:
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. It's a great pleasure to be here.
Mr. Stringham and I will be splitting the time. It's partly because Mr. Stringham, as an engineer with an MBA, spent a significant part of this career working for Syncrude. He has personal experience that I think will be invaluable to the members prior to their trip to the north.
We have sent you written material, and we're not going to go through that. We'll spare you the PowerPoint presentations, but we did circulate those, and we will be referring to some of the charts as we go through them.
We're delighted to be here.
Mr. Chairman, my understanding is that the committee would like us to focus on the economic aspects, but we're obviously quite prepared and would be delighted to talk about any part of the operation you would find useful.
Mr. Cullen, if you'd like, we can even answer your water question. But I guess I should wait until you ask it.
In the first place, I think it is important to put the oil sands story into context. It is part, and only part, of a much larger industry.
This year we expect to see the industry invest about $47 billion in Canada. Payments directly to governments, which Mr. Stringham will talk about to some degree of detail, will be about $27 billion. We represent about 25% of the private sector investment and about 30% of the value on the Toronto Stock Exchange. Total employment across all the provinces and territories approaches half a million Canadians.
But on those numbers, I think it's important to understand that of the $47 billion, $11 billion to $12 billion is in the oil sands. There is a very robust and conventional oil and gas industry in western Canada that will invest somewhere in the area of $30 billion to $35 billion a year.
When you talk about the oil sands, I think it's important to keep in context that the energy economy is far more than that. We've given you a chart that shows where the money is being spent.
The other fundamental that's important to understand about our industry is that people always refer to west Texas crude. Over the last year or so, you've heard numbers of $50 to $70. Fifty percent of our production here in Canada is heavy oil or super heavy oil, which is bitumen, and receives half or less than half of the prices of west Texas intermediate.
Certainly, Mr. Trost is aware of the differential issues in the heavy oil. As we go through some of this conversation, I think it's important to remember that not all oil is created equally.
To give you an idea, over the past year, revenue in the industry has approached $100 billion. But where does the money go? Approximately 45% of it is re-invested in capital that goes directly back into Canada, and we'll talk a little about where that shows up. Twenty-two percent of it is operating costs; that refers to those hundreds of thousands of Canadians who are working. Twenty-nine percent goes to royalties and taxes, including land sales, which is an important factor, and about 4% is returned to the public in terms of distribution to shareholders, unit holders, and other forums.
As you can see, Mr. Chairman, it is a very big part of the economy. Mr. Stringham will touch on a number of the specific aspects, and then I'll close.
I'm going to continue going through the slides we've handed out and give you a little more background in preparation for your trip to Fort McMurray. This is just background material, so I'm going to go very quickly. If you have questions, I'd be happy to answer them.
As you know, the size of the oil sands resource is very large. We are one of the top ten countries in the world producing oil, and right now we're number eight. With the growth in the oil sands we're going to become number four, or perhaps number three, depending on what happens in other countries. I think the important point shown on that slide is that of the top ten oil producing countries in the world, there are only three that can grow--the rest of them are either flat to declining--and they include Venezuela, Saudi Arabia, and Canada. It places a very strong international interest on the development of this oil to meet world as well as Canadian needs.
In looking at that, we have 175 billion barrels of oil in reserves. To explain that number, because there are many different numbers out there, that is how much oil is recoverable at today's economics, using a forecast of prices and today's technology. If either of those change, there could be more that's available, but the 175 billion barrels really today is over 150 years' worth of reserves that can be developed going forward, even at the higher forecasted production rates that we see coming on.
We've also included in here a list of the spending and a list of all the oil sands projects. In particular, you can see these projects are phased. It's not all built upfront in one project. They actually build it over time to try to spread out the labour and the concerns associated with infrastructure and other things. It also shows how many upgraders there are. These take the very thick oil that's like toothpaste or molasses and convert it into light oil, which is light like water or cooking oil. This upgrading process is being done in Canada. There are about another 14 that have been announced to go ahead, or another $43 billion worth of investment in that upgrading process to get it into a nice light oil.
When you put that all together, what I want to show on this graph on page 12 is really the forecast for where we see oil sands going. You can see that today we're at a million barrels a day. We're going to be expanding that with the projects that are going forward--and this is not everything that has been announced, but this is what we think is reasonably accomplished--and it will reach 3.5 million barrels a day by 2015. If you put a constraint on that to say, as the market is speaking, we don't have enough labour, or if we don't have enough infrastructure through pipelines or other things, it will probably drop down below that number, so we've put on here our constrained case line as well. It shows it going from one million barrels a day to about three million barrels a day, instead of 3.5 million.
The very important point on this chart is that the infrastructure and the spending that is going to bring that production on between now and 2010 is already being spent. It takes that long to get those projects on. Therefore, what we're talking about is that there is some variability in the projects post-2010, but up to that point in time they're already spending that money and it will be coming on.
The next couple of charts talk about the economics, in case you had questions on how much it costs to develop the oil sands. The National Energy Board appeared here, so I won't repeat them. They did explain it. Here's the data that shows if you're creating the heavy oil that's like toothpaste or molasses, it costs you somewhere between $10 and $20 U.S. per barrel. If you upgrade it into the nice light sweet oil, then it costs you somewhere in the $30 to $35 range. That was done in 2003.
The next chart shows that the capital costs for doing this, in particular steel costs, have gone up significantly since 2003. You can see that what used to cost about $3.3 billion for a 100,000-barrel-a-day project now costs closer to $6 billion or $10 billion. That's because the world price of steel is going up significantly and quickly. That is not a Canada-only issue, but a world issue, with construction happening around the world and the demand for steel, whereas the labour issue, which is on the next two charts, is really more of a North American issue in the constraints for labour going forward.
I want to explain these two labour charts. One of them looks like a Batman mask, so you understand which chart I'm on. Really, that was last year's view of how much labour was going to be required. You can see they've just published the new version of this year's view, and you can notice the difference. It's being pushed off into the future. The market is pushing some of these projects to spread themselves out over longer periods of time. In other words, they are slowing down somewhat because of the labour constraint, which leads us back to that constrained development going forward. It is also increasing in height. Therefore, there's going to be more required, but more into the future as we go forward. One of the big constraints and concerns we have for developing oil sands is the availability of labour as we go forward.
That's all background.
The reason we were asked to come here is to talk more about what's going on with the royalty side of the system, which is administered by the province, as well as the tax side of the system as it affects the oil sands in particular. I've put some charts together to educate on what elements of royalty and tax are affecting us right now.
The first chart shows that the royalty system comes because the province owns the resource under the Constitution, and as an owner they charge a royalty on that. They have a two-part royalty system that collects money up front before anyone starts anything by selling the rights to win the lease and to develop the lease. They put that up for auction; it's bid on--and those bid prices have been going up dramatically recently--and that collects the economic rent up front.
Then, once a project starts producing, they also collect a royalty on the production. So there are those two parts. The prices going up and down are adjusted in both of those mechanisms. It's like a shock absorber. It actually goes up and down very quickly.
The diagram entitled “Oil Sands Royalty Increases with Higher Prices” shows what happens to a project and the royalty from it when prices go up.
Two things happen. First, it has a 1% royalty until they've recovered their capital cost. That time period shrinks because they recover their capital, the money they have spent, faster. Also the amount of royalty goes up, so they get a twofold benefit: a shorter period at 1% and a larger amount of 25%. The royalty system is very complex, and I'd be glad to describe more details.
On the next chart I've laid down the different elements of the royalty system: what happens during pre-payout royalty, when that payout occurs, what the post-payout royalty of 25% is, what costs are allowed to be deducted in that royalty, and whether there are any uplifts or allowances for overhead. A number of different things go into that; we can discuss that if you like, but those are the basic elements of the royalty regime.
One question that has been asked recently is whether these projects ever reach payout, or do they just stay at the 1% royalty regime? The chart on the next slide shows that 33 of the 65 projects have already achieved that payout and are paying the higher royalty as they go forward. You can see it has dramatically increased recently over the last couple of years. As the prices have been higher, those payouts happen faster, so you've seen the prices and the royalties collected from oil sands this year go to a high of $2.5 billion just for the production royalty, plus another approximately $1.6 billion for the bonus bids or the payments for the leases to get access to it. So it's a total of about $4 billion, compared to under $1 billion a couple of years ago.
When you look at the oil sands royalty regime, you must look at it on the life of the project from the beginning to the end, because it's meant to collect a certain amount of economic rent over the whole life, not in any particular year. That's the difference between that and conventional oil royalties, which you can actually look at on a month-to-month basis as it moves up and down. The oil sands royalty is more project-based; it's similar to what they have in the Canada lands process.
I will switch now from that to what I call “government take”. Really it's a combination of royalty and taxes. Someone would ask how this competes or compares with other places in the world. That's really what you want to see--how reasonable is the fiscal system associated with the oil sands? Many other countries in the world do not have, or have a different combination of, royalties and taxes, so you really need to put the two of those together to try to get an equal comparison between countries.
What I've described here is just what I call “government take”, which includes the royalties, the lease bids, and the taxes. A diagram on slide 20 shows the sharing of the net revenue that comes out of an oil sands project. You can see that for the first eight years a company is investing money into the ground to develop an oil sands project. You can see they're spending what we call in this diagram “project capital”. That can be $1 billion to $10 billion, depending on the size of the project.
They reach a point at which they're actually starting to produce oil. That's when the lower 1% royalty kicks in. Then, when they've recovered their capital--so if they spent $5 billion, when the revenues equal $5 billion coming back--they are allowed to hit that payout when the larger royalty kicks in, and that's the point at which taxation kicks in as well. If you add those together, you can see that over the life of the project, if you put in the project money--the share the project gets out of this--they get back about 51% of the net revenues, which is revenue minus cost.
The governments take about 49%, so it's very close to a 50-50 sharing between the industry and all levels of government when it comes to the net revenues of the oil sands project.
That's how it works. Is that fair?
We've looked at an external consultant named Pedro Van Meurs. He looks at world fiscal systems. He compared 324 different oil fiscal systems around the world. I've listed a number of them here; we can certainly provide to you the list of all 324, but here's the list of systems, many of which our companies are competing with for capital. Number one is the one that collects the least government take, and number 324 is the one that collects the most. You can see that there's the U.K., Kazakhstan, Brazil, Alberta third tier--which is just heavy oil in Alberta--the gulf coast, and then at number 79, the Alberta oil sands. You can see it's kind of near that 100 mark out of the 300. If you look at some of the others, Alaska is right next to it at 89; Australia is at 99. You get down to Alberta, and if they don't have the royalty tax credit, which was eliminated, they drop to about 209. Norway is down at 257, so taking the most out of it as they go forward.
Another way to look at it for competitiveness internationally is to look at what the returns are that companies are earning to develop oil and gas around the world. So the next chart shows you what companies are earning in Asia-Pacific, South and Central America, Africa--and you can see that Canada is actually the lowest of those, although this 2005 report says that was during a time of a lot of oil sands spending. They would expect that once you get through that spending phase, the returns would come back closer to where they are in the U.S., but still fairly near the bottom quartile of the curve as it goes forward.
That's kind of an explanation of the royalty, and I'll get into the tax system a little bit later.
The next four charts talk about the CERI study. I know you've had witnesses before you from CERI talking about the benefits that come to the Canadian public as well as the industry and the manufacturers. The one thing that came out in a recent report that I saw from Statistics Canada that was quite interesting was that with the growth in the oil sands and the oil and gas investment, Alberta is now actually buying more products from Ontario and Quebec than Quebec and Ontario is buying from Alberta. So it's actually a net flow of products and services from Ontario and Quebec into Alberta, as they consume the goods that are produced in eastern Canada.
It really is becoming a much more Canadian industry. Even though the resource is located in Alberta, the goods and services and equipment are coming from all over Canada.
The last one I want to talk about is the tax system, and to really put it in context as to how the tax system applies to the oil sands industry. This is not the oil and gas industry in total. It starts on slide 29, which is right near the end, and it shows that the current income tax rate today is 23% for the oil and gas industry; it's 21% for all other industries. That's being phased in, and we're almost down to the same rate. Next year we will be at the same rate.
In addition, there was a concept called the resource allowance, which was simply a substitute for deductibility of provincial royalties. That's being phased out next year as well. For the oil sands and all other mines, there is a concept called accelerated capital cost allowance, which I'm sure you've heard about. I'll go into a little more detail, but that concept is really something that applies to all mines and to some other sectors in the industry today. But it's somewhat offset by another tax provision called the “available for use” rule.
The “available for use” rule says you can't deduct the cost you spend until it's available to be used. Well, in the oil sands, you're spending dollars for almost five years, sometimes six years, before you actually start producing anything. So you won't be able to deduct any of those costs until it's available for use, or a maximum of three years. The concept of the accelerated capital cost allowance was actually married with the “available for use” rule because they offset each other going forward.
Finally, there has been some question about the investment tax credit issue. There are no longer any investment tax credits, except for Atlantic Canada, and they apply there to a broad spectrum of industries. It's not dedicated only to oil sands or oil and gas.
The last one I really want to talk about is the accelerated capital cost allowance. Since there are a lot of questions about it, I think it is important to understand how it works. Accelerated capital cost allowance is really the deduction of the capital costs you're spending, for tax purposes. In other words, if you spend $5 billion in capital to build an oil sands plant, you're allowed to deduct that. The accelerated capital cost allowance allows you to deduct it as soon as you have revenue from your mine, rather than spreading it out over the life of the mine. So there's a time value of money associated with having the earlier deduction rather than later, but it's the exact same deduction. If you spend $5 billion, all you're allowed to deduct is $5 billion. There's no increase, no uplift, no subsidy. It's simply that you get to deduct it when the revenue arrives.
The limitation on that is that you can only deduct it against the revenue that comes from that mine. In most other tax situations you're allowed to take that deduction to your whole company. Accelerated capital cost allowance is limited only to that one mine, and that mine has to be a major expansion. It has to be greater than 5% of your revenue. It can't simply be ongoing expenditures. So it's very limited, in that sense, and it's also constrained by the fact that you have this “available for use” rule that says you can't deduct any of it until you start producing, or until at least three years have passed. This means it sits there being not deducted for three years, which is not applicable unless you have a large-scale project that's not producing.
The last part of this is really just looking at the tax deferral side of it. In a tax deferral, you can deduct this earlier than you would otherwise, but I just want to emphasize again that it's not deducting any additional costs. It is the time value of money associated with it.
I think I'll stop there. There is one slide talking about the $1.5 billion in subsidies to the oil and gas industry out there, and several people have talked about that. I go through here and talk about where it came from and how many of the things that are in there have been eliminated already. Resource allowance is going next year. Earned depletion was gone back in 1990. The Syncrude remission order has been gone since 2003, and ITCs were included in that.
The biggest part of that claim that was out there of $1.5 billion in “subsidies” was $1 billion associated with exploration, the writing off of dry holes. When you drill a hole and you don't find anything, you get to deduct that capital. That doesn't really apply to the oil sands at all, except in the very small circumstances of some exploration for the in situ.
The other ones are the ones in the accelerated capital cost allowances I've described.
I realize that's very technical. I apologize for taking the extra time, but I thought I would at least put the information out there, and if you have questions, we can describe it.
:
Thank you very much, to the Chair and the committee, for having me here today.
The approach I'm going to take, still within the context of economic impacts, is a little bit different. The way the Pembina Institute attempts to approach matters of energy production and consumption is perhaps broader, or some would say holistic, in that it tries to marry both the social and environmental costs and benefits to provide an overarching framework for how we can make decisions about energy development in Canada.
As you're all aware, a growing amount of national and international attention is being paid to Canada's oil sands, the development of which has led some to suggest that Canada is an emerging energy superpower. From our perspective, if we continue to pursue development of the oil sands in the business as usual manner, we risk becoming known not as an energy superpower but as a superpolluter.
The development of the oil sands is creating significant environmental challenges of both national and international relevance. How Canada's oil sands are developed, we believe, will serve as a defining test of our nation's commitment to sustainable development--that is, development that balances society's social, environmental, and economic imperatives.
As we've already heard today, in discussions regarding the economic impact of oil sands development, we tend to rely upon traditional economic metrics: capital investment, number of jobs created, contribution to the gross domestic product, tax on royalty revenues, etc. Unfortunately, decisions based solely upon these metrics don't take into account the full cost to society of whether and how we develop these resources--that is, the cost to our air, land, water, climate, and communities. We believe that a 21st century approach to sustainable development requires that the analysis of both the costs and benefits of resource development consider the environmental costs and the liabilities that accrue with that development.
Greg already spoke about the pace of development and the rate at which it is going to continue to grow, looking forward. I'd like to go back and look at what the national oil sands task force projected back in the mid-1990s, where they set what they thought was a very ambitious target of achieving a million barrels per day by 2020. That rate of production was achieved in 2004, 16 years ahead of schedule on the production side. Unfortunately, many of the environmental challenges, which the task force acknowledged, were not overcome in that time period. As a result, we're lagging behind.
Again, to provide some context from an environmental perspective, on the basis of the development in the Athabasca oil sands region between 1965 and 2004, this year, the United Nations environment program identified that region as one of the world's top 100 global hot spots of environmental change. That went from virtually no production to a million barrels today. Imagine, if you will, tripling that production, or increasing it by a factor of five in the coming decades, and I think you would acknowledge that we have some significant environmental challenges to overcome.
My colleague Mary Griffiths will be here next week to speak specifically to some of the water use challenges. There's a long litany of other impacts, whether it's local and transboundary air pollution or destruction of the boreal forest and the reclamation of these oil sands facilities back to boreal forest.
Today what I'd like to focus on, though, given my limited time, is what we believe to be one of the most significant and pressing challenges, and that is curtailing the oil sands contribution to climate change from soaring greenhouse gas pollution.
Presenting on that specific topic of climate change is very topical this week, given the release of Sir Nicholas Stern's report on the economics of climate change, which so clearly and eloquently links the environmental imperative, taking action on climate change, to the economic consequences of failing to do so. His review found that if we fail to act, the overall costs and risks of climate change will be equivalent to losing at least 5% of global GDP each year--now and forever.
In contrast, the costs of action to reduce greenhouse gas emissions to avoid the worst impacts can be limited to around 1% of global GDP per year. We believe that reducing greenhouse gas emissions stands as one of the world's most important economic imperatives, in addition to being an environmental imperative.
As a result of the energy intensity of extracting bitumen from oil sands and then upgrading it to produce the synthetic crude oil that can be shipped to refineries, the volume of greenhouse gas pollution produced on a per barrel basis is approximately three times greater for oil sands, relative to conventional oil production. With significant increases in projected oil sands production, the oil sands have become the fastest-growing source of new greenhouse gas pollution. So in an era in which we are grappling with levelling off our greenhouse gas emissions and beginning to reduce them, we have this one sector that stands alone with a very rapid increase in its emissions. Based on some projections we've undertaken, the oil sands could account for almost half of the projected business as usual growth of greenhouse gas emissions nationally between 2003 and 2010.
As was concluded in Stern's report on the economics of climate change, there is still time to avoid the worst impacts of climate change, if we take strong action now.
In Canada, the most urgent action is required in the oil sands. In the next several years, there will be several oil sands megaprojects that will be undergoing their design, engineering, and construction. As was famously stated by Benjamin Franklin, an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure. It's going to be much cheaper to build the ability to achieve significant greenhouse gas emission reductions and greenhouse gas management into oil sands facilities at the outset, rather than relying upon expensive retrofits in the future.
Just last week, the Pembina Institute released a report entitled, “Carbon Neutral by 2020: A Leadership Opportunity in Canada's Oil Sands”, in which we conducted an analysis of the cost for oil sands producers to achieve carbon-neutral or net-zero greenhouse gas emissions by 2020. While we advocate a number of different approaches to achieving this, including fuel switching and energy efficiency at the site, we chose to focus on two mechanisms: carbon capture and store, and the purchase of greenhouse gas offsets. We found that the cost of achieving carbon-neutral production could range anywhere from about $1.76 U.S. to $13.65 U.S. per barrel. At the lower end, this is comparable to the cost of removing lead from gasoline or reducing the amount of sulphur in diesel. We also believe that the analysis was quite conservative, given that it didn't consider possible sources of revenue associated with enhanced oil recovery using the captured carbon emissions, or the likelihood of cost reductions that would result from improvements in the technology after implementation.
Even in the shorter term, achieving carbon-neutral oil sands production could be cheaper than it would be in 2020, if you look at current offset prices under the Kyoto mechanisms. To purchase Kyoto-compliant emission reductions from real environmental projects today would allow a full emissions offset to occur for about $1 Canadian per barrel or less.
Implementing these solutions is going to require the industry to deviate from business as usual. Beyond just tweaking the current practices, such as energy efficiency and trying to reduce energy intensity, it's going to require that we make step-wise changes. Fortunately, when it comes to the oil and gas industry, they have both the financial resources and the technological know-how to make this happen.
In 2005, the sector achieved an historical record for profits when operating profits reached over $30 billion, an increase of more than 50% from 2004. The industry also boasts a record of technological and performance innovation to overcome both economic and environmental challenges—for example, reductions in the flaring and venting of solution gas in Alberta.
We believe this capacity for innovation must be directed towards overcoming the environmental challenges of oil sands development. As Thomas Homer-Dixon of the Trudeau Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies at the University of Toronto recently noted in an editorial, Canada needs to unleash its capitalist creativity on global warming.
From our perspective, when it comes to unleashing this creativity and innovation, the Government of Canada has an important role. Our markets exist within a framework of laws, regulations, and institutions that is crafted and implemented by the government. With the failure of corporate volunteerism to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, it's clear that legislated emission reductions are required.
Given today's economic theme, rather than discussing that, I'd like to focus on the Government of Canada's fiscal policy as it relates to oil sands, and more specifically the accelerated capital cost allowance that Greg already described.
In a 2000 study, the Commissioner of the Environment and Sustainable Development found that the oil sands received exceptional and preferential tax treatment relative to other forms of energy development. His analysis revealed that the oil sands received a significant tax break because these projects qualify for a 100% accelerated cost allowance. With this provision, a company only pays tax on income from an oil sands operation once it has written off all eligible capital costs.
By way of contrast, conventional oil and natural gas, the industry's peers, qualify for a 25% capital cost allowance.
The federal Department of Finance has estimated that the benefit of this tax concession is between $5 million and $40 million for every $1 billion invested. So given the magnitude of investment currently occurring and projected into the future, this translates into potentially billions in deferred tax revenue.
We've been advocating that the Department of Finance eliminate the accelerated capital cost allowance for oil sands to put oil sands on a level playing field with conventional oil and natural gas. This could be done by creating a new capital cost allowance within the Income Tax Act for oil sands and setting the capital cost allowance at 25%, the same rate that's received by conventional oil and gas.
The money saved by eliminating this preferential tax treatment can help facilitate a transition to more sustainable forms of energy production by providing funds for investments in renewable energy and energy efficiency, or perhaps it could just become more focused in its application to oil sands and apply to environmental technologies, such as carbon capture and storage, that can help us overcome some of the environmental challenges associated with development.
To close, I'd like to note that the world is watching Alberta. On a regular basis I get calls from media from around the world. There is a steady stream of journalists travelling to Fort McMurray to see just how we are developing this very large resource and whether or not it's in keeping with many of the international commitments and the way Canada is viewed and perceived by our international peers.
As a result, we're not going to be judged solely on the amount of money invested or jobs created or profits reaped, but by whether we develop the resource in a manner that ensures a lasting legacy of economic prosperity, a healthy environment, and improved social well-being.
I have focused a little bit more on environment. I certainly can comment a bit more on some of the economic dimensions, including some of the economic challenges in Alberta that are associated with the pace and scale of development, and I'd be happy to do so if you'd like.
Thank you.
I guess I'll begin by commenting on your question about whether or not the pace is sustainable from an economic perspective, a social perspective, and environmentally. Certainly, the conclusion we've drawn is no, it is not, because in each of those three dimensions there are significant consequences and significant impacts to Albertans and also more broadly to Canadians.
To provide an example from the social side of things, we've now had the regional municipality of Wood Buffalo pass a unanimous council decision to oppose any new oil sands projects in that region, not on the grounds that they don't want more development to happen, but because there's such a deficit on the infrastructure and the social services side that these projects simply aren't in the interest of their community, which is really the hub of oil sands development.
The regional health authority is running at about half capacity in terms of the number of total medical staff it would require to service the population of Fort McMurray, not including the shadow population that exists in the work camps constructing these facilities. Economically, the province is subject to very significant inflationary pressures right now that are impacting Albertans throughout the province, not only those residing in the oil sands region.
Recently, the provincial government announced that one out of three provincial construction projects would have to be cancelled or deferred because of an increase in construction costs of $3 billion over five years, and they simply didn't have the resources allocated for that. That's compounding this deficit that the province is already facing.
Certainly on the environmental side, not only are there unresolved questions about the environmental impacts, the cumulative impacts, and how much impact that region can withstand, but there is also the simple fact that the technology is not keeping pace with the rate of development. So we're seeing a very rapid increase in the overall net environmental footprint.
This has led a wide variety of organizations and individuals to call for some kind of slowdown or pause, to kind of get the province in order to be able to more sustainably manage this development, and they range from the provincial New Democrats to former Premier Peter Lougheed, environmental groups, and some first nations groups. So the question of pace is not a partisan issue. It's not a question of whether to develop oil sands. Rather, it's a question of how and what is the best way to do so in the public interest.
In terms of the levers that exist, particularly for the federal government, on the topic of environmental assessments, we've seen inconsistent federal engagement in terms of the scope of engagement in environmental assessment. The main trigger for the federal government to be involved has been under the Fisheries Act, subsection 35(2), but under the Canadian Environmental Assessment Act there's a fair degree of latitude that allows the Department of Fisheries and Oceans to determine how broadly or narrowly to scope the environmental assessment.
In the past, they have very narrowly scoped it so that the federal government is not actually involved in an environmental assessment process looking at all of the impacts associated with it, including transboundary air pollution, greenhouse gases, etc.
:
Mr. Tonks, it's a great question, but I don't think it's a question you can restrict to oil sands.
Western Canada as a whole is on fire economically. Saskatchewan is short on labour and is seeing capital projects coming at very high rates. In B.C. it is the same thing. We have a period right now in western Canada where, yes, it's oil and gas, but it's also potash, it's uranium, it's the mountain pine beetle and the injection that's required from the cuts there, it's the municipal infrastructure, and it's Olympic infrastructure. All of western Canada is seeing this.
Remember the opening comment. Oil sands is $12 billion and conventional business is $35 billion. There's a lot going on when you look at western Canada, so I really think it is dangerous to say it's because of the oil sands.
There is an issue. There is no question about the torrid pace in western Canada. On the other hand, it is coming off. Our expectation is that drilling in the conventional business will be off 10% this year. We're already seeing it slowing down. We've seen a number of oil sands projects that are being deferred or are now described as being stretched out, because companies themselves recognize that there are issues relating to costs and such that aren't in their own best interests.
I think you're seeing that this is occurring. There is a market response to it, and I do worry when governments decide that they'll be the ones that decide which project goes forward and which doesn't.
Outside of that context, as Dan said, there is a regulatory process here that is run by the federal and provincial governments. The last licence had over 100 conditions associated with it. These things are being reviewed. But I would agree with Dan. Do we need to look at how we do things differently? Yes, we do.
I would encourage you, if you have not seen it, to look at the material that has been put together by the Province of Alberta on their multi-stakeholder advisory process on the oil sands. They've travelled through six communities across the province to look at these issues. They've had a wide range of representations--from industry to first nations to the environmental community and others--to talk about these things.
What are some of the things that are coming up? I think there are three, and this is where I get to the levers. First and foremost is that people are saying that governments have done very well from the economic growth in western Canada and from the oil and gas industry growth, but communities are not seeing that money funnelled back to them. We're starting to see some of it on the health side. The federal government is now cost sharing on some road infrastructure and those kinds of things. But the fact is, governments, broadly, are not looking at these high areas of high economic growth and investing appropriately.
Second, I agree with Dan. Regulations need to change over time as technology improves. Syncrude has just spent $600 million to take their project up to 95% SO2 recovery. That takes a while, and it's a response to standards. The new Horizon oil sands project will have 99% sulfur recovery from the day it opens its doors. But there are limits to technology.
Again, I'll agree with Dan. We have a technology challenge here. If we want to continue to be a strong resource company--this is not just oil and gas--governments and industry have to get together and figure out how we're going to increase the amount of environmental technology investment in the environment to reduce our footprints. When I look, really, at the big ones over the long term that are going to make a big difference, to me it's about technology.