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37th PARLIAMENT, 2nd SESSION

Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs

EVIDENCE

CONTENTS

Tuesday, June 3, 2003

0905

The Chair (Mr. David Pratt (Nepean—Carleton, Lib.))

Prof. Joseph Jockel (Professor, Canadian Studies Program, St. Lawrence University)

0910

0915

The Chair

Mr. Leon Benoit (Lakeland, Canadian Alliance)

Prof. Joseph Jockel

Mr. Leon Benoit

Prof. Joseph Jockel

0920

Mr. Leon Benoit

Prof. Joseph Jockel

Mr. Leon Benoit

Prof. Joseph Jockel

Mr. Leon Benoit

Prof. Joseph Jockel

Mr. Leon Benoit

Prof. Joseph Jockel

Mr. Leon Benoit

The Chair

Mr. Leon Benoit

Prof. Joseph Jockel

The Chair

Mr. Joe McGuire (Egmont, Lib.)

Prof. Joseph Jockel

Mr. Joe McGuire

Prof. Joseph Jockel

0925

Mr. Joe McGuire

Prof. Joseph Jockel

Mr. Joe McGuire

Prof. Joseph Jockel

Mr. Joe McGuire

Prof. Joseph Jockel

Mr. Joe McGuire

Prof. Joseph Jockel

Mr. Joe McGuire

Prof. Joseph Jockel

0930

Mr. Joe McGuire

Prof. Joseph Jockel

The Chair

Mr. Claude Bachand (Saint-Jean, BQ)

Mr. Joseph Jockel

Mr. Claude Bachand

Mr. Joseph Jockel

Mr. Claude Bachand

Mr. Joseph Jockel

0935

Mr. Claude Bachand

Mr. Joseph Jockel

Mr. Claude Bachand

Mr. Joseph Jockel

Mr. Claude Bachand

The Chair

Mr. David Price (Compton—Stanstead, Lib.)

0940

Prof. Joseph Jockel

Mr. David Price

Prof. Joseph Jockel

Mr. David Price

Prof. Joseph Jockel

Mr. David Price

Prof. Joseph Jockel

Mr. David Price

Prof. Joseph Jockel

0945

Mr. David Price

The Chair

Mrs. Cheryl Gallant (Renfrew—Nipissing—Pembroke, Canadian Alliance)

Prof. Joseph Jockel

Mrs. Cheryl Gallant

Prof. Joseph Jockel

0950

Mrs. Cheryl Gallant

Prof. Joseph Jockel

Mrs. Cheryl Gallant

Prof. Joseph Jockel

Mrs. Cheryl Gallant

Prof. Joseph Jockel

Mrs. Cheryl Gallant

Prof. Joseph Jockel

The Chair

Ms. Anita Neville (Winnipeg South Centre, Lib.)

Prof. Joseph Jockel

0955

Ms. Anita Neville

Prof. Joseph Jockel

Ms. Anita Neville

The Chair

Mr. Leon Benoit

Prof. Joseph Jockel

Mr. Leon Benoit

Prof. Joseph Jockel

Mr. Leon Benoit

Prof. Joseph Jockel

Mr. Leon Benoit

Prof. Joseph Jockel

1000

Mr. Leon Benoit

Prof. Joseph Jockel

Mr. Leon Benoit

Prof. Joseph Jockel

The Chair

1005

Prof. Joseph Jockel

The Chair

Mr. Leon Benoit

1010

Prof. Joseph Jockel

Mr. Leon Benoit

Prof. Joseph Jockel

Mr. Leon Benoit

Prof. Joseph Jockel

Mr. Leon Benoit

Prof. Joseph Jockel

Mr. Leon Benoit

Prof. Joseph Jockel

Mr. Leon Benoit

Prof. Joseph Jockel

Mr. Leon Benoit

Prof. Joseph Jockel

Mr. Leon Benoit

The Chair

1015

Prof. Joseph Jockel

The Chair

Prof. Joseph Jockel

1020

The Chair

Mr. David Price

Prof. Joseph Jockel

Mr. David Price

Prof. Joseph Jockel

Mr. David Price

Prof. Joseph Jockel

1025

Mr. David Price

Prof. Joseph Jockel

The Chair

Mr. Leon Benoit

Prof. Joseph Jockel

Mr. Leon Benoit

Prof. Joseph Jockel

Mr. Leon Benoit

The Chair

1030

Prof. Joseph Jockel

The Chair

Prof. Joseph Jockel

The Chair

1035

Prof. Joseph Jockel

The Chair

Prof. Joseph Jockel

The Chair

Prof. Joseph Jockel

1040

The Chair

Prof. Joseph Jockel

The Chair

Prof. Joseph Jockel

The Chair

1045

Prof. Joseph Jockel

The Chair

Mr. Leon Benoit

Prof. Joseph Jockel

Mr. Leon Benoit

Prof. Joseph Jockel

The Chair

Prof. Joseph Jockel

The Chair

1050

Prof. Joseph Jockel

The Chair

CANADA

Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs

NUMBER 031

2nd SESSION

37th PARLIAMENT

EVIDENCE

Tuesday, June 3, 2003

[Recorded by Electronic Apparatus]

¿ (0905)

[English]

The Chair (Mr. David Pratt (Nepean—Carleton, Lib.)): I call this meeting of the Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs to order.

The committee is very, very pleased today to welcome Professor Joseph Jockel from the Canadian studies program at St. Lawrence University, just across the border or river.

Professor, on behalf of all members here today, welcome to the committee. I understand this is your first appearance before our committee, but I gather you've followed the proceedings of this committee over the years.

So we are very pleased to have you here in person, and without any further delay, perhaps we could get into your comments and then open it up to committee members for questions.

Prof. Joseph Jockel (Professor, Canadian Studies Program, St. Lawrence University): Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for this opportunity to appear before you. I have some brief opening comments and then I am looking forward to your questions.

The Canada-U.S. defence relationship is now open to question. Let me immediately add that I wouldn't for a moment suggest that our two countries will be anything other than partners or allies. Nonetheless, it's not at all certain today that we will maintain the breadth and depth of cooperation that has been the hallmark of our military relationship. It will depend on decisions soon to be taken on both sides of the border.

Upon examination, it shouldn't be surprising that our defence relationship might be loosening, for the two factors that once drew us tightly together militarily have become less binding.

The first of these is the dictates of North American geography. Canadian territory and airspace are much less important today to the strategic defence of North America than they once were. In the 1950s, the chief threat was posed by nuclear-weapon-carrying Soviet bombers, which could fly through Canadian airspace. In response, Americans and Canadians deployed vast air defences. These included the permanent Pinetree radars, the Mid-Canada Line, and the Distant Early Warning Line, all three of which spanned the continent, as well as no fewer than nine RCAF and 75 USAF air defence squadrons and a host of surface-to-air missiles, eventually including the famous Bomarcs here in Canada.

To ward off such an attack and to blunt it through a well-conceived and -executed continent-wide battle plan, the United States and Canada placed these defences under the operational control of a new joint command, NORAD, in 1957. No sooner had NORAD become operational than the threat shifted to intercontinental and submarine-launched ballistic missiles.

It is important to our understanding and the decisions we face today to recognize that no system to detect or track missiles was ever placed in Canada or ever operated by the Canadian Forces. Such sensors are located in Alaska, Greenland, the U.K.—a look at the globe will show why—the continental United States, and space.

Air defence operations, in which Canadians are of course still directly involved, have shrunk dramatically. To be sure, they took on a new importance after September 11 and might be enhanced in the next few years with new capabilities against cruise missiles. But the number of interceptor aircraft and ground radars involved still does not begin to approach that of the past.

The second factor that once tied the United States and Canada very closely together militarily was a common strategic interest abroad of overwhelming importance. We once had that. It was to prevent any hostile or potentially hostile power from dominating Europe and, given Europe's importance, from dominating the world. This critical interest took us into the first and second world wars and then led both our countries into alliance with like-minded Europeans to contain the Soviet Union. Today, no such power threatens Europe, and none is even vaguely in sight.

While Canada and the United States share security interests abroad—not the least of which are combating terror and preventing weapons of mass destruction from falling into the hands of terrorists and rogue states—these do not lend us the great clarity of common purpose we once found in defeating the Germans and in containing the Soviets. A demonstration of this can be found in the recent war in Iraq and in the events leading up to it.

So what are the decisions affecting our bilateral defence relationship? Let me identify three sets.

The first set consists simply of the decisions Canada will soon be taking concerning whether to participate in the missile defence of North America. Its importance is hard to overemphasize. Let me be direct. The future of NORAD and, hence, close Canada-U.S. cooperation for aerospace defence depends on it.

NORAD's core function today is warning of and assessing an aerospace attack on the continent. To be able to do this, it relies on information from U.S. sensors that detect and track missiles and events in space. From the vestigial U.S. and Canadian air defence efforts, a joint Canada-U.S. staff receives this information, and an assessor—who is a general or flag officer—stands ready to confirm on behalf of NORAD that the continent is under attack.

¿ (0910)

Canadian generals at NORAD take their turns at being assessors. The United States would trust no other ally with this responsibility. This is striking, seeing how little Canada actually contributes to aerospace defence.

It is the intent of the United States to link tightly command and control of the missile defence system to warning and assessment. This obviously makes sense since there would only be minutes in which to respond to ballistic missile attack.

If Canada does not participate in missile defence, it can no longer participate in warning and assessment and will lose its place at the very heart of North American air defence operations. The United States would transfer these responsibilities to an all United States command. NORAD would in fact then cease to exist, although our air defence relationship would continue.

Canada-U.S. air defence cooperation would still be necessary for our security and sovereignty. The two countries might maintain a joint air defence command. To save face, they might even call it NORAD. But given the very limited scope of air defences in place today, such a joint command would not be necessary, and regardless, the Canadian military would move from the core to the periphery of North American aerospace defence operations. The bilateral defence relationship would be significantly downgraded. My fear that the hoopla here in Canada over northern command has tended to obscure this distinct possibility.

Let me now turn to defence cooperation overseas. Since the end of the Cold War, Canada has chosen from time to time to deploy military contingents to U.S.-led defence operations. This initially occurred during the first gulf war. Maintaining the option to do so was thereafter formalized in the 1994 defence white paper. Canadian deployments followed during the Kosovo war and the Afghanistan war. While such Canadian contingents have been quite small, they have been more than welcomed by the United States.

The second set of important decisions affecting Canada-U.S. defence relations will be the ones Canada takes concerning the defence budget. Does Canada wish in the coming years to maintain the option to use forces overseas as part of such U.S.-led operations?

Mr. Chairman, you and the other members of the committee know the politics of the defence budget far, far better than I do. I can only observe that I know of no responsible analyst from the Auditor General onward who believes that the range of forces outlined in the 1994 white paper can be maintained at the current level of defence spending.

A moment ago I emphasized that although recent Canadian contributions to U.S.-led wars have been small, they have been welcome from the U.S. perspective. This has largely been because of their political significance. The United States has been much more comfortable acting within alliances or ad hoc coalitions. In other words, and as others have put it, the U.S. sheriff has preferred to ride with a posse. This will remain the case.

In the wake of the bruising experiences leading up to the start of the most recent gulf war, a debate has begun in the United States about the nature of its alliances and coalitions. The outcome of this debate may have an important impact on Canada-U.S. relations.

This is the third and last of decisions that I will briefly address--in this case, decisions to be taken by the United States. It may well be that the United States will be shifting away from a dependence on alliances and coalitions based on their political significance toward ones in which America's overseas partners have real assets to bring into the partnership, especially armed forces or significant geography.

To be sure, we saw during the late war a persistent U.S. emphasis that the campaign was being undertaken with the support of a coalition of the willing, even though the vast majority of the coalition members did not commit even token forces. But this coalition talk was at least partially an effort to provide a political replacement in the wake of the painful United States and British failure to secure a resolution of the UN Security Council.

Many Americans are now arguing that seeking in the future to legitimize U.S. military action through the UN Security Council, NATO's formal structures and broad multilateral political coalitions may not be worth the effort. The sheriff, they are saying, should be picky in pulling together the posse. If these voices prevail, the smaller contributions of the kind that Canada has made in recent years will probably no longer be as welcomed, or welcome, by the United States when it goes to war.

¿ (0915)

That in turn should have an impact on the debate here in Canada over defence spending and over the capabilities of the Canadian Forces. Canadians may want to spend more in order to keep open the option of contributing forces at significant levels to U.S.-led operations, or they may want to forgo the option.

Thank you once again, Mr. Chairman.

The Chair: Thank you very much, Professor Jockel, for those thought-provoking comments. We'll begin our questioning with Mr. Benoit.

Seven minutes.

Mr. Leon Benoit (Lakeland, Canadian Alliance): Thank you, Mr. Chair and Professor, for your comments. I think the comments you've made are sobering comments. I don't think they come as a great surprise to anyone on this committee, but certainly I think they would to a lot of Canadians, including probably quite a few members of Parliament who don't pay as much attention to defence issues.

In terms of your comment that it's not at all certain that we'll maintain the depth and breadth of cooperation with the United States we've had in the past, and you referred to the radar installations, the DEW line, and so on—important uses of Canadian soil to the alliance--if that in fact does happen, how could that reflect on Canadian sovereignty? Particularly if Canada decided not to get involved in missile defence--many say we shouldn't get involved because, if we do, somehow that's reducing our sovereignty—and if we do have, as you say, a much lesser role in terms of our importance to our American neighbours, how might that affect Canadian sovereignty, if at all, over the next 10 to 20 years?

Prof. Joseph Jockel: Sovereignty is a elastic term, and it eventually becomes foreign policy in general if you push it too far. But if you take a stricter definition of sovereignty, to limit it to control over territory, airspace, and waters, not participating in missile defence should have very little impact on Canadian sovereignty. Even without missile defence cooperation, air defence cooperation between Canada and the United States and naval cooperation would continue.

In fact, without missile defence, we would be restructuring our bilateral defence relationship to concentrate just on those areas. I don't think it's sovereignty, at least as traditionally concerned, that's the question here. It's whether or not Canada wants to be involved at the very core of aerospace defence operations, which have been questions about the broader relationship, political relationship, the military relationship, and possibly the economic relationship.

I don't think sovereignty is in question here.

Mr. Leon Benoit: It's those other relationships that are more of a concern to you.

In terms of missile defence and NORAD, you're not the first person to say that if Canada isn't involved in missile defence, NORAD will disappear as we know it, as there would be very little reason for it. You've talked about why it's important to Canada, which I'm glad to hear. But it's clear to me from listening to our American people, including General Eberhart, who is the head of USNORTHCOM and NORAD, how important our involvement in missile defence is to them. To me, it's not entirely obvious why that would be, and yet it's clear that it is important to them that we are involved in this.

Why do you think that is?

Prof. Joseph Jockel: Because that will then leave the structures of Canada-U.S. defence cooperation in place. I don't think it's any of the assets that Canada would bring to missile defence, because as I'm sure you're aware, no element of the system will be located in Canada or operated by Canadians. It's because of this critical link between integrated tactical warning and assessment, as they call it, or ITWA, in NORAD and operation of the missile defence system. Pull that piece out, and the very way we have structured defence cooperation around integrated tactical warning and assessment as the heart.... Canadians can't be in that anymore and we'll have to turn to a general restructuring of our relationship, and that's just not worth it if we can continue it.

¿ (0920)

Mr. Leon Benoit: I take it from your answer that you don't believe part of the reason the Americans feel it's important we cooperate with them on this project is that with us involved as well, critics around the world couldn't.... When the Americans get criticized for building this defence shield, they could point to Canada and say they have allies, that they're not alone in this. Don't you feel that's an important--

Prof. Joseph Jockel: I think that's a flattering thing to say to Canadians, but it's not true. Missile defence is going ahead.

Mr. Leon Benoit: Oh, absolutely.

Prof. Joseph Jockel: There's a broad consensus that was engineered under a Democratic president and continues under a Republican president.

Mr. Leon Benoit: Okay, that's not my question. My question actually was, do you believe that part of the reason the Americans want us involved is that they can, when being criticized for building the shield, point to Canada and say, we have an ally, we're not alone in this, we're not doing this unilaterally?

Prof. Joseph Jockel: No, I don't. In fact, I think that while the title has been changed, it is still thought of as a national missile defence system in the United States.

Mr. Leon Benoit: I wasn't thinking of Americans, I was thinking of overseas critics.

Prof. Joseph Jockel: I don't think that's a prime motivation.

Mr. Leon Benoit: That's interesting, actually.

In terms of defence cooperation overseas, you talked about the three main missions that Canada's been involved in with the United States recently. You said then that Canada will have to beef up our military if we want to maintain the option to participate in future missions. How can the message you're sending be so different from the message this government is sending? The defence minister swears that the increase in the budget last time is absolutely enough for us to maintain the types of mission participation we've been involved in in the past and everything is fine.

The Chair: Mr. Benoit, I'm not sure that is an accurate characterization of the minister's position, but I'll let the professor respond.

Mr. Leon Benoit: Oh, I think it is, Mr. Chair. And I think you can ask questions later, if you like.

Prof. Joseph Jockel: I do know one aspect of a debate to stay out of when I see it.

Some hon. members: Oh, oh!

Prof. Joseph Jockel: I can only underline that you can look at the Auditor General's reports. You can look at standard measures. Over the long run, our levels of defence spending, in particular the levels of capital spending for the Canadian Forces, is below the level needed. This is a standard gauge, the rough gauge that people apply. So in the long run, capabilities cannot be maintained.

The Chair: Thank you, Professor Jockel. Thank you, Mr. Benoit.

Mr. McGuire, seven minutes.

Mr. Joe McGuire (Egmont, Lib.): Thank you, Mr. Chair.

In the second part of your presentation, Mr. Jockel, you were saying that we no longer have common interests abroad. Basically, those treaties or alliances are really no longer necessary. I think that was your second point. Do you agree with that?

Prof. Joseph Jockel: Well, no. I'd say we have common interests abroad, but we don't have the single great defining common interest that tied us together in the 20th century, that being preventing any possible power from achieving dominance in Europe.

Mr. Joe McGuire: Given that, why would we need a missile defence system? If we don't have any enemies anymore, any large enemies, Russia or Nazi Germany or anything like that, who is now the enemy, and why is that enemy so important that we need a worldwide defence system?

Prof. Joseph Jockel: Your use of the word “need” is striking. A classic formulation, of course, of Canada's defence problem is that it doesn't have a problem. If you apply the strict definition of “need”, there is no need to do so in terms of protection of national sovereignty. Canadian armed forces do not serve overseas classic defence needs.

Rather, the issue is, are there wrongs that Canada wants to help put right through the use of armed forces? Are there areas in which Canada wishes to make contributions to international or regional peace and security? Armed forces, in those terms, have to be thought about in exactly the same way as foreign aid or third world development assistance is thought of. Do you need to contribute to third world development? No. Should you contribute to third world development? Yes.

I'd make the same arguments about international peace and security. From time to time there have been situations—Kosovo comes to mind immediately, Afghanistan, and, I might add, I wish Iraq--where Canada has.... Well, let me stick to situations in the past where Canadian armed forces have contributed to human security, to use Mr. Axworthy's term, or international peace and security. But strictly speaking, there is no need. In many ways you might want to think of Canada, as I do, on the great spectrum of countries. On the one hand you find Israel, where everything turns around national defence, where you start with the need and everything else proceeds from that, to the Canadian case, where there is, strictly speaking, no need to do so.

¿ (0925)

Mr. Joe McGuire: In the American case, is there a need?

Prof. Joseph Jockel: Yes.

Mr. Joe McGuire: What's the need?

Prof. Joseph Jockel: Simply by being the largest power in the world, the United States cannot escape its responsibilities.

Mr. Joe McGuire: What is the responsibility...? If there is no enemy, if there is no Soviet Union, if there is no Nazi Germany-type enemy out there, why would the United States need a missile defence system against nobody?

Prof. Joseph Jockel: Are you talking about armed forces or about a missile defence system, or both?

Mr. Joe McGuire: Missile defence, not armed forces.

Prof. Joseph Jockel: The missile defence system that the United States is going to be deploying at this stage is necessary to protect the United States against the possibility, and the strong probability, that several rogue countries may acquire missiles capable of striking at U.S. territory. The United States, particularly after its experiences of September 11, is not prepared to even live with that possibility.

Mr. Joe McGuire: I have a second question, Mr. Chairman.

It's pretty hard to get the attention of the Americans for anything we have done here in our response to 9/11, our response to Afghanistan, our response to Kosovo, or our response to Bosnia. It seems it has all gone for naught because we didn't fall in line on Iraq.

You know, it's really hard to.... The President has made speeches in Congress and he listed countries who were a big help to them. In fact, they were much less help than this country was. Yet Canada never seems to make the list of any enumeration of special contribution that we have made. What we get from the Americans constantly is our shortcomings, our shortcomings in defence spending, which is probably the third highest per capita of any country in the world. I mean, if we compare it to the U.S., we'll never be up to scratch, as far as spending money in defence goes, compared to the United States.

I guess we shouldn't go on with this, but I think this country suffers from.... I mean, why wouldn't we go our own way more? Why wouldn't we carve out a more independent position for this country when basically the contributions we have given have gone strictly unappreciated?

Prof. Joseph Jockel: I think there are a couple of issues here, but two in particular.

The first is the amount of influence that deploying armed forces provides Canada. While it is true that you have more influence inside the tent than outside the tent, that influence is still going to be extremely limited. As you suggest, looking for influence by agreeing to participate in national missile defence or by deploying armed forces overseas is ultimately going to be a frustrating experience. It will always be a frustrating experience, given the size and power of the United States.

As I was suggesting before, the real purpose, to my mind, of maintaining our armed forces is contributing to human security or international peace and security. There will be times—and there have been many times in Canadian history—where Canadians want to deploy armed forces because they want to do the right thing. That's the reason to do it.

¿ (0930)

Mr. Joe McGuire: We've always responded, to my knowledge. We have 48,000 graves in Europe. I think those contributions are indicative of our commitment to world peace and our ability to defend the freedom of democracies, and so on. Those are still largely unappreciated by the United States. I maintain that it's pretty hard to get the attention of the American government for any contribution we have made—even in recent history, let alone more distant history.

Prof. Joseph Jockel: That's probably true.

Again, the game is not.... Do you really want Americans to keep on noticing you? Is the idea here always to have them say, yes, yes, we appreciate, we appreciate, we appreciate? Is that what this is really about?

The Chair: Mr. McGuire, you're well over your time at this point, so we're going to have to wind up this segment of questioning.

We'll have to go to Mr. Bachand at this point.

[Translation]

Mr. Claude Bachand (Saint-Jean, BQ): Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I also welcome Professor Jockel.

I do not know whether you are aware of the Centre for Canadian studies in Plattsburgh? Those people are very active and I do a great deal of work with them.

Mr. Joseph Jockel: I know the former director.

Mr. Claude Bachand: I do a great deal of work with them on economy. We also have good discussions about defence policy and that is what I want to question you about.

Do you not feel that since 1938, when Roosevelt told Mackenzie King that the United States would never tolerate that Canada be attacked by a foreign power, that Canada simply felt it did not need to invest massively in defence? We thought we had a neighbour with huge military might who would protect us in any case if Canada were to be attacked.

Do you think that this theory which dates back to Roosevelt and Mackenzie King still applies today, give or take a little?

Mr. Joseph Jockel: It is highly likely. Let me take this opportunity to repeat something that our ambassador Mr. Cellucci said a few months ago. He said in English that the United States had always been there for Canada. Many Canadians criticize what he said, but it was true nonetheless. The United States were there in the summer of 1940, when Canada faced its most dangerous moment, when the United Kingdom seemed to be on the brink of losing the war. As soon as Canada was obviously in danger, president Roosevelt went to Ogdensburg, in New York State, near Canton, New York, where I live. For the first time, we signed a defence agreement with Canada.

Have I answered your question?

Mr. Claude Bachand: I wonder whether Canada has not ever since relied on the protection of this superpower and therefore not invested hundreds of billions in its own defence system because we can count on our ally to defend us in any event. Do you agree?

Mr. Joseph Jockel: Yes, this phenomenon is called “the involuntary guaranty”. This is the involuntary guaranty given by the United States to Canada. The United States does this not only because Canada is a trading partner or because we like Canadians, true as that might be, but protecting Canada is in our own national interest.

Thus, Canadians need not be grateful to the United States for our defence effort. It is in our own national interest.

¿ (0935)

Mr. Claude Bachand: Earlier, you mentioned that the Americans are more interested in political support when going to war than in the actual sending of troops. They are now a superpower capable of defeating any army. The Americans are striving to form coalitions to create a sense of legitimacy about their interventions. That is what they want.

I have a theory about missile defence and let me come back to it because it really is a current issue. If I follow your reasoning—and mine is more or less similar—you say that if an attack were launched against an American or a Canadian city, it would go over the polar ice cap. Currently, perhaps only North Korea and Russia are able to launch missiles across the polar ice cap at the United States.

I think that what the Americans might be interested in more than anything else is not that we should necessarily invest two or three billion dollars in the shield, but in the Canadian territory. Debris is an issue so that currently, interceptors are only based in Alaska. Thus, if an attack were launched across the polar ice cap, it would take a long time to intercept. You spoke in terms of minutes; in fact, NORAD will detect it in a few seconds, but it might take 20 minutes before launching a counter-strike. An interceptor launched from Alaska at the North Korean missile would fly over Canadian territory.

I feel that Canada would be ready to have interceptors installed in the far North so that interceptions would be made over the polar ice cap and not over Canadian territory.

Does this make any kind of sense to you?

Mr. Joseph Jockel: This is a technical matter. I am not at all certain that the interceptors based in Alaska would cause debris to fall on Canadian soil. You should consult technical experts. Basically, this argument saddens me. I am saddened by the fact that Canadians are debating the possibility of debris falling on their territory.

As for me, let me put one simple question. What would you prefer, a bit of debris in the Canadian north, or a nuclear explosion in Los Angeles?

Mr. Claude Bachand: Are you an American?

Mr. Joseph Jockel: Yes.

Mr. Claude Bachand: I have no further questions.

[English]

The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Bachand.

Mr. Price.

Mr. David Price (Compton—Stanstead, Lib.): Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Thank you, Professor Jockel, for being here. I heard you speak before, and I've always found it very interesting. The interesting thing is that as an American, you know a lot about our Canadian situation.

My first question is about perception. As you know, our involvement at NORAD right now is to be totally or permanently embedded in it, to use the famous new term “embedded”. We are very strongly embedded, in the sense that Canadians tend to be there roughly four years, whereas the Americans only go in two-year stages. So a lot of the time, the Canadians are training the Americans. The other operation we're very embedded in is the American AWACS, where we tend to be into the system very much. The operations at NORAD come under General Eberhart, with the 2IC being Canadian, under General Pennie. As General Eberhart tends to be in Washington a lot of the time, the operations generally tend to come under a Canadian most of the time.

What I'm getting at is that we're very, very involved. The Canadian public in general doesn't seem to know that, and the Americans don't seem to know that either—and this includes a lot of American politicians, who have no idea of what we do or our involvement there.

Granted that you're in the system and have a pretty good idea of what's going on there, but do you find that my assessment is right from the people you talk to?

¿ (0940)

Prof. Joseph Jockel: Yes, but let me add a couple of more details. This gives me an opportunity to add something I should have added in response to Mr. Benoit's question, because it's related to what you just suggested about turnover.

Another reason the American military appreciates the Canadian presence in Colorado Springs is the very high quality of personnel who are employed there. It's the high quality in the Canadian Forces in itself, but also because, particularly for Canadian air force officers, this is a highly desirable posting. You can go from having headed the Canadian air force to being deputy commander-in-chief in NORAD. The American armed forces, despite its vast size, still has some personnel shortages and is delighted to find that there are absolutely high-quality Canadians there.

Here, too, Canada-U.S. relations works the same way elsewhere. Do Americans talk about Canada-U.S. affairs in general? No. Does the U.S. Congress debate every day on Canada-U.S. relations? No. Is it on the top of the agenda of the White House every day? No. But the closer you get to where the people are involved in managing the relationship, there you find people who know and appreciate and have a good deal of understanding of the Canada-U.S. relationship. After all, the largest country desk in the State Department is the Canada desk. There are Canadian people who spend all their time dealing with Canada in the Pentagon. In those areas there's enormous appreciation, and this has spillovers in intelligence and elsewhere.

What I think Canada has to think about in national missile defence is this. If NORAD comes to an end, it'll have an impact right there on those people who do know. Where it becomes much harder to think about and measure is in what the ripple effect would be, then, if Canada was not seen as the very closest defence partner of the United States. That's very hard to measure.

Mr. David Price: As for the trickle-down effect of the knowledge that Canada is so involved, how far does it get down into the public?

Prof. Joseph Jockel: It doesn't go very far.

Mr. David Price: There's no easy way out of that, is there?

Prof. Joseph Jockel: Again, this really is a funny phenomenon. You still can't overemphasize it. Here is this vast U.S. aerospace defence operation. Canadians are right at the core, and you still can't escape the fact that all Canada is really contributing is a couple of fighter aircraft and radar stations; nonetheless, Canada is still at the heart of the operation. It's not done, but the metaphorical telephone call to the President--it could be a Canadian general on the line. There are two Canadian generals who are the assessors at Colorado Springs and who have the authority to confirm on behalf of NORAD.

Mr. David Price: As could have happened on September 11--

Prof. Joseph Jockel: Yes, and of course, as you know, Canadians were heavily involved in that effort that day.

Mr. David Price: Another thing I found quite interesting was that you said no power threatens Europe. And we've heard other questions about why have a missile defence system for North America. Well, the same thing could be said for Europe, which is in the process right now of setting up their own missile defence system, which will be partially operational next year.

Prof. Joseph Jockel: In effect, there are discussions with the Japanese as well, and there is a lot of interest around the world. In fact, this is one reason the U.S. no longer calls the system the national missile defence system. It is in fact a system that is now going to be deployed for North America. The acronym is GMD, ground-based mid-course defence, but it's going to be part of providing missile defences elsewhere in the world.

¿ (0945)

Mr. David Price: Well, yes, of course. Since the Americans were under the ABM Treaty and they couldn't do anything locally, they have been working very strongly in Europe, of course, with the French also to build this system.

The Chair: Mr. Price, we're going to have to finish off there, unfortunately.

We will go to Ms. Gallant, for five minutes.

Mrs. Cheryl Gallant (Renfrew—Nipissing—Pembroke, Canadian Alliance): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Professor, what do you know about the formal defence alliance known as ABCA--America, Britain, Canada, Australia?

Prof. Joseph Jockel: I know of no formal defence alliance under those terms. You might be referring to security arrangements, intelligence arrangements, that exist between Canada, Britain, the United States, and Australia. That may be a reference to those arrangements, of which I know nothing.

Mrs. Cheryl Gallant: Okay. Could you describe how NORAD is important to the Canadian Space Agency and what NORAD's potentially becoming obsolete would mean to the Canadian Space Agency?

Prof. Joseph Jockel: NORAD's an important link. It's one step distant from the Space Agency, so that would be of less importance to the agency per se.

It's much more important to Canada's military space objectives. The Canadian Forces, like all other militaries, are highly dependent upon space-based operations, particularly for communication. Since Canada and the Canadian military sit at the heart of the U.S. aerospace defence effort, that has provided access to U.S. military space-based operations, although it's become less important.

You may have heard people argue before that NORAD provided enormous access to United States Space Command. As part of the command arrangements that took place this past year, the United States Space Command was dissolved, so it's no longer NORAD's twin. It's now United States Northern Command, so that link has become much less important.

I'm sorry; I'm rambling a little bit. I wouldn't call the NORAD link critical for the Space Agency. It's much more important for military space operations.

¿ (0950)

Mrs. Cheryl Gallant: Okay. How many U.S. divisions or troops have paratroop capability?

Prof. Joseph Jockel: I don't know.

Mrs. Cheryl Gallant: They've retained a large degree of their paratroop capability. Why would they find this important, from your point of view, whereas Canada has gone by the wayside on it?

Prof. Joseph Jockel: The whole issue of airborne capability is highly politicized here because of the Airborne Regiment's history. The short answer is that in the case of the United States, it didn't have this particular history, which here led to the government of the day taking extreme measures. That's part of the answer.

To put it in a broader context, the United States wishes to maintain the option to use force, and from time to time uses force, in world affairs with a broad mixture of possibilities, one of which can be the use of paratroops, as we saw in the Iraq war. Canada's military strategy has been to--in recent years in particular, but this certainly extends back to the Second World War--think about certain capabilities and emphasize them.

The navy has sea control. The Canadian air force has fighter interceptor capability. The army has committed brigades. The Government of Canada decided, particularly following this much more limited niche strategy, that an airborne capability wasn't going to be maintained here.

Mrs. Cheryl Gallant: I have one last question. Operationally speaking, could you just give one example of how the use of the French language would be important to Canada-U.S. military operations? Is there ever a need for it, that you're aware of?

Prof. Joseph Jockel: Are you asking me for an example of when French may be used?

Mrs. Cheryl Gallant: When Canada and the U.S. are on joint operational missions--not just containing an area of responsibility, sharing responsibilities, but an actual mission together--do they ever use French at all?

Prof. Joseph Jockel: No, in fact the American armed forces and Canadian armed forces use English together. Having French capabilities, though, has been particularly useful in multinational operations, like some peacekeeping operations in the Balkans, where there were French and Canadian and American troops.

But I don't want to leave you with the impression that bilingualism is ever an impediment to Canada-U.S. defence cooperation. After all, the fighter interceptors at Bagotville operate in Quebec, and they're under the operational control of NORAD. This really is not a Canada-U.S. issue. Canada-U.S. military operation is almost exclusively in English.

The Chair: Thank you, Professor.

Thank you, Ms. Gallant.

Now we go to Mrs. Neville, for five minutes.

Ms. Anita Neville (Winnipeg South Centre, Lib.): Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Thank you, Professor, for your comments--and I apologize for walking in late.

Prof. Joseph Jockel: I have students, so it doesn't shock me.

¿ (0955)

Ms. Anita Neville: There is a lot of opposition among Canadians to Canada's participating in the missile defence system. I certainly hear about it fairly significantly in my own community. The Prime Minister has made a comment that Canada will not move into a space-based missile defence system. How realistic is that, moving into ground-based missile defence system and not engaging with a space-based missile defence system?

Prof. Joseph Jockel: I think it's completely realistic, for now. This is an issue that really doesn't have to be addressed. No element of the missile defence system the United States is planning to deploy next year will put weapons in space, no element whatsoever. The United States has no intention of deploying space-based weapons. There are some research programs underway that might or might not lead to a proposal to put weapons in space.

There is an extremely lively debate in the United States about weapons in space. On the one hand, some argue that it's naive to think that space can't be militarized. Land, sea, and air have become elements of military operations; space will eventually. This side also argues that it should be the goal of the United States to eventually achieve space-based dominance. On the other hand, others argue in the United States--and they're the predominant voices--that no military is more dependent upon space-based assets, satellites, than the United States. Thus no military would have a greater problem if space became militarized, potentially jeopardizing thereby American assets. It's a debate that's still going on.

I don't think there is much question that for now, if Canada decided to sign on to missile defence, it could sign on for the duration of a ground-based system. The NORAD agreements only last for five years, and you can get out of them even before that, though I forget exactly how.

The system being deployed now does not involve weapons in space. I think it's eminently feasible, but there are no guarantees. There are no guarantees the United States will not eventually militarize space. It's not the intent now and not the system that's on the table now.

Ms. Anita Neville: Thank you.

The Chair: Mrs. Neville has nothing further to ask at this time, so we will go to Mr. Benoit, for five minutes.

Mr. Leon Benoit: Thank you, Mr. Chair.

I have some short questions here, and they're in kind of a different area. First, I want to comment on a statement you made, and you can correct me if I'm not portraying it accurately. You said there's no need for a military in Canada to protect our sovereignty. There is no real threat--you're already shaking your head.

Prof. Joseph Jockel: I was talking about overseas.

Mr. Leon Benoit: Okay, even if you just meant overseas, that's what I wanted to question. There are a lot of people who argued that when Hitler was building his forces in Europe; and many argued it for too long. Some of the situations overseas--even the situation in the Balkans over the past 15 years--who knows what they could have developed into? The situation in Afghanistan and Iraq, with certain radical Muslim elements building their forces, could certainly end up becoming a very real threat to our nation here at home, in the long run.

I'm actually somewhat surprised you would state that there's no need for us to be involved in those operations when looking at the security and defence of our nation.

Prof. Joseph Jockel: I think it's hard to make any powerful logical argument that begins with a threat far overseas and ends with a high level of Canadian defence spending, with the justification that, by spending more money, you increase Canadian security against that threat. I can't even imagine an argument for tripling the Canadian defence budget and saying that it will be decisive in dealing with the situation in Afghanistan or Iraq or elsewhere. Canada is not capable of contributing those kinds of forces, and you can't make the link between that threat and the physical security of Canada.

All of that isn't intended to make an argument against Canada spend money on defence and making contributions overseas. I think the much more powerful argument is to sit down and think about what the particular circumstances are in which Canada wants to be able to use force to contribute to regional security and international peace and security.

Mr. Leon Benoit: I understand what you're saying there, but I do wonder if people wouldn't have argued the same point maybe even in 1930.

Prof. Joseph Jockel: Well, in my presentation I tried to suggest that this is what makes thinking about defence so hard. Things really have changed. Senator Dandurand was wrong the first time around; but if he were here now, he'd be right. There is no fundamental threat to Europe. There is no hostile power capable of dominating the world of the kind we have seen in the past.

Mr. Leon Benoit: Is there any real reason to keep NATO together, then?

Prof. Joseph Jockel: There's no reason to keep it together as an alliance for traditional defence purposes. The only reason for keeping NATO together is for political purposes in Europe, to provide a framework for the eastern Europeans to more fully emerge into the transatlantic partnership, and to use the NATO framework for such interventions as some of its members may agree on for international peace and security, with the best example being Kosovo.

Remember, there was no resolution of the UN Security Council over the situation in Kosovo; rather, several NATO members, with Canada among the leaders, used NATO to intervene to help free the Kosovars of Serbian oppression.

À (1000)

Mr. Leon Benoit: So do you think NATO could become a far more effective security body than the United Nations, and may in fact replace that function of the United Nations?

Prof. Joseph Jockel: I'm not sure. This is related to the debate I was talking about in the United States. Remember, it was the formal structures of NATO--in particular, the North Atlantic Council--that the French and Germans and Belgians used to frustrate British and American hopes of supporting the Turks. That calls NATO into question.

This has partly been dealt with now by transferring some of the decision-making from the North Atlantic Council to the Defence Planning Committee, which France doesn't really sit on.

I'm sure the North Atlantic Treaty is going to stay in place. I've no doubts about that. That commits us all to our mutual security. I would not be surprised if NATO evolved towards much more flexible arrangements among its members to use force outside the NATO area, rather than relying on the kind of formal structures that led to the imbroglio in Brussels this past year.

Mr. Leon Benoit: That progression has been taking place. Over the last 10 years, you can see a substantial change.

Prof. Joseph Jockel: Of course, there are people in the United States who now argue that NATO has become much too entangling and that the United States should leave it.

The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Benoit.

As I see no questions from the government side, Professor Jockel, I'd like to get a few questions on the record.

I was drawn to your comments about really how dramatically the strategic situation has changed in terms of the international environment. There have been a number of good pieces written on this subject over the course of the last little while, one of which was by Michael Ignatieff in The New York Times, where he talked about the burden of empire the U.S. is attempting to deal with.

Another piece I found quite interesting was one by Robert Kagan called “Power and Weakness”. Kagan especially maps out a situation where the world views of Europe and the United States have diverged very, very significantly.

I think we certainly saw this in the case of Iraq, that there really has been a major shift in terms of the “tectonic plates” of security interests, and that--using Kagan's terms--the U.S. is from Mars and Europe is from Venus. He describes the U.S. as the sheriff and Europe as a saloon keeper, both with general interests in terms of maintaining peace and order, but sometimes the saloon keeper's interests are not necessarily met by all of this activity generated by the U.S. as a sheriff pursuing its security interests. Really, all the saloon keeper wants to do is to make sure his customers are able to get a drink. It was a very interesting piece, to say the least.

From the standpoint of multilateralism especially, the Europeans seem focused on this these days. Some people saw how Europe dealt with the United States recently as an attempt--to use a phrase I've heard--to “Gulliverize” it by tying it down with various multilateral rules and strategies to try to curtail U.S. power to pursue its strategic interests, as in the case of Iraq, almost unilaterally. We in Canada are caught in a very, very difficult situation that way, over whether or not we gravitate more toward the European view in terms of multilateralism or become Tonto to the United States' Lone Ranger--and that might be overstating our position slightly.

I'd be interested in your analysis of where Canada sits in terms of where it should be going to ensure that its strategic interests are properly protected, and also whether or not you see any possibility of a softening in relations between France and the United States. We saw a certain level of rapprochement between President Bush and President Chirac at the G-8, a little rapprochement in Franco-American relations. Do you think there will be in the future any softening of U.S. unilateralism or, on the other hand, any softening on or appreciation for America's security interests from the European side?

À (1005)

Prof. Joseph Jockel: Thank you for that question, in two senses. It stimulated me to think about something. When you were talking about Kagan, I began to think about Canada too. I was thinking, what planet, then, is Canada from?

An hon. member: Oh, oh!

Prof. Joseph Jockel: It becomes even more interesting because of his notion of what the Europeans say. Europeans are drifting into a sort of neo-pacifist mood, while the United States still relies upon the option to use force in world affairs.

Canada's case is interesting, since it has a ferocious military history, yet thinks of itself as having a peacekeeping past. It sits between two planets in that regard. I'm not sure whether Canadians actually left one planet in 1945 and want to pretend they never lived on it and are moving onto the other one.

As I suggested, there's a debate. This really is a dilemma for Canada, and I don't know what the outcome of the debate in the United States is going to be. It is easy to imagine a situation in which the United States simply does not go back to the UN Security Council for authorization to use force in the foreseeable future. Similarly, it's easy to imagine that the United States wants to steer clear—as we were discussing before—of the formal structures of NATO the next time it wants to use force in world affairs. And similarly, given the unhappy experiences of the past few months, it may, having broken free of those two structures, think more and more of its coalitions in terms of “what are you really going to contribute?”

Or perhaps not. There will be other voices arguing that it's in the interest of the United States to restore multilateral organizations: the United States still needs the UN Security Council, that a rapprochement with France is necessary.

I don't know which way that debate will go. It has partisan overtones. Republicans will tend in one direction,Democrats will tend in another—but not completely. The presidential election next year in the U.S. will be very significant in all this.

But it's clear that if those voices in the U.S. prevail who argue that in fact the United States must not allow itself to be caught in multilateral traps in dealing with matters that are essential to its security, Canadians will then face a dilemma.

That is not, given the Canadian approach to world affairs, the way Canadians have wanted to deal with matters. Under those circumstances, assuming Canada is not going to play any kind of silly games of looking for military counterweights to the United States, which is a pretty good assumption, then there are two sets of options that would face Canada: one, think about intensifying the bilateral relationship with the United States; or, as I've suggested, since being involved overseas militarily is strictly speaking not necessary, not doing it.

The Chair: Okay. Thank you.

Mr. Benoit.

Mr. Leon Benoit: Thank you.

Just pulling up on that, it seems to me the Government of Canada—and not just this government; I'm talking about over the years—has become less focused on the higher-priority strategic interest. For example, this Prime Minister points to Africa very often, when in fact we have very little economic interest, certainly, in Africa.

I'm wondering, when you—you're an American—are looking at Canada, would it make more sense that we focus more on where our greatest interests are? That starts, of course, with the United States. It may include more seriously putting a presence into the Arctic, especially if we believe there may be a water route open up there over the years, and in other areas where in fact we have a greater trade involvement, rather than in areas like Africa—where, really, what is our interest, especially when it comes to an economic interest? There are some other interests, I grant.

It seems to me Canada has become less focused on what's most important to us.

À (1010)

Prof. Joseph Jockel: It does seem, particularly now that you're running such a nice, healthy, admirable surplus, that this might be the moment to think about a recommitment to international affairs, to overseas development assistance. When Canada compares itself with the countries it normally compares itself with, Canadian overseas development assistance isn't measuring up--and similarly on the defence budget. There is probably room to spend more on all of those areas.

Mr. Leon Benoit: Why?

Prof. Joseph Jockel: Because it's the right thing to do; because in addition to dealing with sovereignty and national interests, improving the lot of people overseas through the use of force from time to time, and through provisions of assistance, is the right thing to do.

Mr. Leon Benoit: It's “the right thing to do” based on what?

Prof. Joseph Jockel: Simply from the moral point of view. Those of us in the developed world who are better off should see it as our obligation to help those who aren't.

Lloyd Axworthy, I think, put it best when he talked about human security. I just wish he realized more that there was a military component to human security.

Mr. Leon Benoit: A little less soft power, a little more....

Prof. Joseph Jockel: Both.

Mr. Leon Benoit: Yes, both; okay. I just wanted to run that by.

Concerning missile defence, I got the message a couple of years ago quite clearly that if Canada had quickly gotten involved seriously with the United States and had said to them, “This missile defence sounds interesting; let's sit down and talk about it seriously”, we might have benefited economically through involvement in the project. We are involved to some extent; some of our companies are involved to some extent, I understand. But the economic benefits of signing or showing an interest early might have been quite substantial.

Are you familiar with whether that in fact may be the case?

Prof. Joseph Jockel: Yes, I think that would have been the case. It would have involved some Canadian government priming of the pump, too. This is an argument that goes right back to the eighties with the U.S. SDI program. But, yes, there would have been a greater opportunity.

Mr. Leon Benoit: It's the case in almost every project—with the joint strike fighter project—the earlier in and the greater the commitment, the more economic spinoff you're going to get.

Prof. Joseph Jockel: Yes.

Mr. Leon Benoit: There are those who say we shouldn't be talking about economics in the same breath as security. I think people who say that might have a bit of a difficult time if they were standing on a street corner talking to two friends and said that's really not important; all it would mean is, if we tick the Americans off enough, one of the three won't be working any more. That's simplification, but the fact is that almost 30% of what we produce in Canada goes to the United States.

As you mentioned earlier, the economic connection with the military relationship is there. It's real, and I don't think we should pretend it's not real. We shouldn't base our decisions on that primarily, but it's an important consideration.

Prof. Joseph Jockel: I agree.

Mr. Leon Benoit: I don't have any more questions.

The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Benoit.

Seeing no questions on the Liberal side at this point, I would like to pursue further with you, Professor, the issue of NORAD if Canada decided not to participate in missile defence. I can't help but get from your comments the impression that with Space Command and missile defence outside of NORAD, there isn't much left for NORAD, other than perhaps tracking Santa Claus on the evening of December 24. Can you give us a bit more detail about what you think might happen to NORAD under those circumstances?

À (1015)

Prof. Joseph Jockel: Well, the air defence operations are the important ones that would be left over. They are not as important, and I guess it's the important ones we should talk about now.

But they couldn't be abandoned. As we saw on September 11, having some capability is important. The United States may move to deployment of a national cruise missile defence, which is an enhancement of air defences. Cruise missile defence deals with a threat emerging from the sea. It wouldn't have the same north-south thrust Canada-U.S. air defence relations once had, so it wouldn't involve Canadian airspace and territory as much as in the past.

The first issue we'd have to ask ourselves is whether we want an air defence command. Even that wouldn't be necessary. NORAD was created in 1957 to coordinate vast air defence operations extending along the whole continent. Given the fact that we only have a couple of interceptors and both countries are on active duty, it wouldn't be strictly necessary to have an air defence command. You could do it by pre-1957 arrangements between Winnipeg, North Bay, and Alaska—the U.S. regional command. That would need to be dealt with.

Meanwhile, the bilateral planning group is talking about Canada's relationship to Northern Command. That has particularly some implications for sea cooperation. That group would have to follow its work; a decision would have to be made about whether or not some kind of cooperation with U.S. Northern Command would remain.

But air defence would go to the top of the list.

The Chair: We've gone through, I think it's safe to say, a fairly rough period of Canada-U.S. relations in comments going back to last November, to the NATO summit. I'm wondering how you explain this situation in Canada-U.S. relations, involving some of the comments that have been made, to your students down at St. Lawrence University. How do you explain this thread of anti-Americanism that crops up from time to time in Canada, and can you place it in some sort of historical context? We've had bumpy relations over the years between Canadian prime ministers and U.S. presidents, going back to Diefenbaker-Kennedy and Trudeau-Nixon. Where do you think this fits in?

Prof. Joseph Jockel: First we need to look at it in the broader context. We have insulated ourselves, in the form of the free trade agreement, from a lot of the worst damage we could do to one another—which isn't to say there aren't still trade disputes and difficulties, but we have now protected ourselves. The context is quite different.

This round, it's inescapable that the world outlook of the U.S. administration and the Government of Canada is different. That's going to lead to some clash. But this happens from time to time. It usually happens when there is a change of political party in government, but whenever we hit one rough period in Canada-U.S. relations—Diefenbaker-Kennedy, for example, or Trudeau-Reagan—there is a change in government. Then we have a love-in to fix everything—Pearson goes to Hyannisport; Reagan goes to Quebec City—and then things will either go up or down. I suspect we are only several months away from a love-in to fix everything—next spring.

An hon. member: Martin Goes to New York.

Prof. Joseph Jockel: To visit New York?

We're not quite at the lowest moment, either. The lowest moment really has to be Diefenbaker-Kennedy, and the very lowest moment has to be the Cuban missile crisis. We haven't hit those lows yet.

À (1020)

The Chair: Mr. Price.

Mr. David Price: Thank you, Mr. Chair.

I have two short questions. I'd like you to comment on the follow-up to Leon's questions on NATO, the EU force that's running parallel, really, to our NATO force, because obviously they're going to be double at it--it's going to be the same people--and how that affects the transatlantic alliance. Also, what future do you see in Mexican involvement in the whole North Atlantic--

Prof. Joseph Jockel: To answer that question, it's not clear that the EU force is going to get off the ground. This has a link to earlier questions, but because I've been asked to talk about Canada-U.S. relations, I am going to ask you a question.

I've stressed the fact that Canada's defence policy since 1994 has involved the option to use force in world affairs as part of multilateral contingents. And it has been the case that only the United States has the capability to organize wars. So when you're talking about Canada using force in world affairs now, it's been as part of U.S.-led wars. If the EU military capability gets off the ground, that creates the possibility for Canada having other partners--and I repeat, if that gets off the ground. Again, just as the option to use force in a U.S.-led war does not--as we have had so dramatically demonstrated in Iraq--lead to the commitment to do so, neither would the creation of an EU force.

Mr. David Price: Mr. Chair, I was looking at it in a rather different sense. If they were to get off the ground, that would tend to isolate Canada--maybe because then the future of NATO is probably a bit of a problem--back to being tied closer to the U.S. Would you not see it that way?

Prof. Joseph Jockel: Not necessarily. I would then pursue discussions with the EU authorities to discuss--again, no commitment--how, if there ever were an international contingency operation on which Europeans and Canadians agreed, Canadians could participate in that EU operation.

For now, I think you'd be quite skeptical about the Europeans doing it, partially because of unhappiness by the British, not to mention unhappiness on the part of the United States. But if it does get off the ground, it does create another opportunity for Canada--but not without problems, inasmuch as the Canadian Forces are working on compatibility with U.S. forces and it might--there are some other issues there--create another option that would dovetail nicely into recent Canadian defence policy.

Mr. David Price: What about the Mexicans?

Prof. Joseph Jockel: Oh, the Mexicans. I don't see a possibility of the Mexicans in a North Atlantic context. What's very interesting is that there's now a Mexican official at Colorado Springs to work with Northern Command. Very, very gingerly, the United States is talking to the Mexicans about how they fit in. I suspect Canadians will be involved in these discussions and Northern Command will probably be the locus, not so much on the use of armed force against terrorist attacks but post-attack or post-natural disaster.

Northern Command might turn into a locus for Canada-U.S.-Mexican cooperation. I would not have expected that. The Mexican military is small. Mexico has enormous hesitancy about using force and about its military relationship with the United States, but there does appear to be something happening there.

À (1025)

Mr. David Price: They tend to want to talk to Canada about how we do things, because we tend to be a little closer size-wise as far as our military is concerned. They're a little nervous of the size of the American military, although they want to be attached to them as far as what they can get out of them, let's say.

Prof. Joseph Jockel: Yes.

The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Price.

Mr. Benoit.

Mr. Leon Benoit: If you look at the United Kingdom, at meetings of the NATO parliamentarians, or just speaking to people who are involved in the military in the U.K., in many ways the U.K. doesn't fit in with the rest of Europe. The United States and the United Kingdom have developed a pretty close relationship militarily.

Canada and the United Kingdom have always been close in some ways, but I don't think we've cultivated that relationship over the past few years. It seems to me that the United Kingdom and the United States and Canada may have a lot more in common than the United Kingdom and the rest of the European Union does, in a lot of ways, in terms of values, in terms of the way we approach things.

Do you have any comments on whether--

Prof. Joseph Jockel: Well, the hot term, as I'm sure you know, is the “anglosphere”, the argument that English-speaking countries have a sort of informal and in many cases more formal alliance. The U.S.-U.K.-Australia commitments to Iraq certainly prompted further discussion of that.

I'm not telling you anything new to suggest that this raised ancient questions for Canada that also emerged in the Iraq war, with French-speaking Canadians being more opposed in general to participation in the war than English-speaking Canadians. So there may be something to this.

There's some suggestion, in fact, since there has been a loose rapprochement between the United States and India, that there's something to this notion of anglosphere. I'm not sure how far it may go. It causes real problems for U.S. relations with other countries and it forces the British to make some fundamental decisions.

But there does seem to be something there, the world outlook of several English-speaking countries. I'm not sure how far it's going to go.

Mr. Leon Benoit: I can't imagine the United Kingdom, for example, supporting or taking on the Euro in the near future. It seems to me there's been a new distance created between the United Kingdom and the rest of Europe.

I think it's something.... I know we, as a party, five or six years ago focused a little bit on building a stronger relationship with the United Kingdom, because we have a lot of common values.

Prof. Joseph Jockel: What might be very useful to look at is the Anglo-Canadian experience in Afghanistan. Remember, Canadians worked closely with the Brits in the early days in Afghanistan. In recent years there's been a movement toward, of course, Canadian-American military cooperation overseas. This would be something to talk about to the people involved to see how questions of compatibility between the British and the Canadians worked out. It would be a good area to have someone do a study of, now that you mention it.

Mr. Leon Benoit: Okay. Thank you.

The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Benoit.

Professor, I'd like to go back to the Iraq situation for a couple of minutes.

As you may or may not be aware, the Prime Minister on several occasions indicated that Canada would only consider or only contemplate the use of force based on a UN Security Council resolution, and some of us--I can only speak for myself probably on this count--were somewhat concerned about that declaration or doctrine, if you will. To a certain extent I'm still unclear as to whether or not this constitutes a basis for future Canadian policy and future Canadian engagement and intervention with the use of force.

How did you see that in terms of how it was playing out north of the border here?

À (1030)

Prof. Joseph Jockel: As being situational. We can't overlook the fact that the same government took Canada to war in Kosovo without a UN declaration. Now we have a war without UN declaration and a statement on the part of the Government of Canada that a UN declaration is critical. Which one is the determining precedent?

I don't think there is a determining precedent. Certainly, if you look at Mr. Martin's statements, there is an indication that the earlier one may be more determining than the second one.

The Chair: Right.

I want to get at as well your take on the security psyche in the United States right now, post 9/11. One of the criticisms that have been levelled at people in Canada is that they really don't understand the new security psyche after the events of the twin towers collapsing. Do you think that's a problem not just in Canada but in Europe as well in terms of the international community failing to appreciate the new situation—the new threats—that Americans feel they're under right now?

Prof. Joseph Jockel: I do. The war in Iraq may have changed that substantially. We'll see. You're quite right in saying that the level of unease and anxiety remains in the United States. Americans are prepared to support new forms of border control and the use of American forces in international politics and accept casualties in international politics in the name of security. I suspect now—perhaps I'm sounding repetitious—that after Iraq there is an understanding that the United States thinks security is paramount.

The Chair: This may seem like a peculiar question to you, but of course the history of U.S. foreign policy seems to be marked on many occasions by isolationism. Notwithstanding what happened on September 11, there may be within the United States people who still feel the whole idea of forward defence is misplaced and really what the U.S. should be concentrating on is making sure that homeland defences are taken care of, that other people's wars really shouldn't be of interest to the United States, and that the U.S. is spending too much blood and treasure on what some people--especially on the far right--might describe as foreign adventures that really add very little in the way of value to U.S. security.

How strong do you think that strain is right now? Some people would say that missile defence is a manifestation of that, that really what the U.S. is looking at is protecting its homeland, and that perhaps this concept of global missile defence may be just a little bit of smoke and mirrors as far as the international community is concerned. What America is really focused on right now is ensuring its own security.

To a certain extent we see this in the Congo as well when the French are willing to—obviously they have colonial connections with the Congo, but there seems to be a really strong reluctance to extend U.S. power in some areas where it could make a very significant difference in terms of these local and regional wars.

Do you wish to comment?

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Prof. Joseph Jockel: Yes, I do. I don't think missile defence is a manifestation of that; I think missile defence—this system—is exactly the opposite. I don't think we can overlook the fact that an important motivation for missile defence is to protect the ability of the United States to intervene overseas.

Just imagine ten years from now. Let me sketch out a scenario. Ten years from now Iran acquires capability to strike at the United States with nuclear-tipped missiles. The presence of those missiles would in all probability be enough to deter the United States from intervening in the region. A missile defence system does help protect the ability of the United States to use force in its own interest and in the interest of international peace and stability overseas. There should be no overlooking that.

Nonetheless, you are right about isolationism being a deep and latent strain, and not so latent sometimes in the U.S. What I fear is--and I'm not alone in this--another significant terrorist strike or strikes that would bring that isolationism out. That's bad news for the entire world, because that's when you get things like the U.S. saying, all right, all merchant vessels arriving in the west coast, you arrive at this special port here where we could check you out, and we don't care how long it takes. All vessels arriving in the east coast, you arrive here. Canadians, where's your passport? We don't care if you're going to wait in line for hours and hours.

That's the kind of world we'd have in having the United States withdraw not only from international engagement but in fact from much of its trading capability. That's a possibility. That's the alternative to dealing with terrorism directly, and there will be voices not just on the lunatic right.... You are absolutely right, it's a deep strain. To hell with the world. Leave us alone. We have a continent here. We don't even know anybody else is around. Let's get on with our own business here.

I think that's a possibility.

The Chair: I guess to follow from that, you would see it in Canada's national interest, then, to keep the U.S. engaged internationally.

Prof. Joseph Jockel: Yes. I don't think that's a problem right now. I think the hallmark right now of American interests is engagement, but the greater danger for Canada is U.S. disengagement, although it's not right on the horizon now. But it's always a possibility.

The Chair: In this country we are going to be faced probably with a new foreign policy in the not-too-distant future, a foreign policy review and a defence policy review as well. If you had the option of sketching out some of the main elements in a new Canadian defence policy, how do you think you would approach that task from the standpoint of both spending and personnel levels and the niche capabilities that Canada needs to have to be able to work with the United States?

Prof. Joseph Jockel: It really is linked to the level of defence spending.

I think the 1994 defence white paper is pretty damn good. It provides for cooperation with the United States in essential areas and also provides for Canada's capability to contribute military contingents at smaller levels and somewhat greater levels through a range of options, from international peacekeeping to tougher peace enforcement measures to wars. It also maintains the niches we were talking about—interceptor capability for the air force, sea control for the navy, for the army a more mechanized brigade group and smaller capabilities.

That seems pretty damn good to me because it keeps a range of options and makes no commitments and also maintains military capability. Once you lose military capability, they're hard to retain. The issue is whether or not the money is there to pay for it and, if the money is not there to pay for it, which ones you want to give up. That's where it really begins to get extraordinarily difficult.

À (1040)

The Chair: Just from the standpoint of the sorts of contributions that we have made over the course of the last few years, and I'm thinking particularly of Afghanistan here, in order to really be seen to be pulling our weight, do you feel that in circumstances like that the very least we should be contributing is a brigade?

Prof. Joseph Jockel: I have been wrong on this issue. After talking a lot to the U.S. military in the early 1990s, I was absolutely convinced that the only thing the United States would ever accept as part of a Canadian contribution was a brigade. But when push came to shove, in Afghanistan the United States accepted a Canadian contribution smaller than a brigade. Now American military has gone back to saying, we really mean it, we really mean it. I'm not sure, but this is linked to this debate I mentioned to you before.

If the United States shifts in its approach to alliances to one in which real capabilities matter—it just doesn't want to play the game of coalition of the willing and check the boxes, but you're in only with significant military forces—if that's the case, only a brigade is a significant contribution because it has all the essential services and combat support services and plugs into broader efforts much more easily and effectively than a battle group does.

The Chair: In terms of capabilities that perhaps we don't have now and that we should be getting into in the future, retired Major-General Lewis Mackenzie made the point that he thought Canada should have a couple of aircraft carriers, small British Ark Royal-type aircraft carriers. We've had other people, for instance, argue for attack helicopters.

What sorts of capabilities do you think we need to fill out our niche roles—anything in particular or just more of the same in terms of the white paper?

Prof. Joseph Jockel: More of the same, with some more logistic support capability. As to General Mackenzie's argument for aircraft carriers, that they could be used for several purposes, I'm a little bit doubtful of that because the sea control mission provides such a useful adjunct to all sorts of allied navies, including the U.S. Navy. I'm not sure, it seems to me that an aircraft carrier is an unnecessary expense.

What Canada could use is greater sustainability of forces. That means thinking about naval vessels for greater sustainability overseas, and also simply buying more equipment, because even under the best of circumstances, Canada now does not have the capability to maintain its forces overseas for any lengthy period.

It would be sustainability rather than new military capability of any kind that I'd put the emphasis on. It all depends on the defence budget, though.

The Chair: I want to ask you one final question, because it's a topic that has been bubbling up from below the surface, if I could use that term, in terms of Canada's purchase of submarines. We've taken a lot of heat, especially by the media, on the so-called leaky submarines that we bought from the British.

Maybe I'm probing the depths of your knowledge on Canadian acquisition policy here, but do you have any thoughts on the submarines?

À (1045)

Prof. Joseph Jockel: Not about their technical capabilities and why they're leaking. I can say that acquiring submarines was a good idea. The Canadian navy is in the best shape of all the armed forces. It's extremely versatile, extremely useful. Its sea control mission is well thought out, although it badly needs replacements for the Sea Kings.

Maintaining control above, on, and under the sea, which is the sea control mission of the Canadian navy again, makes a lot of sense, and having submarines as part of that also was a good idea. They seemed like a bargain at the time to me. If there are problems with them technically, I don't know. That does go beyond my knowledge of acquisitions practices.

The Chair: Fair enough.

Mr. Benoit.

Mr. Leon Benoit: I have a final question on the strategic airlift and the importance of that.

I think there's a really good chance that Canada's going to end up in a mess with the arrangement we've made for strategic sea and airlift to the Afghanistan mission. Canada's certainly been encouraged to purchase our own strategic airlift by the United States. They say they're tired of stepping in and moving our equipment for us. We've hired this time. We'll see how it works, but there are a lot of risks to that.

As to the importance of purchasing air and sea lift, what are your comments on that?

Prof. Joseph Jockel: It's useful, but given the expenses that have to be met to maintain current capabilities, it would not go to the top of my list as long as rental capability is there. And in some circumstances, Canada can simply say to the United States, if you really want us there, help us get there. That's not the best way to do business, but given all the other needs, I think it becomes an attractive option.

But if you're sketching out a much broader and more ambitious defence policy with more money—

Mr. Leon Benoit: Which we have and are....

Prof. Joseph Jockel: —then you cover current needs, add sustainability, and add airlift. But I would certainly put current capability much further up on the list than I would adding on strategic airlift or anything else, as desirable as that could be.

The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Benoit.

To follow up on Mr. Benoit's question, I'd like to get your take on future Canadian defence procurement and how important you see it for us perhaps to spend more of our defence dollar in the United States in the future, given what seems to be happening between Europe generally and North America in particular. The Europeans are obviously moving in a certain direction as far as the defence industries are concerned, and we saw that very recently, I think, with the Pratt & Whitney contract. Although Pratt & Whitney had the lowest price, they were essentially ruled out in terms of the A400M engines.

In terms of that being a component of the relationship, how critical do you see that in the future?

Prof. Joseph Jockel: I'd better take a pass on that question. Defence procurement really is a field for specialists, and it's a tricky area. I don't know.

The Chair: Okay. Are there any further questions from committee members?

Well, Professor, on behalf of the entire committee, I'd like to thank you again for being here this morning. I think it was a very fruitful session that we had.

One of the things that continues to surprise us as Canadians, I suppose, is the understanding that some Americans such as you actually are paying attention to what happens north of the border, and for that we are thankful to you and thankful as well to you for providing us with your analysis and your, I would say, very well-thought-out comments.

Again, on behalf of the committee, thanks very much. Perhaps we'll have an opportunity in the not-too-distant future to have you back in front of the committee.

À (1050)

Prof. Joseph Jockel: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The Chair: The meeting is adjourned.