FAAE Committee Report

Security enables development; effective governance enhances security; development creates opportunities, and multiplies the rewards, of improved security and good governance. In this virtuous circle of cause and effect, security is an essential condition of good governance and lasting development.[42]

Report of the Independent Panel on Canada’s Future Role in Afghanistan

[T]he war in Afghanistan cannot be won without a peace track, a political track. Why? Because there is a big political component in the conflict in Afghanistan, and a political component cannot be resolved through war alone. The political component has at least two dimensions: one is the unresolved civil war; the other is the regional factor in the conflict. [43]

Seddiq Weera,
Senior Advisor, Independent National Commission on
Strengthening Peace and Senior Policy Advisor to the Minister of Education,
Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, February 14, 2008

It seems to me that Canada should be using its very hard-won influence within NATO, literally purchased with the blood of Canadian soldiers, to seek to secure the support of the alliance's 26 members—comprising much of the key donor community in Afghanistan as well as the troop-contributing nations—for what is most urgently needed: a new overarching political framework for international engagement in Afghanistan with much more emphasis on creating the conditions for a comprehensive peace process.[44]

Ambassador Peggy Mason
Senior Fellow,
Norman Paterson School of International Affairs
Carleton University, March 6, 2008

… this process will be neither Canadian nor international even, but well and truly Afghan. The Afghans must in effect own the negotiation process. Our role is to support them, to encourage them, to make connections and to serve as a catalyst. We are not necessarily called upon to play the role of negotiator or mediator, particularly given that we are currently combatants.[45]

Gerry Ohlsen
Vice-Chair Group of 78,
and member of the Afghanistan Reference Group, November 29, 2007

The Military Contribution to Security

Canada and other members of the international community that participated in the UN-mediated talks on Afghanistan at Bonn in December 2001 began their final declaration by stating that they were: “Determined to end the tragic conflict in Afghanistan and promote national reconciliation, lasting peace, stability and respect for human rights in the country.” [46] The Bonn talks recognized facts on the ground and established an interim Afghan government, but did not include the Taliban, and its final declaration was not a peace agreement. Despite recognition by all of the need for a comprehensive approach that included both military and non-military elements, the fact that fighting continued and, in the words of the January 2006 Afghanistan Compact, “genuine security remains a fundamental prerequisite for achieving stability and development in Afghanistan,”[47] meant that the military aspects of the international mission were initially accorded the most attention. While reconstruction and development and governance reform are also necessary for long-term security, the strengthening of the insurgency in the south and east of the country has meant that attention and resources focused largely on the military aspects of the mission.

While the UN-authorized International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) was initially deployed only to Kabul, in August 2003 NATO agreed to take command of the force, and in October, the United Nations extended its mandate to cover the whole country. By the time of NATO’s Bucharest Summit in April 2008, ISAF had some 47,000 troops from 40 nations in Afghanistan. By April 2008, the United States had 33,000 troops stationed in Afghanistan: some 19,000 in ISAF and about 14,000 others operating separately under Operation Enduring Freedom, with what the Manley panel called “…a particular emphasis on counterterrorism.”[48]

Canadians have much to be proud of in terms of the work done by members of the Canadian Forces in Afghanistan, where some 20,000 had served by April 2008. This work has regrettably come at a high cost; however, with Canadian military personnel suffering casualty rates “the highest in ISAF as a proportion of troops deployed:” [49] over 80 dead, almost 300 wounded in action and about 400 otherwise injured. Some 2,500 Canadians remained deployed in Kandahar province, which General Rick Hillier told the Committee in April 2008 has been described by Afghan President Karzai as “ ‘the centre of gravity’ for his country… as Kandahar province goes, so will the rest of the country.”[50]

General Hiller told the Committee that Canadian forces have played a key role in Kandahar province since their deployment there, including in the 2006 Operation Medusa, the first brigade-level combat in NATO’s history. As Deputy Special Representative of the UN Secretary General for Afghanistan and former Canadian ambassador to Afghanistan Chris Alexander explained to the Committee, Operation Medusa, which prevented the capture of Kandahar city and proved the Taliban could not stand against NATO in a conventional battle, “…was a battle waged and won primarily by Canadians, with the strong support of allies and the sanction of the United Nations Security Council. Medusa changed the insurgent landscape in southern Afghanistan. It restored hope. It rallied the tribes. It devastated Taliban morale. In the end, it brought roads, jobs, and rural development projects to Panjwai and Zherai districts… In short, Medusa allowed the Government of Afghanistan to regain the advantage in its deadly contest of wills with the resurgent Taliban.”[51]

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The Manley panel reported that: “By many knowledgeable accounts, security generally has deteriorated in the South and East of Afghanistan, including Kandahar province where Canadian Forces are based, through 2006 and 2007.”[52] In April 2008, General Hiller quoted NATO statistics which show that over 90% of attacks took place in only 10% of the country. However, he told members that in the year and a half since Operation Medusa, Canadian Forces have provided security for the return of Afghans to the area surrounding Kandahar and some reconstruction, and have made significant progress training Afghan National Security Forces.[53] The Manley panel had also argued that “…ISAF and Afghan commanders must take every precaution to respect local culture, and to prevent civilian casualties in military operations.”[54]

In response to a question about combined operations with American forces not operating under ISAF, General Hillier replied: “I can tell you for sure that despite the violence caused by the Taliban in heavily populated areas, there is a laser-like focus by the NATO chain of command at every single level, right down to our most junior soldier of any nationality, to ensure that collateral damage is prevented, if at all possible, and minimized.” Following criticism by President Karzai, the Secretary General of the United Nations and others, there is now widespread acknowledgement of the need to reduce the number of Afghan civilian casualties, which, as noted earlier, amounted to at least 1,500 in 2007. General Hillier told the Committee that “we know what the winning conditions must be. That has not been a part [of] having immense collateral damage and therefore turning the population away from us.”[55]

While Committee members have had differences of opinion regarding the mission assigned to the Canadian Forces in Afghanistan, they all agree that the Canadian men and women deployed there have carried this out with the highest degree of professionalism. Members note that the first element of the military mission specified in the motion passed by the House of Commons on March 13, 2008 is “training the Afghan National Security Forces so that they can expeditiously take increasing responsibility for security in Kandahar and Afghanistan as a whole.” The June 2008 cabinet committee report on Canada’s engagement on Afghanistan likewise specified that one of Canada’s priorities in Kandahar would be to “enable the Afghan National Security Forces in Kandahar to sustain a more secure environment and promote law and order.”[56] With this approach, Canada’s military mission in Kandahar can hopefully consolidate security in that province, while at the same time avoiding civilian casualties and strengthening the capacity of the Government of Afghanistan.

Recommendation 2

Taking into account local sensibilities and culture, the Canadian military should carry out its mission as outlined in the motion passed by the House of Commons on March 13, 2008. Moreover, the Government of Canada should do its utmost to ensure that in conducting military operations the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan (ISAF) continues to focus on avoiding Afghan civilian casualties and minimizing property damage.

Establishing the Conditions for a Multi-level Peace Process

While the Taliban-led insurgency is the most obvious and direct threat to peace in Afghanistan, it is not the only one. Insecurity in that country springs from multiple sources, including: a history of conflict with regional states that has resulted in a traditionally weak Afghan state; decades of continual war, including a civil war that underlined ethnic and other divisions in the country; porous borders and traditionally poor relations with neighbouring powers, particularly Pakistan; and chronic poverty.

Overcoming these legacies to achieve real peace will require sustained work over the long term. In addition to reconstruction and development and governance reform, which will be discussed later in this report, significant action must also be taken in the areas of Afghan-led dialogue and reconciliation within the country, and diplomacy and increased cooperation with its neighbours. Retired Canadian diplomat Paul Heinbecker told the Committee that:

I do see that there needs to be a very big diplomatic effort. I don't think we've been doing enough at all. We need to be taking a role that is commensurate with the contribution Canada is actually making. One has to be realistic. There are other countries involved, and those other countries are playing a much larger role, in particular the United States and the British as well. But we are the third donor. We have the leverage, and we should be using that leverage. We should be insisting on using it.[57]

In terms of dialogue and reconciliation in Afghanistan, Hon. John Manley, Chair of the Independent Panel on Canada’s Future Role in Afghanistan, told the Committee that: “We can't win it militarily. We could lose it militarily, however. So we can't send the Salvation Army in; we have to send the Canadian army in. And they have to be equipped, capable, and able to do the job. But if that's all we do… this will not end happily. It will end in an awkward way and in a disappointing way.”[58]

Witnesses before the Committee agreed that since there can be no purely military solution to the conflict in Afghanistan, a political one must ultimately be found. To quote Mr. Manley’s testimony:

I think it's really important to recognize that this insurgency, unless it's the first time ever, will not end in military success. It will end because of a political agreement that will resolve some of the issues there…We must not lose sight of the fact that ultimately a political solution must be found. It must be conditioned, of course, upon appropriate respect for human rights, including the rights of women and others. It must be conditioned on the renunciation of violence. We mustn't get ourselves into the position where we think no political reconciliation is possible and that we're prepared to fight to the last Taliban, because quite frankly, we will never reach that point.[59]

In April 2008 Nick Grono of the International Crisis Group similarly argued that: “insurgents do not have to win -- they just have to not lose long enough to sap the population and the donors’ will.” He added “We are never going to shoot the last insurgent and leave. The military are there to create a security umbrella to allow political and development work to take place and the strategic must take the place of the tactical.”[60] Obviously security and political processes must be complementary and reinforce each other.

At the first hearing of the Special Committee on the Canadian Mission in Afghanistan Ambassador Kai Eide, the Special Representative of the UN Secretary General for Afghanistan explained the key elements of a reconciliation process in this way:

First, a reconciliation process, when it comes about, must be a process led by the Afghan government with the support of the international community. It must be coordinated and led by the Afghan government. Second, it must be a political process, not a security process or intelligence process. Third, it must be based on the Afghanistan Constitution and on what we have achieved over the last few years…No political process should take place at the cost of these achievements. Finally, it must be a process that is conducted on the basis of strength and not as a replacement for our military operations.[61]

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While some initially rejected the idea of “negotiating with the Taliban,” many witnesses underlined that not all insurgents were really “Taliban,” while others added that “the Taliban” itself was composed of a number of groups. Former Secretary of State for External Affairs Flora Macdonald, who has made regular trips to Afghanistan since March 2001, told Members that “…not all the Taliban are militant. Among them are people who desire peace and stability in their country, and many would willingly share those views with others. They’re a political movement, and like any other political movement, there’s real variation in their beliefs.”[62] Former Canadian diplomat Scott Gilmore argued that: “We lump all these various insurgents, from those who are just merely disgruntled to those who are religious fanatics, under one rubric—the Taliban—and that's simply not the case. We need to be able to split them, to come to terms with some of them and isolate others.”[63]

The Government of Afghanistan has already created several mechanisms for political dialogue and outreach. In 2005, it established a Strengthening Peace Commission, also referred to as the National Reconciliation Commission. According to Surendrini Wijeyaratne of the Canadian Council for International Cooperation, this commission, which is still active in 11 provinces of the country, “was set up by the government to attract, often through financial incentives, ‘soft’ Taliban and other ‘opposition’ groups… to peace talks.” While one official told her that the Commission has encouraged over 5,000 people to stop fighting and “reintegrate” into civilian life, however, an international official told her that “We would argue that most of them (the 5,000 reconciled) were not combatants and there is a financial motive that needs to be scrutinized.” [64]

In 2005, the Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission developed a time-bound action plan on peace, justice, and reconciliation that is set to end in June 2008. Oxfam International described this plan as follows in February 2008:

The Afghanistan Action Plan on Peace, Justice and Reconciliation is the measure which most directly aims to strengthen peace. It contains a programme for the acknowledgement of the suffering of Afghan people; reforming state institutions and purging them of human-rights violators and criminals; truth seeking and documentation; promotion of national unity and reconciliation; and the establishment of mechanisms for accountability.

This programme has significant potential, but was only formally launched in December 2006 and is notably absent from the Afghan government’s paper ‘Afghanistan: Challenges and the Way Ahead’ of January 2007. It is only briefly referred to in the [Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board] Annual Report of 1 May 2007.[65]

The issue of whether the Government of Afghanistan would negotiate with leaders of the Taliban was effectively settled in September 2007, when Afghan President Karzai took the unusual step of publicly offering to meet Taliban leader Mullah Omar. While the government rejected conditions set by the Taliban – such as the withdrawal of all foreign forces – the issue was now obviously how and when negotiations might begin. Kamran Bokhari told the Committee that: “We tend to talk about either military conflict or negotiated settlement as if it's a black and white dichotomy, an either/or situation. It is not, because every military conflict ends with a negotiated settlement—and each side knows that. There is no war for the sake of war; we're not going to be in Afghanistan for the long haul or just for the sake of occupying the country. We need to get beyond that and to understand how to reach a negotiated settlement.” [66]

When asked about Canada’s position on a negotiated settlement, then-Minister of Foreign Affairs Maxime Bernier agreed on the need for political dialogue, while underlining that “it is up to the government of Afghanistan to decide how and with whom it intends to establish a lasting peace in Afghanistan. It is a sovereign, democratically elected government… If negotiations were undertaken by the government of Afghanistan with people who respect the Constitution of Afghanistan and who renounce violence, it would be better for the international community.”[67]

While President Karzai’s offer legitimized the idea of negotiations, it was criticized by some as premature, and by others as evidence a peace process might involve only the Government of Afghanistan and the Taliban. In terms of timing, Barnett Rubin told the Committee in March 2007 that “of course people don't surrender when they think they're winning. There haven't been a lot of outstanding successes recently.” He continued:

As long as there is, from their point of view, a part of Afghanistan that is not under the control of the Government of Afghanistan because it's in the tribal agencies and in Pakistan, and as long as that area is also not really controlled by Pakistan and Pakistan does not do more to effectively shut down that recruitment centre, then there is a vast reserve that they have that makes it very difficult to create conditions for that kind of political discussion, although it can be done on a local basis within Afghanistan.[68]

Kamran Bokhari added a year later that: “Of course, the Taliban are being approached. There's a lot of talk about a negotiated settlement. What does that mean? Do we negotiate from a position of relative weakness? Do we allow the other side to dictate terms that at this point in time are not favourable by any stretch of the imagination?”[69]

In terms of process, former Canadian diplomat Gerry Ohlsen of the Group of 78 and the Afghanistan Reference Group argued that:

[…]Afghanistan does not need another back-room deal forged by political elites to save their political hides. But that's what it's going to get if the international community doesn't change direction soon. What Afghanistan does urgently need is a UN-supported, broadly based political dialogue, one that engages all sectors of the society and all communities of interest. They didn't get it at Bonn or at London. They need it now.[70]

While talks would not begin immediately, witnesses outlined a number of approaches based on lessons learned from other conflicts and best practices that could help set the stage for them. Stefan Lehmeier, of the Canadian Peacebuilding Coordinating Committee and the Afghanistan Reference Group, argued that while the motives of the various groups are different and will therefore require different approaches, “…you can assume that probably the majority of actors involved in the insurgency will be open to dialogue.” He added:

The point is it will take a very long time. It will be a process. As you see right now, the central government in Kabul has strict conditions for negotiations, and also strict conditions have been mentioned by members of the insurgency. And at this stage these conditions are not compatible. Where we are today, we cannot have talks, but this is where we are today. Stakes are being raised, and this is where we have to start from, and as the process takes us forward, I think we will get to a point where we can start talking and negotiating.[71]

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Professor Graeme MacQueen of McMaster University and the Afghanistan Reference Group told the Committee that: “A planned, phased peace process for Afghanistan need not take the familiar three-stage form of ceasefire, face-to-face negotiation, and peace agreement. Rather, we might think of the process as dialogue and problem-solving, first stage; negotiation, second stage; and reconciliation, third stage. It would probably be very unwise, in fact, to go directly to negotiation between leaders of main belligerent groups. This would encourage undemocratic backroom deals, which is not what we are advocating.” [72]

Whatever model is eventually chosen by the Government of Afghanistan, Gerry Ohlsen argued that the international community knows how to support it effectively, explaining that “this kind of negotiation would be multidimensional. It would take years. The international community has a long history of doing this in Kosovo, in the former Yugoslavia, in the Congo, in Liberia. We know how to do it. The international community as a whole, the diplomatic community as a whole, knows how to implement this sort of thing… It can be done. It just takes time and it takes patience and a huge commitment.” [73]

Surendrini Wijeyaratne of the Canadian Council for International Cooperation, who visited Afghanistan and conducted extensive interviews with Afghans and international officials in January-February 2008, reported in March 2008 that “interviews carried out… in Afghanistan indicate that nascent peace efforts are already under way. Peace initiatives are currently being carried out by the Government of Afghanistan and Afghan civil society organizations, but these peace efforts are not receiving enough support from the international community and are disconnected, limiting their impact.” [74] She told the Committee that “with further support and some reform,” current efforts in areas such as political outreach and reconciliation, disbanding of illegal armed groups and in particular transitional justice and social reconciliation “could help foster the conditions for a peace process in Afghanistan.”

She said that most of the people she interviewed on this topic argued that there needed to be “a parallel top-down/bottom-up approach.” In her words:

They said there needs to be work with the central government right now to build its capacity to engage in talks with opposition groups in order to resolve issues of internal governance and internal fighting within the government. That needs to be a top priority, so the government is more functional.

There also needs to be grassroots community peacebuilding. The reason for that is that a large number of disputes that happen in Afghanistan are not necessarily insurgency-related. These are disputes over land, water, marriage, the regular old things, that are sometimes mono-ethnic, mono-tribal. Sometimes it's between tribes, between ethnicities, between different communities. There has been a lot of work actually done among Afghan organizations. Oxfam International, for example, just put out a report saying that grassroots peacebuilding—working on local-level disputes, strengthening relationships within communities and between communities, as well as with communities and the central government—can help build foundations for peace, and it also can help build the government's legitimacy in some of these communities as well.[75]

The Committee also heard from the lead author of the OXFAM report referred to above, Matt Waldman, who argued the need for the development of an Afghan national strategy on community peacebuilding. He added “I think if CIDA contributed that would lead the way and encourage other donors to do likewise.”[76]

Recognizing that Canada is a combatant in Afghanistan, witnesses concerned with establishing the conditions for a broad-based peace process argued that it should both champion such a process and increasingly use its CIDA and other programming to help establish the conditions for it, both through its own programming, in cooperation with the Government of Afghanistan, and in cooperation with Canadian civil society organizations. As Gerry Ohlsen told us: “there is a vacuum right now when it comes to constructive, responsible promotion of a political settlement in Afghanistan. It's never had one, and no one is doing it now.” He added that “Canada can—and we should—fill that vacuum. We should take the lead among our NATO allies, including the Americans: within NATO, within the UN, within the region, and with the Afghan government, as well as with the Afghan people. We can help lead to shape a comprehensive peace process.”[77]

Surendrini Wijeyaratne argued that “In order to have a more coordinated or formalized effort, there first needs to be an agreement within the Government of Afghanistan that it will happen. In the international community, Canada can take that first step and play a role in dealing with some of the political reforms. They need to happen rather delicately behind the scenes to form the basis for a more formalized peace process in the future. Those discussions are going on right now, and now is the time to take a more proactive role in responding to them.”[78]

More generally, she recommended that:

Canada is indeed in a leadership position in Afghanistan, and it should make the most of that position by becoming a strong advocate for peace. To do this, Canada can do four things. It can rebalance its diplomatic, development, and military strategies to place greater emphasis on development and building the conditions necessary for an eventual peace process in Afghanistan. It can encourage the international community and the Government of Afghanistan to strengthen the conditions for a future peace process and to coordinate current efforts. It can promote an immediate peace-making and national reconciliation mandate for the UN envoy, which is under negotiation right now. And it must support a recommitment to the action plan on peace, justice, and reconciliation.[79]

However, as Ambassador Peggy Mason reminded the Committee, “it’s not really for us to sit here saying this is the best process or that’s the best process. It’s really... to throw our weight behind, first of all, the idea that the process is necessary: to champion this, not ad hoc efforts.” She added: “In fact, there are many ad hoc efforts going on, including some by Canada. Virtually all of the countries who are troop contributors are there talking at the local level. We’ve heard of Pakistan doing this. Karzai himself is trying to do it, except that he doesn’t have the trust with the parties to do it.” [80]

In June 2008, the cabinet committee report on Canada’s engagement in Afghanistan did acknowledge the importance of Afghan-led efforts toward political reconciliation, and pledged to facilitate them.[81]  While the Government of Canada cannot impose a course of action on the Government of Afghanistan, it can and should continue to state its belief that broad-based negotiations will eventually be required for the establishment of a durable peace in that country. It should also ensure that its CIDA and other programming encourages grassroots dialogue and other means to contribute to establishing the conditions for such a process.

Recommendation 3

The Government of Canada should reinforce efforts on the diplomatic, military and development levels, to promote the creation of conditions favourable to a peace process in Afghanistan.

The Government of Canada should make a concrete commitment to promote the organization of broad-based negotiations both with the central government, by bolstering its ability to initiate talks, and with local communities.

In its CIDA and other programming, the Government of Canada should take advantage of every opportunity to encourage dialogue among all sectors of Afghan society and all communities of interest, and thereby help to establish conditions conducive to peace negotiations.

The Government of Canada should also promote a peace and national reconciliation mandate for the United Nations Special Envoy for Afghanistan.

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Strengthening the Role of the United Nations

Testimony before the Committee underlined two things about the role of the United Nations in Afghanistan. First, it plays a very important role that could increase in importance in the context of supporting political negotiations. Second, it has not been as effective as it should be.

The United Nations has been involved in the most recent international efforts to assist Afghanistan from the beginning, when it authorized the international actions that led to the overthrow of the Taliban regime and helped negotiate the establishment of an interim Afghan government. Nevertheless, many Canadians are probably unaware of the role of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA). In February 2007, Deputy Special Representative Chris Alexander explained to the Committee that:

The United Nations remains at the heart of this effort. There are upwards of 5,000 UN personnel in Afghanistan. This is a fact that is little known in Canada and the outside world, where the focus tends to be on NATO, on the military mission. But these are civilians, and they are part of the largest political mission the United Nations has. It's also an integrated mission, where the expertise of over 20 UN agencies, programs, and funds is brought to bear on the challenges of Afghans, particularly in rural communities, where most Afghans live on a daily basis.

The United Nations has delivered up to one-fifth of all the assistance that has gone to Afghanistan in the past five years. We have overseen the holding of elections. We have implemented rural development projects. We have implemented, even in the conditions of insurgency this year, inoculation programs for the most devastating diseases that have affected children in Afghanistan, even in the war-affected south.[82]

Other witnesses, particularly those that advocated the pursuit of a “peace track” leading to political negotiations in Afghanistan, underlined that the UN could play a critical role as a trusted facilitator. While the United Nations is currently prepared to support the Government of Afghanistan in any negotiations it chooses to hold, Afghan Canadian Seddiq Weera argued that the UN mandate in Afghanistan should be changed to allow it to broker peace negotiations. In his words “The UN is the best placed, it is trusted, it has the infrastructure. We need a neutral body to broker peace. If Afghans could have done it among themselves, why would war and terror be housed in Afghanistan today?”[83] Gerry Ohlsen added that: “The UN may or may not ultimately lead the peace negotiation. UN blue helmets may not ultimately provide the security assistance during the implementation of a peace agreement. But only the UN, only the Security Council, can actually mandate a multi-dimensional peace operation. Equally importantly, only the UN can notionally lead that peace implementation process, if for no other reason than that it’s the only body that is acceptable to the international community.” [84]

Despite the fact that the United Nations and its agencies have provided real help to the people of Afghanistan; however, Colonel Mike Capstick, who commanded Canada’s Strategic Advisory Team in Kabul in 2005-06, told the Committee that “…the United Nations assistance mission in Afghanistan, UNAMA, remains marginal to the dynamic in Kabul.” He continued:

A few of the most powerful states represented in Kabul, as well as some of the most important development agencies, have consistently weakened the possibility of UN leadership by their insistence on following national and organizational agendas and priorities as opposed to those laid out in the compact.

The roots of this problem lie in the period immediately following the fall of the Taliban. The U.S. consciously limited the role of the UN, and the dysfunctional lead-nation system of the Bonn process proved to be a structural barrier to cohesion. Clearly, this situation is untenable.[85]

Retired Canadian diplomat Paul Heinbecker, who was Canadian Ambassador to the United Nations at the time of the Bonn conference, argues that Afghanistan is simply not a priority of the United Nations. As he told the Committee in March 2008: “I understand that Ban Ki-moon described a dozen priorities the other day, and Afghanistan wasn't even one of them. Here we're transfixed, engrossed in Afghanistan, but at New York I don't think that's the case.” He added:

[T]here are two or three factors that explain the current situation. One is that the UN was attacked in Iraq in 2003, and I don't think they have quite got over it—not yet. They lost some of their best and brightest, and it made the UN, as a secretariat institution, quite nervous about its role in the world.

The second thing is to bear in mind that Afghanistan is one of 17 UN missions. The UN has something like 100,000 soldiers and officials in the field—quite a bit more than that if the Darfur operation ever gets off the ground properly. It has a budget of something like $6 billion. And Afghanistan is one of those missions. [86]

Recognition of problems in coordination and other areas led to calls for the appointment of a UN “super-envoy” with expanded authority to oversee international assistance, and perhaps an expanded UNAMA mandate as well. Canada’s then-Minister of Foreign Affairs, Hon. Maxime Bernier, told the Committee in December 2007 that: “We want to work with the Secretary General and the leading states to ensure that the UN continues to play an important role.” On the envoy, he stated:

We also requested support for creating a high-level UN envoy position so that the forces there can be properly coordinated. I can tell you that at NATO, at the Brussels meeting, there were discussions with colleagues about the possibility of a UN special envoy coordinating the efforts of both NATO and the UN, and of other international organizations. The international community should be making a decision in the next few weeks or months on Canada's request, which has been… supported, by the international community. Canada encourages the efforts currently being made to increase coordination in the international community. That is why the special envoy was important to us.[87]

At the end of 2007, the UN Secretary General offered the position of special representative to the British former High Representative for Bosnia and Herzegovina, Lord Paddy Ashdown. Following opposition from both President Karzai and some members of the Security Council, however, Ashdown withdrew his name on January 27, 2008.[88] The Secretary General announced the appointment of Norwegian diplomat Kai Eide as the new Special Representative in March 2008.

On the question of the Special Representative, Paul Heinbecker told the Committee:

[W]hen we and the international community and the UN started in Afghanistan and we had Mr. Brahimi as the head of the operation, we had a truly exceptional man running the operation. Even at that time, when we in Canada were trying to say that all of the authority should be invested in this person so that all the different countries would not be competing with each other and the different aid organizations would not be competing and conflicting and asking contradictory things of people, we weren't able to achieve that, and I would say that subsequently it's become only more difficult to do it.

One of the recommendations in the Manley commission was that there should be a senior UN person appointed. Of course there was talk of Paddy Ashdown being such a person. The Karzai government seemed to be the one that said they didn't want to do that. I'm not sure that should be their call, in fact. I think it would make a lot of sense to have such a person, a person invested with the authority of the international community. At the same time, while the job is not to contradict the local government and to enter into a conflict with it, it is to make sure the interests of the international community are also looked after. [89]

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However, Robert Jackson of the University of Redlands responded that since the strategic goal of the international community is to strengthen the sovereign Government of Afghanistan, the decision should be up to it. In his words, “…if Mr. Karzai and the government do not want to have a UN ambassador there, then of course there’s not much we’re going to be able to do about it. Much of what I’ve seen is that they in fact think that people who come in from outside will be telling them what to do.” [90]

Colonel Mike Capstick argued that whether or not formal changes were made to the mandate of the UN envoy, the real issue would be how much political support is given to the envoy and the UN mission by Canada and other member states, and the extent to which this results in changes on the ground. In his words:

The appointment of the proposed high-level UN envoy holds the potential to redress this situation but would not, by itself, be sufficient to achieve the necessary cohesion…

If UNAMA is to be effective, the appointment of a special envoy must be accompanied by expressions of full political support and genuine behavioural change on the ground. Canada’s political leaders can and must leverage this nation’s hard-earned influence and political capital to exercise leadership in developing the international political will that is absolutely necessary for success in Kabul.[91]

Despite discussion about expanding the mandates of the Special Representative and UNAMA, it was eventually decided that the goals of the international community could be achieved by “sharpening” these mandates rather than expanding them. Upon his arrival in Afghanistan at the end of March 2008, Kai Eide stated that: “Afghanistan has been calling for stronger coordination of international assistance - we need to better respond to this demand. The Security Council has now sharpened our mandate to meet the needs of Afghanistan’s people and government. In the past, there has been much focus on the security situation. This needs to be balanced with the political dimension of our work to deliver much needed peace, stability and visible progress for all the peoples of Afghanistan.”[92]

In terms of increasing the priority given to Afghanistan at the United Nations, Paul Heinbecker suggested to the Committee that: “…the Canadian government should—and I presume it's doing this, but given the circumstances it would have to do more—make a greater effort to persuade the UN to take this more seriously, to raise its profile, to raise its place in the UN list of priorities.”[93] While it would easy to blame the UN bureaucracy and press the Secretary General to add Afghanistan to his list of priorities the next time he makes a speech, however, the problem goes deeper. As UN representative Chris Alexander told members “…the United Nations is only as good as its constituent members.”[94] Canada must redouble efforts in concert with like-minded states to convince all UN members, including those not active in Afghanistan, of the importance of the mission both for that country, for its region and for the broader international community.

Recommendation 4

Given the essential role that the United Nations must play in Afghanistan, the Government of Canada should work with the relevant regional players, the concerned members of the international community and the United Nations to enable the UN to have the means required to ensure better coordination of what is being done and thereby increase the effectiveness of the UN mission in Afghanistan. The Government of Canada should also use all bilateral and UN channels to convince member states and the UN itself of the Afghan conflict’s importance to the international community and thereby convince them of the necessity to make the conflict a priority.

Understanding and Addressing the Regional Dimension

Among the recommendations made by many witnesses was the need, for two reasons, to address Afghanistan within its broader regional context. First, many of the longstanding dynamics in the region – such as the poor relations between Afghanistan and its neighbours -- make it practically impossible to defeat the insurgency in Afghanistan, whose leaders have had a secure sanctuary in Pakistan. Second, the establishment of a peaceful and stable Afghanistan – which regional powers currently see according to one expert as “a potential source of instability through the export of arms, drugs, and ideology,” [95]– would do much to help ensure both the stability and prosperity of a region that Derek Burney called the “most dangerous” in the world. As he told the Committee, “You have nuclear weapon states surrounding Afghanistan—some actual, some potential…” and added “A lot of people focus a lot of attention elsewhere, but when you consider the countries that surround Pakistan and the capacity for mischief that is in that region, you understand the complexity and the tension that goes with the mission we're performing.[96] Addressing the challenges of this region will require understanding core security and other concerns of key actors, encouraging both bilateral and multilateral cooperation to address them, and maintaining engagement over time. As American expert Marvin Weinbaum has warned, “While most regional states have permanent interests in Afghanistan, international players have repeatedly demonstrated short attention spans.”[97]

While insecurity in Afghanistan has many sources, Afghan Ambassador Omar Samad told the Committee that: “If you ask Afghans… most Afghans think that insecurity has external roots. Yes, there is a component that's internal, domestic, and we know there is some dissatisfaction by some groups here and there for this reason or that reason. But the core of the armed groups that are facing us and your soldiers today, and the soldiers of many other countries, is fighting there for an ideological reason, a very narrow ideological reason.” [98]

The Manley panel agreed, stating that: “History proves how readily Afghanistan can fall victim to regional rivalries and foreign invasion.”[99] It later added: “Beyond its own borders, Afghanistan is surrounded by a violence-prone region. The mountainous western reaches of Pakistan, along the boundary with Afghanistan, harbour Afghan insurgents who are reinforced by recruits from countries around the Gulf and further abroad. Pakistan’s own domestic political upheavals and recurring crises—and its concerns about India’s growing economic and political presence in Afghanistan—complicate the region’s geopolitics. Iran, to Afghanistan’s West, has been a source of arms trafficking into Afghanistan.” [100]

Despite the truth of these observations, Afghans also share some responsibility, both for regional tensions and for their impact on Afghanistan. As Weinbaum wrote in 2006:

[…]Afghanistan stands in a dangerous neighborhood. Responsibility for much of the political instability and misery of its people can be traced to external powers seeking to realize their own strategic, ideological, and economic interests in the country. The close and more distant neighbors of Afghanistan have regularly intervened in its politics and economy. Foreigners have sometimes acted on behalf of domestic clients and have organized and armed them to dominate large portions of the country. Although renowned for resisting foreign intruders, Afghans cannot thus be absolved of responsibility for much of the fratricide and destruction that has occurred in recent decades. Still, the aggravating role of outside states, near and far, has also made civil conflicts more sustained and lethal.[101]

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In January 2007, Ambassador James Dobbins, who was the U.S. administration’s envoy to the Afghan opposition in the fall of 2001, told American legislators of the role Afghanistan’s neighbours played both in that country’s “civil war” in the years before before 2001, as well as at the Bonn conference. His testimony is worth citing at length:

Americans tend to recall that, in the immediate aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, the Bush Administration formed a multinational coalition that drove the Taleban from power. It is more accurate, however, to state that in late 2001, the United States joined an existing coalition that had been fighting the Taleban for half a decade. That coalition consisted of Russia, India, Iran, and the Northern Alliance. With the addition of American airpower, and the withdrawal of Pakistani support for their opponent, that coalition prevailed. Northern Alliance troops, who had been equipped, trained and paid by Russia, India and Iran, occupied most of the country.

If credit for America’s military victory in Afghanistan needs to be shared with this unlikely coalition, so must America’s diplomatic achievement in rapidly installing a broadly based successor regime. When named as the American envoy to the Afghan opposition October of 2001, I quickly concluded that the United States could not succeed in halting civil war in Afghanistan, however successful we might be in ousting the Taleban, without the support of the very governments responsible for that war in the first place…

By November of 2001 we were working with the United Nations to bring all factions of the Afghan opposition together in Bonn, where we hoped they would agree upon an interim constitution and the membership of a new government. The UN’s initial inclination had been to tightly sequester the Afghan representatives from all outside contacts in order to prevent foreign government from exerting malign influence over their deliberations. I made the opposite case, arguing that it was only by bringing governments like Iran, Pakistan, India and Russia into the process that we had some chance of securing a positive outcome. In my view the Afghans would only reconcile their differences if they were subjected to convergent pressures from all their foreign sponsors and supporters. And this was, in fact, exactly how it worked out. Each of those governments, and particularly Russia and Iran, played positive and essential roles in forging the compromises upon which the Afghans ultimately agreed.[102]

This level of initial cooperation convinced some that economic and other regional cooperation would continue. Afghanistan has joined a number of regional organizations in the years since 2001, and regional conferences have been held focusing on the potential for economic cooperation in a number of areas, including energy. Yet regional cooperation has not proceeded as far or quickly as many had hoped. Weinbaum wrote in 2006 that:

Particularly disconcerting are the indications that several states in Afghanistan’s neighborhood are becoming more assertive, possibly reviving older geostrategic aims. While none of its neighbors and other interested powers have yet pursued a course to destabilize the Afghan state or threaten its recovery, some seem prepared to extend their influence in Kabul through their traditional, divisive Afghan clients. Only with a renewed commitment of the international community to Afghanistan will it be possible to succeed in holding back these potentially disruptive political currents.[103]

In response to a question about the potential for economic and other cooperation, Barnett Rubin told the Committee that “ … confidence-building measures on security and fundamental issues of national interest are what will make the regional cooperation possible. “ He added: “I think that experience shows that countries tend to put their security interests first. Certainly countries under military rule put their security interests first. I wouldn't say all the countries have an interest in stability in Afghanistan. They all have an interest in Afghanistan being stable and ruled by their friends. The second-best solution is for it to be unstable. The third-best solution is for it to be stable and ruled by their enemies' friends. That is the source of the problem.” [104]

Rubin, who served as an advisor to the UN envoy during the Bonn Conference, underlined the fact that the states of the region cannot escape their mutual dependence during his testimony before the Committee. He told Members that: “At the Bonn Conference, the Iranian representative came to Mr. Brahimi, who was chairing it for the UN, and said to him, ‘I'd like to assure you that from now on, Iran will not interfere in the internal affairs of Afghanistan.’ Mr. Brahimi said to him, ‘Don't speak to me as if I'm a child. It's not possible for Iran not to interfere in the internal affairs of Afghanistan, but what we want you to do is interfere in a way that's positive.” [105]

Seema Patel of the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington likewise told the Committee that: “The diplomatic front in the regional countries I think is critical. It was during Bonn, and it should be for the long term.”[106] Beyond encouragement of greater regional cooperation, Canada and other states can also intensify their bilateral discussions with regional states. According to Paul Heinbecker, “there's more diplomacy we should be directing at Pakistan. There's more we should probably be directing at India and at Iran. I think there's a lot to be done on that front, and if I were in the Committee's position, I'd be advocating doing more of that.” He added that: “I would also like to see the creation of some kind of contact group, based in capitals, the kind of thing we used to do for Bosnia and for Kosovo. And that's the way we brought an end to the Kosovo war, in effect. We had a group of senior officials from the various interested capitals and we got them together, and ultimately we got to an agreement on that.” [107]

Engaging Pakistan

The majority of the testimony before the Committee on regional issues focused on the role of Pakistan. Taliban and al-Qaeda leaders took refuge in the tribal areas of that country after 2001, and from there were essentially able to regroup and re-launch the insurgency in southern Afghanistan. American former journalist Sarah Chayes, who has lived in Kandahar for several years, told the Committee of the insurgency in Afghanistan that:

It's really important that you understand what's happening in southern Afghanistan, not so much as an insurgency--that is, an indigenous uprising by locals--but rather as a kind of invasion by proxy of Afghanistan by Pakistan using Afghans. Fundamentally, this so-called insurgency is being orchestrated, organized, financed, trained, and equipped across the border in Pakistan. So in a sense, what your troops are doing here is protecting Afghans from this invasion. Now, that's schematic. It is certainly true that the more Afghans are disillusioned with the government we have provided them, the more likely they are to be tempted to sympathize with this Taliban invasion, is what I would call it.[108]

Barnett Rubin told Members that “of course, the official policy of the Government of Pakistan is that they support the international effort, but they think it has been excessively military, not sufficiently political. They argue for a political approach to the Taliban, and also to the tribal areas.” He added, however, that: “There certainly is, in Pakistan, obvious infrastructure of support for the insurgency, both in the tribal agencies and also in parts of Baluchistan, which includes madrassas, training camps, recruitment, videos and DVDs that are sold openly, and so on.” [109]

Almost all witnesses agreed that the insurgency in Afghanistan cannot be stopped as long as Taliban leaders based on the Pakistan side of the porous border have a secure sanctuary. Manley panel member Derek Burney told the Committee that: “Unquestionably, the open border between Afghanistan and Pakistan is, next to the shortage of troops, probably the most serious deficiency in the mission to try to counter the insurgency in Afghanistan.”[110]

While many witnesses told the Committee that Canada and its allies should “do more” to press the Pakistani government into taking action, such as “sealing the border,” others pointed out that Pakistan’s policies were based on what it saw as core national interests, and that in any event it had little ability to effectively police its tribal areas that border Afghanistan.

On the question of Pakistani interests and preoccupations, Rubin wrote in early 2007 that:

A realistic assessment of Pakistan's role requires not moving Pakistan from the "with us" to the "against us" column in the "war on terror" account books but recognizing that Pakistan's policy derives from the perceptions, interests, and capabilities of its leaders… The haven and support the Taliban receive in Pakistan are partly a response to claims Afghanistan has made against Pakistan and are also due to Islamabad's concern about both Indian influence in Afghanistan and Afghan backing for Pashtun and Baluch nationalists operating across the Durand Line.

Accordingly, unified pressure on Pakistan should be accompanied by efforts to address Islamabad's core concerns. The United States and its allies should encourage the Afghan government to open a domestic debate on the sensitive issue of recognition of the Durand Line in return for guarantees of stability and access to secure trade and transport corridors to Pakistani ports. Transforming the border region into an area of cooperation rather than conflict will require reform and development in the tribal territories. And Washington should ask India and Afghanistan to take measures to reassure Pakistan that their bilateral relations will not threaten Islamabad.[111]

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On the issue of lack of control over its tribal areas, he told the Committee that: “I want to be clear about the tribal agencies. It's not that the Government of Pakistan has no de facto control over them. The Government of Pakistan has no de jure control over the tribal agencies. They are not under the government administration.”[112]

Former Canadian diplomat Scott Gilmore of the Peace Dividend Trust agreed that: “Pakistan is the elephant in the room, and it is an intractable issue. We, frankly, will not see long-term stability while we have a split policy, as the international community, regarding the way the Taliban insurgents are treated on one side of the Pashtun-speaking belt versus the Afghan side.” While acknowledging calls within Canada for greater pressure on Pakistan, Gilmore added that there was a tendency in Canada to “overestimate our influence in certain capitals around the world… Afghanistan is the right place for us to be, and that's because in Kabul we actually do carry a big stick. We don't in Islamabad, and our allies that do have already been extraordinarily frank and aggressive behind closed doors with President Musharraf…”[113]

Relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan had improved somewhat by 2007, when the two leaders signed a bilateral declaration in Ankara in which they pledged to cooperate on confidence building measures related to border security, signed a trilateral agreement with Iran to carry out more joint border operations and information sharing, and participated in a “Peace Jirga.” At this jirga, Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf acknowledged that “…Afghan militants are supported from Pakistan soil. The problem that you have in your region is because support is provided from our side.” The UN Secretary General later added that the joint declaration produced at this jirga “was an important confidence-building measure between the two countries and the communities on both sides of the border. Both sides identified the need to address jointly a broad range of common problems, beginning with terrorism.” [114]

Canadian Grant Kippen, who lived and worked in Afghanistan with the National Democratic Institute, and later worked with the Pakistani electoral commission in the months before that country’s February 2008 election, told the Committee that “removal of the sources of insurgency in Pakistan requires a new regional approach and needs to address a number of legitimate concerns of both Afghanistan and Pakistan. Among the most compelling of these concerns are development and the education of the populace in the rural tribal areas on both sides of the border, promoting democratic values within Pakistan, and enhancing governance in Afghanistan.” [115] Ambassador Peggy Mason likewise argued that:

No country could possibly have been more forceful in its representations to Pakistan than the United States in seeking to get Pakistan to rein in the Taliban and al-Qaeda in the border areas. It didn’t work. Exhortations, no matter how forceful, must be buttressed with international support for processes that address the deep democratic deficit that is at the roots of Pakistani insecurity in the border areas. The results of the recent elections in Pakistan offer a new opening to begin to do this, given the stated desire of the winners of that election to pursue political dialogue with disaffected local leaders in the border area.[116]

Officials of the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade told the Committee that while Canada was forceful in its discussions with Pakistan on security issues, it was also prepared to help Afghanistan and Pakistan cooperate in such practical areas as border management. Jim Nickel, the Director of the South Asia Division at DFAIT, who had recently travelled to Pakistan’s border region, told members in February 2008 that: “We foresee the border remaining wide open, but, with some investment made in the capabilities of Pakistani and Afghan guards, improvements could be made to border control, on both sides and with mutual cooperation.”[117] Randolph Mank, the Director General of the Asia South and Pacific Bureau, added:

In a rather unique initiative, Canada convened senior officials from Pakistan and Afghanistan from October 30 to November 1 in Dubai for a confidence- and capacity-building workshop to discuss bilateral cooperation on customs, immigration, law enforcement, counter-narcotics, and economic development of the tribal areas. It's not always easy to get these parties in the same room, but they seemed willing to work together. We're now preparing for five follow-up workshops to be held in the spring of 2008.[118]

In June 2008 the Cabinet Committee report announced that one of Canada’s six priorities in Afghanistan would be to “enhance border security, with facilitation of bilateral dialogue between Afghan and Pakistani authorities.”[119]

More generally, officials told the Committee that Canada’s focus is on working with the Government of Pakistan through CIDA and other programming to address development and other challenges in the tribal agencies. According to Jim Nickel: “Working with the other members of the G8, and, of course, with the Pakistani and Afghan governments, Canada is trying to deal with at least four problems: economic development, the Afghan refugees who are still in Pakistan after 25 years, security, including the drug trade, and one more that I have not mentioned, border control. We foresee the border remaining wide open, but, with some investment made in the capabilities of Pakistani and Afghan guards, improvements could be made to border control, on both sides and with mutual cooperation.” [120]

When asked about the specific issue of developing the tribal areas, Nickel replied:

[T]hat is perhaps one of the most difficult problems to solve in the area. As you know, even when the British were there, they had no way to tackle the problem. Nevertheless, strategies have been put in place. There is the strategy presently being adopted by Pakistani government with the support of various development and international aid agencies, including ones from Canada, to develop the frontier region.

Canada's investments will mainly be made at community level and will target education, heath, the status of women in the area and ways to find jobs other than those provided by the Taliban or the drug trade. This is new for Canada and it is being done as part of CIDA programming. Targeted programs have only been in place for two years in Baluchistan, one of the provinces right beside Kandahar. It is new. We must find partners, and historically we do not have any there. It is going to take time. Of course, this is one of Pakistan's least developed regions. As I said earlier, it is a region where the Pakistani government has little authority.[121]

In April 2008, one month after the election of a new government in Pakistan, General Rick Hillier described a recent trip to Afghanistan and the region, which included a visit with his counterpart in Pakistan. He told members that: “We actually think the Pakistanis are stepping up their efforts on the border in a way that we have not yet seen… .” He continued: “We need them to do all they're doing and we need them to do more, and if they can do more in a joined-up fashion with the Afghans, I think that would bring a great deal of effect.” [122]

Recommendation 5

The Government of Canada should significantly increase its focus on regional diplomacy within the context of its mission in Afghanistan. In the particular case of Pakistan, the Government of Canada should take advantage of the recent election of a new government in February 2008 to advance cooperation on key issues of common interest, such as the development of the border regions, notably the Federally Administered Tribal Areas, and increased technical and other cooperation between Pakistan and Afghanistan.

Notes to Part I