[Translation]
Dear colleagues, I am pleased to have this opportunity to appear before the committee regarding amendments proposed to Bill , an Act to amend the Aeronautics Act.
I would like to start by pointing out that Canada has one of the safest air transportation networks in the world. Moreover, allow me to draw the attention of committee members to the fact that over the last 10 years, Transport Canada on two occasions voluntarily agreed to have Canada submit to comprehensive International Civil Aviation Organization audits. The most recent audit, undertaken in 2005, showed that Canada had a rate of compliance of 95.5% compared with an average of 68% for other countries. Moreover, Canada was singled out as a model for the 190 other signatory countries.
[English]
Safety management systems in particular are an international initiative recognized as the most significant advancement in aviation safety in recent years, and Transport Canada is considered a world leader in this area.
The proposed amendments contained in Bill are not before Parliament for the purpose of seeking authority to establish SMS. They are intended to maximize the effectiveness of the existing SMS safety framework and to facilitate the implementation of SMS for certificate holders. This would be done by allowing me, as the Minister of Transport, to require, by order, certificate holders to enhance their SMS or take corrective measures regarding the systems when I consider these systems are deficient. As well, the proposed amendments would provide protection provisions for individuals regarding internal reporting of safety information.
SMS is not self-regulation. I repeat: SMS is not self-regulation. It is not deregulation and it has never been about reducing the number of inspectors involved in safety oversight. The number one priority for resource allocation has been, and will continue to be, to ensure effective safety oversight of the industry.
As I have said on many occasions, SMS regulations are an additional layer above and beyond the existing regulations, requiring certificate holders to be more proactive in identifying hazards before they lead to accidents. SMS implementation does demand changes in how some aspects of safety oversight are delivered.
A new SMS enforcement policy has been established by stating clearly that all intentional violations will be vigorously enforced, and we have proposed in Bill that the maximum level of sanction be significantly increased, as you have seen. If certificate holders are unwilling to develop appropriate corrective measures, or are unable to implement these measures, enforcement action will be vigorously pursued.
The cancellation of the national audit program is also of concern to some and has been used as an example supporting the belief that we are curtailing safety oversight under SMS. In fact, the safety oversight of large operations will continue to be subject to thorough and rigorous safety assessment and validation processes. For the operations outside the SMS safety framework, such as those other than large air carriers, nothing has changed.
[Translation]
Finally, Mr. Chairman, colleagues, I would like to clarify parts of the bill dealing with reporting programs.
As you know, there are two types of voluntary reporting schemes under Bill . They offer different types of protection. The first scheme is a universal and voluntary reporting program which would not involve disciplinary action. All aviation industry stakeholders have access to it and may use it to issue safety-related reports. Individuals are assured that all reports remain anonymous and that the information will not be used against them for law enforcement purposes.
The purpose of this protection is to encourage comprehensive data reporting on safety-related matters, which Transport Canada could not obtain otherwise. I should point out that this protection would not apply when there are accidents of course, criminal offences, or voluntary violations.
The second scheme is directly related to the safety management system and deals with information which could be obtained by Transport Canada when a certificate holder's internal reporting system is being evaluated or audited. This scheme encourages individuals to voluntarily declare safety-related data and provides employers and employees protection against access to information, as well as the assurance that the information will not be used against them. This type of protection also covers data collected from flight recorders.
The purpose is to promote a culture of trust among employers and employees as well as to amass as much safety-related data as possible. Both schemes are based on the same principle. Moreover, once data has been depersonalized, it becomes accessible to all for the purpose of additional analysis and distribution.
That said, safety monitoring reports will, of course, be subject to the provisions of the Access to Information as well as the Privacy Act. Transport Canada has endeavoured to strike a fair balance, to encourage individuals to regularly report data which will serve to enhance air safety without compromising accountability, while maintaining the right to pursue law enforcement action where needed.
[English]
Some witnesses have advocated the creation of whistleblower protection. This possibility was studied, but we realized this approach could not be adopted inside the SMS framework if we want to nurture a safety culture. However, whistleblower-like protection exists in the proposed voluntary non-punitive regime described above, and it already exists in the civil aviation issues reporting system, which is open to everyone.
Finally, it's important to mention that these protections will never prevent enforcement action for deliberate and wilful commission of violation for which Transport Canada would have obtained evidence through its own investigations.
In conclusion, I would like to note that we have listened to the testimony provided by various witnesses and the concerns raised by the members around the table. I am happy to inform you that the government will be bringing forward amendments to address these concerns, specifically on the issues I have outlined here today.
[Translation]
I would be pleased to work with this committee in a positive and responsible manner in order to contribute to the consideration and passage of air safety-related legislative provisions in Bill .
I thank you for your attention. Departmental officials and I are now prepared to answer your questions.
:
We asked for it about two months ago, actually, and we weren't anticipating waiting until the estimates, because the issue—and it's been raised by several witnesses, Mr. Minister, especially after your letter to the
National Post—is the safety of airlines in Canada.
We have had several witnesses here—Judge Moshansky, Greg Holbrook, from the Canadian Federal Pilots Association—and I have before me a letter, which I think has been circulated among all committee members, from an owner of a private airline, DaxAir, and they all say, among other things, that this safety management system cannot function properly unless there is a continuation of regulatory oversight and that you and the department have already cut the national audit program.
So the issue of funds is absolutely crucial to understanding where the truth lies. Have you, in fact, cut those programs? Is Judge Moshansky out to lunch? Is Greg Holbrook telling us a lie? Is DaxAir out in left field?
:
The fact of the matter, colleague, is that the Canadian Federal Pilots Association welcomes the SMS.
You will recall, also, that when the witness, Mr. Moshansky, I believe, came here, my colleague, Brian Jean, asked the question as to whether, had this system been in place at the time it would have been something that would have been welcomed and would certainly have contributed to the fact that we were a little lax at that time in safety management issues. The answer to that was yes; clearly, safety management systems would have been a godsend had they been in place.
Now specifically to your question, my officials will be getting back to you very shortly so you can have the full information regarding the costing for oversight so you can have a clear appreciation of what—
:
I had a pretty clear appreciation, because when Mr. Jean asked Judge Moshansky the question to which you made reference, I immediately followed it up. I have this according to the Hansard. Judge Moshansky said, “I think it would be very good”. My response was to immediately ask whether he thought it would be very good because he understood that there would be no diminution of funds for the audit program and the regulatory system. And he said that, yes, he took it for granted that of course the government would continue its oversight.
The other witnesses who came before us, Minister, all gave us an indication that the SMS would be useful, provided the government inspectorate would not be diminished.
The issue is not so much that there would be a systems-wide plan for safety, but that the operational component of airline safety would be monitored, regulated, reported on, and appropriately dealt with when there was non-compliance. Nobody has so far been able to give us an indication that this is in fact what's going to happen. I dare say, Mr. Minister, that your departmental officials, who must know what the funds are, because it all relates to dollars and people, still have to do the research on it, by your admission.
:
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Minister, I tend to believe that you are a man of good will. However, you do not have control over all the services provided by your department. This is where we have some reservations. When the International Civil Aviation Organization representative came to speak with us, he said he had done an audit in 2005. So, you are right on that point.
However, with respect to regulatory oversight and inspection, clearly, according to these people, you must maintain the same inspection regime you've always had. When they hear that the inspection regime may be scaled back they start asking questions. I believe the next audit will be quite a bit harsher than the last. And that's fine by us.
However, Mr. Moshansky said—and figures would tend to support him—that there were 1,400 inspectors before 1992. Indeed, when the Liberals took office they reduced that number to 870. Withabout 870 inspectors, you are in compliance. The Liberals are the ones who reduced the number of inspectors.
At a safety and security convention, Mr. Preuss declared that by 2013 half of the inspection services would be reduced by attrition and that there would be fewer resources earmarked for regulatory enforcement. At the time we already believed that there would be fewer resources and that that would effectively lead to fewer inspections. Moreover, the 870 remaining inspectors are not all check pilots. In 1993, there were 450 of them. Today there are 400 of them. If, by 2013, you cut the inspection services by half, there will be fewer and fewer check pilots. That is why companies like DaxAir Inc., and even ICAO safety representatives, are of the view that we should not decrease the regulatory oversight program, the inspection service.
With respect to Mr. Preuss, he repeats his rhetoric, but at the same time, he pressures witnesses not to appear before the committee. You may choose to put up with him, but as far as I'm concerned it's a problem.
:
Thank you, Mr. Laframboise.
In fact, I don't want to stand here today and defend the previous regime. However, I would like to make a clarification on the 1,400 inspectors you mentioned earlier on. In simply want to point out that the reduction in this number is the result of organizational changes within the department. With the creation of NAV Canada, a number of inspectors went there. Moreover, another group went to airport services. So, in a general sense, the number of inspectors has not decreased, colleagues.
Am I in a position to specify the nature of the amendments currently being considered? No. However, I am perfectly prepared to listen and work in collaboration with the colleagues around this table to meet the objectives you shared with me here today and at other times. With respect to the number of inspectors, I believe it is indeed incumbent upon us to make sure there is some continuity.
The theory according to which the management system will, in 5, 6 or even 10 years, replace what has existed and should normally continue to exist is, in my view, incorrect. As I mentioned a few moments ago, the objective is to sustain civil aviation safety and make sure these standards are complied with and well understood throughout the country, and that they are a source of pride for us throughout the world. The goal here is not to rob Peter to pay Paul. On the contrary.
Thanks for coming forward today.
I have a couple of comments to start.
First, Mr. Minister, I think you've confirmed in a very real sense that there has been a diminishing number of safety inspectors. If we have more and more airlines and more and more air miles being travelled, essentially by holding the line at the same number of inspectors there is diminished ability to follow up with the inspections.There's no doubt about that. My concern is that the figures you've cited include positions, but they don't actually include bodies who are filling those positions on a full-time basis.
Second, you said very specifically in your comments that this isn't about reducing inspections. My concern is that every single witness who supported SMS in theory was also very clear that inspections, audits, need to be carried out.
When Mr. Preuss appeared before this committee, I requested that the risk assessment around SMS, which was done prior to putting SMS in place, be released to this committee. We know through requests for information that this risk assessment has now been released. It says very clearly that there is potential to reduce safety and that we need a focused inspection program to ensure there is not an increased safety risk. Mr. Preuss signed off on that risk assessment. It did not allow that mitigating factor to be brought in, did not allow that extra protection for Canadians.
I want to ask, Mr. Minister, do you support not having that focused inspection program that your department's own risk assessment indicates is extremely important to not reduce safety?
There's been a general theme throughout the sessions that I've either been sitting on as a witness or listening to; it's an underlying belief that this is about reductions. The budgets haven't changed, as the minister has said.
The speech to which Mr. Laframbroise referred was about our expected retirements. The fact that we even know we're looking at a 46% potential retirement by 2013 is enough indication for us to start taking action to make sure we replace the people we need.
On focused inspections, risk assessment is a rather technical document, and the recommendations in that—as Mr. Julian rightly said—have been signed off by me and will be put into effect. In fact, the whole protocol we're using as we transition to the SMS—and as I mentioned before, it's a three-year program and we're doing this very cautiously—is well developed right now.
If I had the full staff instruction in French I would be presenting it today, but this gives you an idea. No, I didn't pad it. It's a very in-depth approach. We're going to be questioning officials and individuals in the companies, and if there's any doubt about what's going on we'll be following up. If there is any indication that we need to get more information from doing the classic inspection programs, we are more than equipped and able to take that into account, and we will be doing it.
This is a more rigid regime than the one before.
Thank you, Minister, for attending.
The testimony around this table and the discussion that we've just heard seems to focus almost exclusively on the number of inspectors that Transport Canada has to do enforcement to ensure that we have a safe civil aviation program. I'm not sure that is the prime or the only factor to consider. I'm not sure, and I'm going to get your answer on that.
I'd like to use an analogy. Back 50 years ago, when I was a very young child, when an automobile mechanic wanted to fix a car they would do so almost exclusively by manual means. Today, 50 years later, you bring your car into the shop and they have all of these electronic diagnostic tools. In many cases it takes much less time to figure out what's wrong with the car and to fix it.
Somehow the impression that's been left by the opposition members at this table is that the only thing that drives safety management levels is the number of bodies we've got employed. First of all, Mr. Minister, you and your staff members have been saying very clearly that in fact the number of inspectors has not gone down. But even if it had, I'd like you to answer whether or not that is the sole factor we should consider when we're determining air safety in our country.
:
The answer is that the changes we're proposing will greatly improve aviation safety in the country. Safety management systems, I've said it before, were put in place to add an additional, an extra—I don't know how to say it differently—layer of regulations above and beyond the existing regulations. This is the issue that's at hand.
We are not, I repeat, taking away from what is already there. We have indicated we are going to correct attrition. We have indicated that, yes, we have the same level and the same number of people carrying out inspection. We are looking at amendments to reassure the committee members to that effect. We've got the Canadian pilots association, who welcomed SMS. The airline industry officials have come here and they've welcomed the safety management systems that are put in place.
The accident rate continues on a downward trend, and it's expected that SMS will further reduce the accident rate. We're committed not only to maintaining, Mr. Fast, but also improving upon the record, and accident prevention continues to be the primary focus of Transport Canada's safety efforts. That's the long and the short of it.
:
Good afternoon, Minister. I'm pleased that you and your deputy are here with us today.
As members of Parliament, we need to look at the entire issue of safety. The idea is not to oppose a bill just for the sake of opposing it. Being involved in drafting a bill enables us to convince people that it is the right thing to do.
I am going to be speaking again about the designated organizations that will be responsible for most safety procedures. It has been demonstrated that with the main carriers, the system was effective, and the ICAO report is along these lines. However, since this system was introduced, your inspectors have been checking and evaluating the systems that have been implemented rather than doing the inspections themselves. The fact that designated organizations establish safety management systems for other carriers will mean that inspections by our federal inspectors will be replaced by inspections carried out by these designated organizations.
Personally, I do not find that reassuring. On the contrary, I am very concerned that fewer inspectors will be required and that their job will be to check on the systems established by a small validation company. I am very concerned about that. I would like you to tell me whether you are still determined to set up these designated organizations?
:
Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.
Thank you very much, Minister Cannon, for coming forward once again today to help answer some questions on .
Hopefully this committee can continue to work together in the great progress that we have made. Soon we can be moving into clause-by-clause on Bill C-6, so that we can get on to some other important issues, like shippers' issues, that we're all aware of.
Minister Cannon, one of the storylines that we've really gotten in this committee from the start, with our witnesses, has been an endorsement of the safety management system and overlaying that on our current regulatory system.
In fact I can't recall a witness who hasn't come forward and said that safety management systems are great in theory. In fact, while we're reading quotes into the record, I would like to read a quote from Captain Dan Adamus of the Air Line Pilots Association:
Putting “Safety Management Systems” in place at aviation companies regulated and certified by Transport Canada would be an extremely promising step forward in safeguarding Canada's passengers, crew, and cargo. If it is passed, Bill C-6 would set the stage for a quantum leap in safety that will help detect safety threats long before accidents occur. ALPA strongly urges the Parliament to pass this important legislation.
Now, also Judge Moshansky, who was here, talked about SMS and the importance it would have. He actually claimed to have been one of the founders to start the conversation around SMS. Everybody is clearly in favour of SMS, as long as the current regulatory system and process remains in place. And from conversations with you and the department, I believe that those systems are not only going to stay in place, they're going to get a little bit stricter.
I would like to give you the opportunity to set the record straight for this committee on what we will be doing with the existing regulatory system.
:
Thank you for your question. Once again, I think it's an opportunity to be able to reassure everybody around this table that our objective is not to walk away from our responsibility. Our objective is not to deregulate.
Once again, the Government of Canada, through its legislation, and Transport Canada regulate this sector. This is an umbrella approach. It is another tier, another layer of security and safety that is being put forward.
When I was first introduced to this system, I asked exactly the same questions as a lot of the colleagues here around the table, and I wanted to know whether or not this was diminishing Canada's ability and Transport Canada's ability to perfectly regulate the industry and regulate it in terms of safety. We—or at the very least, I—came to a conclusion. When we have somebody who is working on a manufacturer's level and who is looking at the way they're going forward in terms of assembling a plane, when we have somebody who is with a recognized and well-known airline association, who says they are extremely conscious of the role they play with their pilots and with the industry, and when they are able to come forward and issue certificates, people take this extremely seriously. I think that at the end of the day, we have to be able to have confidence in the men and women who do this as a job. This is their daily bread, and they're extremely not only conscious but sensible, sensitized to these important issues. So we're not trying to walk away from our responsibilities.
I mentioned before in French that Transport Canada is a world leader in aviation safety. We've always been a world leader. We do not want to walk away from that. We still want to maintain our number one position. If we need to bring forward amendments that are going to reassure the members of this committee, we will do so, but our intention is to continue with the progress that we've established over the last number of years. It's not a question of being partisan or non-partisan. We're looking at the way Canada has made progressive and important moves in the past, and we want to be able to support and sustain that.
So any idea of walking away from that responsibility would be contrary to what the principles are and what the objective of this piece of legislation is.
I had hoped to get a chance to ask the minister this question.
I noticed one of the key amendments or proposals outlined in this bill, which I gather is really an updated version of Bill C-62, under the previous government's introduction. One of things that I noticed in the outline, and it was mentioned in the discussion, was the provision to encourage employees of Canadian airlines to report safety concerns voluntarily, without fear of legal or disciplinary action.
On the question of the safety management system and the issue of getting employees to be able to report things in an open or protected way, when we originally started discussing this, I was somewhat impressed with some of the proposals under the SMS, safety management system, for the airline industry.
We had the experience of the reports that came through on the railway. Mr. Grégoire, I guess this would be overlapping your area. These two gentlemen specifically focus on the airline, and I'm going to keep to that.
The connection was that in the safety audit we had done and the safety management system appraisal we had done on CN's operations in rail safety, it indicated that although a safety management system was supposedly in place, one that was supported and advocated by management or even extolled by management, it wasn't necessarily enforced and followed through on. There was a disconnect between management and the employees, the supervisors and the mainline employees. It was something that was in fact reported in the audit and in those reports as being a serious flaw.
In fact, there were instances when employees almost lived in a culture of fear. If they reported things too often, they would be penalized in promotion, even to the extent of being able to maintain their jobs. That concerned me. It concerns me coming back now to and the proposals.
What do you see as being able to prevent the kind of problem we saw for CN, with its safety management system and the ability of employees to feel they were able to do their jobs and report the deficiencies? How do you see it being covered in the case of what's being proposed here?
:
What is being proposed here is enforceable. There are a number of provisions in that would make the situation quite different from what it is in rail.
The Railway Safety Act does not provide for very stringent enforcement action. For instance, there are no monetary penalties, and there's no way to lift an operating certificate. The Railway Safety Act is under review now, and we'll have the chance to bring forward all the amendments we wish.
To come back to aviation, if a similar situation occurred in aviation, our inspectors, who would be in the numbers we discussed, would go in. But rather than do the inspection in the way they are doing it today or in the way they used to do it, they would specifically look at a detailed analysis of the safety management system. On the basis of the report, it would indicate that the SMS is not well implemented, and a number of enforcement actions could be taken, or we could decide to go in to do inspections and audits in the usual manner.
All the options are open, and we could lift a certificate or set a huge fine. You will have noticed that in we are proposing to significantly increase the fines we would be able to set for airlines. All of those avenues and enforcement tools could be used.
It is fundamental in the SMS culture we want to implement that employees must report. It's a reporting culture. We really want to encourage everybody to report problems before they arise and before they become more serious problems. We think it's the best way to improve safety.
But if an employee is fired the first time he makes such a report, the system obviously doesn't work and must be fixed. It wouldn't meet the intent of the actual regulation, but we have all the provisions to address the problem.
Thank you to our witnesses for appearing today.
I've been listening to the testimony on for a while here. Bill C-6, as a bill, is no surprise. What surprises me are the last-minute allegations that have been coming in the last couple of weeks or so.
was preceded by . We already heard that in the last Parliament. As I understand it, there were pretty lengthy consultations prior to Bill C-62 as well, before it was introduced. No one raised concerns during that whole process about the inspectorate or the safety issues. The previous government, now the official opposition, didn't raise any caution flags.
As somebody listening to this and following this along and participating in moving forward, I'm now confronted with hearing the “ifs” or the “might haves” or the “could” or “possibly”. I'm still waiting for some solid evidence that somehow SMS is either going to be a bad thing or that Transport Canada's not fulfilling its obligations, and I'm not hearing that.
SMS—and I've said this before to the committee—is not theory in Canada; it's actually in practice. We have something to look at, at least the beginning of a track record on that. Are we teaching others around the world about SMS? Are we showing others how SMS works? Can you tell us who? What other countries are learning from our experience? Because we have experience in it now; it may not be a lot, but we have experience in it now. Can you enlighten us a bit on that?
:
Yes. Everybody is stuck in the same situation as we were a few years ago; that is, the rates of accidents have been going down significantly, as the minister mentioned, since the sixties, but in the last five to ten years or so, or since the mid-nineties, the rates of accidents have been virtually flat. Everybody is concerned that if the traffic picks up again significantly, the number of accidents will increase, because the rate will not have changed.
So the question was this. As everybody is for more safety, what can we do to reduce the rates? The answer was risk management and safety management systems.
We did not invent this. This started in the chemical industry after the Bhopal accident in India. This is really where the SMS concept was started, and it was implemented with great success in the chemical plants around the world. So we said, why don't we move into implementing this in aviation, in rail, and perhaps in other modes, and that's precisely what we're doing.
Given our experience over the last few years, yes, a number of countries are quite impressed and interested in what we're doing to improve safety, and they are calling upon our experts to deliver courses. We cannot be everywhere, but we are going where it makes a difference. We have attended and given courses in China, for instance, where you have the largest volume of growing aviation industry.
I don't know about other countries.
:
I can add a few more. Certainly we have a policy of the western hemisphere first, plus specific areas in ICAO that we support with our limited resources. What we're talking about there is an aid program called COSCAP, which operates out of Beijing. It has both Koreas, and Manchuria in China, in it. So we've been focusing there.
As Marc indicated, China is looking for a way to cope with it, with around 20% growth, and they're implementing it. In fact, I'll be going there again at the end of May to participate in an SMS workshop with their carriers.
We've done the same thing in providing courses for Colombia most recently through that GEASA, the Group of Experts on Aviation Safety, Security and Assistance, under the WHTI, Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative. We're working closely with the FAA, now that they're in the process of putting together their package to meet the ICAO requirement. And of course we've been working hand-in-glove with ICAO on this for many years now. Almost every week there's an official request for us to participate in some program or other around the world, now that ICAO has made it their future framework. Again, we do what we can.
:
Frankly, I'm not hoping, but can give you examples from preliminary implementation. In fact, this is not full implementation yet.
Companies who are embarking on this path can expect somewhere in the order of a 400% to 500% increase in reports. Assuming they follow up these appropriately—in other words, determine what the causes are and put appropriate corrective measures in place—we've seen a 60% reduction in occurrence reports. An occurrence report is for somebody who has actually been hurt, metal that's been bent, property that's been damaged and money that's been lost.
So that's the type of preliminary data we're starting to see in our industry already, and the system is not anywhere close to being mature.
I think you heard a couple of examples from ALPA, in terms of exactly what they're seeing, such as a bunch of data that doesn't make any sense, with incidents repeating—minor though they are—with indications of something more important. And when you go back there with all of that information, including potential violations, or potentially where someone has made an error, you fix those things before the error becomes fatal.
So again, the preliminary data is already there; it's not a speculation. Where it's implemented correctly and appropriately, we're seeing results already.
I'm sure that the honourable member opposite, Mr. Watson, had no intention of indicating that the opposition in the last Parliament wasn't doing its job when he complimented us on actually doing today what wasn't being done then. But that wasn't his intention, and I'm sure it's nobody's intention around the table to take words out of context.
But I didn't have an opportunity to remind the minister, as I'm sure you as the senior staff will, that Judge Moshansky, in a response to a question by Mr. Jean regarding whether if they'd had the SMS they were proposing—and I quote him—“plus the existing regulatory oversight, the incident at Dryden would not have taken place”. Of course, Judge Moshansky said that it's very unlikely it would have.
There's been a campaign, I think, of trying to get at where this SMS fits into the spectrum of trying to do the right thing for Canadian safety, and people are asking some very pertinent questions. I indicated earlier that I had a letter here from DaxAir that was to the attention of David Bayliss, acting regional director, civil aviation. I think you probably have that.
If you'll permit, I'll just read a couple of lines in here, and I think when you read it you'll understand why some of us have to ask some of those very tough questions. It's not an issue about whether it's bodies that count and moneys that count, or whether the new computer systems give you a sense of greater safety. Maybe Mr. Reinhardt is right, you're trying to build a reporting culture. But a reporting culture without the operational audit that actually has teeth causes people some concern. I know that if I'm travelling at 5,000 feet or 35,000 feet, I don't want to be comforted just by the fact that there is a reporting culture.
Here's what DaxAir has to say, and I hope you'll be able to respond:
Transport Canada senior management are becoming rather free and careless with their use of statistics to justify our safety record and Canada's supposed “safest aviation system in the world” status. —
Existing reports show operator deficiencies, which are not being followed up with enforcement action. —
Many of your own inspectors know where the problems lie; yet they do nothing.
What's the value of a reporting culture if the regulator does nothing when the operational issues are raised and when non-compliance is underscored with impunity?
Then just some more:
You speak of more in depth oversight, yet in conflict with your promises, inspectors are being retired without replacement, training budgets cut and the national audit program cancelled.
DaxAir actually signs this letter.
Monsieur Grégoire, you and I had a bit of an exchange earlier. These are people who are in the business, and they're saying, “Are you trusting us to do the job that you're not doing yourselves?” That's really what they're saying.
They finish off with:
Based on our experience to date, change does not appear to be forthcoming from within Transport Canada.
You have to expect that whether it's members of the loyal opposition or others, we have to ask the tough questions.
So Mr. Reinhardt, Mr. Preuss, Mr. Grégoire, we asked this before. Is the SMS stand alone, without continued inspectorate, without the continuation of a very rigorous regulatory and consequential program, a valid way to go?
With respect, I'll just go back to the beginning of your question, Mr. Volpe. Regarding DaxAir, first of all, this is a level carrier that is not part of the national audit program and they're not governed by SMS. That's the first thing.
With respect to taking enforcement action against other carriers that may have been observed by DaxAir carrying out activities that were untoward, we asked DaxAir to provide us with evidence, because like anybody else, when we go to the tribunal, when we go to court, we need evidence. Our inspectors need something to use, and we were not provided with that evidence. So absent evidence, we cannot go to the aviation tribunal with those cases. We have conducted enhanced surveillance there.
With respect to the national audit program, I'm happy to cover this, because this is only covering six or seven carriers, bigger carriers. That's it. All the others are not under the national audit program. When the national audit program was cancelled, there were other staff instructions given. Mr. Preuss showed you the one-inch thick document there, but there is more than that. We have established program validation. We have established assessment. People who are actually monitoring the establishment of SMS are there with the certificate holders more than they were ever there before. Before, we had a frequency of inspection policy stating what the frequency of inspection would be concerning that type of carrier, depending on the nature and risk of the operation. We still have this under the implementation of SMS. We have not changed that.
When people do validation, do not think they're just sitting at their desk looking at papers. Yes, they will start by looking at papers regarding systems, but then they'll travel on site. I have all the staff instructions there, and I could quote for you what they have to do to validate on site.
This is more than we used to do under the old audit program.
:
Do you mean what I meant by low risk? I'll give you an example of what I meant, and there are probably a few of them out there.
Right now, if you and I decide we are going to get into the ultralight business, we would find a relatively benign regulatory environment. In other words, we haven't taken the initiative to put in a firm, elaborate regulatory system, because frankly, it is a low-risk area. However, the growth in that area would indicate to us that if there's anything we can do to put the ultralight operators on a more professional basis, we should do that. One way to do that is to encourage an organization out there to take it upon itself to develop some standards they can work with, to develop some procedures, to perhaps even create a regulatory framework wherein they can control some of the activity. Because right now it's not regulated.
You would find the same, perhaps, in the unmanned vehicles area. You could find it in the air applicators in this country, the ones that are in there doing it.
:
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Justice Moshansky, the pilots, the inspectors and the ICAO are in favour of the SMS. I am too. The only problem is that even the ICAO expects there will be adequate regulatory oversights. That is where we disagree.
Mr. Grégoire, I even had an opportunity to ask you at a committee meeting whether you could guarantee that there had been no budget cuts for pilot training. For two years now, I have been getting complaints from pilots whose hours of training have been reduced. I will tell you quite humbly that I thought this was a labour relations matter. I sometimes have trouble getting involved in labour relations issues. After two years, I realized that they were right: the nature of their work has been changed by the introduction of the Safety Management System.
The fact remains that for small companies such as DaxAir Inc., for example, pilots must be familiar with these systems. I agree with Mr. Jean that issues having to do with bolts will be easier with the SMS. However, there are some companies I cannot trust. I cannot trust new companies that will only be around for a year or two and which, for various reasons, because of a lack of money, even if they have a good SMS—The employees of companies of this type might be reluctant to file complaints, because they fear they will not get paid at the end of the week.
There must be an inspection system that will allow for random checks of any company at any time to see whether everything is in order. We should not have to wait one, two or three years—depending on the schedule you will introduce—before checking the SMS system. This is a service we need. And the ICAO has said the same thing.
After hearing Mr. Preuss, the pilots told us that by 2013, their numbers will be reduced by half. Today, you tell me that will not happen. Do you have any budget forecasts? As a manager, have you analyzed how much money you will need over the next five years to replace the pilots, or are you going to wait until the budget is introduced to tell us that?
:
This is not about beliefs. I am very uncomfortable hearing officials who are supposed to be introducing effective safety systems talk about beliefs. I am very disturbed when I hear people say that they believe something when the data we have demonstrates that the opposite is true.
[English]
I'd like to come back to the issue of the 100 or more files of serious safety violations that were closed with no further action to be taken. Previous to that, the national audit program had been killed.
Our concern, of course, is that we avoid the kind of carnage we're seeing on the railways. For members of this committee to say there's no evidence as long as there are no bodies is completely inappropriate. We've seen what happened in the railway industry, and we want to avoid the same thing happening with the airlines.
So we had 100 or more files of serious safety violations, and they were closed. The national audit program was axed, so there is no way of following up with those companies. My question is around the safety files. How many aircraft were impacted by this, and how has it been tracked by Transport Canada after the files were closed?
:
First of all, I can tell you that I'm answering your questions in good faith. I already answered a question earlier, telling you that the files were not closed. They were transferred to other inspectors, under the SMS system to determine whether there were corrective actions taken by those companies to ensure that the problem would not reoccur. That's what they did.
We have a database of old enforcement cases. In that database, yes, the files were closed. Then it was transferred to other inspectors, under the SMS policy, to determine whether there were corrective measures.
Mr. Julian, I'm in good faith. I've told you twice. I don't know what more to tell you. We did not close them. There is CAD 39 published on the web, which you can view. It has the policy, the procedures, and a bridging document explaining the transition on enforcement.
Everything was open and transparent, and they were not closed. The national audit program was cancelled. That was an administrative constraint. The way we did big audits in the past was to call upon the regions and HQ to work together. We've decided to eliminate that, because it was easier to implement SMS and ensure safety by eliminating this and putting more resources through the transition process.
There were staff instructions given. As I told you, we're in good faith. We're telling you that we have more safety oversight now, through the establishment of SMS, than we had ever before through the old NAP, and the NAP is only for six or seven carriers.
I don't know where you got your facts, but I'm giving you the straight goods, the facts in the proper context, in which you should have gotten them when you got them.
:
I will look forward to getting each and every one of those files brought forward to committee, because we are very concerned about this, as you can imagine.
We're also concerned about the fact that we are not complying with ICAO requirements, and that is something that's very clear and has come out with testimony.
My next question isfor Mr. Preuss, because we weren't able to ask this last time you came forward, Mr. Preuss.
I was interested in knowing under which authority, in December 2005, while all of us around the table were engaged in a federal election campaign, an authorization—civil aviation directive 39—was put out. As well, at that time, the risk assessment for the reduction of regulatory audit activity during SMS implementation was done.
This was in December 2005. It was an issue, of course, that we were concerned about in this committee during the last Parliament, so I am very concerned about an agenda that seemed to be pushed forward during an election campaign.
:
Mr. Chair, I never cease to be amazed at Mr. Julian's sense of imagination. Now we're dealing with conspiracy theories.
We need to get back to the facts. What's the evidence?
I'd like to back to Mr. Moshansky's evidence. Based on what you've told us here today, it appears that he may have been speaking under a misunderstanding of the facts.
First of all, regarding the national audit program, he decried the fact that it had been cancelled, but all of you have confirmed that indeed, the national audit program was replaced with a process that is even more rigorous and that is going to lead to improved safety.
The second aspect is still this issue of the 1,400 inspectors we supposedly had back in the late 1980s, of which there are now 873. You addressed that briefly earlier, but I'd like you to touch on that again. Exactly what happened to all of those supposed inspectors that have been let go or have retired and not been replaced?
:
First of all, this 1,400 number includes three kinds of inspectors. They include inspector pilots, as referred to by Mr. Laframboise; they include technical inspectors, TIs; and they include engineers. In the early 1990s, the time Judge Moshansky referred to, or at the time when we had 1,400, the 1,400 were the 1,400 inspectors in Transport Canada. Since then, we have transferred the air navigation system to Nav Canada. A number of people, especially the civil aviation inspectors who flew aircraft, went to Nav Canada and continued to do the work they were doing, but that significantly reduced the 1,400 number.
Another big bunch of people counted are still with us, but they're not counted in the 866 because they work under another one of my organizations, the aircraft services organization located at the airport. These people teach the inspectors how to fly and they teach them how to do maintenance on the aircraft. So these people are still with Transport Canada, but they're located elsewhere in the organization.
So the core number of 866 we're talking about now, I could say without hesitation, was smaller in the nineties, because since the mid-nineties we have added. I know because I was the original director of civil aviation in the Quebec region, and I saw the number of inspectors I had increase between 1994 and 1997 and then further increase. When I took charge of civil aviation, I had about 130 inspectors in the Quebec region. When I left, I had 174 employees in total, so I had seen an increase.
The same thing occurred elsewhere, because after the Moshansky inquiry, the government decided to allocate additional resources to the regulatory program, as it was called before.
:
I want to thank Mr. Fast for attending one of my creative language classes.
Mr. Chairman, I have two very brief comments.
First of all, Monsieur Grégoire, the numbers you've given and the historical pattern of what has happened in the department might have been a very constructive way to start the hearing earlier. I don't mean to reprimand you on this, but it's certainly a little bit more instructive, now that we're closing off the meeting, than it was at the very beginning, because you're tracing for us where people are and what they do.
I'm looking forward to the report that you want to give, not only to Mr. Fast but I guess to all committee members.
Secondly, I remain a little bit confounded by the use of the word “closed”. Mr. Reinhardt, with all due respect—and this is why I think my colleagues and I have a little bit of doubt in our minds—on two separate occasions in answering questions to Mr. Julian, earlier in the afternoon and just a few minutes ago, you said that the files were not closed, and then you proceeded to say that the files were closed.
On the first occasion, I think it was Mr. Preuss who talked about files having been closed. On both occasions, I asked my colleague seated beside me whether I was hearing things or whether the word “closed” actually meant what I thought it meant in English.
I know that you gave a detailed explanation, and I compliment you on it. But you'll forgive parliamentarians and legislators for the confusion that arises when in one breath you say the files are not closed but are transferred for this kind of attention, and then you finish off by saying that when a file is closed, it goes someplace else.
The only place a file that's closed goes in my office is the shredder.