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Chapter 4 Reviewing the Progress of Canada’s Involvement to Date

Canadian interest in using foreign policy instruments to advance the cause of democracy abroad was galvanized by the U.S. foreign policy debates of the late 1970s and early 1980s about interventions in other states (notably in Central America) on human rights and democracy grounds.[176] In 1983, the U.S. created the National Endowment for Democracy (NED) as an arms-length non-profit body funded through congressional appropriations, to support the development of democratic institutions in other countries.[177] The NED budget received from Congress in fiscal year 2006 was over US$74 million. (The NED also receives about 3% of its financing from other sources, which included in 2005 the Embassy of Canada.) The Endowment has a grant-making relationship with four implementing agencies, which receive more than half of annual NED funds: the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI, loosely associated with the national Democratic Party), the International Republican Institute (IRI, loosely associated with the national Republican Party), the Center for International Private Enterprise, and the American Center for International Labour Solidarity. The budget of NDI alone surpasses that of the NED.[178] Noteworthy is that from the inception of the NED, it involved political parties in democratic development work.

The Canadian government was challenged to become similarly active in the field of democracy support by a 1985-86 parliamentary review of foreign policy. But at the same time, it was also advised to proceed with caution in pursuing a less aggressive and more multilateralist approach to both human rights and democracy promotion. The issue of involving political parties was deemed too sensitive and to this day, Canada has not been involved in political party development as part of democracy assistance. The following summarizes key stages in initial and increasing Canadian involvement in international democratic development.

The June 1986 final report, Independence and Internationalism, of the parliamentary Special Joint Committee on Canada’s International Relations, affirmed that political and human rights development should be part of international cooperation and called for the establishment of an “International Institute of Human Rights and Democratic Development.” This proposal for an independent statutory arms-length body was strongly reaffirmed in the landmark May 1987 report of this Committee (then called the Standing Committee on External Affairs and International Trade), For Whose Benefit?, which remains the only comprehensive parliamentary study undertaken of Canada’s ODA policies and programs.

The Mulroney government responded favourably and appointed two special rapporteurs, Professors John Courtney and Gisèle Côté-Harper, to study the concept. Their summer 1987 report to the government urged adoption of a non-ideological approach, stating: “The notion of democracy which we have adopted, and which we believe must define and inspire Canadian assistance in this area, is quite simply the participation of citizens in decision-making which affects their lives.”[179] Still, the rapporteurs were so wary of the contested connotations of ‘democracy’ that they recommended the new organization be called the International Centre for Human Rights and Institutional Development.[180] Their report stated as justification:

Many of our interlocutors, notably those working in the area of cooperation with developing countries, and those involved in the protection and promotion of human rights internationally, have cautioned us against the use of the word “democracy” and its derivatives in the formulation of the name and the mandate of an eventual institution. This terminology, they have reminded us, has acquired an ideological, political and cultural meaning which differs profoundly from one region of the world to another. Coming from a western industrialized country, it risks being interpreted as an intention to impose on our cooperation programs in this area our own concept of democracy. Others are concerned that it will be received as indicative of the philosophy of the present USA Administration. It seems to us indispensable to avoid any such ambiguity — ambiguity which would prevent, furthermore, many groups which could benefit from Canadian assistance from seeking such assistance.[181]

In the event, the government and the parliament of the day decided it was not necessary to throw the democracy baby out with the bathwater — that it was possible to refer explicitly to democratic development as a goal of universal human rights-based application. Accordingly, Parliament in 1988 passed legislation establishing an International Centre for Human Rights and Democratic Development (ICHRDD, known today by its short form as Rights & Democracy), with a mandate anchored to the UN International Bill of Human Rights.[182]

Funding for the Centre was set at $5 million annually from the official development assistance budget. During some later years, the Centre’s parliamentary appropriation has been even less than that. In fact, the $5 million level was not surpassed until 2005. (The total parliamentary allocation appears to be approximately $8.8 million for the 2006-2007 fiscal year, with the total budget of Rights and Democracy currently just under $10 million.[183]) After considerable delay, the Centre opened its doors in 1990 with Hon. Ed Broadbent as its first president. During its first decade of existence, over 300 democracy assistance projects were supported in nearly 50 countries.[184] The Centre has had three presidents in its history, each of whom testified before the Committee in the course of this study.[185] As noted in Chapter 2, it is also subject to a statutory review every five years.[186]

The establishment of ICHRDD (Rights and Democracy) was the main legacy of Canadian policy discussion of democratic development in the 1980s. From the 1990s to the present, other government-funded activities were initiated and/or expanded, involving in the case of CIDA’s own programming, much larger sums.

Before turning to CIDA, it is important to recognize the highly-regarded international role of Elections Canada, whose former head, Jean-Pierre Kingsley testified before the Committee twice in 2006.[187] During the 1990s, Elections Canada expanded its election monitoring and electoral support activities, including entering into capacity-building agreements with Mexico and the Russian Federation. One of their documents states: “Since 1980, Elections Canada has organized some 400 international democratic development missions in 100 countries around the world.”[188] According to a 2006 DFAIT briefing note, these included “missions with the UN, OAS, OSCE, the Commonwealth and La Francophonie. Some of Canada’s most recent, high profile engagements in the area of democracy promotion have included election assistance in Iraq, Haiti, Afghanistan, the Ukraine, and the Palestinian territories. Afghanistan received a contribution of $13M in support of Afghanistan’s parliamentary, provincial and presidential elections.”[189]

As to the approach which has been taken by Elections Canada, Mr. Kinglsey told the Committee:

Pure observation is not the best way to deploy Elections Canada resources. Our strength lies in providing electoral support that addresses the longer process of democratization. We do this by working to build the capacity and the independence of electoral management bodies — by helping to design, development (sic), implement and strengthen electoral commissions, while respecting the cultures and histories from which they emanate. … Not surprisingly, electoral assistance is also complex work.[190]

Significantly, Mr. Kingsley added that: “With more money and people assigned to our international role, we would be able to accomplish much more. … It is useful to reiterate that Elections Canada is an independent agency of Parliament. This independence provides us with credibility and effectiveness on the international scene.”[191]

From the Government of Canada side, by far the major dispenser of democracy assistance funds has been CIDA, which became more engaged in projects of its own during the 1990s. In the early 1990s, it was still wrestling with defining its role in a growing field. A 1992 bilingual book on democratic development resulting from a study commissioned by CIDA suggested four main types of democracy aid, and a possible division of labour among governmental instruments, arms-length bodies like ICHRDD and Canadian NGOs, differentiating between institutional and state-building aspects of democratic development and more politically sensitive advocacy work. The book was one of the first in the field and was referred to positively by Thomas Axworthy in his testimony.[192] The final two points in the book’s executive summary were:

·        There are four broad types of official development assistance (ODA) support for democratic institution building: strengthening state administrative capacity and bureaucratic expertise; strengthening the formal democratic structures, e.g., legislatures, judiciary, human rights commissions; strengthening civil society, e.g., development NGOs, micro-enterprises, rural cooperatives, credit unions, universities, the media, private entrepreneurs, human rights monitors; and strengthening political advocacy groups, e.g., for human rights, the environment, women’s issues, indigenous peoples, land reform.

·        There is some overlap, but a division of labour may evolve naturally among the relevant Canadian institutions capable of providing democratic development assistance: the Department of External Affairs and Elections Canada have already undertaken much of the electoral monitoring; the International Centre for Human Rights and Democratic Development’s (ICHRDD) semi-autonomous status makes it ideally placed to take on the more politically sensitive work with advocacy or “counter-consensus” groups; Canadian NGOs have built up partnerships with Third World NGOs and some are showing interest in advocacy work. The Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), and perhaps the International Development Research Centre (IDRC), could undertake the bulk of state and formal democratic institutional development.[193]

In 1996, an official framework was adopted, the Government of Canada Policy for CIDA on Human Rights, Democratization and Good Governance, which states:

Democratization builds the effective participation of individuals in decision making and the exercise of power in society, both through the formal processes of democracy, and through the organizations of civil society that give voice to popular concerns. Good governance ensures the effective, honest, equitable and accountable exercise of power by governments. … CIDA does not seek to export particular Canadian institutions or practices; rather, the Agency seeks to work carefully and sensitively with those in developing countries who are best placed to achieve positive change.”

We will return to developments at the federal government level in recent years. But first, it should be noted that Canada was also becoming more active at the multilateral level. (The Committee’s analysis and recommendations on Canada’s future role in international organizations are contained in chapter 8.)

After joining the Organization of American States (OAS) in 1990, Canada took a lead in the creation of the Unit for the Promotion of Democracy in 1991, and later championed the Special Fund for Strengthening Democracy and the 2001 Democracy Charter. The Committee heard testimony from John Graham, President of the Board of Directors of the Canadian Foundation for the Americas, who was instrumental in initiating the work of the Unit for the Promotion of Democracy. Mr. Graham noted that since 1990, the OAS has conducted over 80 election observations in 19 of its 34 members.[194] Subsequently, we also met with senior members of the OAS in Washington, D.C. on  February 6, 2007. The Unit, now the Department for the Promotion of Democracy, has been headed by a Canadian Elizabeth Spehar since 1995. Canada has become the second largest contributor to the OAS (US$9.2 million assessed contribution in 2004-2005, plus an additional voluntary contribution of $9 million); however, the OAS budget for democracy promotion is still fairly small ($3.5 million in 2006 from its own budget with an anticipated $10-15 million in external funding[195]).

In the Commonwealth context, the Mulroney government strongly supported the Harare Commonwealth Declaration in 1991 which pledged leaders to work with renewed vigour on “democracy, democratic processes and institutions which reflect national circumstances, the rule of law and the independence of the judiciary, just and honest government.”[196] In 1995 at Canada’s initiative, the Commonwealth heads of government created the Commonwealth Ministerial Action Group (CMAG) to support, and where necessary work to restore, democratic constitutional rule in member states. The Committee met with the Commonwealth Secretariat in London on October 11, 2006, at which time Secretary General, Donald MacKinnon, noted work on democratic development in 45 countries, including a number of election observation missions in which Canadians have participated. Canada is also the second largest contributor to the Commonwealth (providing $13.16 million to the Commonwealth Fund for Technical Cooperation in
2005-2006).

Canada has also pressed to enshrine democratic principles in the work of la Francophonie, where it is again the second largest contributor ($6.6 million in 2005-2006). A key milestone was the 1997 Hanoi Summit’s Charter of the Francophonie, which declared that the Agence de la Francophonie (since 1998 known as the International Organization of the Francophonie) must “support the efforts of member states and of the Secretary General to consolidate the rule of law and democracy and promotion of human rights.” The Bamako Declaration of 2000 explicitly committed the Francophonie to the defence and promotion of democracy, with work to be carried out by a division of the International Organization, the Délégation à la démocratie et aux droits de l’homme. Subsequently, the 2004 Ougadougou summit adopted a 10-year strategic framework to implement the Bamako Declaration commitments.

In the European and transatlantic context, mention should also be made of Canada’s involvement in the Council of Europe (CoE) and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). The CoE, founded in 1949 to defend human rights, parliamentary democracy, and the rule of law, currently has 46 members. In 1996, Canada gained observer status at the Council, and in 1997 the Parliament of Canada achieved a similar status in the Council’s Parliamentary Assembly. The CoE has played an important role in the establishment of democracies across the continent, including by creating enforcing international human rights standards for all member states, providing technical assistance, monitoring compliance with stringent standards in the areas of human rights, democratic policy-making and elections, and creating parliamentary peer review and oversight mechanisms.

In the case of the OSCE — so named in 1994 emerging out of the Helsinki process of the 1970s; currently with 56 members including Canada and the United States — it has increasingly become a “human dimension” organization. In this regard, the OSCE actively supports the democratization process through its field activities — including election observation — and critically reviewing the records of participating states in its forums. Implementation of member-country commitments in this area is primarily coordinated and monitored through the Office of Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), evolved from the Office for Free Elections established in 1990. Canada is involved as a full member, both at the inter-governmental level and within the OSCE’s Parliamentary Assembly. Canada’s contribution to the OSCE was $7.43 million in 2005-2006.

In 1997, Canada became a sustaining member of the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA) based in Stockholm, Sweden, providing funding of $500,000 in 2005-2006. As the Committee was told during its meeting with IDEA’s senior staff in Stockholm on October 12, 2006, IDEA is an inter-governmental organization with 24 members on six continents, and a global mandate to contribute to sustainable democracy by improving the quality and effectiveness of democratic practices worldwide.[197] IDEA works with 120 partner organizations, notably including from Canada, Elections Canada, CIDA, and the Forum of the Federations (in Sri Lanka). Canada has been represented on IDEA’s Board by Maureen O’Neil, President of IDRC, and since the fall of 2006, Senator Hugh Segal. In May 2006, CIDA co-funded an IDEA conference in Ottawa on effective electoral assistance.[198]

In 2000, Canada became a founding member of the Community of Democracies established at a meeting of 106 governments in Warsaw, Poland. As Richard Rowson, President of the Council for a Community of Democracies (CCD) told the Committee in Washington D.C. on February 6, 2007, the CCD prefers to think in terms of democracy “support” rather than “promotion”. Its premise is that a concert of democracies can help to foster new democracies. In 2005, it established an International Centre for Democratic Transition in Budapest to help with the transfer of knowledge. The CD also has links to the UN system, and pushed to create a UN “Democracy Caucus” in 2004. It has also been involved in UN reform efforts, notably in regard to the Human Rights Council. The CD supports a global effort at “democracy education” and has convened a series of conferences to talk about strategies, including in the most difficult area of the Middle East. However: “There has never been a real civil society constituency for the CD.” The CD has received a grant from the new UN Democracy Fund to enable it to establish regional networks that can seek out more NGO input. The CD sees itself as part of a global democracy movement of both governments and NGOs. There has also been established an international steering committee of the NGO Process of the Community of Democracies.

In terms of the United Nations, it has with Canadian support become increasingly involved in support in democracy assistance activities, principally through the Electoral Assistance Division of the Department of Political Affairs, established in 1992, and the much larger funding of “democratic governance” support ($US1.4 billion in 2005) by the United Nations Development Program (UNDP).[199] Canada’s overall assessed contribution to the work of UNDP was nearly $120 million in 2005-2006, plus millions more for voluntary contributions to UNDP programs in different regions and countries including Haiti.[200]

The UN Secretary-General produced a 1996 report, An Agenda for Democracy, on support to new and restored democracies, and to date six International Conferences on New and Restored Democracies have been held in close cooperation with the UN. The 2000 Millennium Declaration of world leaders included this pledge: “We will spare no effort to promote democracy and strengthen the rule of law …” In 2005, the UN created a Democracy Fund (UNDEF) based on voluntary contributions from member countries (now 27, not including Canada, totalling US$50 million, according to information received by the Committee at a meeting with UNDEF staff on February 7, 2007 in New York). The 2005 UN World Summit also led to the creation of a Peacebuilding Commission which will assist countries in transition from armed conflict to long-term reconstruction, establishing foundations for democratic development, including coordinating support for
institution-building and reform, reconciliation, and electoral assistance.

The Committee had productive meetings with representatives of all these UN bodies in February 2007, and was particularly struck by the number of Canadians occupying senior positions in them. We will examine future UN roles for Canada in Chapter 8.

Returning to developments of recent years within Canada, in 2004 the Canadian government created “Canada Corps” under CIDA as a new vehicle to strengthen Canada’s contribution to human rights, democracy and good governance internationally. A Government of Canada April 2005 International Policy Statement (IPS) subsequently elaborated on the role of Canada Corps in its “Development” chapter, and also announced the establishment of a “‘Democracy Council’ comprising government departments and organizations such as the Parliamentary Centre[201], the IDRC, the Centre for International Governance Innovation, Elections Canada, the Forum of Federations, and Rights and Democracy, to guide good governance policy making.” The IPS also mentioned cooperation “with the Federation of Municipalities to promote sustainable cities and strengthen local governance and capacity building in the developing world.”[202]

According to a February 2007 government background note, the Democracy Council currently consists of DFAIT, CIDA, Elections Canada, Forum of the Federations, IDRC, National Judicial Institute, Parliamentary Centre and Rights and Democracy. In terms of process: “The Council is comprised of Senior Executives of each organization, the Deputy Minister of DFAIT and the President of CIDA. The Council meets twice a year, while a Working Group of the Council, co-chaired by CIDA and DFAIT, meets monthly to support the Council’s activities and objectives.”[203] We will address the Council’s role further in Chapters 6 and 7.

Other governmental and non-governmental Canadian agencies and organizations involved in aspects of democracy assistance abroad include: the RCMP; Department of Justice; Department of Finance (as the department responsible for international financial institutions including the World Bank, which has become a major funder of good governance programs, and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, which explicitly mentions human rights and multi-party democracy in its founding charter); the Institute for Media, Policy and Civil Society (IMPACS), the Media and Democracy Group; the Canadian Bar Association; the Centre for International Governance Innovation (ClGl); CANADEM (which maintains a roster of some 8,000 Canadian experts for international deployment); the World Federalist Movement — Canada, the Federation of Canadian Municipalities. The Committee has received testimony and/or written submissions from most of these organizations.

In mid-2006, DFAIT created a small “Democracy Unit” which appears to be mainly involved in policy development and coordination. However, as a 2006 DFAIT briefing note states: “The primary source of Canadian government funding for the promotion of democracy has been CIDA programming in the area of ‘good governance.’ In the period 1999-2004, funding in the area of good governance accounted for roughly 20%, or more than $380M, of CIDA’s overall annual disbursements.”[204] The 2005-2006 Estimates Part III — Reports on Plans and Priorities for CIDA define governance as one of the agency’s priorities as follows: “Promoting public sector reform and the rule of law; building democratic institutions and processes that represent and engage all members of society; supporting the increased promotion and protection of the human rights of men, women, boys, and girls by institutions, governments, and civil society organizations; and, increasing attention to conflict prevention, post-conflict reconciliation, peacebuilding, and security.”[205]

CIDA’s 2006-2007 Estimates continue to refer to a broad “governance” category, accounting for 21.1% of total planned spending or $584 million. This is the figure given to the Committee by CIDA president in an information note dated March 21, 2007, and which comprises $466 million for “democratic governance” and “for planning purposes, peace and security expenditures of $118 million.”[206] In terms of CIDA’s category of “democratic governance”, this is a significant increase from the total of spending for that in 2005-2006, which was given to the Committee as “over $375 million” by both the Minister for International Cooperation, Josée Verner, in October 2006[207] and CIDA President, Robert Greenhill, in March 2007.[208] In updated information received from Mr. Greenhill on  March 21, 2007, a more precise figure of $376.7 million was given for democratic governance, or 14% of actual CIDA program spending in the 2005-2006 fiscal year.[209]

What is clear is that amounts devoted to democratic development/democratic governance by CIDA have increased significantly since 2005. But getting a handle on what CIDA is currently spending on democratic governance has proved to be more difficult than it should be. Depending on what is being counted, when, and in what category, noted development consultant Ian Smillie suggested to the Committee that it could be much higher:

[D]emocratic governance, which in the 2005-06 estimates for CIDA was $565 million is $900 million today, according to a CIDA document that I picked up the other day. That’s a 60% increase, which might be heartening in some ways, but it’s probably a coding issue. It’s probably the way the issue was coded before. If it’s not a coding issue, if it really is a 60% increase in funding, then that means significant decreases in other areas in a very short space of time, and an indication that, again, we’re not staying the course on some of the things we had in place.[210]

The CIDA document in question, “Canada’s Aid Program”, dated January 29, 2007, in Annex B “Canadian Development Assistance Profile — Sectoral Priorities and Canadian Engagement” has a category called “Democratic Governance and Crisis Response”. The $900 million figure in fact comes from the total allocated for this category, which is a very broad one including — freedom/democracy; public institutions; human rights; rule of law; conflict prevention; humanitarian assistance; peacebuilding. In several other charts in this January 2007 CIDA document, it is indicated that “democratic governance” accounts for 21% of current CIDA aid spending. This overall amount is broken down into: 46% for freedom and democracy; 38% for public institutions/anti-corruption; 8% for human rights; 7% for rule of law.

If one projects that 21% allocation forward into the 2007-2008 fiscal year — in which CIDA will receive $3.049 billion according to the Main Estimates Part II released on February 27, 2007 — CIDA would spend $640.329 million on “democratic governance” broadly defined in that fiscal year. Confusingly, however, the 2007-2008 Estimates Part III for CIDA released on March 30, 2007 do not appear to give an overall amount for democratic governance spending, although the document does state that “democratic governance will be integrated as a priority sector in all major country programs. Over the planning period, 23 per cent of programming to countries of concentration [the total figure for that is given as $826.2 million] is expected to contribute significantly to democratic governance.”[211]

Added to the mix is that CIDA replaced Canada Corps with an Office of Democratic Governance (ODG) on October 30, 2006.[212] CIDA President Robert Greenhill told the Committee that the Office includes a Deployment for Democratic Development Mechanism, “a multi-million dollar initiative which will help CIDA recruit and deploy the best and the brightest Canadian expertise in democratic governance and respond quickly to needs on the ground.”[213] In his testimony of March 2007, Mr. Greenhill further indicated that the Office was budgeted at $40 million “for this year”, and that “the intent of the Office of Democratic Governance is explicitly to be providing additional funds to the already large amounts of money that we’re investing in CIDA and across the government on the issue of democratic governance.”[214]

According to Mr. Greenhill, the Office of Democratic Governance is also intended to contribute to addressing part of the knowledge gap considered by the Committee in Chapter 2:

In a collaborative learning perspective, the Office has combined its strengths with those of the Centre for International Governance Innovation, or CIGI, in Waterloo, to create a knowledge exchange gateway for all stakeholders involved in democratic governance. This virtual governance village will attract the international community’s attention to Canada’s pool of knowledge, expertise and leadership in the field of democratic
governance promotion. It will improve the ability of decision-makers and practitioners to create policies and programs in developing countries based on evidence, and will facilitate the integration of that knowledge and innovative and effective practices.
[215]

Furthermore, the CIDA Report on Plans and Priorities 2007-2008 — Estimates Part III, released on March 30, 2007, outline quite extensive plans for the agenda of this Office:

The Office has promoted a whole-of-government approach by establishing framework arrangements with Statistics Canada and the Office of the Auditor General of Canada. It has also established mechanisms that facilitate greater coherence between Canadian and international organizations when sending election observers abroad.

Through its support to institutions such as the World Bank, the ODG is building the capacity of national statistics organizations and supreme audit institutions in numerous developing countries. It is also providing assistance to the Organization for Economic
Co-operation and Development’s (OECD) Development Assistance Committee’s (DAC) Human Rights Measurement Initiative and Carleton University’s Country Indicators for Foreign Policy Project, both of which will provide accurate, timely and effective governance indicators for evidence-based programming. In addition, ODG is working to establish knowledge networks on democratic governance that strengthen collaboration, exchange and coordination between and among experts, both within and outside of the Agency.
[216]

Elsewhere in this Estimates document, it is stated that the ODG will also fund:

The Democratic Governance Fellows Program: This program will 1) provide “state-of-the art” thinking on issues and problems of democratic governance, trends and innovative approaches for effective practice; 2) develop working relationships between CIDA officials and leading Canadian and international expertise, particularly from developing and transition countries, as well as institutions working to promote democratic governance; and 3) provide expert input into the development, operation and evaluation of CIDA country programs in democratic governance.[217]

Summing up, the Canadian government currently funds a myriad of democracy assistance projects and programs, both directly and indirectly, through Canadian government departments and agencies (principally CIDA), Canadian non-governmental organizations, arms-length institutions, and multilateral institutions. Indeed, CIDA’s written submission to the Committee of October 2006, “CIDA and Democratic Governance”, states that “CIDA works with more than a hundred partners”, the majority of which are other government departments and Canadian organizations. We have attempted in an Appendix to this chapter to provide a schematic overview of the most significant players in Canadian democracy assistance in terms of bilateral ODA funding.

Notwithstanding all this activity and variable funding, some witnesses and other commentators have argued that Canadian support for democratic development remains too modest, diffuse and fragmented to be very visible internationally or to have had much cumulative effect. Canada is not seen as a major player even by those who admire its approach. For example, Thomas Melia of the Walsh School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University, and Deputy Director of Freedom House, mentioned to the Committee (meeting in Washington D.C., February 6, 2007) his participation in a 2002 Defending Democracy book which lauded the merits of Canada’s approach to supporting democratization.[218] He then told the Committee that “probably more Canadians are working in U.S. and international organizations [on democracy support activities] than in Canadian organizations”. Among the latter, “probably the best known asset is Elections Canada”. Rights and Democracy “hasn’t been that visible”.

The Committee will have more to say about how to move forward from the current situation in Part III of our report on new directions for Canadian policy and funding, especially in Chapters 6 and 7. At this point, not least for the purposes of transparency and accountability, we believe it is necessary to have a more clearly established and evaluated baseline of the resources already being expended by Canada for the purposes of democratic development assistance.

Recommendation 5

The independent evaluation of all existing Canadian public funding for democratic development proposed by the Committee in Recommendation 3 should include a complete picture of what is being done, by what organization, for what purposes, and according to a common understanding of what is considered to be democratic development assistance. This complete picture should be seen within the larger framework of the official development assistance policy pursued by Canada.


[176]     For a more detailed account of the evolution of Canadian support for democratic development see Gerald Schmitz, “The Role of International Democracy Promotion in Canada’s Foreign Policy”, Institute for Research on Public Policy, Policy Matters, Vol. 5 No. 10, November 2004 (available online at http://www.irpp.org ).

[177]     For a detailed account of the creation of the NED and subsequent evolution of U.S. democracy promotion in the 1980s see Thomas Carothers, Aiding Democracy Abroad, 1999, pp. 29-40.

[178]     The Committee met with senior representatives of the NED, NDI, and IRI in Washington D.C. on  February 5, 2007. NDI’s current annual budget is US$120 million, and it has 60 field offices around the world. IRI has an annual budget of US$80 million, with 48 field offices abroad. More information on all these entities can be found on their web sites.

[179]     Report of the Special Rapporteurs, Ottawa, n.d. p. 25.

[180]     Ibid., pp. 27ff.

[181]     Ibid., pp. 24-25.

[182]     The International Bill of Human Rights comprises the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights and its legal instruments, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Social, Economic, and Cultural Rights.

[183]     According to information received from Rights and Democracy in March 2007, this is made up of $4.873 million from DFAIT and an additional contribution of $3.930 million from CIDA; the latter amount being only finally decided in January 2007 (and therefore is not reflected in the CIDA 2006-2007 Estimates). When Rights & Democracy’s president, Jean-Louis Roy, appeared before the Committee on Haiti, he gave the current parliamentary allocation as $7.3 million and mentioned that the organization also raises funds from several other sources giving it an annual budget of “a little less than $10 million”. See Evidence, Meeting No. 14, June 21, 2006, p. 9.

[184]     For further information on and analysis of the Centre’s role see Nancy Thede, “Human Rights and Democracy: Issues for Canadian Policy in Democracy Promotion”, Institute for Research on Public Policy, Policy Matters, Vol. 5, No. 3, May 2005.

[185]     Ed Broadbent was succeeded by Warren Allmand from 1997 to 2002, when the current president, Jean-Louis Roy, took up the position. For their testimony see respectively: Evidence, Meeting No. 21, October 18, 2006; Evidence, Meeting No. 40, February 13, 2007; Evidence, Meeting No. 18, October 2, 2006.

[186]     The Committee held a hearing on the last five-year review at the end of 2004. See 38th Parliament, 1st Session, Evidence, Meeting No. 17, December 15, 2004.

[187]     On Elections Canada’s role in Haiti see Evidence, Meeting No. 5, May 30, 2006; and overall in respect of democratic development Evidence, Meeting No. 26, November 1, 2006.

[188]     “Elections Canada on the World Scene: Sharing Experience with Developing Democracies,” (available online at http://www.elections.ca/content.asp?section=gen&document=ec90770&dir=bkg&lang=e&textonly=false).

[189]     DFAIT,“Nurturing young and fragile democracies, building stronger democratic institutions,” Briefing Note, April 2006.

[190]     Evidence, Meeting No. 26, November 1, 2006, p. 11.

[191]     Ibid.

[192]     Evidence, Meeting No. 19, October 4, 2006, p. 11.

[193]     Gerald Schmitz and David Gillies, The Challenge of Democratic Development: Sustaining Democratization in Developing Societies, The North-South Institute, Ottawa, 1992, p.xv.

[194]     Evidence, Meeting No. 18, October 2, 2006, p. 12.

[195]     See Andrew Cooper and Thomas Legler, Intervention without Intervening: The OAS Defense and Promotion of Democracy in the Americas, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2006.

[196]     Thirty years earlier, Prime Minister John Diefenbaker had played a significant role in the debate that saw South Africa leave the Commonwealth in 1961.

[197]     For a review of IDEA’s first decade see Ten Years of Supporting Democracy Worldwide, International IDEA, Stockholm, 2005.

[198]     See Andrew Ellis, Paul Guerin, and Ayman Ayoub, Effective Electoral Assistance: Moving from Event-based Support to Process Support, Conference report and conclusions, IDEA, Stockholm, 2006.

[199]     For a broad analysis see Edward Newman and Roland Rich, eds., The UN Role in Promoting Democracy: Between Ideals and Reality, United Nations University Press, Tokyo, New York, Paris, 2004. From the UNDP see also, UNDP, Human Development Report 2002: Deepening Democracy in a Fragmented World, Oxford University Press, New York, 2002.

[200]     Source: Public Accounts of Canada 2005-2006, p. 90.

[201]     The Parliamentary Centre was founded in 1968 with a mainly domestic mandate. However, since the 1990s it has become increasingly involved in international democracy assistance activities. It works with parliaments around the world to strengthen committee oversight and lawmaking, build the capacity of parliamentary secretariats, develop parliamentary performance and reporting systems, and more generally foster greater transparency and accountability in governance. The Centre received over $5.8 million in government grants in 2005-2006.

[202]     Government of Canada, A Role of Pride and Influence in the World — Canada’s International Policy Statement, April 2005, “Overview,” p. 28.

[203]     “The Democracy Council” background note circulated at the conference organized under the auspices of the Democracy Council, “A Dialogue on Canada’s Approach to Democratic Development”, 15 February 2007.

[204]     DFAIT Briefing Note, April 2006, op.cit.

[205]     CIDA, Report on Plans and Priorities 2005-2006- Estimates Part III, p. 20.

[206]     Information note to the Committee from CIDA President Robert Greenhill, and CIDA Report on Plans and Priorities 2006-2007 — Estimates Part III, p. 13.

[207]     Evidence, Meeting No. 21,October 18, 2006, p. 1.

[208]     Evidence, Meeting No. 43, March 1, 2007,

[209]     See CIDA 2005-2006 Departmental Performance Report, p. 11.

[210]     Evidence, Meeting No. 39, February 1, 2007, p. 13.

[211]     CIDA Report on Plans and Priorities 2007-2008 – Estimates Part III, p. 16, available online at
http://www.tbs-sct.gc.ca/rpp/0708/CIDA-ACDI/cida-acdi01_e.asp#s1 .

[212]     According to the testimony of CIDA President Robert Greenhill, Canada Corps, as structured, “was saddled with a multiple mandate that went beyond good governance and included youth mobilization as well as public engagement”. Evidence, Meeting No. 43, March 1, 2007, p. 10.

[213]     Ibid. p. 12.

[214]     Ibid., p. 13.

[215]     Ibid., p. 11.

[216]     CIDA Report on Plans and Priorities 2007-2008, p.

[217]     Ibid., p. 40.

[218]     See Robert Herman and Theodore Piccone, eds., Defending Democracy: A Global Survey of Foreign Policy Trends 1992-2002, Democracy Coalition Project, Washington D.C., 2002 (http://www.soros.org/newsroom/news/defendingdemocracy_20021031 ) We have already referred to this study in Chapter 2.