FAAE Committee Report

Regional Overview

The absence of a credible political life in most parts of the [Middle East and North Africa] region, while not necessarily bound to produce violent conflict, is intimately connected to a host of questions that affect its longer-term stability:

	•	Ineffective political representation, popular participation and government responsiveness often translate into inadequate mechanisms to express and channel public discontent, creating the potential for extra-institutional protests. These may, in turn, take on more violent forms, especially at a time when regional developments (in the Israeli-Palestinian theatre and in Iraq) have polarised and radicalised public opinion.
	•	In the long run, the lack of genuine public accountability and transparency hampers sound economic development. While transparency and accountability are by no means a guarantee against corruption, their absence virtually ensures it. Also, without public participation, governments are likely to be more receptive to demands for economic reform emanating from the international community than from their own citizens. As a result, policy-makers risk taking insufficient account of the social and political impact of their decisions.
	•	Weakened political legitimacy and economic under-development undermine the Arab states’ ability to play an effective part on the regional scene at a time of crisis when their constructive and creative leadership is more necessary than ever.
	•	The deficit of democratic representation may be a direct source of conflict, as in the case of Algeria.

Addressing this question is the governments’ responsibility, but not theirs alone. Too often, opposition parties and civil society have contented themselves with vacuous slogans and unrealistic proposals that do not resonate with the people and further undermine the credibility of political action.

– International Crisis Group, Middle East Briefing¹⁵⁶

Over a decade ago, the noted Egyptian human rights activist Saad Ibrahim, subsequently jailed and released after international pressure, wrote that: “During the last 25 years, Arab countries have experienced a number of major crises leading to the erosion of the legitimacy of their ruling elites … [yet] the durability of the Arab world’s authoritarian regimes remains striking.”¹⁵⁷ With the exception of Turkey, democracy has still not made much headway within the wider Arab and Muslim Middle East and there are major human rights problems in virtually all countries of the region. The longer-term consequences of the overthrow of dictatorial regimes in Afghanistan and Iraq by external military force are as yet difficult to judge. The threat of terrorism overhangs the region, as does the danger of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Prospects for a resolution of the long-running Israeli-Palestinian conflict also appear at best uncertain. A peaceful, prosperous and democratic Middle East remains more hope than reality.

Interlinked with the political and security challenges are deep-seated problems of social development. Two groundbreaking reports on the Arab world by Arab analysts working under the auspices of the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) have exposed a “poverty of capabilities and poverty of opportunities [that] have their roots in three deficits: freedom, women’s empowerment, and knowledge.”¹⁵⁸ Other reports document the strains arising from a combination of youthful populations¹⁵⁹, growing unemployment, stagnant or declining per capita incomes, and little progress on poverty reduction despite the concentrations of wealth in oil-exporting countries.¹⁶⁰ In remarks to the Committee, Arab League Secretary General Amre Moussa acknowledged these societal deficiencies and suggested that poverty be given an equal priority with terrorism on the international agenda.¹⁶¹

Many witnesses would also agree with the Arab Human Development Report authors that a transition to democratic, accountable governance is an imperative for achieving progress within the region and for improving external relations. As another recent UN-sponsored study states: “Democratization is part and parcel of any serious strategy to liberate the region from the scourges of war and injustice and from the highly politicized interpretation and distortion of religious teachings that, in their original meaning, are meant to encourage, not undermine, the construction of tolerant, just, and inclusive societies.”¹⁶² But how to effect and support such transitions in ways that empower indigenous populations and that are sustainably democratic? The same study acknowledges that: “Transitions to democracy can be violent — more violent than the structural violence that is ever-present under authoritarian rule.” Yet it also concludes that only “gradual reform processes will be successful in the end.”¹⁶³ Canadian Middle East scholar Janice Stein has also argued that “those who are impatient to build democracy, who are champing at the bit, may hurt those they most want to help and damage the prospects for the ‘made at home’ political change that is the precondition for development and peace.”¹⁶⁴

The nature and pace of desirable democratic transitions, along with the efficacy of existing Western democracy promotion activities, are clearly matters of dispute. The many obstacles to political and other reforms in the region are all too apparent, however. Among the main challenges identified in the UN volume are: “Islamic fundamentalism; the negative role of external great powers; the Israeli-Palestinian conflict; the legacy of a long history of violence; and clashes between western and local/regional political and spiritual norms and values.”¹⁶⁵ Many proposals have been put forward for policy approaches to support democratic change. For example, one U.S. study calls for:

… sustained, high-level pressure on Arab states to respect political and civil rights and to create or widen genuine political space; clear, consistent pressure on Arab states to carry out pro-democratic institutional, legal, and constitutional changes; and increased democracy aid that bolsters democracy activists, engages seriously with the challenge of political party development, nurtures efforts to develop the rule of law, supports serious proponents of pro-democratic institutional reforms, and supports a growing range of civil society actors, including moderate Islamists.¹⁶⁶

Western governments appear to be committed to a policy of democratic change in the region, at least in their declared intentions. The UK Government’s strategic agenda, cited earlier in Part I, includes “serious effort to support peaceful political and social reform in the Arab world”.¹⁶⁷ U.S. President Bush’s speech to the National Endowment for Democracy on November 6, 2003 affirmed that “sixty years of Western nations excusing and accommodating the lack of freedom in the Middle East did nothing to make us safe … Therefore, the United States has adopted a new policy, a forward strategy of freedom in the Middle East.”¹⁶⁸ We referred in Part I to proposals being developed by the U.S. for a “Greater Middle East” initiative, to be discussed at the June 2004 G8 Summit, that would promote an ambitious agenda for democratic reforms, including in such areas as women’s rights.¹⁶⁹

While accepting the imperative for Arab political reforms and applauding pro-democracy sentiments, many worry about their application. As one commentary put it: “the creation of a liberal, democratic order in the Arab world is in America’s own long-term interest. But there is a fine distinction — and a world of difference — between a policy of advocating democracy and a policy of imposing it. Apart from being questionable in principle … any crude attempt to impose democracy on the Arabs is liable to backfire in practice.”¹⁷⁰ Observes Michael Bell, a former Canadian ambassador to Egypt and Jordan as well as to Israel and the Palestinian territories — “If we want to be effective, we have to accept that the Middle East is rife with complexities, and there will be few shortcuts.”¹⁷¹

Where does Canada fit in to this evolving regional picture? Witnesses before the Committee were virtually unanimous that Canada has a positive image in the region and that this good will, free of imperial baggage, is an important asset with unrealized potential. Mazen Chouaib of the National Council on Canada-Arab relations argued that “the gate of the Arab world has been open to Canada” but we seem to be slow to reciprocate Arab interest in Canada, observing that in his frequent travels in the region “I was questioned about our apparent lack of interest in developing closer trade, political, and cultural relations. I was also asked about our ability to manage our relationship with the United States. Above all, there was serious interest in understanding Canadian models of governance which in their opinion are behind our successful multiculturalism, which they really desire. … We have the capacity, talent, knowledge, and great experience to provide this model for a better world”.¹⁷²

Chouaib pointed to several deficiencies compared to other Western countries that limit a more visible Canadian presence and role:

In Canada we have very few research and academic institutions that are committed to understanding the region and its complexity. If any exist, they tend to be concerned more about economic survival than research excellence …  We need to invest research money, and we need to open diplomatic and consular services in Arab countries and not rely on foreign agencies and institutions to provide us with the information. For example, the French, British, and other Europeans have cultural centres in almost every country in the region. These institutions give them the advantage of understanding currents, trends, and social developments that are taking place. As well, these centres operate as educational tools for the host peoples about their guests. French cultural centres are famous for providing French language classes, scholarships, movies, and other educational tools to foster people-to-people relations. It is a pragmatic tool for better relations and comprehension of each other. The promotion of Canadian culture and values is a key element in Canadian foreign policy, yet there is an absence of significant developments in this area, despite the opportunities that exist.¹⁷³

Canada does have development assistance programs in the region, notably in Egypt, Jordan and the Palestinian Territories where Canada has also been active on refugee issues. Assistance through the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) and its partners has addressed areas such as poverty reduction, basic education, human resource development, institutional capacity building, child protection, gender equality, micro-credit and small-enterprise development. Paul Hunt of CIDA’s Africa and Middle East Branch illustrated the range of Canadian partnerships with civil society and governmental actors across the region:

The International Development Research Centre, for example, has provided research and capacity development support on the difficult Palestinian refugee issue. The Canadian Federation of Municipalities, the FCM, has provided support for the establishment of partnerships between Canadian and Palestinian municipalities and for helping to strengthen local governance, which affects citizens at the local and community levels. Oxfam and Oxfam-Québec have made a strong and ongoing commitment to assist vulnerable Palestinian communities. And the Department of Education of the Government of New Brunswick has done innovative work on e-learning and education, in both official languages, in collaboration with the Government of Jordan.¹⁷⁴

Canada’s development and humanitarian assistance efforts have “made CIDA’s brand recognizable to Arabs and Muslims”, according to Raja Khouri of the Canadian Arab Federation. “Such actions demonstrate Canada’s values, policies, and national identity to ordinary Arabs and Muslims.” Khouri advocated further educational and dialogue initiatives, using trade and economic levers to push democratic reforms, and enhanced funding and support for “non-governmental organizations and UN agencies that work in literacy, social and democratic development, and education in Arab and Muslim countries … Much of the root causes of radicalism and the attraction to reactionary religious doctrines stem from ignorance, poverty, and lack of opportunity and social development.”¹⁷⁵

Of course, one of the major complicating factors overhanging development efforts in the Middle East are the proximate effects of the tragic Israeli-Palestinian conflict that shows little sign of abating. Many witnesses both in Canada and abroad stressed the resolution of this conflict as ultimately central to realizing peaceful, democratic and sustainable development across the region. We will address the specific question of the Middle East peace process later in this report. But at this point we also want to note the caveat that this unfortunate conflict not be used to deflect attention from what can and should be done to address development and democratic deficits within other countries of the region. Noah Feldman made the point in a compelling way that brought the question back to those wider struggles for democratic development.

One will often hear in Muslim countries a sincerely felt concern for the plight of the Palestinian people. I myself think nothing could be more desirable than the speedy and just resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict through a safe and secure two-state solution that affords security and freedom for both peoples. However, and this is an important however, it is also true that in a systematic way politicians in the Muslim world use the Israeli-Palestinian conflict to deflect attention from problems that are going on at home. Indeed, local Muslims who oppose their governments in the region can actually use the Israeli-Palestinian issue as an indirect way of talking about their discomfort with their own governments. When they criticize western governments for tolerating the conditions there, they are implicitly criticizing their own governments for, in their view, colluding with western governments who are responsible for this. Often that is the only politically acceptable way to express a criticism of their own governments.¹⁷⁶

The Way Forward

In looking at a regional approach, the Committee acknowledges the diversity of the countries visited and viewpoints encountered. It is difficult enough to summarize such findings, nor do we assume there can be any single or simple policy “recipe” to be applied to fit all circumstances. Nonetheless, there are some underlying themes that emerged quite consistently throughout our discussions. They reflect issues that are clearly held to be important by Muslims in the mainstream across the region and that therefore ought to be taken into account in the development of Canadian foreign policy.

	•	It is important to overcome negative stereotypes of Islam (e.g., in the media, “clash” hypotheses, etc.) and any stigmatization of the vast majority of Muslims who reject extremism and terrorism. Increased Western knowledge of Muslim societies, attention to regional public diplomacy, media as well as educational reforms are needed for shared learning that counteracts dismissive or distorted views on either side.177
	•	Canada enhances its reputation and ability to play an honest broker role when it maintains an independent foreign policy standpoint that reflects its distinctive identity and voice, notably in relation to U.S. policies in the region. Canada’s image as a moderate, multicultural, multilaterally minded international actor among nations is a valuable diplomatic asset.
	•	Regional peacebuilding requires a just and lasting resolution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
	•	Governance and other political and social reforms are required in Muslim countries, including in sensitive areas such as religious education. However, such reforms are unlikely to succeed on a basis of external imposition or great-power interference. Outside governments need to be smart, sensitive and sophisticated about how they provide support to internal change agents.
	•	Increased contacts with Canada are welcome at many levels, especially educational and cultural exchanges, but also expanding civil society and private sector ties more generally.
	•	Strengthened relations would benefit from more opportunities for dialogue including through parliamentary contacts and forthright discussions on issues where there may be serious bilateral tensions. Across the region there is a genuine desire to build good relations and to work with Canada bilaterally, regionally and globally.

Turkey

Turkey is the principal successor state that emerged on the ruins of the Ottoman empire following the First World War. The modern Turkish republic was established by Mustafa Kemal in 1923 along secular and unitary lines. The Islamic Caliphate was abolished and a Western-influenced constitution adopted. Under Kemal, who later took the name “Ataturk” which means “father of the Turks”, Turkey developed as a modernizing one-party state. Multi-party elections did not take place until after the Second World War (in which Turkey was neutral). During the Cold War, Turkey allied itself to the West, becoming the first and sole Muslim member-state of NATO. However Turkey’s emerging democracy was interrupted by military coups in the following decades of the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s.

Since the end of the last period of military rule in 1983, parties with Islamic tendencies have gained ground notwithstanding the staunch secularism of the military establishment which sees itself as a guardian of the Kemalist constitution. This trend culminated with the sweeping election victory of Recip Erdogan’s Justice and Development Party (AKP) in November 2002 when it took 35% of the vote and 363 of the 550 seats in the unicameral legislature. An indication of the public disillusionment with the old parties was that virtually none attained the necessary 10% threshold to have representation in parliament. A ban on Erdogan seeking election to Parliament because of an Islamist speech he had made several years earlier was subsequently removed and he became Turkey’s prime minister in March 2003.

Turkey’s nearly 70 million people are overwhelmingly Sunni Muslim.¹⁷⁸ Although the republic is legally and constitutionally secular, as Turkish professor of Islamic law Osman Tastan explained to the Committee, what “Turkey shares with other Muslim countries is a sensitivity about the Muslim identity”. At the same time, there are major differences with the Arab Muslim states, notably in the restrictions on religious education and a more individualistic understanding of Islam. As Tastan pointed out: “Madrassas [Islamic schools] were banned at the beginning of the twentieth century in Turkey. In this way, there are religious teachers, but no more can we say these are religious leaders who could mobilize masses in Turkey. … Turkey is more in touch with Islam through Sufism as well, in the popular sense, in popular culture. This is very much a silent attachment to Islam’s practices in personal, private rooms and so on. This is different from a sharp textual understanding of Islam  … ”.¹⁷⁹

With the coming to power of a moderately Islamist party, the question has been posed whether Turkey remains an anomaly within the Muslim world or whether it could act as a “model” of some kind for the development of Muslim democracy. Noah Feldman was sceptical of a wider application:

With respect to successfully promoting democracy in a Muslim country, I don’t think there is one exemplar of how to do it. Turkey is a place where you have a developing democracy doing rather well, with an Islamic-oriented government behaving very democratically, respecting rights — not perfectly at all, but doing a very good job, a better job, frankly, than their secular predecessors — but you can’t replicate the process because it came about through a 75-year period of fairly autocratic government that repressed religion in a way that was not compatible with the basic freedom of religious exercise. It’s hard to have an example of some place that just automatically works.¹⁸⁰

There is nonetheless cautious optimism, as indicated in the above comment, that Turkey itself is on a promising path and that the populist Islamic character of the AKP has so far shown itself to be pragmatic and accommodating. Indeed it can be argued that the AKP’s victory was a healthy development that would reconcile Islam with reforms bringing Turkey closer to Europe. As one post-election analysis put it: “Turkey is not on the verge of an Islamic revolution. The one-third of the electorate who voted for the Muslim democratic Justice and Development Party do not want that, and the Party’s leaders are not aiming for it. ... With a Muslim democratic party in power, westernization will become a more legitimate consensus: Islamists who were staying on the margins of the democratic system will be incorporated into it just as Europe’s Christian democratic movement succeeded in the early years of the 20th century in reconciling Christians with the Republic.” ¹⁸¹

Given Turkey’s unusual standing as a Muslim NATO ally (Istanbul will host the next NATO summit in June 2004) that has had historically close relations with Israel as well as the United States, the progress of the AKP government has been watched closely in Western capitals.¹⁸² Despite complications caused by the Iraq war¹⁸³ which was massively unpopular with Turks — Turkey resisted pressures to support the invasion and later withdrew an offer to send troops to occupied Iraq — the Erdogan government appears to have manoeuvred adroitly in a number of key areas while keeping in check the suspicions of the powerful military.

There were reports in early 2004 that the Turkish military had agreed to a unified solution for Cyprus, the Greek part of which will join the European Union on May 1, 2004. Then on February 13, 2004, through the intervention of UN Secretary General Kofi Annan, an historic tentative agreement was reached that could pave the way to reunification of the island in time for the May entry into the EU.¹⁸⁴ That would remove a major obstacle to Turkey’s own hopes for EU accession, the status of which is to be reviewed at a December 2004 EU summit. The AKP government is credited with pushing through reforms and pursuing a strongly pro-European approach. And the government seems intent on repairing relations with the United States as indicated by Prime Minister Erdogan’s January 2004 meeting in Washington with President Bush.¹⁸⁵

The shocking terrorist bombings that took place in Istanbul in November 2003 several weeks after the Committee’s visit are unlikely to weaken Turkey’s bonds to the West; indeed they may have the opposite effect. A prominent Turkish academic has argued that: “The terrorist acts will steel the resolve of an increasingly assertive and pro-EU public.”¹⁸⁶ At the same time, the eruption of radical Islamist terrorism on Turkish soil after an absence of some years presents another daunting challenge for the moderate Islamic approach to democracy espoused by the current government.¹⁸⁷

Witness Views in Turkey

There was considerable discussion in the Committee’s meetings in Turkey on the nature of growing Islamic influence within the society and in government. Freelance journalist and television commentator Rusen Cakir, an expert on extremist groups such as the Turkish “Hezbollah”, urged that the role of Islam be seen in context and not exaggerated. He described an Islamic mobilization that is first cultural and socio-economic before becoming political. Unfortunately, though, Western media seem not very interested in the positive side of this Islamic renaissance. Cakir stated that Islamism as a militant political ideology does not appeal to most Muslims in Turkey. There is no chance of any armed movement succeeding even if the country has suffered from episodes of domestic terrorism (with some foreign involvement, noting that of Iran). The growing identification with Islam across a wide spectrum of Turkish society is a response to a number of pressures for change, and the AKP’s election may in fact help to defuse those pressures.

Analysing the sources of the AKP’s appeal, Mustafa Karaalioglu, Ankara Bureau Chief of a leading newspaper, agreed with Cakir that a radical Islamist takeover is not a real threat. He noted that Muslim religious leaders have strongly condemned terrorist violence. As elsewhere in the Muslim world, there is considerable resentment of U.S. and Israeli policies in the Middle East. Observers should be careful, however, not to take extreme voices as representing the Muslim community. Karaalioglu explained that the AKP has its home grown roots in NGO, social justice and reform movements, the religious element of which is compatible with Turkey’s modern secular state. The Kemalist inheritance, and the even older one of a polyglot Ottoman society that tolerated diversity, is not in danger of being overthrown by an extreme Islamization of society.

Other witnesses concurred that the ascendance of the AKP to power could be viewed as having positive liberalizing and democratizing effects. Professor Baskin Oran of Ankara University pointed out that the AKP has in fact been able to move faster than previous governments on EU accession issues, promoting reform measures in areas such as human rights corresponding to the criteria for negotiating accession. He was confident that “Turkey is going to do its homework” in order to be able to join the EU. Paradoxically, the AKP’s Islamic “sub-identity” makes it more trusted at home to be able to negotiate Turkey’s place within the larger European “supra-identity”. Ahmet Yasar Ocak, a historian at Hacetteppe University, argued that the AKP represents a civilized accommodation of modernity and Islam that should be given a chance because it could “lead us to real democracy”.

On the growth of religious consciousness within Turkish society along with interest in religious education, Hadi Adanali of Ankara University’s Faculty of Divinity advised that it be viewed in a positive light provided there is an ongoing critical evaluation of religious teaching so that it is a force for peaceful coexistence, tolerance and justice.¹⁸⁸ The loss of faith in ideologies of secular nationalism has left an opening for political movements with an Islamic character to flourish, and to become a force for democratization. Just as the secularization of the state was a process indigenous to Turkey under Ataturk, Turkey will have to find its own way to accommodate the influence of Islam within its political system under today’s globalizing impacts. The fear is that in the process established secular rights could be undermined, in particular, rights for women. Yet as Professor Adanali pointed out, many Muslims see state restrictions such as the ban on women wearing the headscarf in universities as a denial of religious rights. (Indeed the jailing of women for wearing the headscarf has been an object of EU criticism of the Turkish government for violating religious freedom.¹⁸⁹)

The difficulties of this debate were illustrated by the contrasting views of two prominent NGO witnesses. Sema Kendirci, President of the Turkish Women’s Union, insisted that a strict separation of religion and state be maintained. That included public rules of secular citizenship with full political rights for women, noting recent legislative advances in that regard. The problem with the Muslim headscarf is when it “started to be used as a political symbol”. (In Ottawa, Professor Turgay had told the Committee: “In Turkey a woman wearing a head cover is a very political message. That is the reason they are very careful about it.”¹⁹⁰ Dr. Tastan also pointed to a fear of influence from the Iranian revolution.¹⁹¹)

Fatma Botsan Unsal of the Capital City Women’s Platform acknowledged that she started wearing the headscarf when becoming politically involved as a founding member of the governing AKP (for which she cannot stand as a candidate because she would have to remove her headscarf in parliament¹⁹²). She objected to being forced into either a “Westernist” or “Islamist” mold, arguing that the issue should be one of women’s free choice whether the reasons for choosing to wear the headscarf are “political” or “cultural”. Ms. Unsal contended that a majority of the public favors removing the ban, though the AKP government is treading cautiously and has so far not moved in this direction. Views are mixed as to whether preserving such a ban helps to curb, or perversely contributes to, Islamic radicalism.¹⁹³

Of course there are more serious human rights concerns at issue than clothing restrictions. Ms. Kendirci noted that her organization had wanted to form a political party to press for women’s rights but was denied that official recognition. The struggle was going forward at the level of popular social mobilization around rights to education, protection from domestic violence, prevention of “honour killings”, and other priorities.

A rather harsh assessment of the overall human rights situation was provided by Yilmaz Ensaroglu, President of Maszlum-Der (Organization of Human Rights and Solidarity for Oppressed People), the country’s largest Islamic human rights NGO. He contended that “human rights are violated on a large scale in Turkey” and that “the existing legal system is not capable of protecting human rights”. This includes religious and educational rights, in particular of the Kurdish minority whose identity and language have been suppressed. Although Turkey has ratified major international human rights conventions and the pressures applied by European criteria are welcome, if not always effective, implementation in domestic practice is lacking and parliamentary attention uneven. Concerns persist about top-down control of the political process, independence of the judiciary, restrictions on NGOs, civil rights and media freedom,¹⁹⁴ prison conditions and the use of torture among other abuses.¹⁹⁵

Directions for Canadian Policy

One symbolic issue involving Canada that has surfaced since the Committee’s visit as a flashpoint of civil freedoms and democratic openness in Turkey is the controversy over the showing of the film “Ararat” by Toronto director Atom Egoyan. The subject of the film touches on the alleged Armenian “genocide” of the First World War era, an extremely sensitive topic to this day in Turkey (which has never accepted responsibility), as confirmed by Professor Tastan in his Ottawa testimony.¹⁹⁶ The Turkish government’s minister of culture and tourism approved the film in late 2003, saying it was evidence of the country’s democratic maturity. However, the scheduled release in January 2004 has been indefinitely postponed due to threats from extreme nationalist groups to attack theatres showing it.¹⁹⁷ It is a small but telling indication that Turkey’s journey towards liberal democracy, which has taken some steps forward under the current moderate Islamic government, remains a work in progress.

At the same time, as Canada’s Ambassador Michael Leir observed, Turkey is clearly a country of strategic importance in the Muslim world, not only as a historic crossroads between West and East, but also for its experience as a secular Muslim state that is seeking to embrace Islam in a democratic way. More could be done to improve already good bilateral relations with Canada. For example, Ambassador Leir mentioned the creation of a Canadian-Turkish Business Council. What is most important for the purposes of this study is that Canada be supportive of reform processes in Turkey, without obviously becoming embroiled in domestic disputes over issues such as the headscarf ban. Canada should encourage Turkey to live up to its international human rights commitments, to continue on a path to EU accession, and to negotiate a long-awaited resolution on Cyprus — a country in which Canada maintains a special interest given the presence of peacekeeping troops over several decades.

Modern Turkey may not be a “model” that can be replicated in the rest of the Muslim world, but its present moderate approach to the building of a democracy with Islamic characteristics is one that can have an important demonstration effect. One report following Prime Minister Erdgoan’s meeting with U.S. President Bush in early 2004 put it this way:

Although the Turkish prime minister and his Justice and Development Party have Islamist roots, they are proving in office to be of the liberal variety that believes in free markets and secular democracy. If democracy is to be successfully fostered across the Muslim world, especially in Arab countries, it is vital to encourage this Turkish exemplar.¹⁹⁸

Moreover, as a target of extreme Islamist terrorism, Turkey can also be an important voice in the Muslim world in devising effective strategies to counteract such terrorism. At the same time, Turkey must be subject to continued pressure from Canada and other countries to improve its human rights performance.

RECOMMENDATION 4

Canada should encourage the Government of Turkey to be a voice of democracy and moderation within the Muslim world and to continue to implement democratic and human rights reforms, including respecting the rights of its Kurdish minority, in compliance with Turkey’s international obligations and aspirations to join the European Union.

RECOMMENDATION 5

The Government of Canada should explore ways to facilitate further contacts with Turkey both at the official level and through private sector, civil society, educational and cultural connections. Consideration should be given to inviting Prime Minister Recep Erdogan to visit Canada and to address Parliament on, among other matters, strengthening ties with countries of the Muslim world.

Iran

Iran, with a fast-growing population approaching 70 million (of which 50% are under age 20) is the other major non-Arab country in the Muslim Middle East. Iranian society, while overwhelmingly Shi’a Muslim, is the proud inheritor of a pre-Islamic Persian past and contains non-Muslim religious and ethnic minorities. Yet since the Khomeinist revolution of 1979 Iran’s image has become associated with domination by a militant anti-Western Islamist political ideology. The Islamic Republic of Iran is the world’s only official theocracy. While there is a 290 member elected Parliament (the Islamic Consultative Assembly known as the “Majlis”), its legislation can be blocked by a 12-member constitutional Council of Guardians that answers only to the Spiritual Leader where the ultimate power resides. The Spiritual Leader (currently Ayatollah Ali Khamenei) can also dismiss the elected president and head of state (currently Mohammed Khatami, first elected in 1997 with 70% support and re-elected in 2001 with a strong “reformist” majority behind him).

As Ambassador Philip MacKinnon observed to the Committee in Tehran, Iran is a country of contradictions beyond the troubled surface appearance of a country of frustrated young people ruled by elderly male clerics. Though Iran is far from being a democracy, it is also in the throes of complex social and political dynamics that include participation by an assertive educated female population. Shi’ite Islam, it can be argued, is more open to modern interpretations than is traditional Sunni Islam in much of the Arab world. Yet Iran’s religious leaders have given it “a very conservative interpretation”, according to Professor Turgay of McGill University, who also made pointed reference to “intense corruption at the highest levels of the mullahs”.¹⁹⁹

The major question facing the country, a quarter century after the revolution, seems to be whether the current Islamic regime can reform itself sufficiently to cope with the enormous demographic and socio-economic stresses that have been building up²⁰⁰ and that were manifested in growing public disillusionment with the ability of their elected reform-minded parliamentary majority and government to turn things around.²⁰¹

Indeed, even before the latest confrontation between religious “conservatives” and political “reformers”, many feared that the turnout in the scheduled February 20, 2004 legislative elections would be dismally low²⁰², handing victory to the conservative establishment by default. Since the Committee’s visit, another undemocratic element of the Islamic constitution that has come into play, with conservative elements prevailing in a crucial standoff with reformers, is the power of the Council of Guardians to rule on the admissibility of candidates for elections.

On January 11, 2004, the Council disqualified 4,000 candidates including over 80 serving parliamentarians — among them prominent members of the Majlis with whom the Committee had met — from running in the February elections, an apparent effort to engineer a conservative legislative majority.²⁰³ Reform parliamentarians fought back, staging a sit-in at the Majlis and passing a bill on January 25 to overturn the disqualifications. That move was checked by the Guardian Council exercising its legislative veto, provoking reformers — including President Khatami’s brother, one of the disqualified MPs and leader of the largest reform group, the Islamic Participation Front — to call for the elections to be boycotted or suspended.²⁰⁴ The stakes were raised on February 1, 2004 when over 100 members of the Majlis submitted their resignations in protest., and again on February 15 when the reformist parliamentarians sent a harshly worded letter to Ayatollah Khamenei.²⁰⁵ Nobel winner Shirin Ebadi was among prominent Iranians joining the election boycott.

The Khatami government had raised the prospect it might resign if unable to secure reinstatement of disqualified MPs or postponement of the elections, decisions that rest with the Supreme Leader and Guardian Council.²⁰⁶ However, when Ayatollah Khamenei refused to delay the vote, the government appeared once again to back down and bow to flawed elections dominated by conservatives.²⁰⁷ More ominous is the observation of one report that: “Public interest in the electoral row remains muted. Nearly seven years after Khatami’s landslide election win, most Iranians have grown disillusioned with the reformists’ ability to overcome hard-line opposition to reform.”²⁰⁸ The rigging of the results of the February 20 elections to produce conservative control of the Majlis has further damaged the regime’s credibility domestically and internationally.²⁰⁹ Voter turnout was the worst since the revolution — barely 50% nationally and under 30% in Tehran.

Unless this political crisis — the worst in two decades coinciding with the revolution’s 25th anniversary — can be surmounted, the regime’s sustainability as well as credibility may be in the balance. Some argue that the demonstrable weakness of the internal political reform movement means the time has come to apply stronger external pressures. Such pressures seem to have had some effect late last year in the results of the tough stance taken by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the international community on Iran’s serious breaches of its non-proliferation obligations not to develop nuclear weapons. With the threat of the matter being referred to the UN Security Council, which could have imposed sanctions, Iran appeared to come clean in late October 2003, pledging to suspend illicit uranium-enrichment activities and to allow additional IAEA inspections to monitor and verify compliance.²¹⁰ However additional concerns about Iran’s covert nuclear activities surfaced in February 2004.²¹¹ Following further censure by the IAEA in March 2004, Iran postponed the presence of inspectors.²¹²

In addition to the democratic, human rights and nuclear concerns that Canada shares with other countries, a tragic matter that has gravely affected bilateral relations with Iran is the death while in detention in Tehran of Montreal photojournalist Zahra Kazemi, a holder of dual citizenship, on July 10, 2003. We will pursue the particulars in more detail below. Canada’s dissatisfaction with the Iranian government’s response to allegations of official complicity in Ms. Kazemi’s death, as well as demands for the return of her body to Canada, led to the withdrawal of Canada’s ambassador for several months. Following his return to Tehran, the Committee was still unsure of being able to obtain visas to enter Iran until just prior to departure, notwithstanding an earlier invitation issued by senior Iranian officials who had appeared before the Committee in 2002.²¹³ We hope that our encounters were able to provide timely encouragement to the courageous Iranians with whom we met who understood Canada’s concerns and whose continued reform efforts must be supported if Iran is to have a peaceful democratic future.

Witness Views in Iran

The Committee did not meet with religious hardliners whose power and influence we would certainly not discount. However, we were impressed with the articulateness and sincerity of the public officials with whom we did meet, both in their expressed desire for reforms to succeed and for increased dialogue with countries like Canada, and in their apparent determination to get to the bottom of the Kazemi affair. Our interlocutors were highly educated, some having studied at prestigious Western universities, and well versed in Western politics and foreign policies.

Dr. Mohsen Mirdamadi, Chair of the National Security and Foreign Relations Committee of the Majlis — and among the legislators disqualified from running for re-election in February 2004 — was one of several student leaders of the 1979 revolution with whom we met. He explained the revolutionary impulse of 1979 as one of overcoming despotism and affirming a “revolution of values” in order to create an Islamic form of republic. He rejected the proposition that religion, freedom and democracy cannot be compatibly combined. He agreed that Iran’s form of Islamic democracy must evolve, but liberalizing reform must not harm the beliefs of the people. The aim is to achieve a democratic interpretation that remains faithful to Islam.

Dr. Mirdamadi acknowledged that there are contradictory interpretations and practices in different Muslim countries and that the path to democracy is a “major challenge” for Islamic societies. He also allowed that the general public interest could prevail over certain religious obligations in the case of a conflict. Questioned about the role of the clerical Council of Guardians in blocking Majlis legislation (for example, over accession to CEDAW²¹⁴), Mirdamadi observed Iranian society to be in a period of transitional development. It can learn from European and Western experience in ways that are adapted to Iranian values and culture. He cautioned against simple comparisons.

The question was put: Will people be patient enough to wait for more democracy? Responding that “more are happy than unhappy” and that President Khatami symbolizes support for more reform, Dr. Mirdamadi admitted that if he were still a student he would probably want faster reforms. No doubt he feels both less happy and more strongly about the imperative of change now than when we met with him. In remarks broadcast live on state radio during the pre-election crisis between the Majlis and the Guardian Council, he declared: “They want to cover the ugly body of dictatorship with the beautiful dress of democracy. We had no choice but to resign.”²¹⁵

Another former prominent student leader from 1979, Dr. Massoumeh Ebtekar, a Vice-President of the Islamic Republic and Minister of the Environment, described the students’ primary motivation in one word as “dignity”. Iran’s national independence was at stake and international law could not have prevented a coup d’état that might have smashed the nascent Islamic revolution and the goal of an “Islamic democracy” for which people had given their lives. In her view the revolution established a “totally new Islamic paradigm” and an “Islamic republic” (not simply an Islamic state) approved by popular referendum. However there was no prior experience with this. What the reform process indicates is that the “democratic dimension” is still vibrant despite the many difficulties and challenges. She referred to a “vast spectrum of different viewpoints in Iranian society”. A democracy in which in fact the most powerful have the final say is not what is wanted. What is needed is an “ethical politics” that accepts diversity while respecting majority religious and cultural values. In terms of the “paradigm of women’s advancement” that means seeking equality of the sexes while respecting the central role of the family. Overall: “The reform process is facing quite difficult challenges in Iran, but it is moving forward. I’m quite optimistic that things will improve.” Describing a complicated interplay of religious and democratic factors, she admitted it was difficult to find a balance but argued that Iran could be an example if it succeeds. The world wants to see human rights improvements and “that is natural”.

Members of the Majlis Women’s Faction with whom the Committee met were notably active on human rights issues, including pressing for justice in the investigation of Zahra Kazemi’s murder while in official custody. Dr. Elaheh Koolaee (another of the disqualified legislators) observed that although women are a small number in the Majlis they are a big force in terms of activities and enjoy equal political rights (representation in the Majlis has risen from four to 13 members). She noted that over 60% of university students are women and that this is a society with a strong belief in higher education.²¹⁶ Questioned about the role of women in Iranian society, the effect of the Nobel prize being awarded to Shirin Ebadi, and her statement that Islam was not the problem in terms of discrimination but rather male-dominated cultures, the MPs responded that women have played a leading role in recent Iranian history — in the revolution, during the war with Iraq, and now within the reformist movement. Although there is much to overcome historically and debates over status continue, they see Islam as approving a fully active role for women in all spheres. It was noted that the number of women’s NGOs “has increased remarkably in the past six years”. There are new study centres and women are taking a higher profile. Ms. Ebadi was active in an NGO focused on the rights of children and can be seen as a role model. Her Nobel recognition is evidently a matter of pride for reformers who also see it as an expression of global interest in Iran’s pluralistic social evolution under Islam.

Discussions with Majlis members representing official ethnic and religious minority groups also reported some, if insufficient, progress on issues ranging from religious, educational and cultural rights to socio-economic discrimination. Minorities, it was claimed, are able to exercise political rights. There is a special parliamentary committee on religious minorities and it was also observed that Iran’s Ministry of Education employs 700 non-Muslims. Along with all of the Iranians we met, these spokespersons welcomed more opportunities for contacts and exchanges with Canadians. One who has family in Canada, MP Khosrow Dabestani representing the Zoroastrian community, introduced himself as heading a parliamentary friendship group with Canada. At the same time they hoped that in building bridges with the Muslim world Canada would separate itself from a “neo-conservative” U.S. worldview.

Not surprisingly, given Iran’s inclusion in President Bush’s “axis of evil” and an almost 25-year rupture in diplomatic relations with the United States, Iranians are looking for other approaches to and from the West. This surfaced strongly in a roundtable with members of the Institute for Political and International Studies, a research body linked to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Referring to the situation of post-war Iraq, Institute Director General Dr. Seyed Kazem Sajjadpour saw any notion of “dominoes of democracy” as being proven to be an unrealistic dream. At the same time, he was “very happy that Saddam is out … and that his anti-Iranian ideology has collapsed”. Iran had been first in line to recognize the Iraqi Governing Council and to seek cooperation with it, despite criticism from some Arab League states. The problem he saw was with the mentality of the Bush neo-conservatives (referring to the “axis of evil” label and phrases such as “creative chaos”). As he stated Iran’s national interest: “We are for a stable Iraq.” But Iran cannot support a foreign occupation. Stabilization of a very tough situation will not be possible without legitimacy.

On improving relations with the Muslim world, Canada was cautioned to “keep your distinction” because “too much identification with American foreign policy is not good”. Dr. Sajjadpour observed that even U.S. studies are critically examining the weaknesses of that policy and the need for addressing the hard issues, notably the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Another speaker and former ambassador argued that westerners should not come to Iran seeking the roots of the problem, as if Islam were one of those problems. Religious differences are often exaggerated. What has happened is that the political-ideological lens resulting from September 11 has led to a fixation on threatening elements within Islam. What Iranians remember, however, is the long history of U.S. support for dictators. (He recalled being lobbied by the U.S. at one point to support the Afghan Taliban regime.) They don’t believe that democracy can be brought like a gift of food to poor people. They “have no confidence” in U.S. good intentions. So: “I hope there are different approaches in the Western world.”

Roundtable participants observed that there is a range of democratic and authoritarian interpretations of Islam. The hardliners in the Muslim world and in the West are the ones that will take us to a “clash”, so it is the moderates on each side who must find peaceful accommodation. On their side, as MP Reza Yousefian²¹⁷ put it, there is “no conflict [of Islam] with democracy and human rights”. Dr. Sajjadpour, noting that Iran invented chess, urged understanding the complexities of its situation and avoiding dealing in black and white stereotypes. Iran, he stated, had the first democratic revolution in the Middle East (in 1906). That desire is in the people, he said, affirming that: “Democracy is a process for all.”

Despite these brave words, the Committee also heard more critical testimony on the situation of democracy and human rights in Iran and the risks faced by independent thinkers and defenders of those rights. Dr. Ayatollah Seyed Mostafa Mohaghegh Damad, High Commissioner of the Islamic Human Rights Commission of Iran and also a professor of Islamic law, observed that “the basic problem is the people don’t know their rights”. Therefore rights education and promotion are essential. People are used to obeying what they are told and seeing rights as something to be requested from government. Mr. Mohammad Hassan Ziaiefar, Secretary General of the Commission, pointed to a history of dictatorship to be overcome, referring to the saying of renowned Iranian film director Mohsen Makhmalbaf about there being a “dictatorship mentality” within individual Iranians. Working for democracy in an environment lacking precedents or preparation requires much to be done to inculcate democratic values and habits in the population. He used the metaphor of a “triangle” — among the established political leadership, outside political forces and the grassroots society, including better working relationships with NGOs — to indicate the process needed to meet Iran’s post-revolutionary challenges.

Mr. Ziaiefar was very candid that human rights, and even his own security, remain at risk in Iran: “I have to say honestly it is a bad situation.” Yet reformist movements are bringing attention to human rights violations and growing numbers of advocates will not give up the struggle. He remained confident that the “force of the people will prevail. … Nowadays human rights violators have been identified, isolated and rejected.” He added that “Democracy is not a gift to be presented to us from outside but has to happen from within the society”, then it becomes an unstoppable force. Dr. Damad was equally blunt: “Without democracy, we have no human rights at all.” (In that regard he referred to the recent holding of a human rights conference in Saudi Arabia as being “nonsense”, and also criticized the West for targeting Iran given that it permits much more open debate about Islam than does Saudi Arabia.) The good news is the people’s desire for democracy and for an end to corruption. His private view as a mullah was that a Muslim government is appropriate for a Muslim people, but it should not be an “ideological” religious government or a “theocracy” that negates human rights.

Dr. Damad observed that it is very important for Western governments to approach the issue of human rights in Iran from the standpoint of benefits for the people of the country. If Western motives are perceived to be only self-interested, based on security or anti-terrorism fears, Western interest will be seen as attacking not assisting. U.S. motives are not believed. How can the war in Iraq be about human rights when U.S. and French leaders knew about the human rights atrocities for years but did nothing? The point was made that all human rights must be defended to avoid any perception among Iranians that Canadians care only about the Kazemi case. In Damad’s view, the West needs a better understanding of different schools of Islamic thought on human rights. And “civil society in every Muslim country needs help.” But to be genuine this help must avoid a legacy of past double standards and any self-serving political agenda in order to build long-term supporting partnerships that appreciate Iranians’ situation and concerns.

The Case of Zahra Kazemi and Human Rights in Iran

Montreal-based Canadian-Iranian photojournalist Zahra Kazemi was arrested on June 23, 2003 while taking photographs outside Tehran’s Evin prison where many political prisoners have been held. She was using her Iranian passport (Iran like many countries does not recognize dual citizenship) and had Iranian press accreditation. Ms. Kazemi was detained without official charge in solitary confinement and during the next days suffered life-threatening physical injuries under interrogation, indicating that torture was used. After being transferred to a hospital on June 27, she died of these injuries on July 10 and was buried in Iran on July 22 despite her son’s wishes that her body be returned to Canada. A number of Canadian organizations called on the Government of Canada to take a series of actions pressing for answers from the Iranian government and seeking justice for the torture and murder of a Canadian citizen while in its custody.

At the time of the Committee’s meeting in Tehran in mid-October 2003, a trial was underway of an intelligence ministry official accused of beating Ms. Kazemi. Canada was requesting and subsequently granted a third seat in the courtroom for a non-governmental representative. However, there were strong suspicions of a high-level official cover-up despite the legal proceeding, which was being overseen by the chief prosecutor, Saeed Mortazavi, whom many believed to be the one actually responsible for Ms. Kazemi’s death.

In addition, as the Committee heard, there was intense activity in the Majlis to get the truth and see justice done. Even Iranians who saw this as an unfortunate individual case made a point of stating their shared concerns in that regard. Dr. Mirdamadi in the Committee’s first meeting noted that the circumstances of the murder had provoked one of the lengthiest debates in the Majlis. Among the most outspoken on the subject was Majlis Vice-Speaker Mohsen Armin (yet another of the disqualified MPs) with whom Members met separately and discussed the related work of the parliamentary “Article 90” commission that inquires into infringements of citizens’ constitutional and legal rights. MP Dr. Jamileh Kadivar of the Women’s Faction, who sits on that committee (and who ran in the February 20 elections), was able to provide the Committee with details of its investigation from the time of Ms. Kazemi’s arrest, indicating that a 19-page report had received majority approval although it had been held up from being “read out” in the Parliament by questionable procedural manoeuvres. She was hopeful these would be overcome, and indeed it was Dr. Kadivar who read out that highly critical report in the Majlis on October 28 that pointed the finger of culpability squarely at chief prosecutor Mortazavi and his office. Dr. Kadivar had indicated to us that Article 90 committee members would push for an independent trial of those responsible.²¹⁸ The heads of the human rights commission with whom we met also acknowledged the problems with Iran’s judicial structures and indicated that they were pushing for an independent commission of inquiry in order to restore the confidence of the Iranian people.

The Committee takes note of these efforts in good faith. We also appreciate that it is important to convey Canadian concerns in ways that support Iranians working for reforms from within the society and its political institutions. Nonetheless, the Government of Iran must be kept on notice and held accountable that justice for Zahra Kazemi and her family has still not been done or seen to be done. This matter awaits a satisfactory resolution. Indeed the trial proceeding was abruptly adjourned without explanation in October 2003. A second suspect was reported to have been detained in February 2004, but there was no official indication of any new trial.²¹⁹ As well, in February 2004, the gravity of the Kazemi case and what appears to be an official cover-up were also underlined in a highly critical report by United Nations Human Rights Commission special rapporteur Ambeyi Ligabo on rights abuses in Iran.²²⁰ Furthermore, developments surrounding the disputed February 2004 elections are extremely disturbing for the progress of human rights and democratic reforms within Iran as a whole.

Directions for Canadian Policy

The Committee recognizes the potential for an expanding relationship with Iran, the world’s most important Shi’a Muslim country. With some 2,000 Canadians living in Iran and 300,000 Iranian Canadians resident in Canada, this is an issue of direct interest to many Canadians. Canadians as a whole were outraged by the murder of Zahra Kazemi. But Canadians also responded generously to the plight of victims of the devastating late December earthquake in Bam in southeastern Iran. The Committee takes note of the January 23, 2004 announcement by International Cooperation Minister Aileen Carroll — who was a committee member during our meetings in Tehran — that Canadian official assistance to Iran in the wake of this disaster will rise to over $1.5 million.

The Committee appreciates what we were told about Iranians’ positive perception of Canada, the interest in pursuing political and cultural dialogue, the demand for student visas to Canada and more educational exchanges, and even the possibility of developing economic and trade relations as a springboard to the markets of the Middle East. But much will depend on Iran’s good faith in following through on its nuclear non-proliferation commitments, its dissociation from any support for Islamist terrorism, and on the capacity of the Iranian authorities to achieve major legal and political reforms. Recent events do not augur well in regard to the latter.

The Committee expresses deep concern at the disqualification of reform-minded Iranian parliamentarians who were demanding a fair and democratic electoral process. The Committee also applauds Canada’s leadership at the United Nations in pressing concerns about human rights conditions in Iran.²²¹ These efforts should be pursued even more vigorously in light of the recent critical findings of the UN Human Rights Commission’s special rapporteur on Iran.

The International Crisis Group report cited earlier made the point that: “Many Iranians now place significant hope in vigorous external endeavours to press Iran on human rights and political reform … Iranians also make clear, however, that expanded people-to-people contacts and economic exchanges would help enlarge personal freedoms”. In other words, simply isolating or punishing Iran is unlikely to be an effective policy approach. As the ICG report concludes:

The depth of popular disaffection and the contradiction at the heart of the Iranian regime are such that its long-term sustainability in its present form is in serious doubt. Greater economic and cultural contacts with the outside world, combined with continued international insistence on seeing political reform and more respect for human rights, will strengthen Iran’s burgeoning civil society not weaken it, and dilute the conservatives’ hold on power rather than fortify it.²²²

Noah Feldman, the American expert on Islamic democracy who testified after our meetings in Iran, offered an assessment that broadly agrees with the above, though without underestimating the uncertainties and the challenges ahead for both Iran and its partners.

With respect to Iran, somebody said the people are the right reason for hope there, and roughly speaking, I agree with that. On two different occasions 70% of the people voted for the only reformer on the ballot available to them to vote for, and they voted overwhelmingly for a legislature that expressed reform. … those elections seem not to have paid off in practice, and Iranians are very frustrated by that reality. Free speech has not been there; the opportunity for the elected leaders to govern has not been there. The situation for Iranians now is that many of them want change, but they have seen a violent revolution in the recent past. They know the costs to a society of a violent revolution: they know they will lose a generation, they know many people will die unnecessarily, and they’re nervous about unleashing that. What we can do is communicate as clearly as possible to the Iranians, whether it’s by engaging their government, which is sometimes the right way to do this, or by disengaging from them, which is also sometimes the right way to do it, that we support the aspiration of those 70% of the Iranian people who clearly want change. I think that’s the best way we can help there, and I believe those people will eventually prevail. But it’s going to take time, and there isn’t an obvious route one can point to immediately right now.²²³

In short, this is a crucial testing moment in relations with Iran that calls for active watchful and skilful diplomacy by Canada.

RECOMMENDATION 6

Canada should strongly protest the February 2004 electoral process that disqualified serving parliamentarians and appeal to Iran to conduct open and fair democratic elections. Canada should also continue to work closely with other countries in multilateral forums, and with democratic forces inside Iran, including where still possible through parliamentary and political channels, to press for improvements in Iran’s human rights performance.

RECOMMENDATION 7

The Government of Canada should vigorously continue its efforts to achieve a full accounting from the Government of Iran for the illegal detention, torture and murder of Canadian journalist Zahra Kazemi, and should pursue all avenues of redress that will result in a just and satisfactory resolution.

RECOMMENDATION 8

Canada should at the same time explore ways to increase constructive contacts with Iranian civil society through educational, cultural and other exchanges, private sector and NGO links.

RECOMMENDATION 9

Canada should continue to put pressure on Iran to abide fully by its obligations under the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty, and specifically, to implement the undertakings made to the International Atomic Energy Agency following Iran’s admission of non-compliance in October 2003.

Saudi Arabia

Saudi Arabia is in the throes of a crisis. The economy cannot keep pace with population growth, the welfare state is rapidly deteriorating, and regional and sectarian resentments are rising to the fore. These problems have been exacerbated by an upsurge in radical Islamic activism. Many agree that the Saudi political system must somehow evolve, but a profound cultural schizophrenia prevents the elite from agreeing on the specifics of reform.

– Michael Scott Doran, “The Saudi Paradox”²²⁴

The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is not only the most important and populous country of the Arabian peninsula, it also occupies what Canada’s ambassador Roderick Bell referred to as “the epicentre of Islam”. The reigning monarch King Fahd bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud also holds the title of “Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques” (of Makkah and Madinah). Saudi society is probably more shaped by strict adherence to the Muslim faith than any other country in the Arab and Muslim world. Everything is judged in religious terms and there are also “religious police” to enforce public practice. Although there is a significant Shi’a minority (approximately 10%), the great majority of Saudi Arabia’s 24 million people follow Sunni Islam; moreover, the dominant ideology that infuses the Saudi religious and political establishment adheres to a puritanical school of Sunni Islam known as “Wahhabism”.²²⁵ As Michael Doran puts it succinctly: “Wahhabism is the foundation of an entire political system, and everyone with a stake in the status quo can be expected to rally around it when push comes to shove”.²²⁶

The present Saudi Arabian state is not much more than 70 years old. Following the dissolution of the Ottoman empire, a tribal dynastic leader known as Ibn Saud gradually gained control of most of the Arabian peninsula. The Kingdom was established in 1932 (oil was discovered a few years later in 1938) and the “House of Saud” — today’s royal family numbering some 7,000 princes and growing — has ruled ever since. In the consolidation of the monarchy, the Saud family entered into an alliance with Wahhabism, a political-religious marriage of convenience that, as noted above, prevails to the present day but also circumscribes the regime’s ability to adapt to pressures for change.²²⁷

These pressures are escalating and the strains showing, especially in the wake of September 11, 2001 — when 15 of the 19 hijackers were identified as Saudi citizens — and even more since the May and November 2003 terrorist attacks inside Saudi Arabia itself that have clearly targeted the regime.²²⁸ The May 12 bombings in the capital of Riyadh were a wake-up call that was impossible for Saudi authorities to ignore and that have galvanized a serious domestic counter-terrorism effort. The country is also confronting an existential dilemma in that political, intellectual and socio-cultural development has not kept pace with petroleum-fuelled economic growth.²²⁹ A conflicted unequal and undemocratic society, tied to both traditional religion and Western money and technologies, is being pulled simultaneously both forward by the purveyors of a cell-phone consumer culture²³⁰ and backward by the staunch defenders of Wahhabist virtue.

Saudi Arabia makes no pretence of being a democracy. There are no elections of any kind. But, notwithstanding the detention of several prominent reform proponents in March 2004,²³¹ there have been signs, albeit small and hesitant, of a social and political evolution taking place under stress. These include:

	•	Consideration of the succession and the need for generational changes within the leadership gerontocracy;
	•	Acknowledging the great social demographic problem of young people entering the labour force in a climate of diminishing average per capita incomes, as well as overcoming the dependency on foreign workers;232
	•	Reforming education including religious education;233
	•	Saudi women acquiring identity cards and becoming an economic if not yet political force (for example, there are 4,000 businesswomen in Jeddah with bank accounts of $11.5 billion);234
	•	The existence of increasingly vocal press criticism235 and the holding of a recent human rights conference;236
	•	Less visible public presence of the religious police (“mutaween”) since the terrorist attacks of May 12, 2003;
	•	The first public demonstration seen in many years in October 2003 (though many were arrested);
	•	Trial balloons raising the possibility of local elections, perhaps eventually to the Kingdom’s Consultative Council, the 120-member all-male “Majlis Ash Shura”;
	•	An evolution in the make-up of the Shura Council towards more secular educated elites (currently only 10% have degrees in religious studies; 65% have PhDs or MDs and 87% have attended Western universities).

Notwithstanding these tentative moves, Saudi Arabia continues to labour under an increasingly negative image in the West, not only in the popular media but also in more academic publications. Saudi Arabia’s social-religious conservatism and extreme restrictions on civil rights, for women in particular, make it an easy target. More ominously, the kingdom is accused of being a danger to rather than a friendly ally of Western countries. A frequent charge is that Saudi oil money has been used to export Wahhabism worldwide and in effect to aid the very Islamist political militancy that not only threatens non-Muslim “infidels” but could perversely bring about the downfall of the Wahhabist regime itself.²³⁷

The Committee heard claims of this sort in testimony prior to its visit to Saudi Arabia. For example, Salim Mansur contended that “the money that has come out of Saudi Arabia and has gone to the mosques has carried the bacillus of what I call the neo-fascist variant that has grown up in the Muslim world and has gone through the mosque system. … Right across Canada the mosque imams are all funded by Saudi Arabia”.²³⁸ Üner Turgay stated that Saudi Arabia “in the last twenty years has been … pouring millions and billions of dollars into spreading Wahhabi Islam all across the country, building hundreds and hundreds of mosques, and sending thousands and thousands of brochures and information about Wahhabi. They have certainly affected the interpretation of Islam from one corner of the world to the other”.²³⁹

As for prospects for real liberalizing and democratizing “regime change” within Saudi Arabia, asked about this after the Committee’s return from meetings in Saudi Arabia, Noah Feldman responded that

the Saudis themselves know they need good governance, but they will only respond with more democratization if we’re rather specific in saying “Do it however you want, but begin to devolve power to the people”.  … The Saudi royal family’s only hope for maintaining itself as a constitutional monarchy in the long run, rather than as a relic that eventually goes the way of other uncompromising monarchies of the region, like that of the Shah of Iran for example, is to realize that they need to create a direct link between themselves and their citizens that is not mediated through the opinions of the clerics. As long as it goes from the royal family to the clerics down to the people, the royal family will be hamstrung; they won’t be able to improve things.²⁴⁰

Dr. Feldman also made the point that a government with the kind of oil wealth that Saudi Arabia possesses is not “going to democratize purely on the basis of internal pressures” because it will “always be able to buy off” its opponents. Recent indications of small openings to reform “have more to do with responding to pressure from the outside. And that kind of pressure is best delivered behind closed doors, frankly, not by bombastic hand banging.”²⁴¹

For Canada, the question of how to move Saudi Arabia towards a feasible path of political and human rights reforms has been gravely complicated, as in the case of Iran, by bilateral tensions over the treatment of a Canadian citizen in detention. Indeed the death sentence imposed on William Sampson (who appeared before the Committee on the same day as Dr. Feldman) and Mr. Sampson’s repeated allegations of torture against the Saudi authorities have probably received more Canadian media attention in the past several years than any other aspect of Canada’s relations with the Arab and Muslim world. We will return to this matter in more detail below. At this point what is important to note is that, notwithstanding Mr. Sampson’s release from a Saudi prison in early August 2003, Canada’s ability to engage Saudi Arabia in a constructive dialogue, and vice versa, will be impeded as long as there are unresolved allegations of injustice and mistreatment hanging over the case.

Witness Views in Saudi Arabia

The Committee began its meetings in the important port of Jeddah, on the Red Sea near the holy city of Makkah, at the headquarters of the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC). The timing was propitious coming just after the OIC’s 10th Summit held in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.²⁴² Discussions with Assistant Secretary General for Political Affairs, Ambassador Ezzat Mufti, Senior Advisor to the Secretary General, Ambassador Sa’aduddin Al Tayeb and other senior officials provided an opportunity to exchange views on current international problems affecting Muslim nations. Topping their list of concerns were the impacts of terrorism, the post-war occupation of Iraq, and of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict — which, not surprisingly, Ambassador Mufti largely blamed on the policies of the current Israeli government for “making peace unreachable”. Ambassador Mufti argued that the OIC has had a clear position against terrorism — which violates Islam’s precepts — and is calling for a conference to define the meaning of terrorism. He was careful, however, to distinguish that from justified Palestinian national resistance to occupation. He also criticized negative press treatment of Islam in the West — a familiar refrain in other meetings as well — and what he considered were wrongful accusations associating “Muslim charitable foundations” with terrorism. On Iraq, he underlined the OIC’s unanimous opposition to the war and to any subsequent military participation by a member country (i.e., Turkey).

On a more positive note, Ambassador Mufti emphasized the OIC’s desire to play a broader international role in the advancement of relations among Muslim nations and with other countries in the pursuit of dialogue goals. He indicated that Canada is “respected as fair-minded by OIC members”, appreciated for its moderate “balanced and farsighted” positions, and also for its potential role as a neighbour of the United States. He urged that ideas be explored for further constructive exchanges or working groups on relations with the Muslim world.

In Jeddah, the Committee was also able to meet with Saudi businesswomen from the Jeddah Chamber of Commerce, and separately with prominent male members of the business community. The group of eight women was led by Chamber Deputy Secretary General Fatin Bandaggi, Founder and Director of the Saudi Businesswomen Centre.²⁴³ Women continue to face many restrictions in all walks of life including in doing business, and a growing debate over reforms questions whether these constraints are the result of Islamic duties or of Saudi culture and traditions.²⁴⁴ In that regard, these women spoke of a need “to differentiate between traditions and religion”, noting the big differences among Islamic societies and that Islam accords full rights to both sexes. They saw Saudi women as being “on the move”, getting involved in the local development committee for the first time, etc. Still their remarks reflected some ambivalence on next steps. “We need so much education … [but] we’re not after anything to do with politics”, one said. They would welcome representation in the “Shura” (the appointed advisory council to the King) but this is not a current priority.

An American expatriate member and Muslim convert, Ms. Maria Arena, a consultant and lecturer in communications, spoke of arriving here as a Muslim but without any of the Arabian “cultural baggage”. She stated that for her wearing the headscarf was a “liberating” personal decision even if others might find that strange. Islam in her understanding has given rights to women and what is needed is for them to know and exercise those rights. In Saudi Arabia she had observed “a very vibrant women’s society below the surface” and urged outsiders not to ignore that reality. Another participant stated that “women are more outspoken than men in the media” and indicated a continuing intention to push for reforms when she commented: “Don’t wait for it to happen. Make it happen.”

Other members worried about the negative external perceptions of Saudi society. And after emphasizing the importance of Islam’s “culture of ethics and heritage”, Mrs. Bandaggi stated provocatively: “In my opinion, women suffer more in the west than in the east.” But she and the others did acknowledge a number of challenges facing women in business — “we have a lot of barriers”. They welcomed signs of generational change, of professions opening up to women and other signals of opening up, such as women becoming present in annual economic forums and increasingly speaking and lobbying on their own behalf. Women, they argued need to protest the exploitation of Islam in throwing up impediments to their expanded participation. In overcoming backward social or tribal practices it is “very important to educate women first on their rights under Islam.”

The men’s business group included prominent community leaders, often with ties to North America (both educational and business), and some who have been outspoken in the Saudi media arguing against the influence of religious radicalism and in favour of liberalizing reforms. In conversations they also praised the image of Canada as having benefited from the decision to stay out of the Iraq war, and encouraged a larger Canadian presence and role differentiated from that of the U.S., stressing the desirability for more exchanges in the educational and professional fields. Mr. Amr Khashoggi, Chairman and CEO of Amkest Group, put it that Canada comes off well compared to the U.S. “bull in a china shop” approach, stating “there is more room now for Canadian companies to do business here. It’s a window of opportunity for Canada.”

Participants were concerned that when terrorists hijack religion, the whole society not be punished. They clearly resented “clash” ideologies and negative media stereotypes as well as mistrusting American policies and motives. Fahed Almugairin, Chairman of Saudi Masar (a high-tech marketing company), who had lived some years in the U.S., lamented that: “There’s a new empire now saying we want to democratize the world.” While in his view most Muslims are very tolerant, he was less optimistic now than 10 years ago. Osama El Khereiji, a Certified Public Accountant with Polaris International (and a son studying at Trent University), was concerned about the impression left by double standards of treatment (e.g., the denial or rights to detainees at Guantanamo) — “without equal justice … Bin Laden is a phenomenon that will continue to happen”. In his view, “Muslims have been the major victims of 9/11.” Yes, there may be a problem in the mosques, but there are hundreds of thousands of mosques. Why target Saudi Arabia but ignore U.S. double standards? He also saw the “U.S. mental block” on the Israel-Palestine conflict as being “a driver of 9/11”. To move forward we need to “find a way to increase exchanges”, to resist increasing security barriers closing these avenues, and to strengthen the UN system rather than relying on the strongest state.

The group readily acknowledged their country’s own internal challenges. The problem now, stated Mr. Khashoggi, is with the ‘people-ware’: “We didn’t have much chance to develop the human software … we are cognizant of the issues and want to develop the solutions, but these must be home-grown and at a pace that the population can accept” (suggesting that the people may be more conservative than their leaders). Fahed Almugairin also referred to “a lot of poverty that we have been closing our eyes to” and the need to “fight extremism among ourselves by tackling these issues”. Participants agreed that the terrorist attacks involving Saudis were a wake-up call for a society that had been too lenient with violent expressions of Islamism. They also worried about differences being exaggerated by extremists on all sides. In Khashoggi’s words: “Do we have the ability to respect each other’s differences?”

In the capital of Riyadh, the Committee held several high-level meetings with members of the Majlis Ash Shura’s Committees on Foreign Affairs and Islamic Affairs, the Shura Council’s Chairman, and with Minister of Foreign Affairs Prince Saud Al-Faisal. Dr. Saleh Al-Malik explained the Council’s growth in numbers and evolution in functions and powers since its 1994 establishment.²⁴⁵ Reform was in the air during our visit, including the possibility of partial election of Majlis members, giving it increased powers over state finances, appointing women members, and televising some debates.

Majlis members were anxious to move on from the recent bilateral difficulties caused by the Sampson case (see below) and to pursue cooperation with Canada. Canada was seen as having clean hands compared to some of the big nations. And as put by the Dr. Abdullah Bin Saleh Al-Obeid (a former Secretary General of the Islamic World League): “We do highly appreciate your independent stands on Arab and international issues”. Like the business people, they were also preoccupied by the response to terrorism, from which Dr. Al-Obeid observed that Saudi Arabia has suffered “more than any other country”. He and others rejected any association of Saudi terrorists with Islam or the regime. The September 11 hijackers “were against the Kingdom before they were against international law … the King cannot be held responsible for what they did”. Not only was 9/11 “a disaster for everyone”, stated Dr. Abdul Aziz Bin Ibrahim Al-Faiz, “We were a target of a media campaign that reminded me of the darkest days of the Cold War.” If Saudis are accused of being supporters of terrorism when they are its victims, that mistake will be Bin Laden’s success, leading to a weakening of ties with the West that will make matters more insecure and for which we will all pay. Rather than focusing blame on some general stereotype of Saudi Islam, outsiders should listen to what the proper spokespersons for the Muslim majority are saying. At the same time, there was acknowledgement that the country is going through tremendous changes and economic reforms, so managing internal tensions is as important as outside perceptions.

The theme of rebuilding relations with Canada, including through more parliamentary exchanges, and working together to overcome voices of extremism, including religious extremism, was continued in the meeting with Shura Council Chairman Dr. Salih Bin Abdullah Bin Hemaid.²⁴⁶ The Committee’s next meeting with Foreign Minister Prince Al-Faisal confirmed the Saudi government’s interest in restoring and expanding relations. He also made a point about the importance of “truth between friends — Your true friend is the person who tells you the truth”.

Prince Saud observed that terrorism has been a preoccupying subject for Saudi Arabia in a region that has been wracked by instability for the past five or six decades. The Middle East must move beyond an endless succession of conflicts, as Europe has managed to do. However, the area is now rife with extremism, and hopes for justice for the Palestinians keep being dashed (mentioning the latest Israeli military incursion into the West Bank). Saudi Arabia has been warning of the results, and as yesterday’s “inefficient” terrorists have been replaced by more “professional terrorists”. “It’s not surprising that the seeds of terrorism have grown in the Middle East. … We’re waging a domestic war on terrorism of immense proportions; all of which is going on while we’re experiencing major socio-economic transformation.”

According to Prince Saud, the root causes of terrorism in Saudi Arabia are not to be found in its “Wahhabi” doctrines but in “the lack of resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian question” and the influence of “militaristic quasi-religious sects”. The Saudi government “has been very clear in its negating of the religious basis of the radicals.” He referred to a speech by Crown Prince Abdullah in Pakistan negating this “deviant part of Islam”. In Prince Saud’s words, “it’s a tough fight that is our duty. … Every day we’re catching cells and finding arms caches”. In that regard, he appealed for closer cooperation with Canada and the international community. In particular, he would like to see a better exchange of “raw information” among intelligence agencies, and on a timely basis before major terrorist incidents happen.

Turning to the situation in postwar Iraq, Prince Saud stressed the importance of establishing civilian control as soon as possible and going after the real criminals. Rejecting all Baathists (functionaries from the old regime) will leave too few local people to run the state. Invasion and occupation cannot by themselves establish a better society; a new Iraq must be built on law and new leadership, otherwise there will be a reversion to chaos or dictatorship.

More generally, Prince Saud argued that the West should focus on promoting “good governance” in the region rather than trying to prescribe some ideal form of “democracy”, adding: “Separation of church and state … means nothing here.” In his view, Saudi Arabia has to develop its own forms of best governance (observing that there were fewer restrictions before Saudi Arabia became a nation-state and perhaps “we have to retrieve [that] participation”). Reform will have to take into account social sensitivities that remain. He took the example of the introduction of women diplomats into the foreign ministry, to which radicals had reacted by using their Internet Web sites to denounce the ministry as a “den of sin”. Dress codes exist for men as well as for women. The watershed in terms of women’s rights will be reached through education, and it is women themselves who will fight for their rights. However, he cautioned that Saudi society is “not experimental” in nature and that in light of popular fears of the permissive effects of modernization, expanding women’s participation needs to be done in ways that maintain “social cohesion”. Indeed, it is “a strange phenomenon” that, in his assessment, a majority of Saudi men would vote to give women the vote, whereas a majority of women would vote against doing so.

On strengthening bilateral ties with Canada, Prince Saud stressed that: “Students from Saudi Arabia are now pouring into Canada where they find comfort and welcome” (3,000 in the medical field alone). This reinforced the message of other Saudi interlocutors on the importance they attach to educational access and exchanges in building the relationship.

The issues of strengthening educational, inter-cultural and inter-faith relations were also highlighted in subsequent meetings with Dr. Hamid Bin Ahmad Al-Rifaie²⁴⁷, President of the International Islamic Forum for Dialogue and Assistant Secretary General of the World Muslim Congress, and with academics from King Saud University and Imam Muhammed Bin Saud Islamic University. Dr. Al-Rifaie concentrated on promoting open dialogue based both on what is common among cultures as well as an acceptance of diverse cultural and political outlooks. His argument resisted accepting a Western form of secularization as necessary to develop an Islamic form of liberalism and democracy which would still respect the faith element that evidently remains part of the Saudi view of the political contract between government and citizens.

The university-based academics were remarkably candid about the challenges of educational, liberalizing and democratizing reforms in their country. Some openly admitted the need “to change the political map”, as one put it, observing that religious power increases when political power is seen to weaken. Other “time bombs” included the threats posed by tribal overlords and religious radicals. While acknowledging the need for reforms to Saudi institutions, including religious and educational institutions, they also appealed for Canadian help in counteracting and moving beyond media stereotypes that portray Saudi Arabia as a closed static society when in fact it is experiencing rapid change. Dr. Mishary Al-Muairi, a Professor of Mass Communications at King Saud University observed the advances in women’s education, the huge numbers of Saudi students abroad, and an “interpenetration of media growing faster than anywhere else in the world”. In supporting reform he advised — “Don’t leave it all to the politicians … encourage many delegations to come to Saudi universities from Canada to help foster understanding.”

Other participants reinforced an appeal to expand academic exchanges and other forms of contact taking into account the strategic place of Saudi Arabia within Islam. As one put it: “It is very important that our friends in the West help us in our battle.” Failing to understand and work with the Muslim majority would be to play into the hands of the radicals. And as another participant noted: “Western countries cannot alone win the battle against terrorism.” Of course Saudi Arabia has internal problems. Reference was made to over 1,000 imams having been removed for extremist sympathies. But these are only a small minority. (Some radical clerics have also recanted extremist views. At the climax of the latest hajj pilgrimage in early 2004, the Kingdom’s foremost religious leader, Grand Mufti Sheik Abdul Aziz al-Sheik, also strongly denounced terrorism while defending Wahhabism.²⁴⁸)

A common view among the Committee’s interlocutors was that there is also a need for better outside understanding of Saudi realities. As Dr. Abdulla Al-Askar deftly turned the tables in responding to a suggestion about creating a centre for Western studies in the Kingdom — “We know a lot more about Canada than the average Canadian knows about Saudi Arabia.” That said, it is clear that Saudi professionals are keen to pursue further educational contacts. And in that regard, the facilitation of student visas has emerged as an important issue in the wake of 9/11, with Canada perceived as being more friendly than its neighbour to Saudi students. In the words of Dr. Khalil Al-Khalil: “We don’t want the U.S. security syndrome to be transferred to Canada.”

The Case of William Sampson and Human Rights in Saudi Arabia

William Sampson, one of thousands of Canadians working in Saudi Arabia, was arrested in December 2000 and charged with conspiring in the murder of a British man. In early 2001 a confession was shown on Saudi television that Mr. Sampson alleges was extracted after severe torture. Mr. Sampson was subsequently found guilt of the crime which carries a death sentence that is carried out in Saudi Arabia by public beheading. Protesting the injustice of the conviction and his ongoing mistreatment in prison, Mr. Sampson refused cooperation with the Saudi authorities until his sudden release on August 7, 2003 along with several other convicted prisoners in the case. During the period of his incarceration there were Canadian efforts made to intercede on his behalf — including by a member of this Committee and by the Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Foreign Affairs with special emphasis on Canadians abroad. Although Mr. Sampson has expressed gratitude to Canadian politicians who took up his cause, he has alleged that Canadian officials failed to offer adequate support to him and his family during the time of his prison ordeal. He repeated in detail these allegations and demands for redress in the course of dramatic testimony before the Committee following our return from Saudi Arabia.²⁴⁹

During our meetings in Jeddah and Riyadh we found little willingness to criticize Mr. Sampson’s conviction. (However one interlocutor early on did express the hope that “sometimes a good can come out of evil”, suggesting that the question of Mr. Sampson’s individual treatment as a foreign national might help to bring broader attention to the rights and conditions of prisoners in Saudi Arabia.) Saudi political officials regretted the postponement of scheduled bilateral visits due to upset (on their part) over the Sampson controversy and the negative publicity generated in Canada by his allegations of wrongful conviction and torture. However there was no indication of a willingness to accept that those allegations might have merit.

In the course of the Committee’s meeting with the Chairman and other members of the Shura Council it was apparent that the Saudi view continues to be that Mr. Sampson was found guilty of murder according to their judicial procedures and it would not have been proper to interfere with those. They had sought to cooperate with Canadian authorities; however, any remedy for Mr. Sampson under their Islamic justice system was dependent on seeking an agreement with the British family of the murdered man (which was key to his eventual release). They claimed that Mr. Sampson showed no appreciation for efforts made on his behalf and was non-cooperative. It was clear that his subsequent allegations were strongly resented. In their eyes, Mr. Sampson’s guilty verdict was a result of a due process of law and Saudi Arabia has been unfairly maligned. As was stated: “We believe he was used by Canadian politicians and media to distort the image of the Kingdom”.

It is to state the obvious that repair to the bilateral relationship will remain a challenge until justice is seen to be done in the matter of Mr. Sampson. The Committee takes the view that the Saudi government has a responsibility to thoroughly investigate and respond to the extremely serious allegations of denial of basic rights and use of torture. In that regard, the Canadian government should also take every opportunity to remind the Saudi authorities of that responsibility as part of their domestic and international legal obligations, including under the Convention Against Torture. Ratifying human rights treaties is not enough; they must be adhered to in practice.

We are not calling for a counterproductive confrontational approach to the issue of Saudi Arabia’s respect for the human rights of a Canadian citizen and for human rights more generally. Justice for Mr. Sampson and progress on human rights reforms should be presented as of benefit to all parties. At the same time, Canada’s position must be clear in standing on the side of justice and human rights. In February 2004, Mr. Sampson and six British men who were detained with him in Saudi Arabia announced a civil suit in the British courts seeking damages and compensation from Saudi Arabia for the torture they allege they suffered.²⁵⁰ If Mr. Sampson and his family were to consider pursuing a possible additional option of launching a legal complaint within Saudi Arabia, the Canadian government should fully support such an undertaking.

Directions for Canadian Policy

As indicated by the troubling case of Mr. Sampson and its lingering aftermath, moving Canada’s relations with Saudi Arabia to a more constructive and harmonious plane will take effective diplomacy and actions in good faith. We also recognize the importance of Saudi Arabia in the Muslim world and as country with which Canada and thousands of Canadians have significant ties. There are mutual interests as well as irritants. There is a need for more cooperation in the common struggle against terrorism. There is a need to engage Saudi Arabians on the reform challenges — educational, socio-economic, legal and political — that many Saudis themselves recognize are overdue, but that confront their institutions with real difficulties in being able to successfully manage peaceful transitions. There is a need for Saudi Arabia to participate in international dialogues on the larger issues of relations with the Muslim world raised in this report. There is a need for a facilitation of the kinds of learning and cultural exchanges that we must hope will contribute to a better, more secure, future for the citizens of both our countries.

RECOMMENDATION 10

The Government of Canada should urge Saudi Arabia to address the sources of terrorism and religious extremism within its borders, and offer Canada’s cooperation in common efforts to combat such terrorism and extremism. The Government should also actively pursue opportunities to promote dialogue and to build ties with Saudi Arabia.  In particular, Canada should:

	•	Strongly encourage changes in the direction of human rights, democratic, and educational reforms as being in Saudi Arabia’s interest;
	•	Explore increased intellectual, educational and cultural as well as political exchanges.

RECOMMENDATION 11

The Government of Canada should at the same time continue to impress upon the Government of Saudi Arabia the need for it to conduct a full investigation of the allegations of miscarriage of justice and torture made by Canadian citizen William Sampson, and the need for Saudi Arabia to comply fully with its international human rights obligations. Until justice is done, and seen to be done, bilateral relations will not be able to develop as constructively as we believe is in the mutual interest of both countries.

Egypt

With 75 million people, the vast majority of whom are Sunni Muslims, Egypt is the most populous country in the Middle East and North Africa. As a relatively poor country, Egypt is challenged to provide for the needs of a growing young population. It is also the inheritor of one of the greatest and oldest of human civilizations as well as being a renowned repository of learning and culture within the Arab and Muslim world.

Modern Egypt is burdened by the legacies of a “pharaonic”, colonial, and state-led Arab nationalist past.²⁵¹ And although Egypt was the first Arab state to make peace with Israel, this “cold peace” remains controversial. Indeed its author President Anwar al-Sadat was assassinated in 1981 and Islamist radicals have used terror tactics in their struggles against an authoritarian, repressive state. An emergency law curbing civil rights has been in place for decades. Political power is highly concentrated in the hands of President Hosni Mubarak, in office since taking over from Sadat in 1981. Egypt has in effect a one-party political system dominated by the governing National Democratic Party that took 388 of the 444 elected seats in the People’s Assembly in November 2000 elections.²⁵² However, a potential succession crisis looms in the midst of widespread scepticism about the capacity of the system to undertake meaningful internal political reforms.²⁵³

The “Egyptian model” was described by former Canadian ambassador Michael Bell as “no independent elections, little pluralism. There’s a Parliament, there are elections, but those elections are largely controlled. A small number of opposition members are elected, and the press has some elements of freedom so you can say here’s a criticism of the government for this or that policy, but it’s very strictly curtailed.”²⁵⁴ There is a large state security system and thousands of political prisoners. Mr. Bell cited the high-profile case of human rights and democracy activist Saad Ibrahim, “an Egyptian intellectual imprisoned by the legal authorities of the Mubarak regime because he accepted money from the United States to run his NGO.” While not as bad as Saddam Hussein’s Iraq where Ibrahim would have been killed, the effect is: “To draw a red line and say that these civil society reformers cannot go beyond a certain point, and if they do go beyond a certain point in fostering pluralism, they will pay a price.”²⁵⁵

A major question overhanging the subject of Egyptian political reform is whether it can ultimately accommodate a growing socially based Islamic opposition that feeds off popular anger at the failings of the post-Nasserist secular state. The regime’s attempts to control religious influence and to suppress religious radicalism may contain such opposition in the short run but do not answer rising demands for democratic and social reforms. The potentially moderating role of the Muslim Brotherhood, that originated in Egypt in the 1920s and has spread throughout the Arab Muslim world, bears watching in that regard. In recent years the Brotherhood has eschewed political violence and sought to work within the political system (even if in the process perhaps losing some ground in Egypt to more radical Islamist groups such as the Al-Gama’at Al-Islamiyyah, responsible for the terrorist attacks on foreign tourists at Luxor in November 1997).²⁵⁶ What appears to be a genuine transformation is significant given the Brotherhood’s ideological influence throughout the Muslim world as indicated to the Committee by Mazen Chouab of the National Council on Canada-Arab Relations.²⁵⁷ Yet in Egypt, although the Brotherhood is in effect the largest opposition grouping in the People’s Assembly, its elected parliamentary members must sit as independents because the Brotherhood is still not a legally recognized party.

Even as Arab autocracies like Egypt continue to try to put a lid on democratic and Islamic challenges to their rule, a broader point is that they are losing the battle for people’s hearts and minds. Michael Bell outlined the situation with reference to Egypt in a way that deserves citing at length.

What the Islamic movements have done — the Muslim Brotherhood, for instance, in Egypt — is offer welfare services, education, health care, … more effectively and in a more timely way than the government can. So it’s gaining adherents by its effectiveness. It doesn’t suffer from sclerosis. That effectiveness is very important in getting people’s loyalties.

Middle East regimes would be happy to be rid of the Muslim Brotherhood if they could, even if they’re tolerated now … because they object to those organizations as much as they do to Saad Eddin Ibrahim or so-called leftists or reformists of a secular type. However, the Brotherhood has religion on its side. No government in the Middle East can move radically against a movement that identifies itself with Islam. The irony is that you then have radical movements that wants to replace the regime — of course, they may alter their language, saying they’re only for democracy, etc. — and a government that’s afraid to crack down on them because of their religious affiliation.

So the only legitimate means of opposition is through these movements. If you join a secular movement, if you form an organization to protect the trees in your neighbourhood, you’ll be shut down. Islamic organizations cannot be shut down in the same way because of their resonance, because of their identification with Muslims.²⁵⁸

Some observers perceive an increasing “Islamization” of Egyptian society, as well as an influence of Wahhabist Islam from neighbouring Saudi Arabia where many Egyptians seek temporary work and then return. One of the most visible manifestations of religious influence is the increasing numbers of women wearing headscarves. This phenomenon could be seen in one sense as preparing the ground for more radical forms of Islam. Yet, as Canada’s Ambassador Michel de Salaberry’s pointed out to the Committee in Cairo, “this is a very peaceful country … which has had 7,000 years of assured harvests”. His assessment was not to expect to see an Islamic revolution, something that would not be consistent with Egypt’s national temperament. Moreover, the Islamists who say that “the Qur’an is the solution” really do not have a coherent program to offer.

Ambassador de Salaberry added that the Iraq war has provoked renewed opposition unrest in Egypt, as indeed it has elsewhere in the Middle East. The situation is far from being stable and contented; the prospects for political reform are murky. While Canada’s decision to stay out of that war is popular with Egyptians, like other countries Canada in its relations with Egypt’s state and society will have to navigate the increasingly choppy waters buffeting undemocratic regimes across the Arab region.

Witness Views in Egypt

Several prominent political commentators provided the Committee with valuable insights on the prospects for reform in the current domestic and international context facing Egyptians. Dr. Hala Mustafa, Head of the Political Department, Al Ahram Centre for Political and Strategic Studies and Editor in Chief of the quarterly Democracy Review, tackled the question of why the Arab world seems to have been left behind by what has been called democracy’s “third wave”.²⁵⁹ She pointed to “anti-liberal” elements that are “not open to a diversity of views” and are less receptive to a process of political liberalization based on concepts of individual rights and secular values. In Egypt there had been some movement towards modern liberal constitutionalism during the 1920 and 1930s, but that was reversed in the 1950s under Nasser’s pan-Arabist statist project of modernization. In turn, the failure of this model during the 1970s produced a populist radical Islamist backlash. The result is that “anti-liberal, anti-democratic” trends are “deeply rooted in the political culture”.

The key question is therefore how to break with this pattern. The dilemma for democratic reformers is that opening up the electoral process under the current circumstances would, in her view, “lead to the empowerment of the Islamists”. Hence it is “not the solution for a stable, long-term democracy”. The alternative is to launch a project of liberalization within the society that includes reform of the educational system and women’s participation. (In regard to the latter, she observed that getting women to wear the headscarf is used by the Islamists as a visible symbol in their goal of the Islamization of society.) The problem with the government’s repression of the Islamist movement is that it just crudely cracks down (on threats to its power) without challenging the wrong ideas in the Islamist ideology or being concerned about women’s rights. In fact, it seems that “both sides are competing over the ‘legitimate’ representation of Islam”. Dr. Mustafa’s main concern was a collectivist anti-secular mindset manifested in a politicization of Islam that threatens individual liberties. She was doubtful of change from the bottom, looking instead to secular reformist elites as agents of liberal-democratic change.

Dr. Osama Al-Ghazali Harb, a Member of the Shura Council, Editor in Chief of the International Politics Journal and Secretary General of the Egyptian Council for Foreign Affairs took a somewhat different view, arguing that it is wrong to think of the Islamic world as always in conflict with the Occident. In modern times, it was the messy dissolution of the Ottoman empire followed by unhappy experiences with colonization that have contributed to so many conflicts. More than any cultural differences, it is these political factors that are the most important causes, including of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. He also expressed concern about attitudes one sometimes finds even among those who should know better in the U.S. (referring to an article by Fareed Zakaria in the October 27 issue of Newsweek covering the Boykin affair²⁶⁰). The “utter ignorance” of a comment linking the Islamic God to the worship of an “idol” is illustrative of the perception problem. It feeds the notion of a post-Cold War search for a “new enemy” and “Islam fits the bill” (as though Bin Laden somehow confirms the Huntington thesis of an inevitable clash).

Although Dr. Harb agreed that Egypt’s problems have been exacerbated by the influence of Saudi Arabia’s conservative brand of Islam versus more liberal and tolerant interpretations, he pointed to issues such as the non-resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as inflaming Islamist ideology and contributing to the undemocratic nature of most Muslim Arab countries. He argued that “we are paying the price” for great power strategic interests — anti-Communism, secure oil supplies, standing by Israel — which have sometimes resulted in the U.S. making deals with reactionary dictatorships and paradoxically helping to create the breeding grounds for the kinds of violence that it is now fighting. (It should be noted that Dr. Harb stated he was one of the few Egyptians to have supported military intervention in order to rid Iraq of the Saddam Hussein regime.)

In Dr. Harb’s view: “Building democracies is our job … [but] you can help in preparing the enabling environment and [resolution of] the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is key to preparing the ground for liberalization and democratization.” He saw this as being both a “blind spot” for the U.S. and for the radical Islamists “the main source of their popularity in this region”. Egypt presently lacks any acceptable “model” of a Muslim liberal-democratic state (that of Turkey was rejected as being inapplicable), yet Egypt has the potential to become “the cheapest model for the others” (certainly compared to the “very expensive” experiment of building democracy in Iraq). Egypt was entering a critical phase in developing its own reform process. It would have to deal with the baggage of its pre-Islamic “Pharaonic” tradition not just the debates over Islam. We must remember that: “People are not born democrats. They must learn democracy.”

The thrust of these comments was that a democracy with Islamic features must still achieve certain core elements of democracy if it is to be genuine. Much of the appeal of the Islamists can be attributed to their social concern for the people (contrasting with the poor performance of governments in meeting human needs) as part of their strategy of political mobilization. A movement for the liberalization of civil society will have to address the sources of the Islamists’ appeal and manage the transitional period between today’s authoritarianism and tomorrow’s democracy. Dr. Harb referred to “new generations of Islamic forces” that appear to be accepting democratic ideas, a positive development even if not a fully trusted one. In contrast to Dr. Mustafa, he was “not afraid of free elections”, especially if the Islamists are deprived of the Israeli-Palestinian issue, on which he urged Canada to push the Americans to use their leverage. If there is not to be a political vacuum, forces for genuine democratic reform need to be encouraged within the society as a whole not only among the secular elites.

The Committee’s informal discussion with several Egyptian parliamentarians confirmed both the aspirations for and the tensions over reforms. Dr. Hossam Badrawi, General Secretary of the governing NDP and Head of the Education Committee in the People’s Assembly, spoke of a new mandate to connect the party to the civil society, and of being open to sharing ideas with the opposition groups in the Parliament. However, scepticism about such overtures was expressed by Mr. Mohammed Morsy El-Aiat, a professional engineer and member of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Assembly who sits as an independent but belongs to the Muslim Brotherhood and leads their group of 17 MPs in the Parliament. Democratic avenues are lacking, he observed, noting the difficulties he has as an MP to have his own political group registered. While the recent release of 3,000 political prisoners was a good, humane gesture,²⁶¹ he did not put much stock in it as a real reform step forward — it was “number 99 on a list of 100 things needed to reform our society”. As for fears of an Islamist takeover if there were free elections, those were exaggerated.²⁶²

An important common message from the parliamentarians to the Committee was their appreciation for a distinctive Canadian approach to the Muslim world, which was described as a “major theatre” for confronting global problems by Dr. Mounir Fakhry Abdel-Nour, Head of the Opposition Wafdist Parliamentary Group in the People’s Assembly. (Although one of only two elected Coptic Christians in the Parliament, he explained that he “sincerely belongs to the Muslim world culturally and socially”.) Dr. Abdel-Nour saw the Canadian outlook as being healthier than that of the U.S., expressing a hope that Canadian actions would influence those of a U.S. government often blinded by economic interests. He added that Egypt has historically been open to other cultures and is the “living proof” of the fallacy of the clash of civilizations thesis since it reflects “a sequence of dialogues between different civilizations that have an obvious complementarity”. Worried about the backlash against Western policies leading to dangerous extremism, he urged taking into account the reasons why Islam has become a “rallying ground of protest” against these policies.

The Committee heard directly the preoccupations of the Egyptian government in a lengthy meeting with Foreign Minister Ahmed Maher El Sayed who began by welcoming parliamentary visits and studies as a way to “overcome stereotypes” generated by media distortions.²⁶³ Muslim are understandably frustrated by the misconceptions and double standards, which is why “what we need is real dialogue”, honest frank discussion without preconceived notions.

Much of what Minister El Sayed had to say concerned the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the vexed search for Middle East peace about which he was quite pessimistic, and not surprisingly very critical of Israeli government policies and actions, notably in the construction of the so-called “security fence”. This is a subject that we will turn to in more detail in the following section of the report, where his comments will be more fully reported. Suffice to say that the present climate does not appear to be very propitious in regard to political overtures. We note that, as a result of Egypt’s attempts to broker a ceasefire, Mr. Sayed was personally injured in an assault by an angry Palestinian crowd in Jerusalem after meeting with Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon in late December 2003.²⁶⁴

On the Iraq situation, while no one was sad to see Saddam gone, the key objective for Egypt was a reassertion of control by Iraqis. In Mr. Sayed’s view, U.S. troops had shown themselves to be ignorant of local customs and had made many mistakes. There “has to be a clear timetable for a return to Iraqi control” (noting that the controversy over the proposal for sending Turkish troops had been an opportunity for Iraq’s Interim Governing Council to assert itself). As for Iraq’s future makeup, it was “dangerous to speak of a federation [but we need to] find a way to see a coalition of forces working together”. It was not for outsiders to decide the final form of a future Iraq. The Arab League along with the OIC and the UN accept the need for Iraq to be represented as a sovereign state, but that also means ending the occupation as soon as possible.

On the prospects for democracy in the Middle East, Mr. El Sayed agreed that “the whole Arab world needs reforms”. He recognized that Egypt had much more to do but argued that it must “follow a tempo that the people could accept … [and] reform should not appear as an imposition from outside”. Advances in democracy and human rights “have to be implemented from inner conviction”. He was dismissive of U.S. democracy initiatives, as if one could “impose democracy for $29 million” (apparently referring to U.S. funding for democracy programs directed towards Egypt). “It is more harmful to do this than not”. On the other hand, cooperative alliances for reform are welcomed, mentioning a joint project with the EU on an institute for a “dialogue of civilizations” and a library in Alexandria. What will not work is for the strong to come with their model to be followed. An example is the backlash provoked by U.S. pressure to reform Islamic education. In the Minister’s view, the way to support evolutionary reform from the outside was to be discreet, subtle and patient about it; the way to end support for terrorism was to seek the real reasons behind it and avoid demonizing the other side.

The Committee heard a dynamic civil-society perspective from Dr. Iman Bibars, who is both the Regional Director for the Middle East and North Africa at the Ashoka Centre (an organization for development innovation) and the current chair of the Organization for the Development and Advancement of Women.²⁶⁵ She explained the goals of her NGO as empowerment of women and advocacy for their rights giving the example of a new law allowing women to pass on their Egyptian nationality to their children (previously only men could do so) that was the result of a ten-year fight. Egypt’s constitution includes “equal rights for women formally, but there are lots of gaps and discrimination in practice”. In her view, this is less a matter of “social collectivism” than a result of the authoritarian state negating individual rights.

The real problem, she stated, is that “the idea of the public good has deteriorated”. The government and women’s groups are often not speaking the same language on human rights and one sees “extreme double standards” coming from the West too. For poor women in squatter communities, the first priority is economic rights and they will worry about voting later. For liberal middle class women, the focus is also on concrete gains for women, but in political terms there is also considerable confusion and disappointment with the perceived double standards in Western human rights discourse. Instead of applying some external human rights “conditionality” to relations with Egypt, she suggested that countries like Canada seek out the best among genuine innovative NGOs working with the people on the ground. The important thing is “to work in the Egyptian way” through mobilizing the people themselves and encouraging the forces for change from within. She also called for “funding in a sustained way” that is based on a “selective, intelligent understanding of the community” (citing projects supported by the Ford Foundation and the European Union as good examples).

Questioned about whether the Israeli-Palestinian conflict becomes an excuse used by Arab government to deflect attention away from domestic problems, Dr. Bibars insisted that popular anger over perceived injustices suffered by fellow Arabs is genuine and widespread, not just confined to Islamist groups. There’s a lot of work to be done to repair the image of the West in the eyes of even those who believed in the ideals of Western liberal democracy. Canada is still well regarded but U.S. good intentions are not believed and there is a resistance to the prospect of an “Americanization” of the region.

As for the dangers of “Islamization”, including for women’s rights, she responded: “What makes the Islamists attractive is not collective values; it is self-interest”. They offer social concern and social goods to women who have had no rights or voice to begin with. In short, the Islamists are giving her things of real value and “they are very organized” in terms of community development. There is a class divide here, as it is the Westernized middle and upper-class women who are concerned about losing rights. September 11 has been used to crack down on Islamic militancy,²⁶⁶ but if the militants have lost ground in the society it is more due to the effects of pre-9/11 domestic terrorism that almost wiped out the tourist industry and caused a lot of economic pain.

Her assessment was that Islamic groups would probably do well electorally because they are so well organized in the society compared to others. In theory there are 17 political parties, but they lack internal democracy and connections to the grassroots whereas the Islamists have developed “trained cadres” with an affinity for the ordinary population. Islamists will win if there are free elections. (There are many Islamic groups and in her view the Muslim Brotherhood was not the most connected to the street compared to more militant groups.) The alternative to an Islamist victory is to “create civil society spaces” that allow for genuinely independent NGOs, as well as providing processes that respond to people’s concerns (mentioning ombudsman processes as one possible instrument). On human rights, she saw the release of Saad Ibrahim (a former professor of hers) as unfortunately only a mixed blessing in that it came as a result of external, mainly U.S., pressure, whereas domestic human rights organizations had not done much to come to his assistance. His release was therefore not a big gain for Egyptian civil society. She also identified weaknesses in the proliferation if NGOs during the 1990s. There is another basic factor. As she put it: “If people are flourishing economically, they will not become militants”.

With respect to religious and cultural perspectives, the Committee benefited from the views of Dr. Fahmy Howeidi, a prominent Islamic thinker and writer who has been associated for 45 years with the Al-Ahram newspaper, Dr. Abdel Moety Bayoumi, a professor of Islamic studies and dean of theology at Cairo’s renowned Al-Azhar University as well as a Member of the People’s Assembly, and Mr. Cherif Abdel-Meguid, Chairman of the Islamic Telephone Co. that is notable for having instituted several years ago a religious advice hotline service that operates 24 hours a day.²⁶⁷

Mr. Abdel-Meguid explained that his service is expanding to Saudi Arabia and receives a number of callers from North America. He agreed that “religious discourse needs to change”, but they have been fortunate in their “ability to have eminent moderate scholars on board”. Dr. Bayoumi added that he and his colleagues at Al-Azhar (50 of its 70 faculties teach Islamic subjects) try to go to the sources and only advocate for justice and peace. He claimed that the senior scholars decide matters by consensus and are not under the thumb of the government. As to determining the nature of Islamic religious education, Dr. Howeidi referred to the government granting teaching licenses but Dr. Bayoumi admitted that Islam is open to interpretation by any believer and that “people do not trust the official institutions”. It was observed that there are some 32,000 mosques in Egypt. But “more important than who is speaking in the mosques”, suggested Abdel-Meguid, are the extreme voices heard on Arab satellite TV and disseminated on Internet Web sites. The cycle of misunderstandings and extremism was one reason why Abdel-Meguid hope that Canada could make a positive contribution to moderating intercultural influences. Specifically he proposed creating a “Canadian university in Egypt”.

On the relationship of Islam to democracy and human rights, Dr. Bayoumi denied that there was anything incompatible with these ideals in the Qur’an; on the contrary, Islamic civilization promotes tolerance and the rights of others. “So the Qur’an is never a barrier to achieve democracy but it urges its followers to adopt it.” Dr. Howeidi added that the Islamic way of life includes the general principles of “shura” as the obligation to consult, with the details determined by the circumstances of implementation. He had written a book on the subject of democracy and Islam 12 years ago and “could not find any contradiction”. In Dr. Bayoumi’s view, Islam is able to adapt to different social and political contexts while promoting respect for human values and welfare — in that regard, it could improve upon the weaknesses of Western democracy. On issues like women’s equality and wearing the veil, Dr. Howeidi observed that “we have the right to differ” from other Muslim societies but there is no problem with women choosing to wear it. Dr. Bayoumi added that the Qur’an grants rights equally to men and women and that dress is a matter of choice. In Egypt there is no discrimination on this account.

A contentious point emerged, however, when questions were posed about whether there could be any Islamic justification for “suicide bombings”. Dr. Howeidi seemed to justify them as a form of Palestinian resistance to being expelled from their homeland. Dr. Bayoumi contended that Islamic scholars agree that such so-called “suicide” attacks are not terrorism but “martyrdom” when people sacrifice their lives to resist occupation. There was an implication that these could be justified as a last resort “means of self-defence” against an Israeli “militarized society” supplied with weapons by the West, and that the blame for Palestinian violence should be put on Israeli aggression and intransigence. (Mr. Abdel-Meguid drew the parallel: if the IRA sets off a bomb in London, do we bomb Belfast in retaliation?) In Dr. Bayoumi’s view, it will be hard to improve relations between the West and the Islamic world without a just Middle East peace. And in that regard, he asked who has the most capability to stop the spiral of violence — the stronger or the weaker party to a conflict that has engendered so much hatred and resentment.

This difficult exchange with Committee members spurred Dr. Howeidi to remark that people are sometimes “talking different languages”. He put it rather provocatively that we “know nothing about Canada” but assume U.S. influence. Egyptians who are literate and read the press may know something about Canada’s independent stands but the common people don’t and a visible presence of Canadian culture is lacking.

The subject of how to increase such a presence subsequently came up in a wide-ranging roundtable discussion with members of the Egyptian Council for Foreign Affairs. Its Vice-President, Ambassador Dr. Mohammed Ibrahim Shaker began by observing that “Canada’s separate position from the U.S. on Iraq is greatly appreciated, especially in the intellectual community”, and has been noticed by Arab opinion. In the wake of 9/11, “the Islamic world needs a lot of reform, true, but we’re not waiting for inspiration from President Bush”. It is important to go to the core of things: “We need badly to disentangle politics from religion” and to deal with Western misconceptions of Islam. Because reform is upsetting to some conservative circles, that will take some courage to tackle. That is an Arab task.

Participants agreed on a need for better education on both sides. The West needs to improve its portrayal of Islam; and Egypt, traditionally a centre of Islamic learning, also needs to do a better job of communicating an authentic picture of Islam to the outside world. The diversity of Islamic societies can present a challenge in that regard, as sometimes “the local social habits are put on the back of Islam” (e.g., the restriction against women driving cars in Saudi Arabia, which has nothing to do with religion actually). It was suggested that Canada and Egypt could cooperate through a “joint project” of social communication (using the three languages, English, French and Arabic). One member was concerned by a “lack of communication between your world and ours”, observing that in Egypt the “ordinary person on the street” does not have a sense of Canada or appreciation of its independence vis-à-vis the U.S. Council members advocated encouraging more contacts at all levels, notably with the media. These exchanges brought out a sense of Egyptians’ frustration with some Western attitudes but their perception that they can have an open and constructive dialogue with Canadians.

The sole female member present, Dr. Mona Makram Ebeid also addressed educational issues (she had served five years on the Education Committee of the Parliament), stating that the curriculum is “totally obsolete” and that “education is our biggest problem”, linked to the unemployment problem of the young. She suggested that the “Islamist movement here is a refuge for the frustrated young”, born of “movements of despair and frustration”, not real religious commitment, and that: “What we need from Canada is this: open up universities and training centres.” She also referred to the creation in recent years of a national council for human rights and a national council for women as well as other advances by women. There is hope in a “resurgent civil society” beyond government control or suppression. Mention was also made of an “association for the advancement of education” and programs such as summer camps for poor children. It was suggested that expatriate Egyptians living in Canada might also be enlisted as part of a bridge-building effort involving more educational and cultural exchanges, because it is ignorance that begets intolerance.

Directions for Canadian Policy

The Committee came away from its encounters in Cairo, one of the great capitals of the Arab world, with the sense of important opportunities to be seized. A comment that “Canada is the flavour of the year” was reinforced by the warmth of our reception at an event hosted by Mr. Motaz Raslan, Chairman of the recently formed Canada-Egypt Business Council. We note as well that 2004 marks the 50th anniversary of the establishment of bilateral relations.

In our first meeting, Dr. Harb cited the role played by former Canadian prime minister Lester Pearson during the Suez crisis that put Canada on the diplomatic map in the Middle East, stating: “You have played a very major role and I hope you can continue to do so.” Muslim Brotherhood MP Mohammed Morsy El-Aiat observed that “Canada is more acceptable to people in the Middle East than other Western countries”. He hoped Canada would play a “major role” and would focus on civil society development. And in a last informal discussion, Professor Baghat Korany of the American University in Cairo made the point that Canada was well served to distinguish itself from the worldview of the present U.S. administration, given that the region’s problems could not be solved by military means.

Those final discussions also touched on the ingredients for the Canadian private sector to work successfully in the Arab region, benefiting from the long experience of Mr. Raslan and also native Calgarian Darren Law, Manager of the Conrad Hilton hotel. In terms of enhancing an official Canadian presence in Egypt, Jean-Philippe Tachdjian, Second Secretary at the embassy responsible for Political, Cultural and Public Affairs, outlined compelling proposals for increased projection of Canadian culture and values in the Arab world through more resources for public diplomacy, cultural promotion, and specifically the building of a new Canadian cultural centre in Cairo.²⁶⁸ The Committee was also provided information on the very promising plans currently under consideration to establish the “Al-Ahram Canadian University” in Cairo.

Another important avenue is the development cooperation channel, especially given that Egypt has long been a significant recipient of Canadian aid (CIDA’s 7th largest bilateral program in Africa²⁶⁹). Dr. Bibars was among those who emphasized the value of projects working directly with people through genuinely independent NGOs. In earlier testimony in Ottawa, former Canadian ambassador Michael Bell spoke eloquently about small-scale projects such as a women’s initiative fund to help them start their own businesses and a girls’ education project. As he put it, “if Canadian assistance doesn’t touch people’s lives in the near term, it’s probably not worth doing. … When you change the way people think and give them space, that creates initiative and allows them to fulfill themselves.”²⁷⁰ Sometimes that means creatively getting around official roadblocks and constraints, he added.

Finally, in Cairo, Mrs. Donna Kennedy-Glans, Director of Corporate Responsibility for Calgary-based Menas Associates (and a former Vice-President of Nexen Corporation with long experience in the region), made one of the last points about not neglecting a conscientious role that Canadian business could play. She urged an effort to “engender support for corporate social responsibility in the Arab/Muslim world in a real way, not just rhetoric”. That means exploring “avenues for engagement” working hand in hand with host private sectors — a process she referred to as “wonderful infiltration”. While acknowledging that “companies have not been very good at community investment”, she argued strongly for more connections between the private and the non-profit sectors.

In sum, the Committee underlines that Canadian policymakers have a rich body of experience and menu of ideas from which to draw in order to increase Canada’s relationship with Egypt. At this critical juncture in Egypt’s and the region’s future, it is surely time to do so.

RECOMMENDATION 12

In engaging the Government of Egypt in political dialogue, Canada should consistently encourage Egypt to institute democratic reforms and to respect basic standards of internationally recognized human rights, including in the necessary common efforts to curb political violence and religious extremism. Such efforts should also address underlying conditions of poverty and social exclusion.

RECOMMENDATION 13

The Government of Canada should use the 50th anniversary in 2004 of the establishment of bilateral relations with Egypt to significantly upgrade Canada’s capacity to carry out educational and cultural cooperation activities and exchanges within Egypt and benefiting the wider Arab region. In particular, the Canadian government in cooperation with the provinces should strongly support the Al-Ahram Canadian University project and should consider the feasibility of establishing a Canadian Cultural Centre in Cairo.

RECOMMENDATION 14

The Government should ensure that Canadian development assistance to Egypt is concentrated in people-centred projects, working with independent NGOs wherever possible. Canada should also work with the private sector to advance responsible investment and trade that benefits both countries.

The Middle East Peace Process, Israel and Palestine

The long-running conflict between Israel and the Arab world — which dates from the post-Second World War division of the former British mandate of Palestine and creation of the Jewish state in 1948 — remains the world’s most controversial, and seemingly intractable, international as well as civil conflict. It has led to wars, generations of refugees, dispossession and deprivation, military occupations, the horrors of suicide terrorism, the spread of extremism and hatred; in sum, an enormous and ongoing toll of human suffering and loss.

It is not the Committee’s intention to examine this conflict in any detail, much less to assign blame to any party. However it is impossible to consider the prospects for peaceful and democratic changes in the Arab and wider Muslim world without touching upon it. This is not just a commonly expressed view among our witnesses. For example, the UK Government Strategy Paper we cited in Part I, referring to relations between Western democracies and Islamic countries and groups and the causes of tension in this relationship, states that “the Israel/Palestine problem, if not resolved, will continue to provide their most obvious focus”.²⁷¹

Brief Background

Although, as mentioned, Egypt made a separate peace with Israel in 1979,²⁷² it was not until the 1990s that peace negotiations were undertaken involving the Palestinians — who now number approximately 3.5 million people, predominantly Sunni Muslim, concentrated in the territories of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip (although Palestinian Arabs also constitute a growing minority within Israel²⁷³). September 2003 marked the first decade anniversary of the Oslo peace accords that were the first major breakthrough coming after the violence of the first Palestinian uprising or intifada. Some view Oslo as an “orphaned peace” that was never accepted by many in the Arab world.²⁷⁴ However, its fruitful years did, as former Canadian ambassador Michael Bell has written, allow Israelis and Palestinians “to savour the taste of what living together could mean and they will not forget it, not even during these lean years”.²⁷⁵ The U.S.-sponsored Oslo agreement resulted in the granting of semi-autonomy to the Palestinian territories of the West Bank and Gaza under a Palestinian Authority even if these areas remain under Israeli military control. They would form the core of the future Palestinian state that current peace initiatives envisage coming into being pending a “final status” comprehensive settlement that would resolve outstanding issues such as the status of Jerusalem, the rights of Palestinian refugees, and the fate of Jewish settlements in the occupied territories.

Since Oslo, various peace initiatives and plans have been proposed both by governments and non-governmental groups aimed at achieving that elusive final Israeli-Palestinian/Arab agreement. This already difficult task has been complicated in recent years by the effects of a second Palestinian intifada that began in 2000, the weaknesses of the Palestinian Authority, a continued expansion of Jewish settlements, and Israel’s attempts to crack down on terrorist attacks by Islamist militants and to protect itself against such attacks.²⁷⁶

Most of the peace proposals call for some version of “land for peace” that would result in a two-state solution in which Israel and Palestine would be able to co-exist side by side within secure and recognized borders. From the Arab side, a major official initiative was proposed by Saudi Arabia’s Crown Prince Abdullah and endorsed by the Arab League Summit in Beirut in March 2002. Among other things, it promised full recognition and normalization of relations with Israel provided that it withdrew from all territories occupied since the 1967 war and that an independent Palestinian state was established on those territories. The key international plan that has been in play in the past year is the “Roadmap for Peace” presented by the so-called “Quartet” (of the United States in cooperation with the European Union, the Russian Federation, and the United Nations) to Israel and the Palestinian Authority on April 30, 2003. It envisages a three-phase plan leading to a Palestinian state and permanent peace agreement.

Progress on the roadmap to date has been slow to materialize and has faced numerous setbacks. Dr. Henry Siegman of the Council on Foreign Relations told the Committee in New York in May 2003 that he was pessimistic about Israeli, Palestinian, Arab and U.S. willingness to really make the moves required to drive the roadmap forward.²⁷⁷ Since then, however, several non-governmental initiatives involving prominent Israelis and Palestinians have moved ahead. The most promising, albeit always contentious and contested, of these has been the “Geneva Initiative” led by a former Israelis justice minister Yossi Beilin and former Palestinian culture minister Yasser Abed Rabbo. It produced an accord the text of which was widely circulated in Israel and the Palestinian territories and launched internationally with considerable fanfare in Geneva on December 1, 2003.²⁷⁸ The joint Israeli-Palestinian nature of the initiative was also welcomed by some Western countries, including Canada. The Geneva Accord outlined an ambitious blueprint for potential terms of settlement on all of the main outstanding issues still to be negotiated politically by the governments concerned. To date, however, no government has endorsed this plan. Although the Geneva proposals may not be the solution, and are no substitute for the stalled U.S.- and UN-backed roadmap, they at least have given some hope that Israelis and Palestinians are able to cooperate in producing ideas for peace as a way out of the current impasse.²⁷⁹

Yet some worry that time may be running out for a negotiated two-state solution as envisaged since Oslo. There have always been those who objected to the idea of Israel as a Jewish state and whose preferred scenario would be a single secular state giving equal rights to Israeli and Palestinian citizens. A much more likely prospect, however, is that lack of progress with the roadmap,²⁸⁰ the continued construction of the West Bank “security fence”, combined with Israelis’ fatigue over the ongoing violence — a fatigue and frustration that is at least as great on the Palestinian side²⁸¹ — could lead Israel to seek its own unilateral solution that might involve withdrawing from some occupied territories and retrenching within what it determines are militarily defensible borders. Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon’s controversial proposals made in early February 2004 to dismantle Jewish settlements in Gaza and some in the West Bank lend credence to that possibility.²⁸²

The Committee does not have a crystal ball into the future of this tragic conflict. However, we consider that every reasonable effort to advance the state of political negotiations and to reduce the toll of misery and death inflicted on the peoples of the region is one that is worth the energetic support of Canada’s diplomacy towards the region.

Witness Views in Ottawa Hearings

Many witnesses told the Committee that a resolution of the conflict is seen by Muslims as a top international relations priority. As Salim Mansur put it in an early hearing, “Palestine is the mother of all issues in the Arab-Muslim world, and once this issue is settled to the satisfaction of the Palestinians — and they have been forthcoming, but they cannot achieve the end of Israeli occupation of the land by themselves — the situation between the United States and the Arab-Muslim world will change rapidly for the better.”²⁸³ Saleem Qureshi emphasized that “Palestine remains the most sensitive issue, and public opinion, not only in the Arab world, but far beyond in the Muslim world, generally remains highly hostile to the U.S. because of its total support for Israel. It will perhaps not be an exaggeration to say that so long as the Palestinian-Israel conflict festers, America will not have friendly public opinion anywhere in the Muslim world.”²⁸⁴

Of course, as has already been observed, the conflict can also be used by Muslim governments as a means to deflect criticism of their own performance. The point is that it provides just such an excuse. As Farhang Rajaee stated: “Even if they are not very serious in their heart of hearts about Palestine — they may not lose sleep over the Palestinian cause — as long as it is there, it provides ‘the cause’ … ”. David Dewitt added that “the issue of Israel and the Palestinians is a mobilizing force. It’s something they are required to do for local politics, and it provides them a place within the Organization of the Islamic Conference. Therefore, it allows them at a great distance to take what is considered a principled stand within the Islamic community for their integrity, credibility, and political position, at no cost. As soon as the Israeli-Palestinian situation is resolved within Israel and Palestine, they’ll move on. … Right now it’s convenient and something they can use.”²⁸⁵

Witnesses suggested a range of possibilities in order to move matters forward, with some urging more Canadian involvement. Mazen Chouaib argued that “Canada has a role to play, not only as chair of the refugee committee, but also as a participant in actual negotiations and discussions that will take place according to the roadmap … Canada has leverage in the Arab world, it doesn’t have any colonial or political baggage, and it’s respected because of what it offers.”²⁸⁶ John Sigler stressed that the idea of an “international monitoring force” should be high on our agenda given Canada’s experience in peace operations including in the Middle East region — “I’d give a much higher priority to being involved in the Palestinian-Israel peace process now than I would to Afghanistan.”²⁸⁷

Others pointed to the need to create spaces for political dialogue both in Canada and abroad. Michael Bell referred to the importance of CIDA’s work in the West Bank and Gaza and suggested: “What we can do is to focus on affecting the mindsets of people, the way they think, expanding pluralism, and building institutions.”²⁸⁸ As Karim Karim stated: “We need to create safe spaces among the Palestinians, Israelis, Jews, their diasporas, the Arab diasporas, to come together and to understand them. What is happening right now is that they’re slipping very clearly into racist notions of each other, which really needs to be stopped.”²⁸⁹ According to Sheema Khan: “We need to create more, if you like, ‘dialogue groups’. … we must somehow try to bring people together, create safe spaces where you’re not condemned for being ‘anti-Semitic’ or you’re not condemned for being Islamophobic. If we can get rid of all these labels and just sit down, I think, first to hear each other’s pain  …  because if people realize that the loss of a child, whether Palestinian or Israeli, is deeply hurtful on both sides, if we start to see some commonality, I think that would be a great start.”²⁹⁰

None of this is to underestimate in any way all of the factors that need to be dealt with and the obstacles, attitudinal as well as political and structural, that need to be dealt with in forging a sustainable Middle East peace. Michael Bell observed that it may never be possible to eliminate terrorism but that “if the Palestinian people could lead more normal lives, there might be a falling off in support for the solutions of Hamas and Jihad.” He added: “The important thing, though, is that the Palestinian Authority and its leaders, whoever they might be, have credibility, support and the loyalty of their populations.”²⁹¹ Noah Feldman made another key point about preconditions for negotiations: “I’ll tell you bluntly that any negotiation that’s hostage to extremist violence is not going to be a successful negotiation in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. If you’re going to walk away from negotiations when there’s violence, the negotiations are going to stop, because you’re giving the opportunity to extremists to veto the process.”²⁹²

Secretary General Amre Moussa of the Arab League, who also raised the added complication of Israel’s nuclear weapons monopoly in any goal to rid the Middle East of weapons of mass destruction, claimed that it is not peace proposals that are lacking, but political will and political balance.

There has to be a balanced approach, there has to be a fair settlement, and the ingredients of the settlement are there. We’re not going to invent the wheel every couple of months or every year or every administration or every government in the Middle East. … We in the Arab world are ready to make peace, normalize relations, recognize the state of Israel, and turn the page, put the Arab-Israeli conflict behind us, provided that Israel has the same will and is ready to withdraw, ready to recognize a Palestinian state, ready to deal with any problems we have. Each and every problem has a solution if there is a balance of power between both.²⁹³

The Committee also heard testimony from Mr. Peter Hansen, Commissioner General of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA). He described in detail deteriorating conditions in the occupied territories, with about 60% of the population below the poverty line, unemployment rates of 35-50%, and 1.2 million people dependent on food aid, not to mention the grim statistics of violent deaths and destruction of property. As he stated: “We have not only gone backwards and wiped out all the progress that was made after the Oslo agreement, we have been set back almost ten years in terms of losses, yet that [the Palestinian] economy has to support a much larger population.”²⁹⁴

At the same time, concerns also surfaced about the adequacy of contributions to UNRWA from Arab countries, about allegations of misuse of funds, about perceptions of anti-Israeli bias in the agency, and most seriously, about accusations that UNRWA-supported schools and facilities may have been used, including by militant Islamist organizations operating in the refugee camps, as breeding grounds for Palestinian terrorism. International aid to the Palestinian Authority is reported to have fallen sharply in 2003 from previous years’ levels.²⁹⁵ There are also ongoing controversies over whether Palestinian textbooks incite violence.²⁹⁶ Mr. Hansen denied many of the allegations, arguing that the textbooks issue is not a one-sided black and white question and that considerable progress has been made. Although he acknowledged critical studies such as the one by the Centre for Monitoring the Impact of Peace (CMIP), he also pointed to a more positive U.S.-financed study by the Israel/Palestine Center for Research and Information.²⁹⁷ Furthermore, referring to criticisms made by Israel Defence Force Chief of Staff Moshe Ya’alon over the ineffectiveness of harsh tactics used in the territories in achieving security for Israelis²⁹⁸, Mr. Hansen argued that “excessive use of force” is “probably creating more terrorist bombers … than anyone could by stuffing any amount of textbooks down the throats of any number of schoolchildren”.²⁹⁹

The Committee cannot resolve such controversies in this report. We can only decry the continuing insecurity — not only physical security but also social and economic security — experienced by ordinary citizens, Israelis and Palestinians, caught up in the violence generated by the conflict. Responsible authorities at all levels must at a minimum do everything in their power to reduce those levels of violence.

Witness Views in the Middle East

As already noted, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict was one of the grievances in the relationship of the West and the Muslim world raised most frequently by Arab and Muslim interlocutors. There was often criticism of Western, in particular U.S., support for Israeli government policies. At the same time, this was often coupled with a more positive perception and appreciation of a Canadian approach that was considered to be more moderate and even-handed. A number of witnesses therefore hoped for a stronger Canadian role in addressing the region’s most longstanding and dangerous problem.

For example, Saudi Arabia’s veteran and respected foreign minister, Prince Saud Al-Faisal, noted that “Canada has played an important role in the Middle East with the United Nations … and has an impeccable image in the region.” He explained that he understood Israel’s need for security. However, he argued that this cannot be achieved on the basis of unilateral “geographic demands” — what he bluntly referred to as “grabbing more Arab land” — and Israel’s nuclear monopoly. Moreover, there must be security for Arabs too, and Israelis must learn to live with Palestinians. In Prince Saud’s view, the ingredients for a solution are not that complicated, and should involve a ceasefire supervised by an agreed third party. Unfortunately, with Israel’s military strikes such as the one inside Syria and the U.S. continuing its support for the Sharon government, he worried that the “roadmap” was going nowhere.

Egyptian foreign minister Ahmed Maher El Sayed, also a veteran diplomat, told the Committee that Egypt supported efforts to achieve a mutual peace plan, but at the same time, “no agreement is possible without the consent of Arafat.” He thanked Canada for its support of a UN resolution in the fall of 2003 that condemned Israel’s construction of a “security fence” in the West Bank. In his view, security will not be achieved through walls and more checkpoints, and by Israel taking advantage of those to grab more Arab land, but through learning to live together. The wall is counter-productive since it will not stop suicide bombers but will make a viable two-state solution harder to achieve. Meanwhile, Israel must be held accountable for its clampdown on the occupied territories, for the deaths of innocent Palestinians, and for its policy of targeted assassinations.

Asked if the roadmap had any chance to succeed, Mr. Sayed’s response was only if there is “parallel movement” by both sides through a balanced negotiation. Unfortunately, in his view, while those who are trying to sabotage the roadmap are in the opposition on the Palestinian side, in Israel they are the government. So the process “is in bad shape but not dead”. It is the only official process on the table but the problem is “how to convince people that peace is doable”. It needs U.S. pressure, but the U.S. has not been even-handed, and moving into a pre-election period there is no comparable Arab lobby (to the pro-Israeli lobby). The most objective people are in the U.S. State Department but it has been weakened. Moreover, the roadmap initiative was partly to appease Arab anger over the Iraq invasion. There is fatigue with the ongoing violence, but he was pessimistic about any momentum for peace. Iraq has become a quagmire and the roadmap is not proceeding.

These sentiments were reinforced by remarks made in a roundtable with the Egyptian Council for Foreign Affairs. A former ambassador to Norway referred to the “humanitarian catastrophe” that is afflicting the Palestinian people daily and urged the application of a multilateral vision, including the intervention of an “international force” (harking back to what Lester Pearson proposed at the United Nations 50 years ago) and hoping that Canada would exert pressure on the U.S. to press Israel to accept such a force.

It is worth noting as well that these views coming from established foreign policy elites would typically be distinctly more moderate and accommodating than many opinions one would encounter within Arab and Muslim civil societies. An indication of that came in discussions with Mr. Morsy El-Aiat, head of the Muslim Brotherhood group within Egypt’s People’s Assembly. He claimed that the Muslim Brotherhood accepts the de facto reality of Israel as a state and is not against the Jews as long as Palestine has its own state. However, when pressed, it was apparent that he regarded Israel as an aggressor state lacking a fully legitimate foundation. He therefore held to a preference for an ultimately single-state solution rather than conceding a two-state solution based on mutual Israeli-Palestinian recognition.

The contrast in perspectives was sharp for Committee members who had come from meetings in Israel several days earlier. Israel’s security preoccupations were a dominant theme in those discussions held with foreign ministry officials, members of the Knesset, academics and journalists, although the Committee also heard about the concerns of Israel’s Arab minority and visited the occupied territories.

Members of the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ Centre for Political Research told the Committee that the entire region is facing a transition crisis with the current leadership in many countries likely to be replaced in the next five to ten years. This transition period holds considerable potential for domestic and regional instability. They highlighted a number of Israel’s security concerns in that regard. For example, they saw little prospect for change in an Iranian regime that in their view continues to pose a threat, as much from the “reformist” as the “conservative” side, in its quest to acquire weapons of mass destruction (perhaps like North Korea as deterrence against U.S. intervention). They also drew a clear connection between Tehran, Damascus, Hizballah and Palestinian rejectionists of peace with Israel, characterizing this threat as the "Northern System." They believe Syrian President Bashar al-Assad is giving Hizballah a green light to carry out its periodic attacks against Israel — in effect, Syria is conducting a proxy war through Hizballah as well as through Islamic Jihad and Hamas which also benefit from Syrian support. Iran’s involvement in this system is manifested in particular through the presence of Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps troops stationed in the Beka’a Valley. In the Centre’s assessment, this "system" has allowed Syria and Hizballah to thus far remain immune from the international campaign against terrorism. Clear, firm messages from the international community to Damascus are required in their view.

As to the situation in the Palestinian territories, the Centre’s director, Harry Kney Tal, stated that Yasser Arafat remains the source of authority in the territories. However, the lack of a clear line of succession once Arafat is no longer on the scene increases the risk of the territories becoming a full-fledged “failed state.” Even with Arafat in control, Mr. Kney Tal suggested that local Fatah cells are acting increasingly independently, in some cases with the support of Iran. This is only serving to further weaken central control.

An informal discussion with several members of the Knesset Foreign and Defence Committee raised several other regional security concerns. For example, Committee Chair Yuval Shteinitz of the Likud Party, focused much of his attention on Egypt. He cited numerous examples of Egyptian action, or inaction, designed to undermine both the peace process and Israel’s development of normal relations with other countries in the region, including Morocco and Qatar. On a more positive note, Eti Livni of the centrist Shinui Party spoke about the process behind the high-level, if unofficial, joint Israeli-Palestinian “Geneva initiative” referred to earlier.

Mr. Dore Gold, Director of the Jerusalem Centre for Public Affairs and a former Israeli Ambassador to the United Nations (as well as advisor to Prime Minister Sharon) downplayed the importance of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as a source of “Muslim rage”, arguing that fatwas against the U.S. and Israel were being issued by Islamist radicals even in the Oslo period when Israel was withdrawing from the West Bank and Gaza. In light of his recent book, Hatred’s Kingdom: How Saudi Arabia Supports the New Global Terrorism,³⁰⁰ he not surprisingly pointed the finger at Saudi Arabia’s alleged role in supporting radical jihadist groups from Osama bin Laden and other anti-Soviet “mujahedin” in Afghanistan to contemporary Palestinian rejectionist groups. Mr. Gold also pointed to the prominence of Saudi-issued fatwas justifying suicide bombing on Hamas Web sites as an example of negative Saudi influence.

A rather different, though equally sobering, perspective emerged from a roundtable with NGOs and academics that considered the Israeli public’s mood, the prospects for a rejuvenated peace process, and the condition of Israel’s Arab minority. The Committee heard a relatively pessimistic assessment of the chances for a breakthrough in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. With U.S. attention focused elsewhere and little willingness in the international community to aggressively intervene without Washington’s backing, Avraham Sela, Chair of Hebrew University’s International Relations Department, held out little hope for a negotiated solution anytime soon. At the same time, Israeli Arab human rights expert Mohammed Zeidan, underlined the negative impact of the conflict on relations between Israel’s Arab and Jewish communities. He argued that Israel must take into account the needs of its growing Arab minority as a long-term issue.

Such considerations were reinforced in discussions in Ramallah in the West Bank where Committee members met with several former Palestinian ministers, legislators, officials, and journalists. They stressed that the causes of the conflict and its persistence are primarily political, not religious. However, the militant Islamist groups, who never embraced the Oslo accords, have developed a social base among people suffering deprivation. As well, there was pessimism that the conflict could be solved with the Sharon government in power. As for Chairman Arafat, in their assessment he is not able to stop the suicide bombers and the Palestinian security forces remain too weak. The important thing is to try to coordinate solutions that can contain and lessen the violence inflicted on both sides. The Committee was told that efforts must continue to achieve a ceasefire and a final binding agreement.

Although the next section of the report deals specifically with Jordan, given that country’s especially close association with the Palestinian problem, some Jordanian views should also be noted here. Jordanian parliamentarians spoke out against what they considered to be causes of the current troubles, going back to the borders established by the Western powers after the First World War (e.g., the Sykes Picot agreement³⁰¹). A focus of their frustration was what they saw as the double standard between the treatment of Israel and the Palestinians. It was unreasonable to suggest that anyone who fights for his own land is a terrorist. Without a just peace, suicide bombers will continue to feel they have no other choice. The Committee heard objections to claims of a Jewish right to Palestine as well as complaints about U.S. and Zionist bias in the media and in international organizations.

In a roundtable with Jordanian civil-society representatives, questions surfaced about the future of the two-state solution. A common view was that if such a solution is “off the table”, violent conflict will ensue. Moreover, to be politically workable the solution would need to be pursued along the 1967 (i.e., pre-war) boundaries. It was also noted that requiring the recognition of the “legitimacy of Israel” (as opposed to recognizing Israel’s existence) is understood by many Palestinians to mean accepting their expulsion as being morally justified. In another panel with Jordanian journalists, concerns were expressed about what they saw as a systematic movement towards ending the existence of Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza. History, they maintained, is at an extremely dangerous juncture. If the situation erupts, it could destroy hopes for peace for years. Current negotiations, including those of the non-governmental Geneva initiative, have been carried out in secret. Meanwhile public opinion has no trust in either the good faith of the current Israeli government or the U.S. as an “honest broker”. The impression they conveyed is that the “other side has all the cards” while Arabs and Palestinians are “under the hammer.”

Last but not least, Committee members heard detailed comments from former Jordanian prime minister Taher Masri and former deputy prime minister and foreign minister Abdullah Ensour, both considered moderates but who, while optimistic about the desire for peace on the Arab side, were acutely aware of the depth of bitterness as well as less hopeful about the current orientation of Israel’s government and people. Mr. Masri observed that the Palestinians’ situation had been deteriorating for six decades. If one adds Iraq to a legacy of humiliation and broken promises by the West, the reasons for anti-U.S. feeling in the region are clear and understandable. People in the street are angry with their leadership too. In his view, moderate Islamists are ready for a peace deal with Israel, which means taking its perspective into consideration. But Israeli actions, such as demolition of houses, are seen as punitive rather than self-defence, creating more stumbling blocks.

Mr. Ensour agreed with these generally shared frustrations among Arabs and their perception that they do not receive fair treatment within the international system. He alluded to the UN Security Council and the numbers of U.S. vetoes cast to protect Israel’s interests. A country like Jordan might receive better treatment from a country like Canada. But overall Jordan does not have much of a voice given the systematic bias that favours the other side. Mr. Masri and Mr. Ensour maintained that while there has been some progress towards peace among the region’s states (some, including Jordan, now have peace treaties or relations of some kind with Israel), and while most of the Arab public wants peace, a key question is how serious are the Israelis. Jordanians will recognize Israel’s existence and accept two states along the 1967 borders as a workable solution. But they will not accept Israeli occupation of the Palestinian people and their land.

Mr. Ensour added that there remain political parties in Israel that speak of a greater Israel from the Mediterranean to the Euphrates, not just to the Jordan River. The Israel-Jordan peace treaty did not address other key issues, such as refugees. Palestinians, he noted, can get a job in Israel, but not a passport. For Jordanians, Palestinians are not neighbours but brothers who have been in the region for thousands of years and are entitled to their land. As for the problem of a “right of return,” perhaps the Geneva proposals might offer a way out of this great dilemma. Mr. Masri observed that there were “piles” of ideas, including those developed through the Refugee Working Group chaired by Canada. Flexibility was possible in searching for a solution but it must be fair to the refugees.³⁰²

On Israel’s part, it was observed that many Jewish immigrants do not speak Hebrew or Yiddish, and that Israel’s high standard of living was in difficulty. Eventually, Israel would need to relax from a “war footing” that was damaging its economy. Israel needs security, Mr. Masri agreed, but who is the occupier and who has nuclear weapons? Israel’s harsh military retaliation against attacks on it has the effect of radicalizing the Arab population, and meanwhile the Sharon government rejects the Geneva proposals and its approach to settlements destroys the concept of peace. This is simply no way for Israel to obtain the security it needs.

Directions for Canadian Policy

The Israeli-Palestinian conflict continues to be an international policy minefield and will remain so into the foreseeable future. The perils of Middle East peace processes are such as to present outside governments with more certain dilemmas than rewards. None of this should be underestimated. In the Committee’s view, this does not mean, however, that Canada cannot play a helpful role, arguably a greater role, in trying to improve prospects for peaceful evolution in the region, especially when the persistence of this conflict has been so often identified as of central concern in building a better relationship between Western and Muslim countries.

Canadian policy on the Middle East peace process, as stated to the 59th Session of the UN Human Rights Commission, argues strongly for working “to advance all efforts to encourage the negotiation of a comprehensive, just and durable peace…  Such a resolution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is a necessary condition for ensuring stability across the region as a whole.” The statement adds that “respect for human rights must also be built into a reinvigorated peace process. Israelis will not rest without a deeper sense of security. And Palestinians will not yield their basic requirements for dignity and self-determination. A durable, just solution to this conflict cannot come at the expense of either side’s fundamental needs.”³⁰³

In an address a year ago to the National Council on Canada-Arab Relations, Canada’s Minister of Foreign Affairs Bill Graham, a former Chair of this Committee, underlined the dual aspect of the principles underlying Canada’s policy as follows:

We have always supported a negotiated two-state solution to this problem, with Israel and Palestine living side-by-side in security and peace. Canada’s support of Israel’s right to exist within secure boundaries is fundamental to our policy. … I also want to emphasize that Canada continues to call on Israel to meet its international human rights obligations. We are very concerned about the humanitarian situation in the Palestinian territories and we have urged Israel to ensure that Palestinians have access to food, water, medical supplies and social and educational services. We also urge Israel to freeze all settlement activity in the Occupied Territories. This would be a key step in rebuilding confidence among Palestinians in the viability of a peace process, and its ability to deliver tangible results for them.³⁰⁴

Canadian statements in multilateral forums have both unequivocally condemned all forms of terrorist violence and continued to express concerns about a deteriorating “dire humanitarian and economic situation in the Palestinian territories”, as well as maintaining a consistent objection to Israeli settlements in these territories as “contrary to international law and especially unproductive for the peace process.”³⁰⁵

With respect to processes for political negotiations, Canadian policy, while supporting a variety of peacebuilding activities, also remains firmly committed to the implementation of the Roadmap. As a Canadian statement at the United Nations in November 2003 put it, that commitment is “to the goal of two states living side by side in peace and security, the State of Israel and an independent, viable and democratic Palestinian State.”³⁰⁶

What can Canada bring to current possibilities for reviving productive political negotiations? While witnesses told the Committee repeatedly that Canada is well regarded within the region, it is also the case that Canada is not generally seen as a major actor in the Middle East peace process. In the decade since the Oslo accords were signed, one focus of Canada’s involvement has been on Palestinian refugee issues under the auspices of the United Nations and multilateral agencies. But some analysts contend that this track, and with it Canada’s role, is a diminishing one. As a Canadian academic puts it:

Aside from sporadic policy pronouncements, Canada is still engaged in modest humanitarian efforts, but in light of its declared dedication to development issues and peacebuilding — issues crucial to the success of any Israeli-Palestinian peace agreement — it is curious that the demise of the multilaterals has caused Canada’s work as a regional facilitator to be stymied to such a degree  …  Canada’s absolute and relative diplomatic influence in the region has declined from that of a middle power to a minor power at best, at the same time the other third parties, such as the European Union, have taken an increasingly active role in international affairs.³⁰⁷

We do not necessarily share that marginalizing assessment. Canada’s chairmanship of the working group on refugees gives us a continuing presence on issues that are critical to reaching any viable two-state peace agreement.³⁰⁸ Canada is also providing support to innovative peacebuilding projects.³⁰⁹ Nevertheless, the Committee is concerned that Canada’s acknowledged diplomatic assets in the region may not be sufficiently resourced, mobilized, and utilized to give concrete support to those who are engaged in the difficult and dangerous work of seeking peace and justice.

Canada needs to do more than just welcome peace initiatives by others and denounce the cruel effects of terrorism and violence. We need to be present in finding the solutions. While it is beyond the scope of this report to make detailed policy recommendations in this area, we trust that this matter will be among those considered by the forthcoming review of Canada’s international policies announced in the Speech from the Throne of February 2004.

RECOMMENDATION 15

In order to encourage all possibilities for a resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the Government of Canada should consider how Canada can play a stronger role in supporting:

	•	good governance, social development and educational efforts, working with pro-democracy partners in the region;
	•	conflict resolution, community dialogue and confidence-building measures that strengthen civil society;
	•	peacebuilding initiatives, including facilitating, sponsoring and hosting peace activities in the region, in addition to playing a more active role in advancing the established Roadmap process for political negotiations.

RECOMMENDATION 16

Canada should ensure that its humanitarian and development assistance activities in the Palestinian territories make the maximum contribution to meeting human needs priorities while promoting peaceful and pluralistic solutions to the conflict.

RECOMMENDATION 17

Canada should continue to impress upon Israeli and Palestinian authorities their responsibilities to respect international human rights obligations and their mutual interest in ending all violence, particularly terrorist violence targeting innocent civilians, and pursuing peace negotiations in good faith.

RECOMMENDATION 18

The longer term role and capabilities of Canadian diplomatic, defence, and development assistance resources in advancing the Middle East peace process should be re-assessed in the context of the forthcoming review of Canada’s international policies announced by the Government in February 2004.

Jordan

The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan is, like Morocco, the first Muslim country visited by the Committee in the course of this study, an Arab kingdom without oil and wrestling with questions of socio-economic development and democratic reform. But Jordan’s special circumstances also place it in the middle of the Middle East’s evolving security crises. Jordan lies between Israel and Iraq, and next door to the occupied Palestinian territories; its future is bound up with a resolution to the central conflicts of the Middle East. Of Jordan’s over five million people, a majority are Palestinians, and most of these have Jordanian citizenship.³¹⁰

Jordan was one of the small successor states carved out of the collapsed Ottoman empire by the great-power negotiations that followed the First World War. Established as a monarchy under the Hashemite family since 1921, it became a British mandate territory under the League of Nations until independence in 1946 following the Second World War. The current ruler, King Abdullah II, succeeded his father King Hussein in 1999. Although Jordan has fought two wars against Israel, losing the West Bank of the Jordan river in the 1967 war, the Oslo accords of the early 1990s opened a window that allowed Jordan to follow Egypt’s earlier example and enter into a bilateral peace treaty with Israel in 1994.

Jordan’s monarchy — which retains executive power, albeit constrained by the views of tribal leaders and, to a lesser extent, the 110 members of a revived National Assembly to which elections were held in June 2003 — is considered to be a moderate ally of the United States and Western countries in the region. Jordan has been an active player in Middle East peace negotiations. Following the release of the Geneva Accord in early December 2003, King Abdullah and U.S. President Bush were reported to have discussed new Palestinian ceasefire proposals.³¹¹ At the same time, issues such as the Iraq war and the lack of concrete progress on the Middle East roadmap for peace have provoked growing anger among the population and frustration in official circles. A major question is how well the Hashemite dynasty will be able to manage necessary processes of domestic political and socio-economic reform in the midst of these ongoing crises.

A recent International Crisis Group (ICG) report on the challenges facing Jordan argues that the regime’s stability depends on continuing a carefully managed process of democratic reforms. The report, which was referred to by one of the Committee’s witnesses, Oraib Al-Rantawi of the Al-Quds Center for Political Studies in Amman, observes that: “Jordan has weathered the Middle East’s recent storms, but to maintain stability it must decide how much democracy it now needs and can afford.”³¹² Jordan’s leaders will have to tread a fine balance in both coping with such external developments and responding to internal pressures. The report describes the situation confronting King Abdullah in moving to open up the political space as a course that

…is fraught with risks, not only because it may affect power relationships between a Palestinian-origin majority not yet fully integrated into Jordanian society and the tribes that have been traditional supporters of the monarchy, but also because it is seen by many as a policy pushed by a U.S. government that is distinctly unpopular with the Jordanian public. As in Egypt … U.S. policies in Iraq and on the Israel-Palestinian conflict are hurting the cause of political liberalisation in Jordan.

The King seems to favour a measured process, making a strong pledge in support of democratic reform, relaxing restrictions on expression and association, and pushing for the establishment of a Centre for Human Rights and a Higher Media Council. In June, the government organised elections and revived Parliament after a two-year hiatus. Although the elections were free, their ground rules ensured a safe pro-regime parliament. These steps may not satisfy the strongest critics, but in circumstances where all agree the process could spin out of control if not carefully managed, they are probably realistic. Most of all, they are necessary as a means of addressing popular discontent over the economic situation and regional developments.³¹³

The Committee’s meetings corroborated that assessment of the need for progress both on the Middle East peace process and on domestic political and economic reforms.

Witness Views in Jordan

Describing Jordan as an open society, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Shaher Bak recalled that Jordan and Canada had a cooperative relationship, particularly on human security issues. Discussions about democratization and dialogue between civilizations and religions were important, though not new, and were being stressed by the King. Mr. Bak also noted that Prince Hassan had established the Arab Thought Forum in 1981 to address the diversity of civilizations and cultures within the Arab world. Jordanian political life is evolving, he contended. Elections will eventually be only on the basis of merit. Jordan is opening a national dialogue to build relations between all parts of society, and hopefully these steps will be a positive example for other Muslim societies in the region.

Mr. Bak observed that the difficulties to be overcome included the fallout from September 11, for which Jordan had paid a huge economic price. He added that support for terrorism feeds on the despair caused by poverty and unemployment. Young people with nothing to do and no jobs are fertile ground. In Jordan, 70% of the population is under 20 years old and unemployment is high. Jobs require stability and stability requires peace. Without this, radicalism emerges. He urged consideration of all the elements — political, economic, and cultural — on which international cooperation is required. Within societies, there is a need for tolerance of other religions to be taught in schools. There should be no second-class citizens. Security is important, but without open dialogue between people — as the Geneva Initiative demonstrated between Israelis and Palestinians — innocent people will continue to pay the price.

On Iraq, Mr. Bak argued that only Iraqis can provide security. He indicated that Jordan will assist Iraq to build its police force and judiciary without being preoccupied with the legal framework for such efforts. The priority was to work with the Iraqi people because, as he put it, if your neighbour is insecure, you will never sleep. He argued that Jordan was well placed to be a channel for such assistance working with the United Nations and the Iraqi provisional authorities, and he welcomed Canadian participation in that effort.

With respect to governance and other reforms to promote investor confidence and create jobs in the region, Mr. Bak regretted the absence of an effective regional organization due to the Palestine problem. In his view, the Arab League had proven to be a failure in terms of fostering regional development, and that was again contingent on a solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. He agreed that there was a need for a change in the region’s power structures, and observed that most political initiatives of the past 30 years had been “filtered” through Jordan. An upcoming example of that was a conference to be held in May 2004 on water as a regional issue.

The Committee’s subsequent encounter with Jordanian parliamentarians led by the Assembly’s Speaker, marked the first such exchange between Canadian and Jordanian elected representatives. They expressed appreciation for Canada’s development assistance to Jordan and welcomed an opening of new prospects for political dialogue. They were also candid in their concerns about the problems suffered by their people as a result of what they considered to be a half century of wars and unjust occupation of Arab land. Once more there are doubts over another foreign occupation in the name of fighting terrorism. They gave credit to King Hussein for leading the country courageously to peace with Israel. Jordanians, they stated, reject violence. But in their view, resistance to occupation is another matter and cannot be equated to terrorism. Hence in looking forward to peace, Jordanians also look forward to freedom, dignity and the end of the occupation of Palestine and Iraq. U.S. policies in the region must change or it will be more difficult to continue dialogue. As for Islamist extremists, there will always be some but, they insisted, Islam is a religion of tolerance.

The Committee’s meetings with civil society representatives addressed a range of issues related to political development in Jordan, the role of women, the nature of the Palestinian situation and the ability of Jordan’s governments to respond to pressing economic and social issues in the absence of progress on key regional security issues. Oraib Rantawi, Director of the Al Quds Centre for Political Studies recalled the two major conflicts that had shaped the region: the Arab-Israeli conflict of the past century and the conflicts involving Iraq in the past 20 years. For many years, the Palestinian cause had been an excuse to justify the failure of political and economic reforms in the region. He observed that the reform process on economic issues was moving ahead in Jordan, but achieving an effective civil society was still a long way away. Besides the political reforms needed, poverty, unemployment, and empowerment for women were among the priorities requiring action. Mr. Rantawi added that Jordan’s government also had much work to do in order to deal with religious fundamentalists, social conservatives and the regime’s old guard. Expressing appreciation for the Canadian position on the Iraq war, he hoped that Canada could play a bridge-building role and provide support to Jordan on security and good governance issues.

Amal Sabbagh, Secretary General of Jordan’s National Commission for Women, noted that in 1997, 17 women had contested Assembly seats but none were successful. It had taken a quota to get women into parliament. After six years of lobbying for such a quota, it was granted by King Abdullah, not the government. With the current quota of six women, questions had turned to the nature of the selection mechanism, the number of seats and the bias toward smaller districts. Mrs. Sabbagh observed that the government wants a national dialogue but the elections law was not likely to be a part of the dialogue. However, she was encouraged by regional meetings of parliamentarians with women across Jordan and the substantive, articulate and focused nature of those dialogues that helped to dispel the notion that “women’s advocacy” was driven by elite women in the capital of Amman. As a result, the male parliamentarians were recognizing women as an important voting group in the next elections.

Mouin Rabbani, senior analyst for the International Crisis Group in Amman, noted that there were three themes running through politics in Jordan. First, people feel a lack of adequate political representation. This was especially true for women but also for the general population, even with the recent parliamentary elections. Many people feel that decisions are made without their consent or involvement. Second, they feel there is a lack of adequate participation in the strategy of economic and social development. He explained that the focus on economic reform was not the result of an indigenous process but rather was the result of IMF intervention and strategic considerations. Consequently, there was little room to adjust the process and its priorities did not necessarily enjoy popular support. Third, in his view, the regional crises of Iraq and the Israel-Palestinian conflict had left people in Jordan feeling unable to affect the realities in the region that were of the most interest to them. While Jordan’s political evolution was an advantage compared to rigid autocracies like Syria or Saudi Arabia, it was still an underdeveloped society, a fact that fostered the development of what he termed “extra-legal movements”.

These witnesses also pointed out that many Muslims aspired to democracy and merely debated the form of democracy. Structures for democratic representation and human rights protection would have to be adapted to the particular features of a traditional society like Jordan’s. They did not put much store in either the role of the Arab League³¹⁴ or in external interventions such as the removal of Saddam Hussein’s regime in Iraq (which was not considered a threat to Jordan but rather a commercial partner). One pointed out that, according to a recent poll, 74% of Jordanians consider the U.S. as the biggest threat to the region, the highest percentage among all Arab countries, for several reasons including its seemingly unconditional support for Israel.

At the same time, they considered that Canada’s political capital in the region was high, given our position on the Iraq war. Canada was also seen as having a reputation for not socially excluding minorities and for taking an approach to the question of the Islamic world’s relations with the West that is much different from and more acceptable than that of the U.S. These Jordanians urged Canada to continue to deal with civil society institutions in the Arab world, whose engagement is essential to the reform process. One of the challenges they saw is how to deal with the U.S. on these issues without being driven by a U.S. agenda.

In another roundtable with a group of senior Jordanian journalists, the Committee also came away with the impression that there is a Canadian role in supporting media, human rights and other civil society institutions in the region. The exchanges revealed ongoing concerns about press freedoms in Jordan as well as for the future of the Palestinian people. It was observed that King Abdullah’s focus on economic and social development was accompanied by retrenchment on political issues, including media freedom, noting a new restrictive law that was passed 28 days after September 11, 2001 and the prosecutions that have taken place under this law, including for moral and religious reasons. Moreover, the law made it difficult to report on accusations of impropriety without being exposed to charges. Internal censorship also exists, both in the form of editors toning down stories they expect to be outside the bounds of the acceptable, and in the form of late night calls from the security services to editors suggesting that certain stories not be printed.

While the King himself is widely viewed as progressive on these issues, he is surrounded by conservative security services and other elements of the old guard who are preoccupied with the long-term stability of the regime. There were signs, however, of the beginnings of a movement to allow a more open political environment to re-emerge, including on media issues. One of the problems identified is that journalism is a low-paying profession that lacks respect from officials. The cause of press freedom would also be helped if the government were to sell its shares in the major daily papers.

Another problem noted was that there is virtually no positive coverage of Israel in the press, combined with a constant emphasis on the difficult situation of the Palestinians in the occupied territories. That reflects the widely held view of the Israeli behaviour as that of an armed occupation of unarmed people. However mention was made of an upcoming investigative journalism review of Jordanian-Israeli bilateral relations that would reveal a wealth of regular contact at the “committee level” under the auspices of the bilateral peace treaty. It was also pointed out that in addition to contacts on foreign policy issues, bilateral cooperation projects with Israel have increased, such as on practical economic issues and a survey of the Rift Valley. There is also good cooperation on border and security relations. In the education field, many Jordanian masters and doctoral students are studying at Israeli universities, 28 in the environment field alone. Yet this information is rarely reported.

The views of former prime minister Taher Masri and former foreign minister Abdullah Ensour in regard to the Middle East peace process have already been noted in the preceding chapter. There are several additional important overall points to add from their wide-ranging comments to the Committee. One is their assessment that, even with peace on the Israel-Palestinian fronts, democratic, economic and social development throughout the region would only follow slowly and not necessarily automatically. They conceded that Israel’s existence had been used by many to build and consolidate undemocratic regimes. Peace would expose leaders to pressures for democratization. Changes in the status of women and improvements in the education system might then start moving in the right direction, but these processes would be gradual.

Another point they made is that many in the region are willing to engage with Canada in meeting such challenges. There is fertile ground for working cooperatively in the building of civil society. Mr. Masri recalled the substantial aid Canada had provided to Jordan and the Arab world. He expressed appreciation for a Canadian stance that is regarded as being objective on issues, emphasizing that Jordanians have no complaints about Canada’s “political behaviour”. Echoing these comments, Mr. Ensour saw further political exchanges as “part of the remedy” to the current situation. He argued that they should be institutionalized given that Canada was one of the few countries that could be part of the solution. The ongoing conflict had “minimized civilization” in the region. Once freed from that tragic context, perhaps better things would be possible.

Directions for Canadian Policy

The Committee sees Jordan as an important potential bridge between the West and the Muslim world in an area facing the need to recover and move on from generations of violence and terror. Jordan has benefited from significant Canadian development assistance amounting to approximately $86 million over the past decade focused on education and training, water and sanitation, and peacebuilding. Canada has both an investment and a long-term interest in Jordan’s continued socio-economic development, in its progress along a sustainable path of liberal-democratic reform, and in its ability to contribute to an ultimate resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

On all these counts, Canadian policy should make every effort to encourage and support Jordan’s evolution as a more open and outward-looking society that is engaged in bringing about positive changes for the peoples of the Middle East and for international order as a whole. We note that when Raja Khouri of the Canadian Arab Federation appeared before the Committee in Ottawa and referred to the need to support and build on efforts within Canada and the Muslim world to improve dialogue, intercultural and interfaith understanding, pluralism and non-violent conflict resolution, he cited the motto of a Jordanian-based organization, the South-North Centre for Dialogue and Development that states eloquently and succinctly: “People involved in dialogue are no longer people involved in conflict, but people seeking solutions.”³¹⁵

RECOMMENDATION 19

The Government of Canada should strongly encourage the Government of Jordan to continue along a path of liberalizing socio-economic, democratic, good governance and human rights reforms. Canada should also pursue cooperation with Jordan on regional peace and democracy-building objectives, including cultivating channels for interfaith dialogue and for political dialogue at both official and civil-society levels.

Morocco

Morocco is embracing change while preserving its timeless identity; a historical State where the Mediterranean, the Atlantic and the Sahara meet, a land of dialogue and tolerance for the Berber, Arab, Islamic, Jewish, Mediterranean and African cultures and civilizations. The Moroccans are warm, hospitable and peaceful people. They are a people with a deeply rooted identity, yet open to modernity. Moroccans practice Islam, a religion of kindness and of respect for human life, a religion of tolerance and solidarity. Morocco is a haven of peace, stability and moderation in the Mediterranean and in the world.³¹⁶

Moroccan Prime Minister Driss Jettou
January, 2004

 … free political discussion is far broader than it once was but both democracy and Islam in Morocco still exist very much within the framework of royal control. While the robust multiparty system holds out hope for increasing legislative power in Morocco, it remains to be seen how Muhammad will rule in the long run, and whether he will expand the scope of democracy … ³¹⁷

Noah Feldman

Morocco is widely acknowledged as one of leading states in the Arab world in terms of political reform, and Moroccans argue that the fact that their King also acts as “Commander of the Faithful” helps ensure that Islam as practiced in Morocco remains moderate. The Committee’s visit to Morocco largely confirmed these views, yet also underlined the need to continue assisting Morocco as it continues to pursue political, economic and social reform.

Monarchy and Reform

Morocco’s population of some 31 million is almost totally Berber-Arab and Muslim. A traditional link between Europe and Africa, Morocco is located at the western extremity of the Arab-Muslim world, and, with Algeria, Libya, Mauritania and Tunisia comprises the geographical area known as the Maghreb. A French protectorate from 1912 to 1956, Morocco recovered its independence in 1955 with the return of the Sultan of Morocco (future King Mohammed V) and the formation of the first independent Moroccan government. Although independence came after a long struggle in which religion played a role, this process in Morocco was much less violent than in neighbouring state and regional rival Algeria.

The Monarchy remains the dominant foundation of both Morocco’s society and its government. Article I of Morocco’s constitution defines it as a Muslim state and a constitutional, democratic and social monarchy. The Monarch acts both as the central figure in the government, with the power among others to appoint the Prime Minister, change the constitution and refuse to amend laws, and in religious terms as “Commander of the Faithful.” As one expert has explained, the widely accepted view internationally is “That the king is both religious and secular leader … anchors political legitimacy in compromise, cooperation and consensus that rejects violent confrontation.”³¹⁸

King Mohammed V was succeeded in 1961 by his son, King Hassan II, who was to rule Morocco for almost 40 years. As Feldman has observed, while Hassan II allowed multiple political parties in Morocco, for most of his reign he kept the legislature relatively powerless, and appointed royalist prime ministers and governments. In 1998, however, he appointed a prime minister from what had long been the main opposition party, a move Feldman calls “remarkable progress toward democracy.”³¹⁹

Hassan II was succeeded in July 1999 by his son, Mohammed VI, who, after receiving a law degree in Morocco had served as an aide to Jacques Delors at the European Union, and worked on an advanced law degree in France. The King began his reign by immediately firing his late father’s minister of the interior, a man widely blamed for the repression of dissidents and other abuses. Mohammed VI generally accepted to be one of the leading reformers in the Arab world — Feldman argues, in fact, that he and King Abdullah of Jordan “may … represent the best hope for the development of Islamic democracy in the Arab world.”³²⁰ The first Arab Human Development Report cited Morocco as an example of progress in the Arab world, noting “recent democratic reforms in Morocco,” and “the achievement of Moroccan women’s associations in breaking down old taboos.”³²¹ This latter point about the role of women in Morocco was also made before the Committee in Ottawa by Mazen Chouaib of the National Council on Canada Arab Relations.³²²

A number of witnesses before the Committee agreed on the nature and importance of reforms in Morocco. In New York, Rima Khalaf Hunaidi, a former Deputy Prime Minister of Jordan who, as UN Assistant Secretary General and Director of the UNDP’s Regional Bureau for Arab States was responsible for the production of the landmark Arab Human Development Reports, told the Committee that Morocco had been moving ahead in terms of elections, women in parliament, serious political parties and domestic reconciliation; she would rate it among the top reformers among Arab countries. Dr. Isobel Coleman of the Council on Foreign Relations added that the King saw himself as a young reformer nudging the country along the road to change, for example, through the establishment of quotas to ensure representation of women in the landmark September 2002 election. She also argued that, among other cases, the experience of Morocco has suggested that allowing Islamist parties to participate in elections results in their being less radical.

Addressing Political and Social Challenges

Despite a relatively low turnout, the 2002 election is accepted as the first ever transparent one held in Morocco, and saw the election of 34 women. At least as important was the fact that the government allowed one moderate Islamist party, the Justice and Development Party, to participate, and it won enough support to make it the third largest group in parliament, and the arguably most effective parliamentary opposition in the view of some.³²³ At the same time, the fact that the government did not allow the more popular — and less moderate — Justice and Benevolence Party to participate was seen by most as evidence that more remains to be done in terms of democratization in Morocco. Some were more critical. American political scientist John Entelis argued soon after the election that:

To understand the gap between image and reality in Morocco we must analyse the change that the country has experienced in these last two decades. The current generation of young adults has grown up on broken promises, false hopes, unrealistic expectations, cultural uncertainty and political manipulation. Corruption and elite privileges prevail at the highest levels of political authority, setting a standard for those below.³²⁴

Apart from democratization and governance, the major challenges facing Morocco continue to be economic development, illiteracy — overall rates are high, and reach about 70% for women — unemployment and the marginalization of women. With Canadian and other help, King Mohammed VI has put significant emphasis on education reform. As Noah Feldman has noted “the more educated people are, the more they seek a say in governing themselves. That is why promoting literacy and education are brave (or risky) strategies for a monarch.”³²⁵ In addition, after years of discussion, in the fall of 2003 the King finally introduced a revised Family Relations Act (Moudawana) in parliament, explaining that he did so both as King and as Commander of the Faithful. Long before the revised law was presented, however, Islamists protesting the reform on the streets had outnumbered a pro-reform demonstration by roughly 3 to 1.³²⁶

The May 2003 suicide bombings of five separate targets in Casablanca, which killed 39 and injured 60 (less than a week after the Committee’s visit to Morocco), exposed a real physical security threat to the country. The government moved quickly to address this threat — too quickly, in the opinion of some. Some 634 people were charged in connection with the bombings, leading human rights groups to argue that this has been used as a pretext to arrest so-called extremists. In an open letter to U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell in advance of a December 2003 trip to North Africa, Human Rights Watch argued that:

In Morocco, a crackdown under new anti-terror legislation that intensified after the May 17 attacks in Casablanca is eroding the substantial advances made on human rights over the last decade. Years after the practice of "disappearances" was halted and the incidence of torture dropped, there are again reports of suspicious deaths in detention and persons who remain unaccounted for months after their arrest. We urge you to encourage Moroccan authorities to pursue the detention, investigation, and trials of suspected militants in a way that preserves the progress that made it one of the countries in the region most respectful of human rights.

It is critical also that Moroccan authorities reaffirm their commitment to press freedom. One step they should take is to release imprisoned journalists, notably Ali Mrabet, editor of Demain and Douman, independent weeklies in French and Arabic that were closed down by court order. Mrabet is serving three years in prison after being convicted in May of "insulting the king," "undermining the monarchy, and "endangering the integrity of national territory" for articles, interviews and cartoons he published.³²⁷

In January 2004, Mohammed VI granted clemency to 33 people deemed subversive, including a dozen Islamists, a dozen independence campaigners from Western Sahara and several journalists, including Ali Mrabet. At least as importantly, in December 2003 he announced that a Justice and Reconciliation Commission would be established to produce a definitive account of human rights abuses in Morocco over the past few decades. According to an assessment in The Economist: “If this does its job well it may set an example for the entire Arab world.”³²⁸

Apart from the terrorist threat demonstrated by the 2003 bombings, one analyst has argued that other factors also contribute to “a strange climate of insecurity” in Morocco.³²⁹ Economically, Feldman has noted that “Morocco is on both the Mediterranean and the Atlantic, but it is not the gateway to anywhere but the Sahara Desert, and its productivity is not what it should be.”³³⁰ While the pace of economic reform has not resolved problems such as high unemployment, however, it has led to an exodus from the country to the cities, a trend that will increase if a free trade agreement offered by the United States requires real agricultural reform. The difficulty of officially migrating to Europe has also led to an increase in unofficial migration. Jon Marks adds that, “Many employed professionals believe that in an economy still dominated by family-led companies they can enjoy a comfortable lifestyle but may aspire to no more; for these groups, lack of social mobility has meant tens of thousands have applied to leave for one country which might still take them legally, Canada.”³³¹

A final issue contributing to a sense of insecurity is the fate of the Western Sahara, which remains a key issue in Moroccan politics. The territory was virtually annexed by Morocco in 1975 when King Hassan II organized the “Green March” by some 350,000 unarmed volunteers. Morocco considers this part of its sovereign territory, yet it remains disputed, and with the end of the Cold War international pressure for a diplomatic solution has increased. In July 2003, the United Nations Security Council voted to accept a plan drawn up by former U.S. Secretary of State James Baker that some believe may lead to the loss of the territory to the independence — seeking POLISARIO front in several years. One expert argued in September 2003 that “As he turns forty and after five years on the throne, the Sahara, more even than Islamic radicalism, could prove the defining issue of King Mohammed’s reign.”³³²

Witnesses Views in Morocco

Witnesses in Morocco welcomed the Committee’s visit as an example of the type of dialogue needed between the Muslim world and Western states. They also welcomed the chance to explain the many challenges facing the country, and to lay to rest myths and generalizations propagated by the media about Muslim states that they argued did not apply to Morocco.

On the domestic level, they underlined continuing challenges related to the lack of democracy, widespread illiteracy and the role of women, particularly in the countryside. Academic Fahd Regragui added that we should look at people rather than religions, and that issues such as illiteracy are not the fault of Islam, but of governments. These challenges have resulted in social pressures and strengthened the appeal of extremists. Mohammed Tozy argued that the development of a strong Islamism in Morocco has been very slow. Many witnesses argued that the fact that the King is also “Commander of the Faithful” has reduced the latitude for the political use of religion by others in the country.

Mohammed-Allal Sinaceur, a human rights expert, former minister and, more importantly, “Conseiller de Sa Majesté le Roi” argued that the fact that there is a single juridical and pragmatic (Maliki) Islam in Morocco explains what does not happen there. At the same time, the late Hassan II had thought about the problems of a more politicized Islam, and fought against it. Speaking in Arabic, member of Parliament Fatima Moustaghfi argued that while Morocco was poor economically it was culturally rich. She saw her role as an MP as being to protect her Moroccan culture and help work toward human rights and values. While the King was also the Commander of the Faithful, she noted that at their wedding his bride had not been veiled.

Lahcen Daoudi, a member of Parliament from the moderate Islamist Justice and Development Party argued that Islam had always stressed consultation which was the basis of democracy; while the form may be different, it was the principles that count. As to whether Islamists could “deliver” in the political process, since it had taken centuries to do so in the West, it was unrealistic to expect this in a decade elsewhere. While human rights are not to be violated in Islam, he added that there were both individual and group rights. People could do what they liked in their homes, but had to recognize that there are different rules when they are outside in the “collective space.” While Islam is not violent, people do not know their religion and so can be told anything. On the other hand, people are not born violent, they become violent and this is society’s responsibility. While elites in Morocco thought modernity was around the corner, this was not true and there existed a gap between them and the people. Education is a universal remedy without which nothing would change. Moreover, education and justice must be recognized as a solution while punishment is not.

On the international scene, many witnesses raised the issue of the Palestinians as an example of the frustration felt by Muslims around the world. Some defended the use of suicide bombings as the only means available to Palestinians to combat Israeli occupation. Lawyer and political activist Khalid Seffiani argued that the origin of extremism was violence and occupation such as that by Israel in Palestine. Palestinians were justified in responding to occupation in the same way that Charles de Gaulle had fought the German occupation of France, and he therefore disagreed with Canada’s decision to list Hizbollah as a terrorist group. On the other hand, he did not see the West as a monolithic bloc: while he would have refused to meet with an American delegation, he appreciated EU efforts, and believed Canada should join it in an attempt to establish a political counterweight to the United States. Mohammed Tozy agreed that it was important not to equate groups such as Hizbollah, which were willing to enter into negotiations, with Osama bin Laden.

While noting that the Arab world is disgusted with the injustice and blatant policy of double standards on the issue of Palestine and recommending Canada do more to try to resolve the situation, businessman Abdelmalek Kettani noted that in some respects the Palestinian problem was “viagra” for Arab leaders. While they were not fans of the regime of Saddam Hussein, a number of witnesses also condemned the invasion of Iraq. Khalid Seffiani argued that while he had never liked the regime of Saddam Hussein, no one had the right to overthrow it.

Witnesses praised Canadian policy both on the international and domestic levels. Internationally, several argued that Canada should continue to follow international law, and pursue a policy different from that of the United States. All stressed the need for continued dialogue, and many argued that Canada and its G-8 and EU allies could help Morocco and other Muslim states in terms of economic and technical aid to support education and democratization. Abdelmalek Kettani recommended on behalf of the NGO “Alternatives” that in the short term, Canada and other G-8 states should take countries that were making good progress in governance, such as Morocco, and use them as an example in the broader Arab world. Among other things, they suggested they could establish a fund to help civil society group address modernity. He also singled out student exchanges as a particularly useful vehicle to help overall understanding.

Directions for Canadian Policy

Canada and Morocco have maintained diplomatic relations since 1962. The backbone of these relations for the first three decades was Canadian development assistance. Initially focusing on institutional support, training and education and later shifting to assist in developing Morocco’s private sector in areas such as management and technology, this amounted to about $400 million between 1963 and 1998. Given that most assistance was due to end in 2003, after consultations with the Moroccan government and civil society, a decision was made to refocus assistance in the three areas of basic education, job training and social development. Paul Hunt of CIDA told the Committee that:

 …  recently, with the authorities and civil society groups in Morocco, we have refocused Canada’s contribution program to focus on basic education. Why? It’s the key to a series of positive development changes that take place in a society. And the Moroccan authorities were very keen to have Canada’s capacity in this area in both languages and in a way that was to accompany their efforts to put in place a reform strategy for basic education.³³³

Canadian assistance to Morocco totalled some $5.45 million in fiscal year 2002-2003. The Canadian Embassy in Morocco has a $265,000 Canada Fund for Local Initiatives to assist civil society groups, and a $500,000 fund to promote gender equality.

Canada now has a Moroccan community of some 60,000 — mainly in Montreal — and about 1,000 Moroccan students come to Canada to study each year (Moroccans are the third largest group of foreign students in Quebec). In addition to development assistance, the Canadian government has recognized Morocco as an important and moderate Muslim state and a member of la Francophonie, and has worked to strengthen relations. Gwynne Dyer commented to the Committee in London on the successful and valuable work the Canadian government had done raising Canada’s profile in the Francophone parts of the Muslim world, including the Maghreb, adding that this was money well spent.

The Committee agrees that how Morocco addresses its own challenges has the potential to set an example for other Arab states. Canada should therefore continue to assist Morocco in pursuing further democratization and development.

RECOMMENDATION 20

Canada should continue to encourage and provide support to the Government of Morocco as it pursues its broad program of reform. In particular, Canada should increase assistance in the area of education, and continue assistance for democratization, governance reform and strengthening civil society.