FAAE Committee Report

It is clear that Canada has some well-established expertise in promoting some of the key elements of democratic governance, and that Canadian democracy itself has some unique strengths — e.g. the promotion of tolerance and the forging of a common identity across major cultural, linguistic and regional differences in Canada — to which some of our ‘niche’ expertise may be well placed to speak internationally. Canada is also perceived in manner that may, at certain times and places, make it a more trusted partner in delivering assistance that can be sensitive and highly political in nature. This would be further encouraged by an approach and largely demand-driven style in which Canadian organizations seek, in the main, to facilitate reform processes and to assist local actors in achieving their own agendas for democratic change.

Discussion paper prepared under
the auspices of the Democracy Council[219]

The Canadian approach has two key elements. First of all, over the last twenty years we have developed a strong family of institutions doing this work. … Secondly, we've developed over those years a distinct philosophy of cooperation. Canadians have a clear and distinct approach to cooperation that's appreciated by many of our partners. We support the efforts of people to strengthen their own democratic institutions; we don't attempt to export ours. We share our rich experience and ongoing struggles to reform and develop Canadian democracy, while acknowledging both our successes and our failures. We try to keep ideological baggage to a minimum, preferring results to rhetoric. Most importantly, we believe that democratic development should be practised democratically, between equals.

Robert Miller, President, The Parliamentary Centre[220]

[D]emocracy promotion is challenged by the growing perception in some parts of the world that democracy is not bearing fruit in terms of improving the day-to-day lives of the people. Setbacks will occur, but this does not mean we give up.

In my view, there is no alternative to democracy. What is needed is support for the entire process of democracy building and for the system as a whole, based on each country's values, history and culture. That moreover is our international trademark…

former Chief Electoral Officer of Canada,
Jean-Pierre Kingsley[221]

We should be able to provide the resources needed to empower partners. This is most often mentors, information, skills, knowledge or facilitation. Too often we substitute money for these things and are disappointed with the results.

As Canadians we bring values that are universal, welcome and valuable. Our institutions embrace respect, caring, inclusion, fairness and honesty.

While we seem frustrated with so many of our institutions they are the envy of many and an example to more. Our judicial system, public service, political parties, election systems, official language laws, free media, intergovernmental relations and above all our constitution are what make Canada envied and honoured around the world. … In this area [of democratic development] few donors can provide the skills and experience that Canada possesses, it makes sense that Canada should make these a priority.

Ross Reid, former Progressive Conservative M.P.
and Deputy Minister to the Premier of Newfoundland and Labrador[222]

Canada often prides itself on having a generally positive image abroad as well as playing a distinctive role and influence in international relations. Indeed, DFAIT recently held a public electronic discussion forum (open from January 22 to March 30) that was headlined: “A Uniquely Canadian Approach to Democracy Promotion”.[223] Our first witness, Foreign Minister Peter MacKay contended that:

 [Canada] enjoys some unique credibility and with it some unique opportunities. There is an enormous well of goodwill in the broader global context, and having outsiders assist us with democratic reform can be very sensitive. Therefore, Canada's reputation as a fair player confers clear advantages: we were never a colonial power; we do not have great power ambitions; our motives are not suspect; our agenda is not hidden; and as I said, there is a tremendous depth of goodwill for Canadians. It's partly because of our advocacy, but more so because of our active support for democratic values.[224]

The Minister went on to affirm the depth of institutional and individual experience and expertise that Canada offers to emerging democracies, and the accommodation of diversity that “brings Canadians, who are particularly sensitive to difficult cultural and social contexts, into a position of great ability to offer assistance.”[225] Positive qualities have been ascribed to Canadian approaches in a range of democratic development fields from electoral assistance to police training, democracy education, human rights and rule of law promotion, governance reform and civil society support.

While there is a certain amount of optimistic idealism involved in this characterization of Canada’s role — the proof, as always, will be in the practice and long-term results — the Committee’s Canadian and international witnesses generally concurred that more involvement by Canada in these fields is welcome, and that Canada can bring some comparative advantages to the hard long-term work of supporting democracy internationally. Jennifer Welsh, with whom the Committee met in London in October 2006, concludes in a forthcoming book that notwithstanding all of the hazards and inherent riskiness of such work — underscored by Ian Smillie in his testimony to the Committee[226] — “good governance has been identified as an area where Canada’s experience, combined with its perceived reputation as an ‘impartial donor’, provide the country with a comparative advantage with respect to other actors.”[227]

George Perlin, in suggesting that Canada could lead in establishing a “training program for practitioners, for people who want to make careers in this field, in the delivery of democracy assistance”, added: “We’re widely seen to be more sensitive of distinctive conditions in recipient countries, more open to local advice and engagement, and more inclusive in our relations with partners.”[228] One can also point to the success of CANADEM, “Canada’s Civilian Reserve”, a 10-year old government-funded but low-cost non-profit NGO that has built up roster of 8,000 Canadians qualified for international assignments, with several divisions for different types of civilian deployments. Executive Director Paul Larose-Edwards told the Committee: “Will we get better? Yes, we will, because there will be more and more Canadians that register with us. I predict that there will be anywhere from 25,000 to 35,000 people on that roster ten years from now, so we will continue to figure out how to do that with not too much money.”[229]

Mr. Larose-Edwards emphasized that expanding CANADEM’s roster is not about creating jobs for Canadians, but about finding the right people with the right skills to be able to develop local capacities in recipient countries. As he put it, the kinds of people we like to roster and send out are “not looking to make a career out of staying there for years on end; they’re looking to develop local capacity.” [230] He gave an example of where the skills of both specialized experts and new Canadians can be utilized in very difficult contexts:

In Afghanistan, we've been involved there and sending people over for almost five years now, quite apart from identifying experts for activities in Afghanistan. We deployed police experts and some judicial experts there. We're also a major route for DND to recruit what they call cultural interpreters. These are Afghan Canadians. We've got a roster of 200 Afghan Canadians registered with us and screened. So DND approaches us to pick up these individuals to deploy alongside Canadian troops as key force magnifiers out there.

This is actually a bit of a segue to something that we've been looking to do, where we can, with limited resources — tap into more of those new Canadians to draw on their skill sets for them to go back, not as returning Afghans or returning Congolese, but to go back as Canadians with a particular knowledge and awareness of local culture that those of us who are born and raised in Canada just couldn't possibly have. So our Afghan Canadians have been a huge success story. The Afghan government has picked them up directly from us, DND, Foreign Affairs, and a raft of international organizations.[231]

One matter that remains unclear to the Committee is how this established experience of CANADEM will relate to the new “Deployment for Democratic Development Mechanism” (DDD) which has been created under CIDA’s successor to Canada Corps, the Office of Democratic Governance, as described in Chapter 4. According to a CIDA description circulated to the Committee in January 2007, CANADEM will be eligible to bid on the DDD contract. The bidding process appeared to be still underway when CIDA President Robert Greenhill appeared before the Committee in March 2007. As he told the Committee, the DDD:

[W]ill help CIDA recruit and deploy the best and brightest Canadian expertise in democratic governance and respond quickly to needs on the ground.

Right now, what happens is if within CIDA or another government department we identify a need from a country on a certain expertise...if a country comes to us and says they'd really like help in reforming their office of the auditor general, or they'd really like to establish an improvement in this or that area, actually calling upon and deploying that Canadian expertise can be cumbersome and lengthy. By having a democratic deployment mechanism, we'll be working with a Canadian partner — and this has actually gone out now through a request for proposal and through a competitive bid — to be able to quickly draw upon and provide the best thinking and the best Canadian expertise in these different areas of democratic governance.[232]

The CIDA Estimates Part III released on March 30, 2007 describe the DDD as follows: “This initiative will recruit and deploy Canadian democratic governance expertise in developing countries in response to requests from CIDA's geographic branches and in support of their development strategies. It will contribute to the expected results of these countries in the four elements of democratic governance, and in conflict prevention and peace building.”[233] According to information received by Committee staff from Mr. Larose-Edwards on April 2, 2007, CANADEM did not receive the DDD contract. The Committee’s main concern is that this new CIDA mechanism be coherent with what is already being done by CANADEM on an independent low-cost basis.

Police training, judicial reform, elections, parliamentary strengthening, anti-corruption activities, and local governance are among the specific democracy-building sectors mentioned by witnesses as areas of Canadian experience and competence. The RCMP’s Raf Souccar, Assistant Commissioner, Federal and International Operations, mentioned contributions made in Kosovo, Jordan, Afghanistan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Ivory Coast, Haiti and Sierra Leone. He told the Committee that:

Canada now has the ability to become proactive in its approach to international police operations, working with other government agencies in a whole-of-government approach through the identification of areas of strategic interests and the development of personnel with the competencies necessary to respond to the challenges of working in these environments. What this means for the RCMP and our police partners is that we are now in a position to develop a cadre of police experts ready for international deployments. Our roster of skill sets can match specialists with particular missions that call for their talents. The result will be that these men and women will be available for more rapid deployments than in the past, and perhaps best of all, deployments will reduce the burden on the domestic policing capability of our agency and its partners. … Through their efforts abroad, Canadian police export Canadian culture, values, and an established model of democratic policing.[234]

Mr. Souccar also mentioned as lessons of experience that sustained development requires planning for long-term commitment, and that “successful security sector reform requires strategies that target the equal development of judicial, police and corrections capacity.”[235] The Committee has made this point in its December 2006 report on Haiti.[236]

The Canadian Bar Association (CBA), in its testimony and submission to the Committee, noted that its International Development Committee “has delivered legal and justice reform and capacity-building projects in 29 countries across Asia, Africa, Central Europe, and the Caribbean.”[237] In recommending that Canada engage all elements of the legal system in promoting the rule of law, the CBA argued that Canada should proceed cautiously and critically according to best practices that include local ownership and engagement, noted that legal transplantation from one country to another does not work” and that “it seems that the majority of justice system aid goes into Supreme Courts, law ministries and other places which have little or no impact on the lives of the poor and disadvantaged.”[238] Nevertheless, the CBA concluded that Canada can bring positive attributes to the task:

Canada has both the expertise and the experience to take a larger role in promoting democracy and building the rule of law abroad. … Internationally, Canada’s bijuridical legal system (common law and civil law) is well-regarded and Canada’s jurists well-respected. Canada’s experience with participatory civil and criminal justice reform processes, land registry and aboriginal title issues, and restorative justice issues are all examples of the expertise we can share with the world. In addition, Canada has demonstrated the ability to work successfully in a field that requires significant political and cultural sensitivity. In short, with these assets working in its favour, Canada can and should do more.[239]

To take a specific example of Canadian judicial education expertise at work, University of Calgary law professor, and former chair of the board of Rights and Democracy, Kathleen Mahoney, told the Committee about a $12 million judicial strengthening project in Vietnam of which she has been appointed the Canadian director:

What we're doing there is working very much step-by-step. It's a five-year project and right now it's in the needs assessment phase. I brought our overall work plan, which will have many, many outputs over the five years, everything from examination banks to codes of conduct, to textbooks on substantive issues, to pedagogical techniques and curriculum development for human rights seminars, involvement in civil society, techniques of doing that to assist the judges in developing understanding of ethnic minorities and their values and cultures, etc. So there's a whole range of activities and projects and outcomes that will occur over the next five years.

You see, one of the problems in this field so far is that a lot of judicial education has been very episodic. You go and have a conference for three days in some country in Africa and think when you walk away everything is going to change. It doesn't work that way. It's like educating anyone: you start off with curriculum and you have progress, development, you have evaluations and you have markers you're trying to achieve. So I think we're now into an era of a much more sophisticated approach to these issues.

I think we're seeing that the recipient countries are far more aware of how critically important the judiciary is, not just in the courtroom to dispense justice, but in developing public confidence in democracy. They're seeing the judiciary as an arm of it that must be developed along with governance structures in the mainstream.[240]

With respect to elections, in Chapter 4, we have already noted the internationally-recognized work of Elections Canada in nearly 100 countries since 1990. Former Chief Electoral Officer Jean-Pierre Kingsley elaborated on this in his testimony to the Committee:

Our activities range from sending a single expert to address one aspect of the electoral process to assembling multi-year, multi-country teams to undertake in-depth and ongoing analysis and assistance, to undertaking observation and accompaniment covering all areas of the electoral process. These initiatives have given us the experience that has proven instrumental in evolving a unique approach to international electoral assistance. Our approach is one of accompanying — therefore my use of the word “accompaniment” — electoral management bodies before, during, and after elections, and of helping them develop and strengthen institutional frameworks, skills, and autonomy, or independence, which are crucial building blocks to electoral democratic development.

This approach is an elastic model that allows for mutual learning.[241]

Mr. Kingsley also agreed that basic civic education should become part of developing better electoral processes over the longer term. A he put it: “If we had a holistic approach to democratic approaches and to democratic development, we could start to address in a very significant way, at primary school and at high school, the flaws that need to be addressed in the electoral system or in the education system concerning elections.”[242]

Elections, of course, cannot achieve lasting results without development of the legislative bodies to which candidates for office are elected. Robert Miller, president of the Ottawa-based Parliamentary Centre emphasized to the Committee the key role of strengthening parliamentary institutions and of support from both government and the Parliament of Canada in that regard. As he testified, this means Canadian support for creating local capacity in the field. Speaking of the Centre: “Over the past 15 years, we have evolved into a Canadian-based international organization, with staff and offices delivering programs in many parts of the world. Leadership in the centre comes increasingly from people like Bunleng Men, who heads our program in Cambodia, and Rasheed Draman, who is director of our Africa program, based in our regional office in Accra, Ghana.”[243]

Mr. Draman, in a presentation to the February 15, 2007 “Dialogue on Canada’s Approach to Democratic Development”, gave an example of what is possible:

Under our Canada Fund [for Africa[244]] project — the Africa-Canada Parliamentary Strengthening Program, working through networks clustered around the policy areas identified earlier, we collaborate with policy institutions and civil society groups in Africa, to design and deliver programs aimed at building the capacity of parliamentary committees in the area of poverty reduction. We create linkages between MPs interested in fighting corruption (through national chapters of the African Parliamentary Network Against Corruption — APNAC) and local chapters of Transparency International. These linkages have proved very useful in a number of countries.[245]

Mr. Draman went on to mention work on gender issues in the political process, and, in regard to parliamentary budget and financial oversight, the establishment in October 2006 of a Learning Centre in the Parliamentary Centre’s Ghana office, which over the coming years will be a “Centre of Excellence on Parliamentary Training”. Significantly, he strongly credited Canada as the source of external support because: “Canada has a huge political capital by way of reputation around the world. Unlike other donors, Canada does not have any ‘baggage’. Canadians are warmly welcomed wherever we go. We need to ‘spend’ this capital and make a difference around the world by being innovative, responsive and above all, take risks.”[246]

The Committee takes this latter point to heart, and indeed we had confirmation of the importance of the Canadian contribution from the evidence of a delegation of senior African parliamentarians in November 2006. Mr. Augustine Ruzindana of Uganda, Chair of the African Parliamentarians Network Against Corruption, told the Committee: “Without the input of Canadian aid, it would not have been possible. … Canada is playing a useful role, at least with regard to the African continent, in strengthening democracy.”[247] Mr. Steve Akorli, a retired parliamentarian who is Co-Chair of the Coordinating Council of the Africa-Canada Parliamentary Strengthening Program, added:

Canada has helped Africa a lot. … [In regard to Ghana] it took a country like Canada to come to our aid in building our capacity. … Ghana's parliamentary capacity and oversight in the areas of financing and poverty-related issues has deepened a lot.

The issue of gender activism has been elevated to a level you cannot imagine. The civil society within Ghana has come up with what it calls a “gender manifesto”. It looks at what can be done for women, to move from where they are to where they can have access to land, credit, and things that will give them a bigger voice.

These are the offshoots of the democratic experiment we have done over the past 15 years. We are very grateful to Canada for it.[248]

In terms of supporting stronger parliamentary oversight and anti-corruption activities, our colleague John Williams M.P. — who is Chair of the Global Organization of Parliamentarians Against Corruption (GOPAC) that was founded at a gathering in the Canadian House of Commons in 2002 — urged the Committee to emphasize the importance of building parliamentary independence within partner countries. We will address strengthening the role of parliamentarians further in Chapter 7. As to GOPAC’s work, Mr. Williams told the Committee:

GOPAC has one mission: to make parliaments more effective as democratic institutions of oversight of government. The organization has three pillars to support this mission statement. First is peer support for parliamentarians who are travelling the difficult and sometimes dangerous road of standing up against corruption. Second is education for parliamentarians. We send our young people to university to become lawyers, doctors, engineers, and accountants, but who trains the parliamentarians in the skills of oversight of government? Third is leadership for results. Talk is not sufficient. It is time that we as parliamentarians demanded accountability from our governments and took a leadership role in fighting corruption to ensure honesty and integrity in governance.[249]

In the area of improving local governance, which the Committee has already highlighted in Chapter 2, Canada has been active as well, notably through projects undertaken by the Federation of Canadian Municipalities (FCM). As its acting president Gord Steves told the Committee: “We currently manage 10 programs in Africa, Asia, and Latin America. Our annual program budget currently is $12 million, which employs 35 staff. In 20 years, we’ve worked in 44 countries in Africa, Asia, Latin America, and the Caribbean, and we are currently working in 18 countries as we sit here right now. We are involved with more than 2,500 municipal volunteers; currently 15 volunteer practitioners for each calendar day.”[250]

The FCM, which is funded by CIDA, sees Canada as being an international leader in this field along with the Netherlands. According to Brock Carlton, Director of FCM’s International Centre for Municipal Development, the attempt is to create long-term collaborative partnerships “supporting the strengthening of existing institutions and supporting their capacity to respond to the needs of their community.”

Another element of this is the peer-to-peer. When we are working overseas we are not bringing development professionals who go to Uganda for two weeks, do a nice report, and then they're on an airplane to some other place for another report. We're bringing the folks who do the work here in Canada and they're volunteering their time to go and sit down with the folks who do the work in Kampala, Nairobi, or anywhere else where we're working. They're the people who really do the work. They are bringing the real Canadian experience. They're not saying, we do it in Canada the way it should be done and you should follow what we do. What they're saying is, we've got a certain experience and we in Canada have come to a certain place in our development because of that experience, and because it's so practical, we can work through and help solve your problems in your context in the way that makes sense in your community. It's very much a practitioner based approach.[251]

The FCM also shared with the Committee its proposed “Global Program for Local Governance” (which would involve $12 million annually for five years), and which has been the subject of “difficult conversations” with CIDA. As Mr. Carlton put it: “Currently we’re working with CIDA on a variety of projects, but there’s no continuity over the long term. Projects come, projects go, but there’s no long-term strategy or long-term perspective on how to engage the municipal sector in Canadian interest overseas.”[252] This seems to be a more general problem in the democratic development field. As Robert Miller of the Parliamentary Centre told the Committee: “Democracy is a complex of institutions, practices, values… that develop slowly. It follows that assistance to democratic development must go beyond the relatively short-term, project-by-project approach that has characterized international assistance in the past.”[253]

The Committee will address the elements of giving Canada the elements of an enhanced coherent and long-term strategic approach to supporting democratic development in Part III of this report. We will do so knowing that the above is far from being an exhaustive list of Canadian capabilities at work in the areas of democratic development. Indeed CIDA’s own written submission on “democratic governance” given to the Committee in October 2006 indicated a sample of numerous projects and programs in many countries — perhaps too many — carried out under its sub-sectors of “freedom and democracy”, “human rights”, “accountable public institutions”, and “rule of law”.

It is the question of overall impact and visibility that lingers. On the one hand, we are told that Canada is well-regarded internationally, that Canada has something special to offer, that there are skilled Canadians interested and involved in this field; on the other that Canadian support spread thinly in many places often receives little notice, and that Canada is still punching below its weight in this field.

The contradiction was particularly apparent in the testimony of Kevin Deveaux, then a Member of the Legislative Assembly of Nova Scotia, who has done extensive work with the U.S. National Democratic Institute and who in March 2007 has taken up a full-time position with the UNDP in Vietnam. In response to a question he told the Committee:

From my perspective and that of others in the field, Canadians are doing great work, and Canada has something to offer that no other country can. You'll be amazed at how many Canadians are doing this work, particularly for American organizations, because the Americans have a system that is very similar to maybe Latin America but isn't commonly used in Europe, or in Africa, or in Asia. Our system, our parliamentary system, is much more common, and Canadians have a much better opportunity, based on our experience politically, to provide input.[254]

Yet in earlier remarks he had bluntly stated:

One of the things I want to say from being in the field is that Canada is not a serious player in the area of democratization development. When you look at countries such as the United Kingdom with its Westminster Foundation for Democracy, the Americans with NED, NDI, and IRI, the Germans with their Stiftungs, and others, most people would say that Canada has not even begun to present itself at an international level in the areas particularly of parliamentary and executive and political party development.[255]

The Committee will return to this issue and propose its own solution in Chapter 7.

A further “serious player” issue has been the diffusion of Canadian assistance — too little aid dispersed over many places. As Mr. Deveaux expressed it: “I like the concept of Canada focusing on a few countries but investing significant funds in them. Again, from places like Kosovo and others, I can say that $2 million or $2.5 million Canadian can get you to be the most significant funder and can develop an impressive role for Canada in those countries. So instead of a scattergun approach where you may have 30 or 40 countries, I would recommend that the mandate be on intensive support for ten countries or so, so you end up having a significant impact in those countries.”[256]

The Committee realizes that making such choices will not be easy. But we believe that there is more background work on this which must be done in order that policymakers can make decisions based on the fullest information. Indeed, we note that the Discussion Paper prepared for the Democracy Council sets out a series of pertinent questions in this regard:

Identifying Canadian strengths or areas of comparative advantage might be done in different ways. One might ask: (1) what sort of experience and expertise has Canada accumulated through its aid programs and arms-length and other institutions, and where, in that regard, has Canada built expertise that perhaps distinguishes it from other countries? A second question might be: (2) What are the unique aspects or strengths of the Canadian democratic system itself and how are these aspects reflected or focussed in the kinds of assistance that Canada delivers? Another approach might be to ask: (3) Are there particular geographic regions or institutional fora in which Canada has particular strengths or advantages, or a history of positive engagement on which to build?[257]

Good questions, to which the Discussion Paper drops suggestive hints, but does not answer. The Committee believes that policy-relevant analytical work still needs to be done if the potential of Canadian capabilities and possibilities in democracy aid is to be more fully realized over the longer term.

Recommendation 6

The independent evaluation of existing Canadian democracy assistance funding that we have proposed in Recommendation 3 should include an assessment of those sectors in which Canadian democracy aid has been most effective, and in which Canadians have the greatest capacity to contribute their skills.

Recommendation 7

In terms of actually deploying Canadian expertise abroad, the evaluation should ascertain whether there is coherence among all publicly funded activities being undertaken by Canada.

Recommendation 8

In addition, recognizing that global needs in this complex field are vast, the evaluation should provide some indication of which countries might most benefit from a concentration of Canadian efforts.