HAFF Committee Meeting

37th PARLIAMENT, 2nd SESSION

Standing Committee on Procedure and House Affairs

EVIDENCE

CONTENTS

Wednesday, April 2, 2003

Â

1210

The Chair (Mr. Peter Adams (Peterborough, Lib.))

Mr. John Williams (St. Albert, Canadian Alliance)

The Chair

Mr. Derek Lee (Scarborough—Rouge River, Lib.)

The Chair

Mr. Derek Lee

Â

1215

The Chair

Mr. Ken Epp (Elk Island, Canadian Alliance)

Mr. Derek Lee

Mr. Ken Epp

Mr. Derek Lee

Â

1220

Mr. Ken Epp

The Chair

Mr. Benoît Sauvageau (Repentigny, BQ)

The Chair

Mr. Benoît Sauvageau

The Chair

Mr. Benoît Sauvageau

The Chair

Ms. Marlene Catterall (Ottawa West—Nepean, Lib.)

Mr. Derek Lee

Ms. Marlene Catterall

Mr. Derek Lee

Ms. Marlene Catterall

Mr. Derek Lee

Ms. Marlene Catterall

Mr. Derek Lee

Â

1225

The Chair

Mr. Derek Lee

The Chair

Mr. Jacques Saada (Brossard—La Prairie, Lib.)

Mr. Derek Lee

Mr. Jacques Saada

Mr. Derek Lee

The Chair

Mr. Ken Epp

The Chair

Mrs. Carolyn Parrish (Mississauga Centre, Lib.)

The Chair

Mr. Derek Lee

Mrs. Carolyn Parrish

The Chair

Mr. John Williams

Â

1230

The Chair

Mr. John Williams

The Chair

Mr. John Williams

The Chair

Mr. John Williams

The Chair

Mr. John Williams

Â

1235

The Chair

Mr. John Williams

The Chair

Mr. John Williams

The Chair

Mr. John Williams

The Chair

Mr. John Williams

The Chair

Mr. John Williams

Â

1240

The Chair

Mr. John Williams

Â

1245

Mr. Geoff Regan (Halifax West, Lib.)

Mr. John Williams

The Chair

Mr. John Williams

The Chair

Â

1250

Mr. John Williams

The Chair

Mr. Jacques Saada

The Chair

Mr. John Williams

The Chair

Mr. John Williams

The Chair

Mr. John Williams

Mr. John Williams

The Chair

Mr. Benoît Sauvageau

Mr. John Williams

The Chair

Mr. Benoît Sauvageau

Â

1255

Mr. John Williams

Mr. Benoît Sauvageau

Mr. Benoît Sauvageau

Mr. John Williams

The Chair

Mr. Yvon Godin (Acadie—Bathurst, NDP)

Mr. John Williams

Mr. Yvon Godin

·

1300

Mr. John Williams

Mr. Yvon Godin

Mr. John Williams

The Chair

Mr. Benoît Sauvageau

The Chair

Mrs. Diane Ablonczy (Calgary—Nose Hill, Canadian Alliance)

The Chair

Mrs. Diane Ablonczy

·

1305

·

1310

·

1315

The Chair

Mr. John Williams

The Chair

Mr. John Williams

The Chair

Mr. John Williams

The Chair

·

1320

Mrs. Diane Ablonczy

Ms. Margaret Young (Committee Researcher)

The Chair

Mr. Yvon Godin

·

1325

Mrs. Diane Ablonczy

The Chair

Mr. Benoît Sauvageau

·

1330

Mrs. Diane Ablonczy

Mr. Benoît Sauvageau

Mrs. Diane Ablonczy

·

1335

The Chair

Mr. John Williams

Mrs. Diane Ablonczy

Mr. John Williams

The Chair

Mr. Ken Epp

The Chair

Mrs. Diane Ablonczy

·

1340

The Chair

Mr. John Williams

Mr. Ken Epp

Mr. John Williams

The Chair

Mrs. Carolyn Parrish

The Chair

Mrs. Carolyn Parrish

The Chair

Mrs. Carolyn Parrish

The Chair

Mrs. Carolyn Parrish

The Chair

Mrs. Carolyn Parrish

The Chair

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CANADA

Standing Committee on Procedure and House Affairs

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NUMBER 030

l

2nd SESSION

l

37th PARLIAMENT

---

EVIDENCE

Wednesday, April 2, 2003

[Recorded by Electronic Apparatus]

  (1210)  

[English]

    The Chair (Mr. Peter Adams (Peterborough, Lib.)): Colleagues, if we could begin, we're here pursuant to the committee's mandate under Standing Order 108(3)(a)(iii), consideration of matters related to the inclusion of a code of conduct in the Standing Orders of the House.

    This is an open round table. All members were invited to attend either this round table or the one we held last Wednesday evening. Prior to Wednesday, we circulated the draft report, as you know, which we prepared specifically in draft form so that members of Parliament could comment on it.

    We've also indicated that members have until the end of this week to submit their written comments. I know a number of members have mentioned to me that they couldn't come today and that they are going to do that, so I'm very pleased.

    It is my thought--John, I'll come to you in a minute--that following the expiry of the deadline at the end of this week, we will meet again, have one meeting, likely one meeting, on the report, and move it up from draft form into the form in which we would submit it to the House of Commons.

    John Williams.

    Mr. John Williams (St. Albert, Canadian Alliance): Just a question, Mr. Chair. If we present our oral arguments here, are we also required to put them in writing too?

    The Chair: No, by no means, but you are quite welcome to do both. I was putting this on the record, John, simply to show that we have gone to some trouble. By the way, this is actually the third round table we have had on this topic, because we had one very early to get some sense of what members felt.

    The people have indicated that they are interested in attending. We have two of them here today. One is our colleague, Derek Lee, and the other is John Williams, whom I've already mentioned. The other is Diane Ablonczy. Diane has indicated she will be here at about 12:30.

    Colleagues, I'm in your hands.

    John, would you care to begin, or Derek, would you? Which of you has finished eating?

    Mr. Derek Lee (Scarborough—Rouge River, Lib.): If I could, I have some time constraints.

    Colleagues--I'll try to do this in about five minutes--my first overall reaction is I have never been a huge advocate of increased scrutiny of backbenchers, but I've somewhat reluctantly come to accept that many, many other parliamentary houses have imposed disclosure requirements on their members. Although I don't believe I see anything out there that is broken and needs to be fixed, for whatever reasons they're out there, this initiative has come this far, and if the House has so advised it wants to proceed, then let's make sure we do it in the right way.

    The four areas I want to address are fairly technical and have more to do with implementation, rather than whether or not we should implement.

    The first item involves section 20, and that is the section that allows for the creation of a trust to hold assets of a member. Although the trust is referred to, in the report there are no provisions that detail the trust. In particular, there is no provision for providing for the costs of setting up a trust. It's great to say that a member can put his or her interests into a trust, but there will inevitably be costs. I think most of you will agree, it's not fair for the member to bear these costs out of his or her own pocket. Therefore, which budget will pay for it? It's either the member's office budget, the MOB, or a special allocation from the Board of Internal Economy, BOIE. I guess you have to take your pick, unless there's a lottery system out there. Maybe we can have a House of Commons lottery that will build up a fund that will help us run the trusts.

    The Chair: That's a new one. Thank you very much.

    Mr. Derek Lee: That's a new way, yes.

    My second comment has to do with section 30. It has to do with the powers of inquiry of the commissioner.

    As I read the report, there is no description of the commissioner's powers. As I read it now, the commissioner has no power. He or she would be incapable of having an inquiry because he or she has no power to bring people in for an inquiry. I ask the question, what if the commissioner held an inquiry and nobody showed up--if the member refused to show up, if other members refused to show up, if associates of the member refused to show up? If a commissioner is going to have authority to have an inquiry, then the commissioner has to have powers.

    Now here we have a problem. The House of Commons itself has powers to hold inquiries. It has the power to send for persons, papers, and records. I don't think it's technically possible to just give that power to the commissioner. Those powers belong to members and the House.

    Along the same vein, if one were to give powers to a commissioner, one might have to use a statute to do it. Most of us, including me, do not want to run the system out of a statute. We want to run it using the Standing Orders of the House of Commons. If we put powers into a statute, then the courts will have a window that may give rise to litigation in some different context.

    I think I'm anxious to avoid putting it in statute--the powers, anything in statute--except the creation of the office of commissioner, but I see the difficulty of giving powers to the commissioner without a statute. I don't see how it can be done. The only way I could see us doing it now is if a committee ran the inquiry and the commissioner was a function of the committee in some way.

    The third area is in relation to subsection 31(11). It has to do with the report from an inquiry. Your draft appears not to have addressed the issue of what will be in the report. It assumes that a report will be tabled in the House and then it will be voted on, but the House can only vote on a motion in the House. It could vote on simple concurrence--yes or no in the report--but if we're dealing with a disciplinary matter, there has to be some meat on the bone. There has to be a motion of some sort, and that motion should not come from the government, nor should it come from the commissioner. I cannot conceive of a scenario where members would be comfortable with a motion coming from a commissioner, introduced in the House.

    There has to be a way when a report comes forward to force the report to present a motion that would dispose of the disciplinary issue in some way. If all that's required is concurrence in the report, fine, but I think we have to direct our attention to that. And I reiterate, the motion should not come from the government, nor should it come from a commissioner.

    The fourth area is section 33. Your draft report says that the commissioner, with the approval of the PHA committee, may make rules. I want you to listen up on this one. There is no way in the world I will ever accept a non-parliamentarian making rules for me as an MP. It just isn't going to happen.

    If the House wants to make rules, if the House wants to pass a statute, fine. I will not have a functionary making rules for my colleagues in the House of Commons. If that were to happen, that would be a huge departure from the traditions of the House, as I understand them.

    I don't want commissioners making rules. I don't want the commissioner's under-assistant making rules. I want the House making rules. The current proposal that the commissioner make rules, in my view, should simply not be on, and we cannot delegate this whole process.

  (1215)  

    If the rules are going to be made, the House will make the rules, not a committee. If rules are going to be made, they're going to have to be made and approved by the House. That's my view. I couldn't support something where the House said, Mr. and Mrs. X, you go ahead and make some rules for MPs. No can do.

    Those are my four points and my general one. I'll stop there.

    Thank you.

    The Chair: Thank you very much. You've obviously read the report in great detail.

    Colleagues, are there any comments on these points: the cost of a trust; the power of inquiry of the commissioner; the nature and design of the report to the House and the need to give some thought to that; and section 33, this business of the commissioner perhaps making rules?

    Ken Epp.

    Mr. Ken Epp (Elk Island, Canadian Alliance): Thank you.

    Mr. Lee, based on the preamble at the beginning of your statement and these objections that you've brought forward, would you feel that the best way of handling this and solving this would be just to drop the idea of having a specific conflict of interest code for members of Parliament?

    Mr. Derek Lee: I'm sorry, I missed that.

    Mr. Ken Epp: In view of your preamble, would you feel better if we just dropped the project? You said nothing is broken, so why fix it? You have some pretty serious reservations about some of the provisions in the draft. My question to you is, would you feel better if we just said we've gone through this exercise and we've done the work and we should drop it at this stage and forget it? Would that be what would please you the most?

    Mr. Derek Lee: Although I believe that each of the items I referred to can be fixed, in the end I wouldn't be unhappy if the committee and the House abandoned the project. However, the project is one of political cosmetics and perceptions. The public may perceive us as proceeding on this, and to back away may create as negative a perception as having a problem with it. But, personally, if the project were to be put on the shelf, as were the Milliken-Oliver report and previous studies, I'd be happy to consider it in the years to come as something the House might have to move to if a problem arose with it.

    Does that answer your question?

  (1220)  

    Mr. Ken Epp: Yes.

    The Chair: Thanks, Ken.

    Benoît Sauvageau.

[Translation]

    Mr. Benoît Sauvageau (Repentigny, BQ): Mr. Adams, we're just out of our caucus also. So I have a few questions.

    First, there was a discussion as to whether the spouses...

[English]

    The Chair: Just a minute. We just heard from a witness, and we're actually questioning the witness.

[Translation]

    Mr. Benoît Sauvageau: It's not a round-table? We were called to a round-table.

[English]

    The Chair: It is a round table. I asked for questions for the witness. He just made a presentation.

[Translation]

    Mr. Benoît Sauvageau: Fine. Will we do our presentation afterwards?

[English]

    The Chair: Let me explain. We have two colleagues who have given prior notice that they're going to be here, and perhaps one other, Diane Ablonczy. She may come at 12:30. The idea is that we will hear from them, and then I'd be delighted to move to you. Is that okay with you?

    Mr. Benoît Sauvageau: Yes.

    The Chair: Does anyone else have any questions of Derek?

    Marlene Catterall.

    Ms. Marlene Catterall (Ottawa West—Nepean, Lib.): Derek, with regard to the idea that any disciplinary action has to be by a motion in the House, who could bring the motion, in your view?

    Mr. Derek Lee: Only a member could. Someone would have to put the motion. A draft motion could be constructed in the procedure that led up to the report. The rules and procedure are going to have to mention the options in sending a report, such as a recommendation that the House do nothing or that the House do something and what it should do. There should be enough framework so that when the report gets to the House, it will be clear. If the report is adopted on concurrence, the report will have already said clearly what should be done. If the report doesn't have a clear statement as to what should be done, someone is going to have to craft a motion so that the House can be clear on what it's debating and voting on.

    Ms. Marlene Catterall: So that almost seems to indicate that a motion like that would have to come through a committee like this one.

    Mr. Derek Lee: That would be my view. It would have to come from a committee like this.

    Ms. Marlene Catterall: Okay.

    We have a process now whereby independent agencies can table reports in Parliament through a minister, but it's not the minister's report. Would you suggest something like...?

    I'm not sure a committee, this one or another, should be second-guessing a review by the commissioner. Would you have a problem if there were a provision that said the committee would table the recommendation of the commissioner, as opposed to actually making it the committee's recommendation?

    Mr. Derek Lee: If the commissioner's recommendation is clear, the committee would have to endorse it. In my view, anything that comes from the commissioner should just float out there, uncrystallized as a recommendation, but before it could become anything of substance, it would have to be endorsed by a committee, get the thumbprint of approval, make sure it's clear and actionable, and then be introduced into the House as a committee report--not the tabling of some document in the House. A mere tabling of the document is informational. What would have to come out of this process is a report.

    Ms. Marlene Catterall: Yes.

    Mr. Derek Lee: You used the term “tabling”. The report would be introduced into the House as a report, provided for in the Standing Orders or rules of procedure, and hopefully it would be a report of the committee.

    I just don't like an employee of the House of Commons introducing something into the House. It just rubs me the wrong way. It doesn't seem right, and as much as I would have a lot of respect for a commissioner, whoever he or she was--it's a tough job--I just don't see that person being in a position to introduce something into the House.

  (1225)  

    The Chair: I too will speak, then Jacques Saada, and Ken Epp again.

    Derek, my sense is, on this one, it's not your job to tell us, and we'd be grateful for any advice you have, but I think you've flagged a very important issue, and we're going to deal with it.

    You should know, though, that in that particular loop, we have deliberately cut the committee out, so that there is someone dealing directly with the House of Commons, and we do have to get our heads around exactly how that's being done.

    Mr. Derek Lee: I noticed that.

    The Chair: I'm quite willing to continue with this, but we do have John Williams waiting. We did indicate in the invitation that people would have a certain finite time.

    If I can comment, I believe Derek has thought aloud enough on the first three items--the trust cost, the power of inquiry, and this item now. He has not, by the way, thought that much aloud about how to deal with his concern about the commissioner making rules, the section 33 part.

    I'll go to Jacques Saada, and then Ken Epp, but I'd like to wind it up.

    Jacques.

[Translation]

    Mr. Jacques Saada (Brossard—La Prairie, Lib.): My question is quite simple and brief. In view of the committee's role, as Derek mentioned it, are all proceedings concerning any complaint to be automatically held in camera or will there be public meetings, in your opinion?

[English]

    Mr. Derek Lee: Obviously on dealing with personal matters that have not necessarily become public and front of the House, the committee would have to do some in camera work. I see that as almost an essential thing. The commissioner would do the same. He wouldn't be holding a public inquiry, I don't think--or maybe he or she would.

    It seems to me that it would be really unfair to launch into an inquiry that would be probing to verify allegations, and not having found that the allegations were true or all the factual elements surrounding it, without going in camera, I think an in camera proceeding is--

    Mr. Jacques Saada: That's precisely the reason I was very much in favour of dropping any role for the committee in terms of the assessment of the case, because of the fact that, first of all, you would have no choice but to go in camera. Secondly, we are a political entity, whether we like it or not, and a leak is always possible, and one of the ways to preserve the integrity of the process is to make sure that no political entity would come into the picture except the House of Commons itself, at the last stage of the decision-making process.

    Mr. Derek Lee: Thank you.

    The Chair: Ken Epp.

    Mr. Ken Epp: I will pass.

    The Chair: Okay, thank you.

    Carolyn Parrish.

    Mrs. Carolyn Parrish (Mississauga Centre, Lib.): I don't have a question. I just want to tell Derek in front of everybody else how impressed I always am with the thoroughness of what he does. I haven't read his book yet; I'm going to. But he knows his stuff and I really appreciate it.

    The Chair: Do you want this to go on the record so that everyone can rush out and buy it?

    Mr. Derek Lee: My book plus Sominex is a dead ringer for bedtime reading.

    Mrs. Carolyn Parrish: No, it was very thoughtful and I always appreciate it. I always like something from Derek. Thank you.

    The Chair: If I can echo that, I know of your experience on this committee and in my place here, so we greatly appreciate the contribution and we'll certainly take that very much into account. Thank you very much.

    John Williams.

    Mr. John Williams: Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.

    I have more than a passing interest in this particular exercise that you're going through because, as some of you know, I'm also the chair of an organization called the Global Organization of Parliamentarians Against Corruption, which has as one of its principle objectives to elevate the effectiveness of parliaments as institutions of accountability and governance. If we can't govern ourselves, do we have the right to govern other people?

    Therefore, I applaud the committee in the fact that they are moving in this particular direction. While Mr. Lee has maybe said that if it ain't broke, don't fix it, I have to assure you that around the world there are some parliaments that are broken and do need fixing. Perhaps we can shed some light on the way ahead by the exercise we are going through here. So I compliment the committee on taking that initiative.

    If we are to perform our jobs in any particular role, not just for parliamentarians, one needs to be held accountable in order to achieve honesty, integrity, and so on. I've always defined accountability as forces beyond one's control that cause you to think and act in a certain way. In order for parliamentarians to be motivated to be honest and act with integrity at all times, there should be accountability--in essence, a force beyond their control that will cause them to be pulled up short if they go afoul of the rules.

    So, first of all, you have to have the rules. Two, you have to have the means by which they're pulled up and held accountable for their actions if they abuse the trust that's been placed in them by their constituents who elected them at election time.

    Openness and transparency are fundamental in any democratic institution, and we are the democratic institution of the land. I'm glad you've recognized there is an obligation to be open and transparent, but at the same time an obligation to respect the privacy of the member of Parliament. I echo everything Mr. Lee says, and I emphasize that I'm glad to see that you're proceeding as far as possible by way of Standing Orders rather than by legislation. Again, we should be governing ourselves, as the paramount institution of the land, rather than giving more and more authority to the courts to interfere in what we do.

    I have a number of technical observations, Mr. Chair. The first has to deal with the concept of the commissioner having the right to investigate.

  (1230)  

    The Chair: Do you have a section?

    Mr. John Williams: Well, I'm looking under the original code at page 2 and I see “an independent Ethics”--

    The Chair: Page 2 of the English?

    Mr. John Williams: Page 2 of the English, the long preamble here. It says--

    The Chair: That's section 4, the need for code, right?

    Mr. John Williams: No. There's also section 5, bullet number 4....

    The Chair: By the way, John, if you could, because of the difference in page numbers, it's simpler if you refer to the paragraphs.

    Mr. John Williams: On paragraph 5, bullet number 4, it states, “An independent Ethics Commissioner to serve as an advisor to Members and to investigate allegations that the rules have been violated.” Later on, Mr. Chairman, it actually recommends that the commissioner have the authority to recommend sanction. Not only do we have the commissioner being the judge, jury, and executioner, we also have him being the confidential adviser too. Now, we are talking about codes of conduct and conflicts of interest, and if that is not one blatant and incredible conflict of interest, Mr. Chairman, I don't know what is.

    It cannot be that the ethics commissioner should have the power to investigate, because there are a number of places where he is required to give confidential advice and opinions. He can't investigate these. Therefore--and I recognize the problems with a committee--I would ask this committee to look at the concept of a supernumerary federal judge being asked to conduct investigations. Maybe it's the commissioner who's going to be found wanting, and therefore that has to be resolved. In order to maintain the confidentiality and the professionalism and the highest integrity and to ensure that the commissioner is not involved, I would recommend that a supernumerary judge be looking at the issue.

    There are a couple of points to emphasize that. If we look at the code in English on page 10, it says, in subsection 27(1) that “the Ethics Commissioner may provide the member with a written opinion”. Further down the page, in 27(3), “an opinion given by the Ethics Commissioner to a Member is binding on the Ethics Commissioner”. Then you're going to ask him to conduct an investigation on the member after having given, in essence, legal opinions. That cannot be. I rest my case on that point, Mr. Chair.

    Moving on again, under the original code, item number 7 on page 3, you talk about “to include the spouses, common-law partners,” etc., but I think you should also include trusts. I'm not talking about the blind trust that cabinet would have to create, but there are situations where people do have trusts for whatever reason they have under the Income Tax Act or whatever, so you should perhaps think about including trusts as being assets to be declared.

    I move now to section 36 under “Recommendations Regarding the Draft Bill”. You're talking about the length of term of the ethics commissioner and you're proposing a five-year, non-renewable term. I believe it should be longer or with renewable terms, such as two times five years, or a ten-year term. A five-year, non-renewable term isn't long enough. By the time he learns his job, finds his way around the Hill, he's starting to think that it's time to leave. Five years definitely is not long enough for a non-renewable situation.

    I'm now moving on to the conflict of interest code itself, Mr. Chair.

  (1235)  

    The Chair: This is appendix 1 and the numbers are now Roman numerals.

    Mr. John Williams: I am looking at paragraph 2(e) under “Interpretation”, and this is about furthering private interests, where a member should not be participating in furthering the interest of individual people, including “the person becoming a director or officer in a corporation, association or trade union”. Of course, down below, under “Application”--

    The Chair: Just one minute, John. We don't have the right place here. Could you describe it a little bit? It's under “Principles”, is it?

    Mr. John Williams: It's under “Interpretation”.

    The Chair: Thank you.

    Under “Interpretation”, which is Roman numeral ii for us, colleagues.

    Go ahead.

    Mr. John Williams: I'm now at page Roman numeral iii.

    The Chair: So it's on page Roman numeral ii. It begins item 2 there, under “Furthering private interests”, and it is item (e) under that category. Okay, thank you.

    Mr. John Williams: A “person becoming a director or officer in a corporation”, I believe, conflicts later on with number 4 under “Application”, where it says “This Code applies to all Members”. I think you haven't addressed the issue of order in council appointments where cabinet will make definite appointments to boards and so on. Therefore, you have to recognize that this is part of their job and make some provision for it. I'm not recommending how you do it, but you have to recognize that it is there.

    Moving on, under “Application”, subsection 5(1), where you're talking about the Prime Minister--

    The Chair: Just go down the page, colleagues, under “Application”, and it's subsection 5(1): “Any principles, rules or obligations”--

    Mr. John Williams: --“established by the Prime Minister for Members who are also ministers of the Crown or parliamentary secretaries prevail over any rules, principles or obligations of this Code”.

    I take exception to that, Mr. Chairman. The Prime Minister may, in my opinion, make rules that further restrict or enhance the guidelines, make them more definitive, and make them set a higher standard for members of Parliament, but he shouldn't be making rules that conflict with this basic rule for all members of Parliament.

    Therefore, if the Prime Minister is to make rules, which he will do for the cabinet, then they should be in addition to but not override this code of conduct. That, I think, is quite important, Mr. Chair, because these rules are to be debated by the House and adopted by the entire House. The Prime Minister is one person who may make rules of his own volition. That is not a democratic process; it cannot be used to make rules that actually set these ones aside, so any rules by the Prime Minister cannot conflict. If they do conflict with these, then his are to be struck aside rather than this code. Okay?

    I move on to “Rules of Conduct”, and I'm now on page v, subsection 14(1). First of all, you're talking about section 13, which has been in the Standing Orders since 1867. I think that could stay, and therefore section 14 should be stated as “in addition” to section 13. However, you can deal with that yourselves.

    However, it goes on to say that:

A Member who has reasonable grounds to believe that he or she or a member of his or her family has a private interest that might be affected by a matter that is before the House or a committee of which the Member is a member shall, if present during consideration of the matter, disclose the general nature of the private interest at the first opportunity.

    I ask, how? Shall he make a public declaration to the committee? If it's a committee that's meeting in private or in camera, how does he go on the record as having stated his conflict?

    I move further down, Mr. Chair, to subsection 15(1), for the prohibition of gifts and personal benefits, and would ask that you consider an editorial amendment here that would read “Neither a member” and add the following words “by virtue of their position as a member of Parliament or any other member shall accept gifts”, and so on and so forth. Family gifts in families that have lots of money may very well contravene this rule. When we talk about gifts a person receives in the course of their duties....

  (1240)  

    The Chair: Colleagues, I do notice that at the end of that sentence it says “that is related to the Member's position”. We've noted what you say, but I just draw that to your attention.

    Mr. John Williams: Yes, I think it was the compensation part, so you may be correct there, Mr. Chair.

    Moving further down to 15(3), under “Statement: gift or personal benefit”, on the first line, the three words, “that may be” should be deleted. It should read: “If gifts or personal benefits are accepted”. You cannot say “may be accepted”. You can't make illegal something that may be accepted. If you accept, it's illegal, and if you refuse, it's not illegal, so you have a grammatical correction to make there.

    Moving further on to page vi, section 17, regarding “Government contracts”, I may be kind of picky here, Mr. Chair, but I'm thinking, for example, under the Elections Act and so on we're entitled to various compensations by the Government of Canada. The clause now reads “A Member shall not knowingly be a party to a contract with the Government of Canada under which the Member receives a benefit.” I would add the following words “except as authorized by law that's related to a Member's position”, because we do get reimbursement for election expenses and so on; therefore, you have to cover that off.

    I move on to page vii, under “Trust”, subsection 20(2). The law clerk is here. I don't expect him to give the answer right now, but I question whether a partnership can be placed in a trust. I'm not worried that it can be, but I'm not the lawyer, so I would ask you to get a legal opinion on that because I don't think a partnership can go into a trust.

    I move on to page viii, under “Confidentiality”, paragraph 22(1)(d). You're talking about private corporations, and I wonder whether or not with a private corporation all the shareholders should be identified, Mr. Chair. That's something for the committee to deliberate on.

    I move on now to page xi, under “Complaints”, subsection 29(4): “When the Ethics Commissioner believes that it would be in the public interest to do so”, which is an initiative of an investigation. I can't imagine what kind of public interest would require an ethics commissioner to conduct an investigation. I think he would have to use his own, or if we had a supernumerary Federal Court judge appointed, he would use his own knowledge as to whether or not an investigation were warranted, but I don't think that one would have to rely on the public interest. We know, for example, in many other countries around the world it's never in the public interest to investigate members of the government--or so they seem to think.

    An hon. member: Is he proposing a motion?

    Some hon. members: Oh, oh!

    Mr. John Williams: No, I just said, delete “public interest”.

    We now move to the ethics commissioner and his role on page xii, subsection 30(2), under “Non-meritorious complaints”:

If the Ethics Commissioner is of the opinion that a request for an inquiry is frivolous or vexatious or was not made in good faith, or that there are no or insufficient grounds to warrant an inquiry or the continuation of an inquiry, the Ethics Commissioner shall so state in dismissing the complaint....

    I ask the question, to whom? If it is vexatious and he feels it is unwarranted and without grounds, I don't think it should be a public statement. I don't think he should be tabling a report in the House saying, I received a complaint against Member X, Y, or Z and I dismissed it, unless he's prepared to say who made the complaint so we can find out who's making all these vexatious complaints.

  (1245)  

    Mr. Geoff Regan (Halifax West, Lib.): Can he respond to the complainant?

    Mr. John Williams: Well, he has to respond to who? Again, I don't have all the answers; I'm just raising some questions for the committee to consider.

    Moving on to page xiii, under “Sanctions”, subsection 31(5) finishes by saying “the Ethics Commissioner shall so state in the report and may recommend appropriate sanctions”. I agree with Mr. Lee that it is not for the commissioner to recommend sanctions; it's for him to table his investigation and the report thereof. Surely it is the House that would decide sanctions, not a commissioner or a supernumerary judge in lieu of the commissioner.

    Moving further down to the suspension of the inquiry, since you have covered off--

    The Chair: This is section 32, colleagues.

    Mr. John Williams: It's subsection 32(1).

    Since you have covered off actual breaking of the law, other acts of this nation, if a person resigns as a member of Parliament, that would be sufficient grounds to cease the inquiry, I would expect--unless he has broken some other laws, in which case the RCMP or anybody else could lay their charges, if they so desired. But if a person resigns as a member of Parliament, I would expect that the commissioner, or whoever is conducting the investigation, would no longer have jurisdiction in the matter.

    Now we're moving to “Rules”, under “Miscellaneous”, subsection 33(2), on page xiv.

    I was quite upset about this.

    The Chair: That's subsection 33(2).

  (1250)  

    Mr. John Williams: In subsection 33(2):

Any proposed rules shall be tabled in the House and come into effect, unless there is a negative resolution of the House, 10 sitting days after the day on which they are tabled.

    We are dealing with a serious issue here. We're dealing with an issue that has an impact on all members of Parliament. To just assume that a report tabled in the House automatically becomes part of the Standing Orders and imposed upon us from a negative point of view I don't think can be tolerated.

    It would have to be, presumably, a report by a committee that receives the consent of the House. There's nothing wrong with that. We do that for everything else. This notion that by omission things come into effect cannot be the way we conduct business, especially how we rule ourselves. So that has to be changed.

    That comes to the end of my technical report, but I do want to emphasize also that I agree with Mr. Lee, apart from his point that he'd rather not have the code of conduct. I believe we should have it, and we should be managing ourselves. We cannot be above reproach. We must ensure that we enjoy the confidence of our citizens. Therefore, I believe this is a step forward in achieving that. So I commend you for it.

    The Chair: John, we thank you for that. We also thank you for giving us 16, as I counted them, substantial comments. We'll certainly take them all into account.

    I wonder if you could go back to the one that dealt with paragraph 3(2)(e), your point about conflict of interest and order in council appointments.

    It's paragraph 3(2)(e), colleagues, but on page iii, under “Interpretation”. It was the section dealing with becoming a director of a corporation. John made the point about order in council appointments.

    Could you just explain again the exact point you were making?

[Translation]

    Mr. Jacques Saada: Mr. Chairman, what are you talking about, exactly? I don't have the coordinates. What specific paragraph is this?

[English]

    The Chair: It's under appendix 1, subsection 3(2), under “Interpretation”, and we're dealing with paragraph 3(2)(e).

    John, I apologize for this, because we are working with two sets of page numbers here.

    Do you have that, colleagues?

    Mr. John Williams: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

    The whole of subsection 3(2), and specifically paragraph 3(2)(e), deals with feathering the interests of yourself, your family, or someone else. It specifically makes mention of, under paragraph 3(2)(e), “the person becoming a director or officer in a corporation, association or trade union”.

    That puts you in direct conflict. If you're a cabinet minister recommending or approving order in council appointments for boards of directors of crown corporations, it puts you in direct conflict with section 4, later on the page, which says:

This Code applies to all Members of the House of Commons, including Members who are ministers of the Crown or parliamentary secretaries.

    We do know ministers of the Crown appoint people to boards of directors. That's part of the job. Yet that would also conflict, because you are feathering their private interests.

    The Chair: I would argue that it's part of the job, therefore it's in. Your point is that we should explicitly mention this particular function of their job.

    Mr. John Williams: That's correct.

    Therefore, what you have to do there, Mr. Speaker--I mean Mr. Chairman--

    The Chair: Mr. Speaker is fine.

    Mr. John Williams: Okay, Mr. Speaker. Maybe in the next Parliament.

    Some hon. members: Oh, oh!

    Mr. John Williams: You may want to bring in a rule, which we in the Alliance Party have promoted for a long time, that competence be part of the reason for appointing people to a board of directors. There's nothing wrong with saying this person is appointed to the board of directors of a crown corporation because his experience suggests he would be a good member. If you put that in the rules for order in council appointments to boards and so on, you have largely dealt with the issue of ensuring that members appointed to these boards have the credentials that justify that particular appointment.

    The Chair: Thank you. That's very clear.

    Colleagues, are there any questions or comments for John?

    Benoît Sauvageau.

[Translation]

    Mr. Benoît Sauvageau: I have a question for you, Mr. Williams. In 24(2), on page ix, it says...

[English]

    Mr. John Williams: Page ix, subsection 24(2).

    The Chair: Once again it's appendix 1, page xi.

[Translation]

    Mr. Benoît Sauvageau: It says “Each summary is to be placed on file at the Office of the Ethics Commissioner and made available for public inspection during normal business hours.” I know your expertise and I know that when you read a document, you read it from beginning to end. When you read this report on the conflict of interest code, did you shutter when you saw that the summary of your disclosure would be made available to the public when we know there are interest groups that specialize in “inspecting” the personal files of some members? A summary of your disclosure could be used unconscionably. When you read the report, did you have any questions at all about that aspect?

  (1255)  

[English]

    Mr. John Williams: I thought about it, Mr. Sauvageau. I thought it would be a one-day wonder. The first time we table these reports, if all 301 become available on one day, the media will be overloaded. They'll pick out a few, maybe having to do with people who own shipping lines or whatever, and they'll report on those. After that it becomes a non-issue. It's not going to be a newsworthy event. Once we get through that paper wall--my goodness, I don't want the whole world to know what I have or don't have--we'll find that it's not likely to be a newsworthy event. So I have no problem with that section whatsoever.

[Translation]

    Mr. Benoît Sauvageau: Let's say you have the following situation. You have a lot of assets, Air Canada shares and shares in other corporations, for example, and we're in the middle of an election campaign.

[English]

    An hon. member: If you have Air Canada shares, you don't have a lot of assets.

    Some hon. members: Oh, oh!

[Translation]

    Mr. Benoît Sauvageau: Or, you have debts and you're in the middle of an election campaign. As the summary is available for public consultation during normal business hours, your Conservative or Liberal adversary could use elements from that summary during the election campaign to throw a bit of mud at you.

[English]

    Mr. John Williams: I don't think so. I am prepared to accept that potential problem because I don't see it as a problem. I've fought three elections, and I've found that people are concerned about what you and your party policy are going to do for them. Do they like you and your party policy?

    If you have received no criticism from the ethics commissioner on how you've managed your financial affairs--I use the term “no criticism” because he doesn't have the right to endorse what you have done--then there is no news there. Remember that no dollar amounts will be attached to what is made public. If you have a long list of shares, one may assume that you have a reasonable amount of assets. You wouldn't have two shares of Air Canada, two shares of something else, and two shares of something else. But you can't get a story out of it because you don't know how much it's worth. If you've been honest and open and said, I own Air Canada shares, CP shares, and shares of these companies and I've declared them, so I'm not in a conflict of interest, I don't even think it's a story.

    For the candidates who are opposing you, you can say to them, remember that if you win, your assets will also be made public. Be prepared. You criticize me, I criticize you. Therefore, if you make personal issues an election issue, it backfires. We know that.

    The Chair: I'm going to go to Yvon Godin, but I would like to wrap this up, because Diane Ablonczy is waiting and we also have to hear Benoît's presentation.

    Yvon Godin.

[Translation]

    Mr. Yvon Godin (Acadie—Bathurst, NDP): Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have a brief question about the appointment of the commissioner.

    I wasn't here for the beginning of your presentation and I don't know if this has been addressed. How will we choose our commissioner? Will we do it in Parliament, with 75% of the vote, to avoid anyone being accused of having a particular interest in taking on the job? If the appointment is approved by a 75% parliamentary vote, as I'm suggesting, all parties will be involved in the process.

    So I'd like to have your thoughts on the appointment of the commissioner.

[English]

    Mr. John Williams: I think the appointment should be a formal process by the House, and it should not be 75%. It should have the concurrence of all formal parties in the House of Commons, so that the person enjoys the respect of this society. This is the important thing, that they enjoy the respect and have integrity, and therefore have the concurrence of all parties. Then it can be done. I'm not in favour of 75% for this issue, 50% for that issue, or two-thirds for something else. A majority is a majority; if Parliament approves, Parliament has approved.

[Translation]

    Mr. Yvon Godin: That's one of the reasons I'm still hesitating. Normally, the government has the majority. We know how things work. The Prime Minister will tell whoever is to be the commissioner that he must vote his own way otherwise it is exit stage left. The idea of the 75% majority is to prevent the government from appointing its own choice in order that the commissioner may have the respect of the whole House. That's why I was talking about the percentage.

·  (1300)  

[English]

    Mr. John Williams: I did refer to all-party support.

    Mr. Yvon Godin: Yes, I noticed that.

    Mr. John Williams: This prevents any particular party from dominating the decision—even if they dominate the House.

    The Chair: Again, I want to thank you very much for your presentation. It's very useful to us, and we'll take everything you said into consideration. Thank you.

    Oui, Benoît.

[Translation]

    Mr. Benoît Sauvageau: Before hearing Ms. Ablonczy, could I have a question on the timeframe? Yes? Thank you.

    For all kinds of different reasons, I'd like to know if the deadline of  April 3rd next can be changed. If there's a clearly expressed will to have another information meeting... First of all, is the committee open to that? Second, will it be possible to continue tabling recommendations after next Wednesday or Friday?

[English]

    The Chair: I'm in the hands of the committee. The scenario I described at the beginning was that we would be winding up by the end of the week, so we could then meet again. Everyone essentially agreed to this at our steering committee meeting.

    With reason, I'm sure we have no plan yet to hold the next meeting on this topic; we have a series of other things to do. In terms of getting written input, I would look around and perhaps we could decide this before we start the other business tomorrow morning. I'd be glad to extend it for a short time, but my understanding from the committee is that we want to finish it so that we can move on to the Canada Elections Act legislation we will be dealing with. Is this okay?

    A voice: Yes.

    The Chair: Thank you.

    Diane Ablonczy, we appreciate your patience. We're in your hands.

    Mrs. Diane Ablonczy (Calgary—Nose Hill, Canadian Alliance): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

    I made some notes, but unfortunately I just ripped them out of my printer a few minutes ago, so I have not had the opportunity to get them translated. However, I've provided copies to the researcher and to the chair.

    The Chair: I have a copy. We will translate them.

    Mrs. Diane Ablonczy: Although I am a lawyer, I am not going to, as my colleague just did, take you through chapter and verse of the proposed code. But I would like to just step back a little and give you my perspective as an ordinary member of Parliament.

    I do support a code in principle simply because in these times of questioning trust in public officials, having some guidelines can be very helpful for the public. I'd also like you to know that I have no significant personal holdings; I own no shipping lines, no media empires, or anything even close to it. So I'm not trying to defend any personal position or economic advantage in making these remarks.

    I also approve of and commend you on the open process you are conducting. It's not often members of Parliament get to bore a committee with their own thoughts, and I hope you will find it helpful to hear at least from some members of Parliament.

    Also, just by way of introduction, I would point out to you that I think you might want to consider in your report a statement you make on page 2, paragraph 4, which sets out the need for a code. This essentially contains a disclaimer to the effect that there isn't any real problem and this proposed code is simply a preventative measure.

    I think we all know, Mr. Chair, without being unkind to anybody, that there are problems and have been problems with scandals and ethical lapses over the last months and years. Again, I won't go into particulars because I don't need to, but I would say this. That kind of disclaimer in your report will actually serve to lower the respect for the report because it's really a patent stretch to say this. If members of the public are looking at our efforts and see this kind of rhetoric, they will say, is this really an attempt to honestly address a clear issue, or is this a kind of smoke and mirrors political exercise? I would really urge that there be some rewording of that section.

    I think it might be helpful--and I know you've all done this to some degree--just to set out some of the fundamental principles that as a member of Parliament and an ordinary Canadian I would want to guide this kind of effort.

    First of all, there's the value of fairness and respect for democratic traditions. As you know, democracy means rule by the people. We forget that, I think, very often, Mr. Chairman. It also involves self-governance, where through elected representatives the people of the country manage their own affairs. That means there has to be a real and substantial link, and that means real and substantial accountability between the people, who are supposed to be governing, and their representatives, who actually do the work in our Parliament. I think any code, any effort of this nature, must be founded upon that clear principle.

    Second, there's the principle of the citizens' right to honesty, openness, and accountability from those they entrust with their affairs. As governments become mature--and this is not a criticism of the present government, it's a general observation and is borne out in other countries and in provinces--there tends to be a little bit of circling the wagons and a little bit of disdain about having to explain to the great unwashed some of the finer points of government decisions.

    We need to remember that the principle of this openness and accountability is very, very important if we're going to have a viable democracy, so people aren't going to say, forget those guys; no matter what we say, think, or do, there's nothing we can do to affect them because they're not listening; they don't really want to be open with us. It's very important for members of Parliament that we keep that principle very much viable in everything we do.

·  (1305)  

    The last fundamental principle is equality before the law. That is such a basic tenet of our common law, of our democratic tradition, that sometimes we take it for granted and don't realize that those principles have to be renewed and refreshed in everything we do. I'll come back to that point because it really will be applied to some of the issues I'm going to raise.

    I'm just going to raise four issues of concern with you. There's much I agree with in the observations you've made. I'm not going to bother to tell you I like what you've said because you obviously already like it and I don't need to belabour those points.

    The first real concern I have is that the proposed code is stricter for private MPs than for ministers and parliamentary secretaries. This simply cannot be. If anything, the standard must be the other way around because minsters and parliamentary secretaries have much more power, much more influence, and much more decision-making authority in the way government funds are administered, the way appointments are made, and the way government does business.

    For us to in any way enter into a process whereby the code governing ministers and parliamentary secretaries and people in those positions of authority is less stringent, less open, and less accountable simply turns the world on its head and violates very, very important equality principles. Not only should all members be equally accountable under an equal process, but if anything, there should be a higher onus on those with higher responsibilities.

    As I read this code, it is more stringent for regular members of Parliament than it is for ministers simply because of the way those duties are laid out, because one is more public than another. If the code of responsibilities under which you are operating is not even open to the public but the code for regular members of Parliament is open to the public, how can that be? How can that be called a higher standard? It can't. It can't because you're sheltered from the public knowing what ministers have to adhere to.

    You're also sheltered because although there's a process for a review and to cause an inquiry to be made with private members of Parliament, with ministers and parliamentary secretaries under this regime all that would be sheltered under the skirts of the Prime Minister. That cannot be. That is not a higher standard, it's a lower standard, and I would urge this committee, for the sake of the principle of equality and the other principles I've enunciated, to be very strong about striking down that dichotomy in responsibility and the process by which that responsibility is enforced.

    The second issue I'd like to raise is whether there's sufficiency in this code to really deal with the issues that have been brought up over and over. We can disagree on whether there was validity to the issues that were brought up in public works and in human resources. I don't want to go down a list, but you know what I'm talking about. You can disagree whether there was validity to those issues, but you cannot disagree that there were allegations of cronyism, grants for political support, untendered contracts to supporters, and the list goes on.

    So I ask you, does this code actually deal with these to any degree of sufficiency? If it doesn't, I would suggest that you've wasted a lot of time, because those are the real issues before the public and to some degree real issues for members of Parliament. I've never had an issue with a regular member of Parliament as to how they handle possible conflicts of interest, but I have, as you well know, and I hope fairly and reasonably, had issues with the way ministers handle these issues.

·  (1310)  

    So if the code again doesn't deal with those clear issues that have kept on rising, then it really doesn't do a whole lot of good.

    The other thing, of course, is that I would have a concern that if you have this really stringent code for members, and this very transparent, very solid process for dealing with members' conflicts, then somehow government can point to the fact that there's this code for members, and it will get lost in the communications shuffle that it is not the same code or the same process that actually applies to the people who have been accused of cronyism and conflicts and improper granting of contracts.

    That will simply cause this enormous disconnect in the public mind between, well, if there's this code, how come this stuff keeps happening?It will take a Philadelphia lawyer to explain to the public, well, actually this code doesn't really apply to ministers, only to regular members, and the ministers have something different and you're not really allowed to see how that's dealt with.

    So I'd just say there's going to be a huge problem if we deal with it that way.

    The third issue is, who chooses the ethics commissioner? I know a lot has been said about this. I'll just add something that may be a new light on this.

    Although I don't have substantial holdings--I regret to say--what I do have, and my husband has, I'm going to have to give to some stranger. I don't know this person. He's not my buddy. He's not somebody I propose trust in or have built up a trust relationship with, but I have to trust that person with the details of my personal life and holdings, which, quite frankly, could be used by political opponents or in other ways to raise questions about...I don't know. All of us know how things can be distorted in political life. So I have to trust this person.

    Yet here is this person foisted upon me really by the Prime Minister, and a Prime Minister saying to me, you have to tell this guy everything about your personal dealings. But if I'm going to trust that person, that person must have, I would argue, a fiduciary duty to me, and the only way he can have a fiduciary duty to me is if somehow I have empowered him, have given him leave to act on my behalf. Therefore, I must have a voice in his choice. It's as simple as that.

    If I don't have a voice in his choice by some reasonable democratic measure, I'm not going to trust that person. If that person is not my delegate, if he's not an officer of the House but really basically a member of the Prime Minister's staff whose primary duty is to act on behalf of the Prime Minister, sorry, guys, he does not speak for me. He is not going to get the kind of cooperation that I think we're going to need to make this regime work.

    Yes, a member may kind of adhere to the letter of the law, but you know there are a lot of loopholes in here, like making best efforts to make sure other family members provide information.

    That requires trust. You can never legalize a process to the point where it can override the will and the hearts and the belief and the trust of the people it governs. You can never do that, and so you must build a trust element into the choosing of this individual.

    If I think this individual is impartial, is not playing another political game, is not beholden to other interests, then I'll be quite happy to be very honest and open. But if that is not the case, and I'm not assured that's the case, then you're going to have real problems with people hiding the exact information that this code is designed to make transparent, and I would urge that not happen.

    The last thing, and I don't know if anyone else has raised this, but as a Canadian, I would really urge you to test this whole process and this whole code for public approval.

    As a lawyer, I am a member of the law society, and some of you are members of law societies too. You know very well how the law society is seen by many members of the public. Rightly or wrongly--and as a lawyer, I would say wrongly--they're often seen as a body that protects its members, that whitewashes complaints against its members, that is designed, really, to shield members from the results of their own malfeasance.

·  (1315)  

    If this process is seen by the public as simply all of us getting together in a cosy group and making an arrangement that looks good politically but really shelters us, again we've wasted our time.

    I would suggest that this regime, once you're satisfied with it, be taken to rational, reasonable, thoughtful members of the public, maybe focus groups, and just say, read this; would this make you have more trust and feel better about the fairness, openness, and honesty that is going to be demanded of your members of Parliament? See what they say, because, again, we're not doing this for us, hopefully; we're doing it for the people we serve, for the people of this country, and unless we're prepared to take this to them and see whether it really translates from our exalted level to where the rubber meets the road, the Main Street level, what's the point?

    So I hope those thoughts will be helpful to you, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee. I really do appreciate the opportunity to have put them to you.

    The Chair: Okay, colleagues, I have Yvon Godin, John Williams, and then Benoit Sauvageau, unless....

    Sorry, John.

    Mr. John Williams: There is one item that I omitted to advise the committee about. I don't have any comments on what Ms. Ablonczy has stated, but I'd just like to put one other issue on the table, if I may.

    The Chair: Is it very, very short?

    Mr. John Williams: It's very, very short. It's on page xii, on the publication of a--

    The Chair: This is in appendix 1?

    Mr. John Williams: Yes, it's appendix 1, page xii, under “Cooperation”, subsection 31(2). It says:

The report of the Ethics Commissioner shall be made available to the public upon tabling in the House, or, if the House is not sitting, upon its receipt by the Speaker.

    Then, later on, the members shall have 20 minutes to speak in the House. There could be a long, long time between it being made public and his right to speak. It cannot be made public if the House is not sitting.

    The Chair: Thanks, John. We noted that. And thank you again for your thoughtful presentation.

    Before I go to Yvon and then Benoit, on your first part about discretion, of the need for the code, and so on, you realize that this committee has deliberately released a draft report with commentary in it so that members can get up to speed fairly quickly on things that we have thought about.

    You should know that I think every witness we received was dispassionate--commissioners from the provinces, people, academics commenting on other jurisdictions, and so on. They said there was nothing wrong, but it was important that we fix what is wrong. So there is an appearance.

    They went to great lengths to say to us that in terms of the members, which is what is mentioned here, there is no great scandal out there and that they had not found them. But they went on to say, in the jurisdictions that already have commissioners, things had got even better.

    That's not a whitewash. You did think aloud about the law society, and your personal views of it and the public views of it. I think there is, by the way, a perception out there that there's something very corrupt about where we work, and these people told us that was not the case.

    But we noted your point about ministers. With respect to ministers and parliamentary secretaries, I'd have to say to you that my understanding of this, as it stands now--and again we're going to bear in mind what you said--is that this code does apply to ministers and to parliamentary secretaries. So they are subject to it. The ethics commissioner could take a complaint.

    Let's say you had some concern that a parliamentary secretary was in conflict, the same as if you thought I was in conflict, you could go to the commissioner and deal with it in that way.

    The other point is that the Prime Minister's code is public. I think you sort of implied that it wasn't public.

    We appreciated your comments on who chooses the ethics commissioner, because we have deliberately, in this stage of the report, left it that the House of Commons should be heavily involved.

    I think you heard an exchange between Yvon--was it you?--and John, talking about the 75% vote and things of that type. That's something we seriously have to come back to.

    Yvon Godin, and then Benoît Sauvageau.

·  (1320)  

    Mrs. Diane Ablonczy: If I could, I'd like to just add to that.

    I don't know what the witnesses have told you. I would just say, if there's language in the report that purports to deny the concerns, then there's a problem because you've recognized there are concerns.

    Second, ministers are subject to this code. However, if there is a contradiction between this code and the other one, then there's a difference, so that again is not equality. As I understand the report...go ahead, Margy. Am I wrong in that?

    Ms. Margaret Young (Committee Researcher): No, you're correct in thinking that the Prime Minister's rules, code, and obligations would, in the event of a clear inconsistency, take precedence, but I think what the chair was pointing out was that the ethics commissioner will have jurisdiction over those. Those are public, and any member of Parliament can make a request for an inquiry to the ethics commissioner vis-à-vis compliance with the Prime Minister's rules.

    So in your examples, which all involved ministerial actions, in theory a member could go to the ethics commissioner--and this is under the draft bill, not the code--and ask for an investigation as to compliance with the Prime Minister's rules and obligations. Any report the ethics commissioner made in response to that would have to be made public.

    The Chair: I'll turn it over now to Yvon.

[Translation]

    Mr. Yvon Godin: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

    I'll speak as a simple Canadian.

·  (1325)  

[English]

I'm speaking as an ordinary Canadian.

[Translation]

    In Canada, there are codes of ethics in all provinces for provincial members. You pointed out that the problem isn't with the ordinary members but with the ministers or parliamentary secretaries, and that should be the basis for our action. All across the country, it has been recognized that there should be codes of ethics for all politicians of all legislatures.

    Why would the provinces accept that while we, at the federal level, say that this isn't for us, the ordinary members, but for ministers only? The fact remains that in all provinces there are codes of ethics for members and the government.

    I have a second question I'd like to get your opinion on. You said a lot about the trust that Canadians should show you. Should Canadians make their complaints themselves rather than going through their members? There are arguments in favour of complaints being made only by the members.

[English]

    The argument is that it should be a member of Parliament who's the only person who can launch a complaint. Now what I'd like to know your opinion on is, could an ordinary Canadian launch a complaint, trusting in this code of conduct?

    Mrs. Diane Ablonczy: To answer your first question, the first remark I made was that I do support the code in principle. Of course, this code is for ordinary members, so I'm not suggesting that there should just be a code for some members and not others.

    To answer your second question, if you go back to the fundamental principles I enunciated, one of which was our democratic tradition of rule by the people and self-governance, to be consistent I would have to say that regular citizens should be able to bring forward concerns, because it is ruled by the people. Although they have chosen their representatives, they may be able to bring it forward to a representative or they may feel unable to do that.

    The concern would be as to whether that would be abused, whether you would have people making frivolous accusations because they just don't like something a member of Parliament has said or done. However, I would suggest that as with the courts, the ethics commissioner should have the experience and the gravitas to be able to weed those out and to dismiss them summarily without having a public to-do about it.

    But I think it would be one way where citizens could feel connected again to their government because they would have direct access to the accountability mechanism.

    The Chair: I feel obliged to comment--because again, you realize we've spent a long time on this--that the ethics commissioner can initiate an inquiry, and one of the ways they might decide to do that would be from public input. That's just so you know.

    Benoît Sauvageau.

[Translation]

    Mr. Benoît Sauvageau: If I've understood correctly, I've seen that there's at least one small difference between Mr. Williams' testimony and his appreciation of the code of ethics, and your appreciation.

    You seem to think, just as I do, and you'll correct me if I'm wrong, that in the context of an election campaign we would have to be very careful in order that an adversary might not use the code of ethics to make false representations and accuse us, as members of Parliament, of having contravened this code of ethics. Have I understood correctly that you support the principle and you think there should be a code of ethics but that it should not give rise to vexatious attacks or attacks that could be made out of context and prejudice the electoral process?

    In the principles, in paragraph 2(c), it says that the members:

perform their official duties and functions and arrange their private affairs in a manner that bears the closest public scrutiny, an obligation that may not be fully discharged by simply acting within the law;

    Don't you find that's going a bit far? To use a good old Quebec expression, that means you'll have to be more Catholic than the Pope. When you ask members to uphold a code of ethics, that's one thing, but when you ask them to go beyond the interpretation of the code of ethics and you have a process that allows an accusation or a complaint to be brought before the Ethics Commissioner, don't you think that we're opening ourselves to all kinds of attacks by trying to correct a minor perception?

·  (1330)  

[English]

    Mrs. Diane Ablonczy: Once you have a process, you're going to have people coming to use it. It's the old “if you build it, they will come” truism. So yes, a code like this and a process that is put into place will definitely draw people who will wish to use it for political and possibly not particularly benevolent ends. There's no doubt about that.

    You have to ask yourself, which is the greater harm? Is the greater harm in having a process people can access in a malicious or politically motivated way, or is it in not having a process and continuing to let the concerns about the probity and honesty of members of Parliament grow in the minds of the public?

    Now, I assume there was some evil that was meant to be cured by this whole thing; otherwise, we're wasting our time again. But if there is in fact some evil, some concern, some need that is being dealt with or served by this code, then I would say to you that you have to weigh which the greater need is.

    I think reasonable people could disagree about that. I personally am not going to conduct myself one bit differently because the code is in place than I have done for the last nine years. I believe my personal integrity demands of me to act in a way that will not raise a conflict of interest, and rules and regulations aren't going to change that.

    I assume--I haven't been privy to discussions--that you all must think there will be some benefit, some added incentive, because of this whole process or that you believe it's necessary for public trust in our institution, one or the other. Whatever purpose is supposed to be served by this, then you have to judge whether it's large enough to justify the downside, which you have correctly pointed out. I don't deny that, and I'm sure no one would.

[Translation]

    Mr. Benoît Sauvageau: I think you've put the finger on the most important aspect. You have a code of ethics not to settle a problem but to correct a perception. The various provincial legislatures have their own codes of ethics.

    We've asked the committee—I haven't seen any results so far—if that objective had been attained after the implementation of a code by those several legislatures. After codes of ethics were implemented in Quebec, Alberta, Ontario or elsewhere, was the problem they wanted to correct, namely the perception of dishonesty in the ranks of members, actually corrected?

    I for one believe it was not although I stand to be corrected. We're still using the same medicine to treat the same disease knowing full well that the experiments on other guinea pigs were not positive. So if the main objective of the code of ethics is to correct the perception and if previous experiments have shown that a code of ethics does not correct that perception, do you think we're justified in trying to continue to use the same remedy for the same disease simply to probably arrive at the same result?

[English]

    Mrs. Diane Ablonczy: I would point you to the last issue I raised, which was the need to test this for public approval. I cannot answer your question because I do not know how the public would view this code of conduct that's being proposed, but I strongly advise the committee to get some reasonable idea of that for precisely the reasons you mentioned.

    There's no point, and I said this in my remarks, in going through this exercise if it isn't actually going to connect with the public's need for, or the public's belief that we need, more accountability.

    I would point out, however, that with respect to the accountability of public institutions, to large corporations in the Enron situation, and even to some of the rhetoric that has surrounded the issues of the Iraq war, there are questions as to who's telling the truth and whose versions of the intelligence briefings are correct, etc. These questions have certainly exacerbated a concern in the minds of the public that the people in whom they must repose a great deal of trust and responsibility may need more parameters in which to operate in order to maintain public confidence.

    I think the issue is there. We can't deny that it's there; we can't say that the public is happy and trusts politicians. We know that's problematical. I grieve to say it since we're all politicians, but the real issue is, does this initiative address that real issue? I don't know. I think you should find out.

·  (1335)  

    The Chair: John Williams.

    Mr. John Williams: I just want to re-emphasize what I said and what Ms. Ablonczy has said, namely that there cannot be two rules. We can have a code of conduct for all parliamentarians, and when you have people high up with more trust and more responsibility, there should be more accountability, more openness, and more transparency. Any rules by the Prime Minister imposed on cabinet must be in addition to and can never replace this code of conduct. So it's a higher standard, not a different standard. It must agree with this code and have more, and that has to be absolutely paramount.

    Mrs. Diane Ablonczy: I want you to know that this is the first time John and I have agreed on anything.

    Mr. John Williams: You should hear our caucus debates.

    The other issue, Mr. Chair, is that while some people say this is for public perception, the public already has a perception of parliamentarians, and it's not as good as we would like it to be.

    What we must realize is that you can never eliminate the crime; you can never eliminate people taking advantage of opportunity. All we can do is provide an accountability that brings it out in the open, and let the chips fall where they may.

    That is why we're doing this. It's not a public relations exercise; it's to ensure that the public have confidence in parliamentarians and that for those who step over the line there are consequences.

    The Chair: Ken Epp.

    Mr. Ken Epp: Thank you.

    I appreciate both of your very thoughtful and thorough presentations.

    One area that I would really like to find out about from you is your reaction to the investigation process. You see, we go under the assumption that MPs never do anything wrong, and if they do, it's so small that, compared to the big things that ministers do, it's not of that great importance. However, if this comes into place and becomes part of our Standing Orders, there will be a commissioner, and I hope, according to what you have said, that person will be chosen in such a way that we will collectively, as MPs, have trust in that person.

    But that individual, that commissioner, is now going to conduct investigations. That's part of the mandate. There will be complaints. I think that's inevitable. Whether they're properly founded or not, there are going to be complaints.

    That person is then going to do an investigation and, according to the proposed rules, will report directly to the House. That report will go to the Speaker, who will table it in the House, and at the same time, then, it becomes a public report.

    The way it's set up here is if there is no motion contrariwise, then the recommendation of that commissioner is deemed to have been accepted by the members of the House.

    I'm surprised that neither of you have really addressed that issue, because it looks to me as if we're having a non-parliamentarian, a non-elected person, being a judge of parliamentarians' work, and even though it says there's a way of negating that report by having a motion made in the House by some member who says, we reject that report, or we don't accept the recommendation, then that report is accepted.

    What's your reaction to that? I'd like both of you to answer.

    The Chair: Let's start with Diane and then go to John.

    Mrs. Diane Ablonczy: As a lawyer, I know how vulnerable lawyers are to complaints from the public, and sometimes you're out. If you've ever had a complaint laid against you in the pursuit of your professional duties, and so on, it's not a very positive thing for you to have to say, yes, I've had however many complaints against me in the course of my duties. So I do worry, as a member of Parliament.

    Even if the complaint is found to be without foundation, you still have that on your record, that somehow there was a complaint, it was investigated, and it was found to be without merit. There's always this feeling on the part of the public that where there's smoke, there's fire. That did worry me when I read this.

    You hate to shy away from some of these initiatives because they could cause you some personal problems. That's why I didn't raise it. But I agree with you; I think we should count the cost and the fact that maybe there's a process whereby, if the complaint was found to be without merit, it's not reported publicly or something. I don't know, but I do agree with your concern, Ken, and I think all members of Parliament would be wise to pay attention to the fact that they are going to have this vulnerability now that they didn't before, and that it could cause them problems that they wish hadn't arisen.

·  (1340)  

    The Chair: John Williams.

    Mr. John Williams: I had to read it twice, Mr. Epp, just because I took a double take when I read that point too.

    But you're dealing with, in the appendix, page xii, “Deemed concurrence”, subsection 31(9), where it says, “A report referred to in subsections (3) or (4)”. Subsections 31(3) and 31(4) deal with where the commissioner says there was no contravention of the code, or that it was so trivial that there was no penalty to be imposed. On that basis, these basically say, I have found no fault. That report would be deemed to be concurred in by the House. However, if the commissioner has found fault, then there is a different process that does not automatically--

    Mr. Ken Epp: It's the same. It's a longer timeline.

    Mr. John Williams: No. It says in the appendix, page xiii, subsection 31(10), that a report referred to in subsection 31(5), where he does find there are problems, “shall be taken up, considered and disposed of by the House no later than 15 sitting days after”, unless the House, by order, extends that. Then it says if the report has not been disposed of within the 15 days or a greater number of days, the Speaker shall “put every question necessary” to a vote.

    So there's no automatic disposition if the commissioner finds an issue. If the commissioner finds there is no issue to be dealt with, that report would be deemed concurred in unless the matter is raised specifically.

    The Chair: I'm afraid I must wind this up.

    Diane, we thank you very much.

    John, again, we appreciate your being here.

    Briefly, for the record, Carolyn Parrish.

    Mrs. Carolyn Parrish: I have nothing to say. I've enjoyed this thoroughly.

    The Chair: Okay, I thought you had something.

    Mrs. Carolyn Parrish: No.

    Oh, I do.

    The Chair: Well, I do. Do you want me to say mine first?

    Mrs. Carolyn Parrish: No, I want to say mine first. I'm already disjointed enough.

    The Chair: Go ahead, then.

    Mrs. Carolyn Parrish: First of all, the Subcommittee on Private Members' Business has met, and all items on the order of precedence are votable. We had a question on one, which has been clarified.

    Secondly, we have our first problem to report, which we might want to put back to the committee as a whole.

    We had one item that currently qualifies to be votable, but the subject is before a committee, and the exact item is being put forward by the committee as an amendment to the bill. If the amendment goes through before the bill comes up in the order of precedence in the House, then it's repeating an issue that has already been before the House. Do we allow that person to select another bill at that time? What do we do?

    We couldn't come up with a solution, so we've just thrown that back.

    The Chair: We will note that and raise it at a full committee meeting.

    Mrs. Carolyn Parrish: That was what the hesitation was over.

    The Chair: Thank you.

    Colleagues, I would like to raise the fact that in appendix 2, page vi, under “D. Privileges preserved (section 10)”, I've had some questions raised that I'd sooner discuss when we're discussing the next version of this report about that provision. I just want to note that.

    Tomorrow we meet at our regular time, but in room 253-D. It's a televised meeting. We begin our consideration of Bill C-24, election expenses legislation. Our first witness is the minister, but before we begin, we will briefly consider the report of our steering committee, the plan of work for the future.

    At that time I will raise again briefly Benoît Sauvageau's point about what the committee wants to do with respect to this inquiry that we're into, because, you should know, my thought was that we stop gathering information at the end of this week, and then, at some later date, perhaps immediately following the break or perhaps even next week, we would have one meeting, and we need to resolve that at that point.

    Does anyone else have anything in regard to this meeting?

    Colleagues, I appreciate your patience. I think this was a useful round table meeting--I will repeat this--the third round table we've had on this topic.

    The meeting is adjourned until 11 a.m. tomorrow.