HAFF Committee Meeting

37th PARLIAMENT, 2nd SESSION

Standing Committee on Procedure and House Affairs

EVIDENCE

CONTENTS

Thursday, April 10, 2003

Á

1110

The Chair (Mr. Peter Adams (Peterborough, Lib.))

Mr. Michel Guimond (Beauport—Montmorency—Côte-de-Beaupré—Île-d'Orléans, BQ)

The Chair

Mr. Michel Guimond

The Chair

Mr. Michel Guimond

The Chair

Mr. Michel Guimond

The Chair

Mr. Michel Guimond

The Chair

Mr. Rick Borotsik (Brandon—Souris, PC)

The Chair

Mr. Rick Borotsik

The Chair

Ms. Marlene Catterall (Ottawa West—Nepean, Lib.)

Mr. Rick Borotsik

The Chair

Mr. Michel Guimond

The Chair

Hon. Ed Broadbent (Co-Chair, Canadian Democracy and Corporate Accountability Commission)

Á

1115

Á

1120

Á

1125

The Chair

Hon. Ed Broadbent

Á

1130

The Chair

Mr. Walter Robinson (Federal Director, Canadian Taxpayers' Federation)

Á

1135

Á

1140

The Chair

Mr. Walter Robinson

The Chair

Mr. Aaron Freeman (Board Member, Democracy Watch)

Á

1145

Á

1150

The Chair

Mr. Ted White (North Vancouver, Canadian Alliance)

Hon. Ed Broadbent

Mr. Ted White

Hon. Ed Broadbent

The Chair

Mr. Ted White

Hon. Ed Broadbent

Mr. Ted White

Á

1155

Mr. Walter Robinson

The Chair

Mr. Aaron Freeman

The Chair

Mr. Aaron Freeman

The Chair

Mr. Ted White

The Chair

Mr. Jacques Saada (Brossard—La Prairie, Lib.)

The Chair

Mr. Jacques Saada

The Chair

Mr. Jacques Saada

Â

1200

The Chair

Hon. Ed Broadbent

Mr. Jacques Saada

Hon. Ed Broadbent

The Chair

Mr. Walter Robinson

The Chair

Mr. Walter Robinson

The Chair

Mr. Michel Guimond

Â

1205

The Chair

Hon. Ed Broadbent

Â

1210

Mr. Michel Guimond

Hon. Ed Broadbent

The Chair

Mr. Michel Guimond

The Chair

Mr. Michel Guimond

The Chair

Mr. Geoff Regan (Halifax West, Lib.)

Mr. Michel Guimond

Mr. Geoff Regan

The Chair

Mr. Aaron Freeman

Â

1215

The Chair

Mr. Walter Robinson

The Chair

Mr. Walter Robinson

The Chair

Mr. Dick Proctor (Palliser, NDP)

Mr. Aaron Freeman

Mr. Dick Proctor

Mr. Aaron Freeman

Mr. Dick Proctor

Â

1220

Hon. Ed Broadbent

Mr. Dick Proctor

Hon. Ed Broadbent

Mr. Dick Proctor

The Chair

Mr. Dick Proctor

Mr. Aaron Freeman

The Chair

Mr. Joe Jordan (Leeds—Grenville, Lib.)

Â

1225

Hon. Ed Broadbent

Mr. Joe Jordan

The Chair

Mr. Walter Robinson

The Chair

Hon. Ed Broadbent

The Chair

Mr. Aaron Freeman

Â

1230

The Chair

Mr. Rick Borotsik

Hon. Ed Broadbent

Mr. Rick Borotsik

Hon. Ed Broadbent

Mr. Rick Borotsik

Hon. Ed Broadbent

Mr. Rick Borotsik

Mr. Aaron Freeman

Mr. Rick Borotsik

Mr. Aaron Freeman

Mr. Rick Borotsik

Mr. Walter Robinson

Mr. Rick Borotsik

Mr. Walter Robinson

Mr. Rick Borotsik

Â

1235

Hon. Ed Broadbent

Mr. Rick Borotsik

Hon. Ed Broadbent

Mr. Rick Borotsik

The Chair

Mrs. Carolyn Parrish (Mississauga Centre, Lib.)

The Chair

Hon. Ed Broadbent

Â

1240

The Chair

Mr. Walter Robinson

The Chair

Mr. Aaron Freeman

The Chair

Mr. Ted White

Mr. Aaron Freeman

Â

1245

Mr. Ted White

Mr. Walter Robinson

The Chair

Mr. Ted White

The Chair

Mr. Ted White

Hon. Ed Broadbent

Mr. Ted White

Hon. Ed Broadbent

The Chair

Mr. Jacques Saada

The Chair

Mr. Jacques Saada

Â

1250

Hon. Ed Broadbent

The Chair

Mr. Walter Robinson

The Chair

Mr. Aaron Freeman

The Chair

Mr. Michel Guimond

The Chair

Mr. Michel Guimond

Â

1255

·

1300

The Chair

Mr. Joe Jordan

The Chair

Mr. Jacques Saada

·

1305

The Chair

Mr. Michel Guimond

·

1310

The Chair

Mr. Jacques Saada

Mr. Michel Guimond

Mr. Jacques Saada

Mr. Michel Guimond

The Chair

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CANADA

Standing Committee on Procedure and House Affairs

---

NUMBER 034

l

2nd SESSION

l

37th PARLIAMENT

---

EVIDENCE

Thursday, April 10, 2003

[Recorded by Electronic Apparatus]

Á  (1110)  

[English]

    The Chair (Mr. Peter Adams (Peterborough, Lib.)): Colleagues, we'll begin. We're here today with respect to Bill C-24, an act to amend the Canada Elections Act and the Income Tax Act, political financing. This is part of our series of hearings on this legislation.

    We're very pleased today to have some very distinguished witnesses. We welcome, representing Democracy Watch, Aaron Freeman, who has appeared before our committee before; from the Canadian Taxpayers' Federation, Walter Robinson, federal director, and Bruce Winchester, research director; and from the Canadian Democracy and Corporate Accountability Commission, the Honourable Ed Broadbent, co-chair.

    Gentlemen, we do welcome you all. I propose to begin with Ed Broadbent, if that's okay with the others. Then I would proceed in the same direction, meaning Aaron would be the third person, if that's okay. We appreciate any remarks you may have.

    Colleagues, from Democracy Watch you have a copy of not their statement but an analysis of Bill C-24, which is available in both official languages. I have from the Canadian Taxpayers' Federation their statement, but it's not available in both languages. And Ed Broadbent, I understand, is going to speak to us.

    So could we begin, Ed, with you.

    Colleagues, we'll have all the presentations and then the questions and answers.

    Michel Guimond.

[Translation]

    Mr. Michel Guimond (Beauport—Montmorency—Côte-de-Beaupré—Île-d'Orléans, BQ): Is the document of the Canadian Taxpayers Federation available in both languages?

    Why was it distributed?

[English]

    The Chair: It was not distributed by us.

[Translation]

    Mr. Michel Guimond: Why was it distributed?

[English]

    The Chair: I did not distribute that document.

[Translation]

    Mr. Michel Guimond: Who distributed it?

[English]

    The Chair: I don't know.

[Translation]

    Mr. Michel Guimond: Did it fall from the sky? Was it the Holy Spirit?

[English]

    The Chair: No; they just raised their hands to indicate that they themselves distributed it.

[Translation]

    Mr. Michel Guimond: We will not accept having witnesses do indirectly what is not allowed to be done directly.

    Mr. Chairman, could you please ask one of our clerks to go around and pick up the document that was distributed in violation of the Official Languages Act of Canada, which should be implemented in committee work?

[English]

    The Chair: Let me say first of all that if I had received that statement, I would not have distributed it.

    Rick Borotsik.

    Mr. Rick Borotsik (Brandon—Souris, PC): Mr. Chairman, I was not handed this copy by any one of the clerks or by you.

    The Chair: No, no, it was not distributed by the clerks.

    Mr. Rick Borotsik: I picked it up by myself, Mr. Chairman. I think I have the right to pick up a document. I picked it up, and I have it.

    The Chair: My colleague asks...because they were placed. Walter and Bruce have indicated that they did it.

    Marlene Catterall.

    Ms. Marlene Catterall (Ottawa West—Nepean, Lib.): Mr. Chair, I have just returned my document down to the end of the table. Anybody else who feels that documents should only be distributed in both languages can do the same. I would encourage you to do so.

    Mr. Rick Borotsik: It wasn't distributed.

    The Chair: Michel, I have to insist, if I had received it, I would not have circulated it to the committee.

[Translation]

    Mr. Michel Guimond: With your permission, Mr. Chairman, I feel that you are being hypocritical. You should not allow—and this has been tested a number of times elsewhere—the Holy Spirit or the Good Lord to put a document like this in front of me in your committee room. You should not allow that to happen, Mr. Chairman.

    You are not standing up for yourself. It is up to you, Mr. Chairman, but in other committees, when I have raised this point, the chair has asked that only documents in both official languages be distributed to members.

    It does not bother me; it is your decision. But I just want to tell you that you are going to have to take responsibility for it.

[English]

    The Chair: I thank you for that, Michel. I had received a copy, but I did not know other members had received a copy. On the other hand, as one member has said, feel free to return it. It was not circulated by the committee.

    Ed Broadbent.

    Hon. Ed Broadbent (Co-Chair, Canadian Democracy and Corporate Accountability Commission): Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and members of the committee. It gives me a great deal of pleasure to appear before you.

    I want to say at the outset that I'm not here as a technical expert, which may not surprise some of you. I was co-chair of a commission that recommended on the subject, and I'll come to that in a moment.

    This is by no means a criticism at all, but I just heard about the meeting a couple of days ago. As all of you know, it is an immense and complicated bill. In my comments, then, I will deal with some general observations about some very important principles involved in it, and then I will comment on one or two issues. Afterwards, I would be very happy to respond to questions from members of the committee.

    I want to begin by praising the government for bringing in this legislation. As a democrat, and not as a person with any other particular ideology at this point--though I do have one--I think this is one of the most important pieces of legislation to come before Parliament in recent years. It builds on very innovative and very important legislation about the electoral process that took place during the minority government days of 1972-74, and it does so in a very solid way.

    Fundamentally, it's about the notion of citizens' equality, and what ought to be their equality and capacity in shaping the electoral process. Whether we're talking about candidates, whether we're talking about debates in elections, whether we're talking about outcomes in elections, there ought to be, on the part of any democratic society, of any democratic government, a maximum effort to equalize conditions amongst citizens as citizens.

    The idea of banning collective donations, whether in this case from corporations, or unions, another collectivity, is right in principle. It attempts to establish, to use an old phrase, a “level playing field” among citizens to conduct their electoral processes. I commend the government for taking on this initiative.

    I want to say in this context, as co-chair of a commission on corporate accountability, that just over a year ago I met with Mr. Percy Downe, Chief of Staff to the Prime Minister of Canada, and we presented our recommendations on this and other matters. At that time, Mr. Downe, without making a commitment by the government at that point, responded very favourably to what we had to say. He asked probing questions about our recommendation on this issue and certainly did indicate, as Chief of Staff to the Prime Minister, that at that time he was personally quite favourable to this initiative.

    I want to underline that in supporting this idea of getting collective entities out of the financing of elections, we had strong support in our hearings. We as a commission had hearings across Canada in seven of our major cities--the usual suspects, if I can put it that way--starting with Vancouver in the west and working right through to Halifax in the east. We had public hearings. We also had private meetings with people in the voluntary sector and people in the corporate sector, and we did a massive public opinion poll about 15 to 18 months ago.

    In all of our hearings, whether we were listening to representatives of the business community, the NGO community, churches, academics, or interested citizens, there was a very strong consensus on this recommendation that both corporations and unions get out of the process of funding elections and that we turn this back to citizens.

    We have made a recommendation that only two entities should be involved in financing elections: democratically elected governments on the one hand and individual citizens on the other. Everyone else should be out of it. But I do want to emphasize that on our commission's recommendation, which goes to the principle of this bill, there was strong consensus from those who presented. Of course, it's a kind of self-selected process, coming from those who presented.

    We heard some very interesting testimony, I want to say to members of the committee, from people in the business community. They welcomed this, and told us they would like to get out of being--quote, unquote--“blackmailed” into contributing to the election process. I'd be happy to elaborate a bit on that later, if I'm asked.

    So this is a strong Canadian consensus, I think, if there is something like that at this time in our country, on moving in this kind of direction.

Á  (1115)  

    Let me just make reference to a couple of the issues.

    First, the bill starts out well by saying that only individuals should contribute, and then it gets to the $1,000 exemption. I read the arguments for that, but I really didn't find them persuasive.

    If I may be candid with members of the committee, members of my political party have an awful time supporting measures unless they're perfect. I've been inclined to say that members of the governing party are inclined to take a perfect measure and then always want to end up with some kind of compromise.

    I don't think it's necessary here. I think the bill, the original principle of the bill, is a good one. I don't think it should be cluttered by the $1,000 exemption for small businesses or trade union locals, because that really undercuts the very good principle of this bill, which, I repeat, is that only citizens, as citizens, whatever our ideological differences as citizens, should be making voluntary contributions to this process--not collective sources of money, not small businesses, and not trade union locals.

    I strongly urge the committee to think about this and to go back to the pure principle of the bill, which is to leave the funding of elections to individuals and to democratically elected governments.

    The other important matter I'd like to draw your attention to--and I do this in light of my experience, if I can put it this way, as a former party leader--is that political party leaders in this country, especially their party staff members, know that the major challenge in terms of funding in election campaigns is television advertising. That is the big item. If you look at the budgets for all of the parties, that is either at the top or one of the top two items. It takes a massive amount of money.

    So if we want to put less pressure on all of the parties to have to raise money, then, to be obvious, what we should do is try to look for ways of cutting down the costs of elections.

    I happen to have been in Britain during the 1998 election, and discovered, as a Canadian, a good old hangover of British colonialism, I suppose. If you were a resident of the Commonwealth and resident in the U.K. at that time, you could vote. I actually voted in the U.K. election of 1988.

    I'm not going to indicate who I might have voted for, although it wouldn't surprise people around this table. And I've had some regrets....

    Some hon. members: Oh, oh!

    Hon. Ed Broadbent: At any rate, I cast my vote then as a citizen of the Commonwealth residing in Britain.

    The point I wanted to make is that, as an outside citizen, as a citizen of the Commonwealth, I was delighted with British television, because there were no mindless TV commercials coming from any political party; they're banned. That eliminates a big cost. You don't have seven-second clips or twenty-second clips or any other form of idiocy.

    I say that with care and seriousness, because, as a leader, I did my share of commercials for my political party. All political parties have to do it--and yet they don't. Anyone who thinks for a minute about the election process knows that these booming messages that come out during election campaigns don't contribute seriously to debate. We know that their design and their whole motivation is to focus on particular issues in a very limited kind of way, not to conduct rational, serious discussion but to try to solidify opinion in quite irrational and emotive ways, in certain directions.

    So I think we should look very seriously at banning television advertising. And all parties should get flexible. Maybe we could have during the course of an election, instead of one or two leaders' debates--again, highly symbolic and totally irrational kinds of things in terms of their consequences--four weekly discussions. We could have it established that the networks provide, at the end of each week, a discussion. God forbid it should be a discussion and not rhetoric, or who can come out with the best twenty-second line in a TV debate.

Á  (1120)  

    I'm saying that the committee should consider, (a), making it a law that there'd be no commercials during election campaign on political matters, and (b), looking for ways to maximize the public discussion of the issues involved. As I say, one thing that occurred to me is to have a weekly discussion with the leaders of the parties on all the networks at the end of each week in the campaign. But that's only one idea.

    An additional requirement could be that the networks have to make so much free time available to the parties, however they may want to use it. That's one idea.

    The idea is to cut down the expenses, and cut down the demands for parties to have money. One of the main ways of doing that, I think, would be to consider the kind of thing I'm mentioning with regard to TV commercials.

    There are a couple of other issues, which I will be brief on. First, the important need to finance parties between elections should be recognized by this bill, along with the ongoing responsibility of all political parties between elections. I personally would like to see all the parties use much more of their resources between elections to do what is common in continental Europe, which is to have significant research staffs, and I mean significant, to produce documents that academic journals would be pleased to publish on policy matters that reflect different ideological tendencies--which, again, they should, although some won't, taking simply non-ideological approaches to certain issues.

    Again, speaking as a former party leader, my particular bugbear is that there are inadequate resources available particularly for research so that parties, independent of the House of Commons, can develop thoughtful positions on issues faced by Canada. Ongoing financing is important for a whole range of other matters, too, the good bureaucratic reasons for which all parties have obligations.

    On the question of financing that, the bill suggests it's based on the previous election. There are good arguments for doing that, and I won't go over them. The committee knows them very well. Certain objections have already been raised. The party could be massively unpopular within two years of one election and they could be getting money from the public treasury based on that previous election. But that cuts both ways, because parties actually can become, as I think we all know, unpopular for doing the right thing as well as doing the wrong thing, and I'm not sure current popularity ought to be the best test of funding. So I come back to it that the idea of using the results of the last election as criteria--because this is one matter you do have to be pragmatic about--isn't a bad one.

    Just let me add another consideration. Tom Kent, as members will know, made a proposal that one of the things that should be looked at instead of this is party membership, to make contributions to the party dependent upon their own membership, which would involve verifiable auditing.

    There's a lot to be said for that. With regard to the people in the Alliance, in the Reform Party, with whom I have disagreed--I agree on maybe 1% of their policies--I strongly commend them for their remarkable initiatives in recent years in getting grassroots membership. They went out and hustled, and found a lot of people who agreed with them on a number of issues.

    To my way of thinking, that's very democratic. One way of looking at public support for parties is to look seriously at the issue of established support in the community by people who are actually willing to join a party. I personally would favour probably some mix of financing parties. Broadly speaking, take half the money that it's anticipated to cost, based on previous election results, and take the other half based on party membership. This would be a major incentive for all of Canada's political parties, including new political parties working into this process, to get out there and hustle, to talk to the people of Canada about their views, and to get them to join. So some mix of the funding of political parties based on previous voting and current membership might be a good democratic way of doing that.

    Another option that used to be discussed when I was a member of Parliament--I think I spoke one time on this myself--was that each year, when the budget comes up, to give taxpayers an option, when we send our taxes in, to contribute to a party of their choice. Make it an option, don't make it obligatory, but have it on your tax form, “Do you wish to make a tax contribution of, say, a dollar or a toonie to the party of your choice?” We're talking about millions of dollars here, potentially. But they don't have to do it.

Á  (1125)  

    You may have a government incentive based on this, too: whatever they do, the government could say they'll match it by a dollar. Let's say I'm favouring overall this political party at this time. I think they've done a good job or whatever, and I want an additional dollar from my taxes to go to that party. The government, to encourage this kind of thing, may match that dollar.

    I just think there should be some imaginative effort to look at other ways of financing our political parties in addition to, or in maybe a mélange of methods, the one based on previous party vote.

    There is one final issue, Mr. Chairman, although I don't know how my time is going.

    The Chair: I think you're pretty close, Ed.

    Hon. Ed Broadbent: Okay.

    I just want to deal with one final issue that I know is not before your bill, but it's something that goes to the heart of the bill. This is the third-party funding issue.

    If that issue is not resolved, as members of the committee know, there's a court appeal pending on this. The government is going to intervene, and I hope the government wins, but we don't know.

    I just want to say in principle--again as a democrat on this issue, quite apart from ideological proclivities, if I can put it that way--that everything this committee is doing, all of this bill, will be totally vitiated if those who are campaigning for the right to have unlimited expenditures in election time coming from non-party sources.... That totally undermines, totally undermines, everything that this bill is.

    In some sense, our parties are the democratic essence of the representative system. How can we sensibly set limits on party spending, or do any of that kind of thing, on the one hand and at the same time say to private interest groups, “You can collect as much money as you want, and favour an issue that may directly tie into the agenda of one or more of the political parties”? I think it's deeply, deeply undemocratic. It is not democratic. The right to spend money as such is not a democratic right.

    If we believe in equality, in rights of citizenship, in helping to select candidates, in financing campaigns, and in determining outcomes, including the publicity in the campaign, including the issues that people see before them, with an equal right to help shape that agenda, then we have to make sure we don't have third-party spending that can totally undermine this equality of citizenship.

    I repeat, I'm aware that it's outside directly the purview of this bill, but it directly is involved in the principle. I hope the committee will find a way of making a recommendation on this issue in its final report in case the Supreme Court decision.... I'm not a lawyer--as I've said on other occasions, I have many other faults--but I have reasonable confidence from the lawyers I've been talking to on this issue that the Supreme Court will make the right decision on this. However, the Supreme Court, dare I say it, has been wrong before, and it can be wrong again. Therefore, parliamentary action of some kind may well be required. If so, I'd recommend that the committee deal with this issue in its final report.

    Thank you.

Á  (1130)  

    The Chair: Thank you very much. We do appreciate your remarks and your taking the time this morning.

    Now to the Canadian Taxpayers' Federation, Walter Robinson.

    Mr. Walter Robinson (Federal Director, Canadian Taxpayers' Federation): Thank you, Mr. Chair.

[Translation]

    My presentation before you this morning will be given in English only. However, if you have questions later in English or French, I will try to answer them in the language of your choice.

[English]

    By way of background, allow me to give you the Reader's Digest version of who we are and what we do.

    The CTF was founded in 1990, and in 13 short years it has grown to become Canada's foremost taxpayer advocacy organization, with close to 65,000 active supporters.

[Translation]

    We are a not-for-profit and non-partisan group with nearly 60,000 supporters across Canada, in every region and every province.

[English]

    We fight for lower taxes, less waste, and in the context of today's presentation, more accountable government. We are federally incorporated, not-for-profit, and funded solely by the free-will, after-tax contributions of our supporters. We do not issue tax receipts, nor do we receive any government funding. We are non-partisan, and all CTF staff members are forbidden from holding membership or contributing to any political party.

    On February 11, 2003, the Prime Minister stated in the House that Bill C-24--and I quote--“will reduce cynicism about politics and politicians”. Mr. Chrétien went on to note that this bill, and I quote again from the same speech, “will greatly improve the political culture in Canada”.

    Bill C-24 will do neither.

    If you were to ask Canadians today about pressing national issues, I believe health care, the war on Iraq, or, in this city, the disastrous first game in round one of the NHL playoffs would probably top the list. And if you were to drill further with questions about trust of politicians, respect for government, and faith in public programs, I'd wager a healthy sum that the answers given would focus on this week's Auditor General's report. Where did those 36,000 deportees go, anyway? There's also the failed billion-dollar gun registry; $4 billion annually in corporate welfare and regional development spending; and last year's cash for sponsorship contract scandal.

    Who gives what to whom, or how much to which political party, is simply not on the public policy radar screen. That's because “fixing”, a most inaccurate description of Bill C-24, the political finance system won't address the core problems of politicians not keeping their promises, not governing with integrity, not stopping the waste of billions of tax dollars away from key public priorities, and not strengthening the role and power of individual MPs to become truly independent legislators and effectively function in this House of Commons.

    Let me be clear: Bill C-24 doesn't remove the so-called undue influence of money from politics; it merely replaces corporate and union money on the one hand with taxpayer money on the other. Public cynicism will not change one iota because of this bill. Bill C-24 also perverts the tax system by expanding the amount of dollars eligible for tax credit treatment, a point to which I will return in a few moments.

    Finally, Bill C-24, with its reams of technical amendments to the Canada Elections Act and the Income Tax Act, only serves to further complicate the democratic process. Instead of encouraging new people to come forward with new ideas and new approaches, even those with which we may vehemently disagree, we believe passage of this bill will further the disturbing anti-democratic trend of making elections more and more the sole purview of those who can afford a battery of lawyers, accountants, and technocrats to interpret elections legislation.

    You may not be at the stage of British Columbia's recall legislation, which almost defines to whom, how, and when you can serve coffee, but you're well on your way to this faulty Folgers utopia.

    Now, before I continue outlining our philosophical opposition to this bill, I would be remiss if I did not address some of the positive proposals, which are laudable. Bill C-24, as you know from your studies, is grouped into five key themes: banning political donations by businesses and unions; limiting individual contributions; extending registration, reporting, and auditing regimes to constituency associations; adopting a new regime for the nomination and leadership campaigns; and enhancing--read “more”--public--read “taxpayer”--financing of political parties.

    On point one, we are ambivalent, as we have not surveyed our supporters on this issue, but we do raise a cautionary note. Unions do not pay income taxes, businesses do.

    As for limiting individual contributions to $10,000, in point two, the limit does seem somewhat arbitrary, and we hope this arbitrary limit has not been arrived at in the same cavalier fashion in which this committee tried to cap spending by so-called third parties, a most pejorative term in the extreme, in Bill C-2 in the 36th Parliament.

    Thankfully, the courts have been consistent in striking down the government's draconian and unconscionable--not to mention unconstitutional--spending gag-law provisions.

    That said, in our view it is less offensive to cap contributions than it is to cap spending.

    At this point, I would diverge from my prepared text and note that I would disagree with the Honourable Ed Broadbent, who's sitting beside me. Parties are not the essence of the political system, people and ideas and debate are.

    Extending the auditing and reporting regime to constituency associations on an annual basis is welcome given that these organizations also benefit from public subsidies of the tax system.

Á  (1135)  

    Turning to leadership and nomination campaigns, insofar as these political exercises use riding associations and/or political parties as fronts to funnel donations for generous tax treatment, regimentation of their activities is also sensible. However, allow me to make a broader point here with respect to the electoral system. This is a point on which I think I and my colleague to the right will agree.

    We continue to find it obscene that candidates for a riding nomination, or those who seek the leadership of a political party, must earn a clear majority, 50% plus one, of votes cast, and yet our electoral system allows a political party to form a government with a mere 38% or 39% of votes cast, a minority, and exercise 100% power in, more often than not, an arrogant and belligerent manner for up to five years.

    The absurdity of our voting system, I submit to you, is a greater issue to address than political finance reform, and a more direct cause of, in the words of our Prime Minister, “cynicism about politics and politicians”.

    Turning to the proposals to replace the lost business and union donations within an equivalent, but likely greater, especially with the passage of time, infusion of taxpayer cash--or, as it conveniently has been called, “public financing”--I make the following observations.

    In public policy debates, you know as well as I that words are weapons. Employment of the term “public financing” is a deliberate attempt to soften the self-evident and, we believe, offensive $39-million election year and $25-million annual fleecing thereafter of taxpayers to fund your private, partisan organizations. It is akin to equating political parties with public goods such as hospitals or roads, and dressing up this wealth transfer with intentions of noblesse oblige, as if political parties were disadvantaged through no fault of their own, thus warranting the sympathy and deserved support of the state. It's an indefensible proposition.

    Furthermore, diminishing the variety of sources of potential campaign funds will only serve to make politicians, we believe, more aloof--a very real problem--than they are now, especially with the consequent replacement of taxpayer dollars. The incentive to go out and earn a contribution and look into the whites of the eyes of a business owner, labour leader, or local voter is removed.

    On this point I speak from experience, because this is how we raise money--city after city, meeting by meeting, face to face, eyeball to eyeball. Make no mistake about it, a great deal of personal and organizational accountability stems from this process.

    From this argument, you can logically surmise that we are opposed to increasing the party election rebate percentage, and the same goes for reducing individual candidate eligibility expenses. But by far the most objectionable portion of Bill C-24 is the proposal to double the donation amount, from $200 to $400, eligible for the maximum 75% tax credit treatment, and its consequent effect on the larger donations of the taxable income scale.

    Amendments to the Income Tax Act by their very nature speak to our values as a society. Those things that we find wanting, we tax at a higher level, to reflect their societal cost or to discourage such activity. Those things we wish to encourage, we tax less, or provide tax credit or deferral treatment for.

    Now, consider the political tax credit in the context of other forms of spending disposal income, specifically charitable giving. The maximum amount one can give to the United Way, the local cancer centre, or an AIDS hospice to qualify for maximum tax credit treatment of 16% is $200, and slightly more as you move up the income scale. By raising the political contribution limit to $400 for 75% tax credit treatment, you are implicitly stating through the tax system that donations to private political parties in a mathematical sense are almost ten times more valuable than contributing to charitable, community-building organizations.

    I challenge each and every one of you to put out a news release this afternoon stating this point, or put it in your campaign literature in the next election.

    Any takers?

    To address the broader question of businesses and unions having undue influence over government policy, I submit to you that cleaning up the tendering process for government contracts, where 25% are still sole-sourced according to the Auditor General of Canada; ending corporate welfare subsidies from Industry Canada and its regional development agencies; and eliminating most of the consulting contracts under the direction of CIDA would be the most appropriate remedies to the real problem.

    Finally, if you want to address public cynicism towards this institution and your vocation, and restore confidence, as it should be done, in the political process, then end the political tax credit regime and shake the yoke of party discipline so that you can do what voters sent you here to do. Think and act independently in the interest of your constituents, first, foremost, and always.

Á  (1140)  

[Translation]

    I thank you for your attention this morning. I am looking forward to this debate.

    The Chair: Thank you very much. Does your colleague have something to add right now?

    Mr. Walter Robinson: I am sure that there may be things to add during the question period.

    The Chair: Thank you very much.

[English]

    Now for Democracy Watch, Aaron Freeman.

    Mr. Aaron Freeman (Board Member, Democracy Watch): Thank you, Mr. Chair.

    I'd like to thank the committee for providing me with an opportunity to comment on Bill C-24.

    Democracy Watch has been quite active on the issue of making Canada's political fundraising rules more transparent and democratic since we were founded nearly ten years ago. Fifty organizations from across Canada have endorsed our recommendations in this area.

    This is in fact the third time I have appeared before a parliamentary committee on this issue. I'm pleased to see a willingness on the part of the government to meaningfully address the long-standing need for reform in this area.

    We are by no means alone in advocating the need to address electoral finance reform. Included in our coalition are women's groups, environmental and health organizations, labour unions, community economic development organizations, and many others. Many of the problems being addressed in this bill were identified by the Lortie commission in 1991 and in a series of reports from the Chief Electoral Officer since then.

    In Bill C-24 we have the basis for a law that will limit the potential for wealthy interests to influence the democratic process, but for the law to be effective, amendments that are well within the scope of the bill must be made.

    Current and historic donation patterns, from Canada and elsewhere, suggest that if we close only a few of the key loopholes that donors use to hide donations, the response from donors will be to simply re-route their donations to the loopholes that remain embedded in the system. The amounts and sources of money wouldn't change, only the pattern would. I do not believe this is the objective and the spirit of Bill C-24.

    An effective electoral finance law must do at least three things. First, it must provide for full disclosure of all political donations so that a dollar donated is a dollar disclosed; second, it must provide reasonable limits on how much can be donated, so a line must be established between what is a reasonable contribution to the democratic process and what is an attempt to gain undue access or influence; and third, it must place reasonable limits on election expenses in order to ensure that running for office is affordable and accessible for most Canadians.

    I'll touch on each of these areas, but I'll only highlight some of our key recommendations. A full list of our recommendations has been given to the clerk, and I'd be happy to touch on any of these recommendations during the go-around.

    In the area of disclosure, Bill C-24 closes some of the loopholes in the disclosure regime, including donations to riding associations, leadership races, and nomination races. However, in order to ensure that the money that flows through these loopholes is not simply diverted to other loopholes, the following weaknesses should also be addressed.

    The first is trust funds. These funds include any fund that is controlled by a candidate or party. Some have argued that this loophole has been closed, because donations from these funds to election campaigns are subject to disclosure requirements, but funds could still be used for personal purposes, such as vacations and retirement, and arguably could pay for fundraisers and other expenses indirectly relating to the campaign.

    The second area is identifiers. Identifiers are important because they make it possible to know the true identity of the donor. While we now have address as an identifier, the disclosure regime is still missing other key identifiers, such as employer, corporate affiliation, if the donor is a member of a board or an executive, and in the case of a company or an organization, the parent company. These identifiers are included in the U.S. disclosure system, and they would make it easier to tell if companies were, for example, trying to illegally funnel donations through their employees.

    Third, disclosure is still delayed. Under Bill C-24, parties don't report their donations until July following the end of the previous year. As a result, the donation is not disclosed until up to 18 months after it's made. For riding associations it's five months after the fiscal year. For nomination races disclosure occurs four months after the race. Even for leadership contestants, where the best disclosure regime exists, disclosure occurs every week during the last four weeks of the campaign, but there's no ban on donations between the last disclosure report and the vote. So donors will not be fully known before the vote takes place.

    The second area I'd like to discuss is limits on contributions. As noted earlier, there is a loophole being created for trust funds that must be closed. This is perhaps the most serious loophole in the law, and far exceeds the breadth of any loophole in the U.S. system, since it would allow for unlimited and secret donations to any MP or party.

Á  (1145)  

    Bill C-24 also places a limit of $10,000 on all individual contributions, and places a partial ban on donations from corporations, unions, and other organizations.

    While we support these provisions in principle, there are two reasons to bring the individual limit down considerably. First, $10,000 is far beyond what is affordable for the average Canadian. Being roughly one-sixth of the average household income in Canada, that kind of expenditure would hardly be prudent for the vast majority of Canadians.

    In Quebec and Manitoba, both have complete bans on corporate and union donations, which we would advocate, and an individual limit of $3,000. The Manitoba system was just adopted three years ago. The Quebec system has been in place for 25 years.

    The second reason to bring the limit down is to discourage companies and unions from illegally funnelling donations through employees. With a low enough individual limit, the company or union trying to do this would have to involve a huge number of employees, and the more people involved in such a scheme, the greater the chances of getting caught, which few organizations would be willing to risk. For these reasons Democracy Watch feels that the donation limit should be at a level that is no higher than $1,000.

    The third area in need of reform is expense limits. Bill C-24 provides new limits on nomination races, which we strongly support in principle. However, we feel that the limit of 50% of what can be spent during the election is too high and should be reduced to 25%.

    In addition, new limits should apply to leadership races, the winners of which are generally in positions far more powerful than those who win nomination races.

    Bill C-24 would also include polling and research costs in the definition of election expenses. This too is long overdue, but using this as a justification, the bill would increase the expense limit of parties by roughly $1 million. This would encourage a spiralling of election costs and strengthen the hand of the governing party, since it's generally the only party that spends close to the maximum national limit of roughly $14 million.

    Incidentally, it also strengthens the hand of the party relative to MPs and other candidates. That's something I'd be happy to elaborate on in the discussion.

    Polling and research costs have been a loophole in the system for far too long, and these costs should have been included in the definition from the original law. So we would oppose the provision that would raise the party expense limit. This is proposed paragraph 422(1)(a) in the bill.

    In conclusion, Democracy Watch hopes that Bill C-24 is passed with the amendments we've proposed. We feel these changes are long overdue. Polls show that two-thirds of Canadians favour banning corporate and union donations completely. The transparency provisions in the bill address loopholes that have been identified consistently over the past decade by the Chief Electoral Officer as well as the Lortie commission.

    Suggesting that we wait to study this issue further is a lot like saying we should wait for more research on nicotine addiction before deciding to quit smoking.

    But the most important reason for making these changes, and making them now, is that Canadians have a right to know who's bankrolling the political process and to have a democratic system where the influence of money and the potential for conflict of interest is minimized.

    Thank you.

Á  (1150)  

    The Chair: Aaron, thank you very much, and thank you for your analysis of the bill.

    I would say to all the witnesses that if you have written material and you want to submit it to the committee now or in the future, we'd be glad to receive it.

    The method of questioning we have here is that we have about five minutes for the exchanges, which include both questions and answers, so that we can move around the parties. And from time to time I will interrupt you, as I will interrupt the MPs. I would also say, though, that if you feel you haven't completed the answer, feel free to write us and complete it.

    On the list I have Ted White, Jacques Saada, Michel Guimond, Geoff Regan, Dick Proctor, Joe Jordan, and then Rick Borotsik.

    Ted.

    Mr. Ted White (North Vancouver, Canadian Alliance): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

    To Mr. Broadbent, I'd just like to say from the outset that I think we'll have to agree to disagree on the third-party advertising issue. Both I and my party support the view that the rights of Canadians to freely participate in an election campaign in a way they see fit, with their own money, far outweighs any argument in favour of a party controlling the agenda. So I just wanted to get that on the record.

    I also had one question for you. You did speak about the possibility of using other formulas for the raising of the money, and you gave a couple of suggestions there. I just wondered if any thought had been given to the notion of using registered riding associations as one way of determining that a party should get a contribution. You mentioned membership, but it would be very hard to audit and police that, and it could be open to all sorts of manipulation. However, registering riding associations is a very finite thing, very measurable, and maybe the funding should be based on that.

    Do you have any comments on that?

    Hon. Ed Broadbent: Before commenting, I'd just like clarification. Do you mean that there should be a sort of core funding provided by the public treasury to each riding association that gets established for a given party?

    Mr. Ted White: No, I was rather thinking that if we have to have public funding, is it fairer to base it on the number of registered riding associations a party has than on the number of votes it received in the last election?

    Hon. Ed Broadbent: Still, for clarification, do you mean the number of riding associations...?

    The Chair: Do you mean members at the riding level?

    Mr. Ted White: I mean the number of actual riding associations registered with Elections Canada.

    Hon. Ed Broadbent: Okay. We have 301 riding associations, and that's what I thought you meant.

    It's another way of doing it. It's still a challenge for new parties coming into being, obviously, but most of the established parties would have that. I think if I had my druthers, which is the point I spoke to, I'd have an amalgam or a mixture of money going on the basis of past vote and current membership, although I acknowledge the difficulty in auditing the membership issue. So that's a proposal I'd make. If it turned out to be on the basis of experienced people....

    In my experience, when I was leader, the staffs of all the parties then in existence worked with a higher degree of integrity, if I can put it that way, with each other, in cooperation. So if you had very frank, professional discussions between parties, and it turned out that auditing party membership would be fraught with just too many difficulties, then it may not turn out to be such a good idea. But I certainly think it's very democratic.

    I mentioned in fact the roots of your party. I've already indicated that I don't agree very much with your party philosophically, but I do agree with the democratic impulse that your party and Reform had in getting a lot of members. I think that's a good way of recognizing...using that as a foundation for public contributions.

    Mr. Ted White: Thank you.

    Now, Mr. Robinson, while you were giving your presentation it seemed to me the blood pressure of some of my colleagues across the way was going up a little, but I agree with you that this bill won't reduce cynicism among the population about government. It doesn't control the wasteful spending, as you quite rightly pointed out, or politically motivated spending. It does nothing to address any of those major issues, which are always on people's minds.

    However, I'd like to question you about the tax rebate. You criticized that quite soundly. I just wanted to ask you, is there not an argument in favour of having that tax rebate there if the government wants to encourage small donations by a lot of interested individuals to a political party so that they get involved in the political process and have a commitment to the political process? It helps to get them involved.

    I know there's a separate argument about charities, but if we could just concentrate on the idea of encouraging political participation by a lot of individuals donating a small amount, would that not be a valid tool?

Á  (1155)  

    Mr. Walter Robinson: Through you, Mr. Chair, to Mr. White, yes, I've noticed my presence at various committees does get government members upset sometimes. That's the nature of democratic debate.

    On the issue, we come at it from a libertarian point of view, that if you want to contribute to a private, voluntary association, which is what a political party does in the context of being an organization and a machine to wage an election, I think that's an after-tax decision Canadians should make.

    In terms of the charitable giving component of it, we'd rather see much more generous tax credit treatment. That's something we think would be extremely beneficial to society in the context of contributing to charities as opposed to contributing to political parties.

    I would be more worried about the relevance of political parties in this institution in the context of declining voter turnout, which I don't think will be increased by people just cutting a cheque or buying a riding membership card. It's a function of having candidates, and ideas, and things that people would believe in to actually cast a ballot, for one democratic franchise every four or five years, on election day.

    So I don't see the co-relation.

    The Chair: Aaron Freeman, on this point--very briefly.

    Mr. Aaron Freeman: I didn't have a chance to touch on this in my remarks, but we're on record as being in favour of public financing. We don't have a problem with basing that to some degree on the amount of public support that a party may have. We do think that the current measures are excessive.

    One word about the tax credit, which we're ambivalent on.

    The Chair: Very briefly, Aaron. This is Ted's time.

    Mr. Aaron Freeman: One thing the Lortie commission found about the tax credit is that it's not terribly effective. Of the companies or corporations eligible for the tax credit, only one in five actually claim it. For individuals it varies quite a bit, but only about half of the individuals eligible for the tax credit claim it.

    So I don't think people donate with a view to tax planning. I can speculate as to why those numbers exist, but....

    The Chair: Ted, a comment?

    Mr. Ted White: Well, I think my time is probably up. I did have specific questions for Aaron, but I'll leave it to the second round.

    The Chair: Jacques Saada, Michel Guimond, Geoff Regan, and Dick Proctor.

[Translation]

    Mr. Jacques Saada (Brossard—La Prairie, Lib.): Thank you very much to all of you for being here.

    Mr. Broadbent, I was particularly impressed by two of your arguments. The first deals with the role of lobbies in democracy. If we impose financing limits on the political class, which is composed of elected representatives to begin with, without also limiting financing for lobbies, is democracy really being expressed? I believe that you answered that question, and you and I are on the same wavelength on the matter.

    You did not talk about the $10,000 ceiling. I would like to know whether you agree with that $10,000 ceiling for individual contributions to political parties.

    The other aspect I found particularly interesting—and this is the second point I wanted to raise—is the fact that you talked about different financing formulas, for example, on the basis of the number of members or the number of supporters that a political party has. You also talked about the number of ridings.

    To your knowledge, are there examples of these financing principles being based on a blend of factors, either in Canada or abroad? Does that principle already exist? Is it already being applied somewhere? I ask about it because I am very interested in this principle.

    Mr. Chairman, do you want me to ask all my questions at the same time or one at a time?

[English]

    The Chair: I'd do it fairly quickly, Jacques, if I were you.

[Translation]

    Mr. Jacques Saada: My second question is for Mr. Robinson.

[English]

    The Chair: Jacques, you have to be very quick.

[Translation]

    Mr. Jacques Saada: Of course.

    I wanted to know whether your list of members and funding sources is public. If it is, I would like a copy. I would like to know if you would have gone through this entire litany of anti-government positions—not that I am upset, in fact it makes me smile—regardless of whether Bill C-24 had been introduced. I would like to know how Bill C-24 gives you stronger grounds for criticizing all those government measures.

    Finally, you did not recommend that the refund for election expenses a member is entitled to when he or she obtains 15 % of the vote be eliminated. There are also other measures you did not recommend eliminating. Are you indeed in favour of fully eliminating any form of public funding for political activity?

  (1200)  

[English]

    The Chair: Ed Broadbent, then Walter Robinson.

    Hon. Ed Broadbent: Since turning 65, my memory for some strange reason has not been perfect, so if I miss one of your questions let me know.

    In reverse order, though, on the mixed funding proposals, are there any precedents for this elsewhere? My quick answer is, I don't know. I think Janet Hiebert, an old colleague of mine at Queen's University, is coming before the committee. She has some kind of expertise in this field, and perhaps it would be good to raise that with her. I do know that in continental Europe most of the funding comes out of the public treasury one way or the other, because they believe, like I do, that's a very democratic source.

    Let me then move from that to the other question, with regard to setting limits on lobbying groups, and whether this is anti-democratic by putting restrictions on third-party activity.

    Is that the issue you were getting at?

    Mr. Jacques Saada: It was only to express my agreement with you on the fundamental principle of that. My question was more on the $10,000 limit. You haven't made comments on that yet, and I'd like to hear them.

    Hon. Ed Broadbent: On the $10,000 limit, I note that, when you take into account the cost of living increases, it's roughly equivalent to the Quebec legislation René Lévesque brought in, the $3,000. I didn't comment on it, but if I did go anywhere with that, I think I'd reduce it somewhat, maybe closer to $5,000, to get at this equality principle. I really do take that quite seriously. I think it is absurd, and fundamentally not a democratic argument, to say that people should be able to spend as much as they want in shaping electoral outcomes. Why shouldn't a person on welfare have as much right in shaping electoral outcomes as a millionaire, or people who can get collective amounts of money together?

    So this notion that a fundamental democratic right is connected with spending money to shape outcomes is not democratic. In fact, I think it's anti-democratic.

    The Chair: Walter Robinson, please.

[Translation]

    Mr. Walter Robinson: I heard three questions there, Mr. Saada.

    In answer to your first question, our list is not public. However, this year we have a budget of some $3.5 million for seven offices across Canada, a group of 16 employees and 80 agents, as well as people who do fund-raising for us. Most of our militants are individuals, or SMAs. As for donations by major corporations—if you were familiar with the work we have done over the past six years on contributions and subsidies to businesses, you would understand that it is very difficult for us to obtain funding from major corporations.

    With respect to your second question, if there was no Bill C-24, our members who criticize the government and our political system would feel exactly the same. They would still be there.

    The third question was on reimbursements.

[English]

    The Chair: Be very brief.

[Translation]

    Mr. Walter Robinson: We have no position on reimbursements at the moment, because we plan to put the question to our members this summer, during our annual survey, to determine whether they are for or against these limits.

    In the three last elections, less than 2 % of independent candidates—candidates who did not run under the banner of one of the five political parties—received enough votes to qualify for refunds.

[English]

    The Chair: Likely, Walter, you can come back to that later on.

    It's Michel Guimond followed by Geoff Regan.

[Translation]

    Mr. Michel Guimond: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

    I will speak slowly, so that you can understand me. You know that, on our agenda, there is an item providing for the consideration of other business, if any. You might as well cross out the words “if any”, because there is indeed other business. I have an item to submit.

    The decision you made regarding the document we saw earlier is not a decision I consider satisfactory, in spite of the lip service you paid to the matter. I know that I have only a limited amount of time, and if necessary I will take all my time just to talk about this. But since my mother taught me to control my temper and always behave properly when we have guests, I will save my remarks for the chairman and for committee members later on.

    My question is to Mr. Broadbent, for whom I have a great deal of respect. I do have a great deal of respect for everything you have accomplished, Mr. Broadbent, and for all that you continue to accomplish. You still have a great deal to offer. You are a democrat, and as such have all my respect. This feeling is something that many members of the Bloc Québecois share.

    I have two questions for you. I will put them one after the other, so that you have time to answer them.

    I impute motives to the minister responsible for this bill, Mr. Boudria, and I would like to know what your views are. I find it peculiar that Bill C-24 is introduced now, in the middle of a leadership race within the Liberal Party. So since this bill will not become law before January 2004, the current leadership race—which will be over by then—is not covered by it.

    Without imputing malicious motives to anyone, do you believe that the legislation is clear, and that in spite of the fact it will not come into force until January 2004 it could not be made to apply to activities during the current leadership race? That is my first question.

    Here is my second question: I asked Mr. Kingsley, the chief electoral officer of Canada, about the $1,000 ceiling for corporate donations. I used the Royal Bank of Canada to illustrate my question. The Royal Bank has 650 branches across Canada, and could donate $1,000 650 times to a given party or to a series of candidates. Somewhat ironically, Mr. Kingsley answered that the Royal Bank could donate no more than $3.22, because if the maximum donation of $1,000 were divided by 308—the number of candidates—the final donation would come to $3.22 per candidate. Mr. Kingsley laughed at me a little bit. But I will have the chance to get back at him another time.

    In your view, could the $1,000 limit lead to the establishment of fictional corporations? What can one do with institutions that are legally independent? Since you know the union environment well, I will take unions as an example. Local 2202 of the Teamsters union is independent from local 2428 of the same union. Does this mean that local 2202 can donate $1,000 and that local 2428, which is an independent unit, can also donate $1,000? Or will your answer be the same as Mr. Kingsley's: that the Teamsters, as a single entity, can make only one single donation of $1,000, and would have to divide that $1,000 by 308 if they wanted to help all the candidates.

  (1205)  

[English]

    The Chair: You have two minutes for the response.

[Translation]

    Hon. Ed Broadbent: Thank you, Mr. Guimond.

    First of all, I would like to thank you for your remarks on my contribution to political life. I also agree with many of your party's social policies. Mr. Lévesque himself said that, as far as he was concerned, the most important bill of his entire career was one on social policy. This is something Mr. Lévesque said, and I respect it very much.

[English]

    You raised this question about the Royal Bank, that, you know, you could make a contribution from each branch across the country and so on. Well, for me, that's all the more reason to get out of this idea entirely that either a union or a corporation should be able to make some kind of contribution. I'd just cut it out entirely. Do what the Quebec legislation did 25 years ago and what the Manitoba legislation has done now.

    I don't have the technical expertise in that domain to deal with the detail, if you like, of your question, but it does illustrate for me, in part, the complexity of this. Why not drop it and be quite consistent, and just have funding come from individuals, on the one hand, and the citizens, as represented by their government, on the other?

  (1210)  

[Translation]

    Mr. Michel Guimond: And what about leadership races?

[English]

    Hon. Ed Broadbent: Oh, about whether it would apply to the existing? I don't know. I really wonder what leadership race you could have in mind by that....

    I suspect, if it could be done, it would make a lot of sense to do that. There may be a problem with retroactivity, of applying the law to activity that has already gone on. I think, in fairness, retroactivity would be a real problem in terms of justice, but if there is some way of making it applicable between now and the time the law is adopted, okay. Probably it's not feasible, and therefore, the fact that it comes into effect a year from now seems fine with me.

    The Chair: Walter Robinson--

[Translation]

    Mr. Michel Guimond: Mr. Chairman, my question was not for Mr. Robinson. I'm asking the questions, and I have put them to Mr. Broadbent. I do have another question, however.

[English]

    The Chair: This is true. You're right.

    It is the member's time.

    Go ahead, but be very brief.

[Translation]

    Mr. Michel Guimond: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. You really are having a bad day.

    Mr. Broadbent, I have been told that the system in Manitoba... I don't want to be indiscrete about your place of residence, but I believe you are from Manitoba, are you not? You have never lived in Manitoba? I thought you were from there.

[English]

    The Chair: Michel, that is time.

    Geoff Regan, Dick Proctor, Joe Jordan, Rick Borotsik, and Carolyn Parrish.

    Mr. Geoff Regan (Halifax West, Lib.): Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

    To the witnesses, thank you for coming today.

    Mr. Robinson, I know you've been before committees previously. In future I would hope that, with a budget of $3.5 million, you'd find a few dollars to pay for translation and respect the traditions of this place, which I think you are quite familiar with.

    Mr. Michel Guimond: [Inaudible—Editor]...ten minutes ago.

    An hon. member: He returned his English document.

    Mr. Geoff Regan: I am speaking now. I have a question.

[Translation]

    With all due respect, Mr. Guimond, I will carry on and put my question.

[English]

    Let me talk for a moment about this question of public allowance.

    We heard, for example, from Mr. Kingsley a couple of days ago that approximately 60% of the funding of elections now of political parties is public funding from the taxpayer, as you know. We've seen that Canadian taxpayers have indicated very strongly that they are concerned, and they want to remove the perception of influence of big money, influence of corporations, unions and so forth. But if you're going to remove that kind of funding or limit it substantially, you have to make up somehow; it's going to have an impact on the ability of political parties to finance themselves and to finance elections.

    I guess the question is, surely, providing an allowance based on the votes received in the previous election--I don't think it's a perfect solution, and I'm interested in what other ideas you have, Mr. Freeman, or what other precedents you can tell us about in terms of other ways to do it--strikes me as providing a direct connection between the taxpayer and the party they voted for.

    In other words, the money is going to the party of the taxpayer's choice. They decide, with their vote, which party gets the funding. It's as simple as that.

    Now, again, I don't think it's perfect, but it may be the best there is. It may be the best available. But if you have some other ideas about how it should be done, I'd be interested in hearing those.

    I'd be open to comments from other witnesses as well.

    The Chair: Aaron Freeman.

    Mr. Aaron Freeman: There are all kinds of different formulas that different countries use for public financing. And you're right, I think what a lot of people get hung up on is the lag time between the previous election that the formula is based on and the current election, so you may be dealing with a measure that's five years old. The political landscape may have changed dramatically since then.

    I think you're also right in asking, “What's the alternative?” Again, I think probably in this case the best alternative...well, I can give you some of the other options.

    In the United States they have a donation-matching system for presidential races. There are no limits, of course, on donations, but there are limits on spending if you agree to adhere to those limits. The United States has a constitutional issue with spending limits and with donation limits that in my view we don't have in Canada. We've intervened on this issue in the Harper case. That definitely is one formula that's used.

    The proportion of the popular vote in the previous election is used by other countries. Mexico, for example, just brought in reforms a few years ago. They have full public financing, so there are virtually no private donations, and 70% of their formula is based on the percentage of the popular vote, while 30% is split evenly among the parties. Definitely other countries have an element of their public financing that splits among the parties.

    I think in our case, you probably want to have a mix of measures, so something that reduces expenses--for example, an increase in the free broadcast time for parties. At the same time, you can have some tax measures, like the tax credit; you can have--

  (1215)  

    The Chair: I'm afraid I have to interrupt you, because I think Geoff has agreed that Walter should reply to this as well. But if you have any references, we'd be glad to receive them.

    Walter Robinson.

    Mr. Walter Robinson: Through you, Mr. Chair, to Mr. Regan, I thank him for the counsel with respect to official languages issues. We were invited on Friday. We returned from Regina earlier this week, and we just did not have time to translate. I'll commit to the committee to get a translated version of my remarks before the House of Commons translators do.

    The Chair: Let me say, Walter, it's not an issue. The issue is that the single language was circulated here. Anyone is perfectly entitled to submit material to this committee in either of the official languages, so that's not what's at dispute here.

    Please continue.

    Mr. Walter Robinson: I apologize for offending the committee.

    You echoed a point of view that the Prime Minister made in his remarks on the 11th, when he said about this that public financing would be the only way to remove the perception that big money influences the decisions of government.

    Actually, I'm in agreement with Monsieur Guimond.

[Translation]

    If you want to prohibit corporate and union donations, then it's all or nothing.

[English]

It's not $1,000 or $2,000, it's all or nothing. So I'm actually agreeing with the honourable member, who's not listening at the moment.

    Nonetheless, Mr. Chairman, through you to Mr. Regan, the issue is, why should you replace it? Why do you have to? Why not seek another way, using technology, getting back out and reconnecting with voters face to face, in town hall meetings, showing the Canadian population that money is a currency of getting your ideas out there but is not the sole currency? Why do you have to replace it? We question that fundamental premise.

    That's why we would disagree with the bill in its philosophical intent. I was very clear in my presentation on what we understand we're going to change and what we're not, and what we do like, if you're going to keep the regime; some of the reporting and regimentation and auditing makes perfect sense from a transparency point of view.

    The Chair: Mr. Proctor, then Joe Jordan.

    Mr. Dick Proctor (Palliser, NDP): Thanks very much, and thanks to all the presenters.

    Mr. Freeman, in Democracy Watch's analysis of Bill C-24 you indicated that one of the strengths, as far as you see it, is that it would cap donations of $10,000 to a party. I would agree with you if that were in fact the case, but it is that you can contribute $10,000 per year to all registered political parties.

    So I just wondered, (a), if you were aware of that, and (b), if you had a thought about it.

    Mr. Aaron Freeman: So it's $10,000 to each party.

    Mr. Dick Proctor: That's right.

    Mr. Aaron Freeman: Yes, we're well aware of that, and that's one of the reasons why, if you go a little further down in the analysis, to “Weaknesses”, we say that the $10,000 limit should be brought down considerably, because, you're right, it's not a $10,000 limit. If there are donations to five parties, it's a $50,000 limit. It should be on the donor, not the recipient, and that limit should be much lower. You are begging for an illegal funnelling of donations, the higher the limit you go. And it makes no sense; there are very few Canadians who would find $10,000 at all prudent to donate to a political party.

    The goal of this legislation, or one of the key goals, and this goes back to the public financing issue, should be to encourage the parties to broaden the base of their support. If you have the donation limit too high, it's not going to do that.

    Mr. Dick Proctor: Let me just ask Mr. Broadbent, when Jean-Pierre Kingsley was before the committee this week, he indicated that this $1,000 annual donation from small business and trade unions to an individual candidate or a riding association was not his idea. It does seem to have come after the Prime Minister publicized this. It seems to have come from perhaps some members of his party opposite.

    You were an elected member of Parliament for a considerable period of time, and in terms of raising money, I'm just wondering if you would see it as a problem if we were to follow the advice you're proffering here today and say that we simply should strike that from the bill and make it more pure than it is at the moment.

  (1220)  

    Hon. Ed Broadbent: A couple of points. First, to my understanding, the original draft of the bill, the original idea, did not have this in it.

    Mr. Dick Proctor: That's right.

    Hon. Ed Broadbent: Secondly, for reasons I've already indicated, I don't think it's a good idea. It can just muddy the waters.

    Whenever you can, especially in constitutional and democratic processes, if you can get the principle clear, and keep it, I think that's a good idea. The principle here, to come back to it, is that only individuals should be involved in financing their own elections, and we shouldn't have any collective entities. As a candidate at a local level, I personally don't see how this $1,000 exemption would have made any difference.

    In my particular case, and this is no secret, we had mostly individual contributions, but I came from an auto workers' constituency, and it was perfectly legal, perfectly open that the CAW, as a trade union local, contributed.

    If I were a candidate again, I'd be very happy to go back to simply raising money from local individual citizens and not having unions or local business people contribute. If the local businessman wants to contribute, he can do that as a citizen, not as the owner of a shoe store or whatever else downtown. He or she should be encouraged as a citizen, just like other citizens.

    Mr. Dick Proctor: How much time do I have?

    The Chair: You have one minute.

    Mr. Dick Proctor: To Aaron Freeman, you said you'd be happy to expand on your polling and research in terms of public political spending. You were talking about proposed paragraph 422(1)(a), and said it would also strengthen the hands of parties.

    I wonder if you'd care to elaborate on that point.

    Mr. Aaron Freeman: One of the issues with this bill is how it increases the strength of parties--not just absolutely, but it increases the strength of parties relative to MPs and candidates. The expansion in the expense limit doesn't apply to candidates, it only applies to the parties, and really, it only applies to the governing party, because they're the only party that's going to approach the maximum national limit. The limit is based on the number of candidates you run and the number of ridings. Most parties don't run candidates in all 301 ridings. Two or three usually do, but usually it's only the governing party that comes close to that limit.

    The other thing to consider is that, again, the public funding provisions are directed primarily at the party. I haven't worked it out in terms of percentage, but probably 80% or 90% of the public financing--and the bulk of that is the annual subsidy given quarterly to the party--is by far the biggest portion of the public financing, and it's entirely directed to the party.

    So I think what this bill will do is change the way money moves in an election, and it will make the parties more of the central actors in the election relative to the candidates.

    The Chair: Joe Jordan, then Rick Borotsik, and then Carolyn Parrish.

    Mr. Joe Jordan (Leeds—Grenville, Lib.): Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.

    Mr. Proctor, our movement is gaining momentum to eliminate the thousand altogether, because it seems to me that, as we hear more witnesses, we're going to put in place a machine and spend money to try to police something that, really, as Mr. Broadbent said, kind of goes against the grain of the fundamental concept of the bill. So it's certainly worth exploring and I guess staying on that issue.

    On the issue of the tax treatment of donations, my own read of this--and your statistic, Aaron, on who actually uses the tax receipt was interesting--and for me the value is that it tracks it. I guess it's classical motivation, but if there's an economic incentive to list it on your tax receipt, it brings it into the public domain and shines some light on it.

    So if we were going to move to a system that didn't have any tracking system, other than the voluntary tracking system, I guess we're back to where we don't know who's giving to whom, and that's the problem we're trying to solve.

    Fundamentally, I guess, if what we're trying to say here is that we want to remove the real or imagined problem that money buys influence, or that the political system is somehow more receptive to people based on the size of their wallet, then we have to figure out a way of trying to keep the donations public.

    I like Mr. Broadbent's creed of trying to keep this as simple as we can. It doesn't need to get overly complicated, but it tends to start to get that way.

    Already 60% of the money in politics is public, but there's probably money we don't know about, and maybe that's not the exact thing. On the different formulas, there are pros and cons to everything. You could say, based on the results of the last election, fine, we don't want to disadvantage new parties and new ideas. I think that's one of the outcomes of this particular bill, to try to remove the barriers of entry of people into the electoral process. In any analysis of statistics, in terms of voter turnout and the success of minor parties, we have to deal with that, and maybe this is one way of approaching that. But if you do memberships, the problem, I guess....

    You know, as a taxpayer myself, I would be a little nervous funding the Alliance members in Gaspé that Tom Long signed up. So, again, you're going to spend a lot of money trying to police something. Maybe there's a better way. If the tax treasury can be used as a democratic tool, maybe that's the better way.

    My final point--I'll just put this out as a thought, and maybe all of you can comment--is that one of the ways to bring some sense and light to this is to put strict controls on who can give. Another way is to put strict controls on what you can spend, and take away the need to raise money. I've said this to every group of witnesses.

    Now, $63,000 in Leeds--Grenville--and I'm an expert, I won by 55 votes--

  (1225)  

    Hon. Ed Broadbent: I won by 15 one time.

    Mr. Joe Jordan: I share your pain.

    I would argue that $63,000 is too much; $23,000 could probably do it. Maybe what we should be looking at is, yes, include polling, but it doesn't mean we have to bump it up from 62¢ to 70¢. Let's ratchet down the amount you can spend.

    My final point is, if we're going to go that direction, of course we have to limit third party. You can't tie one hand and release the other.

    Perhaps I can have some comments, then, on maybe limiting.

    The Chair: If people are going to comment it will have to be very short. We have a system here.

    I apologize for cutting you off.

    Walter.

    Mr. Walter Robinson: Very briefly, you don't need tax receipts to track. You can still track and put in the regimentation there, and I would encourage you to do that.

    With respect to votes and the system that people talked about, riding associations I would disagree with. I'm still against the public finance, but riding associations.... I mean, the Tories and the Alliance set up dummy riding associations to say they have 75 or 80 candidates in Quebec. So we don't want to go there.

    With respect to making the vote equal to the dollar subsidy, well, if we're going to apply that principle here, let's apply it to make people's votes count. The million Alliance votes that were cast in Ontario should mean something, and the 800,000 Liberal votes that were wasted in western Canada should also mean something, in the context of voting reform. If we're going to apply that principle here, apply it across the board with voting reform.

    Voices: Hear, hear!

    The Chair: Mr. Broadbent.

    Hon. Ed Broadbent: I would just add my support, if I can, to the view that the committee should spend a lot of time looking at how to keep election expenses down. Anyone following the American political system, as I have done sort of academically for some time, knows it's no accident that every member of the U.S. Senate is a millionaire. The role money plays in that system is one of the things that in an otherwise good democracy really undermines it considerably. All the loopholes around spending have compelled elected members in both parties in the U.S. system to spend half their time fundraising.

    So I agree on this. I think the committee should give a lot of thought, if it can, to ways of cutting down the amount of money needed in elections.

    The Chair: Aaron, a very short comment.

    Mr. Aaron Freeman: I won't have time to comment on all the points, so I'll just comment on two.

    On the issue of using the tax credit as a check on disclosure, which I think you were talking about, it doesn't work. That's the main problem with it. The evidence says it doesn't work.

    One of the reasons it doesn't work, according to fundraisers, is that companies are given the choice, and individuals are given the choice; they can deduct it as a business expense. Now, that's illegal under the Income Tax Act, but it's done. It's widespread. Some people say it accounts for the equivalent of one-third of party revenues.

    So it's not going to work, partly because of that and partly because the disclosure requirement is on the recipient. We could make the disclosure requirement on the donor. You could consider that, although there are difficulties with that for sure.

  (1230)  

    The Chair: I have to cut you off, and I apologize.

    It's Rick Borotsik, then Carolyn Parrish.

    Colleagues, my sense is that if we do have other business, we should aim for about 12:50 to wind this thing up.

    So I'm going to keep going with Rick Borotsik, Carolyn Parrish, then Ted White.

    Mr. Rick Borotsik: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

    Again, welcome to all the members of the panel.

    Mr. Broadbent, you had indicated at one point in time in your conversation that the NDP worked with perfection in legislation, not compromise. In Manitoba there's a piece of legislation that has in fact banned all corporate and union donations, labour donations; however, they do not have a public financing component. As a matter of fact, I would suggest, sir, that there is now a democratic deficit with that piece of legislation being put into place in Manitoba.

    Is that perfection, in your mind?

    Hon. Ed Broadbent: Mr. Doer has done many wonderful things--

    Mr. Rick Borotsik: It's an NDP government. Is that perfection?

    Hon. Ed Broadbent: --and many imaginative things, but he has this minor failure, and it is a failure, to provide public funding. I have said that to Mr. Doer in person, that I hope an otherwise good legislation, and the innovation he's taken--

    Mr. Rick Borotsik: So it's just a minor flaw, then.

    Hon. Ed Broadbent: Just a minor flaw.

    Mr. Rick Borotsik: Okay. I thank you.

    Mr. Freeman, you were the only one of the whole panel to mention trust funds. I know Mr. Robinson had suggested that there would be other ways, perhaps, to get around the system, but you were the only one on trust funds. How does your organization see, with changes to this legislation, attempting to close that particular loophole?

    Mr. Aaron Freeman: I'd be happy to--

    Mr. Rick Borotsik: And briefly, because I have a question for Mr. Robinson as well.

    Mr. Aaron Freeman: Okay.

    I'd be happy to provide you with the language on that, but it's a new provision that would ban trust funds and return money in existing trust funds. There has been a suggestion that you can do this through the code of conduct, but there are a couple of problems with that.

    The first problem is that the code of conduct applies only to MPs, so heading into an election you're going to apply that rule to MPs and not the other candidates.

    The other problem is that unless you believe there's something magic about the number seven, which is the number of attempts Parliament has made to pass a code of conduct, we should deal with it in electoral finance legislation, because they are electoral contributions. The code of conduct may or may not pass, and it may or may not have this provision in it, and it won't apply to all candidates.

    Mr. Rick Borotsik: Mr. Robinson, do you have a comment on trust funds, by any chance? You didn't mention it in your brief.

    Mr. Walter Robinson: We would be supportive. Believe it or not, we're supportive of some of the work Democracy Watch does on winding that up.

    Mr. Rick Borotsik: Okay.

    Mr. Robinson, you had mentioned, and I don't disagree with you, that the premise of this legislation is to stop the influence of corporate and union donations. It's to give the impression that there is going to be a more open and accountable financial contribution to the political process. You had mentioned something...and as I said, I don't disagree, but I'd like you to just perhaps expand on it.

    It seems that the premise is that this will stop any types of corruption within government, that it will stop the influence of business within contracts; I think you talked about the 25% of untendered contracts.

    Can you just expand on that a bit? In your opinion, would this legislation in fact change any of that type of potential within government?

    Mr. Walter Robinson: To answer your question in reverse, to unduly influence? No. Influencing government is a legitimate activity. If a business wants to provide services to government, which is a $15-billion-a-year industry in this country, we want them to do it in the context of a fair and competitive tendering system.

    If you want to stop the influence of government...or rather the influence of business--that was a Freudian slip on my part--and unions in that respect, wind up the opportunities for them to influence those things with respect to corporate welfare and regional development subsidies. They won't want to play the game because there's nothing to play.

    Mr. Rick Borotsik: Mr. Broadbent, very briefly, you talked about more free time on the major networks. I'm not opposed to that. My question simply is, how would you regulate it? Would the government actually pay for that time on the private sector television stations? We're talking a huge cost component here. Would that be paid for by government, then?

  (1235)  

    Hon. Ed Broadbent: How costly it would be would depend on how much time you demanded. They do this in Britain. There is obligatory free time.

    Mr. Rick Borotsik: It's also a public station, as I understand it. We're talking about private sector here.

    Hon. Ed Broadbent: I'm subject to correction on this, but it applies to the other networks in Britain as well. They have banned--and I come back to that point--all political commercials going anywhere in the U.K.

    Obviously you don't want to put the same number of free-time commercials in place that are just going to replace the mindless ones that all the parties buy now, these 20-second clips. And I repeat, all parties, through the competitive pressure, indulge in that.

    I think some obligatory contribution on the part of the networks, as part of their contribution to Canadian democracy, if you like, should be an expanded obligation for them to provide a certain amount of free time, more free time, to all parties.

    To come back to the other thing, and I'll conclude on this, I would very much like to see what I said put in place by the networks at the end of each week, a public discussion of all the leaders together on the week's political issues. Maybe all the networks could collaborate on that.

    Mr. Rick Borotsik: Thank you, Mr. Broadbent.

    The Chair: Carolyn Parrish, Ted White, and then Jacques Saada.

    Mrs. Carolyn Parrish (Mississauga Centre, Lib.): I must have very serious personality problems, other than what's been all over the whole continent, because I actually found something of interest in what each of you said.

    First of all to Mr. Robinson, I have spent a considerable amount of my time looking at increasing tax rebates to charities and have had a heck of a problem, as has John Bryden, because of accountability and auditing. So that's not the panacea answer. You can't compare the two. It's very difficult.

    I agree with Mr. Freeman on the $1,000 limit. I think $10,000 is outrageous. I think the $1,000 limit should be there for everybody. I am getting very concerned that corporations.... As my colleague has mentioned, they should be out of the mix completely.

    I find third-party advertising very undemocratic and potentially dangerous. People with very narrow agendas can print whatever they want. It takes a year to prove a slander case, and by then the election is lost. So I really wish you guys, because I respect you, would think that through very carefully before you keep pounding on that one. I think that one is very dangerous in a democracy.

    It's always fascinating to listen to Mr. Broadbent. I love clear thinking and experience. You're always a wonderful person to listen to. I think you and I agree, the way you've been talking, that spending should come down. I think if we bring the spending down, the amount of money we have to raise becomes easier, becomes more democratic, and involves large corporations and very wealthy people less.

    I'm wondering if any or all of you have a reaction to a system that is--I hate to say this--based closely on the U.S. primary system and based on memberships, where very nominally priced memberships would qualify you to be a card-carrying whatever. Then we could base this rebate system on the number of memberships carried by any party rather than the number of votes acquired in the last election--because you're going to keep perpetuating the strong inheriting the earth. The guys who had the most votes in the election will get the biggest rebates this time, and will get the biggest rebates next time because they'll win the most votes.

    I'd like to see a way of making it less a product of spending and more a product of face-to-face contacts with people, both for nominations and for elections. If I don't have a lot of money to spend on lawn signs, which I think are disgustingly ridiculous things anyway, then I'm going to have to make more contact with people. I'm not going to be able to hide behind lawn signs. I'm not going to be able to hide behind pamphlets. I'm going to have to actually get out and work for the vote.

    So I would really like your comments on this concept. You've already mentioned it, Mr. Broadbent. What if we go back to the idea of nominally priced memberships and then basing the rebates on the number of members a party has?

    The Chair: Comments?

    Ed Broadbent.

    Hon. Ed Broadbent: I don't have much to add to what I've said. I think trying to get a mix based on past votes.... As someone already said with regard to past votes, the problem is, it's past, but it's also an indicator of citizens' participation. If last time they happen to have voted in large numbers for your party, for example, I think there's some good reason, therefore, your party should get more of a rebate.

    So I think a mixture is a good idea--current party membership, which puts the incentive on all parties to get out there and hustle to get Canadians to join in and be participants in the political process in the party sense; and past vote. How that can be done, credibly and with integrity, on party membership is something I would like to see the professional staffs maybe give all of you as MPs some advice on, in terms of how to make that a feasible thing.

  (1240)  

    The Chair: Walter Robinson.

    Mr. Walter Robinson: Through you, Mr. Chair, to the member, on the issue of lawn signs, as Mr. Saada and Mr. Guimond.... They don't put up lawn signs in Quebec. They put them on the 20, and the 40, and every light standard, but they don't put them on their lawns.

    With respect to the spending, well, just don't replace the corporate and union donations that you're banning; then you will automatically reduce the spending. And if you want to do stuff in the elections limits there....

    Again, we're against the system of the funding, but memberships is not the answer. In a previous life, the only partisan membership I ever held was a Tory membership from 1990 to 1993. I remember being a returning officer in these Ottawa ridings, and you'd be surprised how many people lived at the address showing a vacant lot on Cooper Street, with 19 and 20 memberships.

    That's not the way to go.

    The Chair: Aaron Freeman on this.

    Mr. Aaron Freeman: I'd agree with the tone of what's been said. I think you should put this question to some of the researchers and some of the folks at Elections Canada. If they can come up with a workable model, that would be great, but you do need to keep it simple. And you do have this auditing problem. I can't think my way around it.

    I do agree very strongly that you need to bring the expenses down, and if you do that you could bring the public subsidy down. There's ample justification for that. The largest expense for the party, the single largest expense, is election advertising. If you increase the free broadcast time, it's more than justifiable to bring it down.

    With regard to the expense limit, in 1974 it was based on the amount of money that the parties were already spending, and then they built in an inflation consumer price index adjuster. It's not based on trying to bring the expenses of the parties down, it's based on what they're already spending.

    So there's ample justification to bring down the party limit considerably. Going back to your earlier point, I think there's probably not as much justification to bring down the MP limit, and the problem is not necessarily in your riding; the problem is in the more spread-out rural ridings, where there are travel expenses and it is more expensive to run a campaign.

    The Chair: Ted White, then Jacques Saada.

    Mr. Ted White: Thank you, Mr. Chair.

    Through you, I note that Carolyn has mentioned the relationship to the amount of money spent as being important. I'm not sure there's really any evidence that this is it the case. With the Charlottetown Accord, for example, the “yes” side spent ten times as much as the “no” side and still lost. The PCs spent an enormous amount in the 1993 election and lost. Election after election, the Reform and CA MPs get elected with far few dollars spent per MP.

    But I'd like to move back to my question to Mr. Freeman. You mentioned in your presentation that you were distressed about the disclosure time, or the time it took for disclosure to happen. Do you have any suggestions for a mechanism that could be put in place, considering the fact that there are lots of volunteers involved in this process and then the bureaucracy within Elections Canada? Do you have any suggestions for a mechanism to improve that system, to speed up the accountability?

    Mr. Aaron Freeman: Sure. I would put the question to Mr. Kingsley. I would expect his answer would be that it would not be a problem for him to administer that system even during an election.

    The system you would go with would be either a monthly or quarterly disclosure system for parties. You'd have a separate disclosure period for the election period and you'd have them put that disclosure report together within a few days or a week before the vote. You'd have a ban on contributions for that brief period between that disclosure period and the vote. That way, everyone knows who is contributing to every candidate and party before the vote takes place. That system would be workable for Elections Canada, I'm sure.

    I know Mr. Kingsley has offered in the past to create software for candidates and parties, to make it as simple as possible. It's the simple “send” key on the e-mail system to send it to Elections Canada, and it goes right up onto the website and is later audited.

    That system, I think, is quite workable. It works in the United States, where they have a monthly disclosure system in the case of presidential races.

    Just to address your first point, I think the error that's sometimes made when people look at this issue is they assume that what people are saying is that money buys elections every single time, meaning the side that spends more wins every single time. No one is suggesting that. The key issue here is whether money influences elections, and there's ample evidence to show that it does.

  (1245)  

    Mr. Ted White: Mr. Robinson, Carolyn mentioned something that I was going to bring up to pursue further with you, and that's this whole idea of the charities. You threw out a challenge here that we put out a press release along the lines you described in your presentation.

    I wouldn't particularly have much of a problem in putting out such a press release, although I agree with Carolyn, it's a much more complex situation. I don't think you can compare the two, because there's a flaw in your argument. Many charities get all of their money directly from government and from grants. For example, they don't have to go out and eyeball-to-eyeball the way political parties do. We run political meetings, AGMs, fundraisers. I mean, we do work for our money, to a degree. So it's not a pure argument you're advancing.

    I'm sure you also know, if you've done a critique of some of the activities of charities, there is a lot to criticize in there and a lot of accountability that's lacking. So I'm not sure you can draw the direct parallel, and I'd just like you to recognize that. Otherwise, I would have been happy to put out a press release.

    Mr. Walter Robinson: I do recognize that, and I do acknowledge, through you, Mr. Chairman, Ms. Parrish's work and Mr. Bryden's work. We have followed it closely. There is a great degree of issue with the governance of charities, registered charities, overheads and a variety of other issues, and not putting money to where it goes. I'd say the same thing--there's still an issue of that--in government financing of overseas development assistance. Very little of it actually gets overseas. I think you can make a corollary argument there.

    I want to also pick up on Mr. Freeman's point, that it's not a question that money buys the election, and I agree with that. Does it influence? Of course it does. It buys advertising. But so do ideas influence elections, and so does the weather. A variety of things influence an election.

    The Chair: Ted.

    Mr. Ted White: I'd like to ask Mr. Broadbent a question directly, and then if he has time he can add an extra comment.

    The Chair: Please go ahead.

    Mr. Ted White: I found a contradiction in your presentation--

    Hon. Ed Broadbent: Inconceivable.

    Voices: Oh, oh!

    Mr. Ted White: You talked about the fact that political contributions should come from voluntary acts of individuals, and yet you're quite supportive of the idea of the public purse being involved as well. I just wonder, would you not agree to a system that's 100% dependent on voluntary contributions rather than getting the public purse involved at all? What are your objections to that?

    Hon. Ed Broadbent: I don't find it a contradiction between saying that there are two legitimate sources, one on voluntary contributions, which I deeply agree with and put a lot of emphasis on, and at the same time recognizing that a government, which is, in a very real and profound sense in a democracy, representative of all citizens at a given time, contributing to the public process, as is being discussed here, that would benefit all parties and therefore, indirectly, all citizens. They are different approaches, but I don't think they're contradictory.

    Frankly, I think if you could get enough funds--and I'm speaking in part now as a former party leader--to run a credible election in a country as diverse as ours, geographically and from every other point of view, just from voluntary contributions, then fine. I just don't think it would get enough money to be able to get out in a credible way, for people in all regions of the country, all the issues that need to be discussed.

    So I think we need a combination of public funding and voluntary contributions.

    The Chair: Jacques Saada.

[Translation]

    Mr. Jacques Saada: Since it is already 12:49 p.m., I will ask a very brief question.

[English]

    The Chair: Two minutes, perhaps.

[Translation]

    Mr. Jacques Saada: It will not even take two minutes.

    The perception—and I won't debate whether this is a justified perception—is that by lowering the limit we increase the credibility of the government in the eyes of the population.

    Corporations have a tradition of providing assistance in all areas of human activity, be it the arts, culture, sports, or other areas. In what way is allowing them to contribute to Canada's political machinery different from allowing them to contribute to all other kinds of human activity.

    Secondly, if a corporation were to donate $1,000 and an individual were to donate $10,000, do you think the corporation would still be perceived as having more influence over the process?

  (1250)  

[English]

    Hon. Ed Broadbent: I think this is a very important issue. Just to pick up on the point Mr. Robinson made a minute ago, that all kinds of things shape elections--the weather, ideas, money--it's true. And some of us believe money should be cut out. I mean, that's exactly the issue here. Democratic citizenship, going back to Athenian democracy, talked about the notion of equality, of equal input. When you have collective entities putting up money....

    I agree with you that corporations should contribute in many other aspects of society, but in the shaping of public debate, in the selection of candidates, in the final determination of electoral outcomes, it seems to me that all democratic legislators should be concerned with eliminating the role of money, if you like, and maximizing the role of ideas. I think that's at the heart of this bill.

    That's why I think corporations or unions should not be contributing to the electoral process. There we should try to do what John Stuart Mill and everyone else argued, and that is to put major emphasis on the role of ideas, including, if I can come back to this, the idea that a person on welfare should count in principle as much as a millionaire. When money plays a role, you undercut that equality principle.

    The Chair: It's Walter Robinson, then Aaron Freeman, and then I'm going to wind it up.

    Walter.

    Mr. Walter Robinson: The equality of input is still there: It's called the vote. The ballot box is blind. The welfare recipient or the millionaire still cast votes that are equal, at least in theory. We don't have good voting reform, so it's not equal in that sense.

    The question to ask on spending limits, on that type of spending in the larger context, is why are citizens okay to be influenced by a political party spending money but not by a third-party citizens' group, whether it be the NCC, CTF, labour union, or the 4-H Club? The citizen is still equal with their vote.

    The Chair: Aaron Freeman.

    Mr. Aaron Freeman: To go to the heart of your question, the reason it's different with the democratic process is because it's the democratic process. This is the process by which we determine the laws under which we live. Human beings vote, corporations don't. The idea is that people should be at the heart of that process.

    The other reason for eliminating corporate and union donations, and those from other organizations, is a practical one: You're asking for abuse. Corporations, unlike people, can donate through multiple subsidiaries, through shell corporations and so on. I'm not making this stuff up. It happens under the current system. Hundreds of thousands of dollars flow into party coffers from companies where you don't really know, or you have to do a tremendous amount of research to figure out, who the directors are and what the parent company is.

    Again, especially if you are putting further limitations on contributions, what we've learned from other jurisdictions is that when you close one loophole and leave another glaring loophole open, the money just moves to the other glaring loophole.

    The Chair: Colleagues, on your behalf I want to thank our witnesses. I want to thank Ed Broadbent, from the Canadian Democracy and Corporate Accountability Commission. I want to thank, from the Canadian Taxpayers' Federation, Walter Robinson and his colleague Bruce Winchester.

    Bruce, I particularly thank you. As chair, I wish we had more witnesses like you.

    Voices: Oh, oh!

    The Chair: And from Democracy Watch, I'd like to thank Aaron Freeman.

    We thank you all very much indeed.

    Colleagues, we're going to other business.

    Michel Guimond.

[Translation]

    Mr. Michel Guimond: Mr. Chairman, I would like to come back to the decision you made...

[English]

    The Chair: Colleagues, order, please.

    Michel Guimond.

[Translation]

    Mr. Michel Guimond: Mr. Chairman, I would like to come back to your decision not to request that the document distributed by the Canadian Taxpayers' Federation be returned. I would like to tell you that, as a matter of fact, this document was not distributed by the committee staff; I checked this out with our two devoted committee assistants. But one thing is clear: beside me where Mr. Sauvageau, who is absent from the committee sits, there is the agenda, an analysis of Bill C-24, in French and English, and there is the Canadian Taxpayers' Federation document.

    Mr. Chairman, in the three years that I have been sitting on this committee, I have considered myself to be someone who is usually conciliatory. I feel that I am cooperative. I think that I am democratic. I respect each of the members of Parliament who are elected here. You won your elections, we won ours. Our mandate comes from the people. I am not challenging anyone's election. The people are the best judge, and I expect that I will be judged accordingly. I have never felt, from any of the committee members, any desire to bully me as a committee member. I am therefore not paranoid.

    You wonder why I speak slowly. I want to make sure that the committee members who don't have the good fortune of speaking two, three or four languages can understand me. That is why I do not speak fast. I find it very difficult not speaking at my own pace, but I make an effort.

    I am going to use a typical expression from my region. I do not split hairs. I am not somebody who takes offence easily. I am saying this for those of you who have been here for the past three years. However, I do have principles, I have values. I expect the same from the others.

    Mr. Chairman, one of the personality traits that I hate the most is hypocrisy. I would like to thank Ms. Catterall, the government whip. When I intervened earlier, she said that she had decided to put the document back on the table.

    I am surprised that the only other francophone member present, Mr. Saada, has chosen to remain silent. Like me, this is a francophone MP from Quebec who represents the Brossard—La Prairie riding. That is his choice. At any rate, I have no power to demand a colleague to intervene if he does not feel like it. Nevertheless, I am surprised by his silence. But that is not the issue at hand.

    Mr. Chairman, with all due respect for you as a member of Parliament, as a chair and as a man—I do not know you as a friend—, I respectfully submit that earlier, you demonstrated a principle which we refer to in law as “willful blindness”. You allowed something to occur indirectly that could not be allowed directly.

    Mr. Chairman, with all due respect, you demonstrated willful blindness. I am going to re-read the minutes properly, but you indicated that the committee had not distributed the unilingual document in question.

  (1255)  

    It is true, quite true, that it was not distributed by a member of the committee staff, but in spite of your principles about order and decorum in your committee room, you allowed someone to breach that order and decorum.

    Mr. Chairman, when we were the official opposition, I chaired the Standing Committee on Public Accounts for a year and a half. We know what it means to enforce order and decorum. We just have to consult Marleau and Montpetit; we just have to go by our own committee experience.

    You have considerable power, Mr. Chairman. You can ask a security guard to remove someone who comes in to our room. You can have security guards come in and physically remove someone. You can require people in the room to turn off their cell phones and pagers. You can require the cameras, and if there are any at the beginning of a committee meting, to be taken out. There is no need for a formal motion for any of this. These are the powers, duties and responsibilities inherent to your role as chairman.

    It is true that we have a motion proposed by Mr. Johnston of the Canadian Alliance, which reads as follows:

That the committee clerk be authorized to distribute documents to committee members only when these documents exist in both official languages.

    We adopted that motion on October 10, 2002. It is true that what happened today was in compliance with the motion. But does it respect order and decorum?

    In closing, Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask you the following question: does this means that a chair will agree to say nothing about any documents distributed by witnesses, who are third parties, and that he will allow documents to be distributed in the room although they are vexatious, defamatory or in violation of the Official Languages Act?

    All I want is an answer to that question. You will give me your answer here, and I will also get an answer in the House when I raise my point of privilege. That is what it comes down to. Can a third party, even without the chair's permission, distribute documents this way? After all, we will have people distributing things. I can tell you that I will bring them here using my parliamentary privilege. Is it acceptable for a committee chair to abdicate his responsibilities for order and decorum by allowing third parties to distribute any documents they want here or elsewhere in the room? That is a long question, Mr. Chairman, and I am eager to hear your answer.

    Thank you very much.

·  (1300)  

[English]

    The Chair: Joe Jordan, as long as it's very brief on the same issue.

    Mr. Joe Jordan: Yes, it will be very brief, Mr. Chair.

    When I came in and saw that document, I questioned the clerks as to whether it was available in both official languages as well. I mean, I have to balance that...because with this committee we've had problems with doing stuff when we have witnesses, and I think that may have influenced people's handling of this.

    I don't disagree with Mr. Guimond. We can't ban them from putting stuff on tables, but I think this table, and the area in front of members, should be an area where documents are placed that meet the criteria that this committee has set.

    Mr. Guimond will do what he needs to do, but I think in future, the witnesses should not be allowed to place documents in front of members.

    The Chair: Jacques Saada.

[Translation]

    Mr. Jacques Saada: Mr. Chairman, this is strange. I really regret the fact that Mr. Guimond has involved me in his argument, for two reasons.

    First of all, although I may not have put on a big show for the media, my document was returned at the same time as the whip document did, down to the other end of the table. I do not think that his criticism is deserved.

    Secondly, I am of course in agreement with respect to the principle; I don't need to demonstrate this. There have been so many occurrences or incidents of this type that my position is very clear on the matter; I don't have to prove anything to anyone. But I could not accept, and I say this in all sincerity, extremely serious accusations made with respect to the chairman during a televised meeting. Even if I did not agree with your decision, Mr. Chairman, and despite the fact that I think that the decision should have been to return these documents systematically, the tone used by my colleague was, in my mind, so aggressive that had I become involved in the debate, that would have given the television public the impression that I agreed with the aggressive manner in which you were treated. However, I feel that this aggression was not justified, because, generally speaking, you use very good judgment in dealing with the matter of official languages.

    So the fact that I did not want to intervene publicly and openly has nothing to do with the substance of the question. I think that Mr. Jordan was very clear and I fully agree with what he said. That respects the spirit of what we have agreed to among us, namely, that when a group appears, it has the right, as a group, to use either of the two official languages. So the group comes with its documents. It is not entitled to distribute them to us because, as far as we are concerned, both official languages have to be respected at the same time. The group may make these documents available to us at some point, somebody may go and get the documents, but when the document is placed on this table, indeed, the spirit of the official languages must be respected and I fully agree with that.

    I would like to conclude with a word to Mr. Guimond. We each of us have, of course, our own style. We each have our own way of doing things, but I do not accept the unfairness of an accusation that focusses on how I do things and not on the substance of what I do. I would be pleased if, in recognition of this principle, you were to withdraw your accusations pertaining to the fact that I did not speak.

·  (1305)  

[English]

    The Chair: Michel, perhaps I can by saying that, first of all, I'm embarrassed that you have been put in the position of having to make your arguments in this way. I truly am. And I greatly appreciate the fact that you've phrased it that the decision we're looking at is my decision not to have them put back.

    I assure you, had I known in time that these documents had been circulated, as the witnesses said--and they indicated that they themselves circulated them--they would have been removed.

    In future, by the way, as long as we know at this end of the table that material is out there, they will be removed, and the witnesses will be told they cannot do it.

    In general, and I hope not just on this committee but on previous committees, as chair and in other circumstances, I have gone to great lengths--great lengths--to see to it that both official languages are used, and that in particular the minority language is protected. I really have. You should never be put in the position of having to question the services in the minority official language. So I apologize to you for that.

    In answer to the question you posed at the end, the answer, of course, is no; people aren't allowed to circulate material. By the way, they aren't allowed to circulate material whether it be in both official languages or not. As has been indicated here, we have, as a committee and as the chair of this committee, our own authority. This is our area, and we should control these things.

    But as you recognized, I did not know those documents were there until they were there. The question then is, what should I do? This document was going to be translated. It wasn't an extra document, but one the witness was going to speak to, and it was going to be translated. I felt that the witnesses were here and we were in a particular format, so I made the decision that we could proceed with where we were.

    Let me say one more thing, Michel, and then you can certainly speak again.

    At this point, I regret that. If I had the decision to make again, I perhaps would have had them removed and put at the end of the table, where they should have been. But I didn't. Under the circumstances, that was the decision I made.

    And by the way, Michel, it was mine to make. Although you could argue both sides of it, and although I regret it, it was a perfectly legitimate thing for me to do.

    I want to finish, at this stage anyway, by apologizing for putting you in this position--not so much for making the decision, which I regret. It was a decision I made, and I think it can be argued both ways whether I should have done it that way.

    Michel Guimond.

[Translation]

    Mr. Michel Guimond: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate your comment, but I would just like to qualify a little bit what Mr. Jordan said. This does not apply only to the documents distributed around this table, it applies to the committee room. We can easily do something that was not done indirectly, namely, leave a unilingual document there. If the Canadian Taxpayers' Federation were to send a unilingual English or unilingual French document to your offices and then you showed up here for the meeting, I would have no objection, but in the committee room, we must ensure that everything is distributed in both languages, because otherwise, we will start playing cat and mouse. I'm warning you, if after the break this should occur with another group and documents are placed not on the front table but on the back table, I will get up, take the documents and throw them into the wastepaper basket.

    Let's not close our eyes. We acknowledge that there are two official languages in Canada. I do not want to be the brass band for the Official Languages Act. I want to become sovereign; I am not here to reform Canada, but until things change, there are two official languages in Canada. We must not play the game of doing indirectly what cannot be done directly.

    Mr. Regan made a very good comment to the Canadian Taxpayers' Federation. Regardless of whether they come from Regina or anywhere else, it doesn't make sense, considering all the money that they have, that they were unable to find a translator and give this person enough time to translate the document.

    I would also like you to put yourselves in the shoes of someone who receives a document that is not written in his or her mother tongue, but rather in the colleague's mother tongue. We have extremely competent interpreters. I do not know how they can work under these conditions. The work they do is intellectually exhausting. But as a francophone, I should not be penalized for following. Either I have a document that I am able to follow in both languages, or the document is not distributed.

·  (1310)  

[English]

    The Chair: Michel, I apologize for putting you in the position of having to argue this case. As you yourself have said, these documents were circulated. Had I been here five minutes earlier, they would not have been on the table. Whenever we know that such a thing is going to occur, it certainly will be stopped in the future.

    Jacques Saada.

[Translation]

    Mr. Jacques Saada: I asked my colleague something. I did not get an answer or any follow-up. I would like to know if he is prepared to withdraw his statement about what I said concerning the form and not the substance.

    Mr. Michel Guimond: To indicate to you the importance I place on this, I want to come back to another point as well. You must remember, Mr. Chairman, that I appeal your decision to not have the documents picked up. I am not asking you to arrive a half hour before the committee meeting to ensure that nothing has been distributed and play the role of a policeman. When I raised the issue, I expected that you would ask for the document to be withdrawn.

    I will reread what I said. I do not feel that I used unparliamentary language; I nearly raised the issue of silence. I interpreted Mr. Saada's silence. You have given your interpretation and I acknowledge it. But I did not use unparliamentary language. I do not see why I should apologize.

    Mr. Jacques Saada: I am very sorry, Mr. Chairman.

    Mr. Michel Guimond: What did you say, Jacques?

[English]

    The Chair: Michel, if this is drawn to my attention in the future, I will make the opposite decision.

    Colleagues, the meeting is adjourned.