out their rights under section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982.^[202]

Wendy Jocko, Chief, Algonquins of Pikwakanagan First Nation, told the Committee that an evaluation should occur about expanding the parliamentary precinct to include sections of Wellington and Sparks streets in order to establish more robust safety protocols and ensure “another unlawful occupation does not occur in the downtown core again.”^[203]

b)   Indigenous Peoples Space: 100 Wellington Street

Mr. Coburn told the Committee that, in 2019, the Algonquin Nation was promised an Indigenous people’s space at 100 Wellington Street, which is located across the street from Parliament Hill. Ms. Jocko stated that the Algonquin people of Ontario desired clarity and assurances that the extension of the parliamentary precinct to include the area around 100 Wellington Street will not affect the spirit of this promise.^[204]

Mr. Coburn stated that the Algonquin peoples right to access the areas on Wellington around the building needed to be upheld and that they infringed upon by the Freedom Convoy protests.^[205]

Further, Ms. Jocko indicated to the Committee that once the Indigenous Peoples Space opens, the police of jurisdiction needed to ensure the safety and dignity of those who occupy the buildings and to refrain from using “a heavy-handed approach.”^[206]

c)    Absence of Consultation About Precinct Expansion

Ms. Jocko told the Committee that her community had not been consulted about changes to the use of Wellington Street, aside from being invited to appear before the Committee.^[207] She stated that the Algonquin People of Ontario would like to be part of the discussions going forward, and not be excluded from those discussions.^[208]

Mr. Coburn noted that while the Algonquin Anishinabeg nation in Ontario was the only status First Nations community in Ottawa, there were nine others in Quebec that would need to be consulted.^[209]

Mr. Coburn noted that the Algonquins were very amenable to the projects that have been advanced by the City of Ottawa.^[210]

Ms. Jocko also proposed the idea of changing the name of the parliamentary precinct. She stated that she had toured Centre Block prior to its closure for rehabilitation. In her view, the building was elaborate but void of the Algonquin Nation’s presence. As such, Ms. Jocko indicated that she was hopeful that aspects of the Algonquin Nation would be incorporated into refurbished buildings.^[211]

d)   Freedom Convoy

Ms. Jocko indicated that, in her view, the “polite, mild-mannered police response to the blockade of downtown Ottawa by thousands of protesters” during the Freedom Convoy revealed to Indigenous people “a double standard in how law enforcement agencies treat civil disobedience.”^[212] She stated that had Indigenous demonstrators made the same threats, broke the same laws or engaged in the same level of disruption, they would likely have been met with “a very heavy-handed crackdown.^[213] Mr. Coburn noted that in June 2017, several peaceful Indigenous demonstrators who erected a ceremonial tipi on Parliament Hill were detained by the RCMP and PPS.^[214]

Further, Ms. Jocko noted that some participants in the Freedom Convoy, who claimed to be Indigenous, did not respect the territory, protocols and customs of the Algonquin Nation. As an example, she stated that she had seen video of demonstrators near the Centennial Flame using First Nations drums while dancing, drinking alcohol and chanting nonsense and obscenities. Ms. Jocko stated that a memorial to residential school victims had been created in that same space during summer 2021. To Ms. Jocko, the drumming by the demonstrators “was an absolute insult.”^[215]

Nonetheless, Ms. Jocko indicated that she was “very impressed” by the Ottawa city police liaison officer and the OPP’s Killaloe detachment for constantly keeping her informed about all of the activity that was taking place in Ottawa during the Freedom Convoy.^[216] She indicated that she and OPP detachment in Killaloe, along with the City of Ottawa, have a good relationship.

e)   Invocation of the Emergencies Act

Ms. Jocko was asked by the Committee for her opinion on the invocation of the Emergencies Act. She stated that there were “a plurality of viewpoints within Indigenous communities and amongst the Algonquins themselves” in respect of the Freedom Convoy. She noted that she had relatives who at first supported the Convoy then, as time passed, were irritated by the ongoing occupation.

Further, she noted that Indigenous people have always been critical of government overstep. She stated that the Algonquins of Ontario favoured the establishment of sufficient checks on the invocation of anything that could be perceived as infringing upon individual and collective freedoms.^[217] She indicated that a balance must be struck between the exercise of freedoms and maintaining civil order.

5.    The National Capital Commission

Tobi Nussbaum, Chief Executive Officer, National Capital Commission, told the Committee that the NCC’s role was to build a dynamic, sustainable and inspiring capital was relevant to the Committee’s study about the future use of Wellington Street.

He stated that the NCC was responsible for managing Confederation Boulevard, a loop that encompasses Wellington Street west over the Portage Bridge, east along Laurier Avenue in Gatineau, back across Alexandra Bridge, and returning alongside Major’s Hill Park to Wellington Street.^[218] He told the Committee that the NCC was committed to working with federal partners to ensure safe public access to Wellington Street and its surroundings, while also ensuring the respect of its ceremonial value to Canada’s capital.^[219]

Mr. Nussbaum considered the potential transfer of Wellington Street to federal jurisdiction as an opportunity to rethink the use of this important space. Considerations included the perspective of visitors to the National Capital Region, peaceful protests, better public transit, mitigating risks related to the safety of infrastructure, and access to Canada’s democratic institutions.^[220]

He told the Committee that the NCC had “a very open mind” and were “positively inclined towards a rethink of how that space can work.”^[221] However, he stated that data needed to be collected and understood on the impacts of a change to the use of Wellington Street, on matters such as traffic circulation, security, and sound management of the process.

Mr. Nussbaum told the Committee that several large public events were held near Ottawa’s downtown core, in summer 2022, with Wellington Street closed. He noted that the public’s experience was positive and that people understood that they had to make their plans with the Wellington Street closure in mind. He indicated that the NCC wanted citizens who are coming to events in the core of Canada's capital to arrive to the event there by other means than private vehicle, including by transit, walking, or cycling.^[222]

Mr. Nussbaum indicated that an interprovincial transit project office was created within the NCC in the last year to help advance the STO’s tramway line project.^[223] Alain Miguelez, Vice-President, Capital Planning, National Capital Commission, provided the Committee with more details on this project. He stated that the NCC, in collaboration with the STO, would study the construction of a tramway line over the Portage Bridge. The next phase would be the implementation phase, which could see the tramway line constructed. Further, he noted that the NCC has the mandate to study a later phase for this project, which would involve closing the tramway line loop by extending the line over the Alexandra Bridge.^[224]

In a subsequent appearance before the Committee, Mr. Nussbaum informed the Committee that the work of the NCC transit project office was well under way. He stated that the transit project was a vital part of the reimagination of Wellington Street and a crucial step in enhancing interprovincial transit options.^[225]

Mr. Miguelez assured the Committee that the NCC was fully aware of the need to include the Algonquin community in this project, and that they had incorporated very close consultations with the Algonquin nation into its approach. He noted that the Portage Bridge accessed Victoria Island, which is a very important symbolic place for the Algonquin nation.^[226]

6.    OC Transpo

Renée Amilcar, General Manager, Transit Services Department, City of Ottawa told the Committee the effect of the closure of Wellington Street on OC Transpo, which is Ottawa’s public transit system.

Ms. Amilcar stated that OC Transpo wants to continue operating along Wellington Street until a future STO tramway line is built. She stated that this corridor was vital to many customers in both Ottawa and Gatineau, and also allows the most efficient route to pick up and drop off Para Transpo riders.^[227]

Further, OC Transpo supports the potential future creation of an STO tramway line, and it does not want the potential expansion of the parliamentary precinct to negatively affect planning for this line.

Lastly, Ms. Amilcar told the Committee that OC Transpo and STO want continued use of Wellington Street as a detour, in the event of any future large-scale demonstrations or emergencies. In accessing Wellington Street, OC Transpo does not want to have to obtain approval from the NCC or any other agency.^[228]

7.    Société de transport de l’Outaouais

Patrick Leclerc, General Manager, STO, told the Committee that there were many challenges to a project that involved constructing an interprovincial tramway line and changing the use of Wellington Street and Laurier Street. However, in the view of the STO, these were greatly surpassed by the expected benefits. These benefits included increased mobility between the two cities, redesign of the urban space, and safety around the parliamentary precinct.^[229]

He indicated that the STO was considering two potential options for an interprovincial rail line. In respect of a potential tramway line on Wellington Street, he stated that its construction would involve significant urban design and landscaping, promote active transportation, and public transit usage.^[230] The space would create an inviting public environment, mere steps from Canada’s Parliament, and nearby businesses and residential neighbourhoods.

The STO’s plans included having three stations on Wellington Street that were integrated with the OC Transpo transit system, as well as a public space that could be used for events and ceremonies. The next steps in the project involve an in‑depth analysis of the access points to the parliamentary precinct to ensure safe and fluid traffic.^[231]

Mr. Leclerc stated that the STO was confident that an interprovincial tramway line would attract more people to use public transit, due to its high frequency and large capacity. In turn, the STO estimates that car traffic in downtown will be significantly reduced. The STO will also review its current bus service offering with a view of reducing the number that cross into Ottawa.^[232]

According to Mr. Leclerc, expanding the pedestrian space on Wellington Street would improve the safety for all users of the street. He also provided comments on how a tramway line could improve safety in the parliamentary precinct. He noted that private vehicles would be removed from Wellington Street and replaced with a fixed line that was relatively visible and that passed at longer intervals that were predictable.^[233] He further noted that it was easier to secure a tramway line than it was to secure thousands of vehicles that drive by the parliamentary precinct. In the end, Mr. Leclerc told the Committee that the security component of the project would be handled by experts in that field.^[234]

Lastly, Mr. Leclerc told the Committee that studies on public transportation that the STO has reviewed indicate that “for every dollar invested, we get three dollars back.” He noted that the ratio “was not the same for investments in road development.”^[235]

8.    Christine Leadman, Executive Director, Bank Street Business Improvement Area

Christine Leadman, Executive Director, Bank Street Business Improvement Area (BIA), told the Committee that the business members of the BIA supported studying solutions to avoid future disruptions to the businesses on Bank Street, which is located in Ottawa’s downtown core. However, she stated that she believed there were “methods and means to avoid these types of disruptions in the future without permanently shutting down access to Wellington Street.”^[236]

Ms. Leadman told the Committee that the businesses she represents do not agree with the closure of Wellington Street. Indeed, the prospect of closing the street is a matter of “concern” and “anxiety” to these businesses because they believe access to the stores by the public will be made more difficult and less comfortable.^[237] Ms. Leadman told the Committee that, in her experience, people who live in Ottawa travel mostly by vehicle to shop, and that point-of-sale purchases are higher when people are in their vehicles and have access to parking.

To that end, she told the Committee that the BIA agreed to close Bank Street to vehicular traffic to better enable access to pedestrians. However, this resulted in a slight drop in business to the area.^[238]

Instead, Ms. Leadman stated that the BIA supported solutions that would ensure that access to the Bank Street area was not blocked during protests, and did not allow for encampments or semi-permanent structures to be erected.^[239]

On the topic of the impact of the Freedom Convoy, Ms. Leadman stated that the impacts to the residents and businesses alike were unprecedented, and financial losses suffered were worse than any closure caused by COVID-19 pandemic. The BIA conducted studies that showed the losses for BIA members were $357,000 per day.^[240] These losses were the result of lack of access to the area by visitors, clients, employees, and local residents. Further, no pickup services were available for businesses, public transit was rerouted, and there was no vehicle access for deliveries to businesses for their products and services.

A member of the Committee asked Ms. Leadman whether a comparison could be made between the potential closure of Wellington Street in Ottawa, and the removal of car traffic on King Street in Toronto, which led to an increase in sales for the businesses on the latter street. In response, Ms. Leadman stated that the financial success for local businesses on King Street could be attributed to the fact that it was surrounded by a large residential population, there were local supports, and that Toronto has a much better transit system as compared to Ottawa.^[241]

9.    Claude Royer, Spokesperson, Alexandra Bridge Coalition

Claude Royer, Spokesperson, Alexandra Bridge Coalition, told the Committee that the coalition he represents strongly supported constructing an interprovincial tramway line that included the use of Wellington Street.^[242] This proposed line would be a loop that ran before Parliament, crossed into Quebec on Laurier Street, and used the Portage and Alexandra bridges.

Mr. Royer told the Committee that a tramway line along this route would link symbols and significant sites of national importance, and aligned with the NCC’s Plan for Canada’s Capital, 2017–2067.^[243] In his view, this transit loop would help to integrate the public transit systems on both sides of the river and could lead to an increase in cross-border commerce by public transit users.^[244]

He told the Committee that the coalition he represents has as its purpose to call attention to and prevent the planned demolition of the Alexandra Bridge. He indicated that the bridge was recognized as “a historic site of national significance by the Canadian Society for Civil Engineering.”^[245] In his view, the decision to demolish the bridge was made without a full analysis of rehabilitation options, and the process to arrive at the decision lacked public transparency.^[246]

To that end, Mr. Royer told the Committee that the analysis that led to the decision to demolish the Alexandra Bridge prioritized vehicular traffic, whereas in recent times, its use had shifted to being a pedestrian thoroughfare. As such, Mr. Royer stated that converting the bridge to include a tramway line would reduce damage to the structure caused by de-icing salts and thereby increase its lifespan.^[247]

10. David McRobie, Architect

David McRobie, architect, told the Committee he supported removing car, truck, and bus traffic from Wellington Street. Instead, he favoured a generously landscaped pedestrian promenade.^[248] In his view, Wellington Street ought to be transformed from a congested roadway to a landscaped pedestrian thoroughfare befitting a G7 capital. Such a promenade could feature a bidirectional tramway line that ran between Ottawa and Gatineau over the Portage and Alexandra bridges. Such a transformation would protect valued physical assets and human beings within the parliamentary precinct, while being integrated into the fabric of the national capital.

Mr. McRobie stated that installing a tramway line on Wellington Street would showcase 21^st-century public transit technology, ease the impact of the over 200,000 daily commutes, while creating a spectacular and memorable urban space for residents and visitors to the national capital.^[249]

He told the Committee that it was possible to put the Wellington mall to a superior use as an urban promenade. To that end, he stated that such a mall could have:

• amenities for pedestrians and cyclists, including shade trees in summer and be brightly lit in winter;
• a bidirectional tramway link between Ottawa and Gatineau employing electric-powered, low-threshold vehicles for barrier-free access;
• provide convenient transportation to citizens and visitors to the national capital, which linked federal offices, the National Gallery of Canada, the Museum of History, the Byward Market, the War Museum, Victoria Island, etc.; and
• intersections that featured urban-scale illuminated fountains, public art, sculptures and other symbols of Canada and its capital.

In his view, Wellington Street, as a facility, served no one well, and also compromised the security of Parliament Hill. He stated that the opportunity to transform Wellington Street offered “a unique possibility.”^[250] The concept resided on the notion that it ought to be “a place for people.”^[251]

11. Robert Plamondon, Supporters of the Loop

Robert Plamondon, Supporters of the Loop, told the Committee that he has long advocated for Wellington Street to be transformed into a national pedestrian mall. In his view, Wellington Street’s five lanes, which have been used by trucks, buses and cars, and bisect the parliamentary precinct, ought to instead be a space that welcomes Canadians and international visitors alike.^[252] Further, he stated that he was in favour of having a tramway line loop, which connected Ottawa and Gatineau, on this proposed pedestrian mall. This transit loop could serve to better integrate the Ottawa and Gatineau transit systems.

According to Mr. Plamondon, a Wellington Street pedestrian mall would be a place to gather, admire the Parliament buildings, celebrate and learn about Canada, and gather for peaceful protest.^[253] In his view, it would be “a nation-building idea” in which the opportunities to creatively showcase Canada’s national capital would be endless.^[254] Visitors to the National Capital Region, along with residents, would benefit.

Mr. Plamondon noted that the tramway line loop would connect the House of Commons, the Senate, the National War Memorial, the National Gallery, Nepean Point, the Canadian Museum of History, Chaudière Falls, the War Museum, the Holocaust Monument, the Supreme Court and the Bank of Canada Museum.^[255]

In terms of current security situation on Wellington Street, he noted that in 1995 in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, a terrorist incident occurred in which a single rental truck was detonated in front of a federal building. The explosion killed 168 people and damaged 325 buildings within a 16-block radius.^[256]

Further, Mr. Plamondon noted that the current governance, ownership, and security apparatus in and around the parliamentary precinct was “awkward if not dysfunctional.”^[257]

Mr. Plamondon urged parliamentarians to think 25, 50 and 100 years ahead about “what is in the best interest of our capital region and for Canada” and consider this opportunity to transform Wellington Street into a pedestrian mall as “once in a lifetime opportunity.”^[258] He noted that the timing to implement an inspiring vision for Canada’s capital will never be better than it was today and that all that was needed was vision and courage.

Lastly, Mr. Plamondon noted that at the current time, Wellington Street was closed but appeared uninviting. He encouraged decision makers to instead make the space welcoming to all Canadians. To that end, he suggested that events ought to be held in the space, such as a ball hockey tournament, pop-up bistros or even host a grand dinner.^[259]

Recommendations

The right to grant the public access to the parliamentary precincts and the grounds of Parliament Hill belongs to Parliament, as an institution, and its membership. Security for parliamentarians, staff and the general public is essential, rather than incidental, to enabling Parliament to conduct its work. Without adequate security, Parliament would be greatly impeded in its core functions of legislating, debating and holding government accountable.

The Committee has reflected upon and considered the options available to it on the matter of security for Parliament Hill and the parliamentary precinct. Its deliberations were informed by all of the valuable testimony it heard during the course of this study. The Committee recognizes the importance of ensuring the safety and security of parliamentarians, staff and all persons within the parliamentary precinct, while seeking to preserve the welcoming and open character of the nation's capital. Weighing these factors, the Committee recommends:

Recommendation 1

That the government and its partners continue their current consultations and discussions with relevant stakeholders regarding the potential expansion of Parliament Hill onto Wellington and Sparks streets, along with the potential redevelopment of these streets;

That the relevant Indigenous groups, including the Algonquin Peoples of Ontario, be included as partners to the government in the consultations and discussions about the potential use and redevelopment of Wellington and Sparks streets;

That the Parliamentary Protective Service ensure that the potential expansion of the Parliament Hill onto Wellington and Sparks streets does not impose restrictions on the mobility and access of the Algonquin Peoples of Ontario to the Akikodjiwan and Akikpautik sites, also known as the Chaudière Islands, as well as to the promised Indigenous People’s space at 100 Wellington Street, given that Parliament Hill and the parliamentary precinct are located on the unceded territory of the Algonquin Peoples; and

That, should Wellington and Sparks streets be redeveloped, the government must respect the traditions of the relevant Indigenous groups while carrying out the redevelopment work, including respecting any Indigenous artefacts that are found.

Recommendation 2

That the federal jurisdiction for the operational security of Parliament Hill be expanded to include sections of Wellington and Sparks streets and, if necessary, that a transfer of land take place between the City of Ottawa and Public Services and Procurement to allow for Wellington Street and Sparks Street to become part of Parliament Hill.

Recommendation 3

That Wellington Street, from the War Memorial to Kent Street, be closed off to vehicular traffic, yet remain open to traffic related to parliamentary business, public tramways, pedestrian and other forms of active transportation. An important objective is to highlight and promote Parliament Hill and the entire parliamentary precinct as the seat of Canadian democracy which is open to all.

Recommendation 4

That the Parliamentary Protective Service pursue discussions with the appropriate jurisdictions to allow for monitoring of Parliament Hill and with the city and provinces to achieve this, and work collaboratively amongst all security levels to ensure that roles, responsibilities, and communication protocols are clearly defined to ensure a streamlined incidence response.

Recommendation 5

That in recognition of a constantly evolving threat environment, Parliament Hill and the parliamentary precinct require increasingly sophisticated protections, and as such the Parliamentary Protective Service should be provided the necessary resources to secure the Hill and precinct, including but not limited to human resources, material and technological assets.

Recommendation 6

That the Parliament of Canada must be a safe and secure institution which remains open and accessible to the public, including those seeking to express peaceful disagreement and discontent with decision makers, and, to this end, the Committee believes that striking the correct and appropriate balance between these interests should be the responsibility of security and policing professionals subject, as in all matters, to parliamentary oversight and accountability.

Recommendation 7

That the government and its partners create a working group on which the main security officials around and inside the parliamentary perimeter (PPS, OPS, RCMP, OPP) sit, to establish an effective and consistent plan in the event of incidents on Parliament Hill;

That these partners continue to meet regularly – at least twice a year – in order to constantly refine this plan and to allow, above all, to establish and maintain communication between the various security bodies, with respect to perimeter security of Parliament;

That this working group begin by doing a real post-mortem of the various incidents that have taken place on Parliament Hill over the past twenty years, in order to draw real lessons and improve the action plan;

That this working group also meet as needed, when one of the members of the group wishes to report a problem or an incident that could affect the security of parliamentarians and staff.

Recommendation 8

That the government, in collaboration with the various law enforcement and security agencies, establish clear instructions regarding the mandate of each of these partners according to the types of incident, taking into account the expansion of the “effective perimeter” of Parliament Hill following the various works being undertaken in the buildings on the Hill; and that the government inform parliamentarians as quickly as possible.