:
Thank you very much, Mr. Blais.
[English]
I am Patrick McGuinness, the president of the Fisheries Council of Canada.
I thought I'd give you some background and maybe talk a bit about sustainability and, of course, end up with the position of the Fisheries Council of Canada with respect to the proposed amendment to the NAFO constitution.
First, I've been involved as an industry adviser to the NAFO delegation since 1985 as vice-president of the Fisheries Council of Canada, now as president, and in that reign have overseen the publication of three documents.
The first one was in 1987, Foreign Overfishing: A Strategy for Canada. Basically, what we took away from that is that Canada had basically developed good cooperation with East Bloc countries, but that type of cooperation was undermined by the activities of Spain and Portugal and, at that time non-NAFO members, South Korea, Mexico, and the United States of America. We did this report in-house.
In 1990, we hired the Oceans Institute Of Canada to produce the document called Managing Fisheries Resources beyond 200 Miles: Canada's Options to Protect Northwest Atlantic Straddling Stocks. This was a great document in terms of 101 for international fisheries management.
The take-away from that document was simply that the Law of the Sea was like reading a book with the last chapter missing, and that was simply to say there is nothing in the Law of the Sea that really addresses straddling stocks and the issues and demise of the resources that we saw on the high seas. Basically, what the Law of the Sea was saying is that if there is a difficulty concerning fishing on the high seas of straddling stocks, the countries should seek to agree to measures as to how that should be handled.
With this document and recognition that there was nothing in the Law of the Sea that could help us address the issue, we started a campaign to try to see if there could be amendments to the Law of the Sea to address this issue. Really, the response from the international legal lawyers who are involved in oceans issues was this: you people in fisheries had your day in 1982 with the Law of the Sea, and what the Law of the Sea gave you was the fact that you have an economic zone out to 200 miles, so you should be very thankful for that; and as far as the Law of the Sea is concerned, your issues have been dealt with.
At the same time, what was happening was an emergence in terms of the issues of biodiversity, and there was the development of a convention with respect to environment and development. So what we basically did with respect to straddling stocks was to redefine the issue. The issue really became one of biodiversity--if you will, the destruction of fish stocks on the high seas, migrating in the straddling stocks, and so on. Our position was that something should be done internationally to deal with the straddling stock issue.
The UNCED conference in Rio de Janeiro in 1992, I believe, agreed with that concept and gave the message that the United Nations should look toward developing international rules and regulations with respect to the management of highly migratory species and, of course, straddling stocks. In the end, that led to the 1995 United Nations Fish Stocks Agreement, or UNFA. Of course, that was also one in which Canada took leadership, and we are very gratified by that development. Nevertheless, in NAFO the issue still seemed to be quite difficult in terms of bringing responsible fisheries management and to stock overfishing.
That led us to continue our quest, and in 2003 we contracted with Dalhousie Law School to develop this document, basically entitled Straddling Fish Stocks in the Northwest Atlantic: Conservation Concerns and Options. We actually got some funding assistance for this from the Department of Fisheries and Oceans, from the Government of Newfoundland and Labrador, and from Nova Scotia.
This document identified some recommended or possible amendments to the NAFO convention. Basically, it stated that if it's to be amended, it should incorporate UNFA principles. There should be, if you will, a bilateral type of diplomacy to see whether there can be some common vision among the major beneficiaries in terms of the allocation of stocks--Canada, the European Union, and Russia--on addressing or amending NAFO so that sustainability would be the vision of the future.
It identified decision-making problems in NAFO. It recommended that NAFO have an in-house, accessible dispute settlement mechanism.
Many of the issues coming forward are very important, but they're very much with respect to fisheries management issues. It recommended that the NAFO constitution really start to move and use words like “ecosystem-based management”.
The Fisheries Council of Canada has been in the game a long time. We've actually been hiring people to help us develop a strategy.
I just want to talk about sustainability. One of the big issues the Fisheries Council of Canada has been working on, in concert with an organization we're members of, the International Coalition of Fisheries Associations, is the rehabilitation of the image of fisheries management. We have a problem in fisheries management in terms of the world's perception of us. We've had a record of considerable problems with fish stocks, both in national waters and in international waters.
The bottom line is that worldwide we're in the marketplace competing for a share of stomach with poultry, pasta, meat, and so forth. There's no question that food safety is not our issue. Food safety may be the meat industry's issue. Our issue, in terms of vulnerability, is sustainability. When you talk to retailers and food service operators, they want to ensure that when they're serving their customers, those customers can feel, with respect to the species they're eating, that they are part of the solution and not part of the problem.
What we've seen over the last number of years is that with major retailers in Europe, particularly in the U.K. and in France, and in Wal-Mart and Loblaws here in Canada, with respect to fish and seafood, sustainability is the watchword. To a certain extent, that's a reflection of failures, if you will, in fisheries management either nationally or internationally. To try to address that issue, you basically have to modernize fisheries management.
Our job, in terms of the world marketplace, is to prove two things when we're out there selling fish. One is that we're not ruining the stocks. The other is that we're not ruining vulnerable marine ecosystems. There is pressure on our industry and on fisheries management from the marketplace and, in particular, from environmental NGOs.
As I say, I'm co-chair of the International Coalition of Fisheries Associations, which is the Fisheries Council of Canada, the National Fisheries Institute in the United States, the Russian fisheries federations, the Spanish fisheries associations, Australia, and New Zealand. Basically, industry gets the message. Industry gets the message that if we're going to be in this business, if we're willing to compete in the marketplace, we're going to have to demonstrate to consumers and to the world that what we're doing is sustainable.
In that background, around 2004-05 Canada decided to lead that message with respect to the modernization of NAFO. But really, for an institution that has been spending many years fighting over who gets how much fish--give me the fish, don't give it to you--there was a fairly quick pickup of this message that we have an outside world there, and just as Canada has to clean up its fisheries management regime, NAFO does also. So quite to my surprise, that was picked up.
With respect to the amended convention that we have in front of us, let me just say that the Fisheries Council of Canada has been involved in the process from the beginning. In that process, of course, we have our own industry advisory group that gives us advice as to how we should move, but I can tell you frankly that I've also had discussions and input from Bob Applebaum. His input and advice to us has been very important, as we've gone through the draft, in terms of getting specific types of changes that the Canadian delegation basically bought into and about which, at the same time, they were able to convince their colleagues from other countries.
But in terms of what we're looking at now, from the Fisheries Council of Canada's point of view we do not see any tangible negatives in the document. But we do see specific improvements with respect to the current NAFO regime.
We like the emphasis on consensus, and when consensus is not reached, in order for a proposal to be adopted there has to be a two-thirds voting rule. We like the fact that there's an accessible in-house dispute settlement mechanism. And we like the fact that the document codifies in NAFO a management regime that can be described as modern.
Our recommendation to Parliament will be to ratify the document as presented.
Thank you very much.
:
Thank you very much, Chair.
I am not going to repeat anything Patrick said. I'm here mostly, I suppose, as a witness to try to address questions, to the extent you have them. I jotted down a few things just as an overview for my own memory.
I started in the fishing industry in 1977, coincident with the extension of the jurisdiction to 200 miles. I suppose I've been covering the NAFO file since the early 1980s. So I've been kicking around the block on NAFO for quite a while, attending virtually all of the meetings.
When I look at the existing convention we have in front of us, I just reflect on the fact—from my observations over the 25 years or so I've been covering NAFO meetings—that we've had four very different phases of NAFO under the same convention.
I guess I'd like to describe the first phase as being from the early to mid-1980s. At the time, there were lots of fish and lots of quota on the go. Mainly based largely on these large amounts of quotas and fish, Canada controlled NAFO very much.
In addition to having lots of cod, which we had difficulty selling at the time—in a viable way, at least—we took some of our surplus cod and had a long-term agreement with the EU. In exchange for fishing rights in Canada, they provided us with reduced tariffs and with market access. In a similar way, we provided codfish to both Spain and Portugal through bilateral agreements. In addition to that, at NAFO and bilaterally—which affected NAFO—we provided underutilized species' quotas to the East Bloc countries.
So with that combination of trading away fish we weren't catching ourselves, we effectively controlled the NAFO environment during the first period of its life. And all was peaceful, more or less, at the NAFO table.
The mid-eighties changed things in a couple of different ways. These fish quota agreements, most of which were for market access, expired. At that time we saw the Germans lodge objections and saw them fishing cod on the nose of the bank—a lot of cod in one year in particular. We saw the EU change their approach at NAFO as well. Spain and Portugal joined NAFO in 1986. The EU very much didn't want Spain and Portugal, with their capacity, fishing in Europe; they wanted to find fishing opportunities for them elsewhere, including in the northwest Atlantic.
So the EU challenged the TAC-setting process and the quota shares. They basically challenged everything that was challengeable. At that time, Canada still had the underutilized species in its mix, and we were still able to secure votes, I suppose, at NAFO and cooperation at the NAFO table through the eastern European countries.
The decisions of NAFO at the table more or less went along well, but on the water we saw increasing problems with enforcement and cheating by fishing captains. It was systematic in the late eighties and early nineties.
Now, in the early nineties, in my view, we had the height of the overfishing problems and turmoil at NAFO. We had rampant use of the objection procedure by the EU, in particular, and we had the so-called discovery of the Greenland halibut or turbot resource at the time. It all led to the fighting over quotas for turbot, culminating in the Estai incident. There was conflict on the high seas.
When that was resolved—more or less around the same time, or in a similar timeframe, as the UN fish agreement came into place—we had a new phase. So in the last 10 years or so, we've moved into more of a détente and almost a cooperative arrangement with many of the former protagonists at the table, in particular the EU. Both Canada and the EU are cooperating on most of the issues at the NAFO table. How well all of this cooperation will continue is really unknown.
There are signs of fish stock recovery. There are signs that some of the countries who don't now have large quotas, notably the United States and Korea, would like to have a bigger share as these fish stocks recover. Canada and the EU have the largest quotas. It's in our interest to have a status quo in the quota-sharing regime.
That is why we support the move to a two-thirds voting system from the current 50% plus one. It helps us to defend our quota shares at the table. That's why we support an effective dispute resolution procedure to deal with objections by countries such as the Faroe Islands, which are setting their own quotas for shrimp in 3L because they disagree with the outcome at the NAFO table.
When you get into these negotiations, the national interests come to the table. It's the international political environment and how it functions at the table, rather than the document itself, that will most influence the future. The document will help, but it won't dictate how long this will take to unfold. It may not be a made-in-Canada document. As in any dispute, you try to enter into negotiations in good faith to come up with a product that meets your basic objectives. In the end, you sit back and decide if it's in your interest or not. In our view, it is in our interest to ratify this new convention.
:
Yes. The committee has decided to continue with this. I put forward a list of potential witnesses that I think would add great value to our committee. We've heard today from the FCC, the Fisheries Council of Canada, and others. I'll cut right to the chase.
I want to recommend Bill Rowat as someone this committee needs to hear from. He's a former Deputy Minister of Fisheries and Oceans Canada.
George Rose, I understand, was contacted for next Tuesday but wasn't available for that particular day. Dr. Rose is extremely anxious to appear before this committee. He's a former chair of the Fisheries Conservation Group from the Memorial University of Newfoundland.
To get the other side, we've heard from the FCC and others today.
Gus Etchegary, a former president of FPI, is now one of the driving forces behind the Fisheries Community Alliance. It's a very active group in terms of supporting fisheries conservation and has expressed some opinions about this particular NAFO treaty. I think it would be very important for the committee to hear from them and, as well, David Vardy and Les Dean, both of whom are former Deputy Ministers of Fisheries and Aquaculture of the Department of Fisheries and Aquaculture in the province of Newfoundland and Labrador and, I think, former participants in the NAFO process, who may have actually played a very fundamental role in some of the past decisions and format.
Since we have taken the time as a committee to decide some time ago that we needed to address all aspects of this particular issue rather than deal with my motion two weeks ago, and we decided that we need to hear those witnesses, I really think a former Deputy Minister of Fisheries and Oceans Canada, two former Deputy Ministers of Fisheries and Aquaculture in the province of Newfoundland and Labrador, and Gus Etchegary, who represents fishing industry interests in the province of Newfoundland and Labrador, and George Rose, a fisheries scientist and former chair of fisheries conservation, would be great fellows to hear from. So I'd ask the committee to support that.
:
Thank you very much, Mr. Chair, and thank you all for the welcome and the opportunity to come here today to speak to you.
As you probably guessed from the green uniforms, we're from conservation and protection, enforcement branch.
To give you a quick introduction, my colleague Kevin and I are both from Newfoundland coincidentally, although he currently works in Newfoundland, in the St. John's office, and he is the director responsible for the operational aspect of our program, including the NAFO component. I, on the other hand, work here at 200 Kent Street. I moved from Newfoundland in 2005 and I currently look after more of the policy side of our operational programs.
What we thought we would do today is have Kevin give you a quick overview of the operational side of the program of NAFO and how it fits into the scheme, and then, of course, we'll offer you some great answers to your great questions at the end of the session.
Kevin and I both started as fishery officers and have both worked offshore. We've been to sea, we've flown, we were in port. We know first-hand what goes on in the NAFO regulatory area and we know what the fish look like and smell like and we also know what it's like to be seasick. We've been there.
I'm going to turn it over to Mr. Anderson.
Thank you.
We've handed out a document that outlines what we hope to present here today. We'd like to show how the monitoring, control, and surveillance program applies to the reform process. We would also like to describe the elements of the current Canadian NAFO enforcement program and some of the progress we've made in recent years.
The NAFO reform process has two elements. First, we have the convention reform process, which my colleague and I are not in a position to speak to. Second, we have the reform of the NAFO conservation enforcement measures, which took place in 2005 and 2006. Specifically, we would like to speak about the elements of this process as they pertain to monitoring, control, and surveillance. We would then like to review the effectiveness of the existing NAFO monitoring, control, and surveillance regime in the context of the fight against illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing. In this way, we hope to determine the changes needed to strengthen the scheme and make it more effective and efficient in its operations, results, and expenditures.
I turn now to key elements coming out of the post-reform process and key measures we have achieved. There is now an enhanced follow-up provision in regard to certain serious infringements such as misreporting of catch, misreporting of area, and targeting species under moratoriums. This provision allows for the immediate recall to port of a vessel suspected of being in contravention of the measures.
In addition, we have clarified for NAFO members the penalties and sanctions that may be employed by flag states for serious infringements. This results in greater transparency. It forces them to state what happened to these citations and what they did about it.
We've also achieved improved control measures for stocks identified in our rebuilding plan. For example, we now have a provision under which all vessels that fish for Greenland halibut in the NAFO regulatory area must be inspected upon returning to port, including Canadian vessels.
We have enhanced bycatch requirements and established the definitions of bycatch and directed fishing. We have achieved provisions whereby vessels have to move when they encounter excessive bycatch. In the most recent measures, as they pertain to 3M cod and the opening of that fishery, we have retained 5% as opposed to the more normal 10% for actual directed fisheries.
We have achieved improvements in the recording of catch and stowage plans. For enforcement officers, stowage plans are very important. It's our way of understanding what's actually being put in a particular part of the vessel's hold. As one inspector leaves and the next inspector comes on board a few days later, you get a good picture of what fish are being stowed where. It's an important component, something we achieved as recently as 2006.
Enhanced port state control has been achieved as well. Since last year, before entering a port state, flag states have been required to declare that the catch on board is proper, that all the procedures are in place, and that all the proper authorizations have been acquired. We have also achieved an improved vessel monitoring system. In the recent NAFO meetings in Norway, these measures were updated and improved, so that now we will get one-hour reporting as well as the reporting of course and speed.
Within the NAFO regulatory area, I want to bring to your attention the areas known as 3M and 3N. That is the nose and tail and the Flemish Cap, and it is principally the area we're talking about. We're equally responsible for sovereignty and the patrol of boundary lines.
Canada spends approximately $30 million a year on the NAFO enforcement program. This includes our program, the conservation and protection program, the coast guard vessels, the air surveillance contract, and contributions from the Department of National Defence, which also patrols in airplanes and aboard ships. We have, as a result of that, approximately 800 dedicated coast guard and DND days for patrol in the NAFO regulatory area. I would like to highlight that the way we manage, the vessels are actually on alternate weeks. We want to maximize our presence as much as possible. On the return to port, they get approximately 12 hours' turnaround to change crews, change fisheries officers, provision and so on, and get back out.
A very important component of our program is that we stay out in all weather. In the recent storms, with winds of 100 knots, the Cygnus was on patrol. We are also out there during Christmas and the holiday season. We don't alter the program in any seasonal way.
We have 23 inspectors in the NAFO unit. Some of these inspectors have 25 and 30 years' experience; others have less. These inspectors receive various types of training in addition to the regular fishery officer program and are often seen by their colleagues in the NAFO area as people they can look to. They provide training for people from other countries, and we have had requests—as recently as last week from St. Pierre, for example—for training on import inspections. We also provide on-site training for United States inspectors, as well as some from Europe—the Baltic states, and so on.
We have an air surveillance program dedicated, contracted, and delivered by provincial airlines as well as by the Department of National Defence. I would like to note that the significance of the air surveillance program is the coverage area, of course—we have close to 300 flights a year in the area—but it also has significance for sovereignty, for the protection of Canada's 200-mile limit.
The air surveillance program contributes to our marine security program in a broader sense as well, but the air surveillance program has been instrumental in addressing the issue of boundary line violations that were so prevalent back in the 1980s. And of course it's very important for us, in gathering data, to match up with other sources of information in the NAFO regulatory area. We enjoy quite a lot of cooperation, as just noted, with other countries.
But a key, I think, to the whole program is not just the application or the deployment of significant large capital resources, such as ships and planes and so on, and the use of vessel monitoring systems, but how you integrate it—forensic analysis. It's the use of those resources to get a sense of the picture, to be constantly forward-looking.
A violation is the result of the actions of one master, and a citation of the ability of inspectors to intercept at any particular time. But the use of the information in a broader way to integrate where they are fishing now with what the historical patterns are and what the seasonality component is, matching what an inspector sees at sea with where the vessel is actually fishing at various times, is very important to our ability to understand what we believe the catches to be and what we believe the situation currently is.
Specifically, I would like to note some of the post-reform results. We have seen a very significant reduction, as no doubt you have heard, in fishing activity in this area from the 2003 period onwards. There has actually been a 70% decline of fishing activity in the NAFO regulatory area in that timeframe, and approximately 50% more recently.
Some other measures, of course, pertain to bycatch and so on. We have had vessels called back to port since 2006, and on every occasion we have had an opportunity to participate in the inspection.
Thank you.