FOPO Committee Report

CANADIAN COAST GUARD
MARINE COMMUNICATIONS AND TRAFFIC SERVICES

INTRODUCTION

We [MCTS] are the keepers of the gate. We must not let our guard down but rather we must be fully prepared to meet these ever-increasing challenges [to our security] and threats head on.

Julius Smolders, Watch Supervisor, Tofino MCTS

On October 18, 2001, just over a month after the cataclysmic events of September 11, the Standing Committee on Fisheries and Oceans held a meeting with officials from the Department of Fisheries and Oceans (DFO) and Marine Communications and Traffic Services (MCTS) Officers representing CAW–Canada Local 2182. The fundamental issue brought to the attention of the Committee was that the Canadian Coast Guard (CCG) Pacific Region was facing a shortfall of approximately $8 million in its.2001-02 fiscal year budget, of which MCTS accounted for approximately $1 million. Further, the Committee was informed that CCG Pacific Region and MCTS in particular were in a “chronic” shortfall financial state.

The Committee was told that financial constraints were causing problems at Pacific Region MCTS sites including: short staffing; overworked MCTS officers; restrictions and deficiencies in training; old and unreliable equipment; the neglect of international commitments; uncertainty, apprehension and frustration among staff; reduced levels of service; and compromising the security of our borders.

As a result of this meeting, the Committee made the decision to travel to British Columbia to visit MCTS sites in order to determine, for itself, the validity of these claims. It visited British Columbia in November 2001 where it held a meeting with senior officials at the Pacific Regional Headquarters and visited MCTS sites in Victoria, Tofino and Prince Rupert, BC. As a follow up, in March 2002, the Committee also visited East Coast MCTS in Halifax, NS, St. John’s, NL, Rivière-au-Renard, QC, as well as the Canadian Coast Guard College in Sydney, NS.

BACKGROUND

The Canadian Coast Guard

The Canadian Coast Guard (CCG) was established in 1962, in response to demands for a national marine service and a search and rescue service, similar to that of the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG), that could respond to the needs of the fishing and commercial shipping industries.

In 1995, the CCG was transferred from Transport Canada to the Department of Fisheries and Oceans. The enabling legislation, the Oceans Act, which established the Minister of Fisheries and Oceans as the Minister responsible for the CCG did not, however, take effect until two years after the administrative change.

The merger of Coast Guard with the Department of Fisheries and Oceans has been difficult and extremely painful. Funding for both departments was significantly reduced in 1994 as a result of Program Review and the integration of two organizations with different structures and corporate cultures added significantly to the challenges faced.

Role of the Canadian Coast Guard

Unlike its U.S. counterpart,¹ the CCG is a civilian organization. The mandate of the CCG is to:

ensure the safe and environmentally responsible use of Canada’s waters, support understanding and management of oceans resources, facilitate the use of our waters for shipping, recreation and fishing, and provide marine expertise in support of Canada’s domestic and international interests.

The specific programs for which the Coast Guard is responsible are:

Marine Communications and Traffic Services

The mandate of the Marine Communications and Traffic Services is to ensure the safe movement of marine traffic through Canadian waters. Its role is analogous to that of air traffic control with respect to air traffic. The mission of MCTS is to provide communications and traffic services for the marine community and for the benefit of the public at large to ensure:

MCTS Regulatory Framework

The regulatory framework governing the MCTS is based primarily on the Canada Shipping Act, the Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act, the International Maritime Organization (IMO), the Safety of Life at Sea Convention (SOLAS), the IMO International Convention on Maritime Search and Rescue (IMO SAR Convention) and the International Telecommunications Union (ITU) — Radio Regulations.

SOLAS

Canada is a signatory to the International Maritime Organization Convention for Safety of Life at Sea, a comprehensive treaty regarding the safety of merchant shipping. Among other things, the convention requires signatories to make provisions for safety radio-communications services. MCTS provides the distress safety communications coordination and maritime safety information broadcasts in response to this international agreement.

GMDSS

The Global Marine Distress and Safety System (GMDSS) is the new marine communication and distress handling system. It was introduced in a 1988 amendment to the SOLAS convention. The introduction of the GMDSS was to be phased-in in stages between 1993 and February 1, 1999. The basic concept of the system is that search and rescue authorities ashore, as well as ships in the vicinity, will be rapidly alerted in the event of an emergency. The GMDSS makes use of satellite communications provided by Inmarsat² and also uses terrestrial radio. In addition to distress communications, the GMDSS also provides for the dissemination of general maritime safety information such as navigational and meteorological warnings and urgent information to ships.

Canada-United States Cooperative Vessel Traffic Service Agreement

The Canadian and United States Coast Guards established the Co-operative Vessel Traffic System (CVTS) for the Strait of Juan de Fuca region in 1979 (Agreement for a Cooperative Vessel Traffic Management System for the Juan de Fuca Region). The purpose of the agreement is to provide for the safe and efficient movement of vessel traffic and to minimize the risk of pollution and environmental damage by preventing collisions and groundings. As part of the Agreement, Tofino MCTS provides VTS for the offshore approaches to the Juan de Fuca Strait and along the Washington State coastline from 48 degrees north. Seattle Traffic provides VTS for both the Canadian and U.S. waters of Juan de Fuca Strait and Victoria MCTS provides VTS for both Canadian and U.S. waters of Haro Strait, Boundary Passage, and the lower Georgia Straits. Vessels of 300 gross tons or greater require a 24-hour advance report before entering Canadian or U.S. territorial waters. The one report satisfies all West Coast offshore Canadian and U.S. regulatory reporting requirements.

The CVTS had been sought by Canada to address serious concerns that American super tanker traffic posed a serious environmental threat to the Canadian coast line, in particular the Gulf Islands.  The Agreement led to the establishment of one way shipping lanes in the Rosario Strait and several narrow channels. In recent years the Agreement also became the basis for a working arrangement whereby the Canadian traffic control centres would take over management of the nearby American sector should there be a system failure in the United States. Similarly the U.S. would backstop the Canadian system should it experience a failure.  In February 2002 a major system failure occurred as the result of an earthquake near Seattle and the Canadian vessel traffic control centres in Victoria and Tofino were able to step-in and ensure that basic vessel traffic control was maintained in adjacent American waters. 

As a result the Canadian centres averted disaster, clearing a passage for a fully loaded 188,000 ton oil tanker through Rosario Strait, a narrow one-way shipping lane. In the event of another shutdown, a similar assist might not be possible. 

The Canadian Coast Guard was forced in August 2002 to withdraw from the agreement to backstop each other’s system in the event of a system failure because they lacked the training and equipment to fulfill their responsibility. As a result, should a system failure occur in the United States, only a Notice to Shipping will be issued by the Canadian Coast Guard to advise vessels travelling in American waters that they are on their own.  

The Committee heard evidence in Seattle, Victoria and Tofino that the Canadian Coast Guard vessel traffic control centres at Victoria and Tofino no longer have the resources necessary to ensure that the Canada-United States Agreement operates effectively. The cancellation of the backstopping arrangement lends credence to the evidence heard in Seattle.

Great Lakes Agreement (GLA)

The Agreement between Canada and the United States of America for the Promotion of Safety on the Great Lakes by Means of Radio provides for cooperation between Canada and the United States with respect to radio communications for safety and efficient navigation on the Great Lakes.

Eastern Canada VTS Zone Regulations (ECAREG)

The Eastern Canada Vessel Traffic Services (VTS) Zone Regulations (ECAREG) are intended to identify defects and deficiencies in vessels in, or intending to enter, the waters of Eastern Canada so that compensatory measures can be put into place to prevent incidents. First contact for vessels approaching Eastern Canada is through ECAREG. All vessels of 500 GRT³ and over or carrying pollutants or dangerous cargo are now required to report 96 hours prior to entering Canadian Waters in addition to reporting 24 hours prior to entry.

Ships entering Canadian waters are required to provide information regarding operating certificates, defects or deficiencies in shipboard equipment, dangerous cargoes, release of pollutants, etc., prior to entering Canadian waters. When all requirements are satisfied, ECAREG issues a Traffic Clearance to the ship to enter Canadian waters. This Traffic Clearance may contain restrictions depending on the information provided by the ship. Maritimes and Newfoundland MCTS Regions are the gateway for traffic bound for Canada and the U.S. via the Strait of Belle Isle and the Cabot Strait en route to the St. Lawrence Seaway.

Regulations established for other vessel traffic services zones include the Vessel Traffic Services Zones Regulations, the St. Clair and Detroit River Navigation Safety Regulations and the Arctic Shipping Pollution Prevention Regulations.

Creation of the MCTS

The Role of MCTS

In fulfilling its mandate, MCTS performs the following functions:

MCTS clients include: commercial vessels, ferries and government vessels; fishing vessels; pleasure craft; the Canadian public; other government departments and agencies; agencies in other countries; ports, ship owners and pilots and other marine stakeholders.

THE STATE OF CCG MCTS

Pacific Region

During its visit to British Columbia, the Committee held a meeting with senior officials at Pacific Region Headquarters in Vancouver and visited MCTS sites in Vancouver, Victoria, Tofino and Prince Rupert. The Committee also visited the U.S. Coast Guard base in Seattle, Washington.

Regional Headquarters, Vancouver

The Committee met with senior DFO and Coast Guard officials at DFO Pacific Region Headquarters in Vancouver, BC. According to senior officials, major challenges facing MCTS include:

The total DFO budget for the Pacific Region is $302 million (2001-2002 FY). Of this, the Canadian Coast Guard accounts for $89 million and, within the CCG budget, MCTS accounts for approximately $8 million. Eighty percent of this is allocated to salaries and overtime; 20% is allocated to general operating costs. This figure does not include additional support to MCTS provided by Technical Services.

Financial stability is an issue. According to Headquarters, the trend in funding over the last five years has been an annual shortfall of at least $1 million. In the fiscal year 2001-2002,  MCTS Pacific Region received an additional $600,000 in emergency funding from National Headquarters on a one-time basis. This has not relieved the chronic annual shortfall. The demands on MCTS Pacific Region are higher than on the East Coast; the volume of traffic to be managed is much higher than any other region (see Table 1) and the whole coast is covered, compared to only parts of the East Coast. Because of the higher demands, training is more costly; it takes six months for an MCTS officer on the West Coast to “check out” after ab initio training compared to a “month” on the East Coast.

Nevertheless, according to senior officials, the system is working as it should and MCTS is able to deliver effectively on its role although they admit that MCTS cannot fulfill some of its objectives because of staff shortages and financial constraints. A senior official told the Committee that “money is not a problem.” The Committee was shocked by this statement, particularly in view of evidence to the contrary given by officials in Ottawa. This view of MCTS by management turned out to be in stark contrast to what we heard at each and every MCTS facility.

Officials stated that the mandate has not changed since September 11, 2001; security is not currently part of the mandate — such a change would require a cabinet decision and adding security responsibilities to MCTS would represent an additional cost. MCTS, however, performs an informal security role by providing intelligence to both Canadian and U.S. departments and agencies.

Table 1: MCTS Distribution of Workload and Staffing Levels by Region

Victoria

Victoria MCTS’s area of responsibility (AOR) is south and east of Vancouver Island including some U.S. waters. The main challenge is the volume of traffic. This centre manages the highest volume of shipping of any MCTS site — ten times that of any other in the country.

MCTS was short-staffed at the time of the Committee’s visit. The Committee was told that MCTS Victoria needed more operators just to be able to operate safely. Some of the shortage is attributable to the integration of the radio operations and traffic control, when the service lost a number of people who did not have either the inclination or the aptitude to do both jobs. The Committee was also told that because of the very high volume of traffic, Victoria MCTS needed another VTS position,⁶ staffed 12 hours a day. Staff shortages at MCTS Victoria have at times resulted in the reduction or suspension of services. Services are shut down in order of increasing priority.

Aging equipment is also an issue at Victoria. The infrastructure was described as “crumbling before your eyes.” For example, the radio direction finding equipment is 25-30 years old and needs to be replaced.

In addition, Victoria MCTS does not have a drop⁷ from the U.S. Coast Guard radar system. The data from such a drop is essential for the Failure Matrix system to function effectively and, in the view of the Committee, we should strive to establish this link.

Tofino

The Tofino Traffic Zone extends from 124 degrees 40 minutes West (the Tofino-Seattle Line, TSL) to Triangle Island at the north end of Vancouver Island. Tofino MCTS also manages traffic south off the Washington coast to Latitude 48 degrees North by agreement with the United States.

The Tofino MCTS Centre has remote, unmanned radar located on Mount Ozzard and a computerized data processing facility in the Operations Centre at Amphitrite Point. The radar is designed to have a 60 nm range and has an extended range to 84 nm. Radar coverage extends in an arc into the Pacific Ocean off the west coast of Vancouver Island and includes the approaches to Juan de Fuca Strait. Tofino also has a “drop” from the U.S. Coast Guard’s Seattle Traffic Radar located at Cape Flattery on the Washington Olympic Peninsula. VTOSS (Vessel Traffic Operating Support System),⁸ a system developed in-house on the West Coast, had already replaced the older dead reckoning computer and plot table.

Language is a unique challenge for Tofino MCTS, as most VHF communications are made directly to foreign masters or mates who frequently speak little to no English. Care must be taken, even with routine advisories, because of language difficulties. The Centre must also deal with large fishing fleets, both domestic and foreign, that occupy the zone seasonally. The fleets may conflict with other marine traffic, particularly tankers, freighters and barges. Tofino regularly advises vessels of the location and approximate size of the fishing fleets.

Tofino MCTS supports other agencies including DFO and the Coast Guard, the RCMP, the Canada Customs and Revenue Agency, Ship Safety (Transport Canada), the Coast Guard Auxiliary, the Rescue Coordination Centre, Environment Canada, the Department of National Defence, the U.S. Military and Coast Guard, and the Victoria and Port Angeles Pilots and Harbour Commissions.

According to Tofino MCTS officers, MCTS is understaffed. The staffing formula is based on 5.5 persons per position for their three positions. This works out to 17 people for Tofino, which does not meet requirements for the centre. The Committee was told that a number of European countries use a formula of seven or more persons per position to staff their VTS centres. Full staffing to this standard would allow not only for the uninterrupted delivery of services, it would enable existing staff to rotate through refresher and requalification training, for the upgrading of existing qualifications and for career development. It would also allow for “stand back” watch supervisors who would then be able to attend to their specific duties in a timely and professional manner. Currently, supervisors are assigned additional responsibilities without sufficient time to address them.

For Tofino, an enhanced staffing ratio would mean four to five extra personnel and in the view of the Tofino MCTS officers, this would allow Canada to meet its domestic and international obligations.

Staff positions are not being filled in a timely fashion. For example, one of the watch supervisors at Tofino was due to retire within six months of the Committee’s visit; however, it was expected that he would not be replaced before 2003. This would have resulted in the centre being short-staffed for at least a year.

Required training is not being provided even though it has been repeatedly requested. We were told that one officer, promoted to watch supervisor in Tofino, did not receive supervisor training for three years, instead of the six months required by the Public Service Staff Relations Act. In addition, personnel have been acting as on-the-job instructors, despite not having had the basic on-the-job instructor’s course.

Tofino MCTS is very dependent on highly specialized and complex radar surveillance and communications equipment to ensure service delivery. It is also dependent on the technical staff. Because Technical Services Branch has suffered from the same kind of financial constraints and staffing cuts, and even restrictions on the purchase of spare parts, they no longer perform preventative maintenance on equipment, but rather repair the equipment when it breaks down.

Under the CVTS agreement, a regional Joint Coordinating Group (JCG) was established between Canada and the U.S. to oversee the development and issuance of vessel traffic regulations and standard practices and procedures to be used in the CVTS system. The regional JCG meets biannually to review the technical and operational details of the agreement to ensure that procedures, equipment, and regulations in each country are compatible to the extent possible. According to officers in Tofino, most of the staff at Tofino had never attended a JCG meeting in Seattle because of financial constraints. It was suggested that Tofino should send one of the MCTS officers to Seattle every three months until everyone had been there and once a year thereafter. This failure to attend critical activities of the JCG due to financial constraints was reiterated to the Committee by officials in Seattle.

Staff at Tofino raised the issue of security. The Tofino VTS zone is the gateway to the entire Pacific Northwest. Although MCTS does not have a direct security role, the Tofino centre has a very high potential for gathering intelligence that benefits other government agencies. All the intelligence is forwarded to the Department of National Defence, the RCMP, the Canada Customs and Revenue Agency, or the United States and Canadian Coast Guard. Information is distributed via secure and non-secure voice and data circuits to these departments. It was noted that it has become increasingly difficult to relay information directly to surface or air units because of the lack of secure radio systems and that there is a need for scrambled MF and VHF radio communications at MCTS and to increase the number of agencies on secure landlines.

Staff also noted that our ports are increasingly a weak link in our national security:

Additionally since the events of September 11, we have come to realize that the biggest hole in our national security defences are through our ports and waterways.

Julius Smolders, Watch Supervisor, Tofino MCTS

This assessment of our porous ports was confirmed recently in the report of the Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence: Canadian Security and Military Preparedness, tabled in February 2002:

The Committee emerged from its hearings concerned about a broad range of security issues related to organized crime activities at Canadian ports that increase Canada’s vulnerability to terrorist activities.

Vancouver Island provides an optimum staging area for illegal migrants or undesirable aliens, drug trafficking and other security issues because of the rugged coast, the lack of radar coverage of the north of Vancouver Island, and easy access to continental North America. It was argued that these facts highlight the need for radar surveillance off northern Vancouver Island. Past incidents with boats carrying illegal migrants suggest that they are well aware of the extent of current radar coverage. Automatic identification system (AIS)⁹ technology is not a viable alternative from the point of view of security, as a vessel master can shut off the transponder, making the vessel’s passage undetectable. Aircraft and ship patrols are not by themselves complete, practical alternatives for reasons including cost and dependence on weather.

Prince Rupert

Prince Rupert MCTS is responsible for the largest VTS zone in Canada. The zone covers an area of ocean of 77,000 square kilometres (30,000 square miles) and extends from the Alaskan border in the north to Cape Caution just north of Vancouver Island in the south. It takes in the waters of Dixon Entrance, Hecate Strait, and Queen Charlotte Sound.

Prince Rupert operates with 14 communications sites located throughout its AOR; however, it does not have any radar installations. As a result, the Committee was told, Canada cannot be certain what ships are travelling in its waters. The AIS does not negate the need for radar as illegal traffic can disable the transponder. The centre may not know a vessel is in the area unless another vessel calls it in. The north and south ends of the Queen Charlotte Islands were suggested as potential locations. Providing the necessary infrastructure for radar in the region could be expensive because of the remoteness of locations and the lack of grid power, but is essential in the view of the Committee.

Resources have been “drastically reduced” to an unacceptable level over the last five years. For example, the number of technicians in Prince Rupert has been reduced from seven to three. Normally, two technicians are sent out to a remote site. This means that if a technician is sick or on vacation, Prince Rupert itself has no technical support. Not only have the numbers of technicians been reduced, they have also taken on additional responsibilities as a result of the amalgamation with DFO.

Scheduled maintenance is not being carried out. If equipment goes down in winter, it can be very difficult to fix, both because of the remote location of many of the sites and the difficulty of access in poor weather conditions, because of the limited number of daylight hours and harsh conditions at the site. This is compounded by the fact that it can take an hour and a half to fly into some sites for a round trip of three hours, leaving very little remaining daylight time for any maintenance work. In addition, it may not be possible to get back into a site for weeks. Thus, a failure in winter can potentially leave a large area without coverage for an extended period. Therefore, preventative maintenance is much more important in the north than it is in the south. The consequences of equipment failure are potentially very serious because of difficult conditions. The Committee was informed that 18 people had been lost at sea over the previous 14 months in the Prince Rupert zone.

Prince Rupert MCTS was still using an old-fashioned chart table, reminiscent of a World War II movie, with paper information strips for tracking traffic through the zone. VTOSS, however, was expected to be operational within two weeks and training was already taking place. (INNAV¹⁰ the system that VTOSS was “filling in for” was not yet available despite the $17 million already spent on it.¹¹)

At the time of the Committee’s visit (November 23, 2001), there had been 55 days since January that year when equipment had been down at one or more sites. Staff described an incident where a fisherman had been hooked in the eye with a gaff, but the MCTS centre was unable to put the fishing vessel in direct communication with a doctor at the local hospital because a site (Rose Inlet) was out of service.

Tofino MCTS is responsible for a vast area of ocean. Locating a vessel in distress, within this area, by means of direction finding equipment requires that the vessel’s position be determined by triangulation from at least two separate points. In the event of a failure, it may be impossible to determine the precise position of a vessel, and therefore resources, such as an aerial search or “vessels of opportunity” may be required. This is counterproductive and puts the safety of the vessel and its crew and passengers at greater risk.

Prince Rupert was operating short-staffed with less than its proper complement of MCTS officers. Lack of training was an issue. The timeline for replacing officers was a concern. It takes a minimum of a year of training, after college, before a new recruit is really qualified to sit in a position. This means that the earliest that new officers could be available to fill positions would be in 2003. Without action before fall 2003, Prince Rupert expected to lose ten more persons. Furthermore, the Committee was told that Prince Rupert was losing good people because they were not being given the opportunity to upgrade their training.

Staff is dealing with high levels of stress and frustration. Part of this is due to continual “least cost” and “best practices” exercises where the next would begin before the results of the previous one were available. Too many surveys from Regional HQ were asking the centre to work with less money but directing that services not be cut. This was unrealistic in view of already limited resources and any further cuts would be reflected in loss of service. Staff members expressed frustration with senior management’s denial of problems, as they expect senior management to speak on their behalf.

Short staffing also leads to excessive overtime which further adds to the stress experienced by MCTS officers at Prince Rupert and other MCTS sites.

U.S. Coast Guard Seattle

The 13th Coast Guard District is responsible for the Pacific Northwest, covering the states of Washington, Oregon, Idaho and Montana. The units of the district cover more than 460,000 square miles (almost 1.2 million square kilometres) of the Pacific Ocean. The district has 1,279 men and women on active duty, 461 on reserve and is augmented by 1,660 members of the Coast Guard Auxiliary.

In addition to fulfilling missions equivalent to those of the Canadian Coast Guard, including maritime safety, maritime mobility and the protection of natural resources, the U.S. Coast Guard also has major responsibilities for maritime security and national defence. The maritime security mission includes: drug interdiction, alien migrant interdiction, protecting the U.S. Exclusive Economic Zone and living marine resources, and general maritime law enforcement and treaty enforcement. The national defence mission includes: general defence duties, homeland security, port and waterways security and polar icebreaking.

USCG Station Seattle, CG Group Seattle and Vessel Traffic Service Puget Sound are co-located on the waterfront in Seattle, Washington. The primary mission of Station Seattle is maritime law enforcement within Puget Sound. Group Seattle is responsible for search and rescue, maritime law enforcement, recreational boating safety, and aids to navigation. Its AOR is bounded by the U.S.-Canadian border to the north and extends through the Strait of Georgia, and along the San Juan Islands and encompasses all of southern Puget Sound.

Vessel Traffic Service Puget Sound monitors approximately 250,000 vessel movements a year, comprised of tankers, cargo ships, ferries, and tug boats with tows. The centre operates with a high accuracy radar system specifically designed for VTS applications. The present ten radar sites cover 2,500 square miles (6,400 square kilometres) of Puget Sound, Rosario Strait, and the Strait of Juan de Fuca. In 1984, the original VHF-FM transceivers were replaced with a computerized, low-powered sector system that offers more flexibility and quicker response.

VTS Puget Sound is unique among the six vessel traffic services operated by the U.S. Coast Guard, being the only United States VTS that operates with two foreign services, namely Canada’s Victoria and Tofino Traffic. The three services coordinate shipping traffic between Puget Sound, the straits of Georgia, Juan de Fuca, Rosario, Haro, and the west coast of Vancouver Island out to 60 miles (50 nautical miles) off shore.

Seattle staff emphasized the complexity of the region encompassing Puget Sound, the Strait of Georgia and the Strait of Juan de Fuca, which can be regarded as one large waterway. The region is effectively the largest port system in North America, equivalent almost to the whole East Coast and is one of the busiest waterways in the world. In addition to commercial, ferry, fishing and pleasure vessel traffic, the region also has four naval ports, three U.S. and one Canadian.

The need to add the dimension of security while facilitating commerce and providing safe waterways was emphasized. Rear Admiral Brown, Commander of the 13th District, spoke to the Committee about the need to develop common security protocols. He noted that the first criterion is awareness. VTS provides critical information about what vessels are on the water, what they contain and what their intentions are. He noted that the U.S. is already developing protocols on its side and was taking action to “fuse” agencies together. Consequently, joint security needs joint protocols and the U.S. wants to work with Canada rather than taking independent action. In the Rear Admiral’s view, the next critical steps would involve joint pre-planned responses to emergency situations and recognition of critical infrastructures.

Commerce is important to the quality of life and needs to be facilitated, but ports should not be disadvantaged. As land borders have been tightened, there has been a rise in illegal activity through ports.

The Cooperative Vessel Traffic Service (CVTS) Agreement was described as a model international relationship and a foundation to build on. Cooperation with CCG MCTS was excellent. However, while Seattle Coast Guard staff hold the professionalism and dedication of MCTS officers in high regard, they were also aware that their Canadian colleagues, particularly at Tofino, were spread too thin. Getting Canadian staff to Seattle for familiarization with the U.S. system and regulations had been difficult because of staff shortages and inadequate training budgets. Instead, this should be a priority. Victoria’s VTOSS system was praised, but the fact that it is essentially a one-man-show was identified as a weakness.

The visit to USCG Seattle left the Committee with the distinct feeling that we are the proverbial poor cousins to our American counterparts. In the view of the Committee, lack of funding is undermining our relationship with our U.S. counterparts.

East Coast

As a follow up to its West Coast study, the Committee visited three MCTS sites, Halifax, St. John’s and Rivière-au-Renard on the East Coast and the Canadian Coast Guard College in Sydney, NS in March 2002.

Maritimes Region — MCTS Halifax

The Maritimes Region’s AOR includes all of the waters from Eastport, Maine, the Bay of Fundy, the southwest coast of Nova Scotia, Sable Island, the eastern shore of Nova Scotia, Chedabucto Bay, all the waters of Cape Breton and the Cabot Strait, all the waters surrounding Prince Edward Island, and the eastern and northern coasts of New Brunswick.

Vessels contact Halifax Traffic when they reach the traffic zone, approximately 15 nm from Chebucto Head on the western approach to Halifax Harbour. Halifax MCTS handles an average of 4,500 vessels of varying types and sizes each month. The centre’s communications service provides an uninterrupted listening watch along the south coast of Nova Scotia on various distress and other marine frequencies to provide communications assistance for vessels in difficulty.

At the time of the Committee’s visit, Halifax MCTS was in the process (initiated in FY 1999-2000) of a three-year project to improve MCTS services within Halifax Harbour. The project included modernizing the existing MCTS facility at Shannon Hill, replacing the radar systems at Chebucto Head, George’s Island and Bedford Basin, new digital data transmission, distribution and display systems. The new INNAV system was expected to go on line on April 29, 2002. The new international AIS was soon to be implemented for the Port of Halifax and its approaches. The AIS system automatically transmits the vessel’s identification, position, heading, length, beam, type, draught, and hazardous cargo to shore-based stations and other ships.

Detection of foreign vessels by Coast Guard radar is possible only in the Bay of Fundy, Halifax Harbour and Chedabucto Bay. The remainder of the coastline remains open to anyone wishing to enter the country illegally. The officers indicated that CCG should expand its radar coverage in this area with the intent of enhancing the security of our coastline.

Staffing is an issue for Halifax MCTS officers. The Committee was told that staffing in the Maritimes region has been minimal over the last number of years and is now at the point where management cannot meet its contractual obligations. CAW-Local 2182, representing the Coast Guard Marine Communications Officers indicated that this has prompted management to demand, at the bargaining table, excessive notice for annual leave in an effort to curtail excessive overtime resulting directly from inadequate staffing.

The Committee was also told that the “staffing formula” did not meet needs. The formula, for example, does not take into account the larger number of weeks that more senior officers are entitled to or sick leave. We were told that all three Maritimes centres are at or close to minimum staffing levels even without allowing for training. One more person per shift would reduce the problem of overtime.

Some of the problems in the region originate from amalgamation when five radio and three VTS sites in the region were reduced to three centres. Consequently, the remaining centres were more reliant on new remote technology at the same time budgets were being cut. Maintenance was being performed only when equipment went down, technicians were not being paid to standby and there was no technical support for Internet services on the weekend.

The budget was not sufficient for the region to provide all the services that it had in the past and it was suggested that a $700,000 increase in the budget would not be out of hand.

The Union raised concern over the possible consolidation of MCTS centres located in Halifax, NS, Sydney, NS, and St. John, NB. They pointed out that, during the amalgamation of Coast Guard Radio and Vessel Traffic Services, it had been determined that three centres strategically located could deliver the best level of service. This had been reconfirmed in 2000 by Consulting and Audit Canada.¹² According to the Union, Maritimes regional management had been focusing on further consolidation of MCTS sites in the region in response to shrinking budgets, with the intent of eventually establishing one centre in Dartmouth. MCTS officers felt, considering the size of the Maritimes AOR, it would be impossible to control communications, provide safety services and security effectively from one centre. In the view of the Union, a reduction of centres in the region would only increase vulnerability to terrorist organizations, especially in light of the events of September 11, 2001.

Newfoundland Region — MCTS St. John’s

Newfoundland Region is responsible for a vast area of continental shelf (2.5 million square kilometres) and almost 29,000 kilometre of coastline (comparable to that of British Columbia). Ships navigating the region are often exposed to harsh weather, ice and sea conditions and to restricted visibility. The region is served by five MCTS centres located at Goose Bay, St. Anthony, Port aux Basques, Placentia and St. John’s. The centres are responsible for the safe and expeditious movement of ships in the Vessel Traffic Zones of the Strait of Belle Isle, Port aux Basques, Placentia Bay, St. John’s and Eastern Canada (ECAREG) and transatlantic shipping routes off the southeast coast of Newfoundland and the entire Newfoundland offshore area.

There are about 40,000 larger vessel movements through Newfoundland AOR annually as well as tens of thousands of fishing vessel movements. In addition, nearly 50 million tons of pollutant cargo is being transported through the AOR. St. John’s Harbour does not have radar; the system is totally manual. The Committee was told that the Newfoundland Region is currently operating at least cost, which the Committee took to mean that they cannot economize any further.

The limited (50 km/30 miles) range of the radar at Port aux Basques may be a security issue as vessels could enter the Gulf of St. Lawrence undetected through the Cabot Strait, which is approximately 75 miles (120 kilometres) wide. Such vessels would not be detected until they reached Les Escoumins, 300 miles (500 kilometres) into the Gulf.

Québec Region — MCTS Rivière-au-Renard

There are four MCTS centres in the Québec Region: Rivière-au-Renard, Les Escoumins, Québec and Montréal. The region handles about 220,000 vessel movements a year.

Not as much preventative maintenance is being done as several years ago; however, it is almost impossible to have a complete breakdown, as most sites are double equipped (some radio frequencies for commercial calls are not duplicated). All radio site locations are accessible by road except for one, which is only accessible by helicopter.

The region has been doing a study to determine the possibility of consolidating the number of centres while maintaining the same level of service. Seven scenarios were under consideration, ranging from the status quo to one centre. Each year the Québec Region MCTS meets with the marine sector including the commercial shipping industry, pleasure craft, and the pilot authority to advise them of what the region is planning and to seek feedback.

There is a good distribution in the ages of the MCTS officers at Rivière-au-Renard, although three officers were due to retire at Montréal, the following year.

Implementation of AIS is starting; the plan is to have it fully implemented within four years. With both AIS and INNAV, MCTS will have the ability to track the position of vessels in real time. Management told the Committee that, without AIS, a replacement for the radar at Les Escoumins would require a 40-km range and cost $5 million but, with AIS, a less powerful radar system would be required to cover the area where pilots transfer to vessels and cost only $500,000. The Committee is aware that AIS is a valuable tool, which is, however, effective only if vessels are compliant and the equipment is working. Little has changed as a result of September 11; the new 96-hour reporting requirement under ECAREG does not impact on the region.

Canadian Coast Guard College — Sydney, NS

The Canadian Coast Guard College (CCGC), a national maritime training facility, was opened in 1965. The College, located in Cape Breton, is a residential facility that provides training in both official languages. Initially, only men were accepted into the four-year Officer Cadet Training Program (OCTP), which offered training in either Marine Navigation or Engineering. The program was opened to women in 1974.

In 1992, Transport Canada moved its Maritime Training Centre from Cornwall, Ontario, to the CCGC. This move brought with it Vessel Traffic Services, Radio Operations, Logistics and Search and Rescue Departments.

In the early ‘90s, the College began to chart new directions to change from a single-purpose OCTP facility to a multi-purpose organization, much of this reflecting new short-term training. In 1995, the College was transferred from Transport Canada to the Department of Fisheries and Oceans. The College is not part of the Coast Guard organization but reports to the Assistant Deputy Minister, Human Resources in DFO. It is also a satellite campus of the University College of Cape Breton.

The College has recently revived its OCTP by accepting foreign students from the Middle East. The College currently has 60 foreign students and about half the college’s revenue comes from foreign students. The College is currently operating at 2/3 of its capacity of 260 students.

The College started making use of simulators in the mid-70s and most of the training at the College now involves the use of simulators, which provide safe, effective and controlled environments for developing critical skills.

The College’s departments include:

The College developed new business lines during Program Review and revenues have increased from $700,000 in 1995 to $4 million in 2002 (out of a total budget of $11 million). The College currently employs approximately 150 persons and indirectly contributes $8 million to the local economy from residential trainees at the College.

During its visit, the Committee was told by the Director that the College faces a number of challenges, which include:

At least 40% of the teaching staff is expected to retire within the next five to ten years. The College is concerned about attracting new teaching staff. The College currently has a shortage of staff to teach the nautical science program.

The College was “decimated” by Program Review. From 1994 to 1998, there was no program for officer cadets. The College graduated its first class of officer cadets in four years in June 2002.

Staff at the College was aware of difficulties of getting MCTS candidates to the College for the 25-week ab initio training course. For example, a course planned for January 2002, had been cancelled because of lack of funding to send students. The problem was due to lack of funding in the region.

The Committee was told that having an icebreaker made available to the College during the off-season would be very beneficial for instruction.

Both the College and its staff enjoy a very high reputation internationally, in part because it is ISO 9000 accredited. Staff also participate in international conferences and have played a role in the development of international standards.

The MCTS Department of the College has an innovative training team. Training provided includes basic (ab initio), maintenance of skills such a distress and traffic procedures, and professional development. Upcoming issues included a revised Canada Shipping Act and security (for example, staff reiterated the view of MCTS officers that although many people believe AIS is the answer, it can be turned off and is not yet fitted to many vessels). Another challenge is maintaining smooth connection between MCTS training and the field, where the gap can widen quickly as technology develops.

CONCLUSION

Approximately one half of our middle and senior managers and one quarter to one third of our working-level operations staff either retired or took buyouts under the early retirement incentive and early departure incentive programs. Our station alone lost 9 of 22 operational personnel. At the operations level, subsequently, MCTS has been plagued with chronic staff shortages and unrealistic budgetary constraints. These shortfalls have resulted in the temporary reduction or suspension of services, as documented in Canadian Notices to Shipping.

Programs within MCTS, such as training, quality assurance, standards and procedures, etc., are all suffering from neglect. The department is unable to provide us with the appropriate training we require, and we are falling far short on our international commitments.

The number of middle and senior managers within MCTS continues to dwindle. Many of the managers who did remain after amalgamation have since retired or have chosen to finish their careers elsewhere, outside the realm of MCTS. I strongly suspect their decision to leave MCTS was due in large part to the continued pressures of unrealistic financial constraints; frustrations caused by their inability to effectively manage individual MCTS programs under such conditions; and the constant stress and dissatisfaction with the general direction of MCTS and the coast guard in general in recent years.

Julius Smolders, Watch Supervisor, Tofino MCTS

This statement made in Tofino BC accurately depicts many of the problems that the Committee found not only in Tofino but at other MCTS centres around the country.

Canadian Coast Guard MCTS was created as the result of the integration of Coast Guard Radio Services and Coast Guard Vessel Traffic Services when they were transferred from Transport Canada to the Department of Fisheries and Oceans in 1995. Proponents of the integration of the two services under the umbrella of MCTS claim that this has provided a national saving of 209 FTE employees, $10.6 million in salaries and $2.9 million in operational and maintenance costs, amounting to an annual saving of $13.6 million.

The 1995 master plan for the integration of vessel traffic services called for a five-year implementation period, which was subsequently reduced to four years. The 1998-99 to 2000-01 national MCTS business plan called for a period of stability. This has not happened. Financial pressures continue to be imposed year after year and this has affected the ability of the service to conduct mandatory training, modernize equipment, hire new staff in a timely and organized fashion and has undermined the ability of the service to carry out its operationally mandated task. The fundamental issue is that despite the savings already realized by integration, MCTS continues to be chronically underfunded. MCTS Pacific Region alone is underfunded annually to the tune of $1 million. The much higher volume of traffic exacerbates difficulties in the Pacific Region.

It is not clear whether senior management is in denial or simply does not appreciate the depth of the problems caused by underfunding. While senior CCG management in Ottawa acknowledged the shortfall, Pacific Region senior management insisted that MCTS was still able to carry out its mandate by reallocating funding within the existing regional envelope. Committee members doubt that reallocation of funding is possible without seriously disrupting other CCG services as they are aware that other CCG services are also chronically underfunded. The message from the operational sites in the Pacific Region, in particular, was in stark contrast: chronic underfunding has had a serious impact on MCTS operations and is compromising MCTS’s ability to fulfill its mandate.

Over the last several years, we have been trying to fit an operation to a budget. We need to have a budget that fits the operation. We cannot provide a service of this magnitude on a shoestring budget.

Julius Smolders, Watch Supervisor, Tofino MCTS

The Committee believes that this is an accurate assessment of a policy of continual underfunding of MCTS and that the policy is wrong.

What the Committee heard at the operational Pacific Region MCTS centres was confirmed during the Committee’s visit to the U.S. Coast Guard base in Seattle.

Short staffing is compromising the efficient and effective functioning of MCTS. Among other things, it adds to the workload of MCTS officers, puts pressure on them for increased overtime and aggravates stress and frustration. Short staffing is likely to be exacerbated by retirement and attrition over the next few years. The fact that it can take up to two years for a recruit to become fully competent as an MCTS officer emphasizes the need to act immediately to address future staffing requirements. Even at full complement, the Canadian service is understaffed compared to its U.S. and European counterparts. It is not clear that the current staffing formula of 5.5 persons per position provides sufficient resources, particularly when training, sick leave, vacation requirements are taken into account.

MCTS staff is not receiving timely routine training. Officers are frequently unable to attend scheduled training courses because funds run out before the end of the fiscal year, in what was described to us as the “fall wall.” In addition Pacific Region MCTS personnel have been unable to go to Seattle for cross-training on the U.S. side of the Cooperative Vessel Traffic Services operations because of funding constraints and have not been able to travel to Seattle for meetings of the Joint Coordinating Group under the CVTS Agreement.

There is a serious problem with equipment rust-out at many of the sites, which in some cases have resulted in service blackouts over the last three years. Rust-out is aggravated by lack of routine and preventative maintenance due to a reduction in the number of technicians. Instead, equipment is repaired when it breaks. The problem appears to be most acute in Prince Rupert where, as a result of winter weather conditions and the remote location of sites, any equipment failures risk the loss of MCTS services for extended periods. The lack of technical support also undermines the ability to upgrade and modernize operational equipment without delay.

The issues outlined above have lead to a high level of stress and frustration for MCTS personnel. Continuing “least cost analysis” exercises and injunctions for the Pacific Region to solve its own budgetary problems has further intensified the stress. In the view of the Committee, the only reason the MCTS service continues to function as well as it does, is the dedication and professionalism of its staff. However, reliance on such dedication is no substitute for reasonable staffing levels, timely training, and modern functional equipment. The solution is not to continue forcing MCTS to adapt to budgetary pressures, but to provide a stable level of funding that will allow MCTS to fully meet its current mandate.

Other areas of Canada’s public service also face financial and human resources challenges. However, CCG MCTS plays a critical role in ensuring the safety of life at sea and protecting the environmental integrity of Canada’s coasts as well as its increasing role in national security. It also makes an important contribution to protecting Canadian sovereignty. If MCTS does not have the resources to fulfill its mandate, lives may be placed at risk and Canada may not be able to fully meet its international obligations.

It is important to appreciate that a restoration of funding does not respond to any heightened security concerns as a result of September 11 and subsequent events; it would merely allow CCG MCTS to fulfill the role currently mandated. Nor does it respond to the anticipated increase in commercial vessel traffic or other pre-existing security concerns such as drug smuggling and illegal migration. Although CCG MCTS does not itself have a mandate for national security, it plays an invaluable role, as the eyes and ears of other government agencies, in protecting the integrity of Canada’s maritime borders and its sovereignty.

RECOMMENDATIONS

The Committee recommends:

RECOMMENDATION 1

That CCG MCTS Pacific Region receive an immediate increase in funding of at least $2 million in the 2003-2004 federal budget specifically targeted to:

and

That MCTS budgets for the other four regions receive similar consideration.

RECOMMENDATION 2

That action be initiated without delay to bring staffing levels up to a minimum of 7 officers per position.

RECOMMENDATION 3

That a high priority be placed on upgrading and modernizing equipment without delay.

RECOMMENDATION 4

That, where equipment is located at remote or poorly accessible sites, it be duplicated so as to provide backup to reduce the risk of service blackouts.

RECOMMENDATION 5

That the Technical Services staffing levels be increased to a level at which equipment can be maintained on a routine schedule of preventative maintenance rather than waiting until it fails.

In light of new security concerns, the Committee recommends:

RECOMMENDATION 6

That the mandate of CCG MCTS be enhanced to include a formal role in national security.

In addition, the Committee urges the Minister of Fisheries and Oceans to press strongly the Minister of Finance to commit immediate and continuing funding to the Department of Fisheries and Oceans, specifically dedicated to: