FAAE Committee Report
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While the religious heart of Islam might be in Mecca and Medina and in the Arab world, the demographic heart of Islam is in South Asia and southeast Asia.
M.J. Akbar
Canada is the only English-speaking country they want to deal with, be it in education, be it in foreign aid … this is in Southeast and South Asia, particularly in Malaysia and Indonesia, where you’re dealing with at least 250 million Muslims. There Canada is viewed as a middle power with a economic, political, and social conscience. This is the opportunity we have to seize, but this wonderful image we have, rightly so, in my opinion, leaves us terribly heavy responsibilities as well. This is a time to act.
Uner Turgay
More than half of the world’s Muslims live in South and Southeast Asia. These sub-regions include the most populous Muslim country, Indonesia; that with the largest Muslim minority, India; and the only country conceived explicitly as a state for Muslims and also a democracy, Pakistan.336 Malaysia, another important regional state, played host to the OIC’s 10th Summit at the time of the Committee’s visit in October 2003. While no single factor can explain the dynamism of a continent as large, diverse and important as Asia, considering it from the perspective of Islam serves two purposes. First, it illuminates a key factor in the dynamics of much of Asia, particularly the key sub-regions of South and Southeast Asia. Second, and at least as important given current priorities in international affairs, it underlines that much received wisdom in the West about the “Muslim” world — such as the supposed incompatibility of Islam and democracy, and the religiously motivated subordination of women — is in fact based on the much smaller Arab world. The countries of South and Southeast Asia, including those with Muslim majorities, have in fact had much more success with democracy than the Arab world. Moreover, even though women are still discriminated against on a global basis, these same countries have had a higher number of women leaders over the years than have Western ones. While some counter that these women achieved power based on family ties, The Economist pointed out in December 2003 that this practice is global, arguing that “in much of Asia dynastic politics takes the form of a male-to-female transfer, following the American pattern of widows stepping into their dead husband’s shoes. In Asia, though, a coup or an assassination, or both, often serves to hurry the succession along.” 337
In London, Dr. Bavna Dave of the School of Oriental and African Studies at the University of London also emphasized the importance of the five Muslim majority states of Central Asia, particularly after the events of September 2001, and recommended increased Canadian attention to them. The Committee agrees, having visited three of these states in 2000, and tabled a report in June 2001 which raised the geopolitical dangers both of a lack of progress on socio-economic, democratic and human rights reforms, and the challenge posed by militant Islam within Central Asia, a region bordering Afghanistan (then still under Taliban rule), Pakistan and Iran.
In its report, the Committee recommended that the Government of Canada develop specific policies related to Central Asia which echo many of the themes raised in this broader study of relations with the countries of the Muslim world. In particular, the report’s recommendations on Central Asia called for strengthening relations in the following areas:
| • | Regional stability and peacebuilding; | |
| • | Broader long-term economic relationships and sustainable development; | |
| • | Democratic governance reforms, human rights and support to civil society; | |
| • | Human resources, education and culture.338 |
While largely agreeing with the Committee’s analysis of the importance of the region, the government’s response tabled in October 2001 noted that “available resources will remain scarce: Canadian technical assistance will remain modest, and our representation sparse.” The result was few substantive changes. Given major developments affecting the region since 2001, the Committee believes it would now be useful for the government to revisit the Committee’s recommendations in the context of its response to this report.
RECOMMENDATION 21
Given the importance of the states of Central Asia and the developments that have taken place there since September 2001, the Government of Canada should revisit the recommendations contained in the Committee’s 2001 report Advancing Canadian Foreign Policy Objectives in the South Caucasus and Central Asia in the context of reviewing its relations with the countries of the Muslim world.
More generally, while Canadian business interest in Asia and government attention to that region waned after the economic crises of the late 1990s, a good case can now be made for re-engagement.339 The economic case is the most obvious: economic growth in China and the so-called “Asian tigers” has been impressive for several decades; as has related, if uneven, poverty reduction. Asia is expected to account for nearly 60% of world income by 2025, up from about 40% today.340 Beyond economics, however, Asia continues to be important to global security. It is moreover the source of most new Canadians. Despite a traditional tendency to focus attention almost exclusively on the major Asian powers of China, Japan and India, such a focus does justice neither to the complexity of Asia itself, nor to the range of Canadian interests and values there.
Understanding the Role of Islam in Asia
Witnesses in Ottawa and throughout the Muslim world repeatedly argued that while a small but vocal minority of Muslims are violent extremists, the vast majority are moderate, but silent. This argument was made even more strongly in Asia, since, as witnesses in the regions repeatedly pointed out, Islam came to Asia mainly with traders, rather than — or, in India’s case, as well as with — conquerors. Islam in Asia does have a strong tradition of tolerance. At the same time, the global political revival of Islam over the past two decades has been felt there as well, and has become increasingly important in domestic and foreign affairs, both in established democracies such as Malaysia and in new ones such as Indonesia. As Uner Turgay explained:
A common assumption of the plans developed by western theorists and economists and sold to, or indeed imposed upon, Muslim countries through international diplomacy and pressures has been that modernization weakens religious traditions, since it nurtures the process of secularization. However, this has not been the case. Certainly, in the countries I visited recently, Indonesia, Malaysia, Brunei, Dar es Salaam, and Pakistan, the question is not whether Islam is compatible with political development, but rather how much and what kind of Islam is compatible, indeed necessary, for political development. The same question is asked regarding economic policies.
He also noted that “Islamists in South and Southeast Asia today … are stronger than in any other period in recent history.”
The Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade has recognized the role of Islam in Asia as a key both to developments in the region and to the identification of constructive Canadian policies there. It has therefore begun to sponsor academic and other dialogue designed to gain a deeper understanding in this area, build relationships — including with a new generation of leaders — and identify practical policies to pursue. There is real interest in the regions in pursuing dialogue both on economic and development cooperation, and on such Canadian values as pluralism and multiculturalism. However, the type of democracy which emerges in Muslim majority and others states in Asia may well not be identical to our own, since, even apart from the influence of Islam, there may be broader Asian influences as well. As Noah Feldman argued before the Committee when asked about balancing group and individual rights, “One sees this already in a country like South Korea, for example, which is a democracy by anyone’s measure today, but its political values do tend to be more communitarian in many ways than say, the United States’, which is on the other end of the continuum, arguably.”342
Having heard from witnesses in Ottawa and visited key states in South and Southeast Asia, the Committee agrees with the need to pursue long-term policies such as those described in Part II, emphasizing dialogue, education and support for civil society, and drawing on all instruments of Canadian foreign policy. It also notes the words of Noah Feldman:
… I think it’s a mistaken impression — which is shared, by the way, broadly in the United States as well — that the solution to the problems of promoting democracy, women’s rights, and human rights in the region is more money. Money is helpful, but in countries that are relatively poor — that’s certainly true of the countries of South and Southeast Asia — a little money can go a long way if it’s properly spent. When it comes, for example, to promoting education, sometimes all that’s necessary is not to pay for the full curriculum or the school building; just to pay for school lunch in one set of schools will encourage parents to send their children to those schools, for no other reason than to get the free lunch. One can increase attendance by such small moves pretty effectively.343
South Asia comprises eight countries — Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, the Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka — which occupy a landmass half the size of China and are home to one quarter of humanity. South Asia boasts the three largest Muslim populations in the world after Indonesia, with at least 400 million Muslims in Pakistan, India and Bangladesh. The countries of South Asia face daunting challenges of development and democratization. However, the past several years have focused international attention on the major security challenges in the region. In addition to complicating the achievement of development and democratization, those security challenges are seen by some as having links to Islam in one way or another — from the continued presence of self-proclaimed jihadists in Afghanistan and Pakistan, to long-standing tensions between nuclear-armed rivals India and Pakistan (mainly over the fate of Muslim-majority Kashmir), and concerns about possible proliferation given Pakistan’s possession of what some have called the world’s only “Islamic bomb.”
Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf denied that his country had been involved in any nuclear proliferation in a meeting with Parliamentarians in Ottawa in September 2003; in February 2004, however, Abdul Qadeer Khan, the father of Pakistan’s nuclear program, admitted selling nuclear information and material to other countries, and was promptly pardoned by General Musharraf.
The international war on terrorism has focused attention on South Asia. This sub-region was the birthplace of modern international jihadism, as the United States and allies such as Saudi Arabia and Pakistan financed and trained Muslim mujahedeen (“holy warrior”) forces to carry out what, as Indian journalist M.J. Akbar pointed out to the Committee, were basically suicide missions against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan.344 This jihad was successful, but the vacuum that followed the Soviet retreat from Afghanistan was soon occupied by Taliban (religious student) forces, who gave shelter and support to al-Qaeda. Despite the overthrow of the Taliban in 2002, the security situation in Afghanistan outside Kabul remains very dangerous and threatens to derail the stabilization and reconstruction of the country. As analysts from the Department of National Defence argued in mid-2003, “together, Afghanistan and Pakistan probably boast the highest concentration of jihadists anywhere, and thus the US and other governments — including Canada’s — are, and will remain, actively involved in efforts to reduce the attractiveness of those countries as nurseries of jihad. On the one hand, this involves trying to bolster the authority of the interim Afghan government and to defeat Islamist guerrilla groups in Afghanistan. On the other, it involves steering a fine line between rewarding Pakistan’s campaign against al-Qaeda while at the same time avoiding abetting Islamabad’s covert support for jihadist groups in Kashmir.” 345
Canada has played a major role in the international effort to stabilize Afghanistan, militarily, in terms of reconstruction and development, and diplomatically. Canada’s military has made an important contribution in Afghanistan, including assuming the leadership of NATO’s International Security Assistance Force for Afghanistan; it has also paid the heaviest possible cost, that of Canadian lives. In addition, Canada has made an important contribution towards meeting the many humanitarian and other needs of Afghanistan; its $250 million pledge in March 2003 was CIDA’s single largest country pledge ever. Finally, Canada has played an important role diplomatically, both on a multilateral level and bilaterally, opening Canada’s first embassy in Afghanistan.346
Noah Feldman noted before the Committee that the new constitution of Afghanistan recently unveiled
… is really a fascinating document, because on the one hand it does … specify that this is an Islamic republic, and on the other hand, in the very next sentence, it says it should be a democratic government … that rights of freedom of religion are preserved for non-Muslims, that free expression is an inviolable right, that equality exists for men and for women, and that Afghanistan is committed to observing the international conventions to which it is a signatory, which includes conventions guaranteeing equality for all persons. It is in many ways a progressive constitution, and it is also simultaneously one that is deeply Islamic.
He added, however, that “The devil will be in the details … we will find out later whether it works.”347 Salim Mansur argued that “the problem is that Afghanistan has been a part of the world we used to call a buffer state, where the great game was played. This society is not going to change according to the expectation we in the West have, in a matter of a few months or a few years, into a Jeffersonian democracy. We need to have a sense of patient expectation, given how history evolves. I have no illusion that it will take time and commitment. The question is whether we have the time and the commitment.”348
South Asia is the scene of many long-standing conflicts, including a decades-long civil war in Sri Lanka; the parties to that war, however, are currently engaged in peace talks that will hopefully achieve a political solution, probably based on federalism. The most deep-rooted security challenge in South Asia — and the most dangerous, both in terms of actual and millions of potential deaths — is the rivalry between India and Pakistan, which has lasted for more than half a century and resulted in three full-scale wars and a nuclear standoff. The source of this tension was Britain’s agreement as it withdrew in 1947 to partition the subcontinent into Hindu-dominated but nominally secular India and Muslim (east and west) Pakistan, in order to provide a homeland where Muslims could live and worship freely. The aftermath of partition saw severe rioting and population movement that resulted in the deaths of hundreds of thousands in both India and Pakistan. The fate of the former autonomous princely state of Kashmir was disputed at the time of partition in August 1947, and activists argued that its Muslim majority should have the same right to a Muslim homeland as those living in the new Pakistan. The (Hindu) ruler of Kashmir finally decide to join India in October 1947; this decision led to the first Indo-Pakistani war, which ended with India controlling two thirds of Kashmir and Pakistan one third, and a United Nations recommendation for a referendum on Kashmir that has never been held. A second war over Kashmir followed in 1965, and when civil war broke out in Pakistan in 1971, India invaded East Pakistan to support the establishment of an independent state of Bangladesh.
By 1974, India had developed the capacity for what it termed a “peaceful nuclear explosion” — at least partly through the misuse of Canadian nuclear technology. While India’s nuclear capability was undoubtedly developed in response to China, the militarily weaker Pakistan felt obliged to follow it in the development of nuclear weapons. Until recently, Pakistan has also continued to support Kashmiri extremists in their terrorist campaign against India, which included an attack on the Indian Parliament in December 2001. General Hamid Gul, an admitted Islamist and former head of Pakistan’s main intelligence agency, Inter Service Intelligence, was quoted recently as saying, “if they encourage the Kashmiris it’s understandable. The Kashmiri people have risen up in accordance with the UN Charter, and it is the national purpose of Pakistan to help liberate them. India is so huge, so large, so ruthless. If the jihadis go out and contain India, tying down their army on their own soil, for a legitimate cause, why should we not support them?”349 Noah Feldman has argued that the conflict over Kashmir has become “a nearly mythical grudge match where both sides have nuclear weapons.”350 Ann Thomson argued that “there are certain keystone issues that, without solution, perpetuate a wider sense of injustice and conflict in Muslim communities. The Israeli-Palestinian issue is clearly one for Muslims worldwide. The Kashmir dispute between India and Pakistan is another.”351
The rivalry between India and Pakistan was made all the more dangerous by the fact that both countries had long been assumed to possess nuclear weapons, although they had never admitted this. In 1998, India tested nuclear weapons, and Pakistan quickly followed. Canada and the rest of the international community strongly condemned both countries for these tests, and the United Nations Security Council passed Resolution 1172 calling on them to sign the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) without delay and without conditions. This has not happened, and in September 2003, Canada told a meeting of the International Atomic Energy Agency that it
… continues to be concerned that India, Israel and Pakistan … remain outside the NPT, the cornerstone of the international nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime. We urge these countries to join the NPT as non-nuclear-weapon States, unconditionally and without delay. This is an essential requirement for the continued sustainability of the multilateral nuclear non-proliferation regime and a basic requirement of full membership in the international community. We are disappointed that there has been no progress by any of these countries toward this objective.352
Canada has also urged India and Pakistan to restrain their testing of ballistic missiles.
Tensions between the two countries reached a high point in 2002, and the immediate crises were diffused only with the help of intense international diplomacy. Tensions had decreased significantly by the time of the Committee’s visit to South Asia in October 2003, however, and the following months saw a welcome and long-awaited breakthrough. In January 2004, the leaders of India and Pakistan met on the sidelines at a summit of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation, and issued a statement pledging to pursue a composite dialogue on Kashmir and other key issues that divide them.
Before these recent developments, Ann Thomson had argued that “I think Kashmir is an area where Canada really could do something. There is a willingness there to see Canada in its honest broker role. I think both sides would be willing to see Canada in a position where it was promoting dialogue. The Parliamentarians going to the area need to be thinking about whether or not self-determination is realistic for Kashmir and what, if any, role Canada might want to play.”353 Whether or not this is the case, the Canadian government welcomed the recent breakthrough, and the Committee believes it should offer its support to the ongoing process as appropriate.
RECOMMENDATION 22
The Government of Canada should encourage India and Pakistan to continue their composite talks, and should stand ready with the rest of the international community to contribute to the resolution of long-standing disputes, particularly that over Kashmir, as appropriate.
RECOMMENDATION 23
The Government of Canada should continue to urge the governments of Pakistan and India to work together to reduce the risk of nuclear escalation in South Asia and, given recent revelations, redouble their efforts to prevent nuclear proliferation.
Pursuing Development and Democratization
In addition to traditional security challenges, Ann Thomson of South Asia Partnership Canada pointed out that the underlying challenges in South Asia remain those of development and democratization. Despite significant economic growth in India over the last decade, tremendous numbers of people there and in countries such as Pakistan and Bangladesh remain poor, illiterate and therefore vulnerable to exploitation. Pakistan presents unique challenges in terms of democratization. Even countries that have had more success in this area, however, such as Bangladesh, which Noah Feldman argues is “a remarkably free democracy,”354 suffer from weak institutions and corruption, which create further obstacles to building a strong democratic and human rights culture. Combined with poverty and inadequate education, the lack of such a culture makes the residents of the region, particularly the large youth populations, vulnerable to appeals to extremism. There have been important development successes in South Asia over the years: famine has been eliminated and life expectancy and literacy have risen. Nonetheless, countries such as Bangladesh and Afghanistan remain among the poorest in the world, and much remains to be done, particularly in the area of education.
Given a lack of adequate public education, parents in Pakistan and elsewhere often have no choice but to send children to madrassas (free religious schools). As Muslim Indian journalist M.J. Akbar argued before the Committee, “ … the madrassa has a long history and an honourable history, which I think you need to recognize. At what point did the madrassa become a problem rather than a solution? The madrassa is the world’s largest NGO, and there should really be consciousness of that fact. The poorest of the Muslims today who do not get state protection, who do not get state welfare, or who do not have a home or an education or food are picked up by the madrassas.” He added that in the early 1980s he had had interviewed an extremist leader in Kashmir, who said
“ … you Indians think you’ve solved the problem of Kashmir. But do you know something? Your children are no longer going to government schools.” Now, I did not quite understand the meaning of that. He said, “Your children have stopped because the government school structure has decayed. The poorer children used to go to government schools for the midday meal or to use the bathroom, which they did not have at home. But now they’re coming to my madrassas. When I send them out in 15 years, do you think they will be loyal to your India?” He was very clear, and I quoted him on it.355
The majority of madrassas provide a necessary service in meeting the daily physical needs of students, and the number that preach extremism is small; and yet, their curricula rarely leave students prepared for anything but a religious position. Few provide an education that truly prepares youth for the future.
Ann Thomson of South Asia Partnership Canada presented the Committee with an overview of the grassroots work carried out by this coalition of 24 Canadian organizations and their partners in the region, which is focused on governance and democracy, peace and security, and sustainable livelihoods. Once again, she argued the need to look to and support civil society. She noted that:
…in South Asia, we see that Muslims in both majority and minority communities represent the same broad range of attitudes and practices that we have in Canada and in other parts of the world. Our experience shows that the great majority of people want to live peaceful, productive lives in harmony with others in their communities, regardless of religion and other differences. Our partners and colleagues tell us and demonstrate for us that the great mass of Muslims want to be able to practise their own religion, want others to respect it, and are perfectly ready to respect others. Religious differences themselves are not the issue. Poverty, disparities in living standards, unfair treatment before the law, and lack of access to services and opportunity are the issues that give rise to conflict.
She added that “since the majority of Muslims live in the developing world in conditions of poverty, improving their livelihoods and reducing poverty is critical to building more just and equitable societies. In particular, reducing inequalities between these nations and the affluent Western world is an important means of improving relations and limiting the conditions that create support for desperate extremism such as international terrorism.”356
Canada has positive relations and a long history of engagement with all the countries in South Asia, beginning with the Commonwealth connection and continuing through development cooperation going back to the early 1950s. When asked the extent to which Muslim populations distinguished between Canada and “the West,” Gwynne Dyer argued that the distinction would be strongest in the subcontinent. The Committee found this to be true: almost all witnesses made a clear distinction between Canadian policies and those of other Western nations such as the United States and the United Kingdom, particularly following the invasion of Iraq.
No outside country has been able to resolve the security problems in South Asia. However, there has been more success in terms of development. Ann Thomson told the Committee that “during eight years of living and working in Bangladesh and Indonesia, and many more travelling through South Asia, I saw successes … repeated over and over, even in the midst of conflict. Canadian assistance lies behind each of these stories … ”357 She added that:
We should focus in our development cooperation abroad on eliminating poverty, improving livelihoods and social conditions, supporting gender equality, and encouraging democratic practices. Important to all of this is strengthening civil society in other countries and building the capacity of organizations, institutions, community groups, associations, and networks to bring change from within … 358
Many witnesses argued the need to support education in South Asia and elsewhere. M.J. Akbar argued before the Committee that:
I would actually offer a radical thought: why don’t you give … aid to the madrassas? At the moment the madrassas are being funded only from one source, and that source is determining the curriculum. If somebody actually made computers compulsory in madrassas, you would see a dramatic impact inside. You cannot hope to remove them, but you can hope to change them. Just put computers in them. Those children deserve an education. You cannot deny them the right to an education. But change their education and turn them into responsible citizens.359
In addition to development, witnesses in the region called for the types of policies outlined in Part II, ranging from academic and other dialogue to support for education and increased student and other exchanges. Participants at the September 2003 conference on Canada and Islam in Asia in the 21st Century argued that “Regional and rural education programs are essential to the advancement of many Muslim countries. Canada can be instrumental in the development of such programs.” One conference participant, Dr. Fazli Ilhai of the Organization of the Islamic Conference’s Islamic Institute of Technology in Bangladesh, added that “in this age of privatization, government funding for development of educational infrastructure is not enough. We should not discourage private participation in the development of communities by providing educational opportunities but proper, healthy, transparent government regulations must be in place.”
Overall, despite her organization’s focus on South Asia, Ann Thomson stressed a global theme:
Canada will enhance its relations with Muslims across the globe by supporting their efforts to address fundamental concerns: clean water; health services; good education; women’s equality; safe jobs; peace and security; and so many more. By being a helpful partner to Muslims across the world, by providing a voice to those who would not otherwise be heard, and by building a relationship of respect rather than suspicion, Canada will improve dialogue, build trust, and alleviate the poverty that is a major barrier to sustainable and tolerant societies.361
Pakistan was conceived specifically as a state for Muslims, and also as a democracy: the first and only state of its kind … Pakistan is unique in the Muslim world in many ways: in its problems, its importance, and its potential promise … 362
Noah Feldman
The remarkable thing about Pakistan is that its people don’t stop demanding democracy even though their experiences of it have been uniformly disappointing. Despite the country’s overweening military and its desperate poverty, despite the bitter ethnic rivalries and the fear of India that the generals exploit so well, military rulers never manage to resist that demand for very long. In other places military strongmen may stay in power for twenty-five or thirty years — Mubarak in Egypt, Assad in Syria, Suharto in Indonesia — but no Pakistani military dictator has made it much past ten.363
Gwynne Dyer
Pakistan faces a staggering array of related challenges, which include chronic and increasing poverty, lack of democracy, weak institutions, corruption, and — perhaps inevitably given the preceding — extremism. A key problem in Pakistan also remains the power of the military in society; one interlocutor in South Asia repeated an old joke that while countries usually have an army, in Pakistan an army has a country. The President of Pakistan, General Pervez Musharraf, seized power in 1999 in a popular and bloodless coup that was immediately condemned by the international community, including Canada. The Commonwealth promptly suspended Pakistan from its councils and sent a delegation of foreign ministers to that country, led by then-Canadian Foreign Minister Lloyd Axworthy. Mr. Axworthy later wrote that:
Looking back, I wish there had been more time, or perhaps inclination, to pick up on the signs and portents in Pakistan. Here was a society under stress: extremes of poverty and wealth in a region of instability, drought and intrigue; an overburdening debt; huge outlays for the military; miniscule expenditures for education or health; Islamic extremism on the rise, infiltrating the army and intelligence service; a dangerous border conflict with India made all the more treacherous by a nuclear arms race. Offering advice and registering admonishment on a military takeover was too narrow an approach. [The Commonwealth Ministerial Action Group] should have discussed a broad plan of action with the Pakistanis.364
General Musharraf’s decision to agree to U.S. demands and join the war on terror in September 2001 made Pakistan a key regional ally of the United States and other Western governments. This resulted in increased financial assistance and the removal of many of the sanctions that had been placed on the country following its nuclear tests in 1998.
In his meeting with Parliamentarians in Ottawa in September 2003, President Musharraf stated that:
Pakistan is totally committed to fighting terrorism in all its dimensions anywhere in the world. I know that there are aspersions being cast on Pakistan, especially on our western borders, that maybe we are dragging our feet. Maybe we lack that interest. Nothing could be farther from the truth. Pakistan is fighting terrorism in three dimensions, Al Qaeda, Taliban, and sectarian and religious extremism. While fighting Al Qaeda and Taliban is in the short-term context, in the longer-term context, it is fighting religious extremism … we are fighting terrorism in Pakistan’s own interest because it has a fallout in our cities and towns, therefore, there is no ground to even imagine that Pakistan will drag its feet, because we are doing something in our own interest.
He added that the current security challenge was a “tactical” one of coordinating sophisticated intelligence and quick response forces to attack small groups of Taliban and other extremists hiding in the mountainous terrain of Pakistan’s tribal areas bordering Afghanistan. As long as this continued, he believed time was on Pakistan’s side, and that a more serious “strategic” threat posed by a combination of Taliban, al-Qaeda and warlord forces would not emerge.
At the same time, however, an increasing number of observers argue that Pakistan is at best a reluctant ally in the war on terror, and the source of many of the security problems in South Asia rather than their solution. One American author has recently written, for example, that “At the heart of the region’s disorder is Pakistan, whose rise arguably constitutes the most grievous failure of Britain’s colonial unravelling. Pakistan is the archetypal imagined community, an offspring of precipitate partition. Its frontiers are porous, its polyglot population exceptionally diverse. Its chief claim to unity is Islam, on which its authoritarian rulers have relied, inordinately. This has contributed to three wars and a nuclear confrontation with India, chiefly arising from an unresolved dispute over Kashmir, as well as the caesarean birth of Bangladesh in 1971.”365 Similarly, when asked about fundamentalism in Afghanistan, Salim Mansur replied in this way:
The issue is that the neighbouring country of Afghanistan, Pakistan, with a population of over 150 million people, has become entirely a Talibanized society, and this Talibanized society, which emerged from interaction with Afghanistan over a period of 20-25 years in a war against the Soviet Union and subsequently in the internal war, is now feeding into the process. Are we going to be willing to open up the discussion and talk about Pakistan? Are we willing to talk about all the various ways this process has been incubated and has spread its tentacles? Are we willing to consider how dangerous the situation is, when a Talibanized society like Pakistan is now being seen as a front-line state of the United States to deal with the problem of fundamentalism, when the country itself is the incubator of fundamentalism? And this is now a nuclearized country, which is going to divert its attention towards Kashmir, as it has been doing, to spark, possibly, a regional war that could be totally catastrophic.366
There is much truth in these observations. Yet Committee members who visited Pakistan found a much more nuanced country, although one facing tremendous governance and development challenges that Canada and other nations can, and indeed must, help address both in their own interest and in that of millions of South Asians.
Complicating the search for solutions to Pakistan’s multiple governance, development and security problems is a long-standing debate between radicals and modernists over the role of Islam in the state. In August 1947, the year of Pakistan’s creation, its founder Mohammed Ali Jinnah told the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan that “You are free: you are free to go to your temples, you are free to go to your mosques or to any other place of worship in this state of Pakistan. You may belong to any religion or cast and creed — that has nothing to do with the business of the State … We are starting with this fundamental principle that we are all citizens and equal citizens of one State.”367
Yet, as British journalist Owen Bennett Jones argued in a highly regarded recent study of Pakistan:
Ever since its creation, Pakistan has grappled with the issue of what role Islam should play in the state. When he called for the establishment of Pakistan, Mohammed Ali Jinnah advanced the two-nation theory. Muslims and Hindus, he argued, constituted two nations that could never live together. A strict interpretation of the two-nation theory has led some Pakistanis to conclude that the country was always intended to be an Islamic state. But others — and in my opinion the majority — have a different view. They believe that Jinnah was trying to create a country in which Muslims could live in safety, free from Hindu dominance. Most Pakistanis do not want to live in a theocracy: they want their country to be moderate, modern, tolerant and stable.
During the 1980s this vision of Pakistan received a substantial setback. General Zia ul Haq — perhaps the only one of Pakistan’s four military rulers to deserve the epithet “dictator” — consistently advanced the cause of radical Islam. The effects of Zia’s Islamisation campaign are still being felt today. The militant groups remain well-organised, well-armed and well-financed. The current military ruler, General Musharraf, is trying to dismantle Zia’s legacy. His attempt to downplay the role of religion in the state directly challenges the interests of well-entrenched and highly motivated elements of Pakistani society. His success or failure … will have far-reaching implications not only for Pakistan but also the region and the international security system as a whole.368
Witnesses in Ottawa, and the visit of Committee members to Pakistan, confirmed this analysis. Uner Turgay told Committee members that:
In Pakistan legal Islamization in the years immediately following Zia ul-Haq’s period — his death, actually — took root and illustrates the political importance of Islam. The country is still committed to some sort of legal and social, and even, to a degree, political, Islamization. It appears that many of the debates in Pakistan concern the content and method of Islamization, not any meaningful form of return to secularization. The results of the most recent elections clearly show that Islam is very much in politics in Pakistan, and it will continue to dominate all national issues. To a number of intellectuals the success of the religious group Muttahida Majlis-E-Amal, MMA, a loose coalition of Muslim religious parties of all shades, which, with 60 seats, emerged as the third largest political force in the Parliament, was not a surprise.369
While agreeing that few in Pakistan argue for secularization, Noah Feldman underlines that the key challenge remains the establishment of democracy. In his words, “Pakistan can … become a leader in the movement toward Islamic democracy, if only it can move in the direction of democracy itself. The challenge for Pakistan is not so much to make democracy and Islam coexist; after years of discussion, Pakistanis mostly agree that these ideas can and should work together. The impediment to Islamic democracy is not Islam, but anti-democratic forces in Pakistani government and society. The challenge for Pakistan is to make the transition to democracy work this time.”370
Democratization and Good Governance
The Committee’s meetings in Pakistan focused largely on democratization, human rights and development issues. These meetings exposed members to a vibrant civil society which over decades has proven more reliable than Pakistani governments, and a press which is careful, but nevertheless open and critical. Canadian commentator Gwynne Dyer has argued that “Pakistan has been ruled by generals for about half the time since its creation in 1947, but the generals always have a problem with legitimacy. No matter how hard they try, they cannot eradicate the assumption among ordinary Pakistanis that democracy is the normal state of affairs. Always, in the end, the country tries democracy again — even though it has been almost uniquely ill-served by its civilian political leaders.”371 Overall, while politicians from across the political spectrum and civil society representatives were critical of many aspects of the current situation in Pakistan, they were not pessimistic about the future, particularly if Canada and other developed countries helped Pakistan to finally achieve sustainable democracy and address its development and other challenges.
In Ottawa, President Musharraf told Parliamentarians that while his seizure of power may not have been democratic, his government has taken key steps to create sustainable democracy in Pakistan, including decentralization, empowerment of women — including the establishment of quotas to increase their representation in Parliament — and the poor, and checks and balances on the executive. He added, “Please see democracy through Pakistani eyes … There is no set formula for democracy. It has to be tailored in accordance with local environments, and that is exactly what we have done. We have tailored democracy to our local environment and we think genuinely that this is the pattern which is sustainable. Democracy will not be derailed now.”
In fact, General Musharraf has largely followed the letter of the Supreme Court ruling which set a deadline of October 2002 for the restoration of democracy in Pakistan. He began with generally free and fair local elections. These were followed by a widely condemned national referendum extending his rule. Carefully managed national elections followed in October 2002. Finally, in December 2003, after long negotiations, President Musharraf agreed to give up the post of chief of army staff by the end of 2004 in exchange for an extension of his presidency until 2007, thereby securing Parliamentary approval of a series of important constitutional changes contained in the Legal Framework Order (LFO). Yet while General Musharraf has demonstrated as much, if not more, vision than all of his military or civilian predecessors, most observers would probably agree that his actions have still not demonstrated truly democratic governance. Further, by ensuring that the two mainstream opposition political parties remained sidelined even as Pakistan took action against the Taliban and, to a lesser extent, other Islamic radicals — a move that increased anti-U.S. and anti-Musharraf sentiment — President Musharraf directly or indirectly allowed the six-party religious coalition Muttahida Majlis-i-Amal (MMA) to gain an unprecedented number of votes in October 2002. As a result of those elections, the MMA now governs one of Pakistan’s provinces and participates in a coalition government in another.
In a critical January 2004 report, the International Crisis Group argued that despite his rhetoric, General Musharraf has so far failed to adequately address extremism in Pakistan. It argued that:
Musharraf’s failure owes less to the difficulty of implementing reforms than to the military government’s own unwillingness. Indeed, he is following the pattern of the country’s previous military rulers in co-opting religious extremists to support his government’s agenda and to neutralise his secular political opposition. Far from combating extremism, the military government has promoted it through its electoral policies and its failure to implement effective reform. Whatever measures have so far been taken against extremism have been largely cosmetic, to ease international pressure.372
… Musharraf’s agreement with the MMA on the Seventeenth Amendment in late December 2003, which gives constitutional cover to the LFO, has formalized the military’s alliance with the mullahs. Facing the concerted opposition of all major secular, moderate political parties, Musharraf has become even more dependent on the mullahs for regime survival. 373
In terms of human rights, the Government of Pakistan has signed some important international conventions and taken some actions to address the most flagrant abuses of human rights. Unfortunately, overall human rights — particularly in the case of women and minorities — are still not respected in Pakistan. The government has also not addressed a number of discriminatory laws, and has not yet taken strong enough action against such illegal practices such as “honour killings” and “stove burnings,” which are often linked to Islam in the West, but are in fact motivated more by tribal and cultural customs.
Beyond democratization and governance, the development challenges facing Pakistan are staggering. Overall, Pakistan’s human development indicators are well below acceptable standards for countries at a similar level of development, and some are even below those of poorer neighbours in South Asia. After declining before 1990, poverty has since increased alarmingly in Pakistan from 20% to 33%, and is compounded by a high level of illiteracy. Government expenditure for development purposes remains inadequate. Education remains a key concern, since lack of public education increases reliance on the madrassa system, which the government has not yet moved to effectively regulate — as many as 1.5 million students attend unregulated madrassas — despite a commitment more than two years ago to do so. As the International Crisis Group has noted, “the government said it would:
| • | register all madrassas so that it had a clear idea of which groups were running which schools; | |
| • | regulate the curriculum so that all madrassas would adopt a government curriculum by the end of 2002; | |
| • | stop the use of madrassas and mosques as centres for the spread of politically and religious inflammatory statements and publications; and | |
| • | establish model madrassas that would provide modern, useful education and not promote extremism”.374 |
CIDA’s Vice-President for Asia, Hau Sing Tse, told members that while General Musharraf has attempted to carry out reforms, including decentralization, “ … Pakistan possesses very depressing social indicators. It exhibits the characteristics of a very fragile state.” He continued:
We, along with the other donors, have taken some risks to provide assistance to the decentralization initiative. We’re currently focusing on working with the decentralization to the local government and helping the local capacity exercise their authority and decision-making. We are focusing on assisting delivery of education and health services at the local level. Finally, given the dire straits of affairs related to women, we’re working at bettering the lives of women, particularly among the rural poor.375
Total Canadian official development assistance to Pakistan in 2001-2002 was $62.5 million, of which $44.8 million Canada’s imputed share of spending by international financial institutions, the UN and the Commonwealth, $17 million was in the form of bilateral assistance, and $1 million was provided to NGOs and other partners working in Pakistan.
As noted above, the Committee’s meetings with officials, Parliamentarians from across the political spectrum and a range of NGO voices convinced it that democratization remains the key to future stability and prosperity in Pakistan. A number of witnesses were critical of progress toward democracy, expressing doubts about the willingness of either General Musharraf or the army to give up power, and arguing that the government of Pakistan presents one face to the West, and another in the country.
In terms of development, Shamsh Kassim-Lakha, President of the Aga Khan University, told members that there was no single holy grail of development, and the question always is what motivating factors can help change attitudes and outlooks. He argued that Pakistan was an interesting front-line of many cultures, ethnicities and religions, and is also a place of great moderation, with grassroots that want development activities. He added that Pakistan had made real progress on issues such as infant mortality, and that in development, “the more you roll, the faster you roll.” Mr. Akbar Ali Pesnani, the President of the Ismaili Council for Pakistan, argued that much of the growing poverty in Pakistan was due to illiteracy and a lack of education. He added that, since people must be able to understand, a lack of literacy renders democracy for the sake of democracy useless.
Shamsh Kassim-Lakha, who had been given cabinet rank by President Musharraf while chairing a Steering Committee on Higher Education for public university reform, argued that the biggest challenge Pakistan faced was education. He said there were over 10,000 madrassas in Pakistan, and while poor families need these to provide food and shelter as well as religious education, madrassas were not intended to be myopic, and the government was now attempting to reform their curricula. Dr. Mahmood Ghazi, a former Minister of Religious Affairs and currently Vice-President of Academics at Islamabad Islamic University, made a similar argument on the need for education. As minister he had warned President Musharraf that there were no shortcuts to reforming madrassas.
Although Pakistan is increasing its education budget, it will remain inadequate for decades. Dr. Ghazi suggested that Canada and others could help with money, scholarships or assistance in kind, especially at higher levels of education where people were mature enough to understand concepts such as human rights. He added, however, that since most Pakistani students who go abroad to study never return, returning to Pakistan should be a requirement for the completion of degrees, in order to stem this “brain drain.” Other civil society representatives agreed that assistance could be most usefully focused on education. One interlocutor suggested that education-specific assistance could support NGOs and foundations working on education in the voluntary and private sectors. One Parliamentarian added that this could include assistance with teachers and vocational skills.
Directions for Canadian Policy
As noted above, Canada and Pakistan have a long history of relations that include Commonwealth links and development assistance since the 1950s. Following Pakistan’s decision to join the war on terror, Canada eased the sanctions imposed on Pakistan following its nuclear tests — except for those on sanctions on sales of military equipment — and has since pursued a policy of “constructive engagement,” designed to encourage and support democratic and other necessary reforms. Given Pakistan’s development challenges, Canada offered the conversion (swap) of $448 million in outstanding loans into increased education spending by the Government of Pakistan. In Ottawa, President Musharraf told parliamentarians that “the people of Pakistan can never forget this gesture because Canada was the first country to allow this debt to education swap.” Given the importance of this initiative, detailed negotiations and due diligence continue to ensure that this money will directly improve education in Pakistan. At the same time, while thanking Canada for past assistance and encouraging future cooperation, Mr. Salim Saifullah Khan, Secretary-General of the ruling Pakistan Muslim League (unified) raised the issue of the arrest of some 19 Pakistanis in Canada in the fall of 2003. While a number of these people had committed immigration offences, the Canadian government had portrayed the arrests as related to terrorism, which he argued was proof of undue harassment and intimidation, particularly given that Pakistan was a front-line state in the war on terror.
Overall, the Committee believes that while the Government’s constructive engagement approach remains appropriate, given the importance of Pakistan and the scale of its challenges, Canada could play a stronger role.
RECOMMENDATION 24
The Government of Canada should continue to insist on the restoration and strengthening of democracy in Pakistan, as well as greater respect for human rights and faster action on reducing poverty and meeting other development challenges, and should continue to pursue these goals through a policy of constructive engagement.
RECOMMENDATION 25
Given the critical importance of increasing access to adequate and inclusive education in Pakistan, the Government of Canada should apply stringent conditions to ensure that its debt for education swap results in tangible progress toward this goal; increase scholarships and other forms of academic exchanges with that country; and encourage the Government of Pakistan to proceed with its commitment to register all madrassas and regulate their curricula.
India’s glory — the regular, peaceful and democratic transfer of power by parties ruling a poor country of more than a billion people — is not without its dangers. One is that in a calendar crowded by state and national elections, painful reform, however necessary, is deferred in order not to upset potential voters. Another is that some politicians are tempted to stoop to crude populism, including the stoking of communal tensions. In 2004, the year of a general election, India is at risk on both counts.376
India is unique in many respects: it is the world’s second-most populous country, with over 1 billion people, 33% of whom are under the age of 15. It is also the world’s most populous democracy. A decade of strong economic growth has made India the world’s 11th-largest economy — 4th-largest at purchasing power parity. India’s information technology sector and certain other industries are world leaders, and its scientists are now talking of sending a man into space. Yet at the same time, India still faces daunting social, economic and environmental challenges: 44% of its population lives on less than US$1 per day; rates of malnutrition and maternal mortality are high, as are birthrates; more than 4 million people are HIV-positive; and pollution threatens the health and livelihood of half the population.
While over 80% of India’s population is Hindu, some 12% is Muslim, which means a Muslim minority in India which could amount to 130-140 million people, one of the largest Muslim populations in the world. The Committee chose to visit India during its study both to see at first hand the home of the largest Muslim minority in the world, and to exchange views on broader security and development issues in South Asia and around the world. While much international attention has recently focused on the issue of Islamic fundamentalism, with the possible exception of Kashmir, the primary issue in India seems to be the rise of Hindu militancy over the past decade, and related implications both for India’s Muslim community and for the country’s principles of secularism and democracy.
Despite long-standing Commonwealth and other links, relations between India and Canada went into several years of deep freeze following the nuclear tests of 1998 and consequent Canadian sanctions. Canada announced a re-engagement with India in March 2001, and high-level visits by ministers have continued on both sides — including a visit to India by the Canadian Prime Minister just days after that of the Committee. (In fact, India has been designated one of Canada’s four priority relationships beyond the G-8). Members of the Committee who visited India found all interlocutors there very willing to share their views and to help identify themes and suggestions for cooperation.
India is often referred to as “the world’s largest democracy.” A key element of its democratic system over the decades has been secularism; founders such as Jawaharlal Nehru emphasized the importance of respect and tolerance for all religions and communities in the country’s pluralistic society.377 Yet despite constitutional guarantees and institutionalized affirmative action programs, unofficial discrimination against religious and other minorities has continued over the years, as have ethnic and inter-religious clashes. While the numbers of such clashes may be low in terms of India’s huge population, they have had continuing, and, in fact, even growing, political implications. Moreover, according to senior Indian journalist Khushwant Singh, a Sikh who has been a lawyer, a diplomat in Canada and the United Kingdom and a member of Parliament, “Commissions of inquiry have stated in categorical terms that in all Hindu-Muslim riots after Independence, over seventy-five per cent of casualties — in terms of life and property — were Muslim.” 378
Over the past decade, the Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) has replaced the Indian National Congress as India’s governing party — albeit in a coalition — and the issue of communal relations has come to the fore. While Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee is generally seen as relatively moderate within the BJP, others are less so, and have been widely accused of either encouraging chauvinism, or simply benefiting from it when it has been stoked by Hindu extremist groups. One such group is the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS); it was an RSS militant that assassinated Mohandas Gandhi in 1948, later explaining at his trial that Gandhi’s “constant and consistent pandering to the Muslims” had left him with no choice.379 While some Muslims and others have also incited violence and chauvinism, Indian Muslims generally feel under siege as a minority in the country.
The issue of communal violence reached a head in December 1992, when Hindu extremists demolished a 15th-century mosque in Ayodhya in Uttar Pradesh state, claiming it had been constructed there after the destruction of an ancient temple built on the birthplace of the god Ram; they planned to construct another temple in its place. In the widespread violence that followed this incident, more than 3,000 people were killed across India, most of them Muslim. Violence flared again in 2002 in BJP-ruled Gujarat, at a time of heightened religious tensions, when Muslim fanatics attacked and burned a train carrying Hindus home from Ayodhya, killing 59 people; between 1,000 and 2,000 people, mainly Muslims, were killed by mobs as a result.380 Ayodhya has remained a major issue in Indian politics. At the time of the Committee’s visit a national election was imminent, and many feared that political parties would exploit this issue to attract support.
In Ottawa, Karim Karim told the Committee that “the kind of exploitation by political parties in Gujarat, for example, of the differences between Hindus, Muslims, and Christians is abhorrent. But this is what, unfortunately, democratic systems lead to from time to time. What is happening at the national level with the BJP is not completely admirable either.”381 Indian Muslims and human rights groups complained that while over 100 Muslims had been arrested for the initial attack on the train in Gujarat in 2002, no Hindus had been arrested in relation to the much larger attacks that followed. Both India’s National Human Rights Commission and its Supreme Court agreed, ordering that the cases be revisited by the Central Bureau of Investigation rather than local police; and in January 2004, 12 people were arrested and charged with murder and rape.382 This event demonstrates the key theme raised in the Committee’s visit to India, namely that: strong democratic institutions are critically important both for governance in general and to reassure minorities that they will be protected, thereby discouraging extremism.
Addressing Development Challenges
Indians of all ethnic groups and religions face tremendous challenges. Yet Indian Muslims face even more than others: while some 35% of Hindus live below the poverty line, the comparable figure for Muslims is perhaps 50%. In terms of education, more than 50% of Muslims are illiterate, and a large number of Muslim children attend madrassas rather than (admittedly poor) public schools. Muslim women and girls suffer even more in numerous ways, and probably more for reasons of socio-economic status than religion. They are disadvantaged several times over: as women, as poor women and as members of a minority. Overall, Indian Muslim women have an illiteracy rate of perhaps 60%.
While it is important to recognize the different development challenges faced by different groups in India, Ann Thomson of South Asia Partnership Canada (SAP) pointed out that this need not lead to separate programs for assistance. She told members that:
One of SAP Canada’s members, the International Development and Relief Foundation, IDRF, is working in the Jharkand state of India to improve the living conditions of slum residents. In these neighbourhoods, Muslim and Hindu communities live side by side, faced by more or less the same problems. Poverty and its related problems are common to all the poor of the area, so the work must include everyone.
In three slums, IDRF, with its partners, is providing informal education to the children so that they can continue their study in the formal school systems. Women are organized into self-help groups that are saving on a regular basis to establish a revolving microcredit fund. Girls have access to vocational training and the resulting products are sold. The project is also providing the community with visiting nurses. Over three years, this project has improved girls’ access to education, mobilized the communities, generated income, and improved health care. Leaders of this project are now showing interest in educating on a taboo subject in India: HIV and AIDS. By working together, this community has not only improved its living conditions, but has gained recognition and respect within society at large.383
For his part, Salim Mansur argued that “The most dramatic story in the Indian case has nothing to do with CIDA or with any other development organization around the world, it has to do with private enterprise and the development of information technology, south India becoming a silicon valley and now exporting manpower to Europe and to America. The success stories of third world economies that have taken off, Asian countries, parts of India, have little to do with CIDA or World Bank input going through.”384 Hau Sing Tse of CIDA spoke of the recent strong economic growth in India, pointing out that “Our current program supports economic reform, social development, and environmental management.” He added that “the Indian government has recently announced its external aid policy, which directs smaller bilateral donors, like Canada and many others, to work with civil society only and not directly with the government.”385 Canada has therefore decided to discontinue its bilateral aid to India in 2005-2006, although multilateral and partnership programming will continue. At current levels, this would mean a drop from about $60 million annually to $30 million.
Witnesses in India presented a variety of opinions on the many governance, development and other challenges facing India and South Asia. They agreed overwhelmingly, however, that the key strength of the Indian system was its secular, democratic institutions.
Mr. Syed Shahabuddin, a former diplomat and politician, currently president of the non-political All India Muslim Majlis-e-Mushawrat and editor of Mushawrat, a journal about Muslims, thanked members for including India in the Committee’s study. This was important, given both the size of India’s Muslim minority and the fact that some 40% of the world’s Muslims live as minorities. He argued that the biggest issue for Muslims is the freedom to maintain their religious identities, adding that they seek security, dignity, equal opportunity and non-discrimination. While the events in Gujarat were terrible, he argued that it could have been worse, and “it’s still a fire we can put out.” Journalist Saeed Naqvi argued that while there were still development challenges, the “Indian experiment” sees a large Muslim minority living harmoniously through democracy. While all seemed lost after the terrible riots in Gujarat, the order to reopen the cases meant that Indian democracy is triumphing. He argued that the world has a stake in the success of this secular democracy. By contrast, Pakistan would like to see this experiment fail, since in many ways its raison d’être is to be in opposition; if the situation in Kashmir were resolved, it would have to create another bone of contention.
Veteran political commentator Ms. Neerja Chowdury argued that the Hindu/Muslim divide has more to do with the country’s political process than with religion. Politics, including the use of religious symbols, is the problem in India, not religion. She believed that, unfortunately, the situation has become polarized between religious fundamentalists and secular fundamentalists, with no middle way left. What kept the country going is the health of its institutions, along with a free press and civil society. She added that the reason India cannot let Kashmir go is that this would mean accepting the idea that religious groups cannot live together. In her opinion, every nation that believes in multiculturalism has a stake in what happens in Kashmir, and an interest in finding a peaceful solution. (Noting that the United Nations had called for a referendum in Kashmir, Ms. Chowdury argued that free and fair elections held there in the fall of 2002 were effectively referenda.)
Mrs. Krishna Bose, Chair of the Lok Sabha Standing Committee on External Affairs, began the meeting with members of that committee and other Parliamentarians by welcoming the Committee’s visit as part of the recent re-engagement between India and Canada. In response to questions, Indian Parliamentarians argued that they are conscious of their responsibility to protect minority rights. While there are aberrations, Indian politicians know that playing the “race card” is playing with fire.
Mr. Ram Madhav, the main spokesman of the RSS, told members that India has to progress within its own cultural context, which it calls broadly “Hindu,” using this term in a non-religious sense. While the RSS is a voluntary organization not related to government, he admitted that many of its members belong to the governing BJP. Mr. Madhav stated that the RSS believed the events in Gujarat were an aberration, and that the group was involved in dialogue trying to find compromise, as well as contributing on social issues. Other witnesses, however, argued that the RSS had fascist leanings, and that the BJP was the political wing of a collection of cultural and religious groups that included the RSS. A Canadian MP told Mr. Madhav frankly that the RSS was seen as intolerant and a threat to minorities.
In terms of development issues, witnesses generally agreed that Muslims in India faced greater challenges in terms of poverty and education, and that improving education, particularly for Muslim girls, was a priority. Neerja Chowdury agreed that the status of Muslim women in India was not what it should be, and argued that, in her opinion, the biggest human rights issue is the education of Muslim girls. At the same time, she asserted that the leadership of the Muslim community was mostly to blame for this situation, since over the years that community had used its Muslim “vote banks” for other things. Dr. Abad Ahamad, Chair of the Aga Khan Foundation India, argued the need to focus on education and economic improvement, adding that the education of girls is key and skills development is important.
Other representatives of the Aga Khan Foundation India described the foundation’s work with other donors and NGOs, adding that these were not exclusively Muslim. They pointed out that almost all infrastructure in India is government-owned, but that such services as electricity and water remain inadequate: not one city, including Delhi, has 24-hour water service. A very useful model could be public/private partnerships such as those that have been developed in Britain, where the private sector is contracted by the government to deliver services. Far from removing responsibility from government, this arrangement simply recognizes that governments cannot always effectively provide services — particularly in large countries. Such a model could also work in the area of education, with government retaining responsibility for teachers and curricula, but the private sector providing the infrastructure. Unfortunately, it was very difficult to persuade the Indian government to consider pursuing this type of model.
On the specific issues of the Muslim world and relations with Canada, Mr. Shahabuddin argued that civilizations do not “clash,” but rather intermingle, as India shows. He argued that all Muslims, including those in India, are concerned with the situation in Palestine, which they see in terms of colonialism, military force, humanitarian concerns and double standards in international relations. Maulana Wahiduddin Khan praised Canadian multiculturalism, adding that “you are in the good book of Muslim countries.” Dr. Zafarul-Islam Khan argued that Canada has a “clean slate” to provide a voice. Mr. Shahabuddin said Canada is admired by all in both the Muslim world and the broader developing world, given such aspects as its two official languages, freedom for religious minorities, and its independent foreign policy. In his opinion, Canada’s relations with the Muslim world will depend on Canada’s stand on Palestine, its treatment of its Muslim minority and its independence from the United States.
Mr. Naqvi criticized the “war on terrorism,” arguing that, paradoxically, it “multiplies terrorism.” In the case of South Asia, the United States needed the support of Pakistan, which according to Mr. Naqvi pretends to cooperate and goes on puncturing Indian harmony. He argued that Canada should help strengthen democracy in India, and make its independent voice heard on issues where Canada differs from the United States. He noted that the media were very important, pointing out that the BBC World Service gained prominence shortly after the end of the first Gulf War, and that al Jazeera had been created by some Arab journalists to provide their own slant at the time of the second intifada. He argued that Canada consider establishing a satellite media outlet — which was not as expensive as people believe — and also a lecture circuit whereby people from other countries could come to Canada and discuss such issues. Neerja Chowdury agreed that Canada is well placed to encourage dialogue, and that such mechanisms as international conferences and a speakers program would be helpful.
Directions for Canadian Policy
Overall, India has both regional and also global significance on many levels. While the country has done much to address its development and other challenges over the past decades, much remains to be done in the areas of development, relations with Pakistan and intercommunal relations.386 Since Canada has decided to end bilateral development assistance in 2005-2006 at India’s request, the Committee believes it is very important to ensure that adequate funds remain available to assist Indians of all religions and ethnic groups to meet the challenges they face. While the Committee would not presume to lecture Indians on democracy, it simply notes its agreement with those who argued that as a multi-ethnic and multicultural country, Canada has an ongoing interest in the success of the “Indian experiment” in secular democracy.
RECOMMENDATION 26
The Government of Canada should continue to pursue its current policy of re-engagement with India, and, where possible, support Indian government efforts to provide adequate education for the most disadvantaged groups in society. Canada should also support efforts to decrease intercommunal tensions.
Relations with Countries in Southeast Asia
The rise of political Islam represents a challenge to governments throughout Southeast Asia. While the idea of societal renewal or establishing a stronger moral base for societies — some long plagued by government corruption — are positive developments, radical Islam is not. Within the region, difficult developmental challenges and often-rigid political systems have helped fill the ranks of dissatisfied youth, workers, and intellectuals … the critical question is how to find a new equilibrium in the post-September 11 world that allows a non-violent role for Islam.387
Scott B. MacDonald and Jonathan Lemco
The critical long-term issue in Muslim-majority countries such as Indonesia and Malaysia is whether a moderate or militant version of political Islam will prevail … 388
The challenge for the West is to support the reconsolidation of viable democratic states in Southeast Asia … and to forge stronger links with what has been called ‘civil Islam,’ the Muslim civil society groups that advocate moderation and modernity.389
Angel M. Rabasa
While the traditions of Islam in Southeast Asia are very tolerant, the global rise of political Islam over the past quarter-century, and particularly in the last several years since the Asian economic crash of the late 1990s and the war on terrorism, have influenced the mainstream political debates in many of the countries in the region, including both long-established democracies such as Malaysia and newer ones such as Indonesia. At the margins, they have also led a few extremists to commit terrorism.
The Committee’s visits to Indonesia and Malaysia convinced members of the importance of this dynamic region, as well as the moderate traditions of Islam found there. It also allowed members to better understand the complexity of the internal debate now underway between Muslims there over the role of Islam as they pursue development and security and consolidate democracy, and its implications for the broader Muslim world and beyond.
Southeast Asia is composed of the members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) — Brunei, Burma, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam — and Timor-Leste (formerly East Timor). In general, these countries share similarities such as the presence of Malay ancestry and culture, experience of colonization (except for Thailand), and a wide diversity in cultural makeup. While the region includes a number of major religions apart from Islam, it is home to more than 200 million Muslim citizens, who constitute majorities in Indonesia, Malaysia and Brunei, and minorities in Singapore, the Philippines, Thailand and Cambodia. From the perspective of relations between the West and the Muslim world, the importance of the region lies not only in the absolute size of its Muslim population, but the existence of important moderate Muslim majority countries such as Indonesia and Malaysia.
Southeast Asia saw impressive economic growth throughout the 1990s, which both increased its trade links with the world and allowed the states of the region to reduce poverty. The Asian economic crash of 1997-98 was difficult for all of these states, particularly Indonesia, both in terms of economic hardship and the exposure of governance and other problems that economic growth had masked. By 2004, most of the countries of the region had recovered from the economic crash. (In fact, Southeast Asia was the only region outside of North America to which Canadian exports increased in 2002.) The economies and living standards in the region range from high in trading nations such as Singapore and Malaysia, through states such as Thailand, Indonesia and the Philippines which had grown well before the crash, to low in Burma, which remains politically and economically isolated under an oppressive military regime.
In the fall of 2003, Yuen Pau Woo of the Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada argued that “Southeast Asia is going through its own identity crisis. Having largely shaken off the stigma of the Asian crisis, it now has to compete with China for the affection of global investors, while fending off unsavoury images of the sub-region as ‘the second front in the war on terrorism.’” 390
Democratization also continues to be a challenge. While the situation is worse in Burma, Vietnam remains a one-party Communist state where tolerance for dissent is low. The transition to democracy in Cambodia remains difficult. The Philippines, Thailand and Indonesia are considered democratic based on universal suffrage and a free press, yet all require stronger non-partisan institutions to guarantee the democratic process. Finally, while democratic, Singapore and Malaysia have dominant political parties which constrain the political process. In a welcome development, however, ASEAN states recently took an unprecedented step away from their traditional principle of non-interference in internal affairs by criticizing Burma for the detention of pro-democracy leader Aung San Suu Kyi.
Most of the states in Southeast Asia face problems of ethnic nationalism, which have resulted in communal conflicts and secessionist movements in several parts of Indonesia, as well as the Philippines and southern Thailand. As Amitav Acharya has noted, “Prior to September 11, 2001, the major security challenges facing Southeast Asia were intra-ASEAN disputes and domestic instability … Since September 11, 2001, a new challenge, that of transnational terrorism, has come to dominate the security perceptions and agenda of Southeast Asian governments. Southeast Asia has been termed by some analysts as the ‘second front’ in the global war on terror.” He added the qualification, however, that “There are important variations in the nature and objectives of terrorist groups in Southeast Asia.” While some groups, such as the regional Jemaah Islamiyah (“Muslim Community”) seek to establish a pan-Islamic state across the region and have links to al-Qaeda,
Terrorism in Southeast Asia is thus neither exclusively global nor exclusively local. It is both. It breeds from local causes, but draws sustenance from the outside. Issues like the Palestinian question and resentment against the global dominance of the U.S. gives legitimacy to terrorist causes. Although many terrorist groups have religious roots, their motivations are ultimately political, their chief aim being to seize power in their respective states or in the region.391
The threat posed by international terrorism in Southeast Asia was brought home with the bombing of two nightclubs in Bali in October 2002 that killed 202 and injured 300 — many of whom were Australian tourists — and again in August 2003, when the bombing of the J.W. Marriott hotel in Jakarta killed 13 and injured 149 — mostly Indonesian workers. The countries of Southeast Asia have now committed themselves to increased intelligence and other cooperation in this area. According to a mid-2003 assessment by RAND analyst Angel Rabasa: “While collective action against terrorism faces formidable obstacles, including porous and poorly controlled borders, weaknesses in intelligence and law-enforcement institutions and, in some countries, a political reluctance to admit the gravity of the threat, enhanced intelligence-sharing has produced notable successes.”392
Many Asian witnesses made observations similar to Rabasa’s that “Islam was brought to Southeast Asia by Arab, Persian and Indian traders and spread largely through the conversion of elites; thus it developed under different conditions from other regions in the Muslim world, where the religion was established through Arab or Turkish conquest. In Southeast Asia, the continuity of elites under the new religious dispensation permitted the preservation of strong pre-Islamic elements.” Rabasa makes the additional point that “Islam in Southeast Asia is not only uneven in its geographical contiguity, but also extraordinarily diverse internally.”
Despite this tradition of tolerance, as a result of global events ranging from the Iranian revolution and the defeat of the Soviet Union in Afghanistan through to the war on terrorism and perhaps even continued Saudi charitable funding, political Islam has increased its appeal in the region over the past two decades. In Ottawa, Uner Turgay told the Committee that:
Islamists in South and Southeast Asia today … are stronger than in any other period in recent history. In Malaysia Kota Baharu, the capital of Kelantan, is the epicentre of the Islamic movement and Malaysia’s Islamic party, and it is gaining ground there. In Indonesia Vice-President HamzahHaz has several times expressed sympathy for the Islamists in that country. However, the vast diversity of the population in Southeast Asia, with its considerable economic power, no doubt acts as a controlling factor on Islamic fundamentalism.394
While the political debate between Muslims in the region is a domestic one, Rabasa argues that it can have implications for Western nations in two ways: either in the extreme cases where it results in international terrorism, or when Islamic extremists destabilize moderate regional governments.395
Directions for Canadian Policy
Given the importance of Islam in Asia and the pace of recent developments, the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade commissioned Uner Turgay of McGill University’s Institute of Islamic Studies to carry out a research visit to a number of key countries in South and Southeast Asia in February and March 2003. Professor Turgay later argued before the Committee that:
I think Canada is really at the crossroads, there are historic opportunities for Canada. It’s the only English-speaking country right now that has respect in Southeast Asia among the Muslim countries. The pervasive presence of the United States, militarily, economically, very often politically, and not only presence, but at times control, is terribly resented by the Muslims in that part of the world. England’s ready, rabid support for the United States is also very much resented in that part of the world. Australia is no longer viewed by the Indonesians, the Malaysians, or the Muslims in Thailand as an Asia-Pacific nation; it is viewed as the soldier of the West. Why? Because of its avid support for the U.S. policies in the Middle East, as well as, of course, their involvement — and rightly so in that regard — in the East Timor situation. They became the policeman of the West in that part of the world. Canada is the only English-speaking country they want to deal with, be it in education, be it in foreign aid, the Muslims in that part of the world.396
While not focused on relations with Muslim majority countries, Canadian diplomat Daryl Copeland has made a similar argument in urging greater engagement with the countries of Asia. In his words:
… Canada has arrived at a strategic and perhaps even defining moment for advancing its pacific prospects. The decision to abstain from participating in the war in Iraq has bolstered Canadian credibility and legitimacy as an independent actor, and created a strategic opening. The widespread and intensifying antipathy directed at U.S. foreign policy, a development expressed with particular intensity in the Arab and Islamic worlds, has made more crucial than ever before the need to project a distinctly Canadian global identity, That window of possibility, however, will not remain open indefinitely.397
Apart from the fact that it houses the most populous Muslim state in the world in Indonesia, Southeast Asia will also play a key role in the ongoing dialogue over relations between countries of the Muslim world and the West as the home of influential and moderate Muslim majority states. In January 2004, journalist Christopher Hitchens argued of Indonesia that it “will help determine if we are undergoing a clash of civilizations or a clash about civilization — a clash where Muslims are on both sides, and where the uncivilized have already created the conditions for their own eclipse.398 While true of Indonesia, the same can be said for Southeast Asia as a whole. By applying the mechanisms described above in Part II as appropriate, Canada can assist in strengthening both the relatively weak states in this region, and, more importantly, their civil societies, as they continue to address their many challenges and consolidate democracy.
The details of Indonesian politics and the transition from autocracy to democracy are so complex that anyone who has not spent a lifetime studying Indonesia should approach them with great caution. What can be said, however, is that Islamic organizations in Indonesia played an important role in bringing about greater democracy there, and that those Muslim parties continue to participate in Indonesian politics in mostly peaceful ways. Indonesia is now struggling to become a full-fledged democracy — and it is doing so with the participation of its 180 million Muslims. Indonesia is not an Islamic state, but it shows how a flexible Islam can participate in democratic development and democratic politics. It shows that a Muslim population may choose secular government after voting for Islamic parties. Distinctive as Indonesia and its Islam are, they disprove some myths about Islamic democracy and reveal that the possibilities are very broad.399
Noah Feldman
If Indonesia succeeds in consolidating a pluralistic democracy, it will be the world’s third-largest and the largest in the Muslim world. Moderate political Islam as a force in a democratic pluralistic Indonesia could be an antidote to theocratic ideologies and concepts of an intolerant and exclusionist Islamic state.400
Angel Rabasa
Indonesia dominates Southeast Asia in many respects. Physically, it is composed of some 17,000 islands in the world’s largest archipelago, which stretches the distance between Halifax and Vancouver. Demographically, it is home to over 300 ethnic and language groups and at least 230 million people, including the largest Muslim population in the world; as Uner Turgay pointed out to the Committee, Indonesia is larger than the three biggest countries in the Middle East, Turkey, Iran and Egypt, put together.
As the first country Committee members visited in Asia during this study, the questions members posed in Indonesia focused more generally than elsewhere on exploring the nature of Islam in Asia. While acknowledging M. J. Akbar’s caveat that such questions would, at least in part, elicit a “defensive” response,401 the Committee’s interaction with a range of Indonesian religious leaders and scholars, academics and others confirmed the tolerant nature of both the Indonesian and more general Southeast Asian, traditions of Islam. It also confirmed the many democratic and other challenges facing the country, and the desire of Indonesians to strengthen cooperation with Canada.
As Canadian Ambassador Randolph Mank told the Committee in Jakarta, Indonesia remains in many respects a frontier — a huge state with important national unity problems and a front-line state in the war on terrorism. Another key challenge is the continued combination of Islam with pluralist democracy. Indonesia is not formally an Islamic state, and mainstream Indonesian Islam is moderate, civil, tolerant, pluralist and secular. While Indonesians don’t worry about their religion, they do worry about how it is characterized, and most are sensitive to any perceived linking of terrorism with all Muslims, or even all fundamentalists.
The past several years have seen tremendous change in Indonesia, particularly the end of decades of dictatorship and the beginning of a new democracy. Unfortunately, however, the country has seen important economic, governance, security and other challenges over that period as well, which have complicated the consolidation of that democracy. The Asian economic crash was particularly severe in Indonesia, which had seen strong economic growth for decades, and resulted in a doubling of poverty; 60% of the population now survives on less than $2 per day. As well, while the centralized Suharto regime had kept tight control over ethnic and other conflicts in this large and diverse country — or, at any rate, a monopoly on violence — the new openness saw increased ethnic and other violence in several areas, including in East Timor, where a vote by the residents in favour of independence led to a rampage by militia groups supported by the Indonesia military.
Indonesians will vote in at least two and probably three national elections in 2004, which will, among other things, see the end of formal representation of the military and police in national and local legislatures. Unfortunately, however, as the International Crisis Group noted soberly in December 2003:
Indonesians have been gradually losing much of their enthusiasm for democracy since the country’s first post-authoritarian general election in June 1999 … This does not mean that nothing has changed since the fall of Soeharto in 1998, however. Indonesians now enjoy extensive political freedoms — freedom to form political parties, freedom to organize, and freedom of the press. The extremely centralized authoritarian state has given way to a highly decentralized form of government. The military — while retaining a political presence — no longer overshadows all other political groups. But popular aspirations have been lowered drastically. There is no longer an expectation that free elections will lead to effective and accountable government. On the contrary, cynicism about the new political elite of elected politicians is almost universal.402
Democracy was a priority for the newly independent Indonesia in 1949 as its leaders planned to elect a constituent assembly to write a constitution and institute democratic government. A number of parties participated in free elections in 1955, including two parties representing traditionalist and modernist Muslims respectively. 403 This general division of Indonesian Muslims has continued over the decades in the form of two important socio-religious organizations. Over 40 million Indonesian Muslims currently belonging to the more rural and traditionalist Nahdlatatul Ulama (NU), which focuses on enlarging and protecting the welfare of the traditional Muslim community. At the same time, some 35 million belong to the more urban and modernist Muhammadiyah, which focuses primarily on education.
The achievement of democracy in Indonesia was unfortunately halted by decades of dictatorship, however, first under the secular socialist Sukarno (1958-65), then — following a terrible transition in which hundreds of thousands of suspected Communists and others died in state-sponsored violence — the secular anti-Communist Suharto (1967-1998). Toward the end of his reign, Suharto moved toward both secular and Islamist Muslims in an effort to preserve his support. By 1998, however, he had lost the support even of the military, and resigned following demonstrations and riots which took at least 500 lives. Suharto was replaced by his vice-president, and the first free elections in Indonesia for over 40 years were held in 1999. When the elections resulted in no majority, the People’s Consultative Assembly chose well-known Muslim cleric Abdurrahman Wahid, the long-time leader of Nahdlatatul Ulama, as Indonesia’s first freely elected President.
While a Muslim cleric, Wahid represented the tolerant traditions of Indonesian Islam, advocating a pluralistic state in Indonesia rather than an Islamic one. He had also visited Israel, and embraced the idea of relations between Israel and Muslim states.404 Unfortunately, Wahid proved an ineffective President for health and other reasons, and was replaced less than two years later by Megawati Sukarnoputri — the daughter of Sukarno — who had received the greatest number of votes in 1999, and had been named Wahid’s vice-president in a bid to ease tensions.
As in other Muslim countries, the past decade in Indonesia has seen an increase in both Islamic consciousness and political Islamism. M. J. Akbar argued before the Committee that this was a reversal of past practice, when Indonesia was a comfortable society, but “ … really had delinked itself.” 405 In New York, Dr. Isobel Coleman of the Council on Foreign Relations pointed out that opinion polls in Indonesia showed a change on the issue of Palestine following the financial crash of the late 1990s, which many began to blame on financier “George Soros, the Jew.” Some have also linked increased Islamism with continued Saudi charitable funding in Indonesia. According to Jamhari Makruf of Islamic State University, “They come to the poor districts here … and say that they will build a mosque as long as they are allowed to appoint the imam. And then they try to impose Wahhabi indoctrination.”406 Nevertheless, witnesses in Indonesia and most others seem to agree with Angel Rabasa that “Indonesia has not proved to be fertile soil for Wahhabism.”407
Politically, of course, the newly democratic government of Indonesia has become sensitive to the perceptions of voters, and the need to avoid taking actions which could be criticized as against Islam. Sidney Jones, Southeast Asia Director of the International Crisis Group, argued in August 2003 that in order to effectively address terrorism, Indonesian political leaders needed to publicly name Jemaah Islamiyah as the organization responsible for bombings in Bali and elsewhere that had killed hundreds. She added, “Officials are willing to condemn terror, violence and crime. But for fear of offending Muslim leaders, for whom the term Jemaah Islamiyah connotes the broader Muslim community, they are unwilling, with few exceptions, to acknowledge publicly the organization’s existence.”408
While unsuccessful, there have also been calls by some in Indonesia for the adoption of sharia law, or at least for a change to the first principle of the national philosophy of Pancasila — from “belief in the one and only God” to “belief in one God whose name is Allah.”409 At the same time, Uner Turgay told the Committee that while Indonesians expressed solidarity with Palestinians, “in the countries I visited, Indonesia, Malaysia, it is a concern, but it is not going to affect their policies regarding the West.”410 Overall, the effect of these trends has probably been less in Indonesia than in many other Muslim countries, both because of the more tolerant and syncretic tradition of Indonesian Islam, and the active opposition to fundamentalism and extremism on the part of major Muslim leaders.
As Angel Rabasa has noted, “The danger is that, without an effective political-education campaign by moderate Muslims, the radicals, albeit in a minority, might be able to set the parameters of political debate. He added that “There are indications that Indonesian moderates are beginning such a mobilization.” He continued:
Nahdlatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah leaders have appeared together in public to emphasize that Islam does not advocate violence and to warn against the misuse of religion. An increasing number of Muslim scholars are seeking ways to separate Islam from politics following the ‘New Islamic Theology of Politics’ introduced in the 1980s by Nurcholish Madjid. This school of thought contends that Muslims are not obliged to support Islamic parties; its watchword is ‘Islam yes, Islamic party no.’ It also seeks to improve educational opportunities for Muslims so that they can become part of the globalized economy. Some Indonesian Muslim leaders, such as former President Wahid, Muhammadiyah chairman Ahmad Syafii Maarif and a younger generation of leaders, are among the spokesmen for this school of ‘New Muslim Thinking.’411
In an interview published in January 2004, Nurcholish Madjid added that “The Muslims of the Arab world and India have a great past, but we have a great future. We must learn to separate Islam from Arabism — to break the monopoly.”412
An important method of strengthening the moderate and tolerant tradition of Indonesian Islam is through religious education. Fu’ad Jabali of the National Islamic Institute in Jakarta, who received his PhD from McGill University’s Institute of Islamic Studies and whom the Committee met in Indonesia, argued in 2000 that:
Over the past two decades, an Islam based on tolerance and inclusiveness has taken root as mainstream Islam in Indonesia. Key factors in this development include the changing role of rural-level Muslim institutions, the continued modernization of Islamic education, and the reorientation of mass Muslim organizations and their emergence as political as well as social forces, and as leaders in the reform movement.
Indonesia’s fourteen National Islamic Institutes (IAIN) … in major centres and thirty-three … Islamic Colleges in medium sized cities have played a major role in this transformation of Indonesian Islam. Central to this role is the IAIN’s approach to Islam. This approach emphasizes critical thought and objective inquiry; interaction with, tolerance and understanding of, and respect for other religions; a participatory, democratic, and inclusive approach to government and development; and respect for the humanistic, tolerant, egalitarian and open traditions of classical Islam.413
McGill University has had a strong relationship with Islamic institutes in Indonesia for more than 40 years, assisting them in strengthening their own capacities through exchanges and other assistance. In Indonesia, Committee members were repeatedly told of the value of the McGill program, held in high esteem by all, including Indonesia’s government. There is a high degree of Indonesian ownership of these programs, which the Government of Indonesia says is a priority for further cooperation. In addition to building links with Canada, the program addresses broader needs by strengthening the capacity of Indonesian scholars themselves to modernize Islamic education while retaining and strengthening the values of moderate Islam.414
While the McGill and other such assistance focuses in the first instance on higher education, the results of these programs “trickle down,” since the IAINs train some 80% of teachers for the Islamic education system, which is particularly important in poor and rural areas and includes elementary, junior and secondary schools. While regulated by government, however, such schools are underfunded. At the same time, much basic education is carried out at more than 14,000 traditional religious boarding schools called pesantren. While not technically the same as madrassas, which also exist in Indonesia, a number of the concerns raised about madrassas elsewhere — such as the facts that they serve a social welfare function to which many parents have no alternative, that a few preach extremism, and that their curricula are often inadequate and unregulated by the state — also apply to pesantren. The International Crisis Group has argued, however, that while “a tiny fraction” of pesantren have been used by members of Jemaah Islamiyah to train a new generation of their family members, “the religious education system in Indonesia must not be stigmatised.”415
While in Indonesia, members visited an NU-led pesantren near Jakarta, Pesantren Asshiddiqiah Kedoya, where they were greeted by and spoke with almost 4,000 enthusiastic students between the ages of 7 and 19. There seems to be general acknowledgement that pesantren in Indonesia have a more moderate tradition than madrassas in Pakistan or elsewhere. In addition to their social welfare function, there is also broad agreement that they provide access to education that many would not otherwise have, particularly poor and rural girls.
Nevertheless, the Government of Indonesia has recognized the need to ensure that the curricula of pesantren are modernized, and that qualified teachers and adequate facilities are available in the Islamic education sector. External evaluators have recently completed a major evaluation of the education sector in Indonesia, particularly Islamic education. While not yet available, this report seems likely to recommend placing all primary education under the responsibility of the Ministry of Education — thereby removing the Ministry of Religious Affairs, which currently assists with religious education — a move that will take some time in any event.
As the home base of the regional terrorist group Jemaah Islamiya, Indonesia continues to face a significant threat from international terrorism. As noted above, its response to the regional terrorist threat has been criticized as weak by some, both in terms of coordination and corruption, and, more importantly, a political willingness to publicly identify those responsible. While in Indonesia, however, members were told by Canadians and others that the response of the Indonesian government in this area had improved, although more still needed to be done.
The war on terrorism has increased anti-Americanism in Indonesia, further complicating cooperation in this area. U.S. President George Bush visited Indonesia just days after the visit of the Committee, and religious leaders he met reportedly criticized a number of aspects of U.S. foreign policy, including the war on terrorism and what they saw as double standards in the Middle East. As one leading Indonesian newspaper editorialized on the eve of a visit, “We have a whole warehouse of problems: poverty, corruption, foreign debt, the credibility of our legal system and a difficult transition to democracy. These problems aren’t getting enough attention because so much of our energy is being diverted to terrorism, and terrorism in the end is being encouraged by the arrogant attitude of America itself.”416
Ironically, while U.S. Attorney General John Ashcroft visited Indonesia in February 2004 to underline the need for continued cooperation in the war on terror, he again refused Indonesia’s request for immediate access to Hambali, a top Jemaah Islamiyah operative accused of organizing the Bali nightclub bombings captured by the Central Intelligence Agency in Thailand in August 2003, for the purpose of building cases against other suspected terrorists.417
While distinct from international terrorism, Indonesia has also seen a significant amount of other violence that has taken thousands of lives over the past several years and contributed to human rights abuses. Communal riots have taken place in west and central Kalimantan between the Dyaks, the Madureses and other migrants; in the Maluku islands and Sulawesi between Christians and Muslims; and in Java between Javanese and the wealthier Chinese-Indonesian minority. In the wake of the independence of East Timor, Indonesia has also faced renewed violence from longstanding secessionist movements in Aceh and Papua. On a hopeful note, Ann Thomson of South Asia Partnership Canada, who lived and worked in Indonesia for several years, told the Committee that “ … the internecine violence in Indonesia … is well known. What we’re seeing is in fact a clumsy and undirected move towards a more representational form of government in Indonesia.”418 While this may be true, Australian Parliamentarians visiting Ottawa in 2003 told members that many of Indonesia’s neighbours worry about the continuing violence and other developments in that country.
Dr. H.A. Syafi’i Ma’arif, the Chairman of Muhammadiyah and one of Indonesia’s most important Muslim leaders — a member of the small delegation of Indonesian leaders that would meet U.S. President Bush a few days later — explained to members that free will and choice are part of Islam, and that even if some Indonesian Muslims are “committed” and some “nominal,” there is harmony in the country. He argued that radicalization in Indonesia began a decade ago largely as a result of outside influences, such as an increasing presence of those who had received military training in Afghanistan. While they are vocal, he added that these elements are not deep-rooted in Indonesia, and that “they have the courage to face death, but no courage to face life.”
Following a visit to the largest mosque in Southeast Asia, Mesjid Istiqlal, Council of Ulamas (religious scholars) Chairman Professor Dr. H. Umar Shihab and other male and female council members again told the Committee of the moderate, tolerant and inclusive traditions of Indonesian Islam. Professor Dr. H. Umar Shihab argued that most conflicts in Indonesia were over economic, social, resource and other factors rather than religion, although religion can and has been used as a propaganda tool. He explained that Islamic law is limited to such areas as trade, social issues and education rather than politics, and the People’s Consultative Assembly had voted against the adoption of sharia law. He added that interreligious relations are positive and peaceful, including between Muslims and Jews, although they disagree on the issue of Palestine.
Former Minister of Religious Affairs Mr. Tarmizi Taher argued that Indonesia sees itself as neither secular no religious, but rather pro-religion. While most Indonesians were Muslim they were not Arab, and, in fact, since they were so far from the Middle East “we are less Arabized.” On the question of Saudi funding, Dr. Fu’ad Jabali of the State Islamic University (IAIN) argued that this had really started after the Iranian revolution in an attempt to restrict the influence of Shiite Islam. Even if the Saudis tried to set conditions on charitable funding, however, he argued that the nature of Indonesian society tended to moderate foreign ideas.
Mr. Sumargono, vice-president of the Crescent Star Party and a member of the People’s Consultative Assembly, pointed out that the existence of traditionalists and modernists in Indonesia was reflected in the fact that some wanted Islamic culture to remain a private issue and refused to participate in politics, while others wanted an Islamic structure reflected in political parties. An official of Nahdlatatul Ulama noted that Indonesia was still in a transition to democracy, which he estimated would take another 5-6 years. In response to a question on group versus individual rights, he replied that the goal in Asia was to balance such things. Mr. Ibrahim Ambong, the Chair of the powerful Committee I of the Indonesian Parliament, added that Indonesians would like to learn how to balance human rights and security. He added that sometimes conflicts with minorities were caused by economic issues.
In terms of education, Dr. Fu’ad Jabali commented that Canadians were not really foreigners at the State Islamic University, given the presence of such a large numbers of McGill graduates. Since most Indonesians were poor they could only send their children to either madrassas or pesantren, which made education very important, and many IAIN graduates teach at such schools in Indonesia. Many of the books used in pesantren were written years ago, however, and do not mention such concepts as human rights. As a result, IAIN scholars were trying to be a “bridge” with the modern world, in part by developing a new vocabulary. Only a few pesantren teach extremism, while such organizations such as NU and Muhammadiyah promote tolerance and strengthen civil society and democracy through madrassas and pesantren.
Officials at the Ministry of Religious Affairs clarified that the Ministry did not deal with the spiritual lives of religious communities in Indonesia, but with their interaction. It provides funding both to serve the needs of these groups and to promote harmony, which includes harmony between religious groups, within religious groups, and between religious groups and the government. Dr. H. M. Atho Mudzhar, the Head of Research, Development and Religious Affairs at the Ministry, told members that “national unity is very much dependent, among other things, on religious harmony in Indonesia.” While the Ministry of Education is responsible for general education in the country, the Ministry of Religious Affairs helps religious education in madrassas, including trying to revise curricula to reflect reality. The officials argued that the task was to develop cultural rather than political Islam. The issue of Wahhabbism is not new, and is more a theological than a political one. While religious leaders had pledged not to misuse religious symbols for political purposes before the 1999 election, there were again concerns in this area in light of the upcoming elections.
In terms of terrorism, Former Indonesian Foreign Minister Ali Alatas explained that while Indonesia had never differed with the United States and others on the essence of fighting terrorism, it had sometimes differed on the method by which to do so. While the United States argues that it is not fighting Islam in the war on terrorism, it was important to address the roots of the problem, which include a sense of injustice and alienation that are expressed especially in the unresolved conflict in Palestine. Increased discussion of terrorism and a “clash of civilizations” was important, since over the years in foreign policy he had seen that once preconceived notions took hold, they were very difficult to change. The Indonesian government would work to combat the perception that Indonesia was a dangerous place, and hoped its friends would work to combat these and other preconceived notions as well. While dialogue was necessary, it could not just be among the converted.
Sidney Jones of the International Crisis Group addressed the issue of terrorism and violence, arguing that the critical factor drawing Indonesians into terrorist violence was neither the Middle East conflict nor poverty, adding that such violence was not bred in the Islamic schools system. She noted that the majority of people already arrested were third-generation rebels, arguing the critical factor was family lineage, fuelled by other factors. In her words, “this is not a club anyone can join.” Not only was the Jemaah Islamiya terrorist network not expanding, as a result of arrests it was probably contracting. She added that we should not try to deal with Islamic schools in counter-terrorist terms. Finally, while there were a number of Indonesians who favoured the adoption of sharia law, they were willing to pursue this peacefully and democratically, and even most of the radicals who favour the establishment of an Islamic state would not use violence.
In terms of specific Canadian cooperation, officials from the Ministry of Religious Affairs told members that Canadian cooperation such as that with McGill University was important to Indonesia, and that more along these lines would be helpful, particularly on how to promote “inclusive Islam.” Representatives of Nahdlatatul Ulama told the Committee that the organization had sent students to Canada over the years, and would like to do more of this sort of work in the future. It would also welcome Canadian scholars, including language teachers, to come and teach while living at pesantren in Indonesia, which were very different from madrassas in the Middle East. Ms. Clara Joewono of the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (Indonesia) added that Canada could do more in terms of gender issues, especially the education of women.
Directions for Canadian Policy
Canada and Indonesia celebrated 50 years of diplomatic relations in 2002-2003, and relations are strong and positive. Economically, Indonesia is both Canada’s third-largest export market in the region and the third largest destination for Canadian investment in Asia. Overall, Canada’s priority in relations with Indonesia is to assist the continued democratic development of that country.
Canadian development assistance to Indonesia began in 1954, and has shifted over the years from support for large government-sponsored infrastructure programs to focus more on governance. As Hau Sing Tse of CIDA explained in Ottawa:
… political freedom has also resulted in an explosive growth of civil society organizations that were suppressed in the past. CIDA’s program in Indonesia has evolved in line with the needs of the country. Since 1997, CIDA has been focusing on promoting good governance, human rights, and democratic development at the central and local levels, stimulating the growth of small and medium enterprises that create jobs for the poor, and improving the well-being of communities through more sustainable management of natural resources and their environment.419
While CIDA assistance to Indonesia reached a high of some $75 million in 1985-1986, current assistance stands at about $23 million yearly. In terms of assistance for education reform such as that carried out by McGill University, CIDA has assisted three major projects in this area since the early 1980s, the most recent of which saw an $8 million CIDA grant matched by a $5 million grant from the Indonesian government.
As noted above, Indonesia is of key importance both in Southeast Asia and in the broader debate over relations with the Muslim world. Uner Turgay and other also emphasized the particular respect with which Canada is seen in the region following the war in Iraq. This provides Canada with a unique opportunity. On the one hand, the Committee’s visit convinced members that Canada can usefully continue and even increase support in Indonesia for democratization and governance reform, as well as education, civil society and conflict resolution.
At the same time, as an ally in the international campaign against terrorism that did not participate in the invasion of Iraq, Canada can also assist Indonesia in critical areas such as counter-terrorism, while at the same time disproving the perception that such actions are driven solely by the United States, or are inherently anti-Muslim. As argued persuasively by Daryl Copeland about Asia more generally, Canada could “ … develop a niche in the post 9-11 global security architecture by strengthening ties to moderate democratic Islamic countries — Indonesia, Malaysia, Bangladesh … to cultivate innovative new approaches to improving international security and combating terrorism. With its exceptional bilateral political relations Canada has a comparative advantage here and could demonstrate the link between diplomacy and security in ways that the United States and Europeans cannot.420
RECOMMENDATION 27
Recognizing the recent democratic progress made by Indonesia, notably in embracing pluralism, as well as its potential as a model for the rest of the Muslim world, the Government of Canada should continue to both encourage and assist the Government of Indonesia in emphasizing pluralism as a key element of its democracy.
RECOMMENDATION 28
The Government of Canada should continue to strengthen its bilateral cooperation with Indonesia in the areas of democracy and governance; support civil society groups that work to reduce ethnic and other tensions; and support education reform, building on the exemplary experiences of McGill University’s programs.
RECOMMENDATION 29
Canada should also pursue increased counter-terrorist and security cooperation with the Government of Indonesia, including for the peaceful resolution of ethnic and other conflicts.
In response to (opposition Islamic party) PAS’ demand for an Islamic state (governing party) UMNO leaders took the position that Malaysia was already an Islamic country (even a “fundamentalist” Islamic country by virtue of its subscription to the “fundamental principles” of Islam) … Nevertheless, the Mahathir government’s Islamisation campaign has not changed the fundamental structure of the country’s legal, political and administrative system, which is based on the British model and to a large extent reflects the Western political tradition … 421
UNMO’s success in finding a new balance between the expectations of its Malay constituency and the requirements of governing a modernizing, multi-ethnic society will determine whether PAS’ brand of political Islam will be contained as the political project of a minority within the Malay Muslim community, or whether it comes to threaten Malaysia’s model of political compromise and coexistence among the country’s various communities.422
Angel Rabasa
In contrast to Indonesia, which has an overwhelmingly Muslim population and is attempting to consolidate democracy, Malaysia is a prosperous and successful multi-ethnic state with a small Muslim majority that has been formally democratic for decades. At the same time, Malaysia presents a seeming paradox. While widely viewed as a moderate Muslim majority state, its government has long pursued a formal Islamisation program and describes the country not as a moderate, but as a “fundamentalist” Islamic state. It has also taken a leading role in criticizing perceived injustices to Muslims around the world on the international scene.
The argument usually used to explain this situation is that long-time Malaysian Prime Minister Dr. Mahathir Mohamad used both the rhetoric and the reality of Islamisation in an attempt to blunt the attacks of the Islamist opposition Parti Islam sa-Malaysia (PAS), a truly fundamentalist party that favours the imposition of sharia-based state in Malaysia. As Gwynne Dyer argued in an October 2003 article that labelled Dr. Mahathir “an old fool” because of controversial remarks he made that month, “Dr. Mahathir is not a religious extremist. He spent his long political career (which ends with his retirement this month) finding ways to unite Malaysia’s spectacularly diverse ethnic and religious communities in building a prosperous and peaceful society, and he has been remarkably successful.”423
While in Malaysia, however, the Committee was told by a number of witnesses that two decades of Islamisation have, perhaps inevitably, resulted in a more conservative and less-integrated multicultural society. On the international front, David Dewitt told the Committee that Malaysian political leaders have used positions on such issues as the Israel-Palestine dispute as a “mobilizing force” largely for domestic political reasons. In his words, “ … it allows them at a great distance to take what is considered a principled stand within the Islamic community for their integrity, credibility, and political position at no cost. As soon as the Israeli-Palestinian situation is resolved within Israel and Palestine, they’ll move on. It’s not an issue for them. Right now it’s convenient and something they can use.” At the same time, however, he warned that such strategies can backfire “ … because of the protracted nature of the politics, the way it has been absorbed into their educational system and their media is such that while the elites may be able to move on very quickly when and if there’s a negotiated resolution to the Israeli-Palestinian accord, many of the people will find that adjustment much more difficult.”424
Malaysia offers important lessons in the management of diverse ethnic and religious communities in Southeast Asia, and in the growing influence of Islam in the politics and society of one key state in the region. With Prime Minister Mahathir’s resignation in the fall of 2003 just weeks after the Committee’s visit, it remains to be seen to what extent the government of new Prime Minister Abdullah Badawi continues or adapts the policies begun under Mahathir, and their implications both for Malaysia and for its relations with Canada and other Western states.
Malaysia is a federation composed of two regions separated by over 1,000 kilometres of South China Sea.425 Its population of some 25 million is composed of a small Malay majority (58%), with a significant ethnic Chinese (26%), Indian (7%) and other (9%) minorities. Malaysia’s geographic, ethnic and cultural diversity has played an important role in shaping the political development of the country, whose political parties are largely based on ethnicity, locality or religion. Ethnic relations have played a particularly key role since independence in 1957; and when Singapore with its predominantly ethnic Chinese population withdrew from the Federation of Malaysia in 1965, political power switched to ethnic Malays.
Strained relations between the Malay majority and the wealthier ethnic Chinese minority came to a head when the governing United Malay National Organization (UNMO) party lost seats in the 1969 general election, and anti-Chinese rioting in which almost 1,000 died erupted in Kuala Lumpur. (Likewise, ethnic Chinese were also attacked at the time of the Asian crisis in 1997-1998.) Parliamentary government was suspended for 21 months as a result, and a broader coalition government later implemented positive discrimination measures in favour of the bumiputera (“sons of the soil,” ethnic Malays and other indigenous people, together accounting for about 63% of the population) designed to improve their economic weight and so lessen interracial tensions. As a result of a combination of bumiputera policies and a prohibition on immigration from China, by 2003 Malaysia’s Malay population was increasing, while its ethnic Chinese minority was decreasing.
Malaysia saw impressive economic growth beginning in the 1970s which over the next decades allowed it to virtually eliminate poverty, and perhaps reduced minority criticism of bumiputera policies. While the Asian economic crash of the late 1990s caused a crisis, this was less severe in Malaysia than in other regional states, largely due to the refusal of the Mahathir government to follow the prescriptions of the International Monetary Fund and others. Outside Malaysia, Mahathir was also widely criticized at the time for blaming the crisis on the actions of American financier George Soros.
Despite regular and free votes since independence, the dominance of a single political party has continued to constrain the democratic process in Malaysia. As Noah Feldman has argued:
… there have been regular, basically free elections every five years since independence in 1957. Essentially the same ruling coalition has remained in power all that time, but Islamic parties participate in the elections, and Islamic political ideas have gradually become to some extent mainstream … but the stability and extraordinary economic growth of Malaysia have not been accompanied by impressive gains in basic civil liberties. To the contrary, in recent years, free speech and association, never strongly protected, have been further curtailed.426
The Malaysian government moved more toward authoritarianism in 1987, when Dr. Mahathir almost lost power. He responded by consolidating his power within his party, then moved over the next year to reduce the power of and intimidate the judiciary, change the constitution, and reduce checks and balances on the government.427 Feldman continued:
The capstone in this process of jailing dissidents under the draconian Internal Security Act was the arrest and show trial of Anwar Ibrahim erstwhile Deputy Prime Minister and protégé of Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad. A modernist-Islamist politician and former youth movement leader who rose rapidly as the government sought to co-opt the Islamists during the period of economic growth, Ibrahim disagreed publicly with his mentor about fiscal policy when Malaysia ran into tough economic times. Once Ibrahim began to appear as a potential challenger, the Prime Minister’s embrace turned to more of a stranglehold. Mohamad contrived to have Ibrahim convicted of sodomy and thrown in prison, where he remains.428
Islamisation and Mahathir’s Legacy
While Malaysia was declared to be a secular nation on independence,429 and the practice of other religions is guaranteed, Islam is the official religion of the country. More disturbingly to some, Malaysia’s majority Malay population is defined as Muslim in the country’s constitution, thereby linking ethnic and religious groups.
Malaysia’s Islamic opposition PAS was established in 1951, and has contested every Parliamentary election since 1957. It has controlled one province, Kelantan since 1959. Soon after Dr. Mahathir Mohammad became Prime Minister in 1981, however, the Islamic opposition increased in strength, and Mahathir responded in part by co-opting Anwar Ibrahim, and promising and carrying out his own Islamisation campaign thereafter. In the opinion of some, however, by doing so he legitimized the PAS agenda, while engaging in an “Islamisation race” he could not win.
The government’s treatment of Anwar Ibrahim played a role in a significant loss of Malay support for the governing party in the elections of November 1999, and an increase in the vote for PAS, which regained control in one state and made gains in others. The September 11 terrorist attacks discredited Islamic extremism, and Prime Minister Mahathir moved to exploit this. At the same time, he countered a PAS pledge that it would establish an “Islamic state” if it won the next general election by arguing that Malaysia was already an Islamic state — in fact, a “fundamentalist” one430 — and promising further Islamisation.
Malaysia has been an important (if quiet) Southeast Asian partner in the war on terrorism. Among other actions, it has held roughly 100 suspected extremists under its Internal Security Act, which allows for detention without trial — a legacy of British colonial administration. In November 2003, Malaysia adopted new counter-terror laws that Human Rights Watch told the UN Commission on Human Rights were “widely criticized by local human rights groups for being vague and overbroad, thus putting at risk the basic rights of free expression, association and assembly.”431
Anwar Ibrahaim — an informed observer if perhaps not a neutral one — has argued from prison that the war on terrorism has represented a setback for democracy in Southeast Asia. In his opinion, the cause of this setback “ … is not terrorism itself, but the war against terrorism, which is being waged in the name of freedom and democracy. Instead of harnessing democratic energy in the region, it has strengthened the hand of authoritarianism.” He continued:
Re-energized authoritarian regimes gloat over the so-called wisdom of repressive laws and acts. Under pressure from the United States, they have tightened the screws on dissent by describing dissenters as terrorists or Taliban. To appease their domestic audiences, however, they make strident anti-American noises, accusing the Bush administration of hypocrisy and double standards. Their spin doctors write of imperialistic designs, condemn America’s treatment of suspected terrorists and accuse it of human rights abuses — all the while ignoring the stench in their own backyard.432
While cooperating in the war against terrorism, however, Mahathir also called for an international response that addressed “root causes,” and loudly criticized the invasion of Iraq. His last international platform came at the OIC Summit held in Malaysia at the time of the Committee’s visit. Mahathir’s address as host made a number of points about the need for the Muslim world to work together and play to its strengths. International attention, however, focused on the far more controversial elements of the speech, where he spoke of enemies and added that “The Europeans killed 6 million Jews out of 12 million. But today the Jews rule this world by proxy. They get others to fight and die for them.”433 The speech was well received at the Summit, although international reaction was sharply critical, pointing out that it singled out Jews for criticism rather than Israeli government policy.
For over 20 years Mahathir Mohamad has often been controversial in the West, yet is widely accepted to have delivered growth and stability while preserving a moderate Muslim democracy in Malaysia. David Dewitt told the Committee that “aspects of his politics and his policies are repugnant, as with their continuing to publicize the infamous protocols of the elders of Zion, or the way he has used Islamic identities and connections for narrow sectoral interests. Yet other aspects of his government are to be admired, notably in national development, education, and progress in women’s rights.”434
The argument that Mahathir had adopted Islamist rhetoric and policies to reduce the attraction of PAS got support when, soon after he announced his intention to retire, he proposed a series of measures in the area of education. These were designed, in the words of Angel Rabasa, “to break the hold of militant Islam on Malaysian education,” and included the regulation of private Islamic schools. Rabasa concludes that these new initiatives “point to the exhaustion of the policy of Islamisation that has informed UMNO’s philosophy of governance since the early 1980s.”435 He also argues that Malaysia is unlikely to ever become a fully sharia-based state for a number of reasons, including: the dichotomized nature of its society — with Malays constituting only a small majority overall, and no majority in important regions; disagreement among Malays themselves over what type of Islam they would like to see in Malaysia; and the strength of the secular institutions that provide the framework for Malaysian political and economic life.436
While the Committee’s visit to Malaysia confirmed that that country had played a positive and moderate role in terms of relations between the Muslim world and the West, it also underlined a number of concerns about the domestic situation in that country. While the government’s long-term policies of positively discriminating in favour of the bumiputera and further Islamising the country are for Malaysians to pass judgment on, their combination does seem to have resulted in a still modern and moderate society that has become more rigid over time, with implications both for the Malay majority and ethnic minorities. A number of interlocutors discussed various aspects of this rigidity, ranging from laws prohibiting the holding of hands in public to a general perception that members of different ethnic and religious groups mix together less now on a social basis than in the past.437 At the same time, interlocutors were clear that while Canada and other states could assist civil society groups in Malaysia as they seek to strengthen institutions of governance and argue for change, high-profile involvement in such areas as gender equality would probably be counterproductive.
After two decades of rule by a dominant individual, the new government of Abdullah Badawi deserves a chance to place its own stamp on Malaysia. In this respect, some were surprised when, rather than the homage to Mahathir many had expected, his first speech to Parliament as Prime Minister seemed to imply a more open and tolerant style of government.438 As an Islamic scholar who has not been linked to corruption, Abdullah was well placed to defend the Malaysian government’s secular version of Islam, although some argued that if PAS posted further gains in the elections of 2004, Abdullah would face a challenge to his leadership. In the event, the ruling coalition achieved a landslide victory in the Parliamentary and state elections of March 2004, winning 195 of 219 seats in the federal Parliament and regaining control of the state captured by PAS in 1999.439
Tan Sri Dato’ Noordin Sopiee, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of the country’s pre-eminent think tank, the Institute of Strategic and International Studies (ISIS), argued that Malaysia is unique in many respects, and can be a useful model that can also help break negative stereotypes prevalent in the West. Among other characteristics, Malaysia is a very Western-oriented and prosperous trading nation, and one whose Muslim majority is used to living with others. A “committed Muslim,” he repeated that Islam in Southeast Asia is moderate, adding that since Malaysians believe sincerely in moderation and pragmatism, they have worked to develop a form of Islam that is moderate and balanced. The fact that the Islamic opposition PAS contested elections meant people did not have to turn to violence. He added that “in some countries even the moderates are extreme; in this country, even the extremists are moderate.”
A long-time journalist and editor, he responded to questions about the independence of the media by arguing that all governments attempt to control the press, adding that in Malaysia at least this is done openly through party ownership of various newspapers. On the question of individual versus group rights, while there were laws on the books against many things, these were not enforced. In terms of minority rights, the fact that it was necessary to get the support of more than one group to win elections provided balance. There was a “clash” in the world today, but it was between traditionalists and modernists.
ISIS Director General Dato’ Mohamed Jawhar Hassan, a former government official with experience in national security issues, addressed the subject of terrorism, which he pointed out could be used both by state and non-state actors. Citing the example of the African National Congress in South Africa, he argued that it was necessary to distinguish methods from causes, adding that the Palestinians should be seen in this context. Terrorism has a long history and did not begin in September 2001, yet the fact that those attacks targeted the United States meant that this was automatically seen as a universal problem. In fact, while modern terrorism does benefit from high technology and increased travel, he argued that “international terrorism” was often a euphemism for anti-American terrorism.
Depending upon definitions, it was possible to argue that the terrorist threat in Southeast Asia was lower now than it had been in the past. While Jemaah Islamiya had attracted international attention with bombings in Bali and Jakarta, there was little support for its “domestic” agenda of establishing a regional caliphate. Malaysia works very closely with other states on counter-terrorism, and has a “zero tolerance” policy in this area. In regional terms, Indonesia faces important difficulties in this area as a large state that is difficult to monitor, and one where Islam is a powerful political force. The fight against terrorism must be political rather than military, since it is a fight for hearts and minds and we must take away popular support for terrorism. He added that we must understand the enemy and address root causes rather than creating new ones; for this reason, the international war on terrorism is a losing one.
Dr. Chandra Muzaffar, who had formerly been vice-president of an opposition political party and director of the Centre for Civilizational Dialogue at the University of Malaya, explained the work of the International Movement for a Just World (JUST), of which he is president. Drawing on an advisory board that includes American intellectual/activist Noam Chomsky, JUST works to promote cultural understanding and the peaceful resolution of conflicts and to challenge what it sees as the social and economic inequities inherent in the process of globalization.
On domestic issues, he argued that Malaysia had a bright future compared to its neighbours given its stable politics and good economy, although it could not rely forever on individual leadership and needed to strengthen the institutions of governance. In terms of the perception of increasing Islamisation, Dr. Chandra, a Muslim convert, responded that there was a bit of nostalgia at play in this analysis. Islam had always been very important in the country, but while Malaysian cities had long been dominated by non-Malays and non-Muslims, as demographics changed Malays became more conscious of their identity. Such things were part of a process, and might change again in the future.
There were real problems in terms of the protection of minorities and a “creeping intolerance” at the local level, that must be addressed. In terms of the separation of church and state, each society had to be looked at in terms of its own history. Ethical values should be part of the public sphere, and a moderate society should have values that transcend religion. The problem was in the interpretation of religion. He agreed that it was good to have PAS participating in elections, where the government could engage and hopefully defeat them. When asked if Western nations seemed arrogant when discussing human rights with Muslim majority states and others he responded no, since such rights were universal.
In terms of international relations, he believed that “the major issue in the Muslim world is undoubtedly Palestine,” which resonates so much because it is seen as an attempt to grab land and territory in a part of the world that is Arab and Muslim. This has nothing to do with relations between Arabs and Jews, however, who have lived together well in the past. From that perspective, Prime Minister Mahathir’s recent controversial comments should have talked about “political Zionism” rather than “Jews.” Foreign policy is a mixture of pragmatism and theory and, like all policy, must reflect voters. Since the majority of Malaysians are Muslim, this has to be reflected in the country’s foreign policy, particularly on such key issues such as Palestine and Iraq.
He argued that the United States did not want real democracy in oil-producing states such as Saudi Arabia (or Nigeria), adding that despite its oil wealth, Saudi Arabia had done little for women. Groups such as Jemaah Islamiyah were on the fringe, and he did not believe the states of the region would gravitate toward extremist politics, since they were multiracial, and better educated. Noting the existence of the two major moderate Muslim groups in Indonesia, Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama, he warned against a stereotyped view of that country.
Overall, he argued that there was no “clash of civilizations,” but rather a clash of fundamentalisms between some in the Muslim world and some in the West. The argument was really between those who took texts literally and those who understood them in terms of underlying values and context. Canada has a good reputation in the Muslim world, and he urged it to speak out more internationally. In terms of bilateral relations, he noted the value of the McGill program in Indonesia, and argued that more exchanges between all levels of society would be useful.
Professor Syed Serajul Islam, a Canadian political scientist from Lakehead University who specializes in South and Southeast Asia and is currently teaching in Malaysia, summarized a written submission to the Committee and answered questions. Among other points, he argued that only a very few in Malaysia were opposed to liberal values, and pointed out that Islam can thrive in liberal multicultural societies such as Canada. Malaysians did distinguish between Canada and the United States, and he argued that Canada should continue to maintain an independent foreign policy centred on the United Nations. It should also continue to assist in areas such as democratic reform — which is necessary, among other reasons, to eliminate terrorism — including in wealthier countries.
A knowledgeable Canadian with long experience in the region took issue with the argument that Saudi funding had had little impact in Malaysia and Asia more generally, arguing the opposite. As a result of continued Saudi funding since the early 1970s, in many respects he believed the culture of Malaysian Islam had now been hijacked by Arabs, and particularly Wahhabis. The key was education, and he argued for a paradigm shift that would see CIDA focus on assisting primary education, as long as this was based on a secular curriculum. He also argued that Canada should also establish both a foreign intelligence agency and a satellite television presence in the region.
In order to learn about the role of women in Malaysia as well as the broader Muslim world, the Committee met with Y.B. Dato’ Seri Shahrizat binti Abdul Jalil, Malaysia’s Minister for Women and Family Development. While members challenged the minister’s views on a number of occasions, they welcomed the opportunity to discuss them with her as an important contribution to their understanding of Malaysian society.
The Minister explained the work of her ministry, which had been established in 2000, and whose vision is “to achieve gender equality and a stable family institution.” While challenges remained and it was still necessary to mainstream women’s issues, she argued that the key both for women in Malaysia and other Muslim majority countries was to “work smart.” A lawyer and former judge, the minister argued that women have the same rights as men in Islam, and it was when the religion was misinterpreted that there were problems. Problems with the role of women were often cultural rather than religious in any event. While she believed that most women in Saudi Arabia were probably just as happy not to drive cars anyway, she added that “if women want to get out of that quagmire, they will.” She did not believe that Malaysia could do much to improve the status of women in the Middle East, however, given Arab culture. Also, she had been “appalled and disgusted” that an official dinner at the OIC summit had segregated men and women. This was not a Malaysian policy, and she suspected it was the work either of an overzealous official or the OIC secretariat.
The key issues in terms of religious law were both interpretation —especially on the part of older judges — and implementation. Legislation is important, but given that laws can be changed the key was the national mindset. While admitting that those who follow the Koran in such respects as modest dress were not always totally “free” in Western terms, she argued that religion gave strength. Similarly, she did not believe that such issues as headscarves were so important, since religion is in the heart. She argued that the Islamist opposition in Malaysia did not do women justice. At the same time, she disagreed that there was a creeping “fundamentalism” in Malaysia — agreeing with Prime Minister Mahathir that it was already fundamentalist — adding that the fear was extremism. Overall, democracy in Malaysia is more realistic. While there is nothing a Muslim woman cannot do as an individual, it was important to think as well in terms of the culture and the nation.
In addition to the above meetings, Committee members also met both formally and informally with a number of NGO and civil society interlocutors, including representatives from women’s groups, the youth movement, Parliament and academia. While not all these interlocutors had the chance to present their views fully, such meetings reinforced many of the positive messages about Malaysia, while also underlining challenges faced by women and others there as society has become more conservative.
As in other countries visited by the Committee, Islam itself is not a problem in this respect, but its conservative interpretation — in conjunction with cultural and other factors such as patriarchy — may be. No one the Committee met in Malaysia was ready to give up on either their democratic principles or their religion, however. In this respect, they would likely agree with Sheema Khan of the Council on American — Islamic Relations Canada when, referring to Muslim women around the world, she declares that “The key is faith in God as the foundation of self-empowerment.”440 Senator Mobina Jaffer argued similarly that “I believe it is only when women are educated that they will have choices that will enable them to interpret the Koran, which in turn will empower them to attain equality.”441
Directions for Canadian Policy
Relations between Canada and Malaysia have been good for decades, both bilaterally and in terms of cooperation in such multilateral fora as the United Nations, the Commonwealth, APEC and the ASEAN Regional Forum. Canada believes that as a moderate, multiracial Muslim majority nation, Malaysia exercises a positive influence as the Chair of both the Non-Aligned Movement and the Organization of the Islamic Conference. Malaysia has also been an important partner in the war on terrorism in Southeast Asia.
At the same time, Canada remains concerned about some aspects of Malaysia’s democracy. Relations were strained when Canada expressed concerns about the politically motivated arrest and trial of Anwar Ibrahim. Also, while in Malaysia the Committee was told about concerns regarding the continued use of detention without trial, the independence of both the judiciary and the media, and Malaysia’s treatment of some refugee claimants.
Canadian Official Development Assistance to Malaysia began in 1950. Such assistance is based on need, and Malaysia’s strong economic growth in recent decades has reduced this need dramatically. Hau Sing Tse of CIDA told the Committee in Ottawa that:
In recent years, CIDA has assisted Malaysia in making the transition from aid recipient to Canada’s number one trade partner in Southeast Asia. A total of $2.5 billion in trade was transacted in 2002, with programs that emphasized economic policy and cooperation between Canadian and Malaysian institutions and enterprises, including entrepreneurial and managerial training for Malaysian women. In light of Malaysia’s impressive development achievements, our development assistance activities in this country are fairly limited in scope.442
In fact, Canada decided in the late 1990s to gradually phase out bilateral assistance to Malaysia; for all intents and purposes, Malaysia will be graduated from most bilateral and partnership assistance in 2004. On one hand, this decision is justified given that CIDA’s priority is the reduction of poverty, which has been virtually eliminated in Malaysia. At the same time, despite Malaysia largely positive and moderate role in the region, the Committee believes it is important to ensure that adequate resources remain available both to help strengthen the instruments of governance in that country, and to assist civil society groups.
RECOMMENDATION 30
Given that most Canadian development assistance to Malaysia will end in 2004, the Government of Canada should ensure adequate resources remain available to continue working with other countries and moderate civil-society groups — particularly women’s groups — to strengthen institutions of governance and support democratic development, pluralism, minority and other human rights in Malaysia.
| 334 | Evidence, Meeting No. 45 (1145). |
| 335 | Evidence, Meeting No. 35 (1630). |
| 336 | Noah Feldman, After Jihad: America and the Struggle for Islamic Democracy, Farrar, Strauss and Géroux, New York, 2003, p. 119. |
| 337 | “Born to Rule: Is Politics in the Blood, or in the Genes?” The Economist, December 20,, 2003, p. 41. |
| 338 | See SCFAIT Advancing Canadian Foreign Policy Objectives in the South Caucasus and Central Asia, June 2001, Recommendation 5. |
| 339 | See, for example, Daryl Copeland “Diversifying Canada’s Dependence: Look East,” Asian Perspective, Volume 27, No. 4, 2003. |
| 340 | Ibid. In November 2003, the Committee tabled a report by its Subcommittee on International Trade, Trade Disputes and Investment on Reinvigorating Economic Relations Between Canada and Asia-Pacific. |
| 341 | Evidence, Meeting No. 35 (1545). |
| 342 | Evidence, Meeting No. 57 (1205). |
| 343 | Ibid. (1140). |
| 344 | For details, see Steve Coll, Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and Bin Laden, From the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001, The Penguin Press, New York, 2004. |
| 345 | Tony Kellett and Elizabeth Speed, “Whither Jihadist Terrorism,” in Strategic Assessment 2003, Ottawa, Department of National Defence, Directorate of Strategic Analysis, Ottawa, September 2003, p.110. |
| 346 | See Scott Gilmore, “Canadian Foreign Policy and Afghanistan,” 11th Annual Canadian Consortium on Asia Pacific Security (CANCAPS) Conference, December 6, 2003, Calgary, Alberta. Beyond the importance of Afghanistan itself, Mr Gilmore, a DFAIT official, also noted that given Canada’s “unprecedented” and “3D” response, “Afghanistan offers us an important lesson and the implications are significant for Canada’s response to similar crises in the future.” |
| 347 | Evidence, Meeting No. 57 (1235). |
| 348 | Evidence, Meeting No. 31 (1010). |
| 349 | See William Dalrymple, “Murder in Karachi,” The New York Review of Books, Vol. 50, No. 19, December 4, 2003. |
| 350 | Feldman, p. 128. For an interesting series of reports on the issue of Kashmir as seen from both India and Pakistan, see the International Crisis Group, Kashmir: The View From Islamabad, Asia Report No. 68, December 4, 2003, Kashmir: The View From New Delhi, Asia Report No. 69, December 4, 2003, and Kashmir: Learning From the Past, Asia Report No. 70, 4 December 2003. |
| 351 | Evidence, Meeting No. 49 (1115). |
| 352 | “Canadian Statement,” 47th General Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency, September 17, 2003. |
| 353 | Evidence, Meeting No. 49 (1255). |
| 354 | Feldman, p. 114. |
| 355 | Evidence, Meeting No. 45 (1230). |
| 356 | Evidence, Meeting No. 49 (1115-25). |
| 357 | Ibid. (1120). |
| 358 | Ibid. (1125). |
| 359 | Evidence, Meeting No. 45 (1255). |
| 360 | “Canada and Islam in Asia in the 21st Century: A Narrative Report,” September 24-26, 2003, p. 7-8. |
| 361 | Evidence, Meeting No. 49 (1125). |
| 362 | Feldman, p. 129. |
| 363 | Gwynne Dyer, “Pakistan: The Persistence of Democracy,” October 8, 2002, article available at http://www.gwynnedyer.net. |
| 364 | Lloyd Axworthy, Navigating a New World: Canada’s Global Future, Alfred A. Knopf Canada, Toronto, 2003, p. 230. |
| 365 | Karl E. Meyer, The Dust of Empire: The Race for Mastery in the Asian Heartland, Public Affairs Books, New York, 2003, p. 88. |
| 366 | Evidence, Meeting No. 31 (1010). |
| 367 | Cited in Owen Bennett Jones, Pakistan: Eye of the Storm, Yale University Press, New Haven and London, 2002, p. 12. |
| 368 | Ibid., p. xv. |
| 369 | Evidence, Meeting No. 35 (1545). |
| 370 | Feldman, p. 129. |
| 371 | Dyer, (2002). |
| 372 | Unfulfilled Promises: Pakistan’s Failure to Tackle Extremism, International Crisis Group, Asia Report No. 73, Islamabad/ Brussels, January 16, 2004, p. ii. |
| 373 | Ibid., p. 2. |
| 374 | Unfulfilled Promises, p. i. |
| 375 | Evidence, Meeting No. 49 (1105). |
| 376 | Simon Long, “The Billion-Person Question,” The Economist, The World in 2004, fall 2003, p. 71. |
| 377 | New Priorities in South Asia: U.S. Policy Toward India, Pakistan and Afghanistan, Chairmen’s Report of an Independent Task Force Co-sponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations and the Asia Society, 2003, p. 32. |
| 378 | Khushwant Singh, The End of India, Penguin Books India, 2003, p. 90. |
| 379 | Pankaj Mishra, “The Other Face of Fanaticism,” The New York Times Magazine, February 2, 2003. |
| 380 | The respected International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) claims that between 1,000 and 5,000 Muslims died. See International Institute for Strategic Studies, Strategic Survey 2002/3, Oxford University Press, London, May 2003, p. 206. |
| 381 | Evidence, Meeting No. 49 (1250). |
| 382 | See Sanjoy Majumder, “Gujarat and the Judges’ Anger,” BBC News UK Edition (Online), September 12, 2003; and “Arrests Over Gujurat Riots Case,” BBC News UK Edition (Online), January 22, 2004. |
| 383 | Evidence, Meeting No. 49 (1120). |
| 384 | Evidence, Meeting No. 31 (1045). |
| 385 | Evidence, Meeting No. 50 (1105). |
| 386 | A recent report by American experts has noted that “India, it is sometimes said, is like a giant ocean liner that steams ahead at a slow but steady and generally predictable pace and changes direction only very gradually.” See New Priorities in South Asia: U.S, Policy Toward India, Pakistan and Afghanistan, (2003), p. 36. |
| 387 | Scott B. MacDonald and Jonathan Lemco, “Political Islam in Southeast Asia,” Current History, November 2002, p. 392. |
| 388 | Angel M. Rabasa, “Political Islam in Southeast Asia: Moderates, Radicals and Terrorists,” Adelphi Papers Vol. 358, Issue 1, July 2003, International Institute for Strategic Studies, London, 2003, p. 68. |
| 389 | Ibid., p. 72. |
| 390 | Yuen Pau Woo, in Amitav Acharya, “Southeast Asian Security After September 11,” Foreign Policy Dialogue Series 2003-8, Asia-Pacific Foundation of Canada, November 2003, p. 2. |
| 391 | Acharya, p. 3-5. |
| 392 | Rabasa, p. 66. |
| 393 | Ibid., p. 13-14. |
| 394 | Evidence, Meeting No. 35 (1545). |
| 395 | Rabasa, p. 68. |
| 396 | Evidence, Meeting No. 35 (1630). |
| 397 | Copeland, p. 292. |
| 398 | Christopher Hitchens, “A Prayer For Indonesia,” Vanity Fair, January 2004, p. 53. |
| 399 | Feldman, p. 118. |
| 400 | Rabasa, p. 72. |
| 401 | Evidence, Meeting No. 45 (1140). |
| 402 | Indonesia Backgrounder: A Guide to the 2004 Elections, International Crisis Group, Asia Report No. 71, December 18, 2003, p. 1. |
| 403 | Feldman, p.116. |
| 404 | Ibid., p. 117. |
| 405 | Evidence, Meeting No. 45, (1225). |
| 406 | Hitchens, p.51. |
| 407 | Rabasa, p. 16. |
| 408 | Sidney Jones, “Indonesia Faces More Terror,” International Herald Tribune, August 29, 2003. |
| 409 | See Ivar Hellberg, RUSI Newsbrief, Royal United Services Institute, Vol. 24, No. 1, January 2004, p. 8. |
| 410 | Evidence, Meeting No. 35 (1630). |
| 411 | Rabasa, p. 69. |
| 412 | Hitchens, p. 52. |
| 413 | Fu’ad Jabali et. al., “Impact on the Development and Modernization of Islam in Indonesia,” Impact Study: Cooperation Between IAIN and McGill University, Final Report, May 17, 2000, Executive Summary. |
| 414 | Ibid. |
| 415 | Jemaah Islamiyah in South East Asia: Damaged But Still Dangerous, International Crisis Group, Asia Report No. 63, August 26, 2003, p. 31. |
| 416 | Quoted in Sidney Jones, “Why Indonesian Distrust the U.S.,” Far Eastern Economic Review, November 13, 2003. |
| 417 | Jane Perlez, “Ashcroft Asks Asians to Help on Terror (They Want Help, Too),” New York Times, (online), February 5, 2004. |
| 418 | Evidence, Meeting No. 49 (1255). |
| 419 | Evidence, Meeting No. 50 (1105). |
| 420 | Copeland, p. 290. |
| 421 | Rabasa, p. 41. |
| 422 | Ibid., p. 45-46. |
| 423 | Gwynne Dyer, “Two Fanatics and an Old Fool,” October 19, 2003, article accessed at http://www.gwynnedyer.net |
| 424 | Evidence, Meeting No. 45 (1230). |
| 425 | The following draws on the Economist Intelligence Unit, Malaysia Country Profile 2003. |
| 426 | Feldman, p. 114. |
| 427 | Malaysia Country Profile 2003, Economist Intelligence Unit, p. 7. |
| 428 | Feldman, p. 114. |
| 429 | Economist Intelligence Unit, p. 8. |
| 430 | "Mahathir: Malaysia is Fundamentalist State," CNN.com, June 18, 2002, http://edition.cnn.com/2002/WORLD/asiapcf/southeast/06/18/malaysia.mahathir/ |
| 431 | Human Rights Watch, “Human Rights and Counter-Terrorism,” Briefing to the 60th session of the UN Commission on Human Rights, January 2004. |
| 432 | Anwar Ibrahim, “A Passion For Freedom,” The Economist, The World in 2004, 2003, p. 79. |
| 433 | Speech by the Prime Minister of Malaysia, the Hon. Dato Seri Dr. Mahathir Mohamad, at the Opening of the Tenth Session of the Islamic Summit Conference, October 16, 2003. |
| 434 | Evidence, Meeting No. 45 (1110). |
| 435 | Rabasa, p. 45. |
| 436 | Ibid., p. 70. |
| 437 | When asked about laws prohibiting holding hands in public, Noah Feldman replied that “Holding hands in a public park, though a value that certainly I myself would want permitted under any conditions in a society that I would live in, is one that suggests to me something within the reasonable range of decision-making that governments can make with respect to regulating public behaviour. Where cultural norms think it’s OK to dress in a certain way or to behave in a certain way with members of the opposite sex in public, then I think there is room for governments that still respect individual liberties to be sensitive to cultural particularities.” Evidence, Meeting No. 58 (1155). |
| 438 | Jonathan Kent, “Malaysia’s PM Pledges Openness,” BBC News (Online), November 3, 2003. |
| 439 | “Abdullah Sworn in as Malaysian PM”, BBC News (online), March 22, 2004. |
| 440 | Sheema Khan, “Don’t Misread the Koran,” Globe and Mail, February 14, 2003, p. A17. |
| 441 | Evidence, Meeting No. 47 (1145). |
| 442 | Evidence, Meeting No. 50, (1105). |