FAAE Committee Report

I never find anything other than complexities.

David French, Chief Executive, The Westminster Foundation[124]

It is important to get democracy assistance back in the realm of being a universal public good.

Mark Salter, Senior Programme Officer, Democracy Building and
Conflict Management Programme, International Institute for
Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA)[125]

Democracy promotion … is not about top-down social engineering.

David Lowe, Vice-President, Government and External Relations,
National Endowment for Democracy[126]

What we do is try to help people figure it out for themselves.

Christopher Sands, Centre for Strategic and International
Studies and International Republican Institute[127]

Democracy is something that happens every day of the week.

Carolyn McAskie, United Nations Assistant Secretary-General,
Peacebuilding Support Office[128]

Canada has its own particular experience of working for democratic development abroad, as we will review in the next part of this report. There is no one “best” foreign or international model that can simply be grafted on to that experience. At the same time, the comparative experience of other donors can enrich the knowledge base from which Canadian policy development in this area can draw. The Committee was unable to visit democracy promotion institutions in Germany and the Netherlands, although we are familiar with them. We did have direct meetings with democracy assistance agencies and experts in four Nordic countries and the United Kingdom in October 2006, and in the United States (Washington D.C. and New York) in February 2007. That included meetings with multilateral organizations — the Commonwealth Secretariat, International IDEA, and the United Nations.

The meetings we had outside Canada impressed on the Committee the growing range and scope of activities in this field, as well as the many varieties of channels whereby funding for democracy assistance is being delivered. It is not our intention to describe all of these in detail — such information can be found in the analytical literature and on agency web sites[129] — but rather to highlight some points that may contribute to Canadian policy reflection. Our concentration in this chapter will be with European and American donors, as multilateral approaches will be the subject of Chapter 8.

An important point to make at the outset is that there is a wide consensus on the critical issues facing democracy promoters that were dealt with in Chapter 2. Donors may be responding to these issues in different ways, depending on their distinctive institutional histories and levels of resources. They may have different working definitions of what is “democratic development”, or what CIDA categorizes as “democratic governance”. But all are aware of the global challenges and are seeking to increase their effectiveness in providing democracy aid.

When it comes to the U.K. and the Nordic countries, it must be noted that they have achieved ODA/GNI (Official Development Assistance/Gross National Income) ratios that are considerably higher than Canada’s overall level of development assistance (which was 0.34 % in 2005 and 0.30% in 2006; the average country effort was 0.46% in 2006)[130]. In fact, the European Union as a whole has pledged to reach the UN 0.7% target by 2015, with some individual member countries aiming to achieve it before 2015. Three of the four Nordic countries we visited have already exceeded that target. Finland’s ODA percentage is the exception, having slipped from 0.47% in 2005. We were told that it should be at 0.43% in 2007[131]; however, DAC figures show a further slippage to 0.39% in 2006. Finland has pledged to meet the 0.7% target in 2010. The United Kingdom’s ODA ratio was 0.48% in 2005, rising to 0.52% in 2006. The UK Government has also formally pledged to meet the 0.7% target by 2013.[132]

In Denmark, which is committed to maintaining an ODA/GNI ratio of 0.8% (this is the 2006 figure; it had been at 1.0% prior to a change of government in 2001), the Danish government’s Commitment to Development plan for 2007-2011 stresses increased support for Danish democratic development, good governance and anti-corruption efforts in poor countries. In 2007, the amount of one billion kroner for this area (C$192 million), about 10% of ODA, is to increase by $500 million kroner (C$96 million).[133] It is noteworthy that the Danish aid agency DANIDA is no longer a separate organization but has been fully integrated into the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Denmark also has no political party foundations or independent democracy promotion institutions.

Danish aid tends to be focused, long-term and results-driven, with fully two-thirds of Danish aid going to Africa. Mr. Johnny Flento, Director of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Africa Department, told the Committee that their aid approach stresses decentralization to the field, local ownership and local democracy. Governance is also a decisive factor in choosing Danish program countries. However, he acknowledged that among donors to Africa there remain “double standards” at play in regard to making ODA conditional on human rights and democratic governance standards.[134]

Dr. Neil Webster, Head of Department, Development Research: Poverty, Aid, Politics at the Danish Institute of International Affairs observed in a presentation to the Committee that there have been considerable successes in support for participatory democracy but there is still a major problem of linking the local to the national level in a way that empowers all citizens, including the weak and marginalized sectors of society.

Dr. Webster underlined three areas of promise and one warning:

1)     positive movement on fiscal decentralization and involvement of local people in budgeting processes;

2)     civil service reform moving towards accountable service delivery;

3)     movement from local participatory democracy to representative national democracy, giving voice to those who have traditionally been excluded. This must include looking at the role of political parties.

The area of concern was that DANIDA has a tendency to take “a too principled approach” in applying conditionality too strictly. One must be careful about simply withdrawing aid, and also be pragmatic in tackling issues like corruption. It is important not to jeopardize long-term institutional development especially in fragile states. Donors need to recognize that contexts vary greatly and to be able to identify the “drivers of change” in each. There is a question of how much donors trust the political choices made by other countries. But with democracy goes respect for the outcomes of participatory decision-making processes. Democracy can be a way to achieve poverty reduction. It must also be recognized that it can spark contestation and conflict.[135]

In Finland, development aid has always been integrated within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Finnish ODA is very concentrated in eight bilateral program countries. Like Denmark, Finland’s ODA does not have a legislated framework, but this is being sought by the advisory Development Policy Committee (which has representation from all political parties), and would include the 0.7% target, which is supported by three parties. It was also pointed out that in 2006 Finland celebrated the 100^th anniversary of its parliament achieving universal suffrage.

With respect to Finnish ODA democracy and governance programming, officials referred to the handbook Thinking Strategically About Democracy Assistance that was published by the ministry in November 2001.[136] They indicated that it was in the process of being updated in line with cooperation in this area at the EU level and the EU’s governance initiative, drawing on lessons from all member states. About 10% of Finnish ODA goes towards governance activities broadly defined, including for budget support and local cooperation funds. As part of the effort of institution-building, there is a North-South program where Finnish local authorities collaborate with local governments in developing countries. There is also an active program in Afghanistan, although it is not yet considered to be a long-term partner country.[137]

Significantly, the Committee was told by members of the Development Policy Committee, that although the idea of political parties being involved in democratic development had been publicly controversial, since 2005 a working group has been established, “Political Parties of Finland for Democracy”, or “Demo Finland”, which is supported by very modest government funding — €200,000 annually in 2006 (about C$310,000) but expected to increase during 2007.[138] At present, Demo Finland works mainly in Tanzania — cooperating with the Tanzanian Centre for Democracy — and Nepal. Projects aim to promote dialogue, good practices, women’s participation in decision-making, and civic education. The concept of Demo Finland arose out of a 2004 government white paper which affirmed that:

Respect for human rights, equality in society and between the sexes as well as the advancement of democracy are the prerequisites for development. Facilitating and encouraging conditions for the functioning of a multiparty system and parliament creates a favourable ground for the development and establishment of democracy. The Government is looking into ways of increasingly making use of the experience and participation of Finnish parliamentarians and political parties.[139]

Significantly, as well, after some debate it was decided that Demo Finland should follow a multi-party approach (similar to the Netherlands Institute of Multiparty Democracy, NIMD), rather than a “sister”-party or party-to-party model (akin to German, Swedish, or American party foundations or institutes). As one member of the Development Policy Committee put it: “The Dutch model suits us best because it follows a multi-party approach.”[140] The NIMD was also mentioned by several witnesses, including the renowned expert Thomas Carothers in Washington D.C,[141] as one that might be the most applicable for Canada should the Canadian government and Parliament’s political parties decide to become involved in the political party aspects of democratic development. We will examine this further in Chapter 7 of the report which includes a section specifically devoted to the role of political parties and parliamentarians in democracy assistance.

In Sweden, which has committed to reach to reach an ODA/GNI ratio of 1.0% (it was 0.92% in 2005 and rose to 1.03% in 2006 according to DAC figures), the Committee was told about the very strong public support for ODA and the strong involvement of the parliament and civil society. Indeed Sweden’s adoption of a legislative government-wide framework for policy coherence around the goals of equitable and sustainable development followed a two-year parliamentary commission process. Aid to democratic governance has accounted for about 10% on Swedish ODA, and it is expected that the new government elected in the fall of 2006 will give more attention to these issues. One challenge identified by Ministry for Foreign affairs officials is “to identify agents of change.” In the case of a notable target, Belarus, Sweden will be working through media and political parties.[142] Significantly, Sweden’s development agency, SIDA, which accounts for 50% of ODA spending, channels 30 million krona (C$4.6 million) annually — an amount expected to increase — to Swedish political party foundations, with the budget for this allocated according to the number of seats each party receives in parliament.

The Committee was told by SIDA officials that the agency takes a rights-based approach to development. The three main areas of democratic governance assistance are: public-sector governance and public administration; legal sector reforms; democratic institutions and culture including at the local level. One of the challenges is that progress is not just a matter of finding a technical or institutional fix. A deeper analysis is needed of power relations, both formal and informal. A second challenge is implementing the Paris agenda on aid effectiveness and donor coordination.[143] A third is establishing a rights-based chain of accountability for citizens. And a fourth is achieving results-based management of programs through the use of appropriate evaluation indicators. The assessment of democratic outcomes is very difficult but necessary.

Sectors of democracy programming were outlined in regard to:

·        Parliamentary strengthening. This includes involving parliaments in budgetary matters and other instruments of development planning such as in the preparation of the poverty reduction strategy papers (that are used by the international financial institutions). Activities are both bilateral and multilateral, using international parliamentary networks. The Swedish parliament is also “twinned” with parliaments in Vietnam and East Timor.

·        Support for elections. SIDA is trying to work on a long-term basis on election management and issues of civic and voter education. Work in Kenya was cited.

·        Support to political parties. This dimension began in 1996 and was made permanent in 2002. SIDA works through seven political party foundations, following the German model of individual party foundations rather than the Dutch model of one multi-party foundation. A major evaluation of political party support will be carried out in 2009.

The Committee did not have time to meet with representatives of these party foundations. However, we did have meetings with senior staff of the Stockholm-based International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA), a knowledge-based inter-governmental institution which aims to “transform research findings into practical tools” and which has a close relationship with Canada’s International Development Research Centre.[144] One of IDEA’s three areas of focus in 2006 was political parties and participation (including women in politics); the other two being electoral processes and democracy building and conflict management. We have already referred to IDEA’s participatory democracy assessment methodology in Chapter 1. In Chapter 7, we will return to IDEA’s findings on political party development as presented by Roger Hällag, its head of programme for political parties.[145]

Norway, like Sweden, enjoys very high levels of public support for ODA, which is expected to reach a level of 0.97% of GNI in 2007 (it was 0.93% in 2005 and 0.89% in 2006), equivalent to about C$3.5 billion. One of the primary goals of Norwegian aid is “to contribute towards promoting peace, democracy and human rights”, and governance is one of five areas of concentration. Broadly defined, governance accounts for about 18% of ODA.[146] In a meeting with members of the Storting (Parliamentary) Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, it was observed that there is considerable debate over ODA priorities — where does Norway have the most competence and comparative advantage? — over aid effectiveness, and over the challenges being faced in Afghanistan in combining the military element with development aid.

There was considerable discussion with the Committee of the challenges of promoting a multi-party system and how to build in accountability elements. There has been disagreement among the parties in Norway on how to provide party aid, with a division between those parties (such as Labour) that have established international party support networks and smaller parties which do not have this advantage. Nonetheless, a fledgling all-party Norwegian Centre for Democracy Support has been created. Acting Chair, Ms. Marit Nybakk explained that it is important to have such a mechanism to be able to support political parties abroad for the purposes of training, organizational capacity building, increasing the role of women, etc. Officials of the Foreign Affairs ministry and NORAD emphasized the importance of it being an arms-length mechanism. The guidelines for it suggest that a competitive process be used for the funding of project proposals from political parties, and that there also be support for joint projects. This funding remains a very small part of democratic governance assistance. There is still debate in Norway on the best way to provide support through political parties. The previous strategy of support for democratic development did not include this element. NORAD’s thinking is to do it a little bit and to “outsource” it to embassies. Party support is a difficult area that demands that one be careful and proceed with caution.[147]

The Committee did meet directly with officials of the Norwegian Centre for Democracy Support, where we were told the Centre became a permanent body in 2006 after beginning as a pilot project in 2002. Projects are small given that the Centre’s funding is only €600, 000 (C$857, 000) in 2006, increasing to €850,000 (C$1,215,00) in 2007.[148] It is important to note that the Centre was established at the request of all seven parties represented in the Storting. We will return to this in Chapter 7.

While in Oslo, the Committee also met with officials of the Norwegian Resource Bank for Democracy and Human Rights (NORDEM), which was the inspiration for Canada’s CANADEM, about which we will have more to say in Part II of the report. NORDEM was created in 1993 by the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs as a project of the Norwegian Centre for Human Rights at the University of Oslo. At the time, it was the first such program in the world, in order to respond to the need for qualified personnel, available on short notice, for assignments which promote democracy and respect for human rights. NORDEM’s main function is to recruit and train personnel for secondment to international organizations working to promote democracy and human rights. NORDEM has a roster of 250 experts and has carried out 1,700 assignments since 1993. It has developed the first manual in human rights fieldwork (1997, revised in 2001), participated in developing election observation methodology, and produced guidelines for observing electronic voting.[149]

Turning to a larger donor country, the United Kingdom, the Committee met with David French, Chief Executive of the Westminster Foundation for Democracy (WFD) and also the Chair of its Board, Labour M.P. Hugh Bayley, in the context of another meeting with the Chair and members of the UK Parliamentary Select Committee on International Development. The WFD was created in 1992 as a government-sponsored body but with a high degree of independence. It reflects a partnership of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) with British political parties, in which 50% of funding goes to the parties to undertake party-to-party assistance.

According to Mr. French, the WFD is explicitly about political development and is comfortable with the political sensitivities involved. The involvement of political parties came as an initiative from backbench parliamentarians. There is a strong echo of the core funding to political party foundations provided by the U.S. National Endowment for Democracy; however, on a much smaller scale. As well, the WFD allows currently active politicians to be involved and does not have any country offices. The WFD is seeking to deepen its relationship with the Department for International Development (DFID) in light of its July 2006 white paper Eliminating World Poverty: Making Governance Work for the Poor[150] which launched a ₤100 million (C$212 million) democracy fund. At present, however, none of this funding can go towards political party development, a fact with which the WFD disagrees.[151]

Mr. Bayley noted the WFD’s funding — ₤4.1 ($8.7 million) in 2005-2006 — is very small compared to the amounts spent by DFID on governance, which are set to increase in line with the governance emphasis in the July 2006 white paper. DFID’s support for good governance is broader than a political democracy focus. But as the Chair of the Select Committee, Liberal-Democrat M.P. Malcolm Bruce, remarked, “good governance is sustained by good democracy”. The WFD’s niche role is in supporting party-to-party development, and it is seeking additional funding from the FCO and DFID for special projects, for example in Sierra Leone. We will have more to say about the WFD approach in chapter 7.

More broadly, our meeting with members of the Select Committee indicated all-party support for the UK’s legislated mandate for ODA — the International Development Act passed by Parliament in 2002[152] — as a result of a deliberate decision in 1997 to give a strong identity to DFID separate from that of the FCO. Moreover, it was noted that the UK government has committed to reaching the 0.7% target by 2013 (it was at 0.52% in 2006). In terms of the approach to democratic development, Mr. Bayley made the point that it cannot be reduced to a single template of electoral democracy. It must involve local networks and communities, giving the example of Afghanistan and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). This is so that “democracy can be developed, experimented with and built up from the base”. Labour M.P. Anne McKechin added that an important question is: “How do we establish direct links between the poorest citizens and the state?” In her view it is not by imposing our structures on complex local realities and it also means being sensitive to the gender dimensions of democratic development.[153]

Democracy assistance is situated within the UK’s broader international development agenda. One of nine strategic international priorities affirmed in the FCO’s 2006 Active Diplomacy for a Changing World is “promoting sustainable development and poverty reduction underpinned by human rights, democracy, good governance and protection of the environment.”[154] The FCO has an Office of Democracy and Good Governance, the policy of which states, inter alia, that the United Kingdom lobbies governments that do not use democratic practices or processes, and supports those states that are attempting to adopt democratic institutions and complete democratic transitions, emphasizing the representation and participation of the poorer segments of society.[155]

Most of the UK’s democratic governance assistance is channelled through DFID — as is the case for Canada with CIDA. We have already referred in Chapter 2 to International Development Minister Hilary Benn’s October 2006 speech on the subject “Making politics work for the poor: democracy and development”.[156] But as Peter Owen, Senior Governance Advisor in the Policy Division of DFID remarked to the Committee: “There isn’t a cookbook about how to do this.”[157] In elaborating DFID’s approach, officials stressed the importance of understanding the political dynamics in each context, including at the local politics level, and of conducting regular country governance analysis. One must work to find the key drivers of change in each society, though it is also necessary to be careful about which NGOs to work with. It was mentioned that DFID has abandoned strict conditionality in its programming, except for an emphasis on poverty reduction, human rights, and sound financial management. DFID also makes use of governance indicators such as those produced by the World Bank. However, these have to be used carefully and adapted to make them home grown to each context. Very long-term time frames are often involved in bringing about governance changes at the societal level.

DFID’s written submission to the Committee included a section on “Lessons we’re learning” which made the following points:

·        Good governance is not just about governments;

— It’s also about political parties, parliament, the judiciary, media, civil society and the private sector;

·        “Freedoms to” are part of development;

·        Real democracy seems to “lock in” other developmental gains;

·        Finding and designing the right interventions needs a good understanding of context;

·        And prioritisation.[158]

Before considering the large and complex U.S. case, mention should be made of the growing European Union (EU) role. The 1993 Treaty on European Union sets the development and consolidation of democracy and the rule of law, and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms as an explicit objective of the Common Foreign and Security Policy.[159] Subsequently, the EU established the European Initiative for Democratisation and Human Rights (EIDHR) with the aim “to promote human rights, democracy and conflict prevention in third countries by funding activities pursuing these goals.”[160] The annual budget of the EIDHR is about €100 million (C$155 million) and it funds projects in over 30 countries.[161] Roel von Meijenfeldt, Executive Director of the Netherlands Institute for Multiparty Democracy, referred to the following recent EU-level developments in a presentation circulated to the Committee in January 2007:

·        The Policy Unit of the Council of Ministers of the EU, in conjunction with the European Commission produced a first discussion paper on the subject of EU democracy promotion in July 2006 under the title: The EU Approach to Democracy Promotion in External Relations: Food for Thought; [http://www.democracyagenda.org/modules.php?mop=modload&name=Upload&file=index&op=getit&fid=15.] The paper is currently discussed within the EU Council by the Peace and Security Committee of the EU Member States;

·        Members of the European Parliament established a Democracy Caucus that meets to advance EU democracy assistance;

·        The European Parliament accepted in December 2006, following extended negotiations with the European Commission and the Council, a new Regulation for a financing instrument for the promotion of Democracy and Human Rights Worldwide, which includes an opening for assistance to political party development; …

·        An initiative has been taken for the establishment of the European Foundation for Democracy through Partnership [http://www.nimd.org/upload/eurodemofoundation.doc.] that should operate independently from the EU institutions with core functions such as becoming a knowledge hub for activities related to European democracy assistance and with a grant-making capacity that can respond in a flexible and responsive manner to opportunities for advancing democracy.[162]

Turning to U.S. institutions, these are large in size and funding, as befits the world’s superpower, but which come with considerable disadvantages as well as advantages. U.S. net ODA was only 0.22% of GNI in 2005 according to OECD/DAC figures, though this represented a rise of 36.5% in real terms, totalling US$27.6 billion, and was the highest level since 1986. However, the U.S. ODA/GNI ratio has again slipped back to 0.17% in 2006. With respect to democracy support, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) is the world’s largest implementer of democracy programs, with a fiscal year 2006 budget for this purpose of US$833 million.[163] In addition, the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) established in 2004 to administer the Millennium Challenge Account (MCA), budgeted at US$1.5 billion in 2005, explicitly links the provision of ODA to “good governance” practices by recipient countries. At the same time, Thomas Carothers observed to the Committee that, after the huge expansion of democracy assistance since the 1980s, along with a consensus that it goes together with economic development, there is now a “greater state of controversy and debate” than in the past 20 years. “The subject is in a state of change” in the wake of Iraq and a broader pushback against democracy promoters (e.g., in Russia).[164]

In the Committee’s meetings with Paula Dobriansky, Under-Secretary, Democracy and Global Affairs, U.S. Department of State, and other senior executive branch officials[165] — which were conducted under Chatham House rules — there was an evident awareness of the critical issues facing democracy promotion today. Significantly, Ms. Dobriansky, whose title was changed in 2005 to explicitly include democracy, is also Executive Director of the Democracy Promotion Advisory Committee to Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice. For example, it was mentioned that in linking democracy and development[166], people in recipient countries must perceive that democracy delivers positive results. Democracy work must be context-specific rather than a transplanted model and local communities matter greatly.

Reference was made to the backlash against democracy in some countries (regression in Russia, the challenge of China) and to making more use of the Community of Democracies and looking for effective strategies. There was also mention of the Middle East Partnership Initiative, with assistance to education reform, parliaments and political parties, and to MCC compacts involving homegrown projects with education in the forefront, mostly in the Muslim world working through NGOs. As for parliamentary assistance, the demand must come from indigenous parliaments themselves, though perhaps there could be an international secretariat to facilitate inter-parliamentary assistance.

Allusion was made to the inherently risky nature of democracy promotion and to the challenge of getting all U.S. agencies to follow a coherent direction. There seem to have been some tensions between the State Department and USAID. Achieving coordinated country strategies is still difficult and must happen in the field. Indeed, in a separate meeting on February 6, 2007, Thomas Melia, Deputy Director of Freedom House mentioned his work on the U.S. “democracy bureaucracy”, to which we have already made reference in Chapter 2, and in which he analyzes the new initiatives of the Bush administration that have included a bigger role for the State Department.[167] In his view, there is an “increasingly cluttered array” of programs that is “not getting reconciled”. Even the Pentagon is getting into nation-building with little political oversight.[168]

In the Committee’s meetings with senior officials at USAID on February 5, 2007, Deputy Assistant Administrator, Paul Bonicelli stated that: “We see democracy promotion as very much a development exercise”. Yes, there has been some backlash, but “it is impossible to have good governance without democracy”. He acknowledged that there has been a reform process underway within USAID with a view to better overall coordination of responsibilities.[169] Legislators should be involved in that. U.S. ODA has set goals to meet five main objectives: peace and security, governing democratically and justly, investing in people, economic growth, humanitarian assistance.

The Office of Democracy and Governance has programs dealing with elections, rule of law, civil society, and promoting good governance. USAID has also established an “Office of Military Affairs” to deal with increasing linkages between security and development. Maria Rendon, of the Office of Democracy and Governance, explained that synergies with democratic governance are being acknowledged down to the field level and that Secretary Rice is trying to coordinate U.S. efforts overall.

Gerald Hyman, a consultant to the Agency[170] and former director of its Office of Democracy and Governance, underlined that democracy aid is part of ODA and there must be recognition that the governance element is essential (citing the case of Haiti). Democracy is not just instrumental but is a right and value in itself. Mr. Hyman stressed that there is a role for Canada in places like Cuba where the U.S. carries a lot of counter-productive baggage. Yes, there are concerns about China’s influence and Russia’s pushback, but there are also successes in Eastern Europe. There is a need for a “united front of democratic countries”. Cooperation with the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) is part of that. He acknowledged that Canada can do things that the U.S. cannot.

Mr. Bonicelli pointed to the importance of “developing capacity at the local level”. He mentioned the Office of Transition Initiatives which helps local partners advance peace and democracy in priority conflict-prone countries. He also addressed the need for assessments and evaluations, which includes accountability for multilateral funds. The U.S. is working with the UN Democracy Fund. However, multilateral coordination is still a rarity.

On February 5, 2007, the Committee also met with senior representatives of the the National Endowment for Democracy (NED, http://www.ned.org/ ), and two of the major organizations which receive funding from it, the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI, http://www.ndi.org/ ), and the International Republican Institute (IRI, http://www.iri.org/ ).[171] The Committee has already referred to these in Chapter 2. We note here that the party-affiliated institutes, NDI and IRI, have a combined annual budget (US$200 million) that it much more than the NED’s annual Congressional appropriation of approximately US$80 million, making the total resources expended by the NED “family” truly impressive.

Vin Weber, a former Congressman and Chair of the NED’s Board, told the Committee that it has a broad mandate going much beyond elections — “We always talk about the preconditions for democracy” — and looks for practical partnerships with other donors and in recipient countries. Mr. Weber also alluded to the fact that the NED is trying to respond to the pushback against democracy promotion that has occurred in recent years. NED’s Vice-President for Government and External Relations, David Lowe, noted it publishes the Journal of Democracy and sponsors the World Movement for Democracy (http://www.wmd.org/). As he put it: “We believe strongly that this [democracy promotion] is a global movement.” Democracy support should not be about pushing any one country’s national interest. The problem of donor duplication can be mitigated by working through international networks, such as the World Movement.

Ivan Doherty, Director of Political Party Programs at NDI, pointed out that although it is associated with the Democratic Party it tries to work across the political spectrum, and with three party internationals, as an international organization with 60 field offices around the world. NDI works in multi-party contexts and it is also doing work on pro-poor development issues that are linked to democratization processes. Responding to a question about the role of parliamentarians, Mr. Doherty urged that more politicians get involved in political development work.

Christopher Sands, an associate with the smaller IRI, which works only with the conservative party international network, talked about unrealistic local expectations and the need to teach others how to use democratic institutions, as well as the importance of working with locals and “not exporting our model”. He also mentioned IRI’s involvement in voter education programs. Mr. Sands was very positive about Canada doing more in the field given its special experience with party formations and with federalism.

In discussions with the Committee, Mr. Weber observed the unfortunate conflation of democracy promotion with Iraq in many people’s minds. He cited a recent survey showing that only one in three Americans now think that democracy promotion is a good idea. Mr. Doherty agreed that democracy promotion has become harder to do. But he saw Iraq as an aberration, and not yet a lost cause. NDI continues to work in Iraq with some 300 local and international partners. The attempt is at long-term engagement. Mr. Sands agreed that the road to democracy in places like Iraq and Afghanistan is a long one. Democracy is not something that can just be “put in the microwave”. Mr. Lowe said that the NED’s work is not about regime change. And despite the pushback, many local organizations in democracy-challenged countries still appreciate NED’s support.

Mr. Sands noted that one of the challenges in developing democracies is to instil an appreciation of the role of “loyal oppositions”. This may be an area where Canadian practices can help. Moreover, Canada can bring an approach that the U.S. as a superpower cannot. Mr. Lowe agreed that the Canadian voice would be “tremendously helpful”. Mr. Weber pointed to the importance of doing things that are adapted to the level of socio-economic development in each country. Interesting, in a subsequent meeting in New York with Richard Haass, President of the Council on Foreign Relations (and former director of policy planning at the U.S. State Department), he expressed the view that “not enough emphasis is put on the economic side of democratic development.” Moreover, in affirming that arms-length foundations like the NED can do things that
governments — especially U.S. government — cannot, he added that Canada is also in a good position to do things that the U.S. cannot. “You are not radioactive in ways that we are,” is how he put it.[172]

An especially valuable independent perspective on U.S. democracy assistance efforts was provided to the Committee by two internationally-recognized experts at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Thomas Carothers, its Vice-President for Studies — International Politics and Governance, and Marina Ottaway, Director of its Middle East Program.[173] Mr. Carothers observed that in Washington democracy promotion has become much more a point of contention, among both Republicans and Democrats. Realists are resisting the ambitious goals of idealists and ideologues. There is especially sharp debate over President Bush’s “freedom agenda” in the Middle East. Is bringing democracy to the region even the right goal, or is it that the methods used have not been the right ones?

As to how to best fund democracy promotion, this is still an open debate involving the State Department, USAID, and the NED group (which overall receives less than 10% of its funding from government sources). Each instrument has been shown to have advantages and disadvantages. In cases such as Iran, U.S. strategic interests come to the fore. More generally, Mr. Carothers sees USAID being brought more under the purview of the State Department.

According to Mr. Carothers, democracy aid targeting dictatorships has so far been very ineffective. The fact is that the more open the society, the more democracy aid can work. The easy cases have been done, and now we are down to the hard cases. That is one reason there is much uncertainty about potential outcomes. Moreover, democracy promotion has become a crowded field leading to an unsolved problem of donor coordination. Donors also need to carefully assess their entry point in providing democracy assistance, moving beyond a focus on elections.

Ms. Ottaway observed the paradox that the Middle East needs democracy promotion the most, but it is also in this region that it has been the least successful. She bluntly stated that “the democracy promotion agenda of the Bush administration is dead.” The big rhetoric has been toned down. The pressure on autocratic governments “has disappeared” in favour of stability first, and the autocrats know it (citing Egypt as a case “going from bad to worse” in democracy terms).

Programs continue under the Middle East Partnership Initiative and there are lots of traditional projects happening at the base. But even if these are pretty good, they will not make much of a difference on the overall democracy scale. There is a “lack of clarity” in U.S. goals for the region, and a lot of confusion following the victory of Hamas in democratic elections in the PalestinianTerritories. U.S. political party development aid has tended to focus on the secular, liberal parties, but these “have absolutely no organization.” The political process in Arab countries is still one in which “parliaments are pretty irrelevant”, and strong executives confront Islamist parties. This poses huge dilemmas, since pressures for democratic change must come from inside. Nothing will be simple. According to Ms. Ottaway, we need to understand that the particularities of each country require different strategies. We also need to understand the support for Islamist parties, taking into account that the Islamist movements have very strong women’s organizations. Ms. Ottaway noted that when we talk of “civil society” we need to consider more than the NGOs supported by the West.

Asked about his advice for future Canadian policy, Mr. Carothers stated that it is “very important that other countries [than the U.S.] step forward and that “Canada has a unique role to play.” This is especially so as the U.S. has stumbled in its promotion of democracy. With regard to getting into the business of political party aid, Canada may have an advantage in being able to learn from the mistakes of others’ experience. It need not be stuck in what he referred as the old model of party aid. A good example to follow might be the approach of the Netherlands Institute of Multiparty Democracy. We will return to this subject in Chapter 7.

With regard to differences of approach between European and American donors, one Canadian witness, Professor Jeffrey Kopstein of the University of Toronto, contrasted in particular the EU post-1989 approach in Eastern Europe, which he saw as concentrating on state-building from the top, with the U.S. emphasis on “bottom-up” change through civil-society actors. As he put it:

If we look at the EU top-down model… it works beautifully for countries that have a chance to join the EU, but it is all but powerless in other parts of the world that will not be joining the EU anytime soon. The bottom line is that, to date, apart from enlargement, the EU does not have a viable democracy promotion model.

Canada should draw lessons from the strengths and weaknesses of both the EU and the U.S. approaches. We should proceed on both fronts, both in supporting civil society and NGOs on the one hand, and in using the powerful tools of intergovernmental and multilateral institutions on the other. It is important to remember that democracy promotion does not preclude contact with undemocratic regimes. But it is crucial, at the same time, to get the message right. That will be the central challenge for any Canadian government.[174]

In testimony before a Canadian Senate committee, Vidar Helgesen, Secretary-General of International IDEA with which the Committee had meetings in Stockholm in October 2006, also made the following noteworthy comment:

Canada has a very good potential of bridging what is today a considerable gap between American and European approaches. Looking at democracy approaches from the U.S, the European approach is toothless. Looking from Europe, the American approach is counterproductive. This is not a productive situation. There is a need to look into ways of bringing these together because if democracy promotion by the main donor countries is to be effective, they should have more or less the same approaches. Canada, with its good neighbourly relations with the U.S. and with a high degree of credibility both with multilateral institutions and in Europe, could certainly play a role in that.[175]

In covering a lot of ground, this chapter shows that European and American democracy assistance activities — even those which are more established and/or heavily funded than those of Canada — continue to be in a state of evolution. In such a complex, risky field, they have not necessarily found the “answers” which Canada can simply apply. Indeed, as some of the above comments indicate, these other donors would welcome a greater contribution from Canada which is seen as having positive assets to bring to what should be a global endeavour.

Moreover, the Committee takes to heart Thomas Carothers’ remark that Canada has the opportunity to benefit from the mistakes of other donors in moving towards best practices in existing and new fields of democratic development endeavour. To do so will require systematic attention to what those other donors are doing. Accordingly, as part of making Canadian assistance more effective, the Canadian policy community should make it a point to learn from their experiences.

Recommendation 4

Increased Canadian public-sector support for independent research and knowledge generation on effective democratic development assistance, as addressed in Recommendation 2, should encompass staying abreast of the activities of other donor countries, including of their NGOs and experts in this field, and continuous learning from their experiences.