SECU Committee Report

A. The O’Connor Inquiry

On January 28, 2004, the Government of Canada announced the creation of a Commission of Inquiry with a mandate to inquire into the role of Canadian officials in the Maher Arar affair. Chaired by Justice Dennis O’Connor, the Commission of Inquiry into the Actions of Canadian Officials in Relation to Maher Arar (hereafter the O’Connor Inquiry) had two objectives:

• to investigate and report on the actions of Canadian officials in relation to Maher Arar (factual inquiry);
• to make any recommendations on an independent review mechanism for the activities of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) with respect to national security (policy review).[3]

The three-volume report on the factual inquiry was made public on September 18, 2006. It outlines how the actions of Canadian officials contributed to the torture of Mr. Arar and to the violation of his human rights. It contains 23 recommendations[4] intended to address the many weaknesses uncovered in how the RCMP and other Canadian national security agencies conduct their activities.

In releasing his conclusions, Justice O’Connor noted that the RCMP had breached its own information-sharing policies, provided the Americans with inaccurate information about Mr. Arar, neglected to oversee its own investigation, inaccurately described Mr. Arar and his wife as Islamist extremists with suspected ties to Al-Qaeda and refused to support the efforts of the Government of Canada to have Mr. Arar released from prison in Syria. The recommendations in the factual report sought to correct the inadequate information-sharing practices of the departments and agencies that make up the security and intelligence community in Canada and abroad, the insufficient internal controls over such investigations and the weaknesses in the training of investigators, for example, in terms of respect for human rights as well as racial, ethnic and religious profiling.

In December 2006, Justice O’Connor released his policy review report. It contained 13 recommendations, clearly indicating that an independent review mechanism for RMCP activities with greater powers is needed as well as a structure for the integrated review of national security issues to prevent tragic events such as those involving Mr. Arar from recurring.

B. The Iacobucci Inquiry

In December 2006, in response to a recommendation by Justice O’Connor, the Canadian government directed Justice Iacobucci to chair the Internal Inquiry into the Actions of Canadian Officials in Relation to Abdullah Almalki, Ahmad Abou-Elmaati and Muayyed Nureddin (hereafter the Iacobucci Inquiry). According to the terms of reference, Justice Iacobucci was to determine:

1. Whether the detention of Abdullah Almalki, Ahmad Abou-Elmaati and Muayyed Nureddin in Syria or Egypt resulted, directly or indirectly, from actions of Canadian officials, particularly in relation to the sharing of information with foreign countries and, if so, whether those actions were deficient in the circumstances;
2. Whether there were deficiencies in the actions taken by Canadian officials to provide consular services to Abdullah Almalki, Ahmad Abou-Elmaati and Muayyed Nureddin while they were detained in Syria or Egypt; and
3. Whether any mistreatment of Abdullah Almalki, Ahmad Abou-Elmaati and Muayyed Nureddin in Syria or Egypt resulted, directly or indirectly, from actions of Canadian officials, particularly in relation to the sharing of information with foreign countries and, if so, whether those actions were deficient in the circumstances.[5]

Justice Iacobucci released his report in October 2008. Unlike Justice O’Connor’s report, it does not contain any recommendations.[6] Justice Iacobucci does however make several findings with respect to the actions of Canadian officials in these cases and the role that their actions may have played in the detention and mistreatment of these three individuals at the hands of Syrian and Egyptian authorities. Justice Iacobucci concluded that the treatment of Mr. Almalki, Mr. Abou-Elmaati and Mr. Nureddin constituted mistreatment amounting to torture, as defined in the UN Convention Against Torture, during their detention in Syria, and in Egypt, in the case of Mr. Abou-Elmaati.[7] While the inquiry concluded that none of the actions taken by Canadian officials directly contributed to the detention or mistreatment of these Canadians, Justice Iacobucci determined that the actions of Canadian officials had indirectly contributed to their detention (except for Mr. Almalki) and mistreatment at the hands of Syrian officials, and Egyptian officials, in the case of Mr. Abou-Elmaati.