CIMM Committee Meeting

37th PARLIAMENT, 2nd SESSION

Standing Committee on Citizenship and Immigration

EVIDENCE

CONTENTS

Monday, February 17, 2003

¸

1405

The Vice-Chair (Mr. Jerry Pickard (Chatham—Kent Essex, Lib.))

Mr. Jacques Tousignant (Consultant; Vice-President, "Ligue des droits et libertés")

¸

1410

¸

1415

The Vice-Chair (Mr. Jerry Pickard)

Mr. Jacques Tousignant

¸

1420

¸

1425

The Vice-Chair (Mr. Jerry Pickard)

Ms. Madeleine Dalphond-Guiral (Laval Centre, BQ)

Mr. Jacques Tousignant

¸

1430

Ms. Madeleine Dalphond-Guiral

¸

1435

Mr. Jacques Tousignant

Ms. Madeleine Dalphond-Guiral

Mr. Jacques Tousignant

¸

1440

The Vice-Chair (Mr. Jerry Pickard)

Mrs. Diane Ablonczy (Calgary—Nose Hill, Canadian Alliance)

Mr. Jacques Tousignant

Mrs. Diane Ablonczy

¸

1445

Mr. Jacques Tousignant

Mrs. Diane Ablonczy

Ms. Christiane Gagnon

Mr. Jacques Tousignant

¸

1450

The Vice-Chair (Mr. Jerry Pickard)

Mr. Jacques Tousignant

The Vice-Chair (Mr. Jerry Pickard)

Mr. Jacques Tousignant

The Vice-Chair (Mr. Jerry Pickard)

Mr. Jacques Tousignant

The Vice-Chair (Mr. Jerry Pickard)

¸

1455

Mr. Jacques Tousignant

The Vice-Chair (Mr. Jerry Pickard)

¹

1500

Mr. Jacques Tousignant

The Vice-Chair (Mr. Jerry Pickard)

Ms. Hélène Scherrer (Louis-Hébert, Lib.)

Mr. Jacques Tousignant

Ms. Hélène Scherrer

¹

1505

Mr. Jacques Tousignant

Ms. Hélène Scherrer

Mr. Jacques Tousignant

¹

1510

Ms. Hélène Scherrer

Mr. Jacques Tousignant

Le vice-président (M. Jerry Pickard)

Mr. Jacques Tousignant

The Vice-Chair (Mr. Jerry Pickard)

¹

1515

Mr. Yves Côté (Vice-President, "Concept e Sécurité Technologie inc.")

¹

1520

The Vice-Chair (Mr. Jerry Pickard)

Mr. Gregory McConnell (Business Development Manager, LABCAL Technologies Inc.)

¹

1525

¹

1530

The Vice-Chair (Mr. Jerry Pickard)

Mrs. Diane Ablonczy

Mr. Gregory McConnell

Mrs. Diane Ablonczy

Mr. Gregory McConnell

Mrs. Diane Ablonczy

¹

1535

Mr. Gregory McConnell

Mrs. Diane Ablonczy

Mr. Gregory McConnell

Mrs. Diane Ablonczy

Mr. Gregory McConnell

¹

1540

Mrs. Diane Ablonczy

Mr. Gilles Gravel (Vice-President, Technologies, "Concept e Sécurité Technologie inc.")

Mrs. Diane Ablonczy

Mr. Gilles Gravel

¹

1545

Le vice-président (M. Jerry Pickard)

Ms. Hélène Scherrer

Mr. Gregory McConnell

Ms. Hélène Scherrer

¹

1550

Mr. Gregory McConnell

Mr. Serge Ferland (President and CFQ, LABCAL Technologies Inc.)

Mr. Gregory McConnell

M. Serge Ferland

Ms. Hélène Scherrer

Gregory McConnell

¹

1555

The Vice-Chair (Mr. Jerry Pickard)

Ms. Christiane Gagnon

M. Serge Ferland

Ms. Christiane Gagnon

M. Serge Ferland

º

1600

The Vice-Chair (Mr. Jerry Pickard)

Mr. Gilles Gravel

Ms. Christiane Gagnon

Mr. Gilles Gravel

Ms. Christiane Gagnon

Ms. Hélène Scherrer

Ms. Christiane Gagnon

Mr. Gilles Gravel

º

1605

Mrs. Diane Ablonczy

The Vice-Chair (Mr. Jerry Pickard)

Mrs. Diane Ablonczy

Mr. Gilles Gravel

The Vice-Chair (Mr. Jerry Pickard)

Mr. Gregory McConnell

The Vice-Chair (Mr. Jerry Pickard)

Mr. Gregory McConnell

º

1610

Mrs. Diane Ablonczy

The Vice-Chair (Mr. Jerry Pickard)

Mr. Gregory McConnell

º

1615

The Vice-Chair (Mr. Jerry Pickard)

Mr. Gregory McConnell

º

1620

The Vice-Chair (Mr. Jerry Pickard)

Mr. Gregory McConnell

The Vice-Chair (Mr. Jerry Pickard)

Mrs. Diane Ablonczy

º

1625

Mr. Gregory McConnell

Mrs. Diane Ablonczy

The Vice-Chair (Mr. Jerry Pickard)

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CANADA

Standing Committee on Citizenship and Immigration

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NUMBER 039

l

2nd SESSION

l

37th PARLIAMENT

---

EVIDENCE

Monday, February 17, 2003

[Recorded by Electronic Apparatus]

¸  (1405)  

[English]

    The Vice-Chair (Mr. Jerry Pickard (Chatham—Kent Essex, Lib.)): Ladies and gentlemen, I call this meeting to order.

    We have Mr. Jacques Tousignant with us as a witness today from the Organizations of Rights and Freedoms of Quebec. He has submitted a brief. There are other briefs we will circulate, if I have permission from the committee. They are in French. It has been explained in the past that our travel commitments were only a couple of weeks ahead, and so though we would normally only accept briefs in both English and French, we've waived that on many occasions, because of the short notice to presenters. I would ask for the committee's view of that, and if it's okay, I would be more than happy to have these briefs submitted, because some written material is better than none. Thank you very much.

    Monsieur Tousignant.

[Translation]

    Mr. Jacques Tousignant (Consultant; Vice-President, "Ligue des droits et libertés"): Mr. Chairman, ladies and gentlemen, thank you for receiving me here this afternoon. I'm appearing as an individual and as a member of the Ligue des droits et libertés du Québec and as a member of the Ligue des droits et libertés, Quebec Section.

    With respect to the consultations the Canadian government conducts at certain times on major issues, allow me, as a member of a community organization, to emphasize that, very often, and this is somewhat the case in this instance, we find that the consultations do not get advertised as they should in order to alert all the groups that might be interested in expressing their opinion or position. In addition, the deadlines are very often too short for organizations that do not have research teams to help them prepare a strong case, particularly on complex issues such as Bill C-36, the omnibus bill on antiterrorism, or Bill C-17, and now Bill C-18.

    I'll begin by very briefly outlining the position of the Ligue des droits et libertés du Québec on this identity card project. We think it is preferable to stick to the current passport when it comes to using identity papers internationally. For movements within the country, we think we can very well continue to use social insurance cards and driver's licences.

    As for the permanent resident card, which was used last year, I think, on the one hand, that it represents an improvement for Canadians who were required to make do with a crumbling piece of paper as their main identity paper. So that's an improvement, but we ask that there be very strict control over the information entered on the card for permanent residents of Canada.

    Why do we prefer that there not be a switch to an identity card? I'll repeat two reasons which we support and that you have already heard a number of times. First, in terms of technology, this card will not be as secure as people would like to believe, and it will still be subject to potential falsification. Second, it could well be very expensive, even more expensive than the identity thefts that can be seen at the present time.

    We have other reasons. First, we believe this card is not necessary, although it is true that it could be useful at times. In addition, we understand that it may be extremely promising from a technological standpoint. However, as you know and as we know, it opens the way to a potential accumulation of information.

¸  (1410)  

    But we think, precisely, that it is time to restore a balance between adequate security measures against terrorist activities and the defence and promotion of Canadian values, of a democratic society, of a free society and a society that has established the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, which stands and which contains a list of rights that are enjoyed by Canadians and envied by foreigners.

    So we believe that a digitized card will be quite different from the identity cards that many countries such as France currently have. This does not fall under the same class of identity cards: it is a digitized card. We also know that authorities such as the RCMP have requested that citizens' criminal files be entered in the card. It is true that some 100 countries use an identity card, but we also know that other countries have rejected more recent plans to adopt an identity card. Unless I'm mistaken, Australia and New Zealand are two of those countries. And even in the United States, in the present context, Congress and the Senate have refused to adopt a national identity card.

    The main reason why we object to this identity card is that this plan is in addition to a series of measures that are all designed to lay bare the everyday behaviour not only of criminals and criminal suspects, but also of the entire population, and to submit this information to the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, CSIS, and perhaps the CSE and to make it available to police forces and even departments.

    We are thinking, for example, of this international traveller data base that was introduced last fall as an initiative by the Canada Customs and Revenue Agency on the basis of an extremely narrow act that was passed quickly in the fall of 2001. That data base has been expanded. It now includes people who travel by air and, in the course of this year, will include travellers crossing borders by boat, bus and train.

    There is also the Financial Transactions and Reports Analysis Centre of Canada, FTRACC, a secret monitoring service legally established a little more than a year ago which is responsible for analyzing all Canadian financial transactions of $10,000 or more. It focused on international transactions in 2002 and is now gradually concerning itself with domestic transactions of all kinds conducted at banks, trust companies, in short in all offices where financial transactions are conducted.

¸  (1415)  

Here again, we're dealing with an agency that acts in secrecy and conducts analyses for the RCMP and Canadian intelligence services.

    Under Bill C-17, there is a plan to establish a data base on people taking domestic flights within Canada and international flights as well. There is also this legal access plan under which all police departments and intelligence services in the country would be given access to information on all the activities of all Canadian citizens who appear in the computer systems.

    I could add, for example, that the RCMP has already constituted a data base containing the digitized photographs from the 10 million Canadian passports. It has also been announced that the police departments will be asking to have the use of video cameras on public thoroughfares legalized.

    How many minutes do I have left? Three or four more?

[English]

    The Vice-Chair (Mr. Jerry Pickard): We try to keep the presentations in the area of 5 to 10 minutes. Right now you're at almost 9, but 3 to 4 minutes more will be just fine.

[Translation]

    Mr. Jacques Tousignant: Very well. So there are all these intelligence systems. I'm thinking in particular of the plan for legalized access to Internet browsing, which is tantamount to a search into the private lives of each of us.

    I would point out to you that all these plans are designed to do much more than combat terrorism and criminals and crime. They are data bases that include all the citizens of this country. They also represent information-gathering activities which are carried on in silence, without our knowledge, without the people concerned--us--being able to correct incorrect information or even have a say in the way it may be interpreted.

    I will also emphasize that all these powers, which should always be considered as exceptional powers granted to intelligence services and police departments, are exercised without any provision having been made in their enabling statutes for penalties for abuses of these surveillance methods. In our view, this is extremely dangerous for democracy in Canada.

    I'm coming to the conclusion. We hope that the Government of Canada will not yield stupidly and feebly to American pressure, when the United States itself has rejected, for American citizens, both the identity card and legal access, as you probably saw in the American newspapers last week. In other words, what our government wants to impose on us, the U.S. Congress and Senate rejected last week for American citizens by a very large majority. We don't think it's up to us to take the lead in adopting measures that go far beyond what could be called security measures in any reasonable sense of that term.

    Furthermore, while it is true that, on the one hand, the technological means available for gathering intelligence are constantly expanding, we feel it is becoming increasingly appropriate for us to set criteria and guidelines. It is important that, at certain points, even though it is possible to adopt a particular type of surveillance or information-gathering system, we should deliberately stay within limits out of respect for people's freedom, privacy and the great privilege we have had in this country to date of being able to conduct our personal lives, not under the watchful and silent eye of police departments, but in private, which enables each of us to live with the opportunity to think and express our dreams, thoughts, plans, desires and needs. If, on the other hand, we expand these monitoring methods, as we have undertaken to do in Canada, a genuine, deep and permanent self-censorship movement will gradually grow among the public.

¸  (1420)  

People will be afraid to express themselves. One could even say that people will be afraid to consult a doctor, especially if they have a particular psychological or even physical problem. Without being able to determine exactly where this information is or where all these eyes watching us are, we run the risk of feeling that each of us is dragging our past along behind us and that that past is subject to interpretation by more or less intelligent, more or less judicious judges, with whom those concerned will not have the opportunity, as every good citizen should have, of ascertaining any charge that is levelled or of correcting facts if any errors have been made.

    I'll stop there. Once again, we believe that the card is not necessary. The main reason, in addition to all the others, is that we want the government to put a limit on this network of information systems which it is imposing on the Canadian nation. Thank you.

¸  (1425)  

[English]

    The Vice-Chair (Mr. Jerry Pickard): Merci, monsieur Tousignant.

    Because Madeleine has to be away early, I'm going to allow her to start the questioning, followed by Diane.

    Madeleine.

[Translation]

    Ms. Madeleine Dalphond-Guiral (Laval Centre, BQ): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

    Good afternoon, Mr. Tousignant. I entirely subscribe to your preamble, in which you said that a debate such as this must be broadly based. This debate on the identity card must focus on the meaning we as a society and as members of that society attach to rights and freedoms and the right to privacy.

    Since the events of September 2001, in our various constituencies, and I believe that all my colleagues around this table can attest to this, we have seen that citizens want their individual freedom restricted in exchange for an appearance of security. We have very definitely sensed this. The extreme rapidity with which legislation actually limiting citizens' rights and freedoms has been passed attests to this. Some groups of intellectuals have stated their opinions on this, of course, but there has not been any popular support.

    Do you believe that a debate such as this on the identity card can in fact result in this kind of necessary thinking? We are currently experiencing something of a crisis in democracy, and citizens should perhaps be aware of that. Wouldn't holding a debate on this be one way of stating the real problems? That's my first question, which is really a theoretical one.

    There's one thing that I would like to ask you. Costs may be associated with the introduction of an identity card. Personally, I strongly resist the idea of a mandatory identity card. In addition, let's think about an identity card that would be optional and that would contain a very specific and very limited amount of information. There would be no question, for example, of including a person's place of birth. After what we've seen at the American border, we don't want to include the place of birth. Nor would there be any question of including a summary of a person's health information. We don't want a catch-all card, like the cards of some countries which contain a great deal of information. I think this must be debated.

    But when you see the trouble the Canadian government had just in managing social insurance cards, of which there are far more than there are Canadian citizens, when you consider the prohibitive and truly incredible cost of the firearms registry, which was far removed from all citizens, you wonder if we would be able to properly manage a mandatory identity card.

    In my view, not having an identity card will not in any way slow down the technological developments that have resulted in the fact that each of us here is much more well known that we would like to be. That's a fact. I don't think that having a card or not having a card will change anything. I believe we're all involved in this.

    Mr. Jacques Tousignant: I would like to make a few comments on your questions and remarks. You say there has been some popular support for antiterrorism measures over the past two years. It's easy to obtain that support. When you ask people whether they would agree to have their rights restricted or to have some of their freedoms limited provided they are guaranteed a satisfactory degree of security, they say yes. When you ask people if they are opposed to terrorism, they say they are, of course, but when you go into details...

     With regard to popular support, let's remember how the discussions on Bill C-36 went in the fall of 2001. We saw that there was a genuine increase in awareness among the Canadian public in late November or early December. I'm thinking in particular of that seminar organized in Toronto by the professors of the University of Toronto Faculty of Law on the various aspects of Bill C-36, a seminar which had considerable impact in English Canada. From that moment on, there was genuine momentum, and the government invoked closure in the debate. I even saw something that was utterly unfortunate from the standpoint of someone who is in favour of democratic debate: I saw the person who was chairing the Senate mock senators who opposed Bill C-36 and who sought amendments to that bill. So the debate was aborted.

    Increasing national awareness in Canada is definitely a fairly slow process. That's attributable to a certain number of factors, including its sparse population. It's also due to the means of communication, the newspapers people read, the type of newscasts they watch and so on.

     With regard to public reaction, I'm thinking, among other things, of the legal access issue. At the Ligue des droits et libertés, we had 15 days to react to Bill C-36, an extremely complex bill--it's a 170-page file if I'm not mistaken--which questioned the fundamental principles of Canadian criminal law. The Ligue des droits et libertés had 15 days to prepare the written brief it presented to the joint committee. In our opinion, these are democratic exercises which, in some instances, border on parody. The case of the legal access issue was more or less the same thing. The government's initial plan was to visit three cities in Canada. I've been told committee members eventually went to some 20 cities, but the original consultation plan did not even include Toronto. There was Montreal, I believe, Vancouver and a third city, which might have been Halifax. I don't remember.

     Would submitting the identity card issue to the people be an opportunity to survey the public? Perhaps. Furthermore, this may be the most innocent project in one sense, if it is detached from the context, if it is detached from the others. A bill submitted to the Canadian people as a whole concerning legalized access given to police departments and intelligence services to all our Internet browsing, e-mail, credit cards, telephone accounts, all our bank transactions and so on would reach the people. It seems to me that, in a democracy, we should do it, and not to try to pass a bill of this importance quickly, as though it were an innocent bill.

¸  (1430)  

    Ms. Madeleine Dalphond-Guiral: It seems to me that democracy is expressed when people take charge of it. It has to be known that, when a government decides to move ahead with unspeakable things... Remember that we firmly opposed the bill you referred to, and we were not the only ones who did so, but, in our parliamentary system, it's the government that decides. We agree to live with that because you can never exercise enough pressure to make the government back down. With the war, perhaps messages are being sent, but, there again, Mr. Bush doesn't appear to understand.

    I'm thinking that, if we can debate the significance of all that, we will be taking a big step toward making people aware. People are increasingly disgusted with politics. They don't want to take an interest in it; it's well and good for other people and, in any case, it doesn't change a thing. I believe it is high time for us to prove that, if you take charge of politics in hand, you can change things and command respect for people's opinions and wishes.

    You didn't answer me on the very boring part related to costs and management. Is that a part that interests you? You can say that this is not very useful or necessary, that it could ultimately be extremely dangerous for our privacy, but there are also costs. If you tell people that it's going to cost so much and ask them if they still want it, some will undoubtedly backtrack.

¸  (1435)  

    Mr. Jacques Tousignant: Yes. Like all other citizens, I immediately think of the known and foreseeable administrative costs of the firearms registry program in Canada. That obviously gives us pause. It's not an aspect of the issue that we specifically studied because our contribution is aimed instead at the promotion of civil rights and economic, social and cultural rights.

    Ms. Madeleine Dalphond-Guiral: What's your position on a card that would be merely optional and would have very specific parameters?

    Mr. Jacques Tousignant: As for many other things, we think it's better not to put your foot in the door. We haven't had this card until now. We have passports and imitation identity cards, and they work. It's a bit like London police officers, who, until now, have always worked without carrying arms. Why would they start bearing arms? In the march on the American consulate on Saturday, there were people from the RCMP, but they were in civilian clothes, they weren't dressed as martians.

    Coming back to your question specifically, I think it's better not to head in that direction, one of the reasons being that this card would first be optional, but would become mandatory. Once again, pressure being what it is, there would be a temptation to add information to the basic information which might be considered sufficient. I don't mean that that's an absolutely rigid position of the people of the Ligue des droits et libertés, but we feel we haven't needed this to date. Our American neighbours, who would very much like us to have this kind of card, don't have one for themselves. That's another reason not to have one. There is also the question of costs which you have raised. Why not continue along as we have done until now?

    Not having a card prevents everyone from asking us for it and prevents the police from starting to ask us for it at any time. Perhaps things are much better that way. Once again, the fact that a police officer does not have a right to ask someone to identify himself without just cause is part of the old tradition we have inherited from the British common law as part of our ways of doing things in our life and society. The technology is there, but we are not required to use it. What is important is that we guarantee a certain way of life in society, in which freedom in all its forms is not only...

¸  (1440)  

[English]

    The Vice-Chair (Mr. Jerry Pickard): Maybe I could try to get you to answer a little more briefly. I think you've made the same point several times.

    I'm going to move on to Diane. We have about 20 minutes left, so that would split up the time equally.

    Diane, you have the floor.

    Mrs. Diane Ablonczy (Calgary—Nose Hill, Canadian Alliance): Thank you very much for coming. I regret that I do not speak French well enough to converse with you in French. It would be very painful for you if I tried. I'm sure the translator will do a much better job for me.

    I appreciate organizations such as yours, watchdogs for citizens on their civil rights and their privacy. In this case we are having a debate; the minister has said we need to have a debate about a national identity card. It seems to me, though, before we have a debate, we need to understand what we're talking about. So my question to you is, what do you understand the minister to mean by the need for a national identity card? What do you think his purpose is and what ill is he trying to cure, as far as you're aware?

[Translation]

    Mr. Jacques Tousignant: In his speech, Mr. Coderre said that he wanted to prevent identity thefts. He would like it to be easier to identify everyone. We think, rightly or wrongly, that the American government is suggesting to the Canadian government that it would be easier for Canadian citizens to cross the border if they had a digitized identity card.

    You're asking me why the government is pushing an identity card project. I think that technology businesses are increasingly in the market to sell all their discoveries, all their products, all their software; they are suggesting that they will readily provide all kinds of information that we've never had.

    You ask me for the reasons I perceive as a citizen. I've given them to you. I believe the government has four reasons for moving ahead with the card project. I still think it's not necessary because things have worked well until now.

    Even if a new identity card is introduced, cards will still be falsified. We will not completely escape one of the problems the government wishes to solve, and a new type of monitoring will be imposed on the general public in addition to a number of other types of monitoring that the government imposes or wants to impose on it.

[English]

    Mrs. Diane Ablonczy: It's not entirely clear to me, as a member of Parliament and as a member of this committee, exactly what is being attacked here. Surely we're not in the line of manufacturing business for high-tech companies. That would be completely objectionable. Surely we're not in the business of kowtowing to our neighbours. I was just looking at their Homeland Security Act, which was passed last year, and section 1514 says, “Nothing in this Act shall be construed to authorize the development of a national identification system or card.” So I'm certainly not prepared to force something upon the Canadian populace that the American government has explicitly rejected in its own legislation.

    As you say, if the motivation is identity security, that's a pipe dream. I was just talking this weekend to someone who does a lot of business in the Philippines. He said the motto over there is, “If you can make it, we can fake it.” That's true in many parts of the globe, including Canada. The technology available to counterfeiters is every bit as sophisticated as the technology available to governments--quite frankly, from what we've seen lately, maybe a lot more sophisticated, considering some of the messes we have in government departments.

    I share your confusion, I guess. We're guessing at the possible motivation, but it's not particularly clear.

    I want to ask you this. The social insurance number was brought in during the 1960s. I'm sure you were watching even at that time. It was to be an identifier for our pension plan and when we use government programs, such as the employment insurance program. Now, of course, people ask for our SIN numbers when we rent a house, when we apply for a credit card; almost every form you can possibly fill out has a section for your SIN number, even though it's completely against the law to ask for that information--it's certainly not required by law. The Privacy Commissioner of British Columbia referred to this as “function creep”. In other words, if you have a technological or bureaucratic process, the use for that tends to expand. As a civil rights activist, you must have seen this happen. I'd like you to comment on the danger of “function creep” when it comes to this kind of information.

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[Translation]

    Mr. Jacques Tousignant: What does function creep mean?

[English]

    Mrs. Diane Ablonczy: I'm sure our translators are having a great time.

[Translation]

    Ms. Christiane Gagnon: The technology exists and needs are created.

    Mr. Jacques Tousignant: You're right in saying that the social insurance card plays the role of identity card in a certain number of cases, but that's precisely part of what we are saying. We accept the fact that that card can occasionally play the role of identity card, and we find it less invasive and less dangerous than the card the government wants to propose or impose on us.

    You're talking about the national identity card, but we're also thinking about the difficulty the government has managing it. There are more than a million social insurance cards in circulation in Canada that have no real holder. There are 1.2 million of them, I believe. We prefer imperfect means of identifying citizens more perfect means that risk actually invading people's private lives. People's entire lives will be known to police departments and intelligence services because the card will increasingly be a gateway to all information concerning every citizen.

    So we think it preferable that, on certain occasions, it be a little more complicated for the police to check and authenticate someone's identity. We prefer that to a police system in which everyone lives under the watchful and silent eye of the people monitoring people's everyday lives. We prefer that imperfect means, while at the same time hoping the government manages to improve control over the issuing and circulation of social insurance cards.

¸  (1450)  

[English]

    The Vice-Chair (Mr. Jerry Pickard): Thank you very much, Monsieur Tousignant.

    I find it relatively difficult to put together some of your thoughts. You say, on the one hand, the Americans have rejected the card and, on the other hand, the Americans have forced Canadians to put a card together. Is that just speculation on your part? Do you have any information which would lead you to believe that?

[Translation]

    Mr. Jacques Tousignant: An initial answer is that, in the first Patriot Act--because it appears a second one is coming--the American government refused to tend toward adopting an identity card for American citizens.

[English]

    The Vice-Chair (Mr. Jerry Pickard): They all know that. You're making the point that the Americans have rejected it and they forced Canadians to consider it.

[Translation]

    Mr. Jacques Tousignant: No, I wasn't talking about forcing, but in light of everything we hear, even from businessmen, and of everything that's written in the newspapers, one can consider it a pressing invitation. I believe even Canadian businessmen would be quite in favour of this new American request to ease border crossings. So it's a pressing invitation or suggestion by the American government.

[English]

    The Vice-Chair (Mr. Jerry Pickard): Thank you, Jacques. That helps me with what I was hearing.

[Translation]

    Mr. Jacques Tousignant: I'm going to extrapolate. Last week, the U.S. Congress and Senate refused to authorize full implementation of Admiral Pointdexter's Total Information Awareness plan in the United States. Congress and the Senate said no. They said that there would be no access to information that can be provided by the computer services of all kinds used by Americans, that there would be no access respecting American citizens. They draw a distinction between American citizens and the citizens of other countries. It should be borne in mind that the plan to provide legalized access to information contained in computer systems is part of the International Convention on Cybercrime. Under one of the components, in each country, signatories will constitute data bases or give police access to all information contained in the computer systems on every citizen, but the final component of the convention provides for an exchange of information between member countries, as a result of which the United States will eventually be able to obtain information on American citizens from Canadian intelligence services. However, last week, Congress said no. It said that there would be no legal access in respect of American citizens. So the citizens of other countries can be monitored, but not American citizens.

[English]

    The Vice-Chair (Mr. Jerry Pickard): We have a Privacy Act that does prevent sharing of information from one department to another department to another department in our country. One of the problems this committee has is that the minister has opened the debate, but not spelled out what this card may or may not do. The minister has said, let's have a public debate; I'm not setting goals, I'm not setting parameters, I'm not saying where we're at or where we may go, I am saying it is time that we had a debate on a national card. Some folks have termed it the supercard, which I thought I heard today. Other folks look at it as purely a identity card using some means by which we can be more secure as to who a person is. What we have today is a signed card. Quite frankly, as you said, it's not a secure card, nor will it be secure in the future. Technology is changing dramatically. There are people, I would agree, who can move forward with technology underground as well as others can on the surface, but it seems to me that by using the best means we have, we should be able to identify someone through a card.

    I don't know where this debate will go. There are those in the country who say it's good, those who say, no, it invades our personal rights too far. I think your position has been very clear, that debate in Canada should go on, so that we can hear all the different aspects, but eventually to bring this into some kind of forum, which is going to be needed, I think, in the future. We have heard in Halifax, St. John's, P.E.I., and Fredericton, and I'm sure the other part of the committee has heard in Toronto and western Canada, that we need parameters on this. We need to know exactly what we're talking about. One of the difficulties we have with a debate where there are no parameters is that all kinds of things creep in about the whole issue. I find it quite difficult to view it within a reasoned scope, because it's too broad. We don't know where we're going with that card. My view is that the card should be an identifier, and if it is an identifier, it would give security, but would not infringe upon people's rights and privacy. Everybody can speculate a hundred different things, but until the ground rules are set by legislation, I don't know whether we'll ever have clarity on that question.

    Maybe you could respond to that.

¸  (1455)  

[Translation]

    Mr. Jacques Tousignant: Here are some partial answers.

    First of all, we already have identity papers. When we cross borders, when we are outside Canada, it is particularly important to have good identity papers. The Canadian passport was reviewed again a few years ago to make it more secure. We already have a good document.

    As for permanent residents of Canada, the card was introduced, and it is, once again, an identity card. With regard to that card, we wanted to very clearly establish that nothing more should appear on it than what is found in the Canadian passport. We think, and we have even more reasons to believe, in view of all the many new methods that have appeared in the past two years for monitoring all Canadian citizens, that it is preferable to stick to our current situation, even though technology holds the promise of greater security.

    As was noted a moment ago, even with advanced technology, there will always be a way for people to falsify the cards, steal them and I don't know what else.

[English]

    The Vice-Chair (Mr. Jerry Pickard): If I say your concern is what could be added to the card, not the security measure card itself, is that reasonably accurate? I've been in India and I've seen passports piled a foot high that have all been forged and been confiscated. We all know our documents are not as secure as one would like to think they are. However, as was said earlier, it's a possibility five years hence that other cards may not be as secure. Security is important, but your concern is that too much information on a card shared with too many people will cause a social and personal problem on privacy. Is that accurate?

¹  (1500)  

[Translation]

    Mr. Jacques Tousignant: Yes, that's part of it. It seems to me that the identity card project... [Technical difficulty—Editor] ...a purported antiterrorist struggle. It's in part for border problems, or I don't know what else, but it's also because of American pressure that this identity card project is being ramped up.

[English]

    The Vice-Chair (Mr. Jerry Pickard): Again, that's speculation. The minister has not spelled out the parameters of that card or what the fight is about. The minister has said we need a debate on a national card. I'm not going to try to set the parameters. Until the minister does, I guess we're all talking in general terms. I think that's good.

    Madame Scherrer.

[Translation]

    Ms. Hélène Scherrer (Louis-Hébert, Lib.): Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

    I particularly appreciate the fact that the bill has been put on the table and that Canadians, like you, Mr. Tousignant, have been allowed to intervene. I also particularly appreciate the fact that we have come to Quebec City, because committees don't often sit in Quebec City. I find that very interesting. This is the first time I have attended a sitting of a committee that has come to sit in Quebec City.

    I agree with you, Mr. Chairman, when you say that the minister's objective was not to harm Canadians as a whole or to put in place a card that would be more complex, poorly managed and less secure, but rather to introduce a card that would be easy to manage, more secure and would better respond to people's needs, to the extent the parameters desired on the identity card had been selected. I believe the identity card could simply bear some kind of print, a facial scan and eye scan or fingerprint, that would simply indicate that Mr. Tousignant is in fact Mr. Tousignant. The card could simply link you to your name, or there could be an exceptional data base that would provide information on your medical, psychological and tax history.

    At the outset, you stated two premisses in explaining why you were opposed to this card. The first is that it will be too expensive and that its cost will probably be higher than the costs currently associated with all the forged documents that exist. I wondered whether you had any figures on that.

    Mr. Jacques Tousignant: No. I said on that point that I was merely endorsing objections to introducing the card which had previously been made by others a number of times.

    Ms. Hélène Scherrer: All right. We know that the death certificate, birth certificate and passport currently enable us to gain access to employment insurance, for example, and that this costs the economy and contractors a fortune. Until now, we have not known those costs because they had not been evaluated.

    Your second premiss is that this card will not be as secure as the other cards. I don't believe we can say at the present time how much more or less secure it may be than other cards.

    I want to come back to an argument you have advanced a number of times, which is that we don't need it at this time. Ten years ago, I had no computer and I didn't feel I needed one. Now I have one, and I couldn't do without it. I believe that technology gets to us, and I intend to trust technology, a certain type of technology, which enables us to identify what we want to have on a card. We are currently filling files at employment insurance, Revenue Canada, the doctor's office, police departments and so on. I get the impression that my life is much more an open book than if I had a card for which we could select the parameters. I don't want to cause paranoia in saying that the colour of our underwear will appear on the card we're going to carry on with us, but I tend to believe that the technology now enables us to choose to make a connection between Mr. Tousignant and the print on the card so that it is easier to identify him.

    You are right in saying that the card can be forged because someone will definitely find a way to falsify it. The same thing occurs in the case of currency. You can introduce all the additional features you want, there will always be someone who ultimately manages to find them. Don't you think that, with very advanced methods, technology could control this a little? Or do you really feel that, when we give in to high technology, we get the impression we lose control completely?

¹  (1505)  

    Mr. Jacques Tousignant: Technology itself doesn't scare me. And I don't think technology scares my colleagues from the Ligue. It's the use that's made of it. We feel we've been had in the past two years. Our democratic life is threatened in the medium term by the secret use of these powers by police departments, without there being any direct control by Parliament or Canadian society. This is the context in which we see this project arising, another project that relies on technology, and we wonder whether it's necessary. It would undoubtedly be useful at times, but we don't think it's necessary.

    On the matter of technology, now that the automobile exists, police officers often do their city patrols by car. There are also a certain number of cities that have rediscovered the virtues of police foot patrols. In other words, technology is useful in some cases, but not in others. It's up to us to determine what will adequately ensure security, but also what will guarantee life in a free society in which people are respected, in which they are not unnecessarily disturbed, in a society where searches are not conducted without just cause. And we must protect that now. We expect the Canadian government to ensure, somewhat better than it is doing now, the balance between collective security requirements and the promotion, respect for and exercise of the rights of free citizens.

    Ms. Hélène Scherrer: I agree with you when you say we get the impression that, through various mechanisms or criteria, the government always comes looking for a little more information: on your driver's licence, on a health insurance card, on your tax return. All these documents are required at one time or another: to cross the border or obtain a passport, birth certificate, driver's licence or health insurance card. However, don't you think that a card that would limit the information... Now, every time I fill out an application for my driver's licence, I'm asked for all kinds of information: a birth certificate and all kinds of information. I'm going to take out my wallet and show you the cards I have had to apply for by each time providing a little more information on my family, my medical history and so on. If we had a single digital identity card on which the information would be controlled, perhaps we'd be asked for less information when we want to renew the other cards.

    Perhaps the debate should be about all the identity cards that are currently used. We show our credit card, our driver's licence, our birth certificate and our passport here and there. When you add up all the information that's gathered before we are given our cards, it's everything anyone needs in order to know us well.

    Mr. Jacques Tousignant: That's true, but I prefer that people have to obtain individual pieces of information from various cards. What you're referring to is precisely one of the potential dangers. You say that, instead of dragging around a lot of cards, we would have only one. But that's precisely what is extremely risky, in my opinion. I don't think we should go in that direction without carefully examining all the potential repercussions.

    We haven't spoken, for example, of the use that could be made of that kind of card by forgers or people interested in supplying more or less secret information, or agencies that would be created to break into information systems and provide information to potential employers, for example, or I don't know what else.

¹  (1510)  

    Ms. Hélène Scherrer: But that already exists.

    Mr. Jacques Tousignant: That already exists, precisely, but, knowing what we know, you have to think of the risk that the cards may not be used as much as we would like to protect citizens, but that they might be used instead to give people who want to use citizens' private information in new ways to obtain that information.

    Le vice-président (M. Jerry Pickard): Thank you, Mr. Tousignant.

[English]

    We've run a bit over time, but your testimony is very important to us. We are pleased that you took time to come and register your concerns with the committee. They certainly will be looked at very carefully. The nice part about this open debate is that we have opportunities to listen to all kinds of people on the issue and bring together more of a collective reasoning towards what is potentially, as you pointed out at first, that balance between security and the Canadian way. I think that was an important statement to leave on the table at the outset of your comments. Thank you very much. I do appreciate it.

[Translation]

    Mr. Jacques Tousignant: I would like to add two comments. Our wish is that the Canadian government begin promoting respect for civil liberty and fundamental freedoms in Canada, so that we go beyond this mere language of security, as though it were the one and only right Canadians value at this time.

    Our other wish is that committees such as yours manage to publicize the tours they conduct in Canadian cities to a greater degree and that organizations have more time than we had to prepare to appear before committees such as yours.

    Thank you very much for receiving us.

[English]

    The Vice-Chair (Mr. Jerry Pickard): Now I would like to welcome to our committee LABCAL, represented by Serge Ferland and Gregory McConnell, and witnesses from Concept e Sécurité Technologies. I'm sure Yves Côté or Gilles Gravel is going to help us understand a little more about electronic technology. I want to thank you for coming.

    Since we have a target of about an hour, if you could keep your presentation to 5 to 10 minutes, that would be very helpful. Then we will go to the rest of the committee for the balance of the time, and they may go into some of the detail a little further with questions.

    I also want to say thank you very much to LABCAL for bringing us a brief in both official languages. Given the short time you had, we very much appreciate it. I know that took a great deal of effort on your part.

    I will go to Monsieur Côté first.

¹  (1515)  

[Translation]

    Mr. Yves Côté (Vice-President, "Concept e Sécurité Technologie inc."): Good afternoon. Thank you for receiving us here today. The purpose of my presentation is to inform you that there is indeed a solution that would satisfy your need for a certificate of authenticity of the person, while meeting your expectations regarding human rights protection. First, the mission of Concept e Sécurité Technologies Inc. is to design and promote new, simple, effective and cost-effective electronic applications in the security, authentication and other technological integration sectors. As our presentation is in French only, I will try to stay as close as possible to the text.

    Concept e Sécurité Technologies has a multidisciplinary team comprising five experts in computers, risk and security management and corporate management and finance. We have already assisted in a number of high-tech start-ups specializing in software and biotechnology, the development of highly secure systems for financial transactions, security consulting with large businesses and the international marketing and development of technological concepts.

    First, with regard to context, there has been an increase in awareness of security deficiencies as a result of the unfortunate events of September 11, and we have been in a state of crisis since that time. There is the problem of identification in customs and what are called hot points. There is also the matter of compliance with legislation on privacy and with the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Lastly, there are already controls at the various points in the verification process.

    The problems we have identified are, first, of course, the difficulty in certifying the validity of photographs on passports, driver's licences and other authentication documents. There are also the problems of falsification and duplication of documents and borrowed identities. There are also bottlenecks at checkpoints, in customs and elsewhere. Lastly, we have to consider globalization; in other words, the solution must be consistent with international standards of technological compatibility and in respect of legal limits, which differ from one country to another, and democratization. There are also the issues of technological deployment costs, user friendliness, reliability and availability.

    Our solution is a picture-based authentication algorithm making it possible to absolutely certify the validity of the authentication document, that is to say a card or permit such as a passport, citizenship card, driver's licence and so on. We're talking about a reliability factor of approximately 7.5⁵⁰.

    The strategic benefits are as follows. There is of course the infallibility of the document's authenticity, the unit cost of the document, card or passport, which remains very minor, ease of issuing and validation, and the minor cost of introducing and deploying the system. Our solution can also be used in conjunction with other methods for recognizing the person such as the use of biometrics, morphology and so on. Lastly, the owner of the document remains the sole owner of that information. We guarantee respect for personal information.

    Thank you for your attention.

¹  (1520)  

[English]

    The Vice-Chair (Mr. Jerry Pickard): Thank you very much, Yves.

    Now I go to Greg.

[Translation]

    Mr. Gregory McConnell (Business Development Manager, LABCAL Technologies Inc.): Good afternoon. First of all, I would like to introduce myself. My name is Gregory McConnell, and I'm from Labcal Technologies.

    Labcal is a company specializing in identity authentication technologies. We combine fingerprints, or biometrics, smart card and public key cryptography technologies to authenticate people's identities for IT security and physical access control.

    The purpose of our appearance here is to demystify or clarify the context in which biometrics could be used to authenticate a national identity card because there are a lot of false notions on this subject.

[English]

    I'd like to start my presentation by introducing the concept of nominative attribution of benefits. This is a term used in other industries, but it is a dedicated term we use to indicate where an ID card would allow its bearer to receive services, money, any benefits that could be offered. I'm mentioning this because in the case of national ID cards we would obviously be faced with a distribution of Canadian identity. When we say Canadian identity, we also implicitly say all sorts of government and social services that are unique to this country, a certain quality of life that is given to Canadians, both abroad and in Canada. So when considering nominative attribution of benefits or an ID card that would do so, I would like to stress the importance of considering two points. The first is the authentication of the identity of the person bearing the card, the second the validity and the integrity of the document or the ID card itself. Without those two things under control, we don't have a credible ID card system.

[Translation]

    I would now like to provide a brief introduction to fingerprint biometrics and to explain the context in which it could be used in relation to a national identity card.

    In this case, it would be used, and I emphasize this point, to authenticate the document, thus for authentication, not surveillance purposes. I'll come back to that a little later.

    The principle is that we do not use an image of the fingerprint, but once the digital fingerprint has been read, we extract unique features which are called minutiae. This is a principle recognized around the world, and in the legal community, among other. We extract unique features such as end lines on your print, bifurcations and islands, unique features which then enable us to plot them on an XYZ axis and give us coordinates for those characteristics.

    In short, we have a mathematical template of your print, which can be called a biometric profile. I repeat that this is not a picture of the print. This is what will be stored in reference on a card so that its user's identity can then be authenticated.

[English]

    I'd like to introduce another little concept called digital signature. I don't want to go into details--I can obviously back what we are quickly saying here with a more technical speech--but the idea is that we use a digital or electronic signature to protect the integrity, the second point I mentioned. By digitally signing all the data stored on these cards upon enrolment, we guarantee the card's integrity. It's sort of like a seal or a stamp that I put on the data I store on the card, including the fingerprint data. If anybody tried to tamper with that data, to change one bite of information on the card, the seal would automatically be broken and the system could detect it. That's for fraudulent use or copying the card.

    Also, this seal is unique to the exact government employee who issues that card. I can then trace, every time I read a card, the origin of that card to a valid authority. Obviously, if these cards are easy to copy and anybody can issue them, I have, once again, a faulty issuing system. I have to make sure they're only issued by authorized people or centres of enrolment, and then I can trust the information on them as a reference.

¹  (1525)  

[Translation]

    Let's continue on the use of fingerprint biometrics. We're referring to the authentication principle. Wherever this identity is checked, there will simply be a scanner, which will scan the digital print and compare it to a card.

    I'll give you an example. Here's a hand-held device. On one side, it reads the card; on the other, it reads the print. A comparison is done, and there is a match. If the match is positive, you have a valid identification. If the match is negative, someone may have tried to reproduce a card and a bad picture, but was unable to change the biometric reference. So you have a mismatch as a result of fraudulent use.

    I want to emphasize the importance of on-site authentication because a central data base, which is a bad idea when you're talking about biometrics, is not necessary. The idea here is to authenticate the identity certificates or documents circulated in the system. In the same way as a person today verifies a photo card visually by comparing it to the person in front of him, the transaction will be done on site. There is no need for a data base to check that. The same is true in the case of a card: you check the print on the card or the mathematical biometric reference on the card and compare it to what you've just scanned from the user. There's no need to interface with a central data base. This is an authentication that's being done, not surveillance.

    There is no need to know where you conduct the transaction, what transaction you're conducting or who you are. You need to ensure that the card presented means that its holder is a Canadian citizen claiming the benefits and advantages that arise from that status and that that holder also wants to prove that he or she is the Canadian citizen appearing on the card and not someone else. So its an authentication, not a verification.

    We enter fingerprints in data bases for applications used by enforcement agencies. These are, for example, data bases on criminals. If, for example, the government wished to check the histories of future airport employees, it could, as it does today if it wishes, check the criminal data bases to ensure it is not offering a key airport job, for example, to a criminal.

    This is another thing entirely. In terms of technology, this is even another system. There's one called AFIS, Automatic Fingerprint Identification System. These are central data bases. We're talking about one-to-one matching. We're talking about on-site verification of the biometric reference appearing on the card.

¹  (1530)  

[English]

    I'm very quickly brushing a portrait of what could be and how the technology is. The bottom line is that I'd like Canadians and this committee to consider biometric authentication as a means of securing the Canadian identity. We obviously are proud of a lot of the systems we've developed in this country. We are proud of a lot of the systems we've created that other countries cannot afford. Canadian identity means a lot of things in respect of government money, it means a lot of things in respect of personal identity. Minister Coderre mentioned a lot of identity theft problems in this country. This fingerprint is there to protect my identity, to make sure nobody, from abroad or from inside the country, steals this identity and gets in my name the benefits that are linked to this identity. So we're proposing here biometrics to protect one's identity and to protect, as a whole, the services and systems that are so dear and valued in this country.

    Thank you very much.

    The Vice-Chair (Mr. Jerry Pickard): Thank you very much, Greg.

    Diane.

    Mrs. Diane Ablonczy: Thank you for this presentation. I have some practical issues I'd like to explore with you.

    You have a card with your fingerprint on it that says “Gregory McConnell”. What's to stop someone else from using the same card, the same name, just with their own fingerprint?

    Mr. Gregory McConnell: Copying my card or simply creating another card?

    Mrs. Diane Ablonczy: Creating another card in your name.

    Mr. Gregory McConnell: That's where we could go into very technical details. There's a public key infrastructure that goes with this system. There's a central authority that has these long keys created by algorithms that are unique to that identity. We have enrolment devices that issue these cards and transfer those keys to the cards. I could install this system in China, in different countries around the world, without those keys being compatible with a system here. You could have the same technology working on an Italian ID, but as soon as you read the key, it will indicate that it's not generated by the same authority.

    What I'm getting to here is that it would be very difficult to use or create a device that would issue cards exactly the same as the ones issued by the Canadian government, because of those electronic public key principles that we use, also because all of these devices are proprietary to LABCAL, and they need to be unlocked by an authorized enrolment officer, with fingerprint and the public key certificate. I honestly don't want to bore everybody here, but there are a lot of recognized measures that are used to make a central authority, like the Canadian government, unique and all the cards it issues linked to that authority. So it would be very difficult for somebody in their basement to recreate a card like that.

    Mrs. Diane Ablonczy: I understand that, but we live in a world where high school hackers can get into the Pentagon computers, a world where people sell information. Industrial espionage is a high-stakes crime. So it's not impossible. Of course, the more secure our card is thought to be, the higher the stakes to duplicate it. We know there is no such thing as an unduplicatable card. We know it can be made difficult, but we know it's definitely not impossible, and we know the incentive to duplicate it would be strong.

    You've said the use of this card would not require a database.

¹  (1535)  

    Mr. Gregory McConnell: A database of fingerprints. It doesn't mean you don't want a database of citizen names and card numbers. I guess you have a database that shows names and passport numbers today.

    Mrs. Diane Ablonczy: If two people show up saying they're Gregory McConnell, with a card, there has to be some kind of database to cross-check, right?

    Mr. Gregory McConnell: Exactly.

    Mrs. Diane Ablonczy: Also, you said police services could check to see that an individual isn't wanted for anything, doesn't have a criminal record. That also requires some kind of access to a database.

    Mr. Gregory McConnell: First, I want to just conclude on the idea that nothing is impossible to hack into. When I speak of public key cryptography principles we use, there are world contests every year to determine the latest bit-length of signatures that are unhackable. The world's hackers get at it with processing power. There are standards for this. They've established that this latest standard, for example, would take maybe 30 years for all of the processing power in the world to find the unique signature key of the algorithm. So basically, it's very difficult. I'm not saying in two years somebody mightn't do it, but it was recently tested by hackers of this world.

    As you mentioned, nothing is unhackable. Here the question is to take what is the most secure thing available on the market and apply it. I cannot vouch for the future, but we're going from a system with birth certificates, very simple ID cards that a $25,000 printer will copy with holographic images and everything, passports that are obviously copiable. We sell these systems to people who say, what if somebody cuts my finger? I'm saying, you are using a password system right now, I'm making it more secure. I'm not saying it's impossible to hack, but we're trying to preserve an identity here and making sure that if we're spending money on this system, not just anybody will be able to benefit from it.

    Your other question was with reference to a central database for criminals and authentication. I want to separate the two, because the background check for criminals happens as we're speaking. I'm not proposing a system. It is up to the government to decide if that's okay. But the FBI and the RCMP currently have AFIS systems with fingerprints. The FBI has, I believe, 300 million. The NSA has one, and the RCMP, as I mentioned. So if today CATSA or Transport Canada hires an airport comptroller or somebody at an airport, before they employ that person and decide the credentials are right, they want to check. If that person has a key role, they want to check, and they do it right now in a lot of cases.

    If you want the fingerprint to check against something else, they capture the fingerprint now anyway for key personnel, so the fingerprint could actually be another format, another technology. There is no link in order for my technology to authenticate the document. I just wanted to separate surveillance and background checks and ID document authentication.

    When you sign your cheque or your credit card transaction at a restaurant, it's not necessary to indicate where you are and what you are doing. You're confirming, yes, I was here, this is my card, and I'm signing for it. And if I complain about this transaction one day, they will say, here it is.

¹  (1540)  

    Mrs. Diane Ablonczy: I've gone through that.

    By the way, I have a very interesting thing--I don't know if other members of the committee have seen this--from a company that does face scans. They have a whole pitch about why that's a much more useful identifier than a thumb print.

    But rather than go into that, I did have a question for Mr. Côté. You mentioned in your presentation that the technology would have respect for personal information. I wonder if you could expand on that, because a lot of witnesses we've heard and, quite frankly, a lot of members of Parliament are very concerned about personal information being amassed, who might use it, and how the use of it might expand. So I would be interested in your comments relating to those concerns.

[Translation]

    Mr. Gilles Gravel (Vice-President, Technologies, "Concept e Sécurité Technologie inc.") I'll answer your question. We would have liked to be able to provide you with a lot more detail on the technology. Unfortunately, this week, we spoke with our lawyers and they recommended that we withhold certain secrets because we are in the process of patenting our technological principle, which is relatively simple. That moreover is what makes it original and contributes to its performance. It's a system that can be incorporated in existing systems. So it's a very low-cost system.

    However, with respect to how it actually works, I must unfortunately wait before providing you with any information, in view of the fact that we are in a public sitting. However, we would be pleased to sit down with people and with our lawyers to explain our technology. Then we would have legal coverage that would enable us to go into much greater detail. So unfortunately, I cannot provide detailed answers to all the technological questions. What I can say now is that the system is effective.

[English]

    Mrs. Diane Ablonczy: I understand that, and if this idea, in spite of many best efforts, goes farther down the road, we'll certainly be looking for that.

    But let me ask you another question instead. You mentioned that the unit cost of these cards would be minimal. You said the implementation would be minimal and quick. I've been a member of Parliament for nine years, and I have never yet seen a government program that has minimal costs and is quickly put in place, so I'm a little skeptical. If you're trying to fingerprint 20 million people and put that information in an encoded place where it can be authenticated through whatever, with or without a database--I'm a little skeptical on there being no need for a database; somewhere you have to have a database--maybe you could tell the committee why you say it will be quick and cheap.

[Translation]

    Mr. Gilles Gravel: The easy answer that I can give you is that we use a very simple principle that reutilizes what currently exists such as, for example, the passport. We have a passport; a cost is currently associated with that passport. The cost of including our technology would be relatively minor. I can't explain it to you. If I explain it to you, I'll be giving you the recipe. So there will definitely be a certain deployment cost, and we can't hide that from you. If you make 20 million passports and add a cost to each of them, whether it costs 5¢ of $5, that will add costs somewhere, but costs can easily be controlled so as to spread them out, and not just at the Canadian level. This can give other countries the idea to use this technology. This method would become much more global, much more international. When you want much more security, our system, as mentioned earlier, makes it possible, among other things, to add biometrics or morphology. These are additions that permit much more in-depth verifications.

    If you wanted to go to extremes, DNA is the ultimate test, but we're not there. We're still looking for the simplest ways that will suit both government and citizens. That's what's important and that's what we've aimed at. I believe the simplest technologies are often forgotten. We were looking for the simplest and most effective method.

¹  (1545)  

    Le vice-président (M. Jerry Pickard): Merci, Gilles.

    Hélène.

    Ms. Hélène Scherrer: Coming back to Mr. Tousignant's testimony, we know that the three major irritants were cost, confidentiality and everything related to fraud. My first question is for those who already have a card.

    Wouldn't I have to provide other identity cards in order to obtain the card? But in providing those other identity papers to obtain my card, wouldn't I be opening the door again to potential fraud, since those documents I would be providing could be a false driver's licence or some other false card? That's my first question.

    Second, I would like you to tell me about costs that might be associated with such a card.

    Third, I would like a response to Mr. Tousignant's argument about confidentiality. Does this in fact provide access...?

    Mr. Gregory McConnell: The first question is a chicken and egg question. We offer a system for authenticating the document given to the final user. This could be used in the identity verification process. The transaction that is often conducted is verification of this final document. You don't do a full identity check each time. We are proposing a secure method for verifying that final document which is the national identity card. I would suggest that the government use the system currently in use for issuing a passport to verify the person's original identity. Of course, if I want to obtain a passport today or a national identity card, I hope that the government employees will ask me to be there in person, that they will ask me for my birth certificate and perhaps other photo ID. The initial authentication process must exist and it must be highly rigorous. Once that identity has been established beyond any doubt, a document is issued which can preserve that identity which has been established beyond any doubt. We're suggesting a method for authenticating it. If the passport office issues a passport guaranteeing a person's identity, but that document is not infallible, we have a problem. We certify that the citizen to whom the passport was issued is in fact Gregory McConnell, but that document may be falsified. At that point, the previous process becomes null and void.

    Ms. Hélène Scherrer: I want to make sure I understand. Once I receive the card I write my name on and which shows my fingerprint, there are no more problems. But to obtain the card, I could use a false passport.

¹  (1550)  

    Mr. Gregory McConnell: Exactly. The process of identifying the individual before the card is issued must be as rigorous as, if not more than, the process currently used to issue a new baptismal certificate or a new passport. The chain is only as strong as its weakest link. If the first link is very weak, the chain will be defective.

    Mr. Serge Ferland (President and CFQ, LABCAL Technologies Inc.): Today, we obviously can't prove our identity absolutely. We aren't even able to do that at this time because the system won't let us. There aren't even any documents that can... So you have to start somewhere.

    Mr. Gregory McConnell: Apart from the passport and baptismal certificate, but the day when everyone has to carry his baptismal certificate around everywhere... But here again, for people in the identity authentication industry, that document is very easy to falsify.

    As for costs, it is very difficult to advance any figures today. Like my colleagues, I would say that it will depend on many processes. The government often engages in very lengthy consultations, and the cost will have to be amortized. Smart cards will have to be issued to tens of millions of citizens. It may cost less than $10 per card; it might cost $5, $3 or $7. That's not the most expensive part. I believe that it's the professional and administrative processes related to the card that will cost the most.

    We are all aware of the major scandal surrounding the firearms card. It's a big problem, but why is it a problem? It's not the plastic card that is expensive; it's the administrative process. I'm a hunter, and I had to register my firearm and obtain a gun permit. I already had a hunting licence from the Government of Quebec. Now, for one firearm, I have three cards, two of which come from the federal government: one that tells me I am entitled to hunt and the other that tells me that a particular gun has a right to be registered. If I want to buy another weapon, I have to get another card. If I have eight weapons, I'll have eight cards. Tell me where the cost problem lies. Is it in the process or in the card?

    In addition, every time I request a new card, I have to send all that to a centralized system. I don't go on site. I have to send a lot of documents that must be validated, signed by a peace officer and so on. It's a very complicated process.

    However, the passport issuing process, which could serve as a model for a national identity card issuing process, is very simple. You go to a place which is authorized to issue proof of identity. There, the person is photographed after his or her identity cards have been validated and a passport, which is proof of identity, is issued a few weeks later.

    M. Serge Ferland: Issuing a card will cost $5 to $10. That's not the expensive part; it's all the necessary process for verifying someone's identity. That's what will be expensive.

    Ms. Hélène Scherrer: How could this card be an advantage if I need all the other identity papers to obtain it, to identify myself? How would that card be more useful to me than everything I already have in my wallet?

    Gregory McConnell: First, there is no official document that both is portable and validates a Canadian's identity. Formally, it's the passport. In a more day-to-day way, in Quebec, it's the driver's licence. I'm sure it's the same in a number of provinces: where a photo identity card is requested, it's the driver's licence that's requested. I obtain all kinds of services by presenting my driver's licence. If I lose my hospital card or my health insurance card, I'm asked for two photo ID cards. It's documents like those, as informal as the driver's licence, that I offer.

    I have previously spoken to people from the Société de l'assurance automobile du Québec, who said that this is an informal role they play and that they do not want because a legal responsibility is attached to the act of producing the reference identity document.

    So at one point, there will have to be an actual piece of identification that the government is prepared to endorse and accept as proof of identity. It will institute a highly stable identify verification system because what we currently have is a host of informal documents that can be falsified, even the passport. We have seen that the terrorists caught here and there have four or five passports from four or five different countries, and visas as well. I don't know whether any of you have seen the kind of paperwork a landed immigrant or permanent resident has to deal with, but there are very few methods for authenticating those documents.

¹  (1555)  

[English]

    The Vice-Chair (Mr. Jerry Pickard): Thank you.

    Madame Gagnon.

[Translation]

    Ms. Christiane Gagnon: I would like to ask a few more technical questions, but I understand that you are subject to confidentiality requirements regarding the algorithm and biometrics, the two technological developments that seem to ensure document authenticity and that already exist.

    You mentioned the health insurance card, passport and driver's licence. But in the case of a document that has already been falsified, your card will authenticate a false document, a false passport, for example. So there's already a problem. Do you have to redo the entire process for authenticating the information in those documents? Do you take a document and authenticate it saying that this person is really Christiane Gagnon, that she lives at such and such an address, or do you take all the documents...? I have a little trouble understanding that there will be no management of data that will be compiled in order to issue that document, regardless of the technique you submit to us today. I have a little trouble understanding that there will be no management of the information that is in any one of those documents. Perhaps you could explain that to me.

    Regardless of the technique, the other thing that is a problem for me is that, ultimately, we're reversing the approach we have always had of believing in the good faith of all citizens of Quebec and Canada. We are people of good faith, and now we're going to have proof of identity that will say whether or not we are good citizens. I almost feel guilty because it's as though we're the only ones who need it, while other countries don't need it. The United States, for example, is our neighbour, and the Americans don't need to show that they're good citizens. It's precisely because of this kind of argument that we have refused to approve a document of authenticity.

    M. Serge Ferland: You also have to turn the problem around. I, Serge Ferland, have no interest in anyone using my identity. A card that is good, valid, which has been verified, authenticated and ensures my identity protects me. It also prevents others from using my identity, which is a significant protection factor for me.

    Ms. Christiane Gagnon: Don't you think that the fact we have a document of authenticity will make us less vigilant? That document could also be falsified. I'm sure someone will find a way to break through all the controls you think you've established and then we'll give up and say there was a document of authenticity.

    Since September 11, we have wanted to combat terrorism. If we had been more vigilant, we could have known that all of that was organized and could have known the terrorists' names a lot earlier, but there was a kind of laisser-faire attitude because we thought we would never be hit here in North America. I have a bit of a problem with this.

    M. Serge Ferland: You're right. We want to establish an identity card today and we don't even know what documents to use to establish it. Lastly, we're considering the problem in this way and we don't even have documents that we could use as a reference and that would absolutely confirm a person's identity. So there is still a risk of issuing cards to someone who's not there because there are no rules. But one day we'll have to stop the machine. We'll have to say that we're adopting a procedure, a mechanism that will enable us to verify a person's identity with maximum certainty. Once that's done, we'll be able to freeze that person's identity with a card that is issued and that will prove that person's identity. We'll have to do that one day.

    We have no documents that enable us to do that at this time. We have nothing and we were talking about this a moment ago. That's really where the problem lies. If we wanted to issue a card today, we wouldn't have the necessary documents to do so. We don't know what process we're going to adopt.

º  (1600)  

[English]

    The Vice-Chair (Mr. Jerry Pickard): Thank you.

    Gilles, do you wish to comment on it as well?

[Translation]

    Mr. Gilles Gravel: I always take the simplest route. I think we have two problems here. First, we have the problem of globalization. There are people who come here and those who are here. I immediately think at the outset, authenticity is treated as a problem. Ultimately, that problem is between the issuer and the person wishing to have his identity authenticated.

    When you apply for a passport, you take a photograph with you that you hand over to the passport office, but as our colleague said a moment ago, there is no procedure for saying whether the person opposite is the right person. So we're not even talking about a technological problem; we're talking about an issuing problem.

    Furthermore, when you consider globalization, it's the same problem. Who certifies for me that the person from the Middle East has a valid name, address, citizenship and passport? You need a simple and effective method for doing that. Unfortunately, I won't give you my recipe today because that's part of our patent, but you always have to consider the fact that the first problem that must be solved is between the issuer of the document and the citizen. A good citizen has a way of authenticating his identity, and I think the first thing he has to do is to present his papers in person. When you go to pick up your passport, you should be present. That's ultimately the first act of authentication. Notwithstanding all the papers you fill out. Is this the right person who is in front of me? I have a photograph and I look at the person. I have to ask myself whether that person corresponds to the picture on the actual passport.

    When you return to Canada, customs officers look at a person's photograph and papers. So it always takes place between two individuals. There are ways to go beyond that to verify whether the person there has had cosmetic surgery, if that person is wearing make-up or whatever. We have ways, such as biometrics, to certify that a person is actually the one he or she claims to be.

    But the basic problem is not that; it's in the issuing of the initial document. That should not be forgotten.

    Ms. Christiane Gagnon: What about bottlenecks at authentication control points? With a card such as this, bottlenecks are not caused by the presentation of documents, but rather by searches. Officials now search wallets; they search everywhere.

    Mr. Gilles Gravel: That will always be the case.

    Ms. Christiane Gagnon: You talked about bottlenecks, but this bottleneck is not attributable to the identity document. It's as a result of everything surrounding the identity document that it takes more time now to go through the entire verification process. Let's say a person had an identity card. That identity card or the decryption you can make of it to determine whether it is authentic or not will not be the proof that that person is not a potential terrorist because terrorist organizations send people who are not known. They cross borders, and I'm sure we'll give up because we'll say to ourselves...

    I don't believe that a card that would attest to the authenticity of a person's identity will help us achieve our objective of combating terrorism. It's not a kind of passport that will make us happy. That's false security.

    Ms. Hélène Scherrer: It's false security.

    Ms. Christiane Gagnon: That may not be your case, but this will enable governments and the police to obtain a maximum amount of information on many individuals who have nothing to do with terrorism.

    Mr. Gilles Gravel: You're right. It will never replace the good old methods such as searches and so on. When we talk about bottlenecks, we're talking about people who move around regularly. When you're looking for a terrorist, you're generally not looking for the average man; you know those people. The problem is determining who falsified the document, who enters with a false passport, who are we unable to authenticate absolutely. This will never prevent anyone from conducting baggage searches because individuals are suspected of transporting drugs or alcohol. That's not the problem. The problem is when you want to know whether the person who enters here is actually the person appearing in the document. That's what we're trying to find out.

    If I were an Arab arriving from the Middle East on a Canadian passport... There are problems right now, and we are aware of that. We want to know whether the person is actually Canadian and not someone who has taken a Canadian passport, falsified it and is entering the country with it. That's one of the first things that we do, but that will never replace the set of protection measures we have in airports. I hope we don't become careless, even if we have a citizen card or authentic passport which can be confirmed as not having been falsified. If that's the case, we'll have problems. This won't change the basic problem of searches and bottlenecks. It will reduce the number of bottlenecks and make it easier to process people quickly. It may also help process Canadians of Arabic extraction through customs. That's what we should aim for. That, I believe, is how we should view the authentication card.

º  (1605)  

[English]

    Mrs. Diane Ablonczy: Mr. Chairman, I have one quick question.

    The Vice-Chair (Mr. Jerry Pickard): I haven't asked any questions, but go ahead, Diane.

    Mrs. Diane Ablonczy: You're probably dying to ask this too. If you're authenticating my driver's licence, my passport, or any other card, would that authentication be linked to any kind of database?

    Mr. Gilles Gravel: I can't talk about it, sorry.

    The Vice-Chair (Mr. Jerry Pickard): Gregory, in his response, said, yes, probably a list of names and numbers.

    Mr. Gregory McConnell: Exactly.

    The Vice-Chair (Mr. Jerry Pickard): If I heard it correctly, there are other lists out there, such as police lists, criminal lists. The police, using their organization, could relate a name to a clear identity. Those lists already exist, so they're not taking it a step further, they're just assuring that this person is the person he said he was. Health care lists exist. They are not creating new lists, they are not adding to the lists, they're saying this person is who they say they are. At least, that's my interpretation of what was said. Is that correct Greg?

    Mr. Gregory McConnell: I just want to stress two things. There are existing databases of fingerprints for criminal checks. There would be a database for this ID card system alone, but not of fingerprints. The fingerprint is not used to manage the identities in the system, it is used to authenticate the identity at the point of verification. So I need the fingerprint on the card and I need the fingerprint on your finger, which are two things you will always keep with yourself.

    In the database all I need is a reference to your identity--your passport number, your address--maybe we don't want to put the address on it--the date of birth, any identity. If I decide one day that Diane is now a criminal or Diane is deported to Spain and is not a citizen any more, she is revoked from that list. Even if you still have your card and fingerprint, we don't accept it, because that card number or name is not accepted as a Canadian citizen any more. We don't need the fingerprint. At the point of verification, you validate that the name in the card is really yours with the fingerprint. I don't need for the ID card system a fingerprint in a database. I definitely need to manage the identities, you're right. I need to revoke them and enrol them. I need to know the status of this new applicant and what not. It's just that unlike other systems that do centralize fingerprints, this was developed not to use fingerprints in the database, among other things, because if you manage all these fingerprints in the database, it's a very hefty logistics problem to revoke and enrol; there are duplicates, there are a lot of issues. So basically, our system is made not to have fingerprints in a database.

º  (1610)  

    Mrs. Diane Ablonczy: Thank you very much.

    The Vice-Chair (Mr. Jerry Pickard): Some people have said, just upgrade the passport. I want you to think about that as a first question. What's the difference between what we're doing and upgrading what we already have?

    Second, we talked about information creep on cards. My understanding was that separate lists exist, and all you're doing is verifying with another list and identifying people. So is information creep on a card really part of this process, as you see it?

    The third issue that was raised, and it's been raised by many witnesses, is that this creates a police state. I'd like your comments on whether it gives more power to police or just identifies people.

    Fourth, maybe we could accept a voluntary system, rather than having everyone with the card. Would you comment on having a voluntary list?

    Fifth, when we talk about cards that are issued and government taking responsibility, there is a liability involved with taking any responsibility. For instance, if I have a bank card and that bank card is used inappropriately, someone makes charges against it, the bank has to swallow the liability. Are there liability questions for the government regarding this type of card that will crop up in the future?

    Mr. Gregory McConnell: On upgrading the passport system, I believe we would have to start from existing systems, whether they need to be rethought or strengthened for identity authentication. Maybe there's a study to be made there, but why start a whole new system if you already have transferred power to passport offices or recognized authorities across the country to issue identities to people, with picture and everything? These are staff you already have in the government, these are facilities you're already paying for, cameras etc. I would definitely work from an existing facility or infrastructure.

    I wasn't sure I understood the second statement, but as concerns the police state, I believe it amounts to passing the proper laws, it's really a legislation issue. We're proposing a system for authenticating the identity of the national ID card holders. I could detail how these embedded processing devices have what is needed internally to make sure no biometric information travels on the wire that could be intercepted, but if the government controlling this system decides to use it in a police state way, in a Big Brother way, and store it illegally in databases, I think it's up to Canadians to pass laws to establish good practices. There are many laws to protect Canadian citizens today in respect of how the government can use private information and how they cannot use it. I believe that needs to be out there as a debate. What are the rules in using this card? What are the real powers of the government? To what extent can they use it elsewhere? I believe, with our system, because it does not relate to any other system, it would be very difficult to use its information, but it's not impossible. If, at the root, the government is maliciously using it, that would be a whole other problem in Canada, I believe.

    As to a voluntary card, I don't think it's such a bad idea. We discussed it a few times in our company and, as a matter of fact, the Commission d' accès à l'information here debated the use of biometrics. It was suggested that it would be acceptable, under certain terms, if it was voluntary. A passport today is not imposed on anyone, is it? You don't want anybody to take your picture and for them to have your information. I would say a birth certificate is fine for anyone. You're not even forced to have a health card if you want to. But if you want to have the privilege of travelling and entering the U.S., say in the fall of 2004 they've passed a law that will require every travel document to carry biometrics. If you go to other countries that don't require biometrics, they'll certainly require a passport, so you'll have to comply. It's either that or stay in Canada and use systems that do not require that.

    I believe we are living in a new world now, and whether it's us or other countries, if you want to travel, people are going to start requiring better means of authenticating identities. If you want to trade on the stock market or have a licence to fly or have a permit to travel, you will eventually have to enrol in these systems, and if you do not want to, it's your free choice. I don't see why my 86-year-old grandmother who doesn't intend travelling any more should have a travel document with biometrics. She doesn't want or need to go to the U.S. at this point. So I believe it's voluntary. Biometric cards exist right now in Europe, in the Netherlands, among other places, for frequent travellers. They are fast-tracked through customs. They have biometrics on a card. If you don't want to be fast-tracked through customs, if you don't want your fingerprint to be on a card, don't enrol in the frequent traveller program. That's about it.

    So I see this as possible, but if the government decides one day to say all Canadian citizens who want to vote will need that ID card, it becomes another issue. Are you discriminating against people because some people don't want the biometric system, but want to vote? I think those issues need to be debated in Canada. I certainly don't foresee a problem in starting this system on a voluntary basis.

º  (1615)  

    The Vice-Chair (Mr. Jerry Pickard): I referred to information creep. Some people are talking about a supercard, with all kinds of information linked to it, so they lose their privacy. That was the issue, and I believe almost every witness who's come forward, privacy commissioners, people looking at people's rights, have all raised that issue. So that was one.

    The other one concerned government liability. Is there a liability on the government that issues and authenticates cards? Do you see the mechanisms we have in place as protective of government for the biometric situation you're putting forward?

    Mr. Gregory McConnell: I think it's pretty much the same liability you would encounter when issuing a passport or any other official ID document. The government is buying a lot of PKI certificates from Entrust for their government workers right now. They're vouching for their government employee identity. So I guess at some point somebody's got to vouch for a Canadian identity. If it's not our government, I don't know who will. Our mothers will, but they're not everywhere. We need at some point to have some liability, and hence a very strong verification system.

    With the notion of one card for everything, I think we have to start somewhere in issuing a trustworthy identity document, and then it's a question of proposed projects. If you want to start having the driver's licence on that smart card, you can, but if people think it's too intrusive to have all services on one card, it won't pass. Smart card technology has a large potential, but I think the issue here would be national identity, and the government could not integrate it into other existing systems, such as health care or social security, without consulting the public.

º  (1620)  

    The Vice-Chair (Mr. Jerry Pickard): Finally, there are a lot of people around the world who come to Canada as new Canadians. The obvious fact is that in many countries of the world there aren't nice clear documents about who they are, where they came from, records of birth, records of growing up, going to school, church, whatever. They come from Africa, they come from Asia, they come from China, and in some places there's no documentation at all. We are still required in many respects to issue a card. How can you or the government guarantee security in many areas where it's extremely difficult today? People on the ground in foreign countries may be able to identify some of those problems, but we still haven't been able to overcome that. Will this card help in any way?

    Mr. Gregory McConnell: I don't think it does help in securing their background in their country of origin. That is obviously something we have to deal with today. People come in, and we eventually give them a permanent resident card or Canadian citizenship based on the information we can gather. I trust that when the government does that, they have gathered enough information to establish an identity for that person and verify that they're not somebody else. In some countries, I understand, they are deploying ID card systems, and they don't have the exact dates of birth of these people in Africa. They have to, at some point, gauge and establish it. They don't even know their birth dates.

    We can't solve the past, obviously. If these immigrants come to Canada, we have to install processes that will be able to establish, to the best of our knowledge, an identity in the same way we would grant Canadian citizenship today. All our system does is make sure, for example, once we grant it, it's only used by that person and not lent to this friend's friend or cousin in another country or duplicated for their families back home. We've seen in Quebec so many times the health card duplicated in a manner that's laughable--a picture of a woman used by a man. At some point, if you're dispensing these services and privileges to citizens, you have to authenticate who you're giving them to. We're all paying, by our taxes, for the quality of life we have as Canadians. If we start paying to give it to people who are not legally eligible, then there's a problem. So it's also a cost issue here.

    The Vice-Chair (Mr. Jerry Pickard): Ladies and gentlemen, I've asked the bus driver to hold on for a bit. I'm going to give Diane the last question, and then we're going to pack up as soon as we can right after this. The bus is waiting outside, and these folks have to pack up all this gear and be out there immediately. John at the door has been very patient in not pushing us out too quickly. Just keep that in mind.

    Diane.

    Mrs. Diane Ablonczy: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I do apologize to the committee, I just get into these things, but my question's pretty simple.

    With respect to the database that would authenticate the cards--I know I keep coming back to the database, but that's the big concern I hear, so we have to nail this thing down--is it kept by the company, is it sold to the customer?

º  (1625)  

    Mr. Gregory McConnell: It's definitely not the company. Even the creation of these unique key pairs in certificates must be entirely in the hands of the government or whatever client we give this to. Otherwise, we would be liable. We would have a back door to all these systems. We wouldn't want any part of that. So it's definitely all in the hands of the creator of the database. It would probably start with existing databases in Canada. You have identities. I keep referring to the passport. I don't know if social security would be a better way, but there are existing databases you could work from. The company would not create. We would give the tools to develop, to enrol, to capture fingerprints, to extract the mathematical reference, as I was mentioning, but we'd try to keep away from that as much as possible.

    Mrs. Diane Ablonczy: Okay. Thank you.

    The Vice-Chair (Mr. Jerry Pickard): Thank you.

    Gilles, Yves, Greg, Serge, we very much appreciate your coming forward. All the testimony you have put forward will be taken into careful consideration by the committee. I think you've helped at least to give us a clearer picture of where you see technology working in this area. There's obviously a lot of room for debate on this issue in the country, and I assume this debate's going to go on for a period of time, but I want to assure you that the views you've brought forward will be very well used by the committee. Thank you very much.

    The meeting is adjourned.