FAAE Committee Meeting

    I call the meeting to order.

     Welcome to meeting number 2. Pursuant to Standing Order 108(2), today we have our briefing on the situation in Libya.

    In terms of how we're going to handle today's proceedings, we are going to start with the situation in Libya. We will go to about 2:30 p.m. and then we're going to look at the situation in Somalia. We're going to move forward fairly quickly. I notice that not all of our colleagues are here yet, but I think we need to get started so that we can keep on time.

    We will start with our ambassador, Ms. Sandra McCardell, who is Canada's ambassador to Libya. Welcome.

    We will then move along to the Canadian International Development Agency and Stephen Salewicz, who is director of the international humanitarian assistance division. He is joined by Sean Boyd, who is the acting regional director general for Europe, Middle East, and Maghreb.

    We will then move to the Department of National Defence with Major-General Jonathan Vance, director of staff for strategic joint staff, who will be doing the presentation. Joining him today is Brigadier-General Mike Hood, deputy director general for international security policy, and Brigadier-General Blaise Cathcart, Judge Advocate General.

    Thank you very much for being here today.

    Why don't we get started? The three of you have opening statements. We will proceed with Ms. McCardell and then we'll move across the room.

    Thank you very much.

    Members of the standing committee, since the uprising began in February, the Libyan people have shown great resolve in their efforts to create a Libya that respects the principles of democracy and good governance and reflects the aspirations of its people.

    In the face of continued resistance by the Gadhafi regime to this change and the evident willingness of Gadhafi and his inner circle to sacrifice not only the hopes of their people but their very lives to maintain a hold on power, Canada and its international partners have shown determination to support the courageous efforts of the Libyan people.

    In February of this year Moammar Gadhafi and his son Saif al-Islam Gadhafi demonstrated to the world their violent response to the Arab spring. Saif al-Islam, now under an arrest warrant from the International Criminal Court, spoke on Libyan state television on February 20 and promised, “We fight to the last man and woman and bullet. We will not lose Libya”.

    Unfortunately, the last five and a half months have shown that the Gadhafi family intends to fulfill that pledge quite literally.

    In the face of the unrelenting killings of unarmed protesters, Canada pressed early for international action and, on February 26^th, the UN Security Council passed resolution 1970 which demanded “steps to fulfill the legitimate demands of the Libyan population” and imposed a travel ban, an asset freeze, and an arms embargo to back this call.

    Canada acted quickly to implement these measures, going beyond the organizations and individuals listed by the UN.

     Regrettably for the people of Libya, there was no respite from the bloody crackdown. In mid-March, with regime forces on the outskirts of Benghazi, Gadhafi promised to purify Libya inch by inch, house by house, person by person, until the country was clean of the dirt and impurities--and this from a man who had already described his people as rats and dogs.

    In response to this clear threat and with an unprecedented call from the Arab League for a no-fly zone, the UN Security Council passed resolution 1973 on March 17, authorizing the use of all necessary measures to protect civilians and civilian-populated areas under threat of attack.

    The departure of Gadhafi from power has been recognized by the international community as essential to ensuring the future security of the civilian population and the stability of Libya. Statements of the contact group on Libya have repeated this view, which was shared by the G-8 at the Deauville summit in its declaration. It said:

    Canada was among the first participants in the coalition-led and subsequently NATO-led military mission in support of resolution 1973. Our actions have supported Canadian values of democracy, freedom, the rule of law, and human rights, and have served to strengthen our relations with key allies through our common efforts to address security threats at source.

    Gadhafi spoke publicly of his disdain for democracy movements in Tunisia and Egypt, and has threatened that Libyans will move like locusts to attack homes and offices and families in Europe.

    The contact group on Libya, of which Canada is a member, was created as a forum to coordinate the international political response to the Libya crisis, provide a focal point for contact to the Libyan opposition, and support a peaceful and stable transition in Libya. Each meeting has seen an increased number of participants, now reaching 39, and has served as a demonstration of the ever-widening international opposition to the Gadhafi regime.

     During its four meetings, the most recent of which took place in Istanbul on July 15 with the participation of Minister Baird, the contact group has sought to identify political, economic, and humanitarian measures that can be taken by the international community to further isolate Gadhafi and support the Libyan opposition National Transitional Council, or NTC. In Istanbul the contact group agreed to deal with the NTC as the legitimate governing authority in Libya until an interim authority is in place.

    In addition, some important overarching principles to guide the political transition process were set forth. The first is that Gadhafi must leave power according to a defined framework. Second, there will be respect for the territorial integrity, sovereignty, and unity of Libya. Third, there will be justice for Libyans who have suffered atrocities, perpetrators of atrocities cannot be part of the negotiating process or a future political settlement, and there will be a transition period, as outlined in the NTC's road map, to include a national congress, an interim government, and a supreme executive council. Fourth, there will be a transitional process that is inclusive, Libyan-owned, and representative, and includes the potential participation of members of the previous bureaucracy as well as the opposition and other elements of Libyan society in a process leading to national reconciliation.

    The contact group has encouraged participants to provide financial aid to the NTC within the context of applicable laws and has suggested that participants consider allowing the export of oil by opposition-controlled entities, the unfreezing of assets for the benefit of the Libyan people, or the use of these assets as loan guarantees.

    The Istanbul meeting also noted the continued urgent need for the establishment of a genuine ceasefire and safe humanitarian access, but specified that these require the immediate withdrawal of the forces of the regime in Tripoli to their base, the release of all those detained or kidnapped by the Gadhafi regime, the opening of all borders to ensure fast and unimpeded passage of humanitarian aid, the treatment of the wounded, and the provision of water and electricity to all cities and regions to help normalize life.

    While predominant in the east of the country, the NTC brings together diverse elements from within Libyan society including representatives from many major cities across Libya, business and professional people, and former government officials. Its declared vision is a democratic one, its membership united in the common goal of replacing the current regime. The NTC is by its name “transitional”, with the mandate to prepare for a more permanent duly-elected government.

     On June 14 Canada recognized the NTC as the legitimate representative of the Libyan people.

    Less than two weeks later Minister Baird travelled to Benghazi, where he met with the chair of the NTC, Mustafa Abdul-Jalil, along with members of the council and representatives of local civil society, in addition to providing 355 trauma kits to respond to urgent medical needs.

    The minister was impressed by the council's clear commitment to rebuilding Libya despite the significant personal sacrifices that almost all council members had made. During his discussions, the minister made clear to the NTC that the international community has the mandate to protect civilians in Libya, but that it is the responsibility of the NTC to liberate their country. The minister welcomed the commitment of the NTC to principles of democracy, good governance, and human rights, as outlined in their vision of a democratic Libya, but underlined the importance of ensuring these principles are put into action.

    The minister raised with the NTC his concern at the use of rape as a weapon of war, and Libyan opposition echoed the gravity of these heinous crimes and underlined the cultural sensitivities relating to under-reporting. Victims are reluctant to come forward for treatment or support in a country that in any case has virtually no experience in providing it.

     Although Gaddafi has put his own interests above those of his country, the day will come when he will finally relinquish power. After more than 40 years of Gaddafi, Libya is a society with weak institutions and civil society.

    His style of rule encouraged and exploited tribal influences to prevent the creation of unified opposition to him, in addition to using the state security apparatus to intimidate and repress when necessary.

    Following the end of the conflict, a process of national reconciliation will be required, as well as assistance from the international community to support the building of democratic institutions.

    As Minister Baird said following his visit to Benghazi, “No one expects the next steps of Libya’s transition to be easy”.

    The Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade is leading a whole-of-government effort that will respond to a post-Gadhafi Libya with targeted assistance where Canada has value added. Canada's efforts will be coordinated with international partners, including the United Nations, and respond to the needs and aspirations as expressed by the Libyan people.

    In closing, I would like to remind members of the standing committee of the statement of the Prime Minister of Canada on March 16, the day prior to the adoption of resolution 1973 by the UN Security Council:

    Thank you.

    Thank you very much, Ambassador.

    We are now going to move on to CIDA.

    Mr. Salewicz, the floor is yours, sir.

    Thank you very much, and thank you for the invitation to this committee meeting.

    I'd like to speak with you today about CIDA's response to the Libyan crisis.

    The nature of the conflict in Libya is driving the humanitarian response in such a way that programming is divided into two distinct but interrelated operations. First, we're focusing on a response along Libya's borders in support of those who have fled the crisis. Inside Libya, we're focusing on a response to the needs of the population caught in the midst of a series of localized but intense conflict zones.

    In the border regions the ongoing crisis has resulted in the outflow of a large number of people from Libya. As of August 1, 646,600 migrants have crossed the Libyan border into Tunisia, Egypt, Chad, Niger, Algeria, and Sudan to escape the violence. These people fit into two categories: they are either third-country nationals--i.e., migrants who have crossed from Libya to a country that is not their country of origin--or migrants who have returned to their own country.

    The humanitarian response in the border regions has concentrated on the needs of nearly 300,000 third-country nationals who are migrant workers from more than 25 countries, as well as other people of concern, namely refugees.

    This assistance has come in the form of transit camps established at crossing points in Tunisia, as well as some facilities in Egypt to shelter the displaced and provide requisite services until they are repatriated to their countries of origin or, in the case of refugees, until longer-term solutions can be found.

    To date, as of August 1, some 156,300 migrant workers, or third-country nationals, have been assisted to return to their countries of origin. The International Organization of Migration, IOM, has helped to assist in this process, thereby averting a humanitarian crisis on the borders.

    To help respond to the specific needs of the people caught in the border regions, CIDA is working with a number of organizations, namely, as I mentioned, the IOM, as well as the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, and the Canadian Red Cross Society.

    Canadian support is assisting in the repatriation of over 156,000 migrant workers to their countries of origin by providing shelter, food, water, and non-food items to 150,000 migrants, refugees, and other persons of concern stranded on the Egyptian and Tunisian borders. Canadian assistance also supports the basic health care for 100,000 people in transit.

    Turning to the situation inside Libya, in opposition-controlled areas in the east around Benghazi, the humanitarian situation is largely stable with extensive access and freedom of movement reported by humanitarian actors.

    Humanitarian needs in these areas are modest and activities are focused on responding to some food and non-food distribution, provision of medical supplies, and water and sanitation activities.

    However, there are many pockets of intense fighting along the frontlines between the opposing forces as well as in isolated opposition-controlled areas in the west of the country. The intensity of the fighting in these locations has placed the civilian population at greater risk and has resulted in intermittent and/or limited access for all but a few experienced humanitarian actors.

    To help respond to the needs of Libyans affected by the conflict in-country, CIDA is working with the World Food Programme, the International Committee of the Red Cross and the United Nations Population Fund.

     CIDA support to its partners has helped provide food assistance and non-food items, as well as meet the water, sanitation and emergency medical needs of more than 500,000 people inside Libya. Funding to UNFPA will assist up to 50,000 women and girls affected by gender-based violence.

    Of note, the funding to WFP and the ICRC is regional in nature, and includes the provision of assistance to Libyans and others affected by the conflict in Tunisia and Egypt as well those in Libya.

    However, the funding to UNFPA is to protect and assist women and girls from gender-based violence, primarily in Libya.

    This brings CIDA’s total humanitarian assistance to $10 million, announced by the Prime Minister and Minister Oda on June 14 ($2 million) and in March ($8 million).

    CIDA continues to closely monitor the humanitarian situation in Libya and the surrounding countries.

    Thank you.

    Thank you, Mr. Salewicz.

    Now we're going to move to Major-General Vance from the Department of National Defence.

     The floor is yours, sir.

    Mr. Chair, members of the committee, thank you for this opportunity to brief you on Operation MOBILE, Canada’s military contribution to the international effort to respond to the crisis in Libya.

    I am Major-General Jonathan Vance, Director of Staff of the Strategic Joint Staff at NDHQ.

    With me this afternoon is Brigadier-General Mike Hood, deputy director general, international security policy at DND, as well as Brigadier-General Blaise Cathcart, the Judge Advocate General.

    Before you—I hope—are four slides which outline the Canadian Forces involvement in the NATO mission in Libya. I would like to walk you through our past and present contributions to the mission after which we would be pleased to answer your questions.

    Generally speaking, the first part of the information will be on slide 1.

    Since Ambassador McCardell has already well summarized the broader diplomatic and political situation, I will focus my comments on the military aspects of the international effort.

     In response to the emerging crisis in Libya, in February of this year the Government of Canada advised Canadian citizens to leave Libya. Soon after, the Department of Foreign Affairs began a concerted effort to evacuate all Canadians. The Canadian Forces were asked to assist, and we deployed two C-17 Globemaster transport planes and two C-130 Hercules transport planes to help evacuate Canadians and other eligible individuals.

    On March 2, the ship HMCS Charlottetown with an embarked Sea King helicopter departed from Halifax for the Mediterranean. On March 14, the Charlottetown joined the NATO fleet off the coast of Libya and began enforcement of the arms embargo shortly thereafter.

    In total, the Canadian Forces conducted seven flights and assisted in evacuating 153 Canadians and entitled persons from Libya. In addition, the non-combatant evacuation operation coordination centre, which is an international body, assisted with the departure of 4,431 entitled persons, including 308 Canadians, before ceasing operations on March 9.

    As you know, this initial 90-day Canadian military response was supported unanimously in the House of Commons. In June, the House voted to support the extension of Canada's commitment to the NATO mission until September 27, 2011.

     On slide 2 we're now looking at CF support to Operation Unified Protector. It is our Operation Mobile.

    Canada has provided significant military support to the NATO mission in the form of both air and sea assets. Presently we have seven CF-18 Hornet fighters, one CC-150 Polaris air refueller or tanker, two CC-130 Hercules aircraft, and two CP-140 Aurora maritime patrol aircraft deployed in the region, as well as HMCS Charlottetown with her helicopter embarked.

    Canadian Lieutenant-General Charles Bouchard remains in the critical position of NATO Commander of Combined Joint Task Force for Operation UNIFIED PROTECTOR.

Unified Protector, the NATO name of the operation, has three clear objectives that are known as the Berlin goals. These goals were set by NATO foreign affairs ministers last April and include an end to attacks against civilians, the verifiable withdrawal of the regime's military and paramilitary forces to bases, and full and unhindered access to humanitarian aid to all those who need it across Libya.

    If you would like to turn to the map on slide 3, I will briefly discuss the current situation on the ground.

    Along the coast, the lines of confrontation between pro-Gadhafi forces and anti-Gadhafi forces east of Tripoli and in the east near Brega have seen minor fluctuations as the anti-Gadhafi forces continue to work and push west.

    There has been an increase in activity in the Nafusa mountains southwest of Tripoli. Anti-Gadhafi forces have made advances in the region, but the situation remains very dynamic. The significance of these advances is that the main supply routes are no longer under the control of the pro-Gadhafi forces, allowing humanitarian assistance, as was stated earlier, to move more freely from Tunisia into the region.

    At present, it appears as though the pro-Gadhafi forces are maintaining a largely defensive posture. They continue to hold ground, especially in urban areas, and seem to have access to stable financial resources. While the finances of the anti-Gadhafi forces are improving, coordination of their fighting elements over the three main efforts that I've just described remains difficult, in part due to a lack of staff training and cohesive command and control. In short, the situation remains fluid and difficult to predict.

    If I may, I would like to briefly outline some operational milestones, first In terms of the Berlin goals and an end to attacks against civilians. NATO allies and partners have severely reduced Gadhafi's ability to attack civilians and continue to do so. The no-fly zone and embargo have been enforced and pro-regime threats are being eliminated. Rapid enforcement of the no-fly zone assisted anti-Gadhafi forces efforts early to protect Benghazi, preventing the potential for many civilian casualties at the hands of Gadhafi.

    NATO actions have increased survivability and effectiveness of anti-Gadhafi forces, pressuring Gadhafi's forces to withdraw and thus moving toward achieving the second Berlin goal.

    With regard to the third Berlin goal, ensuring unhindered access to humanitarian aid, NATO's efforts have greatly reduced the effectiveness of pro-Gadhafi forces maritime capacity and helped to ensure the ongoing flow of humanitarian supplies into Misrata.

    If you turn to slide 4, you will see some figures on the Canadian contribution relative to the broader coalition effort. There was a coalition total of 17,278 sorties, of which 7,258 were strikes, 137 were maritime air patrol sorties, and 3,896 were air-to-air refuelling sorties.

    In terms of the Canadian contribution, all percentages here are approximate, but it's the best I can do. We have conducted 8% of all offensive counter-air sorties, which is 598; 4% of all air-to-air refuelling sorties, which is 171; and 79% of all maritime patrol aircraft sorties, which is 108. This is 6% of the overall total, and Canada has expended approximately 455 of our laser-guided bombs.

    Under the maritime aspect, the coalition has conducted 203 boardings of suspicious vessels, with Canada having done five of them. HMCS Charlottetown has actively prevented pro-Gadhafi maritime forces from closing the port of Misrata. The continued presence of HMCS Charlottetown ensures the delivery of vital humanitarian aid.

    As you can see, Canada is more than pulling its weight militarily. However, I would like to stress that we see our contribution as just one facet of a broader diplomatic and humanitarian effort to help the Libyan people. A sustainable peace cannot be achieved by military means alone.

    Thank you for your time. We are ready to answer any questions you may have.

    Thank you, Major-General Vance.

    We are going to start with our new rotation. This is the first time we've had a chance to ask questions since we formed our committee, so we'll see how that works today.

    Mr. Dewar, you are starting off. You have the floor for seven minutes, sir.

    Thank you, Chair.

     Thank you to our guests.

    As the chair mentioned, this is the first time the committee has met and, I might add, the first time the foreign affairs committee has actually been formally seized with this issue. There have been briefings, and as members of the committee and our guests will know, before the election we passed a motion on participation and in support of UN resolution 1973; however, we have not had a chance--and this comment is without prejudice--to actually meet, so first of all, thank you to our guests for being here. I think it's important that we meet today since, as I mentioned, as a government and a country we signed on to participate in resolution 1973, but we have yet to meet formally to evaluate it.

    I will start with a question for you, Ambassador.

    As we have been viewing the mission and as things have been going on, we have heard from our spokespersons from the military side with regard to NATO's Berlin goals. We are seized--and certainly this is reflected in the amendments to the motion in the House--with UN resolution 1973. The goals of that included, of course, protection of civilians as well as a ceasefire and some form of political settlement.

    There have been changes recently. As you mentioned in your comments, our allies have gone from initially saying that Gadhafi had to go to saying that we need to find some form of negotiation so that we can end what seems to be an ongoing conflict and find a political solution. You made reference to the contact group.

    Through the chair, could you please update us on Canada's role in being seized with this UN resolution and in working with the UN rapporteur who is also seized with it? Is there sufficient coordination with the UN rapporteur and the contact group? Is Canada involved in that process with the UN rapporteur, and, if so, how closely?

    Just to clarify, I am not aware of a UN rapporteur. Do you mean the UN special envoy charged with the political negotiations?

    Yes.

    That is former Jordanian foreign minister Abdelilah al-Khatib.

    Regarding the coordination between the UN special envoy and the contact group, I am pleased to confirm that the UN participates at every contact group meeting. We have had four so far. When it is possible within his schedule, Mr. Al-Khatib briefs us directly. If he is not able to, then the UN political affairs department provides an update on his efforts at achieving a political negotiation.

    I think it's an important part, because as I indicated in my statement, the contact group really is the international body that can coordinate efforts on a political settlement. Despite the best efforts of our military colleagues, their mandate is quite different, and that is to protect civilians. We have worked with Mr. Al-Khatib and we are participating in the contact group, so we are aware of his briefings at every meeting.

    I have met with the UN special adviser for post-conflict planning at each contact group meeting since the time he was named. We work very closely to support Mr. Al-Khatib's efforts and those of the post-conflict planning team in preparing Libya for Gadhafi's eventual departure and to ensure that we have all the tools in place to support a democratic Libya in the period afterward.

    As we indicated in our briefing, there have been a number of mediation efforts by the African Union, by Russia, and by Turkey. There have been a number of attempts to reach a basis of compromise between Benghazi and Tripoli. The contact group has served to ensure that all of these efforts have been coordinated under the UN special envoy. If we don't ensure that such coordination takes place, obviously we could face efforts coming at cross-purposes.

    One of Canada's roles in the contact group context and in that international forum has been to reaffirm that this must all come under the special envoy and that he is the lead on that coordination process.

    Thank you for that.

    In light of the fact that we seem to be looking at a bit of a stalemate in the military situation—though there's been news today about some changes in the field—I think everyone has noted that this is not something that will be resolved through military means. I think there's a consensus on that.

    If in fact the contact group is not able to find a political settlement between the two groups, can you say what Canada's position will be with regard to Mr. Gadhafi? If there is a settlement satisfying both sides, I assume that Canada will be fine with that and that we'll be in line with our other allies. As we've noted, Prime Minister Cameron said recently that if there is a settlement and Colonel Gadhafi is to remain, that will be fine. Is that Canada's position?

    Second, if in September we find ourselves beyond the motion that the House of Commons passed with regard to the extension, will Canada be looking at, or have you heard of, a return to the Security Council for a new resolution? Has that been talked about?

    That's almost all the time we have, but I'm going to let you answer the questions.

     At this point I am not aware of any plans to bring forward a new resolution on Libya. The mandate that we have under resolution 1973 provides the tools to protect the Libyan people, and at this point there isn't an intention to move forward with another resolution that I'm aware of.

    With respect to Canada's position on the departure of Gadhafi, as I've mentioned, the contact group is the forum for coordinating international political action and international political positions on a settlement. I think this government has been very clear on the record about the fact that Gadhafi must go. The Prime Minister has been on the record about that and so has my minister, and that has been reaffirmed in every contact group statement and in the G-8's Deauville statement, so I think there is absolutely an international consensus that he needs to leave power. How and under what conditions that happens and what transition follows are for the Libyan people to determine. It's their country, and they're responsible for developing a transitional government as outlined in the road map of the National Transitional Council. It will be for them to determine their future.

    Thank you, Ambassador.

    We're going to move to Mr. Dechert for seven minutes.

    Thank you, Mr. Chair, and thank you, ladies and gentlemen, for your remarks this afternoon.

    Ambassador McCardell, I'd like to ask you a question about the meeting with the NTC in Benghazi. I understand that you accompanied the minister on that occasion. Can you provide the members with some insight on your visit and your meeting with the NTC, and on some of the issues that were discussed there? What is your overall impression of the NTC? Who are they? How prepared are they to govern Libya in a post-Gadhafi world?

     On June 27 I was pleased to accompany the minister on his visit to Benghazi, and we thank the Canadian Forces for their assistance in providing the necessary logistics for that visit.

    I think it was an important one. Just to be clear with the members, during that visit the minister had the opportunity to meet with the chair of the National Transitional Council, Mustafa Abdul-Jalil. As well, he had an opportunity to meet with the council itself, which had over 30 members present that day, and finally with members of local civil society. He was able to have a broad sense of the National Transitional Council as well as the local population working with them through civil society.

    I think the meeting was important for a few reasons. First, it gave the minister an opportunity to make clear to the Libyan opposition all of the steps that Canada has taken to support their efforts politically, militarily, and with humanitarian assistance. It was very much appreciated. They were very grateful to Canada for all the assistance to support their democratic transition.

    Second, it gave us an opportunity as well to pass certain important messages to the NTC. At that meeting, the minister underlined that the international mandate was to protect civilians but the responsibility of liberating Libya rested with the NTC, and that they needed to move forward politically and militarily in order to free the rest of their country.

    Third, the minister was able to acknowledge the important progress the NTC has made in establishing principles of democracy and good governance through, as I mentioned in my statement, “A Vision of a Democratic Libya” and also their road map, and to underline to them that the establishment of the principles was the first step but that the measure was really in the implementation of them. We were able to express that to them directly.

    From their side, I think they were very frank with us about the challenges they face. When they created the NTC at the beginning of March, it was done quickly in response to the clear oppression of peaceful protests in Benghazi. It brought together members of the former regime as well as professionals, lawyers, who had been active in pro-democracy efforts when possible in Libya up until that time. When they assembled in Benghazi, clearly they had no idea what was ahead of them, the length of time that was required, or the challenges they would be facing as an organization in establishing themselves in a country that had no tradition of democratic or national institutions.

    Clearly one of the principal challenges they face is developing a democratic culture where one didn't exist before, and in finding the tools to now take care of a territory and a population for which they are now the effective governing authority, as I mentioned in my statement.

    In terms of what else we were able to assess, obviously it's important when you can see people face to face. It was very moving, I think, to see the genuine commitment of these individuals to freeing their country, their willingness to sacrifice personally, and the courage they demonstrated.

    One woman member who is responsible for health issues shared with us details about a colleague of hers in Tripoli who had taken in opposition victims attacked by the Gadhafi regime. They were unable to go to the hospital because if they were found in the hospital, they were taken out because they were known to be protesters. The end is a disturbing one: her colleague had taken them into her private home, and she was discovered and apparently killed for those efforts.

    Certainly understanding the gravity of what these people face.... Their determination was motivating for us to keep the determination that we need to support those efforts.

    Thank you.

    Can you comment on the recent death of General Younis? In particular, can you update us on the situation and the steps that have been taken by the NTC in regard to his death?

    Obviously the death of General Younis is a very sad thing. It is obviously a difficult moment for the Libyan opposition.

    At this point the circumstances of that death are still not clear, although there is speculation about various actors who could be responsible. What's really key is that this is an important test of the NTC's ability to remain united and their ability to apply the tools of due process and the principles of democracy, which they mean to espouse. Thus far they have taken steps to launch an investigation into these events. They have replaced General Younis with a cousin of his to try to maintain continuity in the military command. They are looking very closely at establishing control over the militias. At the end of the investigation, whether these militias are implicated or not, it has been an important lesson on the need to ensure that all armed elements in the territory are under control.

    So far we have seen that they have been able to take those important steps and that, more importantly in the Libyan context, their efforts have been seen to be sufficiently genuine. We have determined that the family and the tribe that General Younis belonged to have accepted those steps. There have been no acts of retaliation, and there has been no retribution thus far. In Libyan terms, if the family were dissatisfied with what they saw as the investigative process, they would have made that very clearly known.

    The outcome remains to be seen, but so far the steps taken are the correct ones.

    Thank you.

    Do I have any further time?

    Maybe you will in the next round.

    Thank you, Mr. Chair.

    We are going to move to Mr. LeBlanc for seven minutes.

    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

    Thank you, Ambassador and the other panel members, for being here.

    I have two questions. One will be more for the ambassador with respect to the International Criminal Court indictment, but I don't want to miss a chance to ask the military generals who are here, particularly as I haven't seen my old friend Mike Hood for almost 10 years. I knew him when he had a previous assignment. I knew him well before he become a general. Since General Hood is wearing the air force uniform, perhaps I could ask him something.

    According to the slides we saw in previous briefings by his colleagues, a huge percentage of the maritime patrol is done by the Canadian Forces. I'm wondering what kinds of missions the maritime patrol would be undertaking and why our effort is so high in proportion to that of our allies. Is it because that's a skill or a capacity we have, and we've chosen to contribute in that way, or are other allies not stepping up with respect to the maritime patrol work? Among other things, I know our forces are doing that very well.

    Notwithstanding your long-standing connection with the general--

    You have to let General Hood answer.

    Voices: Oh, oh!

    I will. I'll let him jump right in there, but he is representing the policy group, so he may not be aware of all these details. However, he is an expert here, and he might know as well.

    We are reflected as having a high percentage because, in the context of overall intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance--anything that flies looking down--if we demarcate that which is assigned to maritime patrol, we just have that many more assets on the ground than others. If you look at all of the ISR hours--the drones and anything that overflies land as well--we would have a smaller percentage overall.

    Is there anything you'd like to add to that, Mike?

    I think that's a very fair statement. If you look at other ISR assets, as he pointed out, we're not able to supply any unarmed aerial vehicles, for instance, so our percentage would be zero. I think if you look at all the assets NATO needs to execute the mission, we just happen to have offered a preponderance of the required maritime patrol assets.

    I had worked for his father as his aide-de-camp, just so the board is aware.

     You felt guilty about that, Mike. You had to clear that up. Thank you very much.

    Ambassador, when we met in previous briefings, I raised with you a concern I have. It follows up on my colleague Mr. Dewar's question around the whole issue of “Colonel Gadhafi has to go”.

    My question is, go where? Go to face the International Criminal Court at The Hague? Go into retirement somewhere in Libya? Be offered some...?

    I know you'll answer about the contact group and other allies and so on. That's the correct answer, but I'm wondering if the Canadian government has given any thought to the obvious dead end if we have allies as important as the Government of the United Kingdom talking publicly about his being able to remain in Libya as part of a negotiated solution.

    That one gesture would, in my mind--and correct me if I'm wrong--completely emasculate the International Criminal Court proceedings. Since Canada is a country that was fundamental to building up the International Criminal Court, surely you share my concern that any solution that sees him face something other than justice would not be a very elegant one.

    Obviously Colonel Gadhafi needs to face justice for what he has done, and Canada has been very committed to that principle regarding impunity both with the ICC and with respect to Libya itself. We were among the first countries to call for this case at the Security Council to be referred to the ICC and to call for a commission of inquiry at the Human Rights Council as well, so I think it's very clear that we have no support for impunity.

    The terms of an eventual peace settlement will depend on the parties on the ground to come to a determination. The Libyan people themselves are really going to have to decide what government structure they want and what transitional structure they want.

    More than that I can't say, but I would point out that I worked with a colleague here at the table previously on Bosnia and was in Sarajevo for a couple of years, and I have to hearken back to the case of Ratko Mladic. I turned on my television set after coming back from Libya to find that after 16 years or something, he was arrested. The arrest warrants remain valid and time is long, so whatever happens in the short term, I think we need to focus on the fact that justice has a long memory.

    I think that's a very valid answer, Ambassador, but perhaps you could reflect from your experience in Libya, or from having studied the political and, I assume, judicial systems in Libya, on what will come out of the other end of this process and the transitional authority.

    One of the concerns I have is that the answer will be that he'll be tried before some Libyan justice system. I'm asking you to imagine what that might look like at the other end of whatever process we're in, so it's probably not a fair question, but based on the justice system that exists in Libya now, do you have any faith that they have the capacity in Libya to bring Colonel Gadhafi to justice?

    That's going to be the obvious off-ramp. They're going to say that the domestic law, the national law, trumps the International Criminal Court proceedings and that we shouldn't worry, because they have a courtroom set up and a jury empanelled and a defence attorney appointed for him from some legal aid regime. I'm sure he'll have a fair trial. It will last about 15 minutes, and the appeal period will be five more minutes, and then at the other end a sentence will be imposed. We've seen that in the past. That, in my mind, would not send the world a great message about what we've achieved if the process to bring him to justice is full of obvious contradictions.

    Do you have any view on how that might work, based on what exists now?

    I have to say that I couldn't in good conscience defend the functioning of the current judicial system in Libya. I think there is not much doubt that the system that exists in Libya now does not meet most international standards for justice and rule of law. It certainly is a highly personalized system in which connections, and in particular connections to the Gadhafi family, would trump most laws you would care to name.

    I am, however, confident that the system that will emerge from Libya will not be the same as the one that exists today. I can't speculate as to exactly what form it will take, but certainly I don't believe that the Libyan people, and certainly not the opposition that we saw in Benghazi or that I've seen repeatedly from the NTC, have any interest in returning to the way things have been.

    Thank you.

    We're now going to move into our second round, which will be five minutes of questions and answers. I'm going to move back to the government side.

    Mr. Van Kesteren, the floor is yours, sir.

    Thank you, Mr. Chair.

    Thank you all for coming here.

    Ambassador, I have two issues that I want to talk about. First is the issue of support. I'm curious about whether or not you've been encouraged by the amount of international support provided. Could you elaborate on some of the work that's been done by other nations, as well as how Canada has shown international leadership in Libya? That's my first question.

    The next question is on the NTC. In the text of your opening remarks, you said that “its declared vision is a democratic one”. Further on you said it has “a mandate to prepare for a more permanent duly elected government”. Could you clarify and elaborate on those points, namely their vision of a democratic society?

     I will just pull up the supporting documents, because if I'm going to quote the NTC, I should at least have its documents in front of me.

    With respect to the support provided, the international community's efforts have been quite impressive. Here I will refer to my statement. At the last contact group meeting we had 39 countries come together, all united on the basic principles of what needed to happen in Libya. There needs to be protection for civilians. There needs to be an end to the oppression by the Gadhafi regime. There needs to be international support now and in the future for a post-Gadhafi Libya.

    To me, the number 39 is impressive when you look at the breadth of opposition to Gadhafi now. At the last meeting, both Brazil and India were represented. These two BRIC countries had not supported the initial resolution 1973 but had in fact abstained on that vote. Now they're coming to these meetings and are subscribing to these same views. At one point it was thought that Africa was not really onside, but at the last meeting Senegal and Sudan were there, and the African Union attends, so I think we're really seeing a very broad recognition that the way things have been in Libya can't continue and that the way the people have been oppressed over the last five and a half months--killed, kidnapped, and in some cases raped--can't continue. I think it's important that we have this sort of consensus, particularly if we're looking at a really comprehensive effort both to strengthen the opposition and to isolate Gadhafi.

    Within that effort, Canada has played an important role. You've heard from my military colleagues on the key role that we've played in the military operations, which has been very impressive. Politically Canada has also played a very important role. We were at the contact group from the start. We've been present every time, advocating for our principles with respect to civilian protection and impunity. We've met with the NTC at each one of these meetings, on the margins, to press upon it the need to provide a proper alternative to the Libyan people.

     We had the very important debate on June 14 in which the House of Commons took the important step of recognizing the NTC as the legitimate representative of the Libyan people. That was specifically acknowledged in Benghazi as an important step in strengthening the opposition's credibility, both with its own people and outside the country. The trip by Minister Baird to Benghazi was an important signal of Canada's commitment, and our delivery of trauma kits at that time was a very welcome contribution of some meaningful medical equipment.

     As well, in these international fora we have had the opportunity to meet with like-minded partners in more direct discussions to develop strategies on how we can move forward. Obviously there are some challenges. Everyone would have been delighted if Gadhafi had seen the light of day five and a half months ago, but he didn't. However, there is still an opportunity to seal a commitment from all our international partners to move forward until the Berlin conditions are met and the Libyan people are genuinely safe in their own country.

     We've been able to work with others not only on how to increase pressure on the Gadhafi regime but also on how to encourage the NTC to be a strong partner when direct political negotiations eventually start. We've encouraged the NTC to develop strong, unified positions. Obviously, as a very diverse organization that has only existed for five and a half months, it needs to develop common policies that the entire leadership agrees to. Then the leadership needs to build bridges with its people to make sure that when a peace deal eventually comes, they can be brought along.

    Canada has been absolutely at the forefront of all of these efforts. I think we can be very proud not only of what our military does but also of what our diplomats do.

    Thank you.

    Thank you very much.

    We're going to move to Madame Laverdière for five minutes.

    Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.

    Thank you, all of you, for your presentations earlier.

    I have about a zillion questions, so I'll start right away.

    My first question has to do with sexual violence.

    What are the latest developments on this issue? Are these atrocities still being committed? Have you been able to get more information about what is happening on the ground? What measures have been taken so far to address the situation?

    Given the topic, I am going to start and I will ask my colleagues from CIDA to provide details on the humanitarian aid for victims of sexual violence.

    Unfortunately, as of now, we have no information indicating that the violence has ended. As I said in my statement, it is difficult to obtain information on this type of crime since the victims are very anxious about making information public and even about looking for help, support or advice from experts. I have heard stories about centres that are trying to help the victims but are hindered by the fact that the women don't want to open the door or enter the building marked: “for victims of sexual violence”. That is a great concern.

    It will be very difficult to obtain more information and see an end to this problem because international assistance is going to be needed. In my view, what would be of most help to those women and girls would actually be to put an end to the current regime that is committing this type of violence against them.

    I would just like to stress that we are trying to make an effort; there is actually a Canadian-Libyan NGO in Tunisia right now trying to help those women, not by using a direct approach, but by making family centres available to provide psychological help to children in order for them to deal with the violence they have witnessed. Also, at those centres, by talking to the families, attempts are being made to obtain a little more information about what happened to the mothers.

    That is what we are doing about it. As I said, this is a country where rape is not openly discussed. There is no system in place or actual experience with the issue because it is a crime that has always been hushed up in the past.

    If I could add, it's an issue that we take very seriously at CIDA as well. We've very concerned about the vulnerability of women to this kind of violence.

    One of the primary objectives of humanitarian assistance is to respond to the most vulnerable populations within an affected community. As such, a lot of our programming and support goes to organizations that already have programs in place to assist women who have been affected by sexual violence. These organizations have also put in place a series of activities from counselling and the provision of health care to working within communities to try to reduce the associated stigmatization.

    Besides our general support to organizations like the ICRC and for the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, we have also provided direct support to UNFPA to respond to the SGBV violence, the sexual and gender-based violence. They have programs in place within Benghazi, and along the borders as well, primarily to respond to victims of sexual violence and to provide them with the health care and the counselling they require in response.

    Prevention, of course, is an important issue, but it is very difficult to address within the situation as it is.

    Thank you.

    Merci, monsieur le président.

    I have another quick question for my former colleague. We were at the diplomatic institute together.

    I would like to know what Canada is doing regarding the prosecution of war crimes. The motion we adopted in Parliament mentioned it. Are we working with the ICC on this issue?

    With regard to the prosecution of war crimes, as my CIDA colleague mentioned, we have been supporting efforts for the victims on the ground. I'm not certain what steps are being taken by the ICC itself. If you wish, I will take that back to my legal colleagues and ask for further information.

    Thank you very much.

    We're going to complete the second round with Mr. Goldring. You have five minutes.

    Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for appearing here today, ladies and gentlemen.

    I've been looking at the map of the theatre of operations. Perhaps we're all here to learn a little bit more about the activities taking place there. Am I to understand from that map of the theatre that the Canadian aircraft are being staged in Italy, or is it Sicily? Is that where they're being staged from? From where are they being staged for the theatre?

    We stage from Sicily, sir, from a base called Trapani, on the island of Sicily.

    It is from Sicily, then, and that's for all of the Canadian aircraft that are involved.

    It's for the F-18s.

    What type of involvement, other than providing the facilities there, would Italy be engaged in? Are they doing other things? Are they putting men or planes or resources into the theatre themselves, or are they providing the ground resources?

    When you say “ground resources”, do you mean ground resources in Italy?

    Yes, in Italy.

    Yes, they are. They are a host nation for those forces that are in Italy. There is an existing or extant NATO command structure already there in Naples, in Poggio, so the headquarters and so on that were already part of the NATO structure are there. Italy plays that part in hosting, and they are also a member of the coalition that is flying.

    Are they providing the facilities for many other countries as well? Canada's resources amount to--what, about 10% of the aircraft resources in operation in the region? Would that be about it?

    We're flying about 6% of the sorties, so as a baseline sortie rate, I would say about 6% is probably accurate.

    What other countries have resources there, predominantly?

    There is a long list of nations involved in varying degrees in this operation. Some are flying only certain types of missions, while others are operating from aircraft carriers. For example, the French were operating off the Charles de Gaulle until recently, and were launching fighters off that aircraft carrier.

    To give you the detail of who is where and what aircraft they are providing, I can take that question on notice and get back to you with an itemized list. I don't have that at hand.

    Yes. It would be just to see whether it's overly heavily weighted with specific countries or not, or whether it is a regional effort. Is there a fair balance?

    We know that in Afghanistan some primary countries were involved in providing a greater number of resources, such as the United States and Britain. Is the same kind of balance of percentage involved in Libya?

    I would say it's a fairly decent balance. Of course, the United States is not playing the same role it did in Afghanistan, but it's still obviously playing a role. This certainly could not happen without the support of the United States.

    It's a good question and it deserves a better answer than I can provide from memory. The best answer would be an itemized list that we can give you of who is doing what and what missions they're flying

    Madam Ambassador, are you encouraged by the amount of international support being given here? Do you have any comments you'd like to make on the cohesiveness of the support that is being given? Are there missing elements, or do you have the package of resources that you need in the vicinity from the variety of countries?

    I think so. As I mentioned when discussing some of the broad participation in the contact group, we've been really pleased to see that this is a wide effort. That's always a concern when you start a military mission in another country, because you want to make sure it is widely accepted. We started with the UN Security Council resolutions, which provided the correct legal framework for us. We were able to draw on the call from the Arab League for the no-fly zone; it was unprecedented, and a really important sign of the regional support for that operation.

    On the political side, the same countries that are engaged on the military side are probably also engaged politically, although it is a little bit broader than that. For example, Germany did not participate in the military mission but has been much more active on the political side. There are some distinctions like that.

    We are pleased and encouraged by the breadth of support. Of course, I am one of the refugees and also wish that it had ended very quickly, because I was also evacuated on a C-17. All that I own is still in a house in Tripoli, so beyond my professional interest, I have a personal interest in really seeing this come to a close because of what has happened to us and because of the people I knew in Tripoli and the Libyans I knew who, quite frankly, deserve something better than what they've had for the last 40 years.

    We can always aim higher, but I think the international focus and determination to keep going and to see the job through is important, and I think it's present.

    So to this stage, it's still cohesive and there's still enthusiasm to carry forward? There isn't wavering from certain specific elements at all?

    I think there's a determination that this needs to be seen through, yes.

    Thank you, Mr. Goldring, and Ambassador.

    I think we have time for one more round. I'm going to start the last round with Mr. Dechert, for five minutes.

    Thank you, Mr. Chair.

    General Vance, I understand there's a report out today that the rebel forces may be within 60 kilometres of Tripoli. I wonder if you could comment generally on the current status of the conflict between the NTC-led forces and the Gadhafi-led forces. Also, could you comment on how the NATO mission to date has degraded Gadhafi's military assets and give us your assessment of what his remaining strength is?

    Thank you for the question.

    In terms of the status of the conflict, I don't have much more to elaborate on beyond what I gave you in my opening statement. Roughly speaking, the fighting on the ground breaks down into three broad areas, although it is much more complex than that. Two of the areas are east of Tripoli and one is west and southwest of Tripoli. These areas are under command of anti-Gadhafi forces with local objectives. For example, the activities around Misrata are aimed at trying to further encroach upon Gadhafi's forces.

    The situation has been described as somewhat static, which is accurate. As the anti-Gadhafi forces have gained access to resources and benefited from some experience and increased their capacity to turn people who were basically civilians into soldiers and gained some momentum, we have been seeing incremental increases and improvements, certainly this week in the southwest.

    I don't think we are anticipating a cataclysmic military end as a result of ground movement by anti-Gadhafi forces. It's slow and steady. We're certainly not seeing the reverse either--that is, pro-Gadhafi forces being able to fundamentally change the situation--because they would then not only face the anti-Gadhafi forces but also NATO forces.

    What's your assessment of the remaining strength of the Gadhafi forces?

    I don't have an assessment immediately at hand, sir. I will take that under notice.

    There is certainly degradation. Generally speaking the capacity of Gadhafi's forces to harm civilians has been degraded and continues to be monitored, and is therefore unlikely to happen easily. However, there is not an obvious effort to return to cantonment sites or to bases, which would indicate that they are going to stop fighting under the Berlin goals. Therefore, there is continued pressure by both ground forces and NATO to keep that pressure on so that this second objective does come to pass.

    Right.

    I do note that we owe you a response on the degradation of those forces.

    Okay, thank you.

    For Ambassador McCardell, what kind of role can Canada play in a post-Gadhafi Libya?

    I'm glad that members of the committee are asking that question, because we've been so very focused on our current mandate and current objectives that we're forgetting somewhat that there is a lot of work to be done after this ends. That's an important question.

    As I mentioned, the contact group meetings are attended by the UN special adviser on post-conflict planning. We use that opportunity to meet with him and to assess where the UN planning is on this and to coordinate with the United Nations, which will likely lead an eventual effort in a post-Gadhafi Libya.

    We are also working with other government departments, including CIDA and the Department of Foreign Affairs and its stabilization and reconstruction task force, to look at what the likely needs will be in Libya after Gadhafi. To that extent, we're building on a really excellent U.K.-led assessment team that went into Benghazi a couple of months ago and began a process of assessing what the conditions were likely to be on the ground and what the priorities would be. A Canadian expert participated in that assessment. It has provided a very good foundation for where we'll probably need to start. We're looking at what those needs are and coordinating with international partners and the UN to see what's likely and who will be looking after what part of this plan eventually. Then we'll look at targeted assistance in areas where Canada has the capacity to add value and can make a very useful contribution.

    That's under way, and we hope we can implement it very soon.

    Thank you.

    We'll move back to Madame Ayala.

    Good afternoon.

    Given that Gaddafi's sphere of influence goes far beyond Libya and that the colonel is seen by a number of African leaders as the grand poobah of Africa, his influence extends over the entire Sahelo-Saharan region: 28 countries, the majority of which are among the most unstable in the world.

    What is going to be done to take over the roles that Gaddafi has played in this entire region, both financially and geopolitically? Is there a regional strategy like the NATO and Canadian one? Is one already in place? Do we realize that Libya is just the tip of the iceberg, an iceberg that covers an area of millions of square kilometres where no stable democracy exists?

    The example of Somalia, which itself is one of the Sahelo-Saharan states after all, shows us clearly that it is impossible to protect the civilian population in an unstable sociopolitical context, especially with terrorist or criminal groups in the area. Those same groups are active all over the Sahelo-Saharan region and are just waiting for political regimes to weaken so that they can tighten their grip.

    Is Canada ready to spend years dealing with the regional instability that will result from the collapse of the Gaddafi regime that, like it or not, was playing a mediating role in that sensitive area?

    Are we aware that Gaddafi will maintain his influence—especially if he stays where he is—and that he will be able to use it against the new government in Libya or, worse yet, to stir up trouble in the entire region in order to undermine NATO's efforts?

    Okay, that's all.

    Perhaps I will let my colleagues from CIDA comment on Africa as a whole and the strategies we could have for the continent.

    You have actually pointed out a number of the effects of Gaddafi's continued presence that concern us. First, he is a negative influence in the region. We have seen the wave of democracy sweep through Tunisia, continue into Egypt but come up against a solid obstacle in Libya precisely because of Gaddafi.

    We are concerned because he could destabilize democracies that are presently in place. Even before the conflict in Libya began, he was making speeches denouncing the demonstrators and the young people who were seeking democracy in Tunisia and then in Egypt. So, yes, we certainly feel that his staying in place is dangerous.

    The second point is about regional instability. Of course Gaddafi could cause us problems from one end of the continent to the other. He is a malevolent and negative influence.

    As to the Sahel, the longer the conflict continues, the more waves of refugees we can expect, of course, both from Libya and from other countries. So the weapons will continue to flow. That has always been a reason…That kind of trafficking is possible. If the conflict in Libya continues, we can certainly expect that flow to continue as well.

    In my opinion, the international committee, with the tools provided by NATO, should certainly continue to put an end to the danger, not only in the north of Africa but across the entire continent as well.

    I will yield the floor to my CIDA colleagues, who have more experience with Africa.

    I am responding from a humanitarian perspective. Of course insecurity is a very important issue for us because our programs respond to the needs of people touched by that insecurity. To the extent that Libya is the tip of the iceberg, as you suggest, where insecurity can arise or increase, we have seen this already in the outflow of migrants from Libya. For instance, recently 1,000 Chadians were flown home to Chad from Libya as the most recent victims of the violence in Libya. To the extent this violence continues, from a humanitarian perspective we will continue to respond. We already have programs in place throughout the region--not only in Somalia, as you mentioned, but also in other countries--that respond to the needs of the most vulnerable who are touched by these insecure situations.

    From a humanitarian perspective, that's how we approach the issue.

    Thank you.

    We're going to finish off with Ms. Brown. Then we're going to take a quick break and thank our guests, and then we'll start with our next round.

    Go ahead, Ms. Brown.

    Thank you, Mr. Chair.

    I'd like to pick up on that comment, Mr. Salewicz. We have the diplomatic and military efforts, and we have the humanitarian effort as well. It is a significant contribution that Canada is making.

    We talk about many of the programs ongoing within Libya, but we all saw the long lineups of people at the borders when this conflict started back in February. I think we were all touched by the desperate needs of some of these migrants who, through no fault of their own, got caught up in a conflict and were anxiously trying to get home to their own countries or just trying to escape.

    First of all, could you tell us if those lineups are easing? Are we expediting those people in getting across the borders? What are the needs at the borders? How is Canada responding? What kinds of programs have we put in place to ensure there's limited loss of life and that we have food aid going in? Could you elaborate on those programs for us?

    Thank you for the question.

    As you mentioned, at the outset of the crisis we were all touched by those images on TV of people lining up to cross the border into Tunisia to escape the violence.

    To the extent that one can succeed in humanitarian assistance operations, I think we did have quite a bit of success in responding to the needs of the migrant workers fleeing the crisis. As I mentioned, more than 640,000 migrant workers have fled. They've either been of Egyptian or Tunisian origin or third-country nationals. The situation was certainly precarious in the first few weeks when the flow started to increase.

     From a Canadian perspective, CIDA deployed individuals to the borders with Tunisia and Egypt to better understand what the situation was. We put a lot of our initial financing into funding IOM, which was essentially transporting individuals home. For instance, Bangladeshis who were crossing the border from Libya into Tunisia were offered a flight home to escape the violence and to free up the border.

    What we didn't want to see was congestion at the border. This crisis could have turned into something quite serious if such congestion had continued and we had been unable to meet the urgent needs of the population, so our first priority was to try to get those people home.

    I can say that it was a resounding success. The lineups have diminished considerably. The population movements have reduced to approximately 2,000 people per day, maximum, into Tunisia and Egypt, so I think we're seeing a diminished flow.

    We have in place and have funded through our programs the development of camps along the border. Within those camps, there's the provision of food aid and shelter. We've provided funding to the Canadian Red Cross, for instance, to bring tents and other supplies to provision these camps. We have also funded the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees to help manage those camps. Of the $10 million allocated to the operation in and outside Libya, a significant proportion has gone to these border regions, because access has been very good.

    I must comment that the Tunisian and the Egyptian governments should be commended for their support. It was extremely helpful, particularly the way the Tunisian government stepped in and provided financial resources. The Tunisian Red Crescent Society stepped in immediately and helped its neighbours out.

    As I said, this is one of those cases in which, in the midst of what was a real crisis, the system worked. The needs of the affected population were responded to and the mechanisms are in place to continue to respond to those needs. Contingency planning is in place in case the high flow rates that we saw at the outset of the crisis commence again. The capacity is there to respond.

    That's all the time we have.

    I want to thank all our witnesses for taking the time to be here today.

     We're going to let our Department of National Defence and our ambassador step back from the table. We're going to break for five minutes and come back with our CIDA officials to talk about the situation in Somalia.

    Thank you very much.

    Pursuant to Standing Order 108(2), we will continue with a briefing on the situation in Somalia. Once again we have our officials here. I want to welcome all of you from CIDA.

    I believe that Stephen Salewicz, the director of the international humanitarian assistance division, will be making an opening statement. We also have Mr. Boyd again, and then joining us is Mr. Baker, who has been here before. Welcome back.

    I will turn the floor over to you for your opening statement.

    Thank you.

    I will read a brief presentation and I look forward to your questions subsequently.

    I'd like to speak to you briefly about CIDA's response to the drought in East Africa. No doubt you are aware that it currently encompasses the countries of Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, and Somalia, where it is imperilling the livelihoods of more than 12 million people.

    Acute malnutrition in drought-affected populations across the region has been recorded at rates as high as three or four times above emergency threshold levels. The WHO emergency threshold is 15% and currently there are rates of 50% or higher being recorded. Those rates are very, very high.

    The UN has now declared a famine in five regions of southern Somalia, a famine that is expected to spread throughout much of the south of the country. Unfortunately, this is a region controlled by al Shabaab, making the humanitarian response much more difficult.

    As a result of the deteriorating situation within Somalia, in part accelerated by the lack of humanitarian access, more than 180,000 Somalis have fled the country into neighbouring Djibouti, Ethiopia, and Kenya since January 2011, severely taxing the already strained refugee response systems in those countries.

    On July 22, Minister Oda visited the Dadaab refugee camps in the northeast of Kenya to see the situation for herself. At that time, Minister Oda announced that Canada, through CIDA, would provide $50 million to help the people affected by the drought in East Africa. This amount, which includes $25 million for emergency food assistance, is in addition to the more than $22 million provided by CIDA in 2011 for humanitarian assistance in Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya and Somalia.

    Minister Oda also announced the creation of an East Africa Drought Relief Fund, through which the Government of Canada will match, dollar for dollar, eligible gifts made by individual Canadians to a registered Canadian charity. These funds will further support Canada's assistance to the victims of the crisis affecting the region.

    CIDA will continue to closely monitor the effects of the drought in East Africa.

    We will now start our round of questions with Mr. Dewar, who has seven minutes.

    Thank you. I will be sharing my time with Madame Laverdière.

    I have a very specific question about response to the announcement made by Minister Oda on July 22. NGOs were asked to provide proposals, I think, a week before that. When can we expect the announcements as to where those moneys are going to be delegated? It has been three weeks since Minister Oda's announcement, and we still haven't heard any announcements on the money being delegated to those groups helping out on the ground.

    Thank you for your question.

    Of course, we are interested in moving as quickly as possible to get money allocated for the response on the ground. As I mentioned, we had $22 million already in place through NGOs and the UN prior to the announcement of July 22. We've been watching this very closely and have been trying to put money in the hands of organizations throughout the last six to eight months to ensure that we continue to meet the needs of the population. The $25 million announced for food aid has been allocated to the WFP, and that's moving forward.

    We are reviewing proposals from our partners. As you mentioned, proposals have been coming in for the last few weeks, and the situation continues to evolve. We are doing the proper due diligence to make sure that we understand the situation on the ground, so I expect those proposals are now being assessed and recommendations are being provided to the minister.

    Thank you.

    Have they gone to the minister for sign-off yet?

    The recommendations have been, to my knowledge, sent to the minister.

    Thank you.

    Thank you.

    Could you tell me exactly how much money is in the matching fund at the moment?

    Thank you for the question.

    At the moment, we do not have the exact figure.

    Because of the timing of the relief fund, we won't have the number of donations until after the end date, which is September 6. We'll be tracking it at that point.

    We're always surprised at the extent of the response by our partners or by Canadians. It is always very generous. There are always many organizations out there that wait until the final deadline to get back to us to indicate how much they've received. We don't expect that number until sometime in mid-September.

    Okay.

    Thank you very much for the clarification.

    Do I still have time for more questions?

    Yes, you have four minutes.

    If possible, I would like you to expand a bit. As you say, it's a very fluid situation, and the drought covers a much larger region, so I would like it if you could expand a little bit on the geographic distribution of efforts.

    Sure. Do you mean our efforts or those of the international community?

    I mean the international community's efforts.

    Okay. Thank you.

    As you said, it is indeed widespread. It's a regional crisis, one that a lot of attention has been paid to. In Somalia there are particular challenges to face, but there are also those that touch people in Kenya, Ethiopia, and Djibouti. As I mentioned, 12.4 million people have been identified as being in need of assistance. The UN alone has requested $2.5 billion to respond regionally to the crisis. Approximately $1 billion would be for Somalia, $740 million for Kenya, close to $1 billion for Ethiopia, and $33 million for Djibouti.

    The crisis is widespread. To date they've received 40% of their funding in terms of those requests. Those requests, it's important to note, were recently revised. The numbers for Somalia have just about doubled in the last week or so. The percentages, of course, were much higher a week or two ago; they continue to increase, and we continue to monitor those needs as they go.

    Go ahead, Mr. Dewar.

    I'm assuming that Canada's response will be commensurate with the ask. I think we were commensurate in our proportional responsibility, but I'm assuming that will be the case.

    I have a question about the situation in the refugee camps, so perhaps you could comment on that. One of the concerns is the backlog, in Kenya in particular, and it's not only in terms of the full opening of the camps. There is some concern that the use of biometrics seems to be creating the backlog. Do you have any comment on that?

    There is a fairly significant backlog of up to a week for processing refugees, I'm hearing. They use biometrics for each refugee, so someone can't actually get to the camp until they've gone through this security process. Could you comment on whether that's a concern, and whether anyone is actually dealing with it? Are we contributing to that part of the mission--i.e., the biometrics and the security oversight?

     I don't have specifics on the biometrics, but I do know they're very important. We look to UNHCR, which is the responsible partner for the camps, to put in place the mechanisms by which to process people. They have long experience and they've developed protocols over time. As you can imagine, in their estimation the best practice is to try to move people through the system, as you suggest--which is very important--but also to put in place appropriate mechanisms to ensure accountability in the use of funds so that we don't have people registered twice for assistance, and so on. I think they're dealing with a very difficult situation. It is really challenging to try to meet the immediate needs of the people while doing registration.

    I don't have the specifics on the biometrics, so unfortunately I can't answer that, but I can look into it. We don't give specific funding to these kinds of programs. We give general, non-earmarked funding to UNHCR with the expectation that they can prioritize those funds and make the responsible choices.

     Thank you.

    We're going to move to this side of the table. Ms. Brown, you have seven minutes.

    Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.

    Thank you, Mr. Salewicz, for that update.

    I think it's important that we note for the record that Canada has really stepped up to the plate on this crisis. Some were calling on Canada to donate perhaps $10 million, but we have compounded that: $50 million is coming, on top of the more than $22 million that we had already given to East Africa. I think it's important that Canadians recognize that we are very concerned about this situation. There isn't one of us who hasn't seen these images on television and isn't heartbroken by some of the things we have seen.

    I know Canadians are very generous. I was at an event last Friday night with the Somali Canadian community here in Ottawa, a fundraiser for the community in Somalia. There was tremendous generosity there, and as Canada has said that we will match this dollar for dollar, we know this generosity--every dollar--is going to be able to save a life.

    I want to ask you to elaborate on some of the partnerships we've developed and some of the trusted partners we know we're working with. I know we've received tremendous congratulations on the work we've done. The Canadian Somali Congress has applauded the Government of Canada. The United Church of Canada has congratulated the federal government. UNICEF is pleased with the action taken by the Government of Canada. Oxfam welcomed the announcement, and the Foodgrains Bank. Those are some of the partners we're working with, but could you elaborate on these partnerships we've developed? What is our sense of confidence in the work they are doing, and how are we seeing this money flow through to get food into the hands and the mouths of these very vulnerable people who are experiencing such devastation?

    Thank you for that question.

    As you said, we work with very experienced partners. Indeed, for humanitarian assistance in the midst of a crisis, the last thing you need is someone with the best of intentions but without the experience or capacity to respond, so our efforts are always targeted at trying to find the partners who have the experience and the capacity to respond in a given situation.

    You mentioned a number of organizations, and I think all of them are indeed experienced partners. WFP is one of the more important partners for CIDA and is the largest humanitarian partner we have within CIDA. As I mentioned already, there is an allocation of $25 million for food aid. Because of their very significant logistical network, this organization has tremendous capacity in the field to respond to the needs of individuals, to get out into what we call the deep field, the places most organizations can't get to, with the food that's required to respond to the needs of these people.

    That said, no organization can actually respond effectively when faced with the kind of conflict that's going on in southern Somalia. Access is very difficult, but since these organizations have the experience and are trusted within the local communities, they have some measure or capacity to try to increase that access to some extent.

    You mentioned CFGB, another very strong partner that has another large network on the ground to respond to the very particular needs of this situation.

    UNICEF and NGOs such as Oxfam and World Vision have been funded by us in the past or are receiving funding right now. For instance, I can mention that right now Oxfam and MSF are receiving money from us for ongoing programming in Ethiopia. In Somalia we have partnerships with Oxfam and World Vision to deliver a variety of activities, including water and sanitation support and medical services. These are the kinds of things that were required in advance of the crisis, which has been building over time, and they continue to be delivered to the population in need.

    As for other partners, I think UNICEF is going to be critical going forward as we look at the particular needs of the population. Right now therapeutic feeding--actually getting to the acutely malnourished--is of critical importance. The children who have been affected by this crisis of course need support, and UNICEF is well placed to provide the kind of therapeutic feeding and the kind of emergency food response and medical intervention that will help them going foward.

    Could you confirm that date for us? You said September 6 was the date. I thought it was by September 16 that Canadians could make a contribution that the government would match dollar for dollar. Would you confirm that date for us, Mr. Salewicz?

    Sure. Let me just look through my paperwork. It's my first day back from a month's vacation.

    Yes, it is September 16; thank you. That's when the program itself comes to an end, and it's going to take at least another couple of weeks before we get the data together on how much has been contributed.

    Could you tell us which organizations are accepting contributions at this point?

    There is the Canadian Humanitarian Coalition, made up of a number of organizations such as CARE Canada and Oxfam Canada. There is also World Vision, and UNICEF Canada. We also have ACF Canada, Action contre la Faim. MSF is also working diligently. There's a large list. As I suggested, the Canadian Red Cross is obviously collecting money for the Red Cross movement.

    Typically we see hundreds of organizations in the midst of collecting funds, and often they'll direct them to their preferred agency over the course of the coming weeks.

    Thank you.

    Thank you.

    We'll finish our second round this afternoon with Mr. LeBlanc.

    Thank you, Mr. Chair, and thank you, gentlemen, for the presentation.

     I want to thank the chair and members of the government for putting together on short notice what I think is at least an important first step in understanding what Canadians and the Government of Canada can do to support people in this region. We've all watched with horror some of the images and the context of the famine that's going on. You're right to refer to it as a regional problem; it's not simply a Somalian question.

    I am a big fan of the work that CIDA does. I've been lucky enough to see in projects in countries in almost every part of the world some great people working for CIDA, with local partners in many cases doing terrific things, and often with very small amounts of money, in the most vulnerable and difficult circumstances, so Ms. Brown is right to highlight the commitment of the government. It was a robust commitment. I am hoping that we as a committee can look at this issue again in the fall and try to make Canadians understand, as Ms. Brown did in her question, precisely what can be done in a very tangible way to support the work not only of your agency but also of other Canadian NGOs and international partners.

    By way of a question, obviously there is much short-term urgency to this, and the focus of your efforts is on famine relief and getting food to those affected and the vulnerable populations in the region. Not to take away from the urgency of the short-term immediate crisis, are we or other international partners also doing any work on trying to support these populations in the longer-term needs of the region on issues such as food security?

    Second, could you offer some comments on the current state of the Somali government? Is the government really in any position to provide security or access to aid groups or international organizations trying to reach its population? Do you see the Somali government as being at all effective, or is it simply irrelevant? There is the threat, as you noted in your briefing note, from some of the paramilitary and terrorist groups that have previously been a huge impediment to getting food to those in great need.

    First of all, let me introduce myself. I'm Philip Baker. I work at CIDA as a regional director general for southern and eastern Africa. I had the honour of accompanying Minister Oda to Somalia for the visit to Nairobi and the camps on the border on July 22. We had the Nairobi sessions the day before. It was a very illuminating visit.

    In general I just want to say a couple of quick things with regard to the longer term. I've worked in a lot of places in Africa, but besides what we see on the ground, even before you get on the ground, as you are arriving, just seeing the intense drought conditions as you are flying into the camp areas hits you like a brick.

    We saw every aspect of the camp from reception right through to long-term settlement within the camps, camps that have been there for a long time. I can speak to the notion of the confidence we have in the partners. Of what we saw, things were incredibly well organized, even in the incredibly busy camp at Dadaab. People have been there for a long time, and coordination is the watchword. That's where you have to be on top of your game.

    Stephen is the expert on humanitarian assistance. I have a bit more of the longer-term perspective, having been able to wander through the camps and see all aspects--even gender-based violence--and to look at what can be done about those things.

    The short-term immediate work is under way. It is very strong, and we have a high level of confidence in what we are seeing. As for the longer term, that also touches on earlier questions about regional stability. As you can imagine, there's a very large international community, and we all work in various places that we have to focus on. It's like a division of labour, if you like, when you look at a large area like sub-Saharan Africa and this region. It's an unstable, challenging region. Canada, through CIDA, is heavily involved in Ethiopia, which is experiencing a large portion of the drought effects. We are very engaged in Kenya, and as you have seen, the security question makes it much more of a challenge to be deeply engaged as a development agency in Somalia.

    However, when you look at the regional efforts that are possible and that are under way, there are quite a few. You spoke about food security. There are also the issues of agricultural growth as well as nutrition for women, children, and youth, all of which we are busily engaged in.

    If you look at our programming in Ethiopia, we're having great effect on all three of those fronts. There's a massive program into which we're putting $140 million over five years. It's a program called the “Productive Safety Net Programme”, and it will allow for a way to close the gap on food and security such that you can help numerous people in many of the drought-affected regions to buy time in order to put longer-term programs in place. Those include things like programs for agricultural growth. Some of the biggest climate change adaptation programming you see in Africa is under way in Ethiopia right now, allowing us to stabilize land that has been degraded and make it productive.

    There are millions of kilometres--and I have seen these myself--of hand-built stone walls that terrace the actual landscape in Ethiopia in some of these incredibly affected regions. These allow you to come in and redevelop that land for agricultural purposes and allow families to sustain themselves and also go on to a little bit more growth that can contribute to their neighbours in terms of markets and sharing and selling their produce.

    You also have things like nutrition programs. Of the money for women and children's health programming announced by the government at Muskoka, $50 million will be going to Ethiopia to support three million children and pregnant and lactating women to enhance their nutrition and allow them to be more productive and to focus on taking that land further so that they can both sustain themselves and perhaps generate enough to provide a small income for the family and pull themselves out of food insecurity.

    These programs are under way, and some of our programming can be done elsewhere. As I said, it's not always just Canada. The British are also very involved in Somalia, for example. You can look at a sharing of that kind of effort across the region, and we stay closely coordinated with other donors.

    Thank you very much.

    Thank you to all the witnesses for being here today.

    To all the members who came back in the middle of the summer, it was nice seeing you, but I hope I don't see you again until September.

    I hope the rest of your summer is good.

    The meeting is adjourned.