TRGO Committee Meeting

STANDING COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORT AND GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS

LE COMITÉ PERMANENT DES TRANSPORTS ET DES OPÉRATIONS GOUVERNEMENTALES

EVIDENCE

[Recorded by Electronic Apparatus]

Thursday, October 25, 2001

• 1058

[English]

The Chair (Mr. Ovid Jackson (Bruce—Grey—Owen Sound, Lib.)): Ladies and gentlemen, I think I see a quorum. I like to start my meetings on time, so I'll start.

Today we have the Canadian Air Traffic Controllers Association, Robert Thurger, and Transport 2000 Canada, David Glastonbury, with a barrister and solicitor—I hope you're not paying him by the hour—James Lyon. Welcome, gentlemen.

As you know, we're on two tracks here. We have to look at the airlines, and we're also looking at the safety and security of the airports. We're glad you're here to help us along with it.

The normal procedure is that you give us your presentation, and then we have a round of questioning.

Who is going to lead?

Mr. David Glastonbury (Former President, Transport 2000 Canada): Mr. Lyon.

• 1100

Mr. James Lyon (Chairman, Air Passenger Safety Group, Transport 2000 Canada): Mr. Chairman, ladies and gentlemen, my name is James Lyon. I'm the chairman of the air passenger safety group, which is a part of Transport 2000 Canada. I was in my youth a pilot, I've been in the aircraft industry, and I am, as the chairman points out, carrying a guilty secret, in that I'm a barrister and solicitor.

The topic I have is flight safety and commercial aviation post-September 11, 2001. I've tried to break it down into sub-topics, beginning with the first century of aviation, which began with the Wright brothers in 1903 and takes us up to today.

In that hundred years, with the exception of wartime, aviation risk faced two standard questions, and they're the basic questions of risk assessment anywhere. The first question is, what are the chances that something will go wrong? These chances in aviation are dependent largely on what I've called five poverties: poverty of design, poverty of materials, poverty of construction, poverty of airmanship, and poverty of weather. More or less any accident fell into one or other, or more than one, of those categories. From the 1960s there was a sixth, deliberate, wicked action by humans, hijacking, attempted murder, that kind of thing.

The second question is, if something does go wrong, how bad will the effects be? The worst that we could readily grasp until quite recently was pretty bad, but it was that the aircraft would crash and injure someone, or kill someone, or kill all of those on board, destroy the aircraft, and less likely, but still possible, cause great damage to the surface, to cities or buildings on the ground.

Great progress was made over that hundred years to reduce the chances that something would go wrong: improvements in design, improvements in materials, improvements in construction, improvements in pilot training—we couldn't improve the weather, but we did have our friends who were able to control aircraft in flight, the air traffic controllers. These risks and their consequences have been widely recognized and embodied in many conventions, the Hague convention, the Warsaw convention, the Hague protocol, the Rome convention, all directed to one or other of these kinds of damage.

On September 11, 2001, all those questions still remained, but there was a completely new horror in the crashes at the World Trade Centre in New York and at the Pentagon. As had been foreseen, there was loss of life to the crew and passengers, there was loss of the aircraft, and there was death and damage on the ground, but this time there was the unforeseen event that the aircraft and their tonnes of fuel were coldly and deliberately used as guided missiles to destroy people and property. Hitherto it was accident, from now on it was deliberate.

When a disaster takes place, there's often someone to blame. We, being human, tend to look around for that person. Who locked this fire escape door? Who took this ship to sea with too few life boats? Which physician prescribed the wrong medicine? These questions all imply the foreseeability of the potential harm and the fact that someone has failed to be alive to his duty. In the society we know it has not been foreseeable that four, or perhaps more, civil airliners and all on board might be converted into a kamikaze fleet. We must rephrase that: it was not foreseeable before September 11, but it is foreseeable now.

These events have, therefore, created problems that are not merely difficult, but unprecedented. The authorities, of course, are there, and they have a job to do, they must cope with them. And the choices they must make, we submit, are not between good choices and bad choices, but between choices probably bad and less bad.

In our analysis we have looked at three environments of danger. The first is pre-flight, on the surface; the second is in-flight until an incident takes place; and the third is in-flight when an incident take place. And in this context, by incident we mean an attempt to take over an aircraft in civil aviation.

• 1105

I'll start with pre-flight, on the surface. There is a range of choices. From extreme to extreme, and without being exhaustive, that range includes, let's say at the first level, full wartime mode, and any of us who have served in the forces will know what that means. Every airport is treated as a military installation. Barbed wire is strung around the perimeter, armed sentries patrol it. They admit only those persons who are authorized, either as passengers or having other business on the airport. This, of course, implies great intrusion on the civil rights and freedoms we have until now enjoyed.

A second level—and I guess these levels are chosen rather arbitrarily—is less-than-wartime mode. The perimeter of every airport is patrolled at irregular intervals, so as not to alert people to exactly when a patrol is coming around. Runways are examined, every aircraft on the ramp is guarded, and everyone who goes on board or works on an aircraft is known and checked. This means flight crew, passengers, cleaners, caterers, mechanics, in short, everyone, and somewhere apart it also means the controllers. The concourse is patrolled by armed guards, as already happens in many European airports. Every item that is taken on board is checked, hand baggage and checked baggage, freight, food containers, and so on. The objective in all this is to prevent collusion between any ground crew who may plant weapons and the apparently innocent passenger who has passed passenger screening and may retrieve those weapons once he gets on board.

The third level is minimal. Do nothing at all, have unarmed guards, do the least you possibly can.

Somewhere in-between these three will the answer come.

The second environment is in-flight. This again presents a series of choices from the extreme to the extreme. The first extreme is total isolation of the flight deck from the passenger cabin. There would be no door whatever between them, and the flight crew would enter from a separate door to the exterior of the aircraft. The separating wall between the flight deck and the passenger cabin would be armoured. The flight crew would, therefore, need to have separate facilities for washing, eating, and so on. One level down from that would be a locked, reinforced door between the flight deck and the passenger cabin. And the third level would be an ordinary locked door between the flight deck and the passenger cabin.

The third environment of danger is the terrorist emergency in flight. And here we look to two possibilities. One is—and we've all had discussion about them—armed sky marshals. Their purpose is, to put it very bluntly, to apply deadly force to hijackers. In so doing, they may injure or kill innocent passengers. As I said before, the choices are not between good and bad, but between bad and less bad. I submit it's less bad to kill one or two innocent passengers than to allow the aircraft to be turned into a guided missile of mass destruction. Again I emphasize the “guided” element in guided missile. It's not accidental, it can be guided with great precision, as we've seen, to two of the most important buildings on the North American continent and destroy them.

It's sometimes argued against the sky marshal proposal that the sky marshal's gun creates a risk of what's called explosive decompression, especially in high altitude flight. We have discussed this and consulted eminent technical people, who tell us that the risk is greatly overestimated. In any event, we're not talking of the .357 magnum or a 9 mm automatic gun. There are firearms now available that will do great damage to a soft target, like a person, but little or none to the wall of the pressure cabin of the aircraft. So that's one proposal that has provoked quite a bit of discussion on both sides.

The second one is that the captain and first officer be armed. This, again, is a last resort. This is the very last chance to save the aircraft, the crew, and the passengers, and the very last chance to save carefully selected, population intensive targets on the ground. I did listen to a radio program where one of the callers suggested that the pilots go off and learn unarmed combat, and with that they could assail the hijacker and wrestle him to the ground or the floor, and all would be well.

• 1110

Mr. Darrel Stinson (Okanagan—Shuswap, Canadian Alliance): They're watching too many Rambo shows.

Mr. James Lyon: Another one was that the captains all go off on an intensive psychiatric course and learn to reason with hijackers who come on board. Neither of those, I think, is going to work. We're talking of a desperate situation and desperate remedies. The pilot's job is not to be a karate expert—or a Rambo—or a psychiatrist. His job is to fly the aircraft, and actually, it's not all that easy to fly an aircraft and to fly it well. The weapons we envisage would be fired from where the captain sits at an intruder as a very last resort.

I would like to mention one topic, which is cost-benefit analysis, a tool to weigh the costs against the merits of technical innovation. It has been used, some may think cynically, in contexts for which it was never intended. In one of those contexts one cost element is human life. For example, how many people will die in a year from cause, and how much will juries award in total damages? How much will it cost to insure against those awards? Divide the amount by the number of deaths, and we have a value for the human life. If it costs less to insure against liability claims than it does to fix the defect, then leave the defect as it is—so goes the cold actuarial reasoning. The tobacco industry, for example, has been criticized for using the tool in this way, but it's by no means alone.

We do not propose here to enter the debate, moral or otherwise, behind this reasoning, save to say that we submit it has no place in the present calculations. Even when cost-benefit analysis is used in the context I've just been describing, there may often be some actuarial link between the input data, however cynical, and the total obligations. For example, there may be only 300 or 400 people on board an aircraft at maximum. If you add flying that aircraft into the World Trade Centre, you have added a completely imponderable element that puts the question far away from cost-benefit analysis and into the public domain. Some, for example, say sky marshals would be costly. Yes, that's true, they would be, but the cost of not having them may well be immeasurable.

In any case such as this the choice must be arbitrary, and we recommend, without being dogmatic, we hope, that there be patrols, armed or unarmed, at major airport concourses; guards over all aircraft on the ramp at all commercial airports; physical or technical search of all persons boarding an aircraft at the ramp; search of all hand baggage, checked baggage, and supplies going on a major passenger aircraft; reinforced locked doors between the flight deck and the passenger cabin; sky marshals armed with suitable weapons on board each major passenger flight; and the captains and first officers on each major passenger flight be suitably armed.

Thank you.

The Chair: Thank you very much, Mr. Lyon.

I just want to square your circle and start with the fact that I understand Bishop Wright, who was the grandfather of Orville and Wilbur, was giving a church sermon one morning and he said, I heard at Stanford they were going to be having blood transfusions. He says, why, I heard some people are saying that men will be able to fly. He said, I want to tell you that flying is reserved for angels.

Darrel, you're on deck.

Mr. Darrel Stinson: I want to thank you, Mr. Lyon, for your brief and for being here today. I want to assure you that even though we make a lot of jokes about the law profession, the latest survey I read had the politician down a lot further.

• 1115

As you're an ex-pilot and you've probably travelled to a number of other countries, in regard to this armed sky marshal, do you have any statistics, where the armed sky marshals are used in other countries, what the difference in attempted hijacks and terrorist activity is between those that use them and those that don't?

Also, do you have information on what airports or what countries would not allow us to land with no sky marshals? We have information that there are parts of the United States where this is not allowed. I have also had a number of calls in my constituency office from people saying they will go down to the States and fly, because they feel a whole lot more secure knowing there is a sky marshal on board some of those flights.

Mr. James Lyon: I don't have statistics, but there's one country in particular that has used sky marshals for a long time, in fact since 1968, and that is Israel. In that time they've had no incidence of hijacking or in-flight attack.

The second question was, where can aircraft go? Again, I'm not sure. I know about the United States. Elsewhere, I don't know.

The third thing was a more general question. It's an oddity, and perhaps it answers that question, that even here in Canada we have one minister who has expressed reluctance—again, I understand all of that, because we don't like too much these armed people on board aircraft, and I don't like it—to have them on board, where I submit they're the last protection against catastrophic loss. Another minister plans to use Canadian air force aircraft to shoot down such an aircraft. I would rather have a captain with a .22 calibre pistol up front than an F-16 or an F-18 with 20 mm cannon blasting at me from outside. We find we're examining a question, and we wonder whether we are looking at it here from this perspective and here from this perspective, when really there is only one perspective.

Mr. Darrel Stinson: I'm not too sure. I agree with you there. I want you to know I'm all in favour of armed marshals on board these flights, but when you mention the captain, I'm not sure if I would agree that only the captain should be armed. When hijackings take place, the captain is sometimes the last one to know. It should be taken care of before that equation.

Mr. James Lyon: I suggested captain and first officer. Of course, arming the captain and the first officer is also in the context of having limited access to the flight deck to start off with and having sky marshals. I don't view the one as being exclusive of the other. On the other hand, I really don't want to see a gunfight at the O.K. Corral enacted.

Mr. Darrel Stinson: Neither do we.

Mr. James Lyon: One has to draw a balance somewhere.

Mr. Darrel Stinson: You bring up the realization that we do have a minister who has said we will put fighters up there, or is looking into this aspect. We might then see the thing, because, yes, I'd sooner have somebody there with a .22 who might deal with this before we call that fighter.

That brings up another question. Do we have any idea of what the time would be from the time a hijacking takes place to the time that fighter could get off the ground to intercept?

Mr. James Lyon: Yes, it does conjure up visions of the Battle of Britain and “Scramble, scramble”. I suppose they could get off fairly fast, but I don't think we have 24-hours a day pilots sitting at combat readiness on the ramp, ready to take off and shoot down a civil aircraft.

Mr. Darrel Stinson: Thank you.

The Chair: Thank you.

Mr. Cannis.

Mr. John Cannis (Scarborough Centre, Lib.): Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Mr. Lyon, have you ever taken a tour of Pearson Airport?

Mr. James Lyon: No, I haven't, not lately; years ago I did.

Mr. John Cannis: Constructively, I would suggest that you do and everybody else does. This committee last week took a tour of Pearson, not just in Pearson, but within the parameters of Pearson. You made some very good points here about security. I too have been at other airports internationally, and I've seen the guards. I think it's a great idea. It visibly shows that there's a presence of security, more than just the typical security guards. But I would strongly suggest that everybody have an opportunity to visit a facility like Pearson. As I recall, there was an article in the paper about one of the back doors. Supposedly, anybody could just drive in. Of course, the media retracted once they got the facts straight.

• 1120

You talked about statistics. Do you have any statistics on such horrendous incidents, hijacking etc., from Canadian airports that you can tell us about?

Mr. James Lyon: No, I don't have a statistical list, but I think Canada has not been notoriously bad.

Mr. John Cannis: Have we had any actual hijackings from Canadian airports?

Mr. David Glastonbury: Yes, there was one. In fact, it was just covered recently on the news, the idea of bringing the individual back—I think he was residing in the States. This took place 20 years ago or so—I'm stretching.

Mr. John Cannis: So we've had one in the last 50 years. Not that I condone hijacking or anything, I think one is one too many, but in comparison to what has happened in the last, let's say, 35-40 years, I would say that's a cut above the rest of them.

There was a comment made earlier that it's safer to fly in the United States because of certain measures that have been taken. There was a senator—I can't remember the name—not too long ago who went before the committee in the U.S. and they talked about how horrendous it was, how dangerous it was, how the borders are unsafe, and what have you. Meanwhile their officials and their experts were saying the opposite. When the senator was questioned as to how she was making the statement, what data she had, she said, I read the paper. Of course, her argument was shot down.

I think today we're trying to find solutions. You've made some very nice recommendations, and I like the way you put it—the worst of the bad etc. But I've also heard—I don't know if you've heard this—that pilots have said they're not really in favour of carrying weapons. Is that true, or did I just hear it or read it in the paper—I try to believe 50% of what I read. Is that true? Have you heard the same thing?

Mr. James Lyon: It's true. Again, some say yes and some say no. I think the movement is, as far as the pilots' unions go, towards saying yes.

Mr. John Cannis: So have they come together as the pilots union, if there is one, to really seek consensus, or are they just saying, this group says no, this group says yes? Has there been an effort, or is there an effort under way now, to find consensus?

Mr. James Lyon: I follow some website reports on this daily. In the U.S., in fact, they're hiring sky marshals. The pilots are in favour of being armed. I believe in Canada CALPA is moving.

Mr. Robert Thurger (President, Canadian Air Traffic Controllers Association): The last report I saw was that they were not in favour of it. It was a very close call, but they never actually took a vote on it. The two people you should talk to who would be more informed than anybody would be the presidents of the two unions, Duane Woerth of ALPA—he would speak internationally for all the pilots—and Don Johnson, the president of ACPA, the Air Canada Pilots Association. Those two would be able to give you a lot of information.

Mr. John Cannis: If I may then, Mr. Chairman, this is a revelation here—

The Chair: Apparently, they will be coming to the committee.

Mr. John Cannis: Excellent. Thank you very much.

Do I have more time? I don't want to hog this committee in any way. If not, I'll cut and come back later.

The Chair: Well, that's nice. We'll just move around quickly. We have somebody else—I didn't realize—who is going to make a statement as well. So I'll make a quick round, and then we'll have a full questioning of all the witnesses.

I'll go to Mario now.

[Translation]

Mr. Mario Laframboise (Argenteuil—Papineau—Mirabel, BQ): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

• 1125

If I understand correctly, you have provided us with some background of the situation. You noted that, since September 11, everything has changed. Obviously, we have noticed this as well except I would say that, if we look at the situation prior to September 11—and you referred to pre-flight, on the surface security at the first, second and third levels—I would say that Canada was probably operating at the third level. This is what I could see. According to your definitions, prior to September 11, we were on minimal mode. Perhaps this does not mean a total absence of security, but we could ascertain, from the analyses and inspections, that, ultimately, the security measures in place in the airports resulted in an 18% failure rate. Consequently, perhaps the measures were not minimal, but we were operating at the third level prior to September 11.

Since September 11, you have naturally made some recommendations. Given the situation prior to September 11, I have a major problem. It is true that we were operating at the third level despite the fact that there had been some serious warnings. Let's not forget the Ressam incident. Ressam wanted to cross the border at Vancouver. Perhaps this did not involve an airport, but he was nevertheless a terrorist, and the Americans advised us that we had problems. However, the security level was not upgraded despite the fact that we were fully aware of the fact that there were terrorists in Canada and that there could be terrorist activities and incidents that could have been as significant as those that occurred on September 11. We must face a cold reality: despite all the warnings we received from the Americans about our inadequate security, we did not, among other things, make any changes to the security level in the airports.

Since September 11, we are dealing with new conditions, and everyone is panicking about how to resolve the security problem. This concerns me because your recommendations really do go from one extreme to the other. Whereas beforehand we had—and I repeat myself—third level security measures, which were probably minimal, now you are recommending that we have armed guards, armed or unarmed patrols, armed guards in the airports, in the planes, and armed pilots. I have a lot of problems with that because, ultimately, the problem that we're trying to resolve with that... Namely with the plane being used as a missile—you're telling us that that type of problem must be resolved, and that a plane should never again be used as a missile, and I agree with you.

You set aside one of your recommendations that I thought was interesting, namely, to really isolate the cockpit from the passengers' cabin by eliminating the door and, finally, this would ensure that the pilots would be completely independent from the passengers. This would ensure that a plane could never be used as a missile.

If that was the objective, why didn't you simply recommend that, in planes, the cockpit be completely independent from the passenger section. The problem would thus be resolved: never again would the plane be used as a missile. This is what it's all about, in the end.

As far as the rest is concerned, if you want to make the passengers feel safer, I would tell you that there are threats in the Montreal subway; we will position armed guards in the Montreal subway. If it's the health and the safety of passengers that you want to guarantee, let's put armed guards in all public transit across the country. But if you want to stop planes from being used as missiles, I think that you gave the solution. Why not simply isolate the cockpit completely and have the pilots enter through an independent door? In this manner, no one will ever be able to take control of the cockpit, and the plane will never be used as a missile.

Why didn't you opt for this solution?

• 1130

[English]

Mr. James Lyon: I didn't choose that solution alone, because there are many choices to be made. That's one good solution. You mentioned the Montreal Metro. In fact, there are metro systems where they do have armed guards on board, for exactly the reason that passengers are at risk, and that's in New York. It's a different risk, as perceived, from what this risk is, but nevertheless, they've been there at least for the last 30 years, because I've been there 30 years ago.

As one of our recommendations we did have reinforced locked doors between the passenger cabin and the flight deck. What we've been trying to do is get a series of increasingly serious responses to hazards. One is, don't let the dangerous thing get on board the aircraft to start with. Examine the people, examine what goes on. If that does happen, try to contain it. Yes, indeed, isolation of the flight deck from the passenger cabin would achieve exactly what you want.

Of course, at the same time, one does also want not to have passengers in the passenger cabin being assailed by hijackers or terrorists. This is at a level before converting the aircraft into the guided missile. That's quite right. I agree.

The Chair: Are you finished Mario?

[Translation]

Mr. Mario Laframboise: Yes.

[English]

The Chair: Thank you.

There are a number of Liberals who want to speak. There's Alex, there's Marcel, and there is André. So you guys may want to split the time.

Mr. Robert Thurger: Mr. Chairman, sorry, I don't quite understand the process here. I'm wondering if I could also respond to Monsieur Laframboise's question.

The Chair: Yes, you can, if it's relevant.

[Translation]

Mr. Robert Thurger: I will speak in English.

[English]

I think there are a number of different issues at stake. One is, yes, we don't want the airplanes to be guided missiles, but we've seen a lot of initiatives by airlines and by ANS providers to reduce costs, because of perceived or actual reductions in the number of people who are flying. I think one of the goals for the Department of Transport would be to ensure that the industry is viable. For that industry to be viable, you need people flying. For people to be secure, they need not only to know that the airplanes aren't going to be guided missiles, but they need to feel safe flying.

I've had a number of conversations with different people across Canada who are scared to fly, and there are a lot of elements that add to that fear. Maybe it's a perceived lack of security in the airports. I was in Toronto yesterday, and I'm not impressed with the security I saw. I was in Calgary the day before, and I walked through security with five people who maybe together weighed 200 pounds. Security is something you should feel intimidated by. That's what security is: you should feel scared of moving forward and make sure you're moving forward in the way the regulations allow you to, not feeling, what are they going to do if I'm doing something wrong anyway?

So I think there are a number of different elements you have to look at. As this committee reports to Transport, I think it's the whole industry you should be concerned about, as opposed to just whether these airplanes are guided missiles or not.

The Chair: Thank you.

For the witnesses, you can respond if you have some information, because the whole object is for you to share information with us.

To try to give everybody a fair shot and to make sure the questioning is equitable, I'm going to go to the Liberals now for 10 minutes, and then I'll go to Val after that.

Alex, Marcel, and then André, if you want to share your time.

• 1135

Mr. Alex Shepherd (Durham, Lib.): On the issue of armed sky marshals, it seems to me that it's predicated on two assumptions. One is that armed marshals reduce the incidence of skyjacking or violent acts on aircraft, and the other is that armed marshals increase the feeling of security among passengers, although I've never seen any statistics supporting any of that. My only relationship with this is that I actually got on a plane once in India where there was an armed marshal. I can tell you, it did just the reverse, it didn't make me feel secure at all. The first question in my mind was why he was there. People seem to be buying into this theory that somehow the general public feels better with people on the aircraft who are armed. I'm not at all convinced that's true.

Mr. James Lyon: Well, sir, if your question was why he was there, you've got an answer to that nowadays. He's there because now we know there's something to be afraid of. Perhaps in India, when you were there, it was an environment with which you were not familiar in Canada, whereas the risks that may not have existed in Canada and with which you were therefore not familiar did exist in India. It was not so very long ago that the Prime Minister of India was shot by her own guards.

Mr. Alex Shepherd: Prior to my being there there was a hijacking that went to Nepal. In fact, I think it was the same group, al-Qaeda.

It seems to me that if you have to rely on arms on aircraft as a defence against skyjacking, it is an abysmal failure of a lot of other systems that has allowed it to happen.

Mr. James Lyon: I think that's true. Sometimes systems fail.

Mr. Alex Shepherd: Wouldn't it be better to put our money in areas where we prevent, we profile people, and make sure those people are not on the plane in the first place?

Mr. James Lyon: Yes.

Mr. Alex Shepherd: And as soon as you introduce firearms, you run the other kinds of risks, such as accidental discharge of a firearm, or the firearm ends up in somebody else's hands. So the point is that by attempting to eliminate one sort of risk, you're actually introducing another risk factor, and you have to weigh those and see if the whole thing makes sense.

Mr. James Lyon: I think you've put your finger on exactly the problem the authorities face. That's exactly the situation.

You say, first, we'll try not to let anyone on board who's going to be a hazard. So we'll have searches, we'll have technology that can detect, dogs, and all kinds of things I'm sure clever minds are working on right now to make sure people who are armed don't get on aircraft or aren't able to get on the aircraft unarmed and find on it a weapon that's been left for them. That's one level.

Then you say, supposing that does fail—and it did fail in at least three aircraft in the U.S.—what then? What can we do that's least bad thereafter. What's least bad thereafter is to take out the people who are there trying to destroy, first, the aircraft and, second, whatever they know they'd like to destroy on the surface, and that might be the city centre of Ottawa. It's a sequence of non-exclusive protections.

Mr. Alex Shepherd: I go back to Mario's point. If you've already excluded the aircraft's becoming a guided missile, your risk factor is significantly reduced. I presume you're now trying to insure yourself against some lunatic who simply wants to kill people. He could do that on the ground, he could do it in the air, I suppose. So you get back to having armed marshals on the Metro and everywhere else, because the impact of that kind of event would be just as great whether it's in the air or whether it's on the ground.

Mr. James Lyon: The external consequences on the Metro are less than the external consequences on an aircraft—certainly, for the people on board they're just as great. If there were a series of incidents on the Metro in which passengers were taken out by religious fanatics, or any kind of fanatic really, and I were a passenger on the metro, I'd be happy to see a policeman there.

Mr. Alex Shepherd: My last question is simply this. On both of these assumptions, there's no statistical basis to prove them—is that correct? There's no statistical basis to say armed air marshals on aircraft reduce the incidence of skyjacking.

Mr. James Lyon: No. I think that goes right back to your point about when you were on the aircraft in India. There were two considerations, and the second consideration was a subjective one on your part, that is, you began to wonder why that guy was there. It's something I didn't know about, I'm not too happy at seeing him there—it had the reverse effect from what was intended. That could be.

Mr. Alex Shepherd: Thank you.

The Chair: Mr. Proulx.

Mr. Marcel Proulx (Hull—Aylmer, Lib.): Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Thank you for being here this morning.

• 1140

As my colleagues have said, I'm going to tell you that I'm not in favour of armed pilots, armed guards, and so on. My personal view is that we have to stop this guard stuff somewhere. If we put a marshal on the plane, are we going to have a sub-marshal to check on the first guy in case he's turned bad? There's no end to this.

What if we were to look strictly at prevention, making sure that the screeners are very qualified, with expertise, not just anybody being paid the minimum salary, but someone who was properly trained? What if we were to look at guarding airplanes on the ground, so that, as you've mentioned, nobody could deposit arms or something in the airplane? What if we do a full search of passengers, a full search of hand baggage? Maybe it's time we came up and said, no more hand baggage aboard airplanes, only magazines or newspapers that the airline supplies. Maybe we're getting to that. We fly on airplanes and we see these people coming on board, and they can hardly walk through the airplane, because they've got so much carry-on luggage. Maybe it's time we stopped that. It would be easier to screen everybody and to make sure they're doing a good job.

And maybe it shouldn't be reinforced locked doors, maybe it should be a totally separate compartment, with an outside door leading to that compartment. Then whatever happens inside the plane, if the system of screening goes wrong, at least we're sure that plane will not be hijacked the way we see hijacking now.

My question to you is, with your experience, do you feel that the system of screening as it is today is safe, or would you rather see the federal government getting involved in this, taking over, and making sure we have, whether it be soldiers or police officers, people who are very properly trained? What is your feeling about that, sir? And let's not get arms aboard airplanes, whether it be with the pilot... You're an ex-pilot, aren't you?

James Lyon: Yes.

Mr. Marcel Proulx: Are you qualified with firearms?

Mr. James Lyon: Well, I've used a lot of them, yes.

Mr. Marcel Proulx: Oh, good for you.

Mr. James Lyon: There goes your argument.

Mr. Marcel Proulx: Then the question will be, do we want pilots who become policemen or do we want policemen who become pilots? Anyway, what is your feeling about the other things?

Mr. James Lyon: Sir, I won't mention guns.

Mr. Marcel Proulx: Good.

Mr. James Lyon: I won't name the names of any airlines, because I don't want to, but I have done some work in the past for airlines that were, you might say, target airlines. Airlines do their own security, and I can tell you that the airlines I was doing work for that were target airlines put a whole lot more thought and effort into it than others.

Mr. Marcel Proulx: In the screening process?

Mr. James Lyon: Yes, in who they hired, who they kept there, what they did, and all the things we talk about now, and sometimes don't like to talk about, like profiling and so on. And they did that because they'd had bitter experience in the past.

It's easy to criticize, and we do see the criticism that these people who are doing the checking are paid by the hour, the lowest common denominator in the labour market, and so on. Is that quite fair? If we were to hire Royal Marine commandos or whatever, they would very soon get bored with doing that kind of work, because it's very routine work. We have to find something that is a balance in getting the job done right by people who will stay awake while they're doing it. I don't mean that in a pejorative way, I mean it's a routine job, you've got hundreds of people storming to and fro, kids, etc., which can be quite tedious. I think I would be happier as a passenger—and I'll take that as my basis for judgment—if the government did it than if the airlines did it.

Mr. Marcel Proulx: Thank you.

The Chair: André, you've got one quick question before I move to Val.

[Translation]

Mr. André Harvey (Chicoutimi—Le Fjord, Lib.): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I would like to know what role your organization plays in preparing, reviewing and possibly amending transportation safety regulations. What role do you play with Transport Canada? Do you have an ongoing role?

• 1145

[English]

Mr. James Lyon: Maybe I can just say one thing first. As Winston Churchill once said,

[Translation]

“Men of France, be ye afraid, I am going to speak French.” I apologize for speaking French so poorly but, at any rate—

Our organization participates in Transport Canada activities. We have been invited to participate in CARAC. This is a committee, a discussion group. We participate in the work of this committee. We are a small group and we are self-financing. It is, therefore, difficult sometimes to do everything that we would like to do. We know our colleagues, the controllers. We also have discussions with Transport Canada, and we have some input in the regulations.

Mr. André Harvey: I have a brief supplementary question.

You must also be in contact with the Association of European Carriers. I would like to ascertain whether or not what I was told about Airbus is accurate. Apparently Airbus ordered that all cockpits were to be hermetically sealed from the passenger side. If this were the case for all companies, meaning that the cockpits would be hermetically sealed—Boeing is also in the process of hermetically sealing its cockpits—and if no passengers were able to board a plane caring an AK-44 and if all passengers were completely disarmed, why, at that point, would we need armed personnel to provide security?

Mr. James Lyon: You are partially right.

Mr. André Harvey: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[English]

The Chair: Val.

Ms. Val Meredith (South Surrey—White Rock—Langley, PC/DR): Thank you, Mr. Chair.

I think what we're talking about is degrees, degrees of security, degrees of reaction, degrees of deterrence. My experience goes back to bush-piloting days in the north, and there were protections in small airports, whereby you needed numbers to get access to the apron of the airport. Airports are only as safe as the nature of those who come into them. I don't think there's a Canadian airport where there aren't either smaller aircraft that are outside the control of large airlines or international planes coming in. So there's only a certain degree to which we can protect ourselves from outside forces.

I think what I see here is—I don't want to say an overreaction—putting all the goods on the table at the same time, and there are degrees to which they may or may not be needed. I don't have the same angst about having armed air marshals on some aircraft, but I think then, again, it's a matter of degree. You don't need air marshals on all aircraft flying in Canada. So it's risk assessment, assessing those high-risk planes, those high-risk areas. You may or may not want to have an armed air marshal. I, like others, have real problems with arming flight crews, and I think we just have to look at the Air Canada-Canadian situation to ask ourselves, do we really want people in the cockpit, when they are both flying together, to have anything on them that might be used?

So I think we have to look at risk assessments, we have to look at deterrence. What would deter anybody, whether it's a terrorist or anybody else, from violating the cockpit and the crew at that level? And I think it's really, what can we use? You've come up with some suggestions We can make recommendations to manufacturers of airplanes as to what some of the expectations would be from the travelling public. I think they understand that their future rests on people flying, and if people don't feel secure, they're not going to fly, and they're not going to sell their planes. So I think some recommendations can go to the manufacturers.

My colleague from the Bloc brought it up. Cost factors are involved. Governments may want to give some recommendations, as you have, about armed air marshals. That's something you're very much for, others are very much against. So I think there will have to be some consideration.

• 1150

Looking at risk assessment, the degree to which one can respond to risk assessment, and the deterrent value of it, what would be your recommendation, from the whole list of seven or eight, or however many you've provided us, for something that would probably measure the assessed risk, so as to have some deterrent, but not overreacting to a degree that's not acceptable?

Mr. James Lyon: We did say in this list not to have a marshal on every aircraft, but to make some assessment of the relative importance of the flight. But the one thing that would certainly stop the absolutely new element, which is the aircraft becoming a guided missile, is what the gentleman here said, and that is having the flight cabin totally isolated from the passenger cabin.

Ms. Val Meredith: So that would be a recommendation that one would have to make to the airlines. I assume they've already, in their own evaluation of what's happened, made that.

Mr. James Lyon: They don't like it, because it's expensive etc.

Ms. Val Meredith: I would suggest that the airlines are probably looking at liability factors and figuring it's cheapter to secure a cockpit than it is to replace aircraft and persons.

Mr. James Lyon: Yes.

Ms. Val Meredith: So that said, your chief recommendation would be that manufacturers and governments look at how we can secure the cockpit, whether it's reinforcing doors or whatever.

I would like to go beyond the aircraft, and I'd like to go back into your comments about airports. Toronto was quite an impressive set-up, but Toronto airport, again, is only as secure as the planes flying into it. How do you see this kind of thing being more of an international concern? What vehicle do you have, as an association that is concerned about air safety, for getting more to the international community, to the States, to South America, to Mexico, to Europe, to associations that are obviously in other parts of the world and must be equally concerned?

Mr. James Lyon: There aren't so very many associations of our kind, as a matter of fact. We are very closely linked with an American-based worldwide association called the International Aviation Safety Association. They are funded, as a matter of fact, by their chairman, who is the widow of one of the passengers on Swissair flight 111. She has devoted her wealth to creating this organization. She has consulted widely with the U.S. Federal Aviation Administration. She has worked with former Vice-President Gore. She has worked with radio, TV, etc. She has established a network, in which we share, of test pilots, former flight engineers, experts of all kinds in the United States, in Australia, in England, in the Netherlands, in France. We share information daily. So we try to correlate what we do with what they do.

Ms. Val Meredith: So you share information, but as a body that could influence the international community to be consistent with their safety measures, you're still not there.

Mr. James Lyon: I have to tell you that we do much less than we would like to do, because we do it at our own expense and in our own time. But that doesn't mean we don't achieve things.

It's a slightly different context, but one of the people whom IASA has been using extensively is an expert on aviation wiring. I remember being in Washington, at the FAA as a matter of fact, with the administrator of the FAA a little under two years ago, when one of the very senior people said, wire is wire is wire. The proposition we were advancing is, that's not quite true; if you have a certain kind of insulation and it becomes old, cracked, and damp, and you have power going through, that insulation actually becomes not insulation, but a conductor, and not merely a conductor, but an explosive conductor. So they were invited into the Vice-President's task force on wiring, and their views, which at one time not long ago were being dismissed as ludicrous, not true, and nonsense, are now very much being looked at.

• 1155

They're lucky they've got the money to do the work. It's unlucky the poor chap was killed, of course, but lucky they've devoted it to this purpose.

Ms. Val Meredith: Okay. Thank you, Mr. Chair.

The Chair: Thank you very much.

Do you have a quick one one, Darrel, before Mr. Thurger makes his remarks?

Mr. Darrel Stinson: Yes, I actually have a couple.

I think people have a tendency to think this is not going to happen in Canada. I believe they're very naive to think that. September 11 has opened up a whole new door. There have been lots of warnings around that this could take place. Not only could it take place, but Canada, if it's lax in security, could be used, the airlines could be used, and as we fly intercontinentally here, we could be used for that in another country. I've heard about the box-cutters on our flights—they were turned back. I've heard about the guns going through our security measures. Let's face facts. If a terrorist wants to get on board, these people are not dumb. There are a number of things I'm carrying on myself here now that could be weapons, right down to this case—all a guy's got to do is squeeze it, and out it comes. It doesn't matter: you cannot have 100% security over how these people are going to get different types of weapons through.

So I will come back again to what Israel does. They have lived with this for many years, so why are we not looking at these other countries, seeing exactly what they have in place, and taking direction from there?

Mr. James Lyon: I suppose, and I hope, that we in Canada are looking at these things.

In 1890 or 1900 they had what were called anarchists. They always ran around with a thing with “bomb” written on it and a fuse sticking out—they were anarchists actually. And from there on in we've had Boys' Own Paper and variations of it, James Bond, the villain who thinks up some scheme to poison the whole waterworks or whatever, and of course, the hero always comes in at the right moment and foils it. And everyone really thought it never could happen.

Yes, it can happen—it happened. And yes, Canada, to those of us who live here—I think it's part of the normal outlook of the human mind—is our home, it has boundaries and borders, and the rest is far away. But if you're in the aviation industry, it's not far away. You get on a plane here and you go there, 10 minutes, 10 hours, it doesn't make any difference. People in the industry—and I follow this daily—are saying, there are not so many jobs in the U.K. now that they've cut back—any jobs in Canada? Well, maybe there are some jobs in Canada. Any jobs in Australia? People are moving around all over the place all the time. When I was a boy in Great Britain, America was far, far away. Now pilots from the U.K. who want to train find it cheaper to go to Florida and train there. This was unheard of when I was a youth, when I was in the air force. The Americans were something far distant, even though we'd just had a war.

The Chair: Okay.

Before we move to Mr. Thurger, I'm hearing some things.

The first thing—for the research staff here—is that you've got to find the individuals. If you could stop the individuals getting on an airplane, that's the best thing you can do, and it starts with intelligence.

I'm also hearing that there are a number of agencies, including the FAA, that used past things that happened, so that they wouldn't happen again. They tried to secure against that.

But I'm also hearing a subtext here. It doesn't matter who does that screening at the airport, not only do they have to be highly trained and motivated, maybe part of our recommendation is that they should rotate. They do the same thing with dogs. If you have a dog looking for drugs and he or she never finds any or gets rewarded, they sort of get weird, don't they? So you've always got to make that connection, and part of it is that these people maybe should rotated from that position, so they're not bored, or they should have various things happening that keep them at a high state of alertness.

I move to Mr. Thurger. You have about 10 to 15 minutes, and then we have some more questions, and then everybody can answer as well.

• 1200

Mr. Robert Thurger: I live in the ATC world, so I speak very quickly and very briefly.

First, thank you very much for inviting me today. I represent the Canadian Air Traffic Controllers Association, which recently merged with the CAW. I have over 2,100 members, about 1,700 or 1,800 of whom are operational air traffic controllers. So what does that mean? Those individuals are the ones who are keeping your planes safe. When you're flying across Canada, they're the ones who are keeping them separated, so that they don't bang into each other. That's our job, we do it every single day. On September 11 we took an additional 200 planes and landed them all across Canada as quickly as possible.

I want to explain the system a little, because whenever I go and talk about ATC, a lot of people don't understand what it is we do. There are pockets of airspace that start at Ottawa International tower and just keep growing until they cover the whole Canadian airspace we're responsible for. None of those pockets overlap, they all adjoin each other. We have 43 towers, seven area control centres, and one TCU, all of which control a piece of airspace in Canada, and they hand off an airplane as it flies wherever it needs to fly in Canadian airspace.

So when an incident like this happens, you can imagine the coordination that is required from our industry, both with our international counterparts, be it over in Europe for the transcontinental flights, the international flights, or the Americans, who we deal with more regularly on a daily basis.

Our concern about safety is twofold. First, there are no redundancies in our job. I'm responsible, as an air traffic controller, for a piece of airspace. That means I understand the rules and regulations that go with that piece of airspace, the airways in the sky, which we like to see as the same as a road map, but it's in the sky. I know the altitudes, I know the mountainous regions, I know the restrictions, I know how high and how low airplanes can fly within that piece of airspace. The person sitting next to me has absolutely no knowledge of that, they don't care. All they know is that I'm going to give them an airplane within a specific period of time, and then they are going to take their knowledge on that airplane and move it through their piece of airspace.

So when we consider the safety elements that are associated with our industry, what would have happened on September 11 had one of those planes gone into one of our buildings? As you can see in the handout, the major concentration of controllers is in the seven area control centres. Sixty-two per cent of our membership is housed in seven buildings. If one of those airplanes goes into one of those buildings, there's been no training for people to be able to say, I know what your airspace is, let me take that over. I can't comment on this part, but there are questions as to whether you would have the capability and technology to do it as well. A lot of our work environment is based on radar. I have a radar screen that depicts my piece of airspace, and so it goes across Canada. So there are questions as to whether or not the service provider has the technological ability to move those radar pictures to the different counterparts within the system.

The other concern is the building itself. Of the seven major centres we have one that is probably a secure building. You talked about the back door in Toronto. The back door in Toronto, I think, was not what people thought it was. It was an access road that gets you to the area control centre and Toronto tower and puts you at baseball throwing distance from airplanes. It was wide open.

Mr. John Cannis: Is it a public road?

Mr. Robert Thurger: Yes, it's the public road.

So my people went down there and asked who they were letting through, because we had a big deal with security that day. We asked how people were getting through. They went down and watched them. They brought down two extra kids that stood there and asked people for identification, but their identification question was, what are you doing? These people went through with white cube vans saying, I'm working on construction. There's a lot of construction going on in Toronto, that's understandable, but this type of access to these facilities warrants a safety concern.

• 1205

In Montreal we have a gate that surrounds the area control centre. It's a gate that requires a pass to get in, and it can require a pass to get out. That's the type of security that would at least protect the individuals inside those buildings. These 1,700 people are the only people who know how to do this job in Canada. You have about a 30% success rate in getting to be a licensed controller, and it takes, on average, close to two years.

This industry needs to be better protected. The licences we work under are governed by Transport Canada. I know there are screenings that go on whenever somebody is hired. I'm not sure at what level those are, but Transport Canada should be looking at them and saying, do we have enough security clearance for the men and women who are doing this job?

The last part of our concern with respect to security of the industry is the people who work inside those buildings. Obviously, there are not just air traffic controllers in the towers and the area control centres, there are other personnel as well. These people have fantastic access to how the system works. If you're an individual who's working a sector of airspace, many times you're on your own. There's nobody looking over your shoulder there. You're the one responsible for keeping all those planes apart. If you have individuals who do not have air traffic control licences or do not have the same level of clearance, but have access to those operation floors, then obviously, you have to look at that level of clearances and say, what is it we need to do to make sure those people working inside the buildings are safe and the information people are gathering by being on that operations floor is restricted from access by the wrong individuals?

I don't have a long list of recommendations, but I definitely have some concerns. I think the major centres and towers in Canada need to be more protected with fencing. I know in Toronto the GTAA has recently announced that they will be putting a fence around the ACC and the tower. That's good news for our members, but similar action should happen across Canada. There are a number of very significant places in Canada where security is a risk.

The other element that needs to happen is simulation on how to take over airspace. If something happens to one of our centres, there needs to be a practised procedure for someone to understand how to take over that airspace, even if that is just to sterilize the airspace, as was done on September 11, clearing all the planes out of that airspace.

Those are the types of approaches that need to be taken to protect the people who keep the planes apart.

The Chair: Thank you very much, Mr. Thurger.

Before I go to Mario for a round of questioning, does your association meet with security people at all on a regular basis to have a chat?

Mr. Robert Thurger: No.

The Chair: I think there's a bit of a divide there, because there are measures that are taken, there are levels of security, and they hire people who maybe you should be aware of.

Mr. Robert Thurger: I know there are levels of security in the screening process for air traffic controllers. I don't know what that level is.

The Chair: I would think part of what should happen is that there should be communication between you and the security people, so that you know you're secured, or if you have concerns, you should go to them.

Mario.

[Translation]

Mr. Mario Laframboise: I am wondering about some things. You targeted Transport Canada for security problems and I think that we need... Transport Canada has been supervising airport security since 1987. Prior to that, this was a responsibility of the RCMP. This was a choice, a policy, and it's not the Liberal government that adopted this policy. At that time, another government was in power.

You were quite right. Specialists in crime and terrorism are going to have to look after airport security. Transport Canada is a civilian organization run by civilians and this has led to these results. As far as security is concerned, Transport Canada has put a lot more emphasis on the costs to be borne by the airlines than real security issues. This is what Transport Canada has been doing over the past 13 or 14 years. Reality is catching up with us today.

The airlines are partially responsible for security. The administrations are partially responsible for security. But these are civilian organizations; these are not organizations that have specialized in terrorism or crime. I believe that the government must decide to put specialists in charge of security, and you are quite right.

• 1210

We must not be afraid to blame Transport Canada. This is a cold reality. Transport Canada is run by civilians and the interest shown in the expenditures of the airline companies and profitability and in what the shareholders are getting is greater than the interest shown in security.

As regards the security programs administered by Transport Canada with the airlines, we need to understand that the employees did not attend ongoing training programs or the like. This was run by Transport Canada and the airline companies and these programs produced the results that we have today. We need to understand that the employees, all the employees in the air transportation sector—you are part of this sector—are those who have been in the most stable jobs in the entire air transportation industry over the past 40 years.

The airlines have changed ownership every time you turn around. It's not over yet. We really have to be able to have confidence in those who work in the sector, and I think that we need to be able to put our trust in organizations specialized in crime and terrorism as well. We have to give the RCMP back the power it had prior to 1987, when it was responsible for airport security. As a first question, I would ask you what you think of this suggestion.

Secondly, as for security in airplanes, I find it difficult to understand, given satellite technology and all of that, why we are not able to have some type of direct control with you, on the radar system, when there's a problem. I do not understand why we are not able to invent some type of technology that would make rapid control possible, technology that could be put in the hands of the pilot, who would be able to respond immediately. I find all of this difficult to comprehend. This is the age of satellites, wireless communications. I do not understand why we have not invented or why we haven't thought about inventing something that could alert you directly to tell you that there's a problem.

Mr. Robert Thurger: The air traffic controllers knew that there was a problem on September 11. As soon as the airplane turned south, towards Washington, they knew that there was a problem, however, they did not know what to do. Nobody knew what the pilot or the terrorists intended to do, but they did know that there was a problem.

All planes have flight paths and we know what these flight paths are. So when planes turn, if they go somewhere else, we ask them what they are doing, if there is a problem.

On September 11th, if they didn't respond, the only way for the air traffic controller to ensure that the air space was secure was to have all the other planes keep their distance and let the others do what they wanted to do. There was never any indication that would have enabled the controllers to understand why this plane was heading toward the office towers. As far as the air traffic controllers were concerned, there was nothing to do, except to ensure the security of the air space.

Mr. Mario Laframboise: Do you think it would be reasonable to make the RCMP once again responsible for airport security?

Mr. Robert Thurger: I do not think that airport security should be the responsibility of anyone who is concerned about profitability. If someone has to worry about how much it will cost to have 6 or 7 people or to have a particular piece of equipment, he will always look at the bottom line.

We see the same thing in our industry. If the air space can be monitored by two or three controllers, the question of cost is always raised. There is always a question about the cost of the equipment we use. In our profession, if a compromise has to be made in terms of the security of the air navigation system and consideration is given to the bottom line, that doesn't work. So, the answer is yes.

• 1215

[English]

The Chair: Thank you, Mario.

Mr. Cannis.

Mr. John Cannis: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

You mentioned the matter of taking over the airspace. Could you just elaborate for me? In times of crisis or problems who would take over the airspace? Who were you referring to, the military?

Mr. Robert Thurger: No. In respect of the pockets of airspace, what happened on September 11 was that the FAA closed their airspace. They responded by grounding all their planes to start with. Any planes that were in the air they got on the ground as quickly as possible. They phoned us and told us nobody is allowed to enter FAA airspace, so get those planes on the ground. The international planes that were less than half way were turned around and told to go back to their departure points. So in that case it's getting the airplanes on the ground, and those authorities that are responsible for the airspace maintain that responsibility and do the job that's required.

Should something happen to one of the facilities that is responsible for the airspace... I'll take Toronto as an example; they're responsible for a large amount of airspace. The United States has access to some of that airspace, and has in the past controlled some of that airspace. So should something happen to the Toronto ACC, for example, what is the ability of adjoining ACCs? In our case, if it's Toronto, you've got Winnipeg, Montreal, and Ottawa. They all basically work airspace that surrounds Toronto. And then you also have the United States authorities down south. So what is the capability for those units surrounding Toronto ACC in picking up those airplanes and getting them safely out of that airspace, and what training has been provided to those controllers, should that happen?

Mr. John Cannis: Okay.

Before I go to the controllers, I just want you to elaborate for me. You mentioned that some kids were hired to protect that area. What do you mean exactly? Did some university students come in for a couple of days?

Mr. Robert Thurger: The people we sent down there said they looked like very young kids, maybe 18, 20, 22.

Mr. John Cannis: Who would hire these kids?

Mr. Robert Thurger: It would be the GTAA, I believe.

Mr. John Cannis: The GTAA. Okay.

In the United States who is responsible for the air traffic controllers? Is it the government?

Mr. Robert Thurger: It's the FAA.

Mr. John Cannis: Who is it in Canada?

Mr. Robert Thurger: It's NAV CANADA.

Mr. John Cannis: What is NAV CANADA?

Mr. Robert Thurger: It is the organization that took over from Transport Canada in 1996. It's a not-for-profit organization that provides air navigation service.

Mr. John Cannis: But there's always a bottom line, though?

Mr. Robert Thurger: It's a not-for-profit organization, but the board of directors of includes six individuals from the airline industry. So if the rates that can be charged by NAV CANADA decrease, obviously, the airline industry's bottom line increases.

Mr. John Cannis: The government has no say? Here when things go well, it's like, well, the circumstances, the environment, you know, people are spending. When things go badly, no matter what, blame the government. So is the government to be blamed here because NAV CANADA is run by a not-for-profit set-up?

Mr. Robert Thurger: No. I think the only responsibility the government has is with the safety oversight. If you ask me whether they have enough resources to do that, I would say no.

Mr. John Cannis: So when they have not enough resources to do their job, who ends up paying the price?

Mr. Robert Thurger: I think there are a number of people who pay the price, among them the controllers, by having to take on more responsibility, more airspace, working more traffic volume than they probably should. I think the ultimate payer is the user.

Mr. John Cannis: Would you prefer the American system or the Canadian system?

Mr. Robert Thurger: On paper, I think the Canadian system is a better system.

Mr. John Cannis: For what reasons?

Mr. Robert Thurger: I think they have proven that there's a faster capacity to put in new equipment and new towers where needed. There wasn't as much legislation to go through.

Mr. John Cannis: Where does your revenue come from to put in new equipment?

Mr. Robert Thurger: It comes from charges on the users, the airlines.

Mr. John Cannis: That's the point I really want to get to, because we're talking about—

• 1220

Mr. Robert Thurger: I just want to finish answering your first question as to who I would rather be with. That's the good side of the not-for-profit organization. The bad side is labour relations, and they have been extremely poor. I think part of that comes from the makeup of the board. I think that needs to be looked at.

Mr. John Cannis: It all boils down to costs, and we're trying to get the consumers, Canadians, people in general to feel confident enough to get back on the planes and fly. That's what we're trying to do.

Previous witnesses came before the committee and talked about how these measures are going to take big dollars. You mentioned earlier, Mr. Lyon, it's going to take money to get us feeling safe, no matter what we're doing. Where are these costs, where are these expenditures going to come from? Today we have the GTAA as an example. It has airport tax for upgrading facilities, infrastructure, etc. If we're trying to get the people back on the planes by providing security, and yet we need to increase the costs of travelling, then the traveller's going to say, I can't afford it.

Do you follow my thought here?

Mr. Robert Thurger: Yes.

Mr. John Cannis: So I mean—

Mr. Robert Thurger: So what's the answer?

Mr. John Cannis: Yes.

Mr. Robert Thurger: I go back to what I've seen since NAV CANADA took over in 1996. There have been hundreds of millions of dollars rebated to the airlines. I don't know where that money went. It certainly didn't go back to reduced ticket prices, I know that. I fly every week, and my prices didn't change.

Mr. John Cannis: I'll close with this, Mr. Chair, if you'll permit me.

What I sense so far from the two presenters is something that came through with other witnesses as well, a failure to communicate. You mention there is an association now as a result of the horrible incident with flight 111. The organization's in the States. I don't want to use any any scapegoats, but in the United States they talk about bureau this and bureau that, and they really don't communicate their intelligence. We've heard it from other people, who say, well, we have our orders from the government. The government isn't telling you not to communicate. We have our sources here as well, our organizations where one is not communicating with the other. So there's information there, from what I sense, there are ideas there, and we are not communicating.

You've given us some answers, and I thank you for that. If I have one suggestion, it is that you people go back to your organizations and your representatives, CATCA, CAW, etc., and start communicating. If there's a directive from the government, please tell us, so that we can convey it to our colleagues and our ministers.

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

The Chair: Val.

Ms. Val Meredith: Thank you, Mr. Chair.

I want to better understand how you become employed. You brought up the safety from the outside, people being able to gain access to the towers and the control centres, but there's a safety factor from within. What I'd like to know is the kinds of qualifications you need to even become a traffic controller. What kind of screening takes place that you're aware of? What kind of time did it take from your application to when you got the clearance to take on the job?

Mr. Robert Thurger: NAV CANADA has hired a consulting company to provide them with candidates to be air traffic controllers. You must have a high school diploma—that's the only sort of credential. There is a security screening process. What happened when I was hired, and I was hired through Transport, was that you were fingerprinted, and the RCMP did whatever it is they do. My understanding is that this still goes on. I don't know exactly what they're looking for—I made it through. I think that's a good thing.

Then you go to Cornwall, the NAV CANADA training institute. The course length varies, but it's approximately six months. You get basic training in Cornwall. Then, depending on the program or what is in place at the time—we've seen a number of different changes—you will go directly to an area control centre or you will go through towers and then to an area control centre. A short term out of Cornwall would be eight months; a long term out of Cornwall, by the time you've gone to the tower, can take upwards of two years.

Once you get your first licence—and your first licence can be in a tower eight months later—you have the authority to control airplanes. In some cases that means you're sitting in a tower. I know Kelowna and Kamloops have a couple of control positions at a time, but there are towers in Canada at the smaller airports where there's only one controller working for an extended period of time, and that individual has absolute control over that facility.

• 1225

Ms. Val Meredith: As a follow-up to that—and it may be because I saw `Pushing Tin, which opened my eyes—there is a lot of pressure and a lot of stress on air traffic controllers. Is part of the the Cornwall training handling stress, trying to sort out those who have the psychological capacity to handle the stress from those who don't?

Mr. Robert Thurger: During the interview process—and I can speak from my interview—there was some of that testing. There were timed questions, someone sitting there asking the question with a stop watch. It gets a bit intimidating—can you handle that pressure?

The real test comes from two things. One is the simulation, but simulation is just that, and everybody knows it's simulation. So there's not a real test of whether you can handle the pressure. The real test comes with what's called on-the-job instructing, and every controller, once they're licensed, will end up being an instructor. So there is an individual who is plugged in and can take over at a moment's notice, take over the control situation, should I make mistakes. I will do the same thing once I'm checked out.

That process is usually five, six, seven, eight months. There's a three- or six-week course that starts beforehand. And as I was saying, everybody is responsible for the rules of their sector, so that three to six weeks involve explaining the rules. The rest of the time is spent learning how to do the job. And the real test of whether you can handle the pressure is when you're on the floor. Where I worked was Vancouver terminal. When you have two planes that are going 180 miles an hour each, both pointed at each other—and they have to be to get on the ground—and you turn them at the appropriate time, that's where you find out if you can do the job or not.

Ms. Val Meredith: What kind of supervision is there to make sure people are doing their jobs and being efficient?

Mr. Robert Thurger: Is there stand-back supervision, to make sure people are on?

Ms. Val Meredith: Yes. Are there people there just monitoring the performance of their employees, so that they're able to assess when somebody may need a week off or whatever?

Mr. Robert Thurger: Or may need some extra help, is that the idea?

Ms. Val Meredith: Yes.

Mr. Robert Thurger: There's supposed to be, but a lot of times—

Ms. Val Meredith: Is there?

Mr. Robert Thurger: No. A lot of times those stand-back supervisors, because of staffing cuts, are plugged in and working positions. When you're working a position, it's something that's extremely hard to explain. You have to pretend that you're sitting there staring at anything. You can't answer a phone that's ringing, your focus has to be entirely on this picture. And if you lose that focus, if for one second you have to go and answer a question, you have to come back to that picture, reacquire everything, and make sure everything is okay. So if they're plugged in, they're not doing their stand-back supervision. In a lot of towers and in a lot of ACCs, there is no stand-back supervision.

Ms. Val Meredith: So would you see that as a safety issue, a safety concern, the fact that you have highly stressed employees without somebody monitoring their performance?

Mr. Robert Thurger: Absolutely.

Ms. Val Meredith: Then the next question is a follow-up to that. Whose responsibility is it? Is it NAV CAN's responsibility to make sure that supervision is provided? Does NAV CAN operate under regulations from Transport Canada? Is there adequate communication—and maybe you can't answer this—between NAV CANADA and the Department of Transport with regard to personnel, resources, all the rest of it?

Mr. Robert Thurger: I know they do communicate. As to whether it's adequate or not, I can't comment on that. Who's responsible? Is there legislation? No, there's no legislation. NAV CANADA uses a risk-based assessment of what needs to happen. They control entirely the staffing levels of the different units or towers. One of our biggest arguments in bargaining is staffing and what should be the appropriate levels. I continually get calls from my members saying, “They're cutting staff again.” “What happened during this incident?” “Well, the supervisor was plugged in, he had no ability to oversee what was going on.”

• 1230

With an incident like September 11, should that have happened in Canadian airspace, one of the roles of the supervisors would be to ensure that proper coordination is going on. If you are the individual sitting there controlling the airplane that has all of a sudden gone off course, you don't just have the one plane, you can have 8 or 10, 15 or 20. Depending on the size of the scope you're working with, you can have a number of other planes.

The supervisor is there to coordinate with the FAA, to be in your left ear saying, okay, this is what's going on, you need to sterilize this airspace. That's their job. If there's an airport accident, their job is to coordinate with the surrounding facilities to shut down the airport, should a plane crash at the airport. That's what they're there for. Do you need them 100% of the time? Absolutely, but not because there are accidents every second. That's the safety element that needs to be there.

Ms. Val Meredith: You would suggest that it's not there?

Mr. Robert Thurger: I would tell you it's not there.

Ms. Val Meredith: Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

[Translation]

The Chair: André Harvey.

Mr. André Harvey: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I would like to thank our witnesses for appearing before our committee this morning. I think that it is important to have an opportunity to have an exchange. A former Quebec premier, Daniel Johnson, said that when he looked at himself he got upset but that he found comfort when he compared himself to others. This is true for individuals and I think that it is true for organizations.

I would like to go back to the way that air transportation is organized in the country. Prior to the events of September 11th, the International Civil Aviation Organization had said that the security and safety system here, in Canada, could not be matched by any other country in the world. I would like to ask you whether or not you feel that this opinion reflects reality on the whole.

Secondly, how useful would aviation beacons be in the country? Correct me if I am wrong, but I think that the Americans have decided to use aviation beacons. How will they improve technology? Even if you track planes in flight in a very accurate manner, when there is a terrorist in the country, there is not very much that you can do. Why have the Americans decided to use aviation beacons, if in fact they have decided to use them?

[English]

Mr. Robert Thurger: Do we have safety comparable to none? I think Canada has done a good job in aviation safety. From my perspective, in respect of controlling airplanes, we've done very well. We have very few catastrophic incidents that are blamed on controllers or pilots. I think they are very professionally trained and do everything they can to make sure the skies are safe. That's what I represent—are the skies safe? Do I fly the planes? Absolutely not. We have professionals we deal with who do that, and that's their responsibility, but we work together to make sure the system is as safe as possible. When you compare flying in Canada to flying elsewhere in the world, I think we do have a much safer system. I credit that to the men and women who do the job. But I think we can improve.

As for the equipment we use, you're right, if a terrorist takes over an airplane, it doesn't matter what equipment you have. If you tell it to turn left and it turns right, the radio's not going to do anything to turn it the other way. The concern I have is whether, should something happen to the equipment in one centre or one tower, an adjoining tower, which could be 300 or 400 miles away, is able to communicate with those airplanes. Radio is a line of sight thing, and you must have a powerful enough piece of equipment to be able to talk to the airplanes. That's where I think it would be prudent to look into whether training should be given. My position would be that it should be, so that should an emergency such as this happen, the men and women who are responsible for that airspace have the ability and the training to take over that airspace and sterilize it properly.

[Translation]

Mr. André Harvey: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The Chair: Marcel Proulx.

[English]

Mr. Marcel Proulx: Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Good morning. You're a member of the Canadian Air Traffic Controllers Association, right?

Mr. Robert Thurger: Yes.

• 1235

Mr. Marcel Proulx: I understand that all Canadian air traffic controllers are employed by NAV CAN.

Mr. Robert Thurger: There are a couple of places in Canada that are military bases where people are employed by JobCircle. We don't represent them. But yes, our 2,100 members—barring maybe 20 others—are the only air traffic controllers in Canada, and they're all employed by NAV CANADA.

Mr. Marcel Proulx: Aside from having all our air traffic controllers on the payroll, NAV CAN also looks after equipment. They also look after operating the equipment and using your services to control all of the air traffic in Canada, except for the few military bases, you're saying.

Mr. Robert Thurger: Yes.

Mr. Marcel Proulx: Is NAV CAN subject to Government of Canada Treasury Board guidelines as far as concerns purchasing, equipment, etc.?

Mr. Robert Thurger: My understanding is that all capital expenditures have absolutely nothing to do with the government, and anything over $5 million has to be approved by the board of directors of NAV CANADA.

Mr. Marcel Proulx: So they're independent, they do what they want.

Mr. Robert Thurger: Yes.

Mr. Marcel Proulx: Do they decide themselves what type of equipment they will supply you with to do your job?

Mr. Robert Thurger: Yes.

Mr. Marcel Proulx: They're the ones who are deciding what you should be using to do your job.

Mr. Robert Thurger: Yes.

Mr. Marcel Proulx: How do we know the equipment is the right equipment? How do we know the equipment they've purchased is not the cheapest equipment on the market? And I'm talking of a worldwide market here, because I understand that NAV CAN doesn't care if it's Canada-made or whatever.

Mr. Robert Thurger: No, not at all, and a lot of the equipment is actually made in-house as well.

Mr. Marcel Proulx: I see. You told us a little while ago that the bottom line at NAV CAN is airlines, because whatever it costs NAV CAN to operate is shared by the users, the airlines.

Mr. Robert Thurger: The mandate given to them by the government is that they be a not-for-profit organization. They charge user fees based on the cost of providing the service, and that includes the cost of debt for capital expenditures and things like that,

Mr. Marcel Proulx: Okay, but the users paying the fees are in fact airline companies.

Mr. Robert Thurger: Yes.

Mr. Marcel Proulx: And they in turn might or might not pass rebates or increases on to travellers.

Mr. Robert Thurger: They also sit on the board of directors of NAV CANADA.

Mr. Marcel Proulx: So my question is, do you feel that the equipment that is supplied by NAV CAN to you air controllers in Canada is the best equipment you could be using?

Mr. Robert Thurger: The best equipment? No. NAV CANADA goes through a process where they certify their own equipment, and we talked about the ability of Transport Canada, as a safety oversight, to have the resources to look into these things. That process of certification, which used to be done, when we were with Transport Canada, through the Transport offices, is done through NAV CANADA. So you've got a company that, while there are steps to go through, certifies its own equipment. I think there's probably a better way of doing it.

Mr. Marcel Proulx: Am I hearing from you that you feel it was better protected or it was better assessed before?

Mr. Robert Thurger: That's hard for me to comment on. The equipment certainly took a lot longer to come onto the floor. We've seen, as air traffic controllers, a sometimes hasty push to get something on the floor. We have a new system that I would say is one of the best systems I've seen for a radar display, but when it first came on the floor, the targets started to jump around a bit. Maybe it needed a little more testing, but that requires money.

There are also issues about training. When a new piece of equipment is put onto the floor, how much training is involved? If it's a small change for the controllers, maybe they can just adapt on the fly. Adapting on the fly with live traffic is something people should really be concerned about, and that's where I think the safety and oversight of a government body needs to play a role, so it can say, if you're going to put a new piece of equipment in, I want to see what training you've provided to the members who are going to use the equipment, and I want to see the tests of that equipment.

• 1240

Mr. Marcel Proulx: You want to see also the service record and so on in regard to that equipment.

Mr. Robert Thurger: In some cases, you're introducing new equipment.

Mr. Marcel Proulx: Yes, but there are service records of the manufacturer, of the company, of the experts that have been involved.

Mr. Robert Thurger: Yes, but there's also a piece of equipment that has been around for 20 years, but we still haven't seen, which is CATS. I think everybody knows what CATS is, or has at least heard of it. It's a system that has been around for 20 years, but is yet to be put in the field, because of a number of different errors that have happened. I won't even begin to speak on why or when they occurred. That system is eventually going to be put on the floor, maybe more for political reasons than for functionality reasons.

We sometimes see equipment coming on the floor and ask, why are you giving me this piece of equipment? My work load just increased because of this. You didn't make the system more efficient, you made my work harder to do. I can't work more airplanes, I'm not providing a better service, so why is this piece of equipment here? Those questions should all be asked by somebody who is not concerned with the bottom line and has a safety perspective as their number one goal.

Mr. Marcel Proulx: Is your association consulted by NAV CAN when they're either testing or choosing equipment?

Mr. Robert Thurger: Yes and no, if that's a fair way to answer. We're asked for input, but if I were to stand up and say, absolutely not, that piece of equipment is not going in the ops room, and give reasons, it could still go in there, unless I took further action.

Mr. Marcel Proulx: Even if you were saying that as president of the association?

Mr. Robert Thurger: Yes.

Mr. Marcel Proulx: I see. Thank you.

The Chair: We'll move to Mario.

[Translation]

Mr. Mario Laframboise: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Thurger, I think you have put your finger right on the problem. Previous governments, prior to the crisis of September 11, made political choices, to reduce taxes and to decrease the debt. They made decisions along those lines. NAV CANADA was created. The service was taken out from under Transport Canada so it would be self-financing.

The same thing was done in airports. Airport authorities were set up so that airports could be self-financing. Taxes are collected from passengers, and these taxes are being increased once again so that these operations can be self-financing. Pressure was brought to bear on employees to reduce costs as much as possible.

In reality, the responsibility for security was placed in the hands of civilians, and today we have a major problem. I think that the responsibility for security should be placed in the hands of security specialists. If there is a price to pay, it should not necessarily be the users who pay it. Security must be enhanced and there will be exceptional costs. I think that it is up to the government to make a choice. It is up to the government to decide if it will earmark $17 billion for debt reduction or if it will earmark less for that purpose. It is a political choice that the government must make.

Mr. Cannis and Mr. Harvey, among others, are trying to tell us that there is no problem and that we must be careful because that will increase costs for users. If we do that, we will kill air service. That is what will happen. If more and more costs are passed on to users, they will travel by plane less often. We have reached a point where you and your members can no longer take on additional work.

So somewhere, for security matters, you will perhaps need more staff. The same will be true for security and airports. The same will be true on planes. There will be additional expenditures, in the name of national security. We have a national security problem and it must be solved. In my opinion, it is not up to the industry to support all of that, as the government is requiring it to do now.

The United States have already decided to invest and to use government money. Other countries are using government money to help the airline industry. It is a choice. All that we are being told today is there is no problem. All was well in a context where we did virtually nothing in terms of security. That is what we did. We were at the third level. We were in the trough of the wave, but we now have a major security problem. We are in a terrible situation because of the incidents that occurred in the United States, that we would not want to see occur here.

• 1245

So as far as I am concerned, we must invest in security, and entrust it to RCMP security specialists and go back to the situation prior to 1987, when the government invested huge sums of money in airport security. Since 1987, they have wanted to save money, they have reduced security and entrusted it to civilian organizations. I think we have to go back to what we had before and take the money we need from government coffers to achieve our objective.

We have a terrible example in the health field. For 14 months, the Minister of Health had a letter telling him to buy medication to counter terrorist acts. In the end, he waited, and he had to place two orders at the same time. That is what happened. A decision was made not to invest, not to spend because we did not have enough money, but today, we are in this situation. You put your finger right on it, Mr. Chairman.

If we ask you for enhanced security, you will need more staff and someone will have to pay for it. I do not think that it is necessarily up to the industry and users to pay, because we will kill air service in Canada if we do that.

[English]

Mr. Robert Thurger: Can NAV CANADA support these changes? Over the last four years since they've taken over, as I've said before, they've rebated to the airlines hundreds of millions of dollars. Those rebates came in reduced fees. One of the loudest advertisements, if you will, was that their rates are lower than the airlines were paying when they were with government.

Can they still support it with these increases? I think if you stop the bottom-line mentality, maybe what needs to be addressed is the makeup of the NAV CANADA board, to look at why there is such a focus on a bottom-line mentality when their number one reason for being is the safety of the airspace in Canada, and that should be their focus. That's where I think the government can play a role.

You might be right, there might be a necessity to have some government funding for certain aspects of what's provided. It's hard for me to say, because I don't get to see where the money goes in NAV CANADA, but when I see hundreds of millions of dollars going back to the airlines in reduced fees that the airlines could take advantage of, there's obviously some room in there for more of a safety conscious approach. It would increase the cost, and maybe those rebates wouldn't be there, but we're still looking at what, compared to when the government owned the whole system, is the same rate of flying in Canada.

The Chair: Thank you.

Alex.

Mr. Alex Shepherd: To clarify something, you mentioned the rebate system a number of times, but how does it happen? Do they assess a rate throughout the year, and then somehow... You had a good performance, so they're going to... How does it work?

Mr. Robert Thurger: They go on historical data. They have a $50 million slush fund they can use. Based on their revenues and their expenses, they charge the users x dollars. If the service becomes more expensive, the user rate increases. If you only had one plane flying in the sky, that plane would be responsible for all the expenses of NAV CANADA. The more traffic they have, obviously, the more the price per user can be decreased. The more they expend money, the more the costs increase. So it's a balancing act, and that's why it was made up as a not-for-profit organization.

Mr. Alex Shepherd: Is it in reality that they've increased their volumes during this period of time, and therefore their unit cost has been reduced and that justifies a rebate?

Mr. Robert Thurger: That could be part of it as well. If volume increases, their unit costs go down, and they can also give rebates to the users.

Mr. Alex Shepherd: So that's not necessarily a psychological thing. They're just trying to shuffle some money into the airlines' pockets.

• 1250

Mr. Robert Thurger: You've got to look at what you are doing to reduce the costs. On the one hand, if you've got more traffic, you obviously have more revenue and your unit costs go down. But you also have to look at what cost-cutting measures have been taken. We talked about the lack of stand-back supervision—that saves them money. There's the cutback in training that has happened—that saves them money. Those types of initiatives, the restricting of training, the restriction on certain capital expenditures, save them money. Those decisions are influenced by the board of directors.

Mr. Alex Shepherd: The board of directors, you've stated that they are former or existing directors with the airlines, is that correct?

Mr. Robert Thurger: Yes.

Mr. Alex Shepherd: Are there interlocking boards or something?

Mr. Robert Thurger: It's a 15-member board. Three or four are government employees. There are three or four independents, who are nominated by the board. There are two union representatives, who are nominated by the eight unions that work for NAV CANADA. And then there are five positions that come from the different airlines.

Mr. Alex Shepherd: So you're alleging that by the time the smoke clears, the board is skewed towards the airlines, because not only do they have the five, but they also have the ability to appoint the external members.

Mr. Robert Thurger: The whole board appoints the independents, so if you get a small monopoly, you can increase your monopoly by who's appointed.

Mr. Alex Shepherd: Are the independents also related to the airline industry?

Mr. Robert Thurger: No, not necessarily.

Mr. Alex Shepherd: Okay.

One thing that went on in the terrorist attack that I never fully understood—maybe you could explain it to me—is this business of transponders that are on the flights themselves, where a pilot has the ability to trip one of these when there's a hijack occurring. Maybe it's just the press doing this, but they said this didn't happen in any of these cases.

Mr. Robert Thurger: There are security measures in place that I'm not sure I'm allowed to divulge. Every aircraft has a transponder. They all have a specific code in that transponder that's assigned by ATC. We provide a code that allows the system, if you're Air Canada 123 and you're squawking this code, to have you come up as Air Canada 123.

Mr. Alex Shepherd: Maybe you can't tell me, and that's fine, but as I understood it, there was something that a pilot can push to say, this plane has been hijacked, or, we're under attack.

Mr. Robert Thurger: There are security measures in place allowing pilots and air traffic controllers to communicate, so that we can know certain flight situations that are going on, loss of communication, emergency, hijacking, those types of things.

Mr. Alex Shepherd: It was alleged in this particular incident on September 11 that this didn't happen.

Mr. Robert Thurger: That's dependent on the knowledge of the hijackers. If the hijackers are knowledgeable about those procedures, then certainly, they can take the appropriate action to make sure they don't happen.

Mr. Alex Shepherd: Is there a way to prevent them doing that?

Mr. Robert Thurger: Not if they have access to the cockpit.

Mr. Alex Shepherd: That's the whole thing, eh?

Mr. Robert Thurger: Yes. It's all based on communication, and there are two forms of communication. There's the radio, and then there's the signal that comes from the transponder, and that transponder can pass along a lot of information. It can pass along the speed of the aircraft, the height of the aircraft, and also the number it's squawking. Those are the two forms of communication you have with pilots.

Mr. Alex Shepherd: Maybe I'm getting way off my terms of reference, but if somebody forced open the cockpit doors, is it possible to trigger that on the transponder, so that the air traffic controller would know that's been breached?

Mr. Robert Thurger: If the system were set up that way. I'm sure with today's technology they could do that.

The Chair: Thank you very much, Alex.

Val.

Ms. Val Meredith: That's actually not a bad segue into what I wanted to follow up on.

• 1255

Let's say that September 11 happened in Toronto. What is the mechanism for you as a controller to report, to follow through to the various levels of RCMP, Transport Canada, whatever, who would need to know what was going on? It may not be terrorism, it may a plane in trouble, maybe a passenger who needs help. How do you get that kind of information to the other agencies?

Mr. Robert Thurger: Generally, you're sitting in a control position, and if something should happen like September 11 on your scope or, if you're sitting in a tower, out your window, you call your stand-back supervisor—and hope he's not working. That communication then would go to a shift manager, who is not a controller, but an employee of NAV CANADA who deals with the external communications. If the shift manager's not around, there are procedures you go through to inform the local authorities, and then it goes along those roads. Basically, it's your stand-back supervisor you would inform first, your manager second, and then those people would take over the communication process.

Ms. Val Meredith: So at any sign of any kind of problem with one of the aircraft that you're controlling, you would automatically pass on that responsibility. Is it instantaneous?

Mr. Robert Thurger: You would pass on the information. The responsibility is always still yours. The responsibility of what's going on with that aircraft is always yours. That can't be taken over by anybody unless you give them control of that airplane, or if they move into another person's airspace, you will hand off to that person. In a case of emergency, other than what happened on September 11, sometimes you will isolate your airspace, so you only deal with the one airplane and are not distracted by all the other airplanes. So you isolate your airspace to just deal with this one individual.

Ms. Val Meredith: Explain to us what isolating the airspace is? Is that moving all the planes out of the area, so you only have one plane in the area and there aren't any complicating factors with that one airplane?

Mr. Robert Thurger: That's exactly right.

Ms. Val Meredith: When you do that, you're taking those aircraft and moving them over into another airspace controlled by another individual?

Mr. Robert Thurger: Yes.

Ms. Val Meredith: For something like September 11, do you feel the reporting mechanisms are adequate? I understand we have the same problem with the possibility that your supervisor is working

Mr. Robert Thurger: If the supervisors aren't working, the information mechanism is there and it works well. If something like September 11 happened in Toronto, Toronto tower, Toronto ACC, or any of the large units across Canada, then no, we wouldn't be adequately equipped. People wouldn't know what their responsibilities were. They've never had the simulation. People have never been given, here's what happens if Toronto goes out. I could tell you that they would make it work.

Ms. Val Meredith: Is there any indication that people are revisiting the need for that kind of training? Is there any indication that NAV CANADA or somebody else is saying, we need to prepare ourselves for a new reality?

Mr. Robert Thurger: I won't comment on what they're doing behind the scenes that they haven't informed me of. What I have seen since September 11 is a cutback in staffing. Where we needed three before, maybe they're saying we only need two now. My concern is that we're probably having more situations where there's less stand-back supervision.

Ms. Val Meredith: Thank you.

The Chair: The chair has a couple of questions for all the panel members, if you don't mind.

We have these spacecraft that go into outer space, and they can be completely guided in. The technology exists whereby you could actually shut an automotive down on the highway, or you could redirect it. Could it be that these controls could be taken over? Has this been discussed at all at any level, the possibility of actually flying the aircraft once the thing is in difficulty and it's heading into the wrong airspace? I know it's a futuristic thing, and maybe it would need to have modifications, but has any of that been talked about?

Mr.Robert Thurger: Not with our association.

Mr. James Lyon: It is being talked about. It's certainly a principle in some of the threads that I follow on the Internet.

• 1300

The Chair: Okay.

Second, everybody who comes to us always says the government should be doing more, there should be more money, they shouldn't have luggage carried on, so you inconvenience the passenger, you make them stay longer, they can't carry their luggage on, they're not the bad guys. Then they stop flying. I hear a lot of people, including some of my colleagues, saying they'll take a train, they'll take a slow boat to China. Is there a component of the airfare that is for security, or is the sky the limit, the government just pays for all the security and the airlines make money on the planes they fly?

Mr. Robert Thurger: I would answer that question the same way I was answering Mr. Laframboise's question. What I've seen since 1996 is hundreds of millions of dollars being rebated to airlines. I think there's obviously, within the system, a capacity for increasing security while not putting that burden on the government. I think the government's role should be to increase their resources to oversee the safety, not necessarily to be responsible for it. That's specifically in respect of the air traffic control industry, not necessarily the passengers or the airport security. I think the resources the government should allocate should be for playing more of an active role in the oversight of safety and demanding that these issues be addressed.

Mr. James Lyon: In answering that question, there's a subjective element, as well as an objective element. Many of the people who are interested in the answers, of course, work for the aircraft industry in one way or another—they fly them, they make them, or whatever. It's a big part of our economy. Of course, there are other ways of getting to places. I'm not in the industry right now, so I can step back a little and say, yes, you can actually go to Montreal by bus, and it does cost you about $22, and it takes no more time than an airplane takes to get there. I never did it until recently, that's how I know. It cost me $21.70, I think it was, and took two hours downtown to downtown.

Before September 11, there was great, as I believe, overcapacity in the aircraft system. What happened on September 11 had an independent existence, but also a continuing existence in connection with all that went before. It may have been a catalyst to make happen, very badly and very suddenly, what was going to happen to some extent anyway, as there was great overcapacity in the airlines. Boeing is just laying off 30,000 employees. I don't think Boeing made that decision on the basis of one incident.

There was a time when I was always the youngest guy around, and now it seems increasingly I'm the oldest one. I remember the war. People put up with an awful lot of things they didn't like in the war. You couldn't go where you wanted to go when you wanted. If you did, it was cold, or it took a long time, or the train was late, or there was no train. Everything was kind of unpleasant. In all the discussions we have on this poor September 11 there's a dichotomy between what people would like to see and what they don't actually realize is implicit in a wartime condition. The Americans speak more frankly, I think, than we do about a wartime condition. That is in many ways what we are discussing, wartime conditions. Wartime conditions are not always pleasant.

The Chair: Thank you.

Mr. Cannis, last question.

Mr. John Cannis: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I thank you for giving me the floor as we close, because I guess I was compelled to ask for the floor, but more than that, I've been provoked to ask for the floor by my colleague from the Bloc Québécois. When I hear such nonsense comments that we are not doing well, we have a national security problem, we do not have a secure environment, we are doing nothing about security, my question becomes, would any reasonable and logical person have made that statement pre-September 11? We bring witnesses here now to tell us, post-September 11, what we can do to fine-tune the system we have. There have been some very constructive comments made by you and previous witnesses. It's unfortunate that my colleague wasn't with us when we did take time to go and visit Pearson and ask the many questions I'm sure you've expressed some concerns about, the gate being one.

• 1305

So I'm disappointed in that, because right now I think we're reacting in the way we should, given what happened September 11 in the United States of America. That, I think , ties in with the question I had earlier, whether some of the proposals you're making today could have been made a year or two ago. What is our record in Canada as regards our aviation and our security in comparison with others? I believe—correct me if I'm wrong—we had one incident 30 years ago or so. I think by fuelling or fostering this type of environment, we are doing a disservice to each and every Canadian, with these outrageous statements from the Bloc Québécois that we have a very insecure system. I would ask you, gentlemen, in your closing remarks, is that the case?

Mr. James Lyon: I'll answer that, sir, by saying what I've said here today, I think—what I certainly meant to say today, if I haven't said it—and what I have said in every radio and TV program I've been involved in on this. One cannot take twentieth-century standards and apply them to the fifteenth century, and one cannot take post-September 11 standards and apply them to pre-September 11. Until September 11—and this is really part of the thesis I'm trying to present—the worst we could think of was that someone would damage the aircraft, or that some really wicked, abnormal person would have it in for some passenger on that aircraft and do his best to take the person out, and the aircraft at the same time. It never crossed anyone's mind that someone was going to take the aircraft and turn it into a guided missile. It could have crossed one's mind that they could, but it never crossed one's mind that they would.

Mr. John Cannis: Or they see it in the movie with Arnold Schwarzenegger, and they say, let's carry out the same thing.

Mr. James Lyon: It's the comic book horror situation.

Unfortunately, some people did do this on September 11, and they made us think, my goodness, we have an entirely set of new problems confronting us, what do we do? If anyone has difficulty in answering those questions, they have all my sympathy, because I've tried to go through a sequence of things as to what I would do sequentially or incrementally, and it's not easy to come up with dogmatic answers, not at all.

So I think we had a system, which, no doubt, had warts and imperfections up to September 11, and could have been improved and perfected, but we have to reappraise the whole thing now.

Mr. John Cannis: I believe that is what we are all attempting to do, each and every concerned member. Irrespective of my colleague's comment about the profession, I believe every profession is an honourable profession. It's up to the individual himself who dishonours his specific profession, whether it be the legal industry or the political environment, sad to say.

So I think, in good faith, we have an obligation to each and every Canadian and each and every human being, no matter where they are, to try to better the system. We do not do justice to the system if such cacophony unfolds, sadly, as is unwarranted and unjustified. You've come here with constructive comments, and I thank you for coming. But I as an individual, representing a specific group of people in my riding, find it unacceptable that we put out the notion that we have a very insecure system. I think we have to work with a positive mental attitude, with positive, constructive comment, such as you brought forward today. I thank you for that.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The Chair: I'd like to thank the witnesses. I think their interventions were informative. I'm sure there are good suggestions in there. We appreciate your frankness. That's why you're here, to be frank with us, not to tell us what we want to hear. Thank you very much for your help.

We're adjourned until Tuesday.