:
Mr. Chairman, honourable members of Parliament, good morning.
I'm here to provide you with a short update of Canadian Forces operations in Afghanistan. My presentation will aim to update you primarily on security issues from the last several weeks, and I'm prepared following my presentation to provide any clarification on the issues presented, if I can.
As you asked me last time I was here before the committee, I intend to provide you with some additional information on the reconstruction efforts. I have provided the clerk with a CD that has a number of photos on a lot of the work that has been done, and you could see the clerk if you want a pictorial representation of some of the Canadian reconstruction efforts.
Understanding that I'll be followed by General Henault, chairman of the NATO military committee, who will provide you with information from a higher NATO level, let me jump right to regional command south, where the main effort over the last several weeks has continued to be the provision of security in the region in setting conditions for further development, particularly in Kandahar City and the Kandahar Afghan development zone, which are very important, not only to Afghans but to Canadians. That's the area we operate in.
Overall, the Taliban have encountered difficulties in mounting significant operations in the south. They continue to resort to bullying and in some cases injuring or killing local Afghans, and they indiscriminately use land mines, improvised explosive devices, and rocket-propelled grenades against Afghan national security forces.
The job of ISAF in the southern region has been focused on protecting Afghans and those trying to help them by attempting to disrupt Taliban actions, seizing their weapons, and the like. The arrival of milder spring weather and the end of the poppy harvest has not resulted in a dramatic increase in Taliban activity, and this is a good sign down in the southern region, especially if I compare it to the situation we found ourselves in last year, or even the years before that. I see a considerable reduction.
In Helmand province, the U.K.-led successful operations in the vicinity of Sangin, which I briefed you on last time during Operation Achilles—which you'll recall was aimed at, in part, creating the necessary conditions to help the international community improve the Kajaki Dam—have come to a conclusion. Security presence operations by the U.K. and Afghan national security forces continue in and around the Kajaki Dam to permit its refurbishment.
As you will have heard, yesterday a Chinook helicopter crashed in this area. A Canadian Forces member, Master Corporal Priede, was on this aircraft. I can confirm that Master Corporal Priede did die. However, the details of the incident are pretty sketchy at this point. It will take a thorough investigation to determine what happened, and that will occur over the days and weeks ahead.
At this point, my thoughts are very much with the family of Master Corporal Priede. He's a hero for what he's accomplished in helping do his bit in ISAF and helping local Afghans.
The Canadian artillery support that was provided to Task Force Helmand during Operation Achilles is now complete, and those guns, a pair of howitzers, have returned to Kandahar province.
Task Force Helmand now has switched its main focus to the provision of security to the provincial capital and the Afghan development zone of Lashkar Gah and the area south of Highway 1 to provide security and allow reconstruction and development projects to continue.
In Oruzgan and Zabul provinces, the focus hasn't changed much since I've briefed you over the months. It continues to be focused on the provincial centres of Tarin Kowt and Zabul, where ISAF looks to enhance Afghan development zones and to maintain security along Highway 1.
Task Force Kandahar, based primarily on the Canadian Joint Task Force Afghanistan, remains focused on security, reconstruction, and development in the Panjwai-Zhari area of operations since I was last here—really, no change to that.
The green oval on the left-hand side of the chart before you points to the Zhari–Panjwai area, where the bulk of our battle group effort has been focused. Our aim in this region is quite simple—to ensure security.
The positive trends that I briefed you on during my last appearance continue, as we see more families. Some 30,000 people have actually returned to this area over the last several months, and the numbers continue to grow. Also, the positive economic revival, albeit slow, is indeed evident through this region.
Our commitment to the Afghans in this region is very strong. Hundreds of Afghan and Canadian soldiers are involved in a variety of activities that include security of key routes, such as Route Summit, and the patrols that aim to protect and shield local Afghans from Taliban activities. For example, you will have seen the media reporting on Operation Hoover. This one-day operation was part of the ongoing effort to support local Afghans in securing the Zhari-Panjwai region. The operation supported Afghan National Army efforts to discover Taliban elements in the region and to seize their weapons. Operation Hoover involved hundreds of Afghan national security forces, and this is a very positive trend. The number of Afghans involved in their own security in this region now number in the hundreds. This is remarkable and is a positive trend.
While engagements with the insurgents were actually limited during this operation, Afghan national security forces and the Joint Task Force Afghanistan achieved the aim of demonstrating freedom of movement and disrupting any Taliban attempts to consolidate in the region. However, and unfortunately, in the course of that operation Corporal Matthew McCully, a member of the Joint Task Force Afghanistan operational mentor and liaison team, affectionately known by the troops as the OMLT, was killed. All of us in the CF pour out our sympathy to Corporal McCully's family. Our soldiers are putting their lives on the line every day to help Afghans to achieve a better future. We can all be proud of their selfless accomplishments and we are humbled by their sacrifices.
Let me now turn to the green oval on the right-hand side of the slide, down towards the bottom. The battle group reconnaissance squadron has deployed out of the Zhari–Panjwai area and to forward operating base, Spin Buldak. Spin Buldak is a town right on the Afghan–Pakistan border. From there, the squadron has been defining patterns of life in the Spin Buldak district, determining the effectiveness and disposition of Afghan national security forces and locating Taliban lines of communication. This operation has been part of the effort to improve border security and to facilitate the expansion of the Kandahar Afghan development zone. Significant progress has been made in developing an understanding of this region, and I would anticipate that they will be there for many weeks to come.
Confidence-building does not end at the Afghan border, and I'd like to highlight another important ISAF Canadian initiative in this regard. Brigadier General Grant and Brigadier General Niazi—General Niazi is the commander of the Pakistan military's northern sector—co-chaired the fifth border flag meeting in Chaman, Pakistan, on May 9. The border flag meetings are an ISAF initiative conducted at various Afghan and Pakistani border locations. They were created as a means to bring together Pakistani and Afghan military officers from the border areas to discuss regional issues of mutual concern, with the coordination of ISAF.
[Translation]
This was the first meeting coordinated by the JTF, the Joint Task Force in Afghanistan, and the second chaired by Brigadier-General Grant. This meeting brings together important security officers from both sides of the Afghan and Pakistani borders. There has been significant progress made in the setting up of radio communications between the two frontiers to help defuse inflammatory situations and to coordinate operations in the border areas.
Brigadier-General Niazi has noted that this border flag meeting was an opportunity to make new friends and he congratulated the JTF for its activities in Afghanistan, which he said contributed to the security of Pakistan. Brigadier-General Grant emphasized the fact that security issues should be worked on together and that mutually acceptable solutions should be decided upon by both sides of the border.
[English]
Cross-border communications have long been strained in this region. Continued bilateral discussions are a significant accomplishment. Regardless of how modest they might outwardly appear, this is good Canadian action, as I see it, the ability to sit down and negotiate. This is a great initiative that obviously will continue.
In its role as a facilitator, ISAF can support a process to develop and sustain this essential dialogue at a regional level. The next meeting will occur later this summer.
Turning now to reconstruction, let me provide a little more information than I usually do on this important activity. As I mentioned, I've provided the clerk with a CD that has many more examples of the photos of our reconstruction efforts. You can review the CD at your leisure.
Canada has provided significant assistance to agriculture, irrigation, and rural development in Kandahar province. For example, over 10 kilometres of canals have been built and 14 kilometres of drainage systems repaired. While that might not sound like much, when you're living in a desert, each inch counts.
In addition, over 1,000 wells have been dug and 800 hand pumps provided. Four large water reservoirs are now in operation, and many kilometres of water supply networks have been established in the province.
[Translation]
The United Nations Mine Action Centre for Afghanistan began a clearance operation in the Panjwayi district. NATO financed the project to the tune of $3.8 million. It will involve up to 300 mine clearers and 100 security guards coming from 4 different contractors.
The nine-month project will clear almost 300 hectares in the Panjwayi and Zhari districts. There will be regular coordination between the service and the JTF in Afghanistan throughout the operation. Brigadier-General Grant, the JTF (Afghanistan) commander, signed a letter of agreement detailing the support activities for the action centre, including the delivery of an operation intended to establish conditions for the arrival of other international and non-governmental organizations in the region.
[English]
The real effect of Joint Task Force Afghanistan development efforts is starting to bear fruit. The national solidarity program, paid largely by Canada, in the Kandahar province has been initiated in the majority of districts. Created by the Government of Afghanistan, the NSP gives rural Afghans a voice in their country's development through the election of community leaders to community development councils, or CDCs. The program supports the CDCs to lead their communities through processes to identify, plan, manage, and monitor their own development projects.
As I've described to you before, it's not Canadians who need to be out in front doing this development but the local Afghans themselves. Our PRT is working overtime across government to create these development councils. As a result, communities are empowered to make decisions and control resources during all stages of the project cycle. The PRT facilitates the creation of CDCs in local communities and development efforts with local elders, through the shura.
There are now 500 registered community development councils across the province that are linking into project funds available through the Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development. International money comes in at the top and will funnel through this ministry. Certainly in Kandahar province there's a fair degree of activity.
Another positive sign is the active involvement of the Kandahar governor in this process; it doesn't point to an improvement in the governance. Now, while he lacks the bureaucracy to back him up, he does his work on the end of a cellphone with local elders. He would be much better off if he had a large bureaucracy under him, but that will come in time. He is—and Afghans do see progress—working toward solutions to improve their lives.
[Translation]
Finally, facilitating the growth and independence of Afghan national security forces through education, the provision of equipment, the building or outfitting of police stations and check-points with vehicles is a key component of the Canadian Forces' efforts in the Kandahar province. We were involved in the facilitation of the construction and outfitting of the above-mentioned police stations and some 15 temporary and permanent check-points with vehicles in the province.
[English]
I've only been able to cover a few elements of the reconstruction. The CD shows many more. I'd be happy to provide additional information, if required by the committee.
On the next slide, I'll just focus a little bit more on the last several weeks of the PRT, which has aimed its main effort in the Zhari District. Not only are we conducting operations there to reassure the local Afghans that we're going to stay and to bring their security forces to bear, but it's also where the PRT works to help with development to facilitate a little bit of reconstruction, and where we really want the international community to come and give us a hand.
The slide depicts a number of the activities that have been accomplished or undertaken. And while I don't have the time to address them all, let me give you a couple of examples.
The provincial director of education held an event to commemorate teachers in Kandahar province. The PRT assisted with the provision of radios—to add to those the director has already received—as part of a plan to connect all of the director's teachers to some form of media, no matter how far away they reside from densely populated urban areas.
The teachers' day took place on May 24. It consisted of a ceremony, including speeches by the director of education and the governor of Kandahar. There were songs by student choirs, a presentation of awards and a luncheon, things we take for granted back here.
The soldiers and the civilians who work within the PRT facilitate many, many activities like that, but it is one that was accomplished on May 24.
[Translation]
Another example is the 20 trucks for the newly identified Afghan national police, which arrived at the regional education centre and are awaiting distribution. They are to be distributed in Kandahar province to replace the existing vehicles or to increase their number.
Moreover, counsellors from the civilian police facilitated the issue of summer uniforms for the Afghan national police at provincial headquarters, to be sent to substations or check-points in the province. A computer system was provided to the technical directors by the counsellors of the civilian police, to help them with the distribution and inventory of the uniforms.
[English]
Finally, on May 15 the provincial reconstruction team and the Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission played host to a meeting on human rights with Kandahar's Afghan national security forces and other security and justice sector leadership. The workshop was a constructive first step in what appears will be an ongoing dialogue between the security forces and the AIHRC. At the conclusion of the meeting, participants signed a short declaration outlining their commitment to human rights and the rule of law, with particular focus on individuals in custody, under investigation, and undergoing trial. Again, it's a small step, but I think a very positive one as we try to help focus Afghans on their own judicial and security reform.
On the next slide you will see that the strategic advisory team continues to busy itself with many important initiatives. Again, I could spend a considerable amount of time talking about all these initiatives, but I'll limit this to just two.
[Translation]
The independent commission on administrative reform and the public service is the main agency in Afghanistan for the reform process of the public administration in general. The United Nations supports the establishment of a national framework for the education and development of Afghani officials. Within the commission, the SAT, the Strategic Advisory Team, assisted with the submission of four evaluation reports on the reconstruction service and Afghan development for World Bank projects. The SAT provided assistance in many areas, but served mainly to provide assistance for the written English.
[English]
Again, they are small steps, but it is assistance that Afghans need to help them do planning and formalize some of their key activities.
On the Ministry of Transport and Civil Aviation, the SAT is involved in two major initiatives. The first is to advertise for the hiring of a project implementation unit that will provide the ministry with a badly needed engineering department to move a backlog of rehabilitation projects forward, while performing capacity-building to hand over this responsibility to the ministry within three years.
The second initiative is a contract for out-of-country training that the ministry firefighting students will undergo. This internationally compliant training is crucial for airport firefighting if the ministry is to meet its international civil requirements and take the task from ISAF. These milestones could have lasting impact on the civil aviation sector in Afghanistan. So the SAT continues to assist the bureaucracy in drawing up strategic plans. It is tremendously important to open airheads. It's not simply a Canadian activity; it's country-wide. To see this sort of activity going on is a good measure.
I don't want to be over the top again and dispel some of the challenges, but certainly you see the activities your SAT is up to.
Until May the Canadian Forces observer, mentoring, and liaison team, or OMLT, was responsible for the mentorship of one Afghan National Army battalion, or Kandak, as it's referred to, within the Kandahar province.
I remember when I first came to the committee we were talking about dozens, then there were a couple of hundred, and now we're talking about hundreds of ANA. It started as a very small step forward in Kandahar province. There was almost no Afghan National Army when we first arrived. We saw that build up to one Afghan National Army battalion that our troops were involved with. In fact, Corporal McCully was working with this Afghan battalion when he was killed.
As the Afghan National Army continues to expand, so too will its presence in Kandahar province. On May 15, Canadian Forces assumed mentorship for the Afghan National Army brigade headquarters responsible for the Kandahar province from the U.S. embedded training team. This was a significant milestone, since it represented a continuing trend toward Afghans assuming responsibility for their own security in the south. We anticipate in the months ahead that two additional Kandaks will deploy to Kandahar province, along with combat support and combat service support elements.
[Translation]
The addition of this capacity to the Afghan National Army will complete the capability of setting up the Afghan National Army so that they can sustain two operational kandaks and a brigade headquarters—
:
Thank you very much for the warm welcome and thank you very much to the committee for having invited me to make a presentation today and to present NATO's perspective.
With me today is Lieutenant-Colonel Anthony White, a member of my staff in Brussels.
[English]
Tony will be here this morning to give me a hand if there are any additional comments or follow-up questions you might need to have answered in writing.
With that, good morning. It certainly is a pleasure to be before this committee this morning and to have been invited to attend here, as the chairman of the NATO Military Committee, in a much different capacity from what I have appeared before this committee in the past.
Sincerely, I have had the opportunity to interact with many of the members of the NATO parliamentary group over the last couple of years. Again, I welcome this opportunity to be back in Canada and to address this group, specifically, and to follow on with many of the discussions we've had in the NATO forum.
[Translation]
I do this with the full awareness of your familiarity with NATO objectives and priorities, and given, in particular, the clear focus that you have had on operations in Afghanistan over the last while.
[English]
I will be talking about Afghanistan a little bit later, but I will preface a little bit of that with what we're doing from a NATO perspective overall.
As most, if not all, of you will be aware, I serve as the chairman of the NATO Military Committee, having been elected to that position by a majority vote of the 26 chiefs of defence of NATO in November 2004 and also with the full support of the government of Canada.
I came into my term on June 16, 2005, so that was nearly two years ago. What I have as a responsibility, primarily, is to speak on behalf of all 26 NATO chiefs of defence and also to chair the weekly NATO Military Committee meetings, which are a very important component of the decision-making process in Brussels. They are aimed at building and generating consensus-based military advice that we must provide to the council for the decisions it undertakes on behalf of all the nations, and obviously, on behalf of the alliance itself. I also serve in that capacity, but as the senior military advisor to the council and as the top officer in NATO.
Thankfully, and with a very sincere look at what the alliance does overall, I have had the opportunity to travel to a number of different locations since I've become the NATO chairman. I've been primarily to NATO nations, but also to partner nations and to many of our contact countries. I've also travelled, of course, many times, to our operational theatres, whether it's Afghanistan, Kosovo, or Iraq, visiting, most recently, Operation Active Endeavour, the ships involved in our counter-terrorist maritime operation in the Mediterranean.
Operation Active Endeavour, I would remind you, is the only Article 5 operation underway in NATO at the moment. It's a compendium of ships, primarily made up of vessels from the standing NATO Maritime Group, which, quite notably, has just integrated a Ukrainian vessel into the force. It's only the second non-NATO nation that's contributed to this operation, the first having been Russia, last fall.
As a result of all that, I have had the great privilege of seeing firsthand what your men and women and also what the men and women of the alliance and its partners do in operations. And I ensure that their voices are heard back at the level I represent at NATO headquarters. I often travel with the North Atlantic Council, as well. So in that respect, I hear it from that perspective and ensure that we know what the issues and problems are out there. And hopefully we can provide our best possible support to them in what they're endeavouring to do on behalf of your nation, but also on behalf of the alliance.
While, as I mentioned at the very outset, I will talk about Afghanistan—it is our number one operational priority—I would like to at least note a few things we're doing in other areas of endeavour.
Let me perhaps just put a little bit of context around the work NATO does.
[Translation]
We currently have 50,500 soldiers, sailors, airmen and airwomen from NATO and partner nations involved in a variety of operations on continents that are frequently far away, and also on three continents and on the Mediterranean. Apart from the military operation in Afghanistan, we have a renowned force, made up of some 16,000 soldiers, airmen, airwomen and sailors in an operation in Kosovo, which is a very important mission, particularly at this stage, which involves talks on Kosovo's long-term status.
[English]
We also have a training mission in Iraq, which is helping to support the professionalization of some 600 Iraqi members—students, military officers, and non-commissioned members—on an annual basis.
We have a support mission to the African Union. It's a very modest one, a small one, but it has nonetheless airlifted some 8,000 troops into Sudan on behalf of or in support of the African Union. We've done some capacity building for them as well and helped them with the professionalization of their forces, how to do lessons learned and a number of other important things. But again, it's at a very modest level and at the request of the UN and the country itself.
We also conduct the operations in the Mediterranean that I talked to you about. This is an enduring mission, but one which has paid off quite significantly, in my view, in reducing the illegal trafficking of arms, illegal immigration, smuggling of people and arms, and a number of things that we have been able to curtail in terms of counter-terrorist operations in the Mediterranean context.
All these operations—and it does spread our forces, collectively, in quite a sizeable region of operations—draw upon limited national forces. Each country has a finite limit to what it can provide, but nonetheless it involves all those NATO, partner, and contact nations. And when I talk about contact nations I refer specifically to the nations that are supporting us in a number of regions, including Australia, Japan, South Korea, New Zealand, and others that we are talking to in the margins of that as well.
Many of the nations I just talked about, especially NATO and the partner nations, are not only providing troops to operations in NATO, but they're also providing troops elsewhere, whether it's in support of the European Union or whether it's in support of other UN operations or coalition operations, in a number of places.
All that being said, it's really to point out to you that the ability of those nations to commit forces or capability to NATO, and most importantly to sustain those commitments, is very much commissioned by their responsibilities elsewhere, including in their own nations, and we need to consider it in that context.
[Translation]
Another factor that is also driving the Alliance is the need to maintain NATO's operational effectiveness in the face of continuing change and transformation. You have no doubt had discussions on this with the Canadian Forces.
[English]
NATO is thus undergoing this very important process of transformation across the spectrum, which is really aiming to ensure that our forces, and the command and control mechanisms that provide the oversight for them, are capable of responding with a much more far-reaching capability than we had before and a much more flexible one than we had during the Cold War—but also one that needs to adapt to the many changes we're seeing around the world. This is not the NATO of our fathers or grandfathers; this is a very different NATO. In fact, overall, what's happened is that NATO's competitive environment, for the lack of a better term, has changed quite significantly.
An important and very visible way in which NATO has adapted to those changes is not only in the defence reform that goes on across the spectrum of NATO and partner nations, but also in the creation of the NATO response force, which I know you've heard about. It's made up of some 20,000 to 25,000 air, land, sea, and marine corps capabilities, ready to move on very short notice—a very high-readiness force that can actually be deployed within five to thirty days of notice to undertake an operation.
I can get into more detail later on, if you'd like, but we certainly have seen its ability to do that, even before it achieved full operational capability, at the Riga summit last November, with the support that was provided to Pakistan, for example, and in the validation exercise that was done last year in Cape Verde, just off the west coast of Africa.
So, overall, what nations are looking to do is to improve the overall capability of their forces and their ability to interoperate with NATO, though adaptable logistics; interoperable command and control systems, which are crucial; language capability; and additional lift, whether it's airlift or sealift; and other things too numerous to mention.
At the same time, the political-military relationship has to evolve in order to ensure that nations are actually able to respond to that very short notice requirement for deployments, if required, and be able to be flexible enough to adjust to this changing environment we're in—one that in many cases requires some very short-term decision-making.
So all of that provides a backdrop to what we're doing in Afghanistan, which I'd now like to touch on a little bit more in depth.
General Howard gave you a very good overview of what's going on in the region you are most interested in, the southern region. Of course that is where much of the current insurgency has been focused, but believe me, there is insurgency throughout Afghanistan. So it's important that you understand the extent of what we're trying to do there, not only from a military point of view, but also from a civilian point of view, or with a comprehensive approach or perspective, if you like.
Just a short time ago, six years or so ago, Afghanistan was a very different place. It had no notion of the rule of law. It had very ambiguous diplomatic or political relations with a small number of countries, two or three at the most, and it was very much an uncontrolled environment in which terrorism could, quite frankly, thrive. And it was a launching ground, if you like, for terrorist attacks and the ones that we saw on September 11.
There were other elements of that as well. Girls could not go to school. Women were prevented from exercising fundamental human rights—not only women, but also men in many cases were restricted from doing many of the things we enjoy. It was, for all intents and purposes, what we would consider an ungoverned space. And there is still some ungoverned space in Afghanistan.
This was the premise on which the most basic human freedoms were inhibited—by the Taliban primarily. And of course I've mentioned to you the breeding ground that it became for international terrorism, something we all have a distinct interest in assuring does not occur again.
[Translation]
Our approach to the resulting operations in Afghanistan has been measured, deliberate and progressive. You are well aware of this, because you have been following events in Afghanistan since the very start. In fact, there is no doubt amongst the 26 nations of the Alliance and its partners that the Afghanistan mission is NATO's absolute operational priority.
[English]
And we have no option but to prevail; this is a very important evolution of the alliance and what it represents.
In that context, though, I can assure you that the alliance is very united in its purpose. I had the opportunity to sit in at the heads of state and government dinner in Riga in November; there was no doubt about the commitment of all the heads of state to NATO and what it represents, and a very emphatic commitment on their part to ensure that what needs to be done will be done on the part of every nation.
Progressively, over time, the capability and equipment shortfalls and the national caveats—which I know you're familiar with—have challenged the effectiveness and also the flexibility of our military mission. But they are being addressed. Again, I can touch on that if you wish.
We've also recognized the need for the international community to collaborate with military forces to find the solutions for Afghanistan. And while the military component remains the essential element of providing security in Afghanistan, and stability as an essential ingredient of success, we are continually seeking ways to harmonize that component with the crucial reconstruction and development effort.
In essence, there is a full recognition that success in Afghanistan cannot be achieved through military means alone—and that's perfectly crystal clear to us at NATO, I can assure you.
Mr. Chairman, are we going to be cut short, with the bells?
All that being said, I do believe it is worth considering for a moment where nations have come since we started the overall operation in Afghanistan. There is now a democratically elected government, and many of you have met some of those members of government. It's established within a relatively secure and stable environment, if you consider what it used to be. There are numerous reconstruction and development projects underway, providing very good hope for the Afghan people. There are more than 17,000 projects across Afghanistan, which is not insignificant.
Eighty-three percent of the population now have access to military facilities, compared with 2004, when it was much lower, at around nine percent. The GDP growth for this year is estimated at a very significant level at 12% to 14%. Over 4,000 kilometres of roads have been completed. The same number of medical clinics have been established. Over seven million children are in school, and I could go on and on. These are only a few examples of the progress that has been made in Afghanistan since we started our mission collectively.
Having visited there on many occasions, I would say to you that the people are feeling the benefits of the international presence, and they're feeling the positive benefits, although there are some negatives as well. All that being said, the successes that we deliver are somewhat fragile. They are fragile because the opposing militant forces, I like to call them—and that includes not only the Taliban but drug lords, criminal elements, a number of extremist groups, if you like, freedom fighters and so on—would prefer a return to that lawless environment they used to be able to operate in, and in which, as you well know, they could intimidate, they could kill people, and force people to support a wide range of their illicit activities.
[Translation]
Nonetheless, the opposing militant forces have discovered, through bitter experience, that they can defeat neither NATO nor SAF by conventional means. Even so, they not only remain a threat to our mission, they also threaten Afghanistan and its prospects for the future.
[English]
So I can say from a NATO perspective that we are achieving some success in Afghanistan. I sincerely believe that.
The momentum that we gained this spring, much different from what we saw last fall, by the way, with additional forces and commitment to engage these opposing militant forces, has demonstrated not only to NATO nations but also to the Afghan people themselves that they do have a better chance of prospering. This is important, from our perspective. They have a much better chance of prospering with NATO than they do with the Taliban. I think that's well recognized now.
We are seeing, in fact, local Afghans actually rejecting extremist elements and running, for lack of a better term, insurgents out of their towns and communities. And we're seeing the opposing militant forces very significantly adjust the way in which they try to oppose us, and this in direct response to those operational successes, Canada having been at the centre of one of those very significant successes last fall.
What we are doing, combined with the reconstruction and development people—and I come back to this because it's an important element of what we believe—is making Afghanistan and their way of life very different and improving it overall. From our perspective, what's important is not only having an image or a perception of improvement, but also that there is actual and tangible improvement to the Afghans on the ground. That really is an important part of winning hearts and minds.
[Translation]
In November 2006, we made a number of commitments at Riga. Following those commitments, which were made by all the heads of state mentioned above, our troop levels in Afghanistan have increased by more than 7,000 soldiers. Though there is still some room for improvement, the caveats—or restrictions—imposed on operational troops have been reduced.
[English]
Overall, then, that has meant that we've increased the numbers in Afghanistan to somewhere around 37,000 troops—I know you're familiar with these numbers, but just to reiterate them—from 37 different countries, and that is compared to what Afghanistan and the mission represented, which was about 5,000 troops in Kabul, when we started this engagement in Afghanistan. So it's quite an evolution. If you add the 11,000 or so members of the coalition who are operating in Afghanistan still, that takes the numbers up very, very close to the 50,000 I've talked to you about.
All of this has improved our operational capabilities. I will nonetheless be the first to say, because I've said this in many fora, especially at ministerial and heads of state levels, that we still have shortfalls in the statement of requirements, the combined joint statement of requirements that we continually seek to fill. Most of those are critical enablers, whether it's medical evacuation or in-theatre lift or communications surveillance and so on. They're being slowly but surely filled, and every contribution that NATO nations or partner nations make, however small, is always very much welcomed. But we keep reinforcing the need to fill it all, and we also reinforce the need to reduce those caveats.
To maintain this momentum, though, we do need to continue building our own and also Afghan capabilities. I haven't talked about that much, but the Afghans themselves are improving in capability and they're fearless fighters. They're also very, very committed to establishing and maintaining that security and stability in their own country and ultimately taking it over themselves. They really are very, very sincere about this, everyone I've talked to, especially their minister of defence and their president.
In my view, all the nations that are militarily engaged in Afghanistan are contributing to success in their own way. They all have specific mandates, but they're all operating under the same operations plan and under the same overall objective. As a consequence, NATO continually asks its members and partners, whoever they may be, to contribute more where they can, and I will continue to do that as well.
That being said, especially with the caveats, it's very clear to us that there are some national caveats that have to be there. It's a law, and that does constrain some freedoms to some degree, but what's most important to us is that there be few or no restrictions on the movement of troops, the geographic flexibility applied to troops in Afghanistan.
On an equally important front, perhaps, the alliance continues to stress the civilian and military cooperation aspects of what we do and the fact that this is crucial—I firmly believe this—to overall success and our ultimate exit strategy. The essence of that cooperation, you heard about it this morning, is embedded in the provincial reconstruction teams and what they do. There are 25 across the entire surface of Afghanistan at the moment. They're doing a number of things to improve how they do business. We have workshops on lessons learned and a number of best practices being applied, coordination being done in Afghanistan of PRTs, not wanting to suggest for a second that there's one-size-fits-all in this respect, but nonetheless trying to harmonize our efforts so that they're more effective overall.
This underscores even more emphatically the need for civilian and military cooperation. We, the military, especially from the NATO context, don't want to control the PRTs or the civilian international community, but we certainly want to be able to harmonize our efforts or at least coordinate our efforts with them, and that's an important dimension of what we're trying to do in a comprehensive approach point of view. You would probably call it more “all of government”. We call it comprehensive approach in the NATO forum. That brings together all the elements, military, political, social, economic, and so on, to bring to bear what we need to do in that theatre.
In short, the reconstruction and development in Afghanistan must be seen as a seamless progression and it must be seen as the ultimate requirement to ensure that the Afghans can, at the end of what we do here, become self-sufficient in the long term.
[Translation]
Over the past few months, the Alliance has also improved direct support to the Afghan army in a number of ways, particularly through the deployment of operational mentoring and liaison teams, which Gen. Howard mentioned earlier.
Those teams are extremely important in training the Afghan army and improving its capacity to deploy and operate with NATO forces in the operational theatre.
[English]
The chiefs of defence got together just a few weeks ago, looked at Afghanistan, and at what our commitments are there, and they agreed with me that one of our critical requirements in Afghanistan is to sustain and enhance what we're doing, from an operational, mentoring, and liaison point of view. The training and equipment of the Afghan army—and, arguably, the same goes for the Afghan national police, the Afghan border guards, and so on—is a critical element for us at the moment, and very much a part of what we are currently trying to do, in terms of keeping this positive momentum going.
As that continues, more of these “omelettes”, as they're very affectionately called—I'm not that favourable to that term, but nonetheless that's what most people use—will be required.
At the moment, we have a requirement for 46 of these omelettes, to give you an indication. Twenty of them have been filled by NATO. The other 26 are currently being filled by the coalition, and they're called “embedded training teams”. I was very gratified, as the Afghan battalions stood up and needed the assistance, to see what Canada was going to be doing, in terms of a regional approach to provide these liaison teams, in a brigade sense, if you like, to enhance what these OMLTs are doing.
These OMLTs, as we embed them or as we generate them, then off-load those embedded training teams that the Americans have applied to this. Those embedded training teams take on the training of the Afghan national police, which is equally important, and that is ultimately part of the force multiplier that we need in Afghanistan.
In the end, we will need somewhere in the neighbourhood of a hundred of these operational mentoring and liaison teams to actually support the professionalization and ultimate independent approach to the Afghan national army, and everything that represents. So these are important, and important to our overall exit strategy, which certainly we need to take conscious consideration of.
Again, I'll just mention the comprehensive approach, because it is a very important element of what we do. It's the glue, from our perspective, that holds together all the lines of activity that we have on the international front in Afghanistan. If we're divided on this approach, on the comprehensive approach and what it means to harmonizing our efforts, I'm convinced that we will have trouble and we will have some difficulty in achieving the overall success that we need to achieve.
[Translation]
Regional actors are equally critical to the success of our efforts. Pakistan, for example—and you know what Pakistan now represents—has shown immense willingness, particularly lately, to support our operations.
[English]
I visited Pakistan again just a few weeks ago. I have been discussing with them the importance of the border controls, especially. Pakistan views, the same as we would view, that a stable, democratic Afghanistan is just as important to them as it is to the nations supporting this mission because it is a direct neighbour of theirs, and stability in their region is what they want, ultimately.
In that respect, Pakistan has deployed some 80,000 troops along the border with Afghanistan. And if you factor in the fact that they have to rotate those troops, just as we rotate troops, you need a three-to-one ratio, which means they've committed somewhere in the neighbourhood of a quarter of a million troops to support the Afghan border activity. They've established some 1,000 border posts along the border, as compared to perhaps 100 on the part of Afghanistan.
They have also participated with us in what we call the Tripartite Commission, which is made up of Afghans, the Afghan chief of defence, primarily; the International Security Assistance Force through its commander; and also the Pakistani commander.
All of that has been a feature of our cooperation in the region, and it has enabled us to do some very good coordination along that border, not the least of which has been engaging where we need to, ensuring that we can curtail insurgent activity across the border together when it's needed. They also participate in a joint operation centre in Kabul. They are very capable officers. I'm very aware of what they do, all of that being a better coordination of our efforts across the border.
And finally, much of the publicity that surrounds the events in Afghanistan is reported as solely the purview of NATO, and consequently ISAF. This is the impression that is no doubt the result of a number of things, especially when you note that most of the activity that we see reported is front-line activity, and not the other activity that comes with it.
But NATO is not alone in Afghanistan, and I know you know this only too well. I've seen what James Appathurai and Chris Alexander and others have said to you, and I know the CDS will have said this to you as well. There are a number of very important actors there, not the least of which is the U.S. coalition, the United Nations, the G-8, the European Union, the World Bank, and soon we will have a European Union police training mission in Afghanistan, which will help us to do all the things I've just talked to you about.
So there are a number of difficult issues we still need to face, but all of this, with a comprehensive approach, will allow us, in my view, to prevail in the long term.
I have one last set of points before I open it up to your comments, and just a couple of moments to address the issue of detainees, because I know it is an important part of your discussion here in Canada and especially in Parliament.
I would note for you that there is no NATO-wide policy on detainees; however, it was directed through the operations plan, which is approved. It's recommended by the military committee but approved by the North Atlantic Council.
Commander ISAF, through the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, was directed to develop a set of guidelines and procedures governing the manner in which detainees were to be handled. It provides a very clear guidance. I have seen the guidance. It has been exposed to the North Atlantic Council. They're satisfied with it. All of it gives very clear guidance on the way in which individuals are to be handled.
Again, you've heard the terms on the criteria. We normally have to hand them over within 96 hours of the original detention or arrest. At the end of that period the individual must be released or handed over to Afghan authorities. And these are sovereign authorities; they handle their own internal security matters. However, there is a but: NATO has provided explicit instructions that no individual is to be handed over to any authority if it's believed that the individual is likely to be harmed or injured, abused in any way, following the handover.
In sum, we have directed and instructed our forces on the ground to exercise extreme diligence when arresting or detaining individuals, first of all; and we've also given them explicit instructions on how to handle them subsequently.
We call it a standing operating procedure, or an SOP. It's an SOP that is a sub-set of that operations plan I talked to you about. It has held us in good stead so far. And it is supplemented by a number of bilateral agreements between nations and the Afghan government in the same way that the Canadian government has done this.
This is what we encourage, and certainly we acknowledge Canada's attention in this context from a NATO perspective.
[Translation]
To conclude my remarks, Mr. Chairman, I would like to reiterate that the route we are taking to deliver peace and independent government in Afghanistan requires far more than military force. Our mission is an overall mission, which will ensure long-term success.
[English]
What is critically important from our point of view are the positive actions on the part of the rest of the international community, and a number of things are going on. I looked at some numbers a few days ago and noted some $26 billion has been applied to Afghanistan since the UN mandate was established in 2001 and the thousands of troops you are very familiar with. The military forces of NATO with their civilian counterparts are creating better conditions in Afghanistan, which will, in our view, deliver lasting peace.
Everyone is doing their part, in my perspective. Some nations are very small. I can tell you those small nations all feel just as committed to Afghanistan and would like to have larger contributions if they had them to provide, but sometimes can't. NATO views that no contribution is too small. Anyone who wishes to help we are very pleased with.
We'll continue to use what has been contributed by nations, including Canada, in the most effective way, but we need more resources to achieve the task overall, and I talked about that earlier. We continue to articulate those requirements, and the Supreme Allied Commander, General Craddock, has done that very recently in pointing out very clearly what some of the shortfalls still are.
Afghanistan is certainly a fragile country, and those of you who have been there will know that. Although it has its own government, it still has a number of tribal, rural, and other cultures that underpin it. The change there, and General Howard talked about this, will not occur overnight, and we're very conscious of that. It's going to take time and it can't be rushed. The last thing we want to do is come out of Afghanistan too soon and find ourselves back in there in the way that we had to go in there in the first instance.
For that reason, it's the belief of NATO, and my own personal belief, that it's simply too early to allow forces to come out and certainly to allow the forces we're opposing, and those we have now managed to control in a very significant way, to re-establish what was a very brutal and also oppressive hold on the people of Afghanistan. We expect to be there for a while yet and until the job is done.
In closing, I would say, as a Canadian NATO officer, that I'm very proud of the fact I can show this Canadian flag every day in the North Atlantic Council and on several visits to a number of different nations. Canada has played a very pivotal role in this process, a very important role, and is highly respected by the nations.
Again, I refer to the Riga summit and the dinner I attended with all the heads of state. Canada was spotlighted during that dinner. Many of the heads of state complimented the Prime Minister for the courage, the commitment, and also the sacrifices that Canadians were making to make this mission what it is and to do what has to be done.
Those are the contributions Canadians are making there with unfortunate losses, which we always regret. We recognize those losses every time they occur, either at the military committee or at the North Atlantic Council level. We know the Canadians have made some very courageous contributions, military and civilian—it's not just military. People put their lives on the line every day to do the job that's being done there.
Canada is making a difference, and that's the message I want to leave with you. It is making a positive difference and it's a nation that's seen at the leading edge of leadership and capability in Afghanistan.
The final word I would say, nonetheless, is that all the allies are contributing, and it's a very complex mission, but one that ultimately we will prevail in. From my perspective, I continue to be encouraged every time I go there and see the improvements that occur step-by-step. They are not huge improvements. It will never be downtown Nepean or downtown Ottawa, but that's not what we're trying to achieve. We're trying to achieve a stable environment they can thrive in, and I think we will, in the long term.
[Translation]
Thank you. It has been a pleasure to be given this opportunity to be here today.
Mr. Chairman, I would be happy to answer any questions committee members may have. Thank you.