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38th PARLIAMENT, 1st SESSION

Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade

EVIDENCE

CONTENTS

Thursday, November 3, 2005

0905

The Chair (Mr. Bernard Patry (Pierrefonds—Dollard, Lib.))

Mr. André Donneur (Professor, Department of Political Science, Université du Québec à Montréal)

0910

The Chair

Mr. Kevin Sorenson (Crowfoot, CPC)

Mr. André Donneur

0915

Mr. Kevin Sorenson

The Chair

Mr. André Donneur

0920

The Chair

Mr. Pierre Paquette (Joliette, BQ)

0925

Mr. André Donneur

Mr. Pierre Paquette

Mr. André Donneur

0930

Mr. Pierre Paquette

Mr. André Donneur

The Chair

Ms. Beth Phinney (Hamilton Mountain, Lib.)

Mr. André Donneur

Ms. Beth Phinney

0935

Mr. André Donneur

Ms. Beth Phinney

Mr. André Donneur

Ms. Beth Phinney

Mr. André Donneur

Ms. Beth Phinney

The Chair

0940

Mr. André Donneur

The Chair

Mr. André Donneur

The Chair

Mr. Kevin Sorenson

0945

Mr. André Donneur

0950

The Chair

Ms. Beth Phinney

Mr. André Donneur

The Chair

Mr. Pierre Paquette

Mr. André Donneur

0955

The Chair

Ms. Beth Phinney

Mr. André Donneur

The Chair

Mr. William Hogg (Professor, Political Studies, Bishop's University)

The Chair

1015

Mr. William Hogg

The Chair

Mr. William Hogg

1020

The Chair

Mr. Kevin Sorenson

1025

Mr. William Hogg

Mr. Kevin Sorenson

Mr. William Hogg

Mr. Kevin Sorenson

1030

Mr. William Hogg

Mr. Kevin Sorenson

Mr. William Hogg

Mr. Kevin Sorenson

Mr. William Hogg

Mr. Kevin Sorenson

Mr. William Hogg

1035

The Chair

Mr. Kevin Sorenson

Mr. William Hogg

1040

Mr. Kevin Sorenson

The Chair

Mr. Pierre Paquette

Mr. William Hogg

Mr. Pierre Paquette

Mr. William Hogg

Mr. Pierre Paquette

Mr. William Hogg

Mr. Pierre Paquette

Mr. William Hogg

1045

Mr. Pierre Paquette

Mr. William Hogg

Mr. Pierre Paquette

Mr. William Hogg

Mr. Pierre Paquette

Mr. William Hogg

Mr. Pierre Paquette

Mr. William Hogg

Mr. Pierre Paquette

The Chair

Mr. Pierre Paquette

Mr. William Hogg

Mr. Pierre Paquette

Mr. William Hogg

Mr. Pierre Paquette

The Chair

Mr. Pierre Paquette

Mr. William Hogg

Mr. Pierre Paquette

Mr. William Hogg

Mr. Pierre Paquette

Mr. William Hogg

1050

Mr. Pierre Paquette

Mr. William Hogg

Mr. Pierre Paquette

Mr. William Hogg

The Chair

Ms. Beth Phinney

Mr. William Hogg

1055

Ms. Beth Phinney

Mr. William Hogg

Ms. Beth Phinney

Mr. William Hogg

Ms. Beth Phinney

Mr. William Hogg

Ms. Beth Phinney

Mr. William Hogg

Ms. Beth Phinney

Mr. William Hogg

Ms. Beth Phinney

Mr. William Hogg

The Chair

Mr. William Hogg

1100

The Chair

Mr. William Hogg

The Chair

Mr. William Hogg

The Chair

Mr. Kevin Sorenson

Mr. William Hogg

Mr. Kevin Sorenson

Mr. William Hogg

Mr. Kevin Sorenson

1105

Mr. William Hogg

Mr. Kevin Sorenson

Mr. William Hogg

Mr. Pierre Paquette

Mr. William Hogg

1110

Mr. Kevin Sorenson

Mr. William Hogg

The Chair

Mr. Pierre Paquette

Mr. William Hogg

Mr. Pierre Paquette

The Chair

Mr. William Hogg

Mr. Pierre Paquette

Mr. William Hogg

The Chair

Mr. William Hogg

1115

The Chair

Mr. William Hogg

The Chair

Ms. Judith Berlyn (Co-Chair, Westmount Initiative for Peace, Canadian Peace Alliance (The))

The Chair

Ms. Judith Berlyn

1135

1140

The Chair

Normand Beaudet (Coordinateur du Centre de ressourcs sur la non-violence, Collectif Echec à la guerre)

The Chair

Ms. Judith Berlyn

The Chair

Normand Beaudet

1145

1150

The Chair

Normand Beaudet

The Chair

Normand Beaudet

The Chair

Normand Beaudet

The Chair

Normand Beaudet

The Chair

Normand Beaudet

The Chair

Ms. Judith Berlyn

The Chair

Ms. Judith Berlyn

1155

The Chair

Ms. Judith Berlyn

The Chair

Mr. Kevin Sorenson

Ms. Judith Berlyn

Mr. Kevin Sorenson

Ms. Judith Berlyn

The Chair

Mr. Pierre Paquette

Normand Beaudet

Mr. Pierre Paquette

Normand Beaudet

Mr. Pierre Paquette

Normand Beaudet

Mr. Pierre Paquette

Normand Beaudet

1200

Ms. Judith Berlyn

Mr. Pierre Paquette

Ms. Judith Berlyn

Mr. Pierre Paquette

Ms. Judith Berlyn

Mr. Pierre Paquette

Ms. Judith Berlyn

Normand Beaudet

Mr. Pierre Paquette

Ms. Judith Berlyn

Mr. Pierre Paquette

Normand Beaudet

Mr. Pierre Paquette

1205

Normand Beaudet

Mr. Pierre Paquette

Normand Beaudet

Mr. Pierre Paquette

The Chair

Mr. Pierre Paquette

Ms. Judith Berlyn

Mr. Pierre Paquette

Ms. Judith Berlyn

Mr. Pierre Paquette

Ms. Judith Berlyn

Mr. Pierre Paquette

Ms. Judith Berlyn

Mr. Pierre Paquette

Ms. Judith Berlyn

Mr. Pierre Paquette

Ms. Judith Berlyn

Mr. Pierre Paquette

Ms. Judith Berlyn

1210

The Chair

Ms. Judith Berlyn

The Chair

Ms. Judith Berlyn

The Chair

Ms. Beth Phinney

Ms. Judith Berlyn

Ms. Beth Phinney

Ms. Judith Berlyn

Ms. Beth Phinney

Ms. Judith Berlyn

1215

Normand Beaudet

Ms. Beth Phinney

The Chair

Normand Beaudet

The Chair

Normand Beaudet

The Chair

Normand Beaudet

The Chair

CANADA

Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade

NUMBER 068

1st SESSION

38th PARLIAMENT

EVIDENCE

Thursday, November 3, 2005

[Recorded by Electronic Apparatus]

* * *

¿ (0905)

[Translation]

The Chair (Mr. Bernard Patry (Pierrefonds—Dollard, Lib.)): Good morning. Pursuant to Standing Order 108(2), we are continuing our study of Canada's International Policy Statement. This morning, we are pleased to welcome Mr. André Donneur, Professor of Political Science from the Université du Québec à Montréal.

As you know, Mr. Donneur, following the government's release of the International Policy Statement last April, the committee undertook a review of it in Ottawa by holding round tables. We are now travelling across the country. We are visiting all the provincial capitals. Today and tomorrow, we are in Montreal. We are very pleased to welcome you. We very much look forward to your comments on Canada's International Policy Statement. You now have the floor.

Mr. André Donneur (Professor, Department of Political Science, Université du Québec à Montréal): Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I thank the committee for hearing me.

Canada's International Policy Statement is made up of a series of documents which, in my opinion, are balanced. It emphasizes both continentalism, that is to say the need for a North-American partnership, more specifically with the United States, and multilateralism, or a world partnership, particularly through the United Nations and the multilateral institutions, which is part of a long-standing Canadian tradition.

As examples of continentalism taken from the document, I will focus on ensuring partnership with the United States in the areas of security and commerce, on a more in-depth smart border, a broadening of the EXPRES and NEXUS programs, the Security and Prosperity Partnership which was adopted in 2005, the Binational Planning Group on defence, and more generally, the use of NAFTA and our existing common military institutions, while always ensuring Canadian sovereignty.

As for multilateralism, I will take as an example the Stabilization and Reconstruction Task Force intended to provide a rapid response to any international crisis, while emphasizing the three Ds, diplomacy, defence and development, which implies interdepartmental cooperation as well as cooperation on the ground in order to best respond to the crises of failed or fragile states.

Another example is to develop targeted initiatives in the areas of trade and investment, particularly with China, India and Brazil, within the framework of international organizations and bilaterally.

Contributing to Millennium Development Goals is another theme running through the document as is the creation of an L-20 for world governance. There is therefore an effort to balance both continentalism and multilateralism, combining the principles of each in order to show that they are not incompatible.

Having said that, is this program, this statement not overly ambitious? It has the advantage of integrating all elements of Canada's international policy. However, is it not a bit too much? Are the projected means sufficient? This is something to be followed closely, for the future and for its implementation.

I will make a few remarks that are somewhat provocative, while always bearing in mind the difficulties of implementation. As we apply the statement, we will of course have to ensure that there is the respect of human rights, both bilaterally and multilaterally. This is affirmed in the statement, but I believe it is important to emphasize this point. On the bilateral front, particularly, the coordination and securing of our border with the United States, which is the result of a long process, could be reinforced, while seeing to it that human rights are respected.

My next comment will be more provocative: Should we not make efforts to ensure that international trade rules are tied to the application of the International Trade Organization conventions? This would have the triple benefit of promoting fairer trade, ensuring standard working conditions in third world countries, and at the same time maintaining jobs at home.

The targeted sustainable development goals are all well and good, but should we not attempt insofar as it is possible to increase the resources allocated to them?

In conclusion, I would say that within the framework of its partnership with the United States and in general, Canada must ensure that Canadian interests are always protected.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

¿ (0910)

The Chair: Thank you, Prof. Donneur.

We will now move to the question and answer period.

[English]

We will start with the vice-chair, Mr. Sorenson, please.

Mr. Kevin Sorenson (Crowfoot, CPC): Good morning, again, and thank you for being here this morning.

As you know, our committee is starting to go across Canada. Parts of our committee spent a week in the United States. While were been there, we talked about a lot of issues dealing with security and trade. You made mention in your brief that one must always bear in mind and maintain the relationships with the United States because of the importance of continentalism. With that, we have found, there comes some occasional frustrations, as we depend so much on the United States for our trade. We deal right now with the largest power, really, in the world, the United States. We're fortunate to have them close to us as far as trade is concerned. Having 300 million people right next to a country of 30 million...we've grown very close to them, and we've grown to realize that 80% of our trade, basically, is with them, and we don't want to lose that.

That being said, they've come out with some fairly strong statements in regard to security: it trumps trade. Security considerations must always be a priority for them. I'm wondering if you have any ideas in regard to some of the measures. You've talked about NEXUS and you've talked about some of the other things, the expressways that we have at our border, but now the United States is talking about passports and needing passports to go from one country to the other. Would you have any ideas on ways that we can keep this continentalism strong but always protect our sovereignty and not let it be diminished?

[Translation]

Mr. André Donneur: Mr. Chairman, Mr. Sorenson, this is a very broad subject. Already, the measures taken have been rather effective. They could of course go further and continue to be applied and developed.

On the passport issue, I believe it could still be negotiated. We must not forget that our trade with the United States is extremely important, but for the United States, we are also equally important on the economic and trade fronts, even though we are smaller. Given the fact that you come from Alberta, Mr. Sorenson, you recognize the importance of our energy exports to the United States.

There are therefore ways in which to discuss and negotiate, both through diplomacy and at the same time through repeated demands and concurrent pressures.

Besides, as regards the passport issue, we have seen that the Americans are backing off somewhat. There is more talk about identification cards than of passports. In any case, it is obvious that our best insurance remains our own work on border controls, always bearing in mind the respect of human rights.

¿ (0915)

[English]

Mr. Kevin Sorenson: How do we do that? For example, how do we do it when perhaps Canadian values would appear to be in some ways...? And it's not even values, because the process would be so much different from what the United States has.

We talk about strengthening things at the border. We don't want the passport thing, but this is something that they implement. So how do we do this negotiation with them?

You mentioned that we need to be a little stronger, tougher, put a little pressure on them. I think that's the way you worded it. It seems as though every time we try to assert pressure on the United States, we end up losing. How do we effectively pressure them into something when they've been so abundantly clear that this is their perspective? We have many border crossings where we have one individual sitting, but when we go off to their border crossings, we note that they have many more resources at the borders. They have individuals at the borders who are armed, for example. Our government says this isn't that important, but the Americans say we aren't taking security seriously enough.

So how do we then exert that pressure on them to say to let us decide the proper measures at these border crossings? How do we exert the pressure you're talking about? What would you be willing to negotiate?

Even on the softwood lumber, it would seem that every time we try to negotiate or to put a little pressure on, we have a Prime Minister who will start talking right away about cutting back energy or looking for markets in China and India. I think we have to develop those markets, undoubtedly. I mean, it's just dismissed by them. I read this morning in the paper where, if anything is linked to energy, Alberta right away says don't even bother going there.

We talk about the softwood lumber issue. The Prime Minister, not so much in a threatening way, but in trying to be frank with the Americans, says, listen, there are no guarantees here; we'll find markets somewhere else. Then the Premier of Alberta jumps in and says, don't start linking resources with lumber; don't start linking lumber with agriculture; don't start linking all these other issues together. We have a trade minister who is trying to somehow exert a little pressure on the United States, and from within, our premiers are saying don't go there.

How do you do that?

The Chair: We don't have any answers. That's why we asked you.

[Translation]

Mr. André Donneur: I know that it is extremely difficult. It is always very difficult to tie in those two components. This will be a long-term effort that will require a great deal of perseverance.

As for the issue of border security, I do believe that we have made progress, overall. However, there are limits to the measures that we can take. It is also possible, I believe, that people wanting to travel more frequently to Canada without being required to have a passport are bringing internal pressures to bear within the United States. This is perhaps one of the elements that should be taken into consideration. However, there is no miracle solution, in fact. We will have to persevere on the diplomatic front and use the network of people we have in Washington who can bring pressure to bear. I see nothing else for the moment. I have few ideas.

On the other hand, the United States wants to have a close relationship with Canada. We must present ourselves to them with some energy and some strength.

¿ (0920)

[English]

The Chair: Monsieur Paquette.

[Translation]

Mr. Pierre Paquette (Joliette, BQ): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I thank you for having come today, Prof. Donneur.

I would like to follow along the same lines. You have identified a solution, that of pointing out to the Americans that it is in their interest to settle certain problems with Canada. Take the softwood issue, for example. Many groups and organizations are currently paying the price of the American protectionist lobby's efforts. Canada has not made good use of its allies. I am thinking of Home Depot and other businesses that sell wood, who are obliged to assume part of the costs of the tax. We could use a similar strategy regarding the passport issue.

I went to Washington recently to discuss border issues between Canada and the United States. We were told that pieces of identification were not a valid response and that a document equivalent to a passport was required. That is their current position. That means there would have to be a card that proves Canadian citizenship. The American official told us that any resident of Quebec could get a driver's licence and that the same thing was true for health insurance cards. In their eyes, these things are not valid.

I agree with you when you say that probably more Americans than Canadians will be penalized by this because fewer Americans than Canadians hold a passport. We should perhaps ensure that the chambers of commerce on the American side of the border are more vocal on this issue.

We gave the American officials the example of an elderly woman in her 80s who always entered Canada from a neighbouring American town, without a passport. She can leave the United States without having to show anything at all. When she tries to return, she will be held up at the border. She will say that she has been crossing the border with no problem for 80 years. The Americans had not considered the problem from the perspective of their own citizens, they were only seeing it as a border security issue.

You have therefore pointed the way to a solution that we should follow in time. However, I am most interested in the issue of the connection between human rights and trade, because it has been raised by several people.

One thing bothers me somewhat. Since Mr. Martin came to power, there has been a tendency to separate foreign affairs and international trade. This was shown, among other ways, by the Liberal decision to create two completely separate departments rather than to maintain the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade. As you know, the bill was defeated in the House. The fact nevertheless remains that we are presented with estimates for foreign affairs and with estimates for international trade. There seems to be a will, despite everything, to make a distinction between the two.

You talked about the ILO conventions. Canada has not signed all of the most significant conventions, which were identified at the time of the 50^th anniversary of the creation of the International Labour Organization.

How can we make sure that the foreign affairs issues, the commitments Canada makes on the international front—particularly concerning human rights and other areas, such as the environment and social rights—are taken into account during the drafting of our trade policy? There is not much in Canada's International Policy Statement to assure us that these things are really connected.

Before you answer, I wanted to make you aware of the fact that we had tabled an amendment to ensure that Export Development Canada, EDC, be bound by Canada's international commitments, when granting loans or supporting exporters. This amendment was defeated. The Liberals do not seem very interested by this aspect.

How can we ensure that in such a statement, there truly is a link made between foreign affairs and our international trade, in a context where we have the impression that the government has a tendency to want to make such a radical distinction between the two?

¿ (0925)

Mr. André Donneur: Thank you for your question.

Mr. Pierre Paquette: Should Canada not sign the ILO's basic conventions? There are at least three or four we did not sign.

Mr. André Donneur: Given our general policy and the very spirit of our foreign policies, it would, in my opinion, be in our best interest to sign these conventions. Foreign policy must be consistent. In particular, it is especially important that we ratify these conventions when we intervene on the international scene, particularly in international courts. This affects our country's reputation.

As far as trade negotiations are concerned, I think that, despite everything, representations on human rights are required. It is absolutely essential that we emphasize this diplomatic intervention and, to do this, we need to give more instructions to our diplomats and trade representatives. This is how we could further basic respect for human rights.

I am not hiding the fact that this type of initiative is extremely difficult. There is a long history related to economic and trade relations, and we cannot completely ignore the problems that arise in implementing such an approach in concrete terms. I am not saying that we should do nothing about this, even if it means establishing coalitions with countries headed in the same direction. In my opinion, this would not be impossible.

¿ (0930)

Mr. Pierre Paquette: As far as Canada's international reputation is concerned, many people were very disappointed to see that the International Policy Statement made no reference to the UN objective of 0.7 per cent of GNP for official development aid. If my memory serves me correctly, France and Germany have made a commitment to achieve this objective by 2015. However, the financial situation of these two countries is much more fragile than that of Canada. Great Britain, a country that is not known for being avant-garde in this area, has also made this commitment.

In your opinion, do you think that this statement should have included our commitment to reach this level of 0.7 per cent of our GNP by 2015? Or do you think that this objective in itself is not important to Canada's international reputation? The statement goes on at great length about generosity and official development aid. Unfortunately, it makes no concrete commitments in terms of Canadian development aid.

Mr. André Donneur: Mr. Chairman, indeed it would be preferable, to the extent possible, to set an objective of 0.7 per cent. This is in fact a Canadian objective that goes back some time. We all know that there have been recessions and financial problems. Many governments have successively decreased this percentage. However, although the current trend has this percentage increasing, it is important to set and achieve this objective by a deadline. We must bear in mind that this will not be an easy undertaking. In politics, many things are not easy.

The Chair: Thank you.

Ms. Phinney.

[English]

Ms. Beth Phinney (Hamilton Mountain, Lib.): Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you, Professor, for coming this morning.

I would like to follow up on Mr. Paquette's question and ask you what you feel about the foreign affairs department splitting, with trade being a totally separate unit. How does that strike you?

[Translation]

Mr. André Donneur: Mr. Chairman, in my opinion, it is important that international and foreign policy be as integrated as possible. This is no easy task. However, there is a paradox in the International Policy Statement, and this time it is much more apparent than it was in previous white papers or political statements. Trade has been separated from foreign affairs. Personally, I feel that it is important that we integrate aspects of trade and, in addition, defence, into our foreign policy.

[English]

Ms. Beth Phinney: We have to admit that we don't know why it's been separated. In fact, I think the House voted down the motion, but the trade department is still sitting there, as Mr. Paquette said; it's still operating as a separate unit, and we don't know why. Most of the comments we've heard so far have been that they don't agree that it be separated; so maybe we'll be able to take this back, and we'll see what effect it has when we get back to Ottawa.

I'd like you to talk about the United Nations. They've been trying in the last few months to change the United Nations, to change some of its orientation and to make it more efficient. They weren't very successful.

How do you rate the United Nations? How do you think Canada should react to that? Should they be continuing to put efforts into the United Nations? Is the G-20 something that's moving away from the United Nations? How do you think we should handle that?

¿ (0935)

[Translation]

Mr. André Donneur: Mr. Chairman, I am convinced that the United Nations is still an important player in the area of foreign policy and international society. Although we have often witnessed this organization's failures, the UN has had some successes in avoiding conflicts and in providing relief to certain populations.

Reforming the UN is a very slow and arduous process. Naturally, the international balance of power and the fact that certain states have contradictory interests must be taken into account. And yet we must not give up in our attempts to make the United Nations more effective. Moreover, we must remember that we can support certain regional organizations that play a secondary role.

Accordingly, I think that the United Nations, despite its difficulties, is still a very significant player. We must consider its successes and not just dwell on its failures. Without going into details, I would say that the examples provided in the statement are quite clear on that matter.

[English]

Ms. Beth Phinney: So would you see the G-20 as a secondary organization on the side? There could be some regional organizations. Is that what you were thinking of when you were thinking of the G-20?

[Translation]

Mr. André Donneur: No. The purpose of this organization is to bring together the major powers from the north and the south. Its role dovetails with that of the G8 and other organizations.

[English]

Ms. Beth Phinney: Yes, but it was L-20 I should have mentioned, not the G-20.

[Translation]

Mr. André Donneur: Yes, all right.

[English]

Ms. Beth Phinney: Thank you.

[Translation]

The Chair: Prof. Donneur, I would like to ask you a question.

In addition to visiting various capital cities, we consulted online through our Internet site. We really want to reach out to young people. We always say that they are the future of our country. Prof. Cooper, from the University of Waterloo, said this week that he felt that young people had a desire to contribute to international policy.

Have you observed this phenomenon as well? As a political science professor at UQAM, could you tell me what interests young people in this field? Is it human rights, development spending, defence? Could you summarize what the young people are telling you in the classroom?

¿ (0940)

Mr. André Donneur: Mr. Chairman, we have indeed seen a particular interest in policy and international relations. A significant number of students have enrolled in courses, particularly in the advanced studies program.

It is interesting to note that, in actual fact, there are many interests. Some of our students are passionate about what we refer to as the third world, they are interested in work done in developing countries. We have had some concrete examples of this, for example we have had students who have done study terms or have participated in activities of this type. Moreover, there are some students who are more interested in international law. They are also committed, but they are particularly interested in human rights. Others are interested in security issues. Some of them have done work terms at the Department of National Defence. Some have even stayed there.

Students have shown a desire to contribute to the international community. I do not want to sound utopic, but I would say that they have aspirations for a safer, more equitable world. Interests vary from one student to the next.

The Chair: Foreign students come and study at UQAM, and some Canadian graduate students have an opportunity to study abroad. What do you think of these exchanges? Do they occur very often?

Mr. André Donneur: Yes, there are many foreign students and there are in fact exchange programs. Some students have gone to the United States and Europe. In addition, their programs enabled them to visit other countries. For example, a summer program gives them an opportunity to go to Berlin and another one to Russia. There are also programs that are run in cooperation with other countries, such as countries in North Africa, for example.

[English]

The Chair: Mr. Sorenson is next, and then Ms. Phinney.

Mr. Kevin Sorenson: I'm sure, being a political science professor, you have ideas on this, and I would appreciate hearing them this morning.

I want to go back to what we were talking about a little earlier on how domestic policies affect us internationally. Over the past 15 to 20 years we have watched our birth rate decline in Canada. In fact, it got as low as 1.2 children per couple, and this has affected the workforce. It's now up to 1.6 children per couple.

Everywhere we go people are talking about the lack of labour and how it's going to affect us, especially in the next 15 years. Our immigration minister has come out with a new plan, setting the threshold fairly high, at 300,000 new Canadians coming to our country per year. He wants to phase this in over the next five years. We have a 750,000 backlog already.

We have these high goals of bringing new Canadians to our country, and recognize that we have an aging population and are going to be really lacking in skilled labour down the road. But there's the other picture, where the Americans are saying security is a priority, and many believe that some of the immigration controls we have may be extremely bothersome to the United States. I say this because you've talked quite a bit about human rights, and that's where I really want to go with this.

Some believe that stricter immigration controls can help deter perceived threats to the people of the United States and Canada in our fight against terrorism and other things, but we also want to make sure we don't violate anyone's human rights, especially those of the many good Arab Muslim Canadians we have.

How do we offset this? Are there any special ways that we can bring forth a policy to increase new Canadians coming because of the need, recognize the security concerns that are a priority, and not trample on people's human rights? What are the most effective ways to protect human rights as we try to have these high goals of immigration?

¿ (0945)

[Translation]

Mr. André Donneur: Thank your for your question.

Mr. Chairman, indeed we must pay very careful attention to the security aspect of recruiting. We already have tools available to us, but perhaps we should increase the number, at least if this proves to be necessary. We must ensure that the security checks for selection purposes are done properly.

I feel that it is quite legitimate for all countries, including Canada, needless to say, to have this type of concern. That being said, I am convinced that a significant number of immigrants will be able to meet the security criteria requirements that we have established. I refer here to those individuals who have the required qualifications, respect human rights and meet our security standards.

¿ (0950)

[English]

The Chair: Ms. Phinney.

Ms. Beth Phinney: Thank you very much.

CIDA decided recently that it would cut back on the number of countries and concentrate on just 25 countries. I don't know if you know which countries they are, and if you agree with which countries have been picked. What do you think of the idea of just concentrating on 25?

[Translation]

Mr. André Donneur: Based on my experience, I know that it is better to focus assistance on a more limited number of countries rather than try to spread it everywhere. In that sense, that would be a good move. Obviously, we must focus on those countries with the most significant needs, countries with glaring needs in the area of welfare and development. I believe that this is important.

I am a bit uncomfortable saying which country should be chosen. Nevertheless, concentrating our efforts is a good thing and other countries have already had this experience. For instance, certain Scandinavian countries have concentrated their efforts and achieved better results than they would have had they spread the assistance here and there. At any rate, we don't have the means to cover everything. It is important to focus effectively on—

The Chair: Thank you.

Mr. Paquette.

Mr. Pierre Paquette: The role of parliamentarians is another aspect that many, starting with us, feel is absent from the International Policy Statement. In Canada, the executive is responsible for ratifying international treaties. The House of Commons is very rarely seized of this issue, unless it comes as an implementation act for the treaties themselves. There was one recent exception, when Prime Minister Chrétien decided to hold a vote in the House of Commons on the Kyoto Protocol. This was, nevertheless, a decision made by the Prime Minister.

First of all, what role should parliamentarians play, particularly at a time when negotiations are underway that will have a major impact on the lives of all of our citizens? I am thinking, for example, of the WTO negotiations.

Should the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade have a greater role to play? Someone told us, I believe it was Jeffrey Sachs but I am not 100 per cent sure, that foreign policy in the United States was more consensual because the committee in charge of this issue had a more important role to play in defining policy, so that when administrations change, the policy shift is relatively slight. However, in Canada, if the Conservatives are in power, we have a certain policy; if it is the Liberals, we have another policy. And once the Bloc Québécois is in power, there will be a third policy. Unfortunately, it is highly unlikely that the NDP will ever form the government in Ottawa.

In your opinion, what role should be played by parliamentarians and the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade?

Mr. André Donneur: I think that the role of the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade should be strengthened. I would have liked the committee to have been more involved, even in defining the International Policy Statement.

It is always a bit difficult to make a comparison with the United States, because their Constitution is different. Nevertheless, I think that it is important that Parliament be more involved in foreign policy and in policy in general, although it must be said that Parliament has been given an increased role.

If we look at what has happened over a long period of time, we can see that there has been an increased role given to committees and Parliament. However, given the current international situation and in view of the changes in international structure that we have seen since the early 1990s, I think that it is particularly important that Parliament be involved as much as possible in such a process. I especially think that it is important that the committee, where there is an opportunity to delve into matters in greater depth, be given a role in international policy making. I think that this is indeed important.

¿ (0955)

[English]

The Chair: Ms. Phinney, do you have another?

Ms. Beth Phinney: I'd like to comment on what's being discussed just now. It seems that we do have an influence, because we seem to be ahead of the decisions that are made in the department. We pass a number of motions--maybe the chair can explain some of them. We are well ahead of whatever the department decides, so we do have an influence. Maybe they're areas where they would choose not to even get involved, but because we did a paper and passed it through the House, in six months' time we find that becomes the policy of the government.

When you came here today you gave a short talk, but is there any particular area in foreign policy that you would like to expand on that you haven't spoken about yet?

[Translation]

Mr. André Donneur: I think that we have covered the question. There are a tremendous number of aspects to be discussed. I will think for a moment.

Perhaps we could discuss...

The Chair: If you have any recommendations for us, you could always send them to the committee. In addition, I would like to reiterate that we provide on-line consultations. This would be very important for students.

To continue with what my colleagues were saying, the committee has released several reports. One of the reports was an attempt to determine what Canada should do now that NAFTA has been in existence for ten years. We did a very wonderful report on this issue.

I would like to say that all of the studies and reports that we do have been adopted unanimously. The government and the three opposition parties do really work on a consensus basis.

We also did a study on relations between Canada and countries in the Muslim world following the attacks in the United States. The government uses this report a great deal. We did a study on the 7 per cent; we adopted a report on the matter. We adopted a report on human rights as they pertain to Canadian companies working abroad, particularly in the mining sector. We have prepared a tremendous number of reports. We have also presented a report, which was done very well by Mr. Paquette, on chapter 19 of NAFTA.

I must tell you that these reports don't make newspaper headlines. That is not what is important to us. What counts is having some influence on government and to be able to tell it which direction it should be heading in according to parliamentarians from all political parties.

Thank you very much for coming this morning. We have found this very interesting. I would remind you that we are seeking the opinion of young people. If you could have any influence on young people as far as our on-line consultation process is concerned, it would be greatly appreciated. Thank you, Mr. Donneur.

We will take a five to ten-minute break.

À (1000)

À (1010)

The Chair: We will now resume the review of the International Policy Statement. We have the pleasure of welcoming Mr. William Hogg, who is a professor of political studies at Bishop's University.

Welcome, Mr. Hogg.

Mr. William Hogg (Professor, Political Studies, Bishop's University): Good morning, Mr. Patry.

The Chair: I am really delighted to have you here. As I already told you, we rarely hear from professors from Bishop's University. We will listen to your comments on the International Policy Statement.

À (1015)

Mr. William Hogg: Thank you very much. I will be reading my text in English as I typed it in this language.

The Chair: You may use either of the two languages, that does not pose any problem.

Mr. William Hogg: We could then have a discussion in both official languages.

[English]

The document I prepared was a reflection I developed after the IPS was published in April. I haven't really looked at it since, but I think it's still quite relevant today. It's titled “Something Old, Something New, and a Leaner, Meaner Canada”.

Some will question whether the new IPS, entitled A Role of Pride and Influence in the World, was worth the wait. Granted, Prime Minister Martin's hemming and hawing and politicking over the details of the IPS during the lead-up to its release did allow for some new ideas to come forward and in my opinion offered some pretty good theatre to those who cared to watch. But in essence, much of the document is a reformulation of Canada in the World, which was released a decade ago. Much is old, and in my opinion not much is new. But underlying the document is an interesting trend. The IPS, I think, introduces us to a leaner, meaner Canada.

I'll start with the old. Implicitly found in the documents are the three pillars from 1995: security, prosperity, and values, in the form of what the Prime Minister had said in the budget: global citizenship. They're still there. So are many of the other catchwords of Canadian foreign and defence policy from the past decade: human security, the responsibility to protect, the promotion of democracy, the importance of human rights, and the rule of law in international relations.

Concerns with failed states, terrorism, and weapons of mass destruction are peppered throughout both the 1995 document and the 2005 document, although terrorism is now much more at the forefront, as it should be.

In the defence statement, much has been carried forward from the 1994 white paper: Canada's armed forces must remain a multi-purpose, combat-capable force, able through interoperability and coordination to fight with the best. Some aspects of the international development statement remain the same, with concerns for good government, private sector development, health, basic education, and environmental sustainability echoing 1995 core goals for official development assistance programs.

Market access for Canadian goods, services, and investments abroad remains a core goal today for trade policy, just as it did in 1995. And multilateralism still rules.

Many of the new parts of the IPS are actually somewhat old as well. If one read the Martin government's budget of February 2005, we were already introduced to the pillars. We would have seen the creation of the global peace and security fund in Foreign Affairs Canada's budget and envelope. DND's reinvestment was one of the highlights of that budget as well. Outside of the budget, the three Ds—development, diplomacy, and defence coordination abroad—and the notion of three-bloc war, which was quite prevalent in the defence policy statement, have been institutionalized in the IPS, but are far from new concepts. DND has been talking about these for nigh on three or four years.

The Minister for International Development also indicated to a Montreal audience in March that there will be some serious rationalization in how Canada does development assistance now. We were told back in March, basically a month and a half before the IPS, that there will only be 25 countries receiving assistance. Of course, she didn't tell us which ones, but we were given a fairly good idea about what directions were going to be taken.

So those interested in Canada's place in the world did not actually have to wait until the release of the IPS for the main insights into Prime Minister's new foreign policy.

“Out with the new”: there are some significant new policy directions in the IPS. First, the focus on North America from diplomatic, defence, and trade perspectives is quite new for foreign policy statements. Traditionally, liberal governments have shied away from saying “Washington” in the formulation of international policy; see both Trudeau's and Chrétien's white papers. This IPS is different in that there are very few pages where there is not reference made to our neighbour to the south.

Second, the rationalization of international development goes even farther than most had expected, creating this core group of 25 development partners, who will now receive the vast bulk of Canada's official development assistance. This will definitely allow Canadian development funds to be used more efficiently but, on the other hand, will reduce the presence of the Canadian flag in many developing and francophone countries.

À (1020)

From a defence perspective, the creation of Canada Command hearkens to a focus on Canada's territorial defence and security above those concerns of the hemisphere and the world at large. Foreign Affairs Canada is allowed to reassert itself as the interpreter, articulator, integrator, advocate, provider, and steward of Canada's voice and actions in the world, although it will be interesting to see how other ministries will, over the long term, react to this.

And now the leaner and meaner. Just as an aside, I don't mean meaner as in méchant; I mean meaner as in much more efficient and effective.

What much of the IPS foretells is this leaner and meaner Canada in the world. The tone of the paper, all 200-plus pages, speaks to an overall retreat into the hemisphere by Canada, with Ottawa's hierarchy of interests being, first, home, then the United States, North America, the western hemisphere, and then the rest, in that order. It is much less internationalist than previous foreign policy statements. This, what some have qualified as quasi-isolationism given historical Canadian traditions abroad, is reflected in some of these underlying principles of the new foreign policy.

Development assistance, while keeping the issues mentioned above, quietly drops basic human needs, basic human needs being the necessity to feed masses of starving men, women, and children in developing countries. This has been struck from the development statement. Canada's dealings with international organizations will now focus on outcome rather than process, a shift that, if it had been in place in 2003, I think would have led to Canada's participation in the war against Iraq.

The priority of Canada's armed forces is supposed to be the protection of Canada's shores rather than action abroad bringing about peace and security, although we have yet to see this policy effectively implemented. The IPS continues the trend introduced by the 1994 defence white paper, where expectations that a force of 60,000 to 65,000 men and women—which is in reality right now 52,000—will do everything everywhere, while at the same time expanding missions.

Operation tempo and overstretch has not been solved by this IPS or by the budget in 2005. The Canadian Forces will not be able to undertake new international commitments and maintain old ones at the same time as protecting the Arctic and defending Canada against terrorists, at least not with current and planned force sizes, equipment, and budgetary limits. The development of a special operations group also indicates a willingness to send JTF-2 out to the field much more often, as a leaner and meaner fighting machine.

In conclusion, Canada probably needs to be leaner and meaner. It probably is time to drop some of the international nice-guy image that Canada has bandied about since 1945 in exchange for a somewhat rougher and tougher image. International context demands this. Rumblings out of allied capitals and on CNN, the war against international terrorism, tough negotiations at the WTO and in NAFTA, and a minority government at home would make the best politician bend to these pressures. In the IPS, Martin has bent. The question now is, has he bent too far?

There is one final point I wanted to bring up about the IPS. This has come out when I've talked to bureaucrats in Ottawa. The IPS actually may serve another purpose, and a much more important purpose than actually stating what Canada's foreign policy is, and that is, how do we make foreign policy? The process of creating the IPS is what's more important to withdraw from the IPS itself. It's the most interesting part of the whole project. The combination of public interaction with state actors, as I say in my political science classes, is rather novel and should probably be used in the future.

Thank you very much.

The Chair: Thank you very much, Mr. Hogg. Merci beaucoup.

Now we'll start with questions and answers.

Mr. Sorenson.

Mr. Kevin Sorenson: Thank you.

This is the first day I've been on this tour, but we did spend a week in Washington, and I heard some of the meetings that we've had in Toronto over the last week. In the next few weeks, our committee is going to the Maritimes and then out west.

I guess I'm trying to get a feel from the presenters, and I want to get a feel from the presenters, as to how they think Canada is viewed around the world, how we're viewed at home.

You mentioned in your briefing, when we were talking about the developing countries and the 25 countries we're going to target, that what it means is a diminished presence of the Canadian flag in many countries, and you mentioned especially francophone countries. Is that good? What do you think people around the world will think about Canada if we start drawing back from some countries where we just had a presence? A lot of people debate whether or not we've been effective around the world. Yes, we've been there; we were just Canada, you know. Is that good? Is that step back good? Are there negative results that we're going to see because of it?

À (1025)

Mr. William Hogg: One of the things I tell my students—and this happens a lot in my classes at the end of the semester, they come up and ask me what I think—is that in my job as a professor, I'm not supposed to say what I think. Basically I'm supposed to set out what the reality is to a certain extent, then let them make the interpretation.

Mr. Kevin Sorenson: That sounds very political, that does. That's what politicians try to do.

Mr. William Hogg: I know, at least I hope politicians try to be....

Now, regarding external views of Canadian foreign policy, how are we seen from abroad? Generally, I think there is a problem of misinterpretation of what Canada is in the world. From analyzing Canadian foreign policy, I think Canada is a national interest country, for the most part. Others expect us to be different, though. Others expect us to be the peacekeepers, the good development assistant, the providers, even though most of the time we're just digging wells for a lot of the money we invest. I think there is a mismatch between what the Canadian state does and what people expect us to provide.

As well, that's similar to what's going on inside. I think much of the Canadian public might be trapped in this vision of a 1960s or 1970s image of Canada in the world, which is not to say it's a good or bad thing—Andrew Cohen made a lot of money by saying we have to go back to the 1960s and the golden era of Canadian foreign policy, because Canadians like to hear that.

From my perspective, I think Canada has a very realistic foreign policy. Even though sometimes in our foreign policy statements we might say things that sound a little adventuresome, when it comes to the actual application of our foreign policy, we do things within our capacity as a democratic state that has a very limited set of means. The Canadian public doesn't like to spend money abroad; they'd rather see it spent at home. I think we try to deal with what the international system—especially our neighbour to the south, our NATO allies, and countries in Africa—expects us to do within the limited means we have.

Is this good, especially with the flag issue you brought up? I think there are other ways Canada is flying our flag right now with regard to development. Personally, I have a student who is over in Tanzania right now on a Canada Corps project. That's not really development assistance, but it's federal money invested in having a Canadian work abroad in the field, waving the flag to a certain extent—although I'm not sure she even brought Canadian flags with her. So I think there are other ways beyond ODA we're doing this.

Going back to the question of francophone states, I think this is going to be an important change because it gets down to some of the more fundamental questions in Canadian foreign policy, and that's especially the relationship between francophone and anglophone interests in Canadian foreign policy.

Does that answer your question?

Mr. Kevin Sorenson: Yes. We're intrinsically.... I've got a real cold today, so big words like “intrinsically” sometimes don't come out well.

But we're very closely tied to the United States, and 80% of our trade, culture.... As much as we like to talk about Canadian culture, it's a tough one to define, apart from the United States being here. So we see these very close ties in trade and culture. The part of the country where I live, in the west, was developed by Americans coming up and opening up the west. For example, my grandfather came up from Minnesota and homesteaded, and struck out and farmed. So a lot of our home ties are continental in nature.

Looking at it from an international perspective, how do you think our ties to the United States are affecting us? You haven't really mentioned that in your answer to me about what people around the world think of Canada. Is it positive or negative? In spite of the fact that it's a reality, does it jeopardize some of our other relationships, and how can we offset this?

À (1030)

Mr. William Hogg: Sure. I think U.S. images of what Canada does in the world are very much separated from the actual relationship on the ground between Canada and the U.S. Everybody says we've got to watch out what we do, because the Americans will get angry with us. Let's talk about trade. Since the 2003 war in Iraq, nothing has happened. We said no, and nothing happened. In fact, our trade relationship has gotten better to a certain extent.

Even with the increased strength of the Canadian dollar, we have a bigger and bigger trade surplus with the U.S. They keep buying our goods. On the ground, I think there's a difference between what Washington and Ottawa--

Mr. Kevin Sorenson: Let me interrupt here. You say we've gotten better, yet there are more irritants. I come from a rural Alberta constituency. Mainly the irritants are BSE and the beef moving across the border. Before this situation, we had that free trade and fair trade. We had very clear laws as to when that border should open, and they didn't open it.

We have, right now, a very bothersome softwood lumber issue. In fact, it is so bothersome that our Prime Minister stands and suggests that if they aren't going to honour it, he may perhaps have to take a tougher stand against them. He says we'll look to other places for a lot of our trade, energy included--to China, India, and some of those countries.

Then we have the United States coming out since 2003 and saying you're going to have to have a passport to go into Canada. The trade implications of this alone.... We have members of Parliament from all parties in that Windsor area, and they are very concerned about the traffic back and forth. An American family of four would come into Canada and buy, spend, travel, or whatever; now, with about 80 bucks a pop for a passport, they may be deterred from doing that.

All these little things keep coming along, just being irritants. Trade is up, but our productivity is fairly strong and the economy is strong. So for trade to be up is natural, but these irritants are also up.

Mr. William Hogg: On some of those issues, I wouldn't want to separate Canada from the rest of the world. Canada is not different from the Europeans or the Asians in having problems accessing American markets.

The passport applies to the British just as much as it does to the Canadians. It shouldn't, and I think we're going to see in Washington a fairly successful push by senators and members of Congress to overturn this rule for Canada. I think that's going to be; I can't guarantee it, but I think there's enough of a will within Washington to overturn that passport requirement, because it's going to hurt America just as much as it's going to hurt Canada.

Mr. Kevin Sorenson: It isn't just an ID card. It may be biometric. It may be a lot of things. It's not, as Mr. Paquette said in the last round, just a driver's licence. Anyone can get a driver's licence.

We are a little different from Great Britain, because if I were an American going to Great Britain, I would have a passport--

Mr. William Hogg: Sure.

Mr. Kevin Sorenson: --but if I have a family of four, I can just drive across the border and up to Toronto, or drive across the border at any of our crossings. That happens a lot.

Mr. William Hogg: Sure. I understand that. I think one of the things is--and I don't want to sound like I'm scared of the border or anything--that maybe it's time that even the Americans had more than a driver's licence as ID to cross our border. We are living in times that are different from the good old eighties and seventies, when the border wasn't a problem. We are living with terrorism, and terrorism is tied in with the freedom of movement of migrants around the world, just as much as it is in Europe, just as much as it is in North America. There's fairly free movement across these borders, and maybe we do need a little bit more strength at the border to make sure we don't face that.

The major crisis in Canada-U.S. relations--and this was brought up at a conference I was at over the weekend--is what happens if we get that dirty bomb coming in from Canada and exploding in New York. That's the end of the border, basically, right there. That's the closing of the border forever, with basically Mexicanization of the northern frontier. Perhaps these identity cards, then, are necessary--perhaps.

À (1035)

The Chair: Mr. Sorenson.

Mr. Kevin Sorenson: I have one more quick question that is totally opposite. There is no way of segueing into this one, but we are on foreign policy.

We have, over the last number of years, seen China grow. It has become a power economically. We have many concerns there with regard to human rights. China is a big player. India has become a big player. As Thomas Friedman says, the world's boundaries, the borders, are indeed disappearing, and we have a global economy whether we like it or not. We are competing with people in some countries who do not have the same input costs on a lot of things.

A year ago a number of major resource companies were looking at selling to China. Minmetals, Noranda, Falconbridge, all those--a lot of this field or sector was looking at selling to China. Is there any fear of this with you?

When foreign interests or foreign companies own resources--we see it in the tar sands--is there any difference with state?

Mr. William Hogg: What's interesting is that I wrote an op-ed in the Globe on this in August, right around the time that CNOOC, the Chinese National Offshore Oil Company, a state-owned enterprise that was trying to buy Unocal, one of the American oil firms with a lot of interest in east Asia, questioning whether or not we actually have globalization. How did the Unical bid get shot down? Well, it was the U.S. Congress who said no, this is a national security threat.

I think Canada has to have a debate about where the line is drawn between globalization...because we are pro-globalization. We rely upon it--45% of our GDP is derived from international trade--and it's going to be even more important, because a year ago the number for bilateral trade with the U.S. was 87% and now it's 80%. Where is the rest of that trade going, that 7% difference? Across the Pacific.

The notion of globalization is going to be even more important for Canada. So I think there has to be a debate about how far we are willing to let the free capitalism associated with globalization dominate the national interest of maintaining at least the capacity to direct where major companies like Noranda or Petro Kazakhstan, which was bought out by CNOOC, invest their resources at home, in Canada. We have to find out how much we want to make sure those resources stay in Canada, sort of the same as with the oil sands. I don't know what the percentages of ownership are for the development rights in the oil sands, but I don't think there are very many Canadian companies. I don't think we can even say that we're close to 50% ownership there. That could be a question of national security, if you think that guaranteed access to energy is part of national security. The Americans see that; that's why they shot down CNOOC. CNOOC was a threat to the capacity of the Americans to maintain their national interest in energy.

So yes, I think we have to have a debate, and it's a very good point: where does globalization end and the national interest come back in?

À (1040)

Mr. Kevin Sorenson: Thank you.

The Chair: Thank you.

Monsieur Paquette.

[Translation]

Mr. Pierre Paquette: I would like to go back to the issue of the border. In a nutshell, you stated that today's border is no longer what we used to have. At the same time, once you land in Europe, you show your passport once and then you don't have to take it out anymore. I went from Italy to Slovenia the day after the London attack, and I crossed the border without any problem. These countries are trying to harmonize their security policies.

Ultimately, would it not be preferable for us to work together, if this were possible, to harmonize some of our security rules with the American and even Mexican authorities—I will go back to the issue of Mexico later on—rather than deciding to take a step back from what we had acquired, namely, the relative free movement of people? I say “relative”, because if the Americans did have some doubts about us, the United States could ask for more details. So should we not be working towards achieving a smart border, instead of going backwards to create a border that looks like the one that existed in Europe 20 or 30 years ago?

Economic integration is occurring at an incredible rate. We have just seen this happen with Bombardier, which moved some of its recreational vehicle manufacturing to Mexico. As part of this exchange between Canada and the United States and, more and more often, between Canada and Mexico, we see the same companies that circulate. There are also some issues. If we want to have a smart border with the Americans and create a security perimeter, the Americans will have requirements regarding Canadian and Quebec values, which may lead to some friction.

Do we want to give further consideration to this approach?

Mr. William Hogg: That's an approach that we could explore. I am not sure that that is the best approach to take.

I live in the Eastern Townships. I am very close to Stanstead and Newport. I know how important the border is as far as security is concerned. I do not think that a North American fortress would be in the interest of Canada. Our needs are different from those of the United States. For example, we have different needs pertaining to immigration, refugees, individuals who are trying to flee their truly dangerous countries and who want to come to Canada to start a new life and build a better future for their family.

Over the weekend, the Minister of Citizenship and Immigration said that he wanted to increase the number of immigrants by 40 per cent over the next five years. He wants to bring the 700,000 people who are waiting at our border into the country. The Minister of Foreign Affairs stated that he wanted Canada to have a population of 40 million in 10 years time. This will be possible with immigration.

Mr. Pierre Paquette: Perhaps the Minister of Foreign Affairs will help make the population grow as well.

Mr. William Hogg: I am not quite finished. There is a difference between Canada and the United States, and I do not believe that building a fortress—

Mr. Pierre Paquette: I thought that a large number of the refugees came from the United States.

Mr. William Hogg: I do not know, I am not an expert in this field, except as it pertains to our refugees, but it is clear that some indeed come from the United States. Nevertheless, the vast majority of our immigrants come from Eastern Asia and South Asia. They are business people, small- and medium-sized business entrepreneurs.

Mr. Pierre Paquette: In your opinion, what is Mexico's place in Canada's foreign affairs policy?

Mr. William Hogg: I think that we should give more importance to Mexico. Indeed, we saw that the Mexicans are an ally as far as softwood lumber is concerned. To some extent—it is not quite the same—they are in a situation similar to ours as far as Washington is concerned. Mexico is a small but heavily populated country with few resources whereas we are a country with a small population and abundant resources. The United States has a large population and vast resources, but Americans need us. However, the Americans are in a dominant position.

We need to build, within NAFTA, a type of block with Mexico, to demonstrate to the United States that it needs to abide by the rules of the game because we negotiated in good faith.

À (1045)

Mr. Pierre Paquette: Precisely, when we did our study on NAFTA, we observed that Canadians—and to a lesser extent Quebeckers—do not have the reflex to bypass Washington.

Mr. William Hogg: No, that is true. This is a weakness in—

Mr. Pierre Paquette: In Quebec, there is somewhat more concern about Latin America, Mexico and Brazil.

Mr. William Hogg: Things that are more like that.

Mr. Pierre Paquette: Nevertheless, I was surprised to see how, outside of our relations with the Americans—

Mr. William Hogg: Yes, this is a possible ally. The problem is that we don't have enough exchanges. Trade relations constitute an important base for developing a political relationship. Trade relations dictate a good political relationship. However, I think that we are starting from the wrong end: we have a good political relationship, or a possible relationship, but we don't have enough trade relations with Mexico so that—

Mr. Pierre Paquette: So that Mexico is a real ally on the political front.

Mr. William Hogg: Precisely.

Mr. Pierre Paquette: By the way, is the Summit of the Americas opening today or tomorrow?

The Chair: On November 4.

Mr. Pierre Paquette: The Latin Americans are clearly not interested in negotiating a free-trade zone for the Americas, probably because they want to strengthen their position before opening negotiations with the Americans. On the other hand, Canada has an interest in working to consolidate NAFTA.

Meetings were held, and Mr. Manley participated in a kind of NAFTA-plus. Civil society was brought into play. There is much talk about the social integration of North America, which presents an opportunity to go beyond economic integration and take social and political factors into account.

Do you think that this would be worth considering, although, perhaps, not in the short term?

Mr. William Hogg: NAFTA-plus?

Mr. Pierre Paquette: Yes.

Mr. William Hogg: Before becoming a fan of Canadian foreign policy, I was a fan of European integration. The Europeans have gone beyond mere economic integration and have progressed further towards social and political integration because their history is quite different from that of North America. The war experience has much to do with it. Canada had such peaceful relations with the Americans that we do not feel any need to go further. This is one of the reasons why NAFTA-plus is raising some concerns among the public.

Also, although I have not read them, I have heard what Mr. Bouchard and Mr. Facal said when they criticized the new Quebec social plan. It looks much like what Mr. Manley wants, namely some kind of shift towards American values, with some reform of Canada's economic principles, a slight reduction of the size of the state apparatus, etc. These things might well be going on right now, without being negotiated with the Americans; it is a natural process.

Mr. Pierre Paquette: Do I have any time left, Mr. Chairman?

The Chair: Yes.

Mr. Pierre Paquette: You said at the end of your presentation that the process used for defining foreign policy is as important as the policy itself. This statement makes little mention if any of parliamentarians, except for one reference right at the beginning. Civil society is mentioned, but in very vague terms.

In your view, what role would parliamentarians and civil society play in defining Canada's foreign policy? Rather than hold an exercise every 10 years, would it not be better to proceed through consultations so that the policy can constantly adapt to a changing reality—

Mr. William Hogg: Yes.

Mr. Pierre Paquette: —rather than this exercise where a High Mass is celebrated, which may indeed be necessary?

Mr. William Hogg: Rob McRae, a Director General with the Department of Foreign Affairs, came to our conference. He said that Canada's International Policy Statement was already out-of-date.

Mr. Pierre Paquette: Really?

Mr. William Hogg: Yes, in a certain sense. But he also said that the most important thing is the annual review process. The ministers involved in the IPS, in consultation with Parliament and civil society, are supposed to carry out yearly reviews. These reviews will be more important than the IPS itself, because we can safely say that the IPS goes out-of-date as soon as it is tabled. The international system is in a constant state of change.

The same thing was said about the White Paper on Defence in 1994, and about "Canada in the World" in 1995. The world is changing too fast, and as you say, we cannot proceed with the review only once every 10 years. There must be a yearly review process. This is why the IPS is already somewhat outdated. Our yearly review is being prepared right now.

It would be good if parliamentarians were more involved in this. I am not sure whether that will happen, because I know that bureaucrats tend to hang on to their powers. I have studied Canada's foreign policy closely, but I am not sure that parliamentarians have the time to do this on a yearly basis. As someone said, you are very busy and you sit on many committees.

À (1050)

Mr. Pierre Paquette: The Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade does this all the time, as a natural process.

Mr. William Hogg: Yes.

Mr. Pierre Paquette: Our role in foreign policy planning could be more formal than it is now. We table reports and, as Mr. Patry just mentioned with our other witness, we get the government's response. We do not always feel that our comments have been taken into account.

Mr. William Hogg: The power exercised by the Prime Minister's cabinet in planning foreign policy is another problem. Theoretically, and most of us agree, the Prime Minister's cabinet has a great deal of influence on the final content of any kind of foreign policy statement. This takes some power away from the bureaucrats, and perhaps also from the MPs. Here, it is an elite and not a majority that makes the decision. I do not want to evaluate this approach at this time, this really is the way things are done, and I think that the problem lies there.

The Chair: Ms. Phinney.

[English]

Ms. Beth Phinney: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

You mentioned in your statement that the IPS drops human needs. I think the speaker before you said that the countries that were chosen by CIDA were not necessarily the ones with the greatest need. In fact, the minister of CIDA said it's good governance that's the key, although of course she didn't say “and it's not the people who need it the most”. So she thinks that the strong civil service, independent judiciary, respect for human rights, and aversion to corruption are the strongest things.

How do you feel about that?

Mr. William Hogg: It depends on where you want to put your chickens and your eggs. I think development can only be sustainable if you have good governance, but you can't get good governance without stability within a country, and that's reliant upon your population being in good health, educated, well fed, and so on.

So she's right to a certain extent, but it means that somebody else out there has to take care of those basic human needs. And if it's not going to be Canada, then she'd better find out who it's going to be, because we can't have good governance until you have the basic human needs that are necessary in the everyday lives of people living in the types of countries that we need to help in the international system.

I think she's basically said that Canada is removing itself slowly from the business of feeding the hungry, and it's more getting governments to treat their people better. I'm not sure if the number of states behind the scenes doing the basic human needs.... I don't know if she's relying on the NGOs or if she knows there are other states that are going to supplant Canada in the role of providing the necessary food.

We saw that there was an announcement this morning from the World Food Programme in Pakistan. They've only gotten 10% of the donations needed. They're going to have to stop their humanitarian flights, because people aren't doing the basic human needs, the foodstuff, that is necessary for the survival of the individuals. If you don't have the survival, then you don't have a state to have good governance with.

So she might know that there are other states that are going to take up the slack that Canada may be dropping a little bit here. Maybe she does. I don't know. I haven't talked to her about it.

À (1055)

Ms. Beth Phinney: She certainly hasn't ever mentioned it, that I've heard anyway. Maybe if we'd agreed to this 0.7%, it might have balanced this a little bit.

Mr. William Hogg: It could have, yes.

Ms. Beth Phinney: Thank you.

Mr. William Hogg: The thing on the 0.7% is that when Prime Minister Pearson--he was actually ex-Prime Minister Pearson when he said it-- mentioned the 0.7% goal, Canada would have been able to do it within five or six years if the subsequent Liberal government had continued the same sort of spending trends that Prime Minister Pearson had started. So back then it was a reasonable goal, a very reasonable goal. Now, unfortunately, I think it's a goal--and rightly so--for which the government really hasn't jumped on board yet, because it would be fairly costly from a fiscal standpoint.

It would be nice to get to it, though. It would be nice if the government put a voice behind when a date will be reached, like some of our other allies have, but it's going to be really costly because of past decisions that were probably not the best ones.

Is that okay?

Ms. Beth Phinney: Prime Minister Martin has said that he wants to reach this goal.

Mr. William Hogg: Yes.

Ms. Beth Phinney: That's what he really would like to do, but he doesn't want to commit in writing that he's going to do it in case something--

Mr. William Hogg: And I understand that.

Ms. Beth Phinney: A lot of the public doesn't understand this, that we have committed to doing it. The Prime Minister does want to do it; it's just that something terrible could happen in Canada five years from now, and we can't reach it, and then we've signed a document that we can't--

Mr. William Hogg: But one of the problems is that a lot of past Canadian governments of several colours have made the same promise to achieve it, and unless you put it in writing, I'm not sure if it's going to ever happen. Even if you put it in writing, it probably would not happen on the same sort of timeline as was promised. And that's the reality of domestic and international politics. Things change.

Ms. Beth Phinney: Why can't it be a reality to us if it's a reality to Norway and different countries?

Mr. William Hogg: Because they've been doing it for so long it's the status quo. To get from 0.27% or 0.28%, where we're at, to 0.7% is a major change in the status quo, and if you have taken a public administration or public policy course...this is what I teach my students. It's much easier to maintain the status quo than to cause change, especially when you're talking about fiscal spending patterns. To break that mould from the 0.26% or 0.27%...to get up to 0.35% is going to take 10 years; how long is it going to take to 0.7%? It's going to be a major change to the way we spend.

Again, if we had continued spending the same way as Prime Minister Pearson had started, then we would be there today and we would probably be beyond it today, but unfortunately we ran into the 1970s. And it's not just Prime Minister Trudeau's fault, but the fact is that the Scandinavian countries have being doing this for a very long time; it's the status quo. And it's actually declining right now. I think Denmark is almost below the 0.7%, where it's always been above 0.7%, so even there you might see some changes taking place.

The Chair: I have a question for you.

I want to go back to Monsieur Paquette's question.

You mentioned that the process of developing the IPS is more interesting and more important in the long run than the statement itself. I think it's the first time that we heard this, and it's a very important comment. Knowing that the government took more than six months to come out with the statement, it's probably going to take us more time than that to try to do a report, because it's a minority government and we only had it before the summer recess.

How do you see the negative and positive elements of this statement, in a sense, knowing that we have diplomacy, defence, and development treaties? For us, it's about everything that Canada is doing. Do you see this differently? Would you like a statement on everything overall for every year or on a pattern for one year?

I want to get your input.

Mr. William Hogg: James and I were talking about this before we started.

There are lots and lots of things that are not included in the IPS. I specialize in arms control issues to a certain extent, and they're not there.

I've been interviewing lots of arms control people in Ottawa since the IPS came out. I've asked them what they think of the fact that the IPS didn't say anything about arms control. They said that it doesn't really matter to them. They know that they have x number of dollars. They know what the mandates are for the NPT, they know what the mandate is for small arms and light weapons, and they know what the mandates are on all kinds of arms control issues.

It's the same thing for the peace process in the Middle East. I've interviewed several people on the peace process in the Middle East, and they said the same thing.

If the IPS doesn't say anything about those specific issue areas, does it mean that those specific issue areas don't matter to the government? Sure, they do. But I think it means that the IPS is less important about what it says, because two key issues, the peace process in the Middle East and arms control, are barely there.

They have said to me that they like the way the IPS was developed, with inter-agency cooperation and Foreign Affairs getting a little more punch to its role in foreign policy development. There has been a lot of worry that as each ministry in Ottawa develops its own international desk, Foreign Affairs loses an ounce of power. Every time International Trade brings in a new international trade guy, and every time Immigration Canada develops its own immigration policies internationally, Foreign Affairs has been worried about that. They liked that Foreign Affairs and all the other ministries came together to put this together.

I think that's where the importance of the document lies. I think that the IPS is important to a certain extent for what it says, but it's more about the process than the final product itself.

Á (1100)

The Chair: You mentioned process versus outcome, and you mentioned that it would be on the outcome side as to whether Canada will be part of the war in Iraq and the willing coalition, in a sense. Does the process mean that we need to go multilaterally, and the outcome means that we need to get rid of Saddam Hussein? Do you think the way Canada is doing its foreign policy is a good way?

Mr. William Hogg: Do you mean that it's process based rather than outcome based?

The Chair: Yes.

Mr. William Hogg: For a country like Canada, it has to be process-based. For a country like the U.S., it doesn't have to be process-based.

Canada is a small country, with small resources in the international system. We have to rely on the rule of law, we have to rely on international treaties, and we have to rely on formal rules of behaviour among states.

On the other hand, when looking at the international system, the U.S. will rely on international treaties, international law, and rules of behaviour until it doesn't fit with their interests anymore. They can then go outside the rules of behaviour and do what they want. Their outcomes are more important than the process.

I don't think it can be like that for Canada because of the position we have in the international system. We're not a powerful state. We can't manage the international system if we decide that international law doesn't matter to us anymore, whereas the U.S. can. I think that's why the process is more important than the outcome.

The Chair: Thank you.

Mr. Sorenson.

Mr. Kevin Sorenson: I want to review a statement, if I can get you to comment on it. You may have read this already. Have you?

Mr. William Hogg: Who is it by? Is it Jack Granatstein's?

Mr. Kevin Sorenson: Yes.

Mr. William Hogg: He was our keynote speaker at this conference. I was there when he said it.

Mr. Kevin Sorenson: Well, then, for the sake of the multitudes sitting out there listening to this today, I'll just read you the quote and the statement, and get your feelings on it:

An increasingly multicultural Canada mustn't pressure the government to develop foreign policy that ignores national interests in favour of disparate demands from ethnic groups, according to a popular historian.

“Foreign policy is not about loving everyone or even helping everyone,” said Jack Granatstein. “Our foreign policy must be based on what is important to Canadians as a whole, not to Canadians wearing only their old country, ethnicity, religious hat. Anything else is a recipe for fragmentation, division and discord.”

You've already hit on some of the points that are important to Canadians. We believe in human rights. We believe in good governance. We expect good governance and human rights, not just here in our country but around the world. We believe in the rule of law. There's a long list of values that we believe in. Canada has a role to assure that human rights, rule of law, and good governance are happening here in our country and abroad.

Maybe this is two questions rather than one...no, let's stick with Granatstein for a now. Just maybe comment on that.

Also, we may have talked about this already, but through our policy, are there any other ways in which we can promote human rights, good governance, etc., around the world? When we talk about CIDA and when we talk about development and relief, we don't always say, oh, this country has been hit by a tsunami or an earthquake or a natural disaster, but they could improve their human rights or they could improve their governance, so we won't send money. We take care of people first, and then we try to use that, maybe—do we or don't we?—to leverage some of these other things.

So first of all, there's Granatstein, and secondly, there's the most effective way to really make a difference in the world.

Á (1105)

Mr. William Hogg: Jack was our keynote speaker for the conference that I helped to organize, so I know why he put that speech together. The conference was on demographics and Canadian foreign policy, and how our changing demographics within the country are going to affect our capacity to develop foreign policy. It's interesting that I gave the same lecture to my students in a little less interesting fashion yesterday.

Jack is assuming that demographic populations, when they come to Canada, bring their problems with them and will then pressure the government to act upon those problems. A poll was commissioned by the CDFAI for this conference, and it actually showed that Jack might not be right. He might be worried about something that isn't going to take place. He's worried that these demographics are going to import problems and challenge normal Canadian foreign policy concerns, whereas—

Mr. Kevin Sorenson: We have seen that. Air India was an example of where it may sometimes happen. But you're saying it may not be a—

Mr. William Hogg: Well, no, the poll itself said that newly arrived Canadians actually are.... Now, we can always question the role of polls and whether polls are effective ways of gauging what's actually going on, but the poll said newly arrived Canadians are adopting the same types of foreign policy concerns and demands as established English Canadians.

Professor Granatstein might have been assuming that they are coming in and challenging the fundamentals of Canadian foreign policy. I think the poll went against him. I think I'm here today because of an op-ed I wrote in the Citizen with regard to this issue itself.

We have to be less concerned about the impact of demographics if the trend continues and if the trend that we saw in the poll is actually the real trend: that these newly arrived Canadians are actually adopting established English Canadian values.

Now, this isn't going to be nice for Monsieur Paquette, but

[Translation]

they espouse positions that are opposed to those of Quebec with regard to Canada in the world and international relations in general. As regards international relations, Quebec has a different position.

There is another problem looming before us. During the two or five years to come, we are expecting the arrival of approximately 1.1 million new immigrants. They will probably settle in Toronto and Vancouver, and will choose to adopt English Canadian values rather than French Canadian ones. This might utterly dilute Quebec's influence on foreign policy planning.

Mr. Pierre Paquette: Yet another argument in favour of Quebec sovereignty.

Mr. William Hogg: And there are other [Editor's Note: Inaudible.]We will not get into that here: it is another issue, but I have arguments against that.

Á (1110)

[English]

So that was your demographics question. I think Jack might have been fear-mongering a little bit, and I think a lot of people in the audience were a little bit.... It says in that article that his comments were quite controversial and were seen as quite controversial by a lot of the people in the audience.

Do we use our development assistance as leverage for good governance? If you look at the response to the tsunami, the response to Pakistan, and to other natural disasters like those, I don't think those funds come from the long-term infrastructural moneys that CIDA has for development assistance. These were emergency responses by the federal government, from general coffers, I guess, although I don't know the exact sources. I'm not sure these are the types of moneys that Minister Carroll has to be able to influence good governance and so on. The Canadian government itself could use that, but there is so much other money out there. There are billions and billions of dollars for the tsunami relief. There is not enough for Pakistan, but there is still....

We're a small voice in that overall influx of massive sums of money, so I'm not sure how much voice Canada has in influencing good governance and civil society and rule of law in those countries with those moneys. There was just so much money thrown in all at the same time that it lost its face, and it may not be as effective a policy tool for effecting change that way.

Does that answer your question?

Mr. Kevin Sorenson: Yes, it certainly does. Thank you.

I also take note, Mr. Chairman, that Mr. Hogg has said this is his first time appearing before a parliamentary committee. I suggest that he might be a witness we would like to have in Ottawa sometime on other issues, because we've been very appreciative of his views.

Mr. William Hogg: Thank you.

The Chair: We wanted someone from Bishop's too.

[Translation]

Mr. Pierre Paquette: Given that the gentleman took the time to type his text, perhaps the clerk could—

Mr. William Hogg: It is only in English. This is why I did not give you a copy of it.

Mr. Pierre Paquette: We would like to have it for our work.

[English]

The Chair: I have a question. We're really trying to have involvement from youth. It's one of the reasons we had the meeting at UQAM. We met with Canada 25, a youth organization, in Ottawa, and with youths in Toronto also.

Do you see any change in youths, like your students, when it comes to foreign affairs and policies? How can we get them more involved? That's very important for us.

I know we have the e-consultations, and they are mainly for youth.

Mr. William Hogg: Yes, we can talk about the role of e-consultations and whether they're consultations or a simple outreach tool.

We had a long debate at the conference over the weekend, because Mark McLaughlin, who is the director of the e-consultation, was there and gave a presentation. He was giving his presentation in the context of involving youths in the foreign policy-making process.

There's a big debate about what actual e-consultations are. Are they an outreach or for getting the message out? Is it consultation: okay, this is my opinion, and it might count or it might not.

One professor from UNBC, Heather Smith, said that what you actually have to do is get engagement, which is joint policy-making, between those you are trying to involve through something like e-consultation and either Parliament or the bureaucracy. There is some consultation involved, but we haven't really gotten past the outreach yet. What that means is that for those who care about foreign policy but are not academics, bureaucrats, a parliamentarian, or with an NGO, it's very hard to get involved in the foreign policy-making process constructively.

For youths, I approached one of the Canada 25 guys who was at this conference. I'm supposed to be a youth still. I don't think I am, but—

[Translation]

Mr. Pierre Paquette: —remain forever young.

[English]

Mr. William Hogg: I told him that I'm not sure if I have as much faith in youth, which I am, as Canada 25 does. Canada 25 is not a reflective image of youth today; it's an elite group of, I'd say, 2% or 3% of that demographic, which is fine, and they have a voice.

The Chair: Good, okay.

Mr. William Hogg: I think the student I sent out to Tanzania is one of those important Canadians playing a role and interested in foreign policy, but the group is not representative of all youth.

I gave my mid-term back last week, and there was a 59% average. I'm not too sure if I trust the whole range too much. Of course, I have five people with an A in that class, so I know there is hope for that demographic.

But here we're talking about domestic politics, and I have a problem with the education system and some of the different reforms that are taking place, both within Quebec and also pan-Canadian-wise, in that students can't write anymore and all that.

So broadly speaking, I'm not too sure youths—this is the whole demographic—are going to be as interested as their forefathers, their parents, their grandparents, and people like that. The 3% to 5% who are will be very good, which is good and hope for the future. But I'd say they're about normal for the rest of the group. They have their interests in health care and education policy, tuition, and things like that, and foreign policy is a side game for them.

Á (1115)

The Chair: Very good. Thank you.

I just want to remind you that we also have a town hall meeting tonight.

Mr. William Hogg: I have to teach this afternoon.

The Chair: Thank you very much.

We'll recess for a few minutes.

Á (1115)

Á (1130)

[Translation]

The Chair: Now let us get back to our study of the International Policy Statement.

We are pleased to welcome Ms. Judith Berlyn, co-chair of the Westmount Initiative for Peace, and Mr. Normand Beaudet, representing the Centre de ressources sur la non-violence.

[English]

Welcome, Ms. Berlyn. Bienvenue, Monsieur Beaudet.

We'll start with Ms. Berlyn. You have a few minutes for your statement. Do you have a statement?

Ms. Judith Berlyn (Co-Chair, Westmount Initiative for Peace, Canadian Peace Alliance (The)): Well, I have--

The Chair: In your head. Go ahead, no problem.

Ms. Judith Berlyn: I need to correct you. I'm not president of the Westmount Initiative for Peace. I'm an active member. I'm here on behalf of the Canadian Peace Alliance, l'Alliance canadienne pour la paix, which is an umbrella organization of peace groups au niveau pan-Canadian.

We have prepared a document that is the result of a consultative process we conducted ourselves, exactly. We started this process about five years ago, and at that time there was no major consultation being offered by the government. In fact, we are now 12 years, according to my recollection, from the last sort of global consultation on Canada's role in the world, which led up to 1994, when there was a white paper on defence, and I guess there was one on foreign policy too, I don't remember. But 12 years is too long an interval, we feel.

We're very glad for this opportunity. Our major request would be that you recommend to the government that it institute an ongoing consultative process on the disarmament and peace issues within the department, because we have experienced a very good model for this with respect to human rights. There are human rights consultations in the Lester B. Pearson Building every year for two or three days. They are very open. All Canadian NGOs concerned with human rights may go there and discuss with government officials, and the minister always comes, and so forth. We would like a similar process to happen with respect to disarmament and peace issues and Canada's role in the world.

That's overall; it's not in the report.

The report you will read. I'm not going to go over the content. It makes 42 recommendations for changes to government policy. They're very specific, very concrete. It was not planned to be a response to the new policy, but in effect, I think it can serve that purpose and that's how we're presenting it here today.

As to the new policy, I have read only the overview and the defence cahier, and I find them very disappointing, not nearly good enough for Canadians and Canada. People in Canada have much...well, you will be hearing from them.

I would like to speak very briefly about three main areas. The Canadian Peace Alliance has existed for 20 years. We'll be celebrating our 20th anniversary at a conference in Ottawa next weekend. In that time, the main focus of our work has been under three headings. One is the role of the Canadian armed forces. Another is Canadian involvement in the international weapons trade. The third is Canada's role in achieving a nuclear weapon-free world; in other words, our role for nuclear disarmament.

In terms of the role of the Canadian armed forces, we strongly advise that the government.... There's very little, that I could find, concrete in the new policy. What we do observe is that the role has changed. It has always been a kind of double mandate, which we find contradictory. One part of the mandate is what is sometimes called the “people helping people” role--they use that even in their publicity--or “helping save lives”, as the recent recruitment campaign was titled. Those, of course, are the good things that all Canadians like--search and rescue, emergency disaster relief, delivery of humanitarian aid, and participation in traditional United Nations peacekeeping--all good and well.

The other part of the mandate is called, rather euphemistically, combat readiness, but if you were to use the same language that is used in the PR campaigns, they could be equally termed “people killing people” or “helping take lives”. That is what we are now in Afghanistan to do, and personally I am grateful to Major General Rick Hillier for telling it like it is last July, when he said our troops were going there to kill and be killed. That was echoed recently by Bill Graham, when he spoke to the CORIM here in Montreal and said, in effect--not his words, but his message--expect the body bags.

This change in emphasis of the role has happened, as we see it, through a series of ad hoc decisions since the early 1990s, probably starting in the Balkans in the summer of 1992. But there was never any public discussion. I don't think parliamentarians discussed it. Certainly, public opinion had no chance to comment on it.

Á (1135)

What we suggest in terms of the role of the Canadian armed forces is the following logical progression--the four Ds. First, define the role and have a public debate about that; second, determine what functions our troops have to be able to perform in order to play the role we have defined; third, decide what training and equipment they need in order to perform the functions in order to play the role; and last, the fourth step in the process is to draft a budget. Do not throw money at them with no idea of what it's for or make up a shopping list of military equipment and so on, which is how we see it going at the moment. Please follow those four logical steps to arrive at a decision as to what resources they actually need to do the job we're asking them to do. But first we have to define the job.

On Canada's involvement in the international weapons trade, this is something that saddens me beyond anything else, I think, and for the following reasons. There are four trades that create victims. These are the slave trade, the drug trade, the sex trade, and the arms trade. They're all very nasty ways to make a buck. You cannot be involved in any of those four forms of commerce without directly victimizing human beings.

Yet, although most government's condemn the first three, they condone the fourth. In fact, it's much worse than that. They don't just condone the arms trade; they actively support it. They sponsor it. They subsidize it with public money. We have arms trade fairs all over the place, where Canadian companies go and showcase their technologies of death and destruction and try to sell them all over the world, and government is behind that. Government helps them get contracts. I have heard top civil servants apologizing to CEOs of companies right here in Montreal, such as Oerlikon and SNC-Lavalin and Pratt & Whitney--and of course our own Bombardier is in it too, because with all that government money going into it, it becomes very profitable to make arms.

But why, why, when they're all--

Á (1140)

The Chair: I'm sorry, which one is Bombardier doing?

[Translation]

Normand Beaudet (Coordinateur du Centre de ressourcs sur la non-violence, Collectif Echec à la guerre):

These are components of air warfare systems.

The Chair: All right.

[English]

Ms. Judith Berlyn: You will see recommendations in the report about Canadian involvement in the international weapons trade, so please pay attention.

On the nuclear question, very briefly, when I try to explain to people Canada's policy about nuclear weapons, I call it a double-E policy. The two Es, fortunately, are the same in both official languages. They are eliminate and essential. As a country that has ratified the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Canada is committed to the elimination of all nuclear weapons in the world. We have good rhetoric on that. We say we believe in that. We always say we believe in that. However, in the meantime, as members of NATO we apparently are content with NATO's policy, which finds that nuclear weapons are essential, and NATO even has plans to use nuclear weapons, to use them first--first strike, it's called.

This is totally contradictory. How many people when they go through a cupboard to decide what clothes to give away, and they find their best winter coat, say, this wonderful coat keeps me warm and we have cold winters, so I think I'll put it on the pile for the Salvation Army? You don't eliminate what you consider to be essential. So this contradiction has to be resolved, and de facto it's being resolved at the moment in favour of NATO.

Now, I was just very glad to hear William Hogg say that we must--and I think we must--uphold international law at all times. The treaty is international law. We have signed the treaty. Those obligations should trump anything else that we do in the field of nuclear weapons. But we are silent, far too silent, on far too many things. The policy is silent.

I should have mentioned that I'm also on the steering committee of the Canadian Network to Abolish Nuclear Weapons, and of course the Canadian Peace Alliance is a founding member of that network. You will, I'm sure, be getting a submission from them, and we support it absolutely.

Thank you very much.

The Chair: Thank you, Mrs. Berlyn.

Monsieur Beaudet, s'il vous plaît.

[Translation]

Normand Beaudet:

Thank you for giving me the opportunity to appear before this committee. I will deal with two items. The first has to do with the position of Collectif Échec à la guerre. I want to strongly emphasize that in Quebec, at the time when Canada had to decide whether or not to join with the Americans in the war in Iraq, 250,000 persons gathered in the streets, in the bitter cold, in the month of March, to voice their opposition to any eventual offensive action by Canada in Iraq. The Collectif Échec à la guerre organized this demonstration. This was not just a tiny part of the population, but there were hundreds of thousands of people who were very concerned by the Canadian government's thinking. The organizations that work for peace were very impressed by this. Of course, we won because Canada is not participating in the Iraq war.

On the other hand, this summer, on the sly, during vacation, the holiday period, Canadian government made what seems to us an administrative decision, to send Canadian troops on a clearly offensive mission in southern Iraq, more precisely in Kandahar, to flush the Talibans out. As Judith explained, there was no clear and specific defence policy statement about that kind of engagement. This, for us, is a drastic turnabout in Canadian foreign policy. This kind of offensive operation poses an immediate threat to Canada, inasmuch as it exposes Canada to potential terrorists attacks.

The members of our organizations and the Canadian public never expressed their agreement that Canadian foreign policy include this type of offensive mission. The reality is being concealed from the young people who are now being massively recruited in Quebec schools. The Department of National Defence has set the goal of increasing the number of Canadian troops from 62,000 to 90,000. This has given rise to a massive recruitment campaign among the young people in schools. Now they are still projecting the image of peacekeeping, which is hypocritical in the extreme. They should tell the young people that they want to hire them and if they accept a job, they could be called upon to take part in offensive operations. As we speak, recruiting is going on and weapons systems are being purchased on the sly with the funds that were just granted. People are not being told what they will have to do. Those who will have to participate in such operations are being deceived. I find this appalling.

Some of my family members recently went away on a mission. When I informed them about the situation, they were very surprised. I cannot name anyone, but I can nonetheless say that one of my cousins is currently on a base in Saudi Arabia. Neither he nor the people with him were aware of this shift in policy. Canadian policy is taking a new turn, but the people have no say in this. And this creates a problem. The Collectif Échec à la guerre is very concerned with this.

In Quebec, nearly 100 organizations belong to this collective. We believe that we should withdraw all the advisors who are currently in Iraq, and perhaps even the technical advisors working for companies like SNC-Lavalin. Apparently, some companies are currently being consulted for advice on military operations. This should stop right away. Canada should stop these operations. The Canadian public has not accepted that Canada should get involved in offensive missions.

We demand that military spending be frozen until a public debate has taken place. We could then determine whether Canada should get involved in offensive missions or whether it should strictly stick to peacekeeping, for instance, which is traditionally a defensive role. We should decide whether the nation should choose to get involved in offensive missions led by NATO, or remain within the framework of the United Nations. These issues should be debated in depth.

Currently, the citizens of this country reject the notion of an ongoing partnership with the American war machine.

Á (1145)

For the time being, we're being dragged along behind it. Because we haven't defined our own defence policy and done the preliminary work that was so well described by Ms. Berlyn, namely defining policy and putting the four Ds in practice, we're moving ahead blindly. Decisions are being made without public consultation and we're making commitments that are completely unacceptable, the excuse being that since we are a member of certain alliances, we don't have a choice anyway. That's absurd and incoherent and must be called into question. We're talking about an increase in expenditures by the Department of National Defence that could go as high as $12.8 billion over five years. This is a major change of direction, and people have to have a say about this.

We're also asking that American deserters who left during offensive missions be allowed in as political refugees. These people were subject to the same situation with regard to the offensive orientation of their government, even though perhaps they should have expected it. Nevertheless, these are refugees from a political standpoint.

We are very concerned about Canada's change in domestic policy. This whole dynamic that means that we are turning toward missions that are offensive in nature makes Canada more vulnerable to future terrorist acts. Therefore, we are told that we must inevitably opt for a policy of increased protection copied off the American system. Our organization is profoundly opposed to such a position. I will now take off my hat as a member of the Collectif Échec à la guerre and replace it with that of coordinator of the Centre de ressources sur la non-violence.

For many years, we've been working on methods of international conflict prevention. There are many ways to intervene in a preventive manner, be it through civil mechanisms of early crisis detection, crisis documentation, crisis vigilance or international alerts on conflict situations.

It is not true that situations such as that of Rwanda cannot be prevented. I took part in a preventive mission in Burundi. I was present in the field with Ould-Abdallah, representative to the UN Secretary General. It was clearly understood that dramatic events were about to unfold. Measures were proposed. Most of them were not of a military nature. And yet, preparations are being made for military measures.

The only non-military method that is used and prepared in advance is diplomacy. However, this is a mechanism for negotiation, not for non-violent sanctions. There's a tremendous amount of work to do in Canada with regard to the application of sanctions and early detection mechanisms. The same is true for containing situations of international conflict. Canada should talk with its military. I challenge you to find a single one for whom the use of force is not a last resort, in other words, the method used once all other methods have been exhausted. I also challenge you to tell me five non-violent action methods that could have been used preventively in the case of Rwanda. I'm listening. I only want five, whereas we've catalogued at least 150.

You are experts in the field. Name five non-violent measures that Canada applied before deciding to intervene in the field with a military representative. What are the non-violent ways that Canada uses in a preventive manner in conflict situations? Can anyone answer me?

Á (1150)

The Chair: Usually, it's not the members who answer questions from witnesses.

Normand Beaudet: No?

The Chair: We're here to listen to you.

Normand Beaudet: The fact remains that most people are incapable of answering that question. That means there's a problem.

The Chair: Within the Francophonie, there was Bamako. Next week there will be a meeting of what is being referred to as Bamako +5. There's a great deal of talk about prevention and vigilance with regard to intervention, not from the standpoint of diplomacy but in a different way, as you mentioned. This trend also exists to a certain extent in the Commonwealth. The point is to react before events occur, as is currently being done in Côte d'Ivoire. This approach is also being considered in Ethiopia.

Normand Beaudet: These are very meager attempts.

The Chair: We're working on that. Let's just say I'm wearing another hat. Like you, I own several. I am the International President of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Francophonie, and this is a subject that we have discussed and that we want to pursue.

Normand Beaudet: Well then, we will cooperate with you.

The Chair: Usually, I don't answer questions from witnesses. However, I'm pleased to tell you that we do wear other hats on occasion.

Have you finished your presentation?

Normand Beaudet: Yes. In any case, to make things official, I will table a brief which refers to international conflict and crisis prevention methods.

The Chair: Thank you.

[English]

Before asking my colleagues to ask questions, I want to say this to Ms. Berlyn.

I'm very pleased that one of the things you mentioned from memory was the report of the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs—it's mentioned on page 30—but I must say that when we reviewed the Canadian policy on nuclear non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament in 1998 in Canada and the Nuclear Challenge, one of our recommendations was to have an annual consultation with civil society. I know that has happened—at least for a couple of years—but I don't know if that's been so in the last couple of years.

One of the other recommendations at that time was to review NATO's nuclear policy, and NATO did agree to review it in 1999—although the war in Kosovo meant that the review never really went as far as Canada and Germany wanted.

But we're taking note of your comments on this.

Ms. Judith Berlyn: May I just comment on the consultative process you just mentioned?

The Chair: Yes.

Ms. Judith Berlyn: I'm very grateful that you made that recommendation, and I can tell you how it is playing out. It is a very restrained process, by invitation only. It is limited to approximately 30 people: 10 academics, 10 civil servants, and 10 NGOs only.

I mentioned the Canadian Network to Abolish Nuclear Weapons, a regroupement of other coalitions. I think it had 17 founding members, and it's now up to about 20, but with only 10 NGOs allowed in the consultations, not even all of the members of the Canadian Network to Abolish Nuclear Weapons can go to them. We are not even allowed as observers; it is a very closed process.

So I hope you will recommend what we are asking, that the department use the model of its own process with respect to human rights, which is a very good consultative process. I've been going through that process since 1992, so that we won't sell weapons to human rights abusing regimes—at least that's what we go there to ask. But if it followed that model and was open to all NGOs in Canada focused on disarmament and peace, or Canada's role in the world in disarmament and peace, and the process was allowed to be open, they would not be flooded. If it's not every year, make it every two years, so that it is an ongoing discussion.

Á (1155)

The Chair: We also take note of that.

Ms. Judith Berlyn: Thank you.

The Chair: Mr. Sorenson.

Mr. Kevin Sorenson: I don't think I have questions. I would just say that I went through the booklet here, and certainly I do appreciate the passion of those who are presenting here this morning. But when I read through this thing on globalizing peace, it seems like there's more bitterness and slamming of Canada and the United States, which take up the majority of what the book is about:

...the United States is now planning to use.... Submissions to the People's Commission underlined Canada's reliance on the use and threat of military force to advance its economic interests and those of its rich allies. ... Canada is selling arms world wide, is participating in...military programs that will perpetrate the arms race, and is ready and willing...

I find it a very negative submission.

Ms. Judith Berlyn: I hope you have a look at our recommendations.

Mr. Kevin Sorenson: I will.

Ms. Judith Berlyn: Because they're quite concrete, and we hope they're positive.

[Translation]

The Chair: Mr. Paquette.

Mr. Pierre Paquette: Thank you for your presentations. I'm no great expert on military matters. My friend Claude Bachand, the member for Saint-Jean, would be in a better position than I am to discuss this subject.

Could you please explain briefly what [Editor's Note: Technical Difficulty] in Iraq? Are these Canadian military personnel?

Normand Beaudet: These are Canadian companies that act as consultants to American corporations who have a mandate regarding management...

Mr. Pierre Paquette: From a technological standpoint.

Normand Beaudet: ... of technology, of infrastructure. I know that a lot of subcontracts are being signed right now for the management of military bases that are being set up in certain locations, and then private enterprises are responsible for managing them.

Personally, I'm a consultant. In my opinion, when you're talking about defence and military operations, this is no longer a civilian consultant market that doesn't require a policy framework. Even the consultants who are currently taking part in support operations are turning increasingly toward military operations. This is a highly questionable way of doing things; there's no framework, there's very little knowledge of it, and it should be the subject of some investigation by the federal government.

Mr. Pierre Paquette: So you're proposing that there be some regulation or legislation that would serve as a framework for the kind of consultancy provided by Canadian firms, consultancy that is linked to offensive military operations.

Normand Beaudet: Yes. If these activities are not in keeping with Canadian policy, then clearly, these types of operations should not be supported.

Mr. Pierre Paquette: All right.

That in fact brings me to the document from the Canadian Peace Alliance. Your second recommendation deals with the fact that any crown corporation, including Export Development Canada and Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd., should be bound by the Access to Information Act as well as the Environmental Assessment Act. Wouldn't it be appropriate to go even further, that is to force these corporations to respect Canada's international commitments?

I mentioned this earlier but I repeat: when the Export Development Corporation was changed into Export Development Canada, I submitted an amendment stipulating that this organization be compelled to act in accordance with the obligations contained in any convention signed by Canada. The amendment was defeated. I'm wondering whether the second recommendation shouldn't be broadened to compel all crown corporations to behave in a way that complies with international treaties signed by Canada.

Normand Beaudet: Especially since most of their international operations are associated with Canadian policy, which often subsidizes commercial operations. That means that Canadian funds are being used to feed these types of operations, especially their marketing.

Â (1200)

Ms. Judith Berlyn: That's an excellent suggestion that I strongly support. However, it's shocking to us to see crown corporations not being forced to respond to requests for access to information.

Mr. Pierre Paquette: We're working on that issue through the Halifax initiative. I think things are going in the right direction. There should be...

Ms. Judith Berlyn: We will note your suggestion in order to improve our recommendation. Thank you, Mr. Paquette.

Mr. Pierre Paquette: Further on, you talk about export permits for military materiel going to the US. Export permits already exist. It was stated earlier that the Department of International Trade currently issues these permits. It has been suggested to the committee that the Department of Foreign Affairs be responsible for issuing these permits in order to ensure that these are issued in compliance with foreign affairs policy rather than international trade.

I'd like to hear your views on that. At the same time, perhaps you could explain how export permits for military materiel going to the US would add anything.

Ms. Judith Berlyn: We don't have to export. Right now Canada's policy consists in not exporting military goods to countries at...

Mr. Pierre Paquette: At war?

Ms. Judith Berlyn: ...who engage in offensive military action. I presume that any such export of military goods to the US stopped on March 19, 2003, but I doubt it. I imagine that we're not following our own policy in this case. I haven't checked, but...

Normand Beaudet: The policy is being circumvented by using the American channel. This is a very well-known way to circumvent Canadian policy. In any event, the excuse often given is that we only produce parts and components that go into arms systems assembled in the United States. Therefore, we can export components to the United States that will then be sent to countries at war.

Why are we so adept at tracing anything we need to in the field of agriculture when we don't do it for military components? In order to be consistent, perhaps we should track components that go into arms systems that are exported to countries where there are conflicts.

Mr. Pierre Paquette: With regard to sanctions, you proposed that the government:

26. Not impose sanctions without both the informed consent of organized, broadly-based opposition within the country in question; and the approval of the United Nations.

What happens in a situation where groups are not in agreement? Let me give you an example.

When we began the campaign to boycott Canadian investment in South Africa, the COSATU was in agreement—that was the union present when I was at the CSN; and that's why I took part in these debates—but the union in exile, whose name escapes me, disagreed. In the final analysis, we relied on the people in the field. But it seems to me that perhaps you should better define...

[English]

Ms. Judith Berlyn: Okay.

[Translation]

Mr. Pierre Paquette: That often scares me. In conflicts like the one in South Africa, that is the campaign to abolish apartheid through boycotts, there are also internal opposition groups, and there is a power struggle. This type of sanction is often supported by one group rather than another, for reasons that have to do with their internal dynamics. This is a notion that I'd like to explore further.

Normand Beaudet: What page is that on?

Mr. Pierre Paquette: It's on page 31.

Â (1205)

Normand Beaudet: Perfect.

Mr. Pierre Paquette: I can give you another example. I will be tabling a bill that seeks to have the Canada-Israel Free Trade Agreement limited to territories recognized by the UN in 1948. I'm sure I will be told that this will adversely affect Palestinians who are currently working in the occupied territories and producing goods exported to Canada or Europe. On the other hand, many people in the Arab and Muslim communities already support this bill. How do you [Editor's Note: Technical Difficulty]?

Normand Beaudet: We're really at the heart here of the problem of non-violent sanctions. Right now, one of the problems is that all the financial resources are put into the preparation of military infrastructures and infinitesimal parts of the budget are earmarked for preparing a strategy of non-violent sanctions to counter certain situations. So we end up forced to wait until the crisis becomes very significant to justify resorting to military force. We have to wait until the situation has really degenerated and it's too late to intervene. We wait because we don't want to restort to military intervention too quickly. We have to develop non-violent sanctions that are far more diverse. There are types of sanctions that can be used before a boycott. These sanctions have to be imposed first, there has to be early detection, we have to put in place all kinds of surveillance measures, border control, in order to help the leaders and prevent arms from arriving in the country. When we get to the economic sanctions that you're talking about, we do receive support for their implementation because other sanctions have already been used. If we do nothing, if we wait until a boycott is necessary in order to act, it's a bit late. We must develop all the mechanisms for civilian non-military and non-violent intervention before we invest everything in military resources.

Mr. Pierre Paquette: I have two more brief questions.

The Chair: No problem.

Mr. Pierre Paquette: I share the general approach, except for a few details. Proposition 27 reads as follows:

27. Work to make World Trade Organization rules subordinate to domestic environmental and human rights law.

Ms. Judith Berlyn: Yes.

Mr. Pierre Paquette: I agree with the principle of making the WTO subordinate. It seems to me that we should talk more about an international convention, because if local legislation is weak with regard to environmental issues, of course, that won't help the cause at all. When I work on these issues as critic for international trade, I generally propose that we find some way to ensure that the WTO develop mechanisms together with the ILO so that fundamental conventions are respected and major international conventions on the environment are complied with as well, in the framework of the international exchanges.

I do understand that the goal here is to allow national parliaments some capacity to legislate for the common good without being limited by the rules of international trade. However, I find that this proposal doesn't really render that idea.

Ms. Judith Berlyn: It's badly formulated.

Mr. Pierre Paquette: I'd like to mention one last thing.

Ms. Judith Berlyn: I appreciate these suggestions for improvement.

Mr. Pierre Paquette: I've seen nothing about nuclear test bans. At NATO, there is a group that you refer to, I believe, when you talk about [Editor's Note: Technical Difficulty]. This group is working to ban the proliferation of nuclear arms, as well as on a nuclear test ban.

I'm wondering whether, in the interest of furthering a global ban on nuclear weapons, we shouldn't try to work on a nuclear test ban.

Ms. Judith Berlyn: There is a movement to have a treaty. Is that what you're referring to?

Mr. Pierre Paquette: Exactly, and that's within NATO.

Ms. Judith Berlyn: No, it's within the UN.

Mr. Pierre Paquette: Yes, but it also includes NATO member countries, such as Norway.

Ms. Judith Berlyn: That's right. There is a coalition.

Mr. Pierre Paquette: Should Canada be a part of it?

Ms. Judith Berlyn: We believe that, as a NATO member, Canada could play a far more important role in the nuclear arms issue. Canada and Greece are the two NATO countries which have required that any US nuclear weapons on their territory be withdrawn. At present, Belgium is debating the issue in its own Parliament, though I do not know what the latest developments are.

Canada would play a significant role if it would help other NATO member countries which do not have nuclear weapons to request that all nuclear weapons be withdrawn from their territory. At present, the situation is extremely confused. I have a document dealing with the issue, but unfortunately it is in English only. With regard to the nuclear weapons issue as a whole, we believe that Canada took two steps backwards in October, reversing its policy on the export of nuclear technology to India. Everyone knows that India now has a nuclear bomb, thanks to a Canadian reactor. That reactor instantly provides any country that acquires it with a mine of plutonium, a raw material from which nuclear weapons can be produced!

However, the UN resolution was a very positive step. Canada came together with five or six other countries to enable taskforces focusing on this issue to be established. If my memory serves me, this was in Geneva. But in any case, it was within the framework of the UN Disarmament Conference. However, at the last minute, Canada withdrew support for the resolution, probably because of direct pressure from Washington. At least, that is what I imagine.

Â (1210)

[English]

But there's a banner headline in the newspapers: “Canada drops UN disarmament resolution”.

[Translation]

This is not a priority!

The Chair: Thank you.

Ms. Judith Berlyn: I beg your pardon?

[English]

The Chair: The titles are not from the--

Ms. Judith Berlyn: But it's what happens. In this case,

[Translation]

it's the truth.

[English]

The Chair: Now we'll go to Ms. Phinney.

Ms. Beth Phinney: Thank you very much for your presentation. There are a lot of positive things that we can work on.

Could you could take a few minutes and possibly tell us some of the good things that are going on? I feel bad even for your own group, because you're talking about all negative things. You've done a lot of work on this and should have credit for that, and there are a lot of other organizations that are doing good work and I think they deserve credit. There are probably some positive things that are going on, some of the programs that CIDA has, the beginning of trying to get there without having to go to war.

Are there some positive things going on that you can tell us about?

Ms. Judith Berlyn: I do not know a lot about the development side of things. I have a lot of friends whose focus is on development. I think they, on the whole, are not thrilled with CIDA. That's not to say everything about CIDA....

What we don't like, if I can put it in very general terms, is that overseas development aid should not be seen principally in terms of contracts for Canadian companies and jobs for Canadians, and a lot of that goes on. A lot of the money goes into employing....

What we would like to see in terms of overseas development aid is that we go into communities and provide the infrastructure they need. If they need wells to be dug, we go and dig wells. If they need schools to be built, we go and build schools, or hospitals, but we do things for communities, we do it with the participation of the local population, and we are not looking for contracts.

My father was a civil engineer. He never had so much work in his life as he did in the late 1940s and early 1950s, all over Europe and North Africa. Why? Because we have this cycle as human beings--this is not just Canada--where we destroy and rebuild, and destroy and rebuild. As we develop our technologies of death and destruction--and I'm sorry if Mr. Sorenson doesn't like the truth about that--the capacity of the technologies of death and destruction to destroy and kill is getting bigger with every decade. So we feel that we have to back away from that whole approach to international affairs and really look at what is good for people and the planet.

Ms. Beth Phinney: I can name you one organization, the Aga Khan Foundation, which gets big funding from CIDA. That's exactly what you're talking about. They go into an area, they find out what they need, and they help them do what they have to do.

Ms. Judith Berlyn: That's wonderful. We think the whole approach should be more in that direction.

Ms. Beth Phinney: So there are positive things going on, and it's due to government money.

Ms. Judith Berlyn: Absolutely. We do a lot of positive things.

Â (1215)

[Translation]

Normand Beaudet: I will not talk only about international development, given that Canada's role in the UN peacekeeping force dates back quite a few years. Through the military, Canada has participated in implementing a number of excellent control mechanisms designed to contain conflicts. However, I have the impression that accomplishments have not been systematically kept track of, and as a result we cannot learn to develop this approach further.

With the fall of the Berlin Wall, the veto between east and west came to an end. With the disappearance of that veto, which hindered any action and limited our roles in the event of conflict, the containment of our role in conflicts also came to an end. We then focused on offensive missions rather than drawing a lesson from the past and wondering how we could improve the mechanisms by making them more effective, and intervene at the civilian level before choosing a military solution. In order to make our interventions more effective, the role of the military could then have been brought into line with the peacekeeping philosophy.

Yet, as soon as the UN veto mechanism disappeared, Canada launched itself heart and soul into offensive missions. This is what we criticize. It seems that we have learned nothing in these 40 years of peacekeeping missions, an unfortunate situation that clearly illustrates the negative dynamic that prevails. In our view, this is really going off track.

[English]

Ms. Beth Phinney: Thank you.

The Chair: Merci beaucoup, Madame Phinney.

[Translation]

I would like to ask a very practical question about non-violent sanctions.

Normand Beaudet: Well, that describes the context of my trip to Burundi. I can therefore answer your question.

The Chair: I like that approach. The UN Security Council will consider imposing sanctions on Syria. In your opinion, how could we ensure that those sanctions are non-violent?

Normand Beaudet: I'm not very familiar with Syria. I would rather talk about the Great Lakes region, an area I am much more familiar with since I have been there.

The Chair: Very well.

Normand Beaudet: The situation in Burundi is becoming more stable, but nonetheless remains very precarious at present. The people are seeing the advent of this increasing political stability, saying that there are positive aspects to it, but they are still uncertain. The international community should have a presence there. It is a well-known fact that, since Belgium decolonized Burundi, there have been at least five cycles of massacres, with 100,000 victims. Every 15 years, a new cycle of massacres seems to begin. The young people who experienced those massacres seem to contain their hate until the moment when some event or some political assassination triggers it. It is a verifiable phenomenon, which is typical of the history in this region.

There is a lot of work to be done on the ground with regard to non-violent sanctions. Social interveners would have to defuse the profound crises that people experience at the personal level. Many services could be provided, among other things to detect new radical factions which are being formed at present and whose hate propaganda could become a threat. We could even detect and monitor people developing tools to spread hate propaganda, and be ready to apply non-violent sanctions. We could control the circulation of arms throughout the country, particularly since it is in a stabilization phase.

If we do nothing, then in five or ten years, we might have to go through exactly the same actions again. I could mention dozens of non-military and civilian measures that could be implemented. We have inventoried some 198.

The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Beaudet.

Thank you, Ms. Berlyn.

[English]

As always, it was appreciated.

We're going to adjourn until this afternoon at 1:45.

Thank you.