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FAAE Committee Report

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It now appears that 9/11 not only shook us out of our complacent sense of security, it also opened our eyes to a complex, dangerous and needy world. Indeed, I don’t think it would be an exaggeration to say that we have learned more about the world and international affairs in the past 27 months than we did in the previous 27 years.89

Allan Gregg

The Changing International and Domestic Environments

The Committee’s study of Canada’s relations with the countries of the Muslim world has underlined the complexity of modern international relations, in terms of both dynamics in key regions around the world, and requirements for the development and conduct of foreign policy. Witnesses before the Committee were unanimous on two points: the importance of the Muslim world for Canadian foreign policy, and the need for care when considering foreign policy along these lines. The Committee agrees on both.

Specific recommendations arising from the Committee’s visits throughout the Muslim world will be discussed in the regional chapters. The following outlines some of the main elements the Committee believes are necessary for a constructive overall Canadian approach to understanding developments in the diverse countries of the Muslim world, improving Canada’s relations with those countries and strengthening the development and conduct of Canadian foreign policy in this area.

A number of recurring themes came through clearly during the Committee’s hearings and travels, notably the need for increased education both at home and abroad, and for increased intercultural and interfaith dialogue. A number of specific mechanisms — many of which could come under the general rubric of “public diplomacy” — were also raised by witnesses, including economic and cultural ties; development assistance; support for civil society, democratization and addressing human rights; communications/media initiatives; and youth exchanges and parliamentary exchanges. All of these have some merit, but Canada will reap the full benefit from these and other initiatives only after more fully engaging Canadian Muslims in the development and implementation of its — and their — foreign policy.

The Implications of Diasporas and Foreign Policy

Even before the terrorist attacks of September 2001, the nature of international relations was undergoing important changes: there was a growing recognition of the importance of multiple identities, and a steady shift from relations based almost solely on governments to those that include and benefit from stronger links to civil society and between individuals.

An increasingly important element of modern international relations is the role of worldwide diasporas, which one observer has referred to as “globalization-from-below.”90 Professor Karim Karim of Carleton University noted before the Committee that “understanding the role of diasporas in the world today is vital for a fuller comprehension of international relations.” As he explained:

Diasporas have grown significantly in the west … Relatively accessible air travel and means of communication such as the Internet, satellite television, and the phone mean they can keep in touch with their global groups on a regular basis. The impact that this and other aspects of globalization have had on the role of national borders is strengthening the place of worldwide diasporas.

Whereas governments view persons as subjects of specific jurisdictions, members of diasporas — and I would also add to the diasporas members such as those of transnational corporate elites, who are based in various countries for long periods — increasingly view themselves as cosmopolitan citizens. This does not necessarily mean they resist attachment to their countries of settlement, but they maintain a broader notion of the global self.

Ties cut across national borders in intricate linkages that enable individuals to give and receive spiritual, social, economic, and cultural support … 

In an observation that has particular importance in light of the global war against terror, he noted that “unfortunately, militants and terrorists also exploit these networks for destructive purposes. It is incumbent upon governments to be able to distinguish between the legitimate and highly beneficial connections that are the characteristics of all diasporas from the criminal activities of the few.”91 Finally, he noted that the unsatisfactory flow of information to the Canadian government in the cases of Maher Arar and Zahra Kazemi “ … reflects partially the views of these Middle Eastern governments about the diasporas.” He added that “it is clear that Canada will have to engage sooner rather than later in an international discussion about the implications of transnational diasporas and contemporary cosmopolitanism for foreign policy, immigration, citizenship and security issues.” 92

According to Mr. Karim, “Diaspora is especially significant in Muslim contexts.”93 This point was also made to the Committee in New York by Columbia University historian Richard Bulliet. Since many of the democratic and other challenges facing Arab and other Muslim states involve conflict between moderate reformers and hardliners, there is reason to believe that Muslim diasporas in Canada and other countries in the West can play a key role in helping to resolve these struggles. In Bulliet’s opinion, the fact that diaspora communities in the West are relatively well off, educated and used to dealing pluralist societies makes them one of several “edge” situations most likely over the longer term to help resolve the crisis of authority within Islam.94 He told Committee members that while the problems of the Islamic world are most acute in the Middle East, in his opinion the likely source of change would be either in well-educated and well-off diaspora communities, or in countries such as Indonesia, Malaysia, Bangladesh or India. Likewise, noted British theologian Karen Armstrong told members in London that “Canada … could be one of those places that could be a bridge between East and West … [and] show that it is possible to live a vibrant, creative and intellectually and spiritually dynamic Muslim life in a Western country and put pressure on their own countries to reform.”

Learning From European Experiences

As the Committee learned in France and the United Kingdom during the course of its study, the recent growth of large populations of European Muslims — Islam is now the second-largest religion in Europe — and a resulting backlash, have had implications not only for domestic politics, but also for the foreign policies of major European states such as France, the United Kingdom and Germany. The issue is making itself felt even at the level of the European Union. British Foreign Secretary Jack Straw has pointed out that there was a debate in the Intergovernmental Conference about whether the draft European constitution should include a statement acknowledging the Judaeo-Christian heritage of Europe.95 Another debate involves the possible links between criticism of Israeli government policies and anti-Semitism. As one American expert noted in 2002,“ Europe’s Muslims, so far, have not been very active in trying to influence Europe’s foreign policy in regard to the Islamic world and issues of concern to the Muslims. Nevertheless, their mere presence has affected the attitudes and approaches of Europe’s policymakers toward a number of key issues, notably the Arab-Israeli conflict.” 96

France has the largest population of European Muslims with 4-5 million, mainly descended from North Africa or immigrants. French foreign policy continues to place special emphasis on relations with the Arab rather than the broader Muslim world. In Paris, Committee members saw at first hand the link between domestic and foreign policy as they visited the Institut du monde arab, a cultural and political project first proposed as a means of promoting a positive image of Arab countries and culture in the aftermath of the OPEC oil crises of the 1970s.

Yet the foreign policy implications of France’s growing Muslim population have been overshadowed by domestic issues, many of which have revolved around the question of secularism. France’s Muslim community has traditionally had no single structured leadership, but after several false starts, in 2003 the French government assisted French Muslims in establishing a new representative and autonomous Conseil francais du culte musulman, to advise on both technical question and issues of principle. (While in Paris the Committee met with the president of the Conseil, Dr. Dalil Boubaker, who is also Chancellor of the Mosquée de Paris) The most controversial debate has focused on the hijab or Muslim headscarf. In December 2003, the French government proposed a law outlawing all obvious signs of religious affiliation, including the hijab, in schools and public offices. Protests ensued both in France itself and in a number of Muslim majority states abroad. As The Economist noted in January 2004, the French government “ … wants to put right misunderstandings about the French secular state and the obligations of religious groups. Its position is certainly clear — but so might be the damage to relations with Muslims at home and abroad.”97

The United Kingdom has a Muslim population of around 2 million, most of whom are descendents of immigrants from South Asia or immigrants. British Foreign Secretary Jack Straw — over 25% of whose constituents are Muslim — noted in a speech delivered in Indonesia last year that “The size and importance of our Muslim communities is such that no British government —present or future — can afford to turn a blind eye to their domestic or international concerns. Britain’s Muslims are preoccupied with the same domestic issues as all of our voters: decent schools, high standards in healthcare provision and a prosperous economy. But when it comes to international issues, they are particularly concerned about developments in the Middle East and North Africa, and South and South East Asia.” 98

Even though the majority of Muslims in Britain are of South Asian rather than the Middle Eastern descent, Dr. Rima Khalaf of the United Nations Development Programme pointed out to Committee members in New York that the most important newspapers in the Arab world are now published in London. The country has also seen public extremism — notably that of Abu Hamza Al-Mazri, a radical cleric at the Finsbury Park Mosque until his dismissal in early 2003 — leading some wags to refer to the capital as “Londonistan.”99 Nevertheless, Canadian diplomats in London told members that there had been “a fair bit of shock” when two Muslims who grew up in the United Kingdom had committed suicide bombings in the Middle East in 2003. Many British Muslims and others also condemned the government’s recent decision to join the United States in the invasion of Iraq. Sheik Dr. M. A. Zaki Badawi, the Chairman of the Imams and Mosques Council of England, and himself a former Imam of the Finsbury Park Mosque, told members in London that the few who preached intolerance in Britain were not qualified imams; Abu Hamza Al-Mazri was in fact an electrician. He added, however, that in the absence of both indigenous religious training in Britain and formal standards, anyone could call themselves a religious leader. He had therefore founded Muslim College — which has both male and female students — to train “home-grown” imams in Britain so these would no longer have to be imported from the Middle East and elsewhere; in addition he hoped to bring the key role of scholars in interpreting Islam into focus in the West.

In October 2003, the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) launched a Multi Faith Week, designed to celebrate the United Kingdom’s many different faiths and cultures. Events during the week included a seminar on faith and foreign policy. In his opening address, the Foreign Secretary noted that while British Muslims have the same concerns as other constituents about domestic issues, “ … when it comes to foreign policy, differences become more apparent.” In a background document on faith groups and foreign policy, the FCO raised a number of important questions concerning the relationship between faith groups and foreign policy that apply equally to other countries. The document states:

The FCO is comfortable making common cause with faith groups which share its values or approach. But we need to be aware of the potential difficulties. There are areas where the UK will be out of sympathy with, or even actively opposed to the agenda of faith groups. Their priorities may coincide with FCO priorities in some respects, but may clash with UK policy in areas such as: the role of contraception in disease prevention and population control in the developing world; the rights of women in Muslim majority countries; homosexuality; asylum/migration; and the definition of ‘extremists’ and ‘terrorist’ organisations.

Faith communities can help the FCO to understand the world in all its complexity. They will only be able to do this effectively if they understand UK foreign policy in all its complexity. Dialogue is an over-used word, but dialogue will be crucial in developing a mature relationship — one which can withstand serious moral or political disagreements.100

The Foreign Secretary noted that in order to convince faith communities that Britain’s foreign policy was balanced and accommodating of religious beliefs, the government had to improve its efforts to reach out to faith communities. He added that “like policy-making in any other sphere from transport to law and order, our foreign policy will only benefit from exposure to rigorous public debate.”101

Germany has a Muslim population of perhaps 3 million, almost two million of whom have Turkish citizenship, including several hundred thousand Kurds. This has had important domestic implications for issues such as citizenship. The ongoing debate over the possible admission of Turkey to the European Union has also underlined the links between domestic and foreign policy, with implications for policy on the EU itself, bilateral relations and issues such as arms sales.

In the aftermath of the September 2001 attacks, the German government has taken a number of steps to address the challenges of relations with the Muslim world, including the appointment of a Commissioner for Intercultural Dialogue/Dialogue with the Islamic World, who is responsible for the trans-departmental coordination of dialogue-based policy areas. The Commissioner is assisted in his work by a Task Force for Dialogue with the Islamic World, made up of a combination of senior officials and outside experts. The Task Force also has access to some 26 dialogue advisors — because of language and other requirements recruited mainly from outside the German foreign service — now posted at German missions abroad, particularly in the Islamic world.102

Engaging Canadian Muslims

The presence of Muslims in Canada is not new. Edmonton’s Al Rashid Mosque, built in 1938, is the oldest in North America, and McGill University’s Institute of Islamic Studies is over 50 years old. Canada’s Muslim population has grown dramatically in recent decades, however, and contrary to the situation in Europe or the United States, where the dominant model remains one of assimilation, Muslim and other witnesses praised Canada’s policies of multiculturalism and pluralism, which have assisted in the development of what is in many ways a unique community. Among other attributes, Canada’s Muslim community has a significant number of women leaders, and the Chairman of the Canadian Islamic Congress has been quoted as saying that “We are creating a new culture.” 103 The Canadian Muslim community also encompasses a diversity of opinion and therefore lively debate. While Irshad Manji’s controversial recent book The Trouble With Islam: Wake-Up Call For Honesty and Change104 certainly does not reflect the views of the majority of Canadian Muslims, the fact that as a member of that community she felt free to voice her opinions speaks well of it.

In addition to Canada’s lack of colonial history, policies such as multiculturalism and pluralism have helped strengthen this country’s image throughout the Muslim world. While Canadian Muslims are playing an ever-greater role in all areas of national life, however — the Canadian Forces commissioned its first Muslim chaplain in December 2003 — a number of witnesses expressed at least a perception that much more needs to be done to engage Canadian Muslims in the development of public policy in a number of areas, including foreign policy.

Wahida Valiante of the Canadian Islamic Congress argued before the Committee that “ …  although Muslims make up a significant minority in Canada, numbering about 650,000, they have had very little impact on Canadian domestic or foreign policy.”105 She noted that one reason for this has to do with the Muslim community itself. “What they lack here in Canada … is a unified understanding of the political system and the importance of engaging politicians in proactive discussions on issues of national and international importance. This is a vital component of being citizens of a democratic society.”

More specifically in terms of foreign policy, Mrs. Valiante observed: “There is some perception in the Muslim community that socio-political theories, such as the clash of civilizations and the prevalent anti-Islam bias in the media, have in some measure influenced Canada’s foreign policy and direct dealings with the Islamic world. Nationally, many Muslims feel they cannot make a noticeable difference in Canada’s foreign or domestic policies, especially concerning Palestine.” She noted “the absence of any federal government initiative or commitment to promoting a better understanding of the Islamic world,” pointing out that this could be rectified through the establishment of a Muslim affairs portfolio or department in Ottawa. More simply, she added that “Canadian Muslims are rarely invited to participate in policy discussions concerning issues of the Muslim world or to sit on committees that develop strategies and programs that affect Muslims in Canada and abroad.” Mazen Chouaib agreed, pointing out that “Canadians of all walks of life have a role to play in devising our foreign policy.”106

Consultations in the development of foreign policy are not a panacea. However, it is obviously necessary to take action to address the perception that Canadian Muslim voices are not adequately listened to, by ensuring that they and others are fully consulted in the development of the country’s foreign policy. Beyond simple transparency, proper and ongoing consultations will also ensure that Canada’s foreign policy benefits from the unique knowledge and experiences of Muslim Canadians. Foreign Minister Bill Graham told an American audience in the fall of 2003 that “Each of our nations is being enriched by a growing Muslim population … our countries … share a similar concern for engaging moderate Muslim voices around the world, and we share extensive Muslim communities within our borders that can aid us in that task.”107 Ann Thomson of South Asia Partnership Canada was more specific, arguing that “in our relations with Muslim countries and communities overseas, we should draw on the knowledge and expertise of Canadian Muslim organizations. The Canadian government can work closely with progressive Muslim social justice organizations and support building of strong practical partnerships between them and organizations in Muslim majority and minority countries.”108

Salim Mansur agreed, but added two important caveats which echoed those of the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office:

 … for Canada to fully and successfully engage with the Muslim world, it also means engaging constructively and energetically with Canadians who are Muslims. This means being open to a diversity of opinion among Canadian Muslims, to recognize that since Islam is a universal faith, Muslims in Canada come from all points of the compass bringing different cultures and languages that contribute to the richness of the Canadian mosaic. But this should not mean the openness becomes a conduit of change in one direction, nor should Canadian tradition and history … be diluted in any way before the demands of any one segment of the multicultural Canadian family.109

The Committee agrees that it is vital to ensure that Canadian Muslims are fully consulted along with other groups in the ongoing development of Canadian foreign policy. Aside from demonstrating transparency, this will ensure that the country’s foreign policy benefits from their unique knowledge and experiences, both in relations with the countries of the Muslim world and more generally.

Elements of a Long-Term Approach

There are presently only four ways through which people around the world, and in the Muslim world in particular, are exposed to Canada: one, through political efforts such as UN roles or peacekeeping missions; two, cultural exchanges, including foreign students studying in Canada; three, commerce, including exports of Canadian entertainment; and four, aid. It’s debatable which of these four is the most effective in promoting Canada and its values; however, it is clear that commercial ventures are at least the most profitable. In the long run, however, the most effective means of promoting Canada is through accepting foreign students for study in Canadian universities. 110

Dr. Sheema Khan
Council on American Islamic Relations (Canada)

Beyond the need for broad and ongoing consultation with Muslim and other Canadians in the development of foreign policy, the following are a number of key themes raised during the Committee’s hearings and travels. A consideration of these themes will assist Canada in the development of a constructive approach to relations with the countries of the Muslim world. While the Committee’s mandate does not extend to domestic issues, the near-unanimous calls from witnesses for increased generation and communication of knowledge at home and abroad, dialogue between Muslims and non-Muslims, and a rethinking of security practices obviously have domestic as well as foreign policy implications.

Education and Dialogue

What we are now witnessing is a clash of ignorance, an ignorance that is mutual, longstanding, and to which the west and the Islamic world have been blind for decades at their great peril.

His Highness the Aga Khan

The recommendation most frequently made before the Committee was undoubtedly the need for increased education both at home and abroad, and a range of dialogue activities. In the opinion of the Canadian Islamic Congress:

Canada’s foreign policy towards the Muslim world should include clear directives to engage in dialogue with Muslim intellectuals and scholars here at home, as well as in Islamic countries, in order to accelerate the exchange of ideas, skills, knowledge, and experience that would facilitate the constructing or rebuilding of civil societies and democracies that embrace diversity, morality, and general equality.

There’s much Canadians do not understand about Islam and Muslims, so public education is vital for promoting harmony, peace, and human rights. Through education, Canada’s security concerns can be addressed by promoting social justice, both at home and abroad, and resolving conflicts using the principles and morals of natural justice, which are the best guarantees for achieving global security.111

In terms of education, as David Dewitt pointed out, “One educates in favour of progress, and education comes in many forms using many instruments.”112 Noah Feldman argued that: “Educating ourselves is crucial, because the kind of democracy that will emerge, if it is to emerge in the Muslim world, will not look like our democracy … Education involves first of all, learning languages … Second, it involves overcoming a fear of religion.”113

While acknowledging the need, in cooperation with the provinces as necessary, for domestic education and dialogue activities, the more traditional foreign policy focus of assisting education abroad was also raised frequently both in Ottawa and during the Committee’s travels abroad. Nazeer Ladhani argued that, after an emphasis on pluralism, the next recommendation of the Aga Khan Foundation Canada was “education, education, education.” He added that “ … perhaps most important of all, we must focus on improving the quality of and access to education generally at all levels in the Muslim world. This must include improving education to foster the spirit of inquiry, encourage innovative thinking, and promote tolerance. In the end, replacing ignorance and hopelessness with knowledge, skills, and opportunity for men, and especially for women, is the best means of combating the poverty and isolation that too often leads to intolerance and extremism.”114 Senator Mobina Jaffer said that “ … the area where our country will be best able to leave its mark is the education of girls in Muslim countries.” Then Secretary of State for Asia-Pacific David Kilgour spoke in September 2003 of the need to expand “support for education programs that provide alternatives to narrow-minded systems that perpetuate intolerance.”115

As we shall see later, McGill University (Montreal) has a long history of academic exchanges in Indonesia that are widely admired in the region, and have now also been shown to indirectly help address poverty and other issues.116 Tariq Ismael argued that “ … our universities have an international reputation that is basically similar to that of the Americans, without the American political baggage, if you will.” He proposed an academic exchange focus with Iraq in particular, with the goal of establishing an international University in Baghdad.117 As noted above, Dr. Sheema Khan argued that “in the long run … the most effective means of promoting Canada is through accepting foreign students for study in Canadian universities.” She added “In the last few years, due to visa restrictions, the number of foreign graduate students seeking to study in the United States has declined considerably. Canada has the opportunity to fill that void, but it would require an investment in scholarship funding. We can impress upon foreign students our Canadian values of tolerance, fairness, pluralism and mutual respect, and thereby contribute towards building a better world.”118 Such policies are all the more valuable given the large and growing youth population in almost all Muslim societies.

The Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade has recognized the need to explore in more depth relations between Canada and the Muslim world. Over the past several years, the Canadian Centre for Foreign Policy Development has sponsored a series of expert meetings on this topic, the recommendations of which were summarized by Suman Bhattacharyya. On the related issues of education and dialogue, he noted that

to combat a lack of knowledge about Islam, Canada’s education projects at home could focus on rectifying misconceptions about Islam, and should recognize the existence of debates within Islam... As well, Canada could play an important role in supporting education in Muslim communities, including the education of Muslim women of their rights within Islam and how rights can be used as tools of empowerment. Canadian educational institutions could play a useful role by continuing to support educational and cultural exchanges.”119

Beyond education, which is a critical but obviously long-term solution, witnesses were clear on the need for increased dialogue at multiple levels. According to Raja Khouri, “ … the cultural divide has to be bridged. I think the most critical thing we’re dealing with today is that the cultural divide is growing. It used to be much better than this, but now it’s growing … this is the biggest danger here, and that cultural divide needs to be overcome. And that can only happen through dialogue and education, education, education.”120

Like education and the broader generation and communication of knowledge, dialogue can obviously come in many forms. In June 2003, Women Engaging in Bridge Building held a one-day conference on Parliament Hill entitled “Diversity in Islam — Bridging the Gap.” Witnesses made such suggestions as international conferences and the establishment of a lecture circuit for experts from throughout the Muslim world. The Committee was warmly welcomed in its visits throughout the Muslim world, and Professor Turgay pointed out that dialogue can also include parliamentary diplomacy. In his words, “Even the Muslims are trying to understand the Islamic world today. It’s not very easy, it changes very often. Keeping in mind the diversity of the Muslim world, keeping in mind the vitality of Islam, and keeping in mind that it’s going to be there for God knows how long, it’s incumbent on us to make every effort to understand Islam. That involves hearings, that involves conferences, that involves a lot of travelling by the members of this committee, by the politicians.”121

While recommendations to increase dialogue may seem to address process rather than substance, the Committee agrees with then Secretary of State for Asia Pacific David Kilgour, who argued in the fall of 2003 that “the objective of genuine dialogue is not necessarily to find agreement, but more importantly mutual respect.”122 Karen Armstrong noted simply that anything we could do to get a creative conversation going without sneers and slurs would be helpful. The Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade also jointly sponsored an international conference in Montreal in the fall of 2003 on the subject of Canada and Islam in Asia, and the Committee encourages it to continue work along these lines.

Canadian Values and Culture

Witnesses were clear in their opinion that in addition to promoting universal values such as human rights, such fundamental Canadian values as pluralism and multiculturalism were largely responsible for Canada’s positive image and deeply respected in the Muslim world, and should remain at the heart of Canadian public diplomacy and other initiatives. Dr. Sheema Khan agreed that “ … it’s clear that our foreign policy should be distinctly Canadian, in harmony with our basic values of compassion, fairness, and justice.” She added, however, that “contradictions between our words and our deeds will only sow mistrust.”123

Arguing for a broad definition of the term “pluralism,” Nazeer Ladhani of the Aga Khan Foundation Canada recommended that the Canadian government should “see pluralism as a key, strategic resource for Canada’s foreign relations. An enhanced foreign policy focus on fostering pluralism — a fundamental value and defining component of Canadian culture — would enhance relations between Canada and the Muslim world and, more generally, increase security and prosperity in Canada and around the world.”124 He later added that “we need to identify and support institutions and initiatives that can help to communicate Canadian values, interests, and experiences to the Muslim world … There are many strong potential partners in Canada and within civil society institutions of the Muslim world to connect and communicate with Muslim people.”125

Mazen Chouaib pointed out that, “the promotion of Canadian culture and values is a key element in Canadian foreign policy, yet there is an absence of significant developments in this area, despite the opportunities that exist.” In particular, he noted that other countries such as France and the United Kingdom make significant use of cultural centres in the Middle East, which are “a pragmatic tool for better relations and comprehension of each other.”126 While in Paris, Committee members held their meetings in the Canadian Cultural Centre, and, as we shall see later, members heard at least one suggestion for the creation of a new such centre in the Middle East.

Supporting Civil Society and Democratization

Canadian foreign policy has long recognized the importance of supporting civil societies abroad, among other things as a key element of democratization. Such a process is a long-term one, of course, and Nazeer Ladhani warned that it must go beyond the simple trappings of elections. David Dewitt noted that such support could take many forms: “When opportunities to promote and especially to assist peoples in these countries in their pursuit of reformist agendas leading toward democratic politics arise, we should be prepared to invest in various ways … This might be in security sector reform, trade liberalization, education, or, in particular, capacity building of the civic institutions in these countries. It should mean our interest in good governance, transparency, and a reduction in violence, things that CIDA once had on its agenda.”127

Gwynne Dyer told members in London that while it was not the West’s job to export democracy anywhere, the best contribution Canada could make to “common human values” would be to support Muslim human rights initiatives and civil society. Raja Khouri recommended that “ … Canada should lead an effort in the West to provide economic trade and development incentives to governments in the Muslim world that focus on reform and democratization and open up their systems and institutions. By the same token, governments that do not reform should not receive any arms or economic assistance.”128 Ann Thomson argued that “active and democratic civil societies serve as the DNA of pluralism, tolerance, and cooperation. Canada needs to support people structure more than infrastructure.”129

While many witnesses agreed that Canada should strongly support civil society in the countries of the Muslim world, several also warned of the need to avoid the impression that we are attempting to influence what remain essentially domestic debates. According to Uner Turgay, “The Canadian example of civil society is very much in demand in the Muslim world. That can be accomplished by exchange programs. And unions are important. They can train union people. We’ll educate some of the organizations by inviting them here for short-term visits or sending our people there. It’s very important, I think.”130 He added, however:

 … I think direct, obvious support for some of the liberal Islamic organizations is perhaps not the wisest thing. Again … I consider that it is doing a very fine job with small projects that bring the local people closer to the west, that attention that we can show towards their Islamic sensitivities. It’s tough. It’s hard for me to answer …

On the other hand, if there is a civil group over there arguing against the death penalty, I think you can support that. I don’t see anything wrong with that. We must not appear as if we are really meddling, yet we have to keep some of our own principles and stand by them and argue with them. We really have to.131

Addressing Terrorism and Security

All witnesses agreed on the need to condemn terrorism and the death of innocent civilians, although Raja Khouri of the Canadian Arab Federation and others argued that Canada must see even suicide attacks within a broader political context. At the domestic level, while there are obviously Muslims and others in Canada who support the use of terror, the Committee agrees with the vast majority of its witnesses that these represent a very small minority. However, the Committee accepts the warning of former CSIS director Reid Morden against complacency in this area, and that of Salim Mansur against political correctness.

Beyond suggestions that the government do more of some things to properly represent and protect its Muslim citizens, a number of witnesses argued that it must also do less of others, particularly in the areas of security and immigration. According to Raja Khouri, “September 11 and the security agenda that has taken over since then have essentially separated our communities from the rest of Canadians, first of all through guilt by association and the mere suspicion of Arabs and Muslims following what happened on September 11, and then through the subsequent legislation of Bill C-36 and the current Bill C-18, lawful access, etc., and a public agenda that has put security ahead of human and civil rights in this country.”132 He noted that:

 … Canada must also educate its own institutions and public about the Muslim world, its culture, and politics. Canadian political institutions have demonstrated a superficial and stereotypical understanding of Canadian Arabs and Muslims, as evident in the ignorant, clumsy, and often offensive way security agencies have treated them since September 11, 2001. Indeed, the immigration and solicitor general departments’ actions toward our communities have often been perceived as hostile, and the justice department’s attitude nothing short of indifferent …

For Canada to improve its relations with countries of the Muslim world, it must first get its own house in order by understanding, listening to, and protecting the rights of Arabs and Muslims within it. All practices of racial profiling must cease, and the security agenda must not be allowed to step roughshod over the country’s commitment to multiculturalism and human rights.133

All Canadians agree with the need to continue the global fight against terrorism, and most would probably agree that this can best be done through even closer intelligence, security and other cooperation around the world. Given valid criticisms of some of the aspects of the fight against terrorism, however, the Committee believes it neither complacent nor politically correct to agree with veteran Canadian diplomat Ferry de Kerckhove, a former high commissioner to Pakistan and ambassador to Indonesia, who argued in a personal capacity in the fall of 2003 that “There is clearly a need for a new security paradigm to fight terrorism. Muslim communities in western countries should be involved in devising it or, at least, being brought into the tent where some of the paradigm’s broad lines are being worked on, both to reassure them that it is not an anti-Islamic paradigm and to get any insight of use from the communities to fight Islamist terrorism.”134 The Committee therefore welcomes the forthcoming establishment of a parliamentary Standing Committee on National Security as it recommended in December 2002, and the public inquiry into the case of Maher Arar. Both these initiatives should contribute to stronger public policy in this area, including the relations between consular services abroad and security agencies at home.

Addressing Human Rights

Witnesses before the Committee — particularly Canadian Muslims — were clear in their demand that the Canadian government speak up strongly against all human rights abuses, including those by majority Muslim states. As Raja Khouri put it,

 … we must uphold human rights equally for all people and all places. Human rights are universal and indivisible. It’s more than a motto to brandish at conferences and international fora. We need to advocate for human rights in places like Chechnya, China, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Egypt. We may have to allow our interests to suffer in the short term by refusing to accommodate “friendly” regimes, so that we will gain in the long term by helping democracy and stability take hold.135

Dr. Sheema Khan of the Council on American-Islamic Relations Canada agreed, adding that “We have to speak out when people who stand up for basic human rights, which are universal, are being threatened. I think we have to take a stronger stand on that.”136 As cited above, Professor Uner Turgay argued that some Muslim governments hide behind Islam and cultural relativism, saying “ … take Saudi Arabia again, which does that physical punishment — cutting off hands, chopping off heads. We have to be critical of that. It doesn’t matter what the cost is. These are our very basic values.” 137 The Committee agrees that Canada must continue to speak out strongly against all human rights abuses, including those committed by Muslim majority states.

Emphasizing the Rights of Women and Minorities

Beyond a general need to support universal human rights, many of the witnesses and groups the Committee met in Canada and throughout the Muslim world spoke of the particular challenges facing women, and also minorities. Noah Feldman has pointed out that while there is little in Islam itself which justifies the second-class treatment of either women or minorities in Islamic states, such treatment does exist in practice, although the same can be said of many non-Islamic states as well.138 In her presentation before the committee, Senator Mobina Jaffer highlighted the importance of the rights of women and minorities — particularly the importance of education. She added that, as the Committee travelled throughout the Muslim world, “I respectfully suggest that you ask the same questions of women and minorities in these countries, as you will help our country and others in developing foreign policies that will ensure enduring partnerships.”139

The issue of women’s rights was the subject of extensive discussion in meetings in the Middle East and in Asia, where members met with women parliamentarians, prominent activists, women’s rights organizations, academics, journalists and others. As noted above, Senator Jaffer stressed the importance of women’s rights — and particularly the importance of education in liberating women — arguing that Canada should continue to assist this through CIDA and other programs. As noted in Part 1, Rights and Democracy also spoke to the Committee of its work on women’s rights in Afghanistan and elsewhere, and there are concrete and inexpensive ways that Canada can continue to help address the issue of women’s rights.

In terms of minorities, Iris Almeida of Rights and Democracy told the Committee that “ … the problem of minorities has become one of the main phenomena that can help us understand and manage diversity and democratic pluralism in many countries.”140 While minority issues were raised in many countries, as noted above and later, they took on a particular importance during the Committee’s visit to India, where the minority Muslim population is one of the largest in the world.

Minority rights must also be protected at home, however, and, as noted above, a number of Canadian Muslims argued before the Committee that they have been discriminated against by government security policies after September 11, 2001. Senator Jaffer made the same point in a speech to the Senate in February 2004 on the second reading of the Public Safety Act 2002. Arguing the need to protect “people who look like me,” she added that:

September 11 was a terrible tragedy. It changed our country and the world, as we knew them. We need to respond. I do not dispute that. We need to ensure that our government had the powers it needed … It was our duty and we responded. However … we must not forget … that we have a duty to ensure the civil liberties and freedoms of all our citizens, and that all our citizens are protected. That is fundamental to our Canadian system and to our security as a nation. 141

Protecting Canadians and Strengthening Diplomatic Advocacy

Thousands of Canadians have unfortunately been imprisoned in other countries over the years, and almost three-quarters of the nearly 3,000 currently imprisoned are in the United States due to drug-related offences. Over the past year, however, high-profile cases such as that of Maher Arar, Zahra Kazemi and William Sampson, have taught Canadians that beyond condemning human rights abuses in general, there is a need for stronger action to protect Canadians unlawfully imprisoned, tortured and even possibly murdered abroad. In the fall of 2003, following several hearings on the broader question of Canadians detained abroad which focused largely on the case of Maher Arar, the majority of the Committee passed a resolution calling for a public inquiry into the Maher Arar case.142 It therefore welcomes the government’s announcement in early 2004 that such an inquiry will be held as an important step in learning lessons for the future. The specific cases of Zahra Kazemi in Iran and William Sampson in Saudi Arabia will be discussed in later country sections.

After hearing from the Minister of Foreign Affairs and senior officials on this subject last year, the Committee agrees with the need to adopt a more aggressive strategy of effective rather than “soft” or “hard” diplomacy for the protection of all Canadians. Before his elevation to cabinet, former Committee member the Honourable Irwin Cotler published a list of 10 “rules of diplomatic advocacy” the Canadian government should follow to ensure better protection for Canadians held abroad, arguing that “the time has come for Canada to make it clear that we will not sit idly by while our citizens are illegally detained, imprisoned, abused and tortured.”143 The Committee also welcomes the fact that in December 2003 the government appointed a new parliamentary secretary to the Minister of Foreign Affairs with special emphasis on Canadians abroad. Mr. Cotler’s tenth recommendation was that “ Parliament should be much more engaged in the defence and protection of our citizens unlawfully detained abroad.” The Committee agrees, and in addition to the hearings it has already held, will continue to focus on these important issues.

Public Diplomacy and Media

A number of the suggestions raised during the Committee’s study could be considered elements of “public diplomacy.” Reid Morden, who is not only a former director of CSIS, but also a former deputy minister of Foreign Affairs, explained this term as follows: “it’s not just the doing, it’s letting people know what you’re doing.”144 More formally, the Advisory Committee on Public Diplomacy appointed by the U.S. Congress argued in its 2003 report Changing Minds, Winning Peace: A New Strategic Direction for U.S. Public Diplomacy in the Arab and Muslim World, that “public diplomacy is the promotion of the national interest by informing, engaging and influencing people around the world.”145

In recent years, the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade has recognized the increased need for public diplomacy, which Jean-Phillipe Tachdjian of the Canadian Embassy in Egypt noted in a personal submission to the Committee “is a wide field which includes many facets including advocacy, media relations, education promotion and wider cultural affairs.” Noting that the latter includes both telling people “ … who Canadians are (our own unique identity) and what we are not (i.e. not Americans and not Europeans),” he argued that resources currently devoted to these functions in Egypt and elsewhere are inadequate.146 Likewise political scientist Denis Stairs recently argued that “the growing requirement for ‘public diplomacy’ cannot be adequately met without more staff.”147

A number of witnesses in Asia argued that Canada should consider establishing a satellite television presence to present Canadian news or other Canadian content. Likewise, in a recent overview of Canada’s relations with the Asia-Pacific region, veteran diplomat Daryl Copeland suggested that the government “develop a satellite television presence — Canada’s absence in that field is crippling.”148 When questioned on this subject by a member of the Committee in the fall of 2003, Canadian Broadcasting Corporation President and CEO Robert Rabinovich replied that “ … there’s no question that there is a demand out there for that service. We would very much like to consider expansion and development of a foreign service television channel around the world, because [Radio Canada International] is only radio.” When asked about the cost, he replied that “it’s relatively doable, especially if we could attract a couple more public sector partners such as the Australians and a couple of others to come in with us … It’s not expensive per se, but it’s not cheap, and it would take a commitment of funds and a desire by government that we move in that direction.”149

Strengthening Foreign Policy Instruments

While the preceding principles will allow Canada to review and strengthen key aspects of its foreign policy that touch on relations with the countries of the Muslim world, Professor Syed Serajul Islam recommended the government “set up an interdepartmental council to look into Canada’s relations with the Muslim world and recommend steps to be taken in this regard.”150

More generally, the Committee’s hearings once again highlighted a number of areas in which Canada must re-examine the tools through which it will deliver this policy — the so-called “three Ds and T” of defence, development, diplomacy, and trade.151 As David Dewitt argued “… particularly in defence and in CIDA and in our development politics, we need reconsideration of our capacities. Capabilities in all three sectors need to be enhanced and refocused. If we can’t do everything, we need to choose what, when, where, and how we wish to invest our scarce resources and our leverage, and pursue track-two diplomacy in this area where we can contribute.”152 A number of witnesses spoke of CIDA programs and resources, and former ambassador Michael Bell noted that in the case of Israel and Palestine DFAIT’s Human Security Fund had been “very effective.” Uner Turgay added that “ … the missions have exchange program funds, which are very limited, by the way, they are desperately in need of more funds, both locally initiated fund and exchange funds.”153 While resources will be only one aspect of the re-examination of Canadian foreign policy instruments, as always they will loom large; as the Committee noted last year in its contribution to the Foreign Policy Dialogue, Resources are not a substitute for policy, yet policy without adequate resources cannot achieve either its goals or its potential.”154

Canadian diplomats remain the front-line deliverers of Canada’s foreign policy, and the Committee reiterates the need to compensate them adequately for this task. The diversity of the Muslim world also emphasizes the need to increase the number of Foreign Service officers speaking such languages as Arabic, both by recruiting native speakers and increasing language training.

While it is necessary to ensure that DFAIT headquarters is adequately resourced, it is Canadian missions in the Muslim world and elsewhere that on a day-to-day basis explain the world to Ottawa, and Ottawa to the world. Recognizing the importance of adequate diplomatic representation, the Canadian government has recently agreed with the Committee’s recommendation to increase Canadian representation in the United States. Likewise, as the Canadian government develops a comprehensive approach to relations with the countries of the Muslim world, it will no doubt need to increase Canadian diplomatic resources in key regions and countries.

The September 2001 attacks and the first two years of the war on terrorism have exposed common weaknesses in Western countries related both to intelligence capabilities in general and the lack of language capabilities in particular. The Canadian government increased the resources available to Canada’s intelligence community in the 2002 federal budget, which in turn allowed an increase in capabilities. At least one veteran Canadian observer in Southeast Asia, however, argued that the new geopolitical realities both there and globally required the establishment of a Canadian foreign intelligence service. While most witnesses would probably not go this far, their cumulative descriptions of the complexity of the Muslim world lead to the conclusion that the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade must take a proactive approach and ensure it has an independent assessment capability in Ottawa to deal effectively with the information it receives from multiple sources.155

RECOMMENDATION 3

The Government of Canada must ensure a proper understanding of the complexities of the diverse countries of the Muslim world and develop a constructive long-term approach toward them. In particular, the Committee is convinced that there cannot be genuine democratic progress without a serious process of increasing equality for women — economic, social, and political equality — in law and in practice.

As part of this constructive approach, the Government should:

  ensure full consultation with a broad range of groups, including Muslim groups, in the ongoing development of its foreign policy;
  place greater emphasis on generating and communicating knowledge at home and abroad; support secular education abroad which upholds human rights and individual freedoms; and, noting the example of McGill University’s successful program in Indonesia, in cooperation with the provinces as necessary, encourage other Canadian educational institutions to establish similar programs in Muslim countries;
  continue to support intercultural and interfaith dialogue;
  in cooperation with the provinces as necessary, expand student and other exchange programs;
  emphasize values such as pluralism and multiculturalism, and encourage the adoption of universal human rights values and freedoms such as freedom of speech, religion, association, enterprise and ownership of property;
  continue to support civil society and democratization throughout the Muslim world and elsewhere;
  continue to strongly condemn all human rights abuses;
  place even greater emphasis on the need for gender equality and women’s rights;
  speak out strongly in defence of minority rights, including minority religious communities, and encourage their full participation in the national affairs of their countries;
  pursue a more aggressive strategy for the protection of Canadians detained abroad;
  strongly consider supporting the idea of establishing a Canadian news service televised by satellite; and
  ensure adequate resources for enhanced linguistic and analysis capabilities within the Canadian government, and consider the establishment of a mechanism within the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade to coordinate dialogue activities with the countries of the Muslim world.

89Allan Gregg, “Bumpy Ride,” Macleans, December 2003, p. 30.
90Karim Karim, “Canada’s Relations with Countries of the Muslim World,” Submission, October 2, 2003, citing Richard Falk.
91Evidence, Meeting 49 (1105).
92Ibid. (1110).
93Ibid. (1105).
94Richard Bulliet, The Case For Islamo-Christian Civilization, Columbia University Press, forthcoming, August 2004, Chapter 4.
95Foreign Secretary’s Opening Remarks at Seminar on Faith and Foreign Policy, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, London, October 8, 2003.
96See Shireen T. Hunter, “Conclusions and Outlook for European Islam,” in Shireen T. Hunter ed., Islam, Europe’s Second Religion: The New Social, Cultural and Political Landscape, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, 2002, p. 275.
97“Veil of Tears,” The Economist, January 17, 2004, p. 44.
98Jack Straw, “The United Kingdom and the Muslim World,” Jakarta, January 9, 2003.
99See Gordon Corera, “How Militant Islam Found a Home in London,” Jane’s Intelligence Review,
August 2002.
100United Kingdom Foreign and Commonwealth Office, “Working With Faith Groups”.
101Foreign Secretary’s Opening Remarks at Seminar on Faith and Foreign Policy, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, London, October 8, 2003.
102The Committee is grateful to the German Embassy in Ottawa for supplying this information.
103Bob Harvey, “Canadian Muslims Creating a New Culture,” Ottawa Citizen, July 12, 2003.
104Irshad Manji, The Trouble With Islam: Wake-Up Call For Honesty and Change, Toronto, Random House Canada, 2003.
105Evidence, Meeting No. 34 (0930).
106Evidence, Meeting No. 35 (1610).
107Notes for an Address by the Honourable Bill Graham, Minister of Foreign Affairs, to the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, Chicago, November 20, 2003, p. 6.
108Evidence, Meeting No. 49 (1125)
109Evidence, Meeting No. 31 (0920).
110Evidence, Meeting No. 53 (1135-40).
111Evidence, Meeting No. 34 (0940).
112Evidence, Meeting No. 45 (1120).
113Evidence, Meeting No. 57 (1205).
114Evidence, Meeting No. 35 (1625).
115“From Tolerance to Understanding: Strengthening Canada’s Relations with Muslim Communities in Asia-Pacific,” Remarks by the Honourable David Kilgour, Secretary of State (Asia-Pacific) to “Canada and Islam in Asia in the 21st Century” conference, Montreal, September 24, 2003.
116See “Impact Study Cooperation Between IAIN and McGill University, Impact on the Development and Modernization of Islam in Indonesia,” IAIN, Jakarta, May 17, 2000, available on the Web site of the McGill Centre for Islamic Studies.
117Evidence, Meeting No. 47 (1110).
118Evidence, Meeting No. 53 (1140).
119Canadian Centre for Foreign Policy Development, Canada and the Muslim World, Summary Report from Expert Meetings, Ottawa, 2003, p. 12.
120Evidence, Meeting No. 53 (1210).
121Evidence, Meeting No. 35 (1655).
122David Kilgour, Notes for an Address, Dinner with the Malaysian Community in Edmonton,
October 17, 2003.
123Evidence, Meeting No. 53 (1135).
124Aga Khan Foundation Canada, Presentation to the House of Commons Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade, “Study on Canada’s Relations with the Countries in the Muslim World,” May 7, 2003, p. 9-10. In October 2002 the Aga Khan announced the intention of establishing, with the collaboration of the Government of Canada, a secular, nondenominational and bilingual internationally focused Global Centre for Pluralism in Ottawa to promote pluralism as a global ethic and practice. See Global Centre for Pluralism — Update, Aga Khan Foundation Canada, March 9, 2004.
125Evidence, Meeting No. 35 (1625).
126Ibid. (1555).
127Evidence, Meeting No. 45 (1115).
128Evidence, Meeting No. 53 (1120).
129Evidence, Meeting No. 49 (1125).
130Evidence, Meeting No. 35 (1705).
131Evidence, Meeting No. 47 (1250).
132Evidence, Meeting No. 53 (1155)
133Ibid. (1125).
134See Ferry de Kerckhove “Islam and multiculturalism: The challenge of successful integration,” edited version of a paper presented to the conference on Canada and Islam in Asia in the 21st Century, Montreal, September 24-26, 2003.
135Evidence, Meeting No. 53 (1120).
136Ibid. (1150).
137Evidence, Meeting No. 47 (1250).
138Noah Feldman, After Jihad: America and the Struggle for Islamic Democracy, Farrar, Strauss and Giroux New York, 2003, p. 62-68.
139Evidence, Meeting No. 47 (1140).
140Evidence, Meeting No. 3, February 25, 2004.
141Debates of the Senate, 3rd Session, 37th Parliament, Volume 141, Issue 17, February 26, 2004 (1450).
142Overall, the Committee held at least four substantial meetings on these cases, with the Minister of Foreign Affairs (Meeting No. 54, November 4, 2003); the Solicitor General of Canada (Meeting No. 50, October 7, 2003); senior officials of the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade and the Department of the Solicitor General/RCMP (Meeting No.46, September 25, 2003 and accompanying their ministers); Monia Mazigh (the wife of Maher Arar) (Meeting No. 46, September 25, 2003); and William Sampson (Meeting No. 57, November 6, 2003).
143Irwin Cotler, “The 10 Rules of Diplomatic Advocacy, The National Post, August 19, 2003.
144Evidence, Meeting No. 31 (1040).
145Changing Minds, Winning Peace: A New Strategic Direction for US Public Diplomacy in the Arab and Muslim World, Report of the Advisory Group on Public Diplomacy for the Arab and Muslim World, Washington, October 2003, p. 13.
146Jean-Phillipe Tachdjian, “The Projection of Canadian Culture and Values in the Arab World: A Strategy Paper.”
147Denis Stairs, “Challenges and Opportunities for Canadian Foreign Policy in the Paul Martin Era,” International Journal, Volume LVIII, No. 4, 2003, p. 501 (footnote 9).
148Daryl Copeland, “Diversifying Canada’s Dependence: Look East,” Asian Perspective, Volume 27, No. 4, 2003, p. 289.
149Evidence, House of Commons Standing Committee on Canadian Heritage, October 28, 2003 (1140-45). Mr. Rabinovich gave a similar answer to members of the Senate Standing Committee on Transportation and Communications on October 23, 2003.
150Syed Serajul Islam, Submission.
151Stairs, p. 499.
152Evidence, Meeting No. 45 (1120).
153Evidence, Meeting No. 35 (1705).
154Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade, A Contribution to the Foreign Policy Dialogue, May 2003, p. 4.
155According to Denis Stairs, “one of Canada’s most dangerous vulnerabilities in international politico-security affairs is the fact that it is so dependent on the United States as a source of intelligence in relation to issues arising, for example, in areas like the Middle East. Having confidence in our own judgment requires confidence that we know what is really going on.” See Stairs, p. 501 (footnote 10).