Notices of Meeting include information about the subject matter to be examined by the committee and date, time and place of the meeting, as well as a list of any witnesses scheduled to appear. The Evidence is the edited and revised transcript of what is said before a committee. The Minutes of Proceedings are the official record of the business conducted by the committee at a sitting.
We have with us, from the Department of Health, Greg Carreau, director general, safe environments directorate.
From the Department of the Environment, we have Mr. John Moffet, who we know very well and has been very useful to this committee on a number of subjects. He's the assistant deputy minister, environmental protection branch.
We have also have Laura Farquharson, director general, legislative and regulatory affairs, environmental protection branch, and Jacqueline Gonçalves, director general, science and risk assessment, science and technology branch.
To all those representing departments today, welcome back to the committee.
Before we begin the clause‑by‑clause consideration of the bill, there are a number of irregularities, if I may say so, or items that should be clarified by the legislative clerk who is with us. It has to do with the way some of the provisions of the Bill S‑5 are written.
I will give you a very specific example. On pages 2 and 3—
In the English version of the bill, after paragraph (a), there are subparagraphs (i), (ii) and (iii) that are really quite distinct. In the French version, all the text is compressed into one paragraph, which makes it harder to read.
By the way, I'll warn you: We're going to take our time, because clause‑by‑clause consideration is complicated.
Apparently, this arrangement is normal. It should be understood that this is not an exact translation. According to the instructions given, one law clerk drafts the English version, but another law clerk drafts the French version. Apparently, the models used for the languages are not identical. I'm told that this is not a mistake.
If I understand correctly, there are no consequences.
In some places, on pages 4 and 5, for example, both versions present subparagraphs in the same way. However, in other places in the bill, one version uses subparagraphs (a), (b) and (c), for example, but it's not quite the same in the other version.
I'd like to know if there are any consequences to this.
I'm told that I should ask the officials. They may be able to explain why the two versions diverge.
Does anyone want to answer the question now?
[English]
Can any of the officials speak to the fact that on page 2, in subclause 3(1), we have paragraph 3(1)(a) in both English and in French, but in English we then have subparagraphs 3(1)(a)(i) and 3(1)(a)(ii) and so on, but that is not reflected in the French.
Is that normal? Does anyone want to...? Our legislative clerk—
Yes. I'm just trying to look quickly at what you're looking at. I do believe it's is a drafting custom that it's written one way in English and one way in French. It's just different—
The amendment is that Bill S-5, in clause 2, be amended by replacing line 10 on page 1 with the following:
“ery individual in Canada and future generations have a right to a healthy environ-”
Really, the addition here is “future generations”. We heard from a number of witnesses that giving future generations the right to a healthy environment is important. We heard this from young people and from first nation leaders.
I hope that the committee will support this amendment.
Mr. Chair, I'd like to make a comment that has more to do with form than substance. Of course, in legislation, it's all about the words. I don't know if my colleague Ms. Pauzé sees the proposed wording the same way I do:
qu'il reconnaît que tout particulier au Canada de même que les générations futures ont droit à un
To be quite honest, this is the first time I've ever seen the word “particulier” used to refer to human beings. I checked and it's a correct usage, but I feel the word “personne” would be more suitable.
However, I don't mean to question the translators' authority, but I will follow Ms. Pauzé's lead.
No, apparently I didn't call the vote on the amendment. We just had the vote on the subamendment.
I was going to call the vote on the amendment if there wasn't anyone interested in speaking to it, but Mr. Kurek is interested. Mr. Kurek asked that Mr. Moffet give his opinion on the amendment.
I apologize for not intervening before the vote. I think I was on mute.
I just want to point out that the consequence of changing the terminology from “individual” to “person” means that this right would be extended to corporations as well as people. That was not the intention of the government in introducing this right.
The term “person” in common law has a broad interpretation. It includes corporations as well as humans.
I'd like to propose a subamendment to change it in the French version. I won't change it back, because I know we're not allowed to do that. Rather than saying—
I'll put an argument out that if someone wanted to make it “all people” in the French—I'm sorry, my French is not strong enough—and rather than “every individual” say “all individuals” so that we're not voting on the exact same subamendment, then we could return to the language that would not extend this to corporations.
Mr. Chair, I don't want to start a war of words, but according to the definition in the Larousse dictionary, it's a human being, regardless of gender. I certainly don't wish to challenge Mr. Moffet on this, because I assume he has a lot more legislative experience than I do. However, that was the word I thought was most appropriate. If there is another one—
I know, but according to the dictionary definition, it's a human being, regardless of gender. If, by any chance, we have another definition, that's fine, no problem. As I'm saying, I won't fight over a word, but this appears to be the word that best describes what we're talking about here, which is human beings.
Even then, we'd be playing with fire a little. I consulted with the legislative clerk and my understanding is that changing one word in one part of the bill could have cascading effects. So we could get bogged down doing it that way.
I've been assured that the word “particulier” refers to people, not businesses or entities we call corporations.
I'm prepared to go back to the original wording if necessary, but according to the Larousse, the word “particulier” is defined as follows: which belongs to or is specifically assigned to someone, to something; which distinguishes someone or something; or which is characterized by something unusual. In short, that's a far cry from the individual or human being, along with the unborn child we want to protect.
Apparently, the federal Interpretation Act assigns a different meaning to those words. I'm going to ask Mr. Moffet to weigh in because he's the expert. As you say, he has a lot of legislative experience.
(1325)
[English]
Ms. Collins, is your hand up from before, or is it new?
Under the federal Interpretation Act, unless a term is explicitly defined otherwise in a statute, then it is to be defined according to the Interpretation Act. The Interpretation Act provides that the term “person” in French and English has the broad definition that I just described. That includes—I'm not sure what the term is—“body corporate”, I think, as well as a human. If we insert that language into this text, then we would be acknowledging a right held not just by Canadians or people in Canada but also by corporations in Canada.
That seems pretty clear. Using the word “personne” would give rights to both corporations and individuals, and I don't believe that's really the intent of the bill.
Mr. Moffet just explained the need to look at the Interpretation Act, which tells us how to interpret federal statutes. In other words, the Larousse doesn't have the final say.
In that case, Mr. Moffet, can you clarify how the word “particulier” is defined in federal statutes, according to Interpretation Act? Do you have an example? This isn't the first time human beings have been referred to in federal legislation. What French word is used for “human being”? We understand that it's not the word “personne”. Is it “particulier”, “individu”, “gens”? Give me the specific French word used in other federal statutes to refer to humans, and we will use it immediately.
The term “particulier” was the term that the Department of Justice drafters used. It is a term that already appears in the French text of the existing—
Okay. The term “particulier” is the term that the Department of Justice drafters used in drafting this amendment. It is a term that is already used in other provisions in the existing CEPA to refer to humans, so it would be a consistent usage of the term throughout the act.
What you're saying, Mr. Moffet, is that if we go with “personne” rather than “particulier”, we have to bring in another CEPA amendment act to amend all of CEPA as it stands now, because that's the term they use in CEPA.
Mr. Chair, if we have unanimous consent, I move that the decision that was made be rescinded, for the linguistic and legislative reasons that have just been clearly explained to us.
I think my role is to explain the consequences of the amendment.
In this case, the amendment would change the scope of the right in the bill considerably. It's contrary to the entire approach that's been taken in drafting these provisions.
The bill proposes that the right would be acknowledged for all individuals living now. We need to draw a distinction between recognizing a right that future generations hold versus what is in the current text, which acknowledges that the current generation needs to take into account the needs of future generations. That provision and that concept are in the bill.
What is not in the bill, which would be changed by this amendment, would be to accord a right to people not yet born. That would, as I said, significantly change the nature of the right and diverge considerably from the government's intent in this case.
I would just refer people to the United Nations document on a call to action for human rights and the rights of future generations. It talks about the interlinked crises of climate change, environmental degradation, loss of biodiversity and pollution as violating the rights of people—everyday countless people—and threatening the effective enjoyment of human rights of future generations.
This call to action really recognizes that climate actions are impacting people today and they will also impact future generations. We've heard that from numerous witnesses.
Yes, and that's due to the terms of the motion passed by this committee that reduces the rights I would otherwise have, just to clarify that for all members. I'm here, I know, at some point, because I have many amendments. Some of you may regret that you passed a motion, without really knowing what you were doing, that says that members of parties with fewer than 12 MPs or who are independents must show up with their amendments at clause-by-clause stage even though we have the right to present them in the House as a whole, but for the motion.
This one is a fairly straightforward and small amendment. I hope it might be acceptable to the committee. What PV-1, my first amendment, proposes is to restore what has been in the Canadian Environmental Protection Act for decades, which is the concept of virtual elimination of a toxic substance.
We from the Green Party argue that the virtual elimination of toxic substances should remain within the Canadian Environmental Protection Act. We know there have been problems with the implementation of this act, of this concept of virtual elimination, but there are ways to ensure that virtual elimination of toxic substances from commerce can be restored to the act. I have additional amendments throughout the bill that make this more workable.
I know I have very little time under the terms of the motion to explain it fully, but I think members of the committee, I hope, are familiar with the arguments made by the Canadian Environmental Law Association about how removing virtual elimination weakens the act.
I'd ask if any of the officials would have any....
I think this is going to happen just as a preamble to my question, Mr. Chair. Because this is an extremely technical bill, I expect that a question you'll hear often is asking the officials to expand on the impacts of some of these amendments as especially.... You know, with the paper I printed off, I felt almost guilty of a sin after printing off so much paper for an environmental bill.
My preamble is that I suspect we're going to often hear questions asking the officials, the drafting folks, the legislative clerk and the clerk to weigh in on some of the impacts of what these amendments may or may not include.
With that, Mr. Chair, I would ask if Mr. Moffet or other witnesses would have any insights to share related to the separate amendments, specifically PV-1.
MP May is correct in that the bill would slightly amend the preamble, essentially by removing reference to virtual elimination because virtual elimination is codified—well, defined—in the current CEPA, and there is a codified set of requirements regarding virtual elimination. As she explained, the implementation of those provisions has proven unworkable, despite two decades of effort.
There is a new approach proposed in the bill that would expand on virtual elimination, retain the emphasis on a default preference for prohibition of a broader set of substances than are referred to in the current virtual elimination regime, and define that group of substances as substances of highest concern.
In order to avoid confusion by retaining the reference in the statute in one place when we're removing it in all other places, the proposal is to remove it from the preamble while retaining the overall emphasis in the preamble on the need to control, manage and prevent pollution and waste.
I apologize. I said “highest concern”. I think the term is slightly different in the act, but we'll get to that provision later. The point is that there is now a new regime that is broader than virtual elimination and that focuses on giving a preference to eliminating those substances that are posing the worst kind of risk. It's broadening the concept in it but deleting this particular term throughout the act in order to avoid any confusion.
First, I don't understand why we don't have the English version of the motion.
Then I discovered something else when reading this amendment. The French version uses “principe de la prudence” everywhere in the act. So we looked it up in the dictionary and did some historical research. In French, we use the word “précaution”. That's what came out of the 1992 Rio Declaration. I understand that, at the time, the language chosen came from other public policy spheres, but in French, based on the Rio Declaration, it should be “principe de précaution”.
In fact, I remember doing a search on the Pest Management Regulatory Agency and noticing that, in that context, they also used “principe de précaution”.
The precautionary approach enacted in 1992 is as follows:
Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent environmental degradation.
Therefore, I'd like to propose an amendment to replace the word “prudence” with the word “précaution”.
Based on its usage, the word “prudence” (“caution” in English) refers to accounting values. It's one of the seven big accounting and economic principles. For example, accounting records should be collected with “prudence” (“caution” in English.
“Principe de la prudence” is not used when we talk about the environment. In this area, we always talk about the “principe de précaution” (“precautionary principle” in English).
It's not on Madame Pauzé's point, but on the motion itself. This seems to change the French version to be more along the lines of “cost-effective” instead of “effective”. My French is not strong, but that's my understanding.
In my opinion, I think the language of “effective” seems much more in line with where I'd like to see this bill go, rather than solely focusing on cost-effectiveness.
In the spirit of giving a full explanation, I'm proposing this amendment to respond to the other place's amendment, to the “precautionary principle” formulations in the preamble.
In paragraph 2(1)(a) of the act, the ENEV committee of the Senate, as you know, amended the English version as subparagraph 2(1)(a)(ii) to remove the word “cost” from the phrase “cost-effective measures” in an attempt to better align the English provision with the French provision, which simply refers to “mesures effectives”.
However, the discrepancy between the English “cost-effective measures” and the French “mesures effectives” is not a translation error and in fact is consistent with the English and French versions of the 1992 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development upon which the provision is based. In order to avoid misalignment and to ensure that the key notion that precautionary measures be cost-effective remains in CEPA, the government proposes to correct the purported translation error by amending the French version of the act rather than the English.
That was a long explanation, Mr. Chair, but I hope that clarifies things.
I understand what Mr. Duguid just said about his amendment, but I'm not sure he answered my question about the fact that this is about the “principe de précaution” rather than the “principe de la prudence”. That is the point of the subamendment I wanted to propose. A little later, I will also propose that we use the definition given in the Rio Declaration.
What I don't like about the wording of amendment G‑1 is the use of the term “mesures rentables” when talking about “remettre à plus tard l’adoption de mesures rentables”. What are “mesures rentables”? Does it mean that it has to be profitable only in economic terms?
Personally, if those are the words being used, I will vote against the amendment, even though it supposedly makes a correction to the French version.
As I understand it, we should be talking about measures that are “efficaces” rather than “rentables”, but I'll come back to that later, as that's not what we're dealing with right now.
Again, I would like to call on Mr. Moffet's knowledge and ask him to clarify what he thinks of Ms. Pauzé's suggestion to change the word “prudence” to “précaution”.
Mr. Moffet, since this is once again a question of changing words and since the explanations you gave on a previous question a few minutes ago convinced us very well, I appeal again to your knowledge. In your opinion, is the word “précaution” more appropriate than the word “prudence”?
We always rely on our colleagues in the Department of Justice. In this context, it is the word “prudence” that is used, and I think that is the right word. It is also the word that is used in federal law in other contexts.
When you talk about the federal legislation, are you talking specifically about the one we're looking at right now or other federal legislation related to the environment?
Ms. Pauzé's point is well taken. As she explained to us earlier, the wording refers to what is in the Rio Declaration, and it is the word “précaution” that is used there. If we want to be consistent and coherent in talking about the environment, it would certainly be historically justified and justifiable.
The word “prudence” is used elsewhere in the original CEPA text as a translation of this principle. For example, I believe it is used in section 76.1, as well as in the preamble, which the committee is reviewing.
I completely agree with Ms. Farquharson. It is true, and we have checked it, that they use the word “prudence” in the 1999 act.
Please recall, however, the point I was making earlier. Perhaps that was the language that was used at the time. After all, it was only seven years after the Rio Declaration. Now, in the context of environmental laws, it is the precautionary principle that is put forward instead, as defined in that declaration.
By the way, with regard to “mesures rentables”, in English, I think it says “cost efficiency”.
Yes. The term used in the English version corresponds to the one used in the Rio Declaration.
I don't like the fact that the French version talks about “mesures effectives”, but I figure what's sauce for the goose is sauce for the gander. So, if I'm working for the precautionary principle, even though I don't like the word “effectives”, I'll accept it, because that's the term used in the French version of the Rio Declaration. I would therefore like to see a correction made. I will table an amendment to that effect.
We cannot maintain an error that dates back to 1999. We have to be consistent with what the government signs internationally.
Mr. Chair, I just want to make the observation that these terms have been used consistently in multiple federal statutes since the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development in the manner in which they currently appear in CEPA.
One possible consequence of amending CEPA with regard to this definition would be that it would call into question the intention of the other statutes that retain the original Rio terminology. In turn, that could have unintended implications for the intended requirement in those statutes to exercise the precautionary principle in decision-making.
From a government, statutory, consistency perspective, it would be our recommendation to retain the same terminology that has appeared in all federal statutes since 1992, that has not been subject to challenge, and that has enabled officials and decision-makers to exercise the precautionary principle consistently.
Since my French is far from passable and since this is a unique amendment because both the English and French of the amendment are in French, Mr. Chair, my question to the experts—and possibly the mover of the motion—is this: If this subamendment changes that particular word, is there an impact on the rest of the bill? Is it setting a precedent that would require that particular word?
If I'm following the conversation correctly, would “prudence” be required to be changed throughout the entirety of the act? Would this have implications?
I think Mr. Moffet was implying that if it starts here, then the consequence would be the entirety of CEPA, both what is amended and what is not, and related acts. I know some of the witness testimony we heard talked about this being one of a number of acts related to environmental regulation, whether it be in agriculture, health, pharmaceuticals or that sort of thing.
My question comes down to this: If that word is changed in this amendment en français, does that have sweeping consequences across the entirety of this act and possibly other acts?
The short answer is “yes” with regard to CEPA and other statutes.
Certainly in CEPA the terms appear at least four other times. In some cases, it's in provisions that have not been amended by Bill S-5 and are therefore not open to this committee to amend.
This error is over 20 years old. I am trying to correct what may have been a translation error, at the time. I will recall what I said earlier. The Rio Declaration was signed by Canada in 1992 and the act came not long after, seven years after that declaration. There may have been a slip in the translation.
I don't understand why we are not able to correct this. Are federal laws so rigid that we can't even correct a 20‑year-old mistake?
I don't care what legal argument I'm given, I'm saying that Canada signed the Rio Declaration, and I'm asking that our environmental law be consistent with that declaration that we signed internationally. This declaration does not refer to the “principe de prudence”, which is an accounting and economic principle, but rather to the “principe de précaution”, which is a principle that applies to the environment.
I just want to be very clear, because in general I think I support Madam Pauzé's change. I also oppose the intention of the original motion, and I would much prefer that we change the English version to “effective” rather than “cost-effective”. However, from what I'm hearing, if we were to do that, we would have to change a number of areas in this act—the ones we can change—but there are areas in this act that we're unable to change, and then they would be inconsistent.
I just want to make sure that I'm comprehending that correctly. Mr. Moffet, can you just clarify? Did I get that right?
I'm suggesting that in order to be consistent, that would be the appropriate consequence so that the same terms are used consistently throughout the act and then, ideally, throughout all federal statutes.
Just for this act in particular, if we were to go and change everything from “cost-effective” to “effective” and from “la prudence” to.... I am forgetting the French word that Madam Pauzé suggested, but if we were to do that for all of the areas that we can change, what is the impact of having that inconsistency with areas that we can't change in this act?
I think the short answer is that we don't know, so it would create uncertainty because you would have the same term defined in different ways in the same statute. I'm reluctant to speculate, but I think we can say that it would create some uncertainty as to the way in which the various provisions might be interpreted, particularly if they're subject to judicial review.
I think changing this in all of the areas that we possibly can and opening up some uncertainty—meaning maybe moving in the direction of “effective” versus “cost-effective” and the precautionary principle—doesn't seem too dangerous to me, but I'm curious what the danger is that you see or what the negative repercussion of that uncertainty is.
I think the concern that I'm articulating is that we would have what was intended to be the same obligation associated with various decisions under the act now subject to different legal obligations, or at least differently defined legal obligations.
I think the concern is that if a decision made under one of those provisions was challenged in a judicial review, the fact that there are different definitions in the act could lead to an unintended outcome. I don't think I can point to a very specific implication other than the risk of uncertain outcomes as a result of what would be an inconsistent approach to precaution in the statute.
Again, I remind you that the definition hasn't been challenged or the exercise of precaution hasn't been challenged to date.
Sorry, Mr. Moffet, but could you tell us what other statutes this slight change here might affect, where “prudence” is listed as opposed to “precaution”? You mentioned that there seems to be some problem, in that this change would affect several other bills by being inconsistent. It would be good for this committee to know which bills you're referring to.
I don't think we've done a full survey on this particular question, but I believe that it was under the Rio declaration that we used “prudence” and “cost-effective” in English. I think it's the Federal Sustainable Development Act that also uses “prudence”. The Canada National Marine Conservation Areas Act also uses “prudence”. The Pest Control Products Act also uses “prudence”. It is in a number of statutes.
I would say that “cost-effective measures”, which is definitely how the precautionary principle is interpreted, is different from “effective measures”. My understanding of the Senate amendment is that we were not trying to change the concept; we were trying to get the translation right. If the English is “effective measures”, meaning “cost-effective measures”, then the French should align with that and say, “mesures rentables”.
I would like to add that in 1999, the Government of Canada established that the precautionary principle concept should be understood as follows:
[English]
The government's actions to protect the environment and health are guided by the precautionary principle, which states that “where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent environmental degradation.”
[Translation]
This is exactly what is in the Rio Declaration, but at the time it was mistranslated into French. The words “precautionary principle” were translated as “principe de la prudence”. It is this error that needs to be corrected, 20 years later.
No one can provide any example where this might have confused the judges. I think we need to clear this up.
In fact, a little later, I am going to table an amendment defining the precautionary principle. Of course, I will take the definition found in the Rio Declaration, since that is the one used in English. That is all I want to do.
I'm starting to get mad, I apologize, but enough is enough. We're getting bogged down for a word that has been clearly defined since 1992. There is an error dating back to 1999. It is said that this could pose a problem for judges. I'm sorry, but I really don't agree.
Ms. May, technically speaking, as you know, you're permitted to speak to your amendments and so on, but it is at my discretion. If what you have to say is very brief, because I know you were at Rio, I will allow it, but be very brief, please.
The precautionary principle, as read out by Madam Pauzé, was correct. For the benefit of committee members, the addition of the notion of “cost-effective” was not in a precautionary principle at Rio, nor was it in the Stockholm declaration. It's not in our Oceans Act when precautionary principles are referenced, nor is it in the Canada National Marine Conservation Areas Act.
I was going to say something very similar to what Ms. May just brought up. It's just that in the precautionary principle in Stockholm, “cost-effective” isn't mentioned.
I do want to correct the record. The Senate committee clearly spoke to removing the word “cost”. Their rationale was so that we don't limit environmental protection. Rather than reinserting this into the translation, I think we should actually just correct it in full and remove “cost” throughout.
That said, I think it seems likely that a majority of committee members might keep it in. I would love it if we could kind of move this along. I'm not sure if Madame Pauzé had officially submitted her subamendment, but I'm very much in support of it and I would love to come to a vote soon, if possible.
My question is addressed to the experts and specialists.
In the event that the committee votes in favour of this amendment, which seeks to replace the word “prudence” with the word “précaution” in order to respect the correct translation of the word used in the English version, would this have any impact on Bill S‑5? I'm only talking about Bill S‑5. Are there any words referring to this principle that would need to be changed if the word “précaution” were used instead of “prudence”?
Mr. Chair, as many folks have already said—Mr. Kurek in particular—it's a technical bill. We're parsing language here. It might be best, Mr. Chair, as I understand the procedure, to stand this matter so that we can sort it out.
Mr. Chair, let me make a suggestion. This is a very interesting issue, but time is running out. I would recommend that the experts take the time to determine if the word “prudence” would have any impact elsewhere in the act and provide us with an answer at the next sitting when we consider the bill.
This is what Mr. Duguid is proposing. He wants us to put aside the debate on this amendment, so that we can take the time to get the proper information. At the moment, we are going around in circles.
That is noted, but Mr. Duguid has suggested that we put this debate to one side. So I need to find out how to proceed. I think I understand, but we will see.
Mr. Duguid has proposed that we set aside the debate on the amendment. We have to decide on that.
Are you all in favour of setting aside debate on this amendment?
Yes, Mr. Chair, I will move this government motion to respond to the other place's amendment to the precautionary principle in paragraph 2(1)(a) of the act.
Once again, the ENEV committee amended the English version of the subparagraph 2(1)(a)(ii) to remove the word “cost” from the phrase “cost-effective measures” in an attempt to better align the English provision with the French provision, which simply refers to “mesures effectives”. However, the discrepancy between the English “cost-effective measures” and the French is not a translation error and in fact is consistent with the English and French versions of the 1992 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development upon which the provision is based.
This does sound a lot like my previous intervention, Mr. Chair.
In order to avoid misalignment and to ensure that the key notion that precautionary measures be cost-effective remains in CEPA, the government proposes to correct the purported translation error by amending the French version of the act rather than the English.
I don't know if we could get Mr. Moffet to provide some commentary again, Mr. Chair.
I'll reiterate the fact that the Senate purposely took out the the word “cost”, so the translation error here should be switched if we were going to return to what the Senate had amended.
To go back to 1999, when the committee was looking at this issue for the 1998 CEPA bill, Bill C-32, some Liberals, along with some Progressive Conservatives and NDP and Bloc members succeeded in committee with an articulation excluding the word “cost”, but then it was overturned by the cabinet and the Liberal reform folks at report stage. That's a little bit of history on this.
There are lots of people who want the word “cost” taken out of this. Again, notably, it is not in the Stockholm declaration or in a number of the other ones that Ms. May had articulated.
You're going to find me tiresome on this. That said, I'm not going to correct the Rio Declaration. In the English version we looked at, it says “cost-effective”, and that's translated into French as “mesures effectives”, not “mesures rentables”.
We have looked at the current act. Under “Administrative Duties”, in the “Duties of the Government of Canada”, subsection 2(1) states:
2(1) In the administration of this Act, the Government of Canada shall, having regard to the Constitution and laws of Canada and subject to subsection (1.1),
(a) exercise its powers in a manner that protects the environment and human health [...]
A little further on in the description, it says:
[...] shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent environmental degradation, and promotes and reinforces enforceable pollution prevention approaches [...]
In the French version it says: "[...] ne doit pas servir de prétexte pour remettre à plus tard l'adoption de mesures effectives[...]"
I don't understand why anyone would change the French version. I would keep “cost-effective” in the English version of the act, for the reason I gave earlier: it is the term used in the English version of the Rio Declaration. Now, in French, it should be “mesures effectives”, as it was in the original text of the act.
I could propose a subamendment to replace “mesures rentables” with “mesures effectives”. Personally, I would prefer the word “efficaces” be used, but I won't get hung up on that. So it would be back to what was in the act, which was “mesures effectives”.
I think much of translation now will be “cost-effective” from “effectives” in French.
The thing about “effective” is it's a subjective term. I think my colleagues around the table understand that the more precision we get in this wording, the better, and “cost-effective” is actually measurable, so I do think it's important to change it back to “cost-effective”.
This language around protecting the rights of nature comes from not only a number of organizations but also a number of first nation individuals who have been advocating to protect the rights of nature.
Here where I live on Vancouver Island in the Salish Sea, the Esquimalt and Songhees nations have participated in reconciliation dialogues asking for areas to be protected, recognizing that nature should have rights, since in their opinion these are living entities. There has also been an amazing movement around the St. Lawrence River as well, and around the world. In areas like New Zealand there are folks who are advocating to protect the rights of nature.
My comment on this will be similar to one that I made earlier in the meeting, which was that this would fundamentally change the scope of the right that is articulated in the bill, which at the moment is focused on individuals, people, and it would confer that right on humans as the rights holders.
Recognizing that nature or components of nature have rights of their own would represent a fundamental paradigm shift, and it's certainly not one that the government has yet contemplated or thought through fully, so in addition to that kind of fundamental change in the focus of the right that would be provided by Bill S-5, the bill as currently written doesn't contain any supplementary or complementary provisions that would provide legal personhood or any corresponding procedural or substantive rights to nature.
By contrast, of course, the way we've articulated the right to humans is supplemented in CEPA already, and in Bill S-5 with various additional procedural rights and additional substantive rights in order to give life to that new right. We have not provided for any such additional provisions related to the rights of nature in Bill S-5.
Again, in this bill, what we're trying to do is to get precision around these definitions, and without a definitive decision around the rights of nature, I think it is probably as open-ended as anything we've considered in this House of Commons since I've been here.
I want to thank the officials and other members for their comments.
Really, expanding rights and including the rights of nature means that we are acknowledging that it has the right, in and of itself, to exist and to flourish. This is something that other countries have been doing, and I would be happy to work with officials to change other areas of the act.
We did skip through a number of sections in clause 2 that have further amendments on the rights of nature, and I hope that the committee would consider this really important move when it comes to protecting our ecosystems and natural communities.
I'll just say I think this is a really interesting addition. I don't think inserting this where it is right now, essentially, given what Mr. Moffet has said, will really give the right framework to put it into place. I think this is something that would be very interesting for us to study in the committee, perhaps in a future study, so that we could look at what it would actually look like to implement this in practice to really do it justice. However, given the concerns that have been raised by Mr. Moffet, I have some concerns as to whether this amendment would be an effective way of doing that.
I will move it, although I hope there won't be too much discussion as it is in a similar vein to previous amendments to “protect the right of every individual in Canada and future generations”.
(Amendment negatived: nays 9; yeas 2 [See Minutes of Proceedings])
The Chair: We move on to Green Party amendment 2. It's already deemed moved, so I would ask Ms. May to make a brief explanation in support of her motion.
Thank you for the indulgence earlier to allow me to provide more detail from history.
This amendment, specifically to draw members' attention to the biggest change to the text we have in front us, is to remove the words “subject to any reasonable limits”. I'll note that in other acts of this kind, in environmental and human rights legislation, no such qualifying language is used to limit the application of these principles. The language I have proposed here is all found elsewhere within the act, and clearly members are very familiar with the notion of applying the precautionary principle, the principles of environmental justice, the polluter pays principle and the principles of sustainable development, substitution, non-regression and intergenerational equity.
I will again draw members' attention to the fact that at this stage it is quite inappropriate to include the words “subject to any reasonable limits”. That language was removed in relation to the right to a healthy environment when this bill was before the Senate.
I hope this is just tidying things up to keep things consistent.
First of all, I'll ask Mr. Moffet for the interpretation of these legal terms and how they'll impact the legislation by being inserted here, and then I'll speak to it again after that point.
To clarify, “subject to any reasonable limits” remained in the bill after the Senate studied it, and as witnesses before the committee acknowledged, no right is absolute. That's what “subject to any reasonable limits” indicates. If you took it out, the implication might be unclear.
As for adding the additional principles, the way the provision is constructed, the list is not exhaustive as it is. Other principles could be part of what's considered in “the right to a healthy environment”. It would be elaborated on in the implementation framework and it might include some of these principles. That's something that could be discussed as we develop the implementation framework.
I would say that at least one of the principles, “substitution”, is specifically related—at least from my understanding—to chemicals management, substances management, whereas this right is applying to the whole act. I think it might be better to highlight the few key principles—as has been done—that should be covered and allow for others to be explored through the process of developing the implementation framework.
I do. My colleagues will know, because I've spoken about this before, that these principles we're talking about here have little to no legal standing in any court that I know of. If it's true that there have been cases decided in which it has been determined what these terms mean on a legal basis, particularly in Canada—things like principles of “substitution”, “non-regression”, “intergenerational equity” and “environmental justice”—I have yet to see any tangibility around these terms. As opposed to this committee drafting or approving legislation that will open up somebody else to interpreting what we mean here, I think it is kicking the can down the road.
I think we have to get precise in what we're trying to accomplish here and not just put nice words on paper but find something that lands. I will be saying this whenever these terms come up in this bill. These are not, as far as I know, tangible terms for which any meaning has been determined through a legal process. I can be educated on this, but I'm certain it hasn't happened in Canada. The meaning of this terminology is wide open and subject to somebody else's interpretation at this point in time.
I want to speak in support of this motion—I have a very similar one that follows—with the exception, I think, of something that maybe strengthens my motion in this motion by Ms. May. I think the polluter pays principle is a really valuable addition. I think something that could strengthen both of our motions would be changing the word “applying” to “upholding”. If this doesn't pass, I'll likely be submitting a motion from the floor right afterward.
I am not going to go back to the precautionary principle. That said, I will propose a definition of this principle when we get to clause 4 of the bill.
I want to say to Ms. May that I will vote for her amendment, even though in ecological and environmental circles the French word “durable” has been discussed for at least 10 years. Some people say that we should not say “durable”, but “viable”. I have participated in some of these discussions.
I find that Mr. McLean's arguments are also correct. Nevertheless, as a matter of principle and because it clearly mentions “environmental justice” and “polluter pays”, I will be voting for the amendment.
While I agree with what Ms. Pauzé and Ms. May are saying here—and Ms. Collins on the next one—I think there are differences between the one Ms. May put forward and the one Ms. Collins put forward. I'm looking at this as the statute. We have the whole section on implementation framework. These principles do change over time. Some of these, as Mr. McLean was saying, aren't well defined right now. New ones will be introduced as we continue to make progress in the environmental field. I feel as though these are the types of things that we'd be better off addressing when we have time to really address them over the next year or two in the implementation framework.
That would be my suggestion on how we deal with this, as opposed to putting it into the statute here.
We are studying a bill. We may agree on some principles or disagree on others, but principles must be defined in a piece of legislation. This is not an electoral program, a speech or something you say. As long as this is not clearly defined in the text of the law, it can have all sorts of consequences, since laws are made to be observed, applied, and even challenged and then interpreted by judges in court. So, at this stage, the terms must be defined. The current amendment does not do this.
Mr. Chair, rather than moving that amendment, I'm going to move the same wording, except I'm going to change the word “apply” to “uphold”.
The amendment I will move would be as follows:
That Bill S-5, in Clause 3, be amended by adding after line 13 on page 3 the following:
“(a.3) in relation to paragraph (a.2), uphold principles such as principles of environmental justice — including the avoidance of adverse effects that disproportionately affect vulnerable populations — the principle of non-regression and the principle of intergenerational equity;”
We've talked a little bit about it already, but I do think that naming some of these principles in the bill is important. They do already appear in CEPA. Especially when we're talking about vulnerable populations, it's so essential.
I recognize that the committee didn't want to explicitly give the right to future generations, but the principle of intergenerational equity is one that I think everyone can get on board with, and it wouldn't have, I think, the same kind of ramifications that extending the full right to a healthy environment to future generations would. It's essential that we uphold these principles of environmental justice.
No, the motion as it is in your package was not moved. An alternate motion was moved, which is basically identical, except the word “uphold” is where the word “apply” was.
Mr. Moffet previously spoke at this committee about the rights of future generations that we're trying to build into this bill, so can I speak to him again?
If the principle of intergenerational equity is the same thing we voted down earlier, I'd like his input on how his interpretation is different from what he spoke about earlier on respecting the rights of future generations and intergenerational equity.
I'll start. I might need to be supported by my colleagues.
The basic difference I want to bring to your attention is the difference between giving a right to future generations versus putting an obligation on current decision-makers to account for the interests of future generations. Intergenerational equity refers to the latter concept in the way it's constructed in CEPA now, so it requires us when we make decisions today to consider the impacts on future generations. That's not the same as giving a right to a future generation.
Mr. Chair, I'm curious on behalf of my francophone colleagues. The motion that was moved was moved in English and there was concern about translation and whatnot. I want to hear from those who are—
The presentation of the amendment will be brief, Mr. Chair.
With this amendment, we want to strengthen the fundamental principles for the implementation of the right to a healthy environment.
We have amply complained that, given where the right to a healthy environment is enshrined in Bill S‑5, it is not a real right. Still, we are trying to strengthen its implementation by establishing it among the administrative obligations contained in section 2 of CEPA.
The wording would be:
(a.3) adhere to the principles of environmental justice—including by avoiding adverse effects that disproportionately affect vulnerable populations—the principle of non-regression and the principle of intergenerational equity;
You will also have noticed that the principle of non-regression is back.
Thanks, Chair. I didn't want to interrupt, but if I'm reading correctly, I'd question whether or not this is in order, given the amendment that was passed just prior to this one. I'd ask, Mr. Chair, if that could be clarified.
They are very similar, I'm told. In amendment NDP-6 there's a reference to paragraph (a.2), and in amendment BQ-2 there's no reference to paragraph (a.2). I'm told that you can add to any clause. It would be renumbered. They can't both be (a.3). I'm told it's not out of order. It may be a little repetitive, but it's not out of order.
Ms. Collins, was that your point of order too? Was it the same?
I just want to see if maybe Madame Pauzé wants to withdraw it, given that it has almost exactly the same language except for the word “uphold”, which I think is strong, in the last amendment. I just want to check in with Madame Pauzé to see if she wants it to have the same—