TRGO Committee Meeting

STANDING COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORT AND GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS

LE COMITÉ PERMANENT DES TRANSPORTS ET DES OPÉRATIONS GOUVERNEMENTALES

EVIDENCE

[Editor's Note: Proceedings start in camera]

[Recorded by Electronic Apparatus]

Tuesday, October 16, 2001

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[English]

The Chair (Mr. Ovid Jackson (Bruce—Grey—Owen Sound, Lib.)): I'd like to start this section of the meeting of the transport committee.

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With us are Clifford Mackay, president and chief executive officer of the Air Transport Association of Canada; and Michael Skrobica, the association's vice-president of industry monetary affairs.

Gentlemen, the procedure is that you have approximately five minutes to give us your comments, although we may give you a little latitude over that. You can give us a blurb, and then we will have the rest of the time for questions. We like to keep both the questions and the answers precise in order to get in as many questions as possible. Thank you very much.

Mr. Mackay, will you be the lead guy here?

Mr. J. Clifford Mackay (President and Chief Executive Officer, Air Transport Association of Canada): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

First, let me again thank the committee for taking the time to hear us today. Frankly, I only wish we could be here under more pleasant circumstances.

Let me start off by saying the security of our passengers and crew is a paramount preoccupation of the members of our association, and we're pleased to be here to discuss it further with you. I want to just emphasize that when I say “the members of our association”, I mean all members of our association. We're not just simply referring to the larger airlines, although that's obviously what the media and other people are focusing on. We're also talking about a large number of our smaller members—people who fly charters, who operate flight schools, and others. I think you need to know our membership is fairly broadly based.

I've passed around comments. I don't intend to read them, but I will give you just some highlights as we go through.

I think the first thing we need to say—and I'm sure you've heard it from other witnesses, but let me say it again—is that the tragic events of September 11 were really epoch-making. That's particularly true for our industry. Nothing has been the same since then. I can't reinforce that point any more with you. Everything has changed since September 11 in our business. We are still trying to understand the full implications of that statement as we work our way through very many different changes in the industry.

We believe the process we are in is going to be long, expensive, frustrating, and will lead to many changes, some of which we're even have difficulty articulating yet. We don't know ourselves where this is going to take us. I want people to understand that this is a journey upon which we've embarked, but we're really not absolutely sure where the end point is. But we do know we have to do this.

Just let me say a few things about what has happened since September 11. Obviously, in the first frantic days after the tragedy, our phone lines were almost continuously on conference calls. We were routinely having a hundred-plus people on conference calls that went on hour after hour as we tried to work with Transport Canada and other security officials to put in place short-term, interim measures so that we could get the planes back in the air. My staff literally worked around the clock in some cases, and my vice-president with me today was the man directly in charge of many of those things. If you have questions along those lines, Michael can answer them.

We need to say thank you to Transport Canada and to other security officials. They worked tirelessly with us, and in a relatively short period of time, in an unbelievably uncertain and difficult environment, we were able to get people flying again. I think a lot of kudos need to go to Transport Canada, particularly its security and safety branch.

One of the surprising results of the intense review that went on at that time was our belief that the basic system, the fundamentals, seemed to be withstanding the kind of scrutiny they were given—and by the fundamentals, I mean the role of government, which is primarily to set the regulations, to be the scrutineer, to be the standard setter, and to be the enforcer; and the role of the industry, be it either airports or airlines primarily, to actually implement the regulations and policies set forth by the government. They seem to be withstanding the test of time, although I'm not sure there aren't going to be wrinkles there as well.

Let me mention some of the changes that have gone on since September 11. I'll mention three lines of defence on the ground, and one in the air.

First, as I'm sure you are all aware, the police presence at airports has gone up dramatically. In most cases, it has tripled, and it continues to be sustained at very high levels.

Secondly, passenger screening has been dramatically tightened up. In some cases, new equipment is already in the process of being deployed. In addition to that, we are increasing the level and consistency of training, primarily through the introduction of computer-based systems, and this will allow us to have much more consistent training and also to implement new training much more quickly and efficiently, across the entire system, throughout the country, as new equipment comes into the system. We hope these new techniques will help us a lot in the coming weeks and months.

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Thirdly, we are in the process of deploying new security screening equipment. There's a range of equipment, some of which the minister has already announced; I think one was announced late last week, and a second one about a week and a half earlier than that. I think the total amount of the commitment to new equipment is now approaching $75 million or $80 million, and we would not be surprised if further announcements were forthcoming over the next few months as that unfolds. This equipment is for baggage, as well as for passenger screening. Much of it is focused on the ability to try to pick up traces of various sorts of material, as well as the traditional equipment that was more focused on picking up metallic items.

So those are some of the things that have already been implemented on the ground. I won't take you through a very long list of specific security measures that were intended to tighten up the system broadly, but some of that information is available from the department.

Last but not least, we are working on a number of measures in the air. You are aware of the measures in regard to cockpit doors. We are working not only to reinforce the doors in the short term, but to redesign the doors in the longer term so that we not only have stronger doors, but doors that also meet a number of the other safety concerns pilots and other crews on the aircraft have.

In addition to that, we're looking at training and procedures with regard to the training of crews on aircraft. Some of those I can talk openly about, while others we would not speak about in public.

Mr. Chairman, with those brief remarks, perhaps I should stop there. I just wanted to give the committee a sense of the overview of some of the things going on, and I'll see if there are any questions.

The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Mackay. I'll start with Mr. Moore, of the Canadian Alliance.

Mr. James Moore (Port Moody—Coquitlam—Port Coquitlam, Canadian Alliance): Since the September 11 attacks, there have been a number of calls from people suggesting the government may take over airport security, and that it may be a good idea. What is your association's view on that?

Mr. Clifford Mackay: Let me just be specific about airport security. I think there are essentially two different kinds of security that go on at airports. One is the security of the physical establishments themselves. Generally speaking, airports are responsible for that. I'm not aware of anything specific in that area. I think the area you're referring to is the pre-screening for passengers.

Mr. James Moore: Yes.

Mr. Clifford Mackay: In that context, then, our view at the moment is that the system does not appear to be fundamentally broken. Obviously, though, we're looking at standards and at what we can do to upgrade the system.

I should tell you some of our members have said they would welcome the government taking it over. I think they're concerned about increasing costs. But we're not sure that's the right, best long-term solution. What we have said to government officials and others is that we're quite prepared to study a range of options in order to see what the best option is. But our view, particularly in the environment we're in today, is that if there's a better solution to the problem, let's go look at it to try to find out what it is, but let's not knee-jerk. Let's not make a decision without appropriate analysis and without really understanding what we're talking about here, because that will simply erode public confidence, not make it better.

Mr. James Moore: Fair enough. That having been said, it may still happen that we go down that road.

Specifically with regard to the financing of the carriers and the authorities, what sort of financing arrangement do you think would be most effective and efficient in achieving that? For example, they have an airport improvement fee at YVR, and I know some European countries basically have the equivalent of an airport security fee. It's the equivalent of two to three dollars per passenger, and you pay it virtually as a toll as you go on a plane. With those sorts of considerations in mind, assuming the government might do that, what sort of financing arrangement would be most effective?

Mr. Clifford Mackay: If we're going to move to an environment in which the government does in fact take over and actually implement and deliver security, then we would argue that taxpayers should pay for it. This is just another charge on the travelling public—

Mr. James Moore: As a whole, or on the individual traveller?

Mr. Clifford Mackay: —and the travelling public will have no control whatsoever over what they're paying for, how much it is, or anything else.

Mr. Reg Alcock (Winnipeg South, Lib.): Why should the taxpayer pay for it?

Mr. Clifford Mackay: The taxpayers should pay for it because it's a question of national security.

Mr. James Moore: Should it be taxpayers in general, or should it be dubbed in as a user fee?

Mr. Clifford Mackay: I would argue that the taxpayers in general should pay for it, if that's where you're going to go.

Mr. James Moore: Fair enough.

Is that five minutes, Mr. Chair?

The Chair: No, Jim, you have some more time. If you don't want it, though, we could go over to the other side. That's fine.

Mr. James Moore: You can go ahead, Peter. Do the cockpits.

Mr. Peter Goldring (Edmonton Centre-East, Canadian Alliance): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

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Just as a general question about aircraft safety itself, something has been suggested to me by one of my constituents, and I think it sounds like a good idea. We have the black boxes on board the planes now. With the electronics that exist right now, I would think they could be very easily upgraded to have video, particularly in the cockpit area. That would be a very easy thing to add. And I would think you could also add video to the cabin portion, too.

I'm thinking that if you did put this video on board the plane—and I believe electronics are able to do it now—you could broadcast it to the ground, too. Would this not add immeasurably to trying to fathom what happened when we do have the black boxes? Also, if it was able to be transmitted to the ground, then obviously control towers and whoever else was viewing this plane would be able to see what's happening on board the plane. They'd not just be catching a recording of it after the fact, but actually while it's ongoing.

The second part might require extra development, but I would think the first part, which would be the video on board, both in the cabin and the cockpit, should be an automatic.

Mr. Clifford Mackay: First, technologically, you're right. It is possible to put video on an aircraft and to download it in real time so that someone on the ground can actually see what's going on in the airplane at the same time it's happening. That's technologically possible. It wouldn't have much to do with black boxes, by the way, because they're a separate monitoring system.

Mr. Peter Goldring: But you could record this in the black box. The black box takes information from all things.

Mr. Clifford Mackay: You could, but we would have to dramatically change the black boxes to do that, because you're now recording video information, which takes enormously more capacity than what we have with the way we record information at the moment. So I'm not sure that... yes, we could do that, but you would almost have to design a third black box for that process. It would not be an easy fix to simply take the existing two black boxes that we have and to then do that.

Mr. Peter Goldring: For what length of time are you recording the audio in the black box now?

Mr. Clifford Mackay: The audio is usually about thirty minutes. Usually that's what we record. But video is a whole different order of magnitude in terms of data when it comes to recording.

Let me come to your question, though, which is why we wouldn't just do that and make every airplane download this information to the ground on a continuous basis.

We are looking at putting video systems on aircraft. That's the first thing I should say to you. But one of the big issues we're going to have to deal with if we go down that road is volume. There are tens of thousands of flights a day in North America alone. If you're downloading all of that video, who is looking at it? How can you quickly get your hands on that one piece of video you want out of all of that, so that if you do have an emergency, you can do something about it? These are not—

Mr. Peter Goldring: But if you have a problem on the plane and it's self-triggered from the problem, it could put out an alert to the ground, I would think.

Mr. Clifford Mackay: There may be some techniques like that that we can use, but I don't want to leave you with the impression that somebody can walk down the street and talk to a couple of companies, and that these problems will be fixed in a week. They won't be.

These are complicated issues you're dealing with here, and this will take time. Whenever we put new systems on an airplane, we are required to go through a very rigorous review system to make sure that, in trying to fix a problem, we're not creating another problem from a safety point of view. So I don't want to leave you with the impression that this would be something simple to do. But I can tell you it is an option on the table.

Mr. Peter Goldring: Just as a last question or another suggestion, I was asked this question and thought it sounded very relevant. What about putting up posters of wanted terrorists at your security check-in points—in other words, people who have been identified internationally? Understandably, the people operating the scanners, operating the security systems, don't have this information in front of them on a ready and available basis. I would think, though, that it would also give confidence to the passengers to know these things are out in front of their security people. You might even have participation from passengers who might identify somebody from this, too. In other words, is there a problem of putting a series of posters at the security check-ins?

Mr. Clifford Mackay: We're looking at various sorts of awareness programs. I must admit our major focus is trying to ensure the people who travel know what the new rules are, so that they don't get inconvenienced any more than they have to.

Mr. Peter Goldring: But specifically, is there a problem with the posters?

Mr. Clifford Mackay: On the idea of somehow training people to identify people, I can tell you that when we receive alerts from security authorities, we already do disseminate those sorts of information to security people.

Mr. Peter Goldring: But is there a problem with the posters?

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Mr. Clifford Mackay: We have not put wanted posters up in airports to date. I would argue some would probably think it's a good idea. Others would probably be scared silly of it. It's hard to say which way they'd go, but my general point is that we can only agree to better disseminate information on any threats that are out there, and we're looking at ways to do that.

The Chair: We'll go the Liberal side now. I have Mr. Szabo and Mr. Byrne for ten minutes—and you guys can share that time.

Mr. Paul Szabo (Mississauga South, Lib.): Thank you, Mr. Mackay.

As an industry association, your principal responsibility is to be a conduit of communication between the industry and your members, but I will assume you have no direct responsibility for safety and security.

Mr. Clifford Mackay: I should correct you on that. The industry association is something called a member of a company called the Air Transport Security Corporation. We own that company, and that company owns and maintains all of the prescreening equipment in all airports in Canada.

Mr. Paul Szabo: I'm sorry, but could you repeat that last part?

Mr. Clifford Mackay: That company owns and maintains the screening equipment in all of the airports across Canada.

Mr. Paul Szabo: You have no direct responsibility for safety or security in airports.

Mr. Clifford Mackay: No, I just corrected you on that.

Mr. Paul Szabo: Well, just because you're a member of a corporation that provides screening equipment, that doesn't mean you have any authority to change anything.

Mr. Clifford Mackay: Well, no one other than—

Mr. Paul Szabo: You can suggest, and I think that's an important part.

Mr. Clifford Mackay: I was just trying to clarify what our role was, sir.

Mr. Paul Szabo: Okay. I was under the understanding that Transport Canada provides all the standards and the regulations—

Mr. Clifford Mackay: That's precisely true.

Mr. Paul Szabo: —and that you're not telling Transport Canada what to do.

Mr. Clifford Mackay: No, we implement things on their behalf. That's correct.

Mr. Paul Szabo: You would advise, consult, etc., but you don't have any responsibility.

I note that you say in your statement, “The security of our passenger and crews is a paramount preoccupation”. The word “preoccupation” obviously is of interest.

Later on in the written comments you gave to us, you refer to screeners getting forty hours of classroom and on-the-job training, and you say this training will now be improved as a consequence of September 11. In other words, you weren't doing very well, you admit it now, and you have to make some changes. There is an admission of inadequate security from the standpoint of screening.

I raise this because I think—and we have to be honest here—anybody who is an air traveller and has taken the time to view it would probably characterize it—in my experience, it's at Pearson—as being that the screeners don't care. The appearance is that they're all standing around talking. Nobody's looking. Nobody seems to be engaged with my safety or security, or that of anybody else. The optics are awful, and they have been awful for a long time. We now have had an incident and everybody is talking about the great things we're going to do.

I think a good starting point is to maybe answer the question posed to the RCMP earlier—or at least it was suggested. What do you hope to achieve? Where do you want to go? If you really wanted to address the issues of safety and security and make sure we were up to Transport Canada's highest possible standards—which is their policy—you would virtually have to create a policing community with optics, with a filter so dense that people's first reaction would be, “Wow! This appears to be working.”

So I guess the question for you... you know lots about the airlines and air transport. First of all, are we going to tell the airline industry and everybody involved in it to start working with Transport Canada to get the appearance, the optics, there for everybody to say this is a safe and secure environment? You don't have to know the details underpinning it, but you can see it, you can sense it. We admit it hasn't worked very well in the past. The optics have not been good.

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Isn't the first part of a problem to admit the situation we had pre-September 11 was in fact inadequate, and that everybody involved in it had better smarten up and take a stronger position on how we are going to really approach safety and security? Is it time to be a little tougher?

Mr. Clifford Mackay: Let me try to answer, because you asked a number of questions there. Let me start off with the basics.

We do not believe the system we ran before September 11 was somehow basically flawed. We did not have a series of instances in Canada in which there were significant breaches in security. We did not have any major incidents in the last number of years, so I think it's unfair to make the point that, somehow or other, the whole system wasn't working.

Having said that, as I said in my opening remarks, September 11 changed the world. I'll be very frank with you. Nobody thought somebody would figure out how you could turn an airplane into a flying bomb and do what they did. It was just so inconceivable that it wasn't part of the framework people were working on when they were thinking about what kinds of security threats we had to worry about. That has fundamentally changed, and I couldn't agree with you more. That message has to be out there. So if your point is that we need to find better ways to tell everybody there are an awful lot of things going on and things are changing, then I can only say I agree with you.

Having said that, I must tell you we believe it is a preoccupation—and that's why I use the word “preoccupation” in my statement. There is no other issue that I have spent more time on since September 11 than security. My colleagues and I spend enormous amounts of time on it, and we will continue to spend enormous amounts of time on it until everybody gets to a level of comfort and confidence at which we think we're there. I wish I could tell you what that level will be. I can tell you pieces of it, but I personally don't have all the answers, because we are still not sure what the full range of the threat is.

What we do know is that everything we can do to try to mitigate the risk on the ground is a lot better than trying to mitigate the risk in the air. Once you get an incident when an airplane is actually flying, the risk to human life is enormous, and we want to stop it before it gets there. We will be looking at measures in the air, but what we really want to do is stop it on the ground.

Mr. Paul Szabo: Okay. Nobody ever thought you could use a plane... Obviously the “nobody” you're referring to probably never watched Arnold Schwarzenegger movies.

An hon. member: Or Tora! Tora! Tora!

Mr. Paul Szabo: And Tora! Tora! Tora!, yes. Come on. I'm sorry, but that's not good enough for the industry.

Mr. Clifford Mackay: Well, we're going to disagree on that, sir.

Mr. Paul Szabo: No, that's not good enough for the industry. Terrorists do push the envelope. In fact, now they're even further into the next dimension of terrorism.

I was interested at your reaction—and please don't take this personally, but we want to do a good report, and we need your help—that we did not have a number of incidents, and that the old situation therefore must have been okay. I'm sorry, but I don't think that's good enough, because it doesn't take a number of incidents, it only takes one—September 11—to enter what could be another world war.

We did not do a good job. This committee said we have to do a better job. We have to engage everybody who has a role to play—be it advisory or whatever—to participate, including the RCMP, the industry association, the airlines, Transport Canada, etc.

The RCMP officer asked the rhetorical question about what we want to achieve. I would like to know whether or not you've given any thought whatsoever to what we should try to achieve in our airports or our airlines in order to instil confidence and a comfort level in all involved—passengers, crew, regulators, etc. Where are we really trying to go without creating a police state?

Mr. Clifford Mackay: I'll try to give you some partial answer.

The Chair: Mr. Szabo has gone two minutes beyond your ten minutes, so I'll come back to you in the next round, Gerry.

Mr. Clifford Mackay: Obviously, one of the things we want to achieve—and you've already touched on it—is the highest level of confidence among our passengers that we can achieve. We want them to feel safe. That's one of the primary objectives.

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The second thing is that we want to achieve a level of security that is harmonized with our major trading partners. It's no good if we have one level of security here, the U.S. has another, and the Europeans have a third, because we have to deal with each other and people have to move across those various borders. We need to look at harmonization, so we need the international community to be a part of all of this. We don't live in isolation here, so ICAO and others have to be very much a part of where we're doing here.

The third thing is that we want the best technology we can get our hands on. I'm very proud to say that, in Canada, we have generally had the best technology in the past, but we have to keep that up. That's not cheap, but we have to keep moving down the road of getting the best technology.

The fourth thing I would say is that we need to do a much better job of integrating the system. By that, I mean the ability... The question was raised earlier about using real-time video as one of the many techniques. How can we better integrate the system? How can we better make sure the customs, immigration, and security people are all talking to each other, and that the information that needs to flow to ticket agents, to screeners, and to others is there in a timely way; and that if we do have an incident, we have systems that can rapidly allow us to assess the best response to those incidents? That is an enormous undertaking, and it is not working as well as it could work.

You asked me what we can do to improve things. Those are some of the specific things we need to work on.

Mr. Paul Szabo: Thank you. That's exactly what I wanted to hear.

The Chair: Monsieur Mario Laframboise, from the Bloc Québécois, please.

[Translation]

Mr. Mario Laframboise (Argenteuil—Papineau—Mirabel, BQ): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I have a comment and a question for you, Mr. Mackay. First, her is my comment. I can read in your paper that you congratulate the government for the decisions they made quickly. You also congratulate Transport Canada. Strangely enough, for my part I have no congratulations to make, and it's not only because I'm a member of the opposition. I don't feel like congratulating the governments, not just the liberal government, but all the governments that, since 1987, have decided that, finally, the whole security issue would be left to public organizations.

Before 1987, as we were shown this morning, it was the RCMP that had the responsibility to maintain and monitor safety and security at our airports. For various reasons, mostly economical, that responsibility has been decentralized and transferred to public organizations since 1987.

Your members, the airlines, do have some responsibility. You're right. You have a responsibility regarding security. You grant security contracts to agencies. Some responsibilities over security matters were transferred to airport authorities, and it is Transport Canada which monitors that. But you are all civic organizations. Within your organizations, no one is an expert on criminal matters and whatnot. The responsibility for security at airports was transferred to civic organizations. You did that with the constraints you are having. Your members are companies that must make profits. So, of course, the smaller their expenses, the larger their profits. The airline industry had to face some problems. I'm sure you know that your members are changing. Companies are changing their senior managers, and no ongoing training programs are there yet, Mr. Mackay.

In the private sector, most self-respecting companies have ISO standards. Across Canada, in terms of security, we don't even have high level standards we are committed to meet or to get enforced by anyone involved in security. Why? Because it is Transport Canada which takes care of that, a civic agency which is often more busy managing disputes between airlines, their profitability problems and the expenses they have to make, while the responsibility for all that should have been given, at least since 1999, that is since the Ressam case, when the Americans notified Canada about the fact that it was having security problems—

As you know, when you question employees, they tell you that, in spite of the Ressam case and despite the fact that, for a few years, we have been having avowed terrorists in Canada, and we know there are threats, yet security has not been tightened at all, no new standards have been laid down. You have kept on managing and administering within your budgets and, of course, you got into situations like the one we are experiencing today where, naturally, you congratulate the government since they are spending money.

I understand you. I can see where you're coming from. It's normal that the government should pay for security problems, Mr. Mackay. It's normal. It is our national security which is at issue and it belongs to the government to take care of security matters. When you say that we should not make decisions too quickly in order not to affect public confidence, it's hard for me to understand since I have the impression that this confidence is at its lowest level. If you think it's going to get still lower, then I don't know... Decisions must be made quickly, Mr. Mackay. The government must make real decisions. You must make actual demands involving expenses, and the responsibility for security matters has to be given to experts on criminal and terrorist issues.

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This is not where lies the mandate of Transport Canada, and this is not either where lies your members' mandate as airlines. These might give themselves such mandates, but for me, it's for the government to pay for that if we want to restore public confidence and get the industry started again. What we are doing now is just wait. The message you are delivering us today in saying that we should not make decisions too quickly is the following: "Let's wait, let's leave the whole economy fall down, that whole sector fall down, and afterwards, we are going to pick up the pieces and invest".

I am asking you my question. Is that your message? You are telling us today to take our time before investing in the airline industry. "Let's take our time". That's what you told us earlier: not to make decisions too quickly, because we must be careful. Is that the actual message you're delivering us?

[English]

Mr. Clifford Mackay: The first thing I think I need to comment on is what you were asking about the level of expertise that exists in the industry with regard to security. I have to tell you it's good. Almost all of the people involved in security in the industry are fully trained policing people. Many of them have many, many years of experience. Many of them have retired from the RCMP and other major police forces across the country. So when you go to airports or airlines and talk with their security people, you are talking to people who are professional police people who do have that sort of background.

Are they right up to speed with what's going on in the last 24 to 48 hours on terrorism threats and whatnot? Of course not. They're not in the position to have that sort of knowledge. But are they able to assess the knowledge they're given by the security authorities? My answer is that they are. They're trained to do that, and they can do it well. So I'm not concerned that we have a fundamental problem with the level of expertise of people who work for airports and airlines across the country in their security offices.

When I say to not jump quickly, what I'm really doing is cautioning the committee to think through whatever changes and options you may wish to recommend. Think them through fairly carefully, because this is a huge and complex system that we're talking about. We're probably talking about a hundred airports across the country. We're talking about millions of people moving through them routinely, so when we make changes, they have to be made with consideration and in a very disciplined way. Otherwise, we will create chaos, and that's exactly what we're trying to avoid, because chaos doesn't reduce the security risk, it increases the security risk. So in making those comments, that's the only message I'm trying to leave with the committee.

Can things be improved? I think I've already said in this committee that the answer is that they can be. Should the government do it all? I'm not convinced that's the right answer in all circumstances. Governments are very good at some things. They're not very good at other things. Over the years, we have shown that when it comes to being very flexible and able to move quickly to changing circumstances, government organizations are usually not very good at that. When you're running an airport or you're running an airline, you have to change all the time. It's part of the business. There are not 24 hours that go by when you're not dealing with a whole range of different problems to be solved, etc. I'm not sure the government is the best organization to do that sort of thing.

Does government have a very critical role to play in all of this? Absolutely. I think it has already been partly defined. We rely very heavily on the government for at least two things. One, that's where we go to get advice on what the threat is and what is going on, because only governments have access to that sort of information. Two, they are the rule- and standard-makers—they have to be because of the international nature of this and because public safety is involved—and they are they enforcers. They are the people who do look over our shoulder—and rightly so—to ensure things are being done well. Should they play a bigger role in that? We haven't rejected that out of hand, but we think it needs to be though through carefully.

[Translation]

Mr. Mario Laframboise: As I understand, you are telling me that everything has gone well and that you have done what was to be done. That's what you are telling me.

Why didn't you simply have an ongoing training program on security matters, as most self-respecting companies do? Why, since you are so good, so smart, haven't you just put in place, years ago, an ongoing training program on security matters, a program in which your employees would have participated, sir?

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[English]

Mr. Clifford Mackay: Mike, do you want to answer that? Okay?

We do, but Mike can give you the details.

Mr. Michael Skrobica (Vice-President, Industry Monetary Affairs, Air Transport Association of Canada): Beyond the forty hours of initial training, there is recurrent training, on an annual basis, of approximately eight hours for all passenger security screeners. Prior to September 11, we had contracted to obtain a computer-based training system that will assist us in delivering any changes on a more rapid basis than could be done in the existing format. It will also allow us to train passenger screening agents on new pieces of equipment now in the pipeline.

The Chair: Thank you very much.

I think I'll move to Bev Desjarlais now.

Mrs. Bev Desjarlais (Churchill, NDP): To follow along, Mr. Mackay, when you were commenting, I know Mr. Szabo didn't want to hear the nits and grits of the Air Transport Security Corporation. Maybe you could just fill me in on how that works.

Mr. Clifford Mackay: The Air Transport Security Corporation is a not-for-profit corporation that was established a few years ago. It has now been in operation for about four or five years.

It's a small company. Its role in life is to own and maintain the security equipment that exists in the various airports across Canada. Like everything else in our industry, it is regulated by Transport Canada. In other words, the standards for the equipment are set by Transport Canada, and the company implements things along those lines. It also acquires equipment as equipment wears out and as it needs to be replaced, and it acquires and redeploys equipment in various places as the traffic patterns shift in various airports across the country. That's really what it does.

Mrs. Bev Desjarlais: So it owns the equipment in all the airports.

Mr. Clifford Mackay: Yes.

Now, just to make sure, there's a wrinkle coming up. Because of the September 11 crisis, the government is now buying equipment directly. ATSC will be involved in deploying that equipment because that's where its expertise is, that's what it does for a living. It has the technical expertise to make sure the equipment is put in the right place, is aligned properly, is calibrated, etc. That's its role in all of this.

Mrs. Bev Desjarlais: Who owns the company, out of curiosity?

Mr. Clifford Mackay: We do. The Air Transport Association of Canada owns it.

Mrs. Bev Desjarlais: So would that be all the airlines involved in the Air Transport Association?

Mr. Clifford Mackay: The Air Transport Association is a separate corporation. It's a not-for-profit corporation. It in fact owns that company. Because the company is not-for-profit—

Mrs. Bev Desjarlais: Who makes up the Air Transport Association of Canada?

Mr. Clifford Mackay: We have about 320 members. It's essentially composed of just about everybody involved in commercial aviation in the country.

Mrs. Bev Desjarlais: Okay, so it's basically the airlines.

Mr. Clifford Mackay: Exactly.

Mrs. Bev Desjarlais: Do you have ongoing discussions with the RCMP on security issues? Are they involved in the training?

Mr. Clifford Mackay: I'll ask Mike to answer that.

Mr. Michael Skrobica: Most of our interface with government is through Transport Canada and its safety and security branch. Transport Canada is obviously in daily contact with both the RCMP and CSIS.

Mrs. Bev Desjarlais: They're in daily contact?

Mr. Michael Skrobica: That's what I understand. There's a three-person group within the Transport Canada Safety and Security Group that is responsible for intelligence.

Mrs. Bev Desjarlais: Okay.

As far as responsibility for hiring airport security and training them is concerned, Transport Canada is responsible for the regulations, but who is ultimately responsible for making sure all those staff are trained properly, get the ongoing...

[Editor's Note: Inaudible]

...and who pays those airport security people?

Mr. Clifford Mackay: The people who are responsible at an individual airport are what we call the lead carrier. Now, let me just talk to you about what a leader carrier is.

A lead carrier tends to be the carrier that has the majority of traffic at an airport. I'll give you two examples. In Winnipeg, it would be Air Canada. In Kelowna, it would be WestJet. They are responsible for the implementation of the security regulations as promulgated by Transport Canada. Parts of those regulations say you shall have screening and it will be to certain standards, etc. So whoever the lead carrier is, they are responsible for ensuring those regulations are implemented.

• 1055

In most cases, what normally happens is that the lead carrier contracts with a security company to provide the personnel to man the equipment. The equipment is provided by the Air Transport Security Corporation—there it is—and somebody has to man and operate that equipment. That is usually done through a contracting arrangement with a security company, and the contract specifies the requirements as laid down by Transport Canada—how much training, etc. All personnel in this world require security screening, so they have to go through this process, etc. That's how it works.

From a financial point of view, the lead carrier then turns around and allocates the cost of that service, usually on a passenger formula, to all of the other users in the airport.

Mrs. Bev Desjarlais: Is it on a per passenger or per flight formula?

Mr. Clifford Mackay: It depends on the airport, but quite often it's on a per passenger basis.

Mrs. Bev Desjarlais: A per passenger basis.

Mr. Clifford Mackay: Yes, that's how they charge. You move so many passengers through the airport in a month, so your share is x.

Mrs. Bev Desjarlais: I just want to sneak one more in here if I can.

Who ensures that the security companies being hired have qualified personnel and are doing the training? Are they certified in any way, shape, or form?

Mr. Michael Skrobica: Transport Canada assures that the passenger screening agents meet the regulated training program, and it also does quality assurance.

Mrs. Bev Desjarlais: Thank you.

The Chair: Thank you, Bev.

I'll go to Val, and then I'll come back to the Liberals, in rotation. You'll have to share your time. I hope you do. I have Gerry, Alex, and Reg, and then I'll come back over to the Alliance.

You have the floor, Val.

Ms. Val Meredith (South Surrey—White Rock—Langley, PC/DR): Thank you.

When you first appeared, I was trying to assess just what exactly it is that you are responsible for and who it is that you represent. You've clarified that a little bit, but would it be fair to say that, from a security point of view, it's really this not-for-profit corporation that is the most concerned about it, in that you supply all of the equipment? If there is not enough equipment, if the equipment is not up to standards, or if there's a different requirement for the equipment, it's this not-for-profit corporation that would be responsible for making sure the equipment is now capable of looking at other substances, that the equipment is modern, that all of the airports have the necessary equipment. That brings it into line that you represent these 320 members involved in commercial aviation. Do you represent all the air carriers?

Mr. Clifford Mackay: The short answer is, yes. The only exceptions would be about three or four small, regional carriers. We represent just about everybody else in this industry.

Ms. Val Meredith: So you do represent Air Canada.

Mr. Clifford Mackay: Yes.

Ms. Val Meredith: So Air Canada is the major player in this not-for-profit corporation that's buying this equipment or is getting it.

My next question is whether you are able to... I think you said you were getting new equipment. If passenger screening is going to be increased, how available is this equipment, and what's your timeframe for getting the new pieces of equipment required to do that?

Mr. Clifford Mackay: I'll ask Mike to comment in some detail on this, but there are a number of pieces of equipment that are relatively readily available and that we are acquiring quickly. These are trace equipment, certain pieces of X-ray equipment, and upgrades to X-ray equipment. We are acquiring that quite quickly. The government has made a decision to buy it directly—that's the fastest way to do it—so we're working with them on that.

There are some other pieces of equipment that are generally referred to as CTX equipment. These are much more sophisticated pieces of equipment only available in the U.S.—in fact, the technology was partly developed with financial assistance from the FAA—and there are discussions going on to acquire some of that equipment for Canadian use. However, that requires government-to-government discussions as well, because of the FAA involvement in the technology. We're hopeful we'll be able to also access that equipment very quickly, though.

Mike, do you want to just say what the schedule is at the moment?

• 1100

Mr. Michael Skrobica: There are three tranches of equipment deployment that we envision right now. The first one was announced by the minister shortly after September 11. The first involves equipment that includes enhanced X-ray and trace detection equipment, and it will detect explosives. We anticipate that this first tranche will be deployed in the October-to-January timeframe. It will be deployed at seven airports that have U.S. pre-clearance facilities.

A second tranche was announced by the minister about ten days ago. It follows on the first tranche and would deploy equipment at the larger airports that have international flights at this point in time. A deployment schedule has not been fixed, but it would follow the October-January first tranche. I would estimate that it would be completed in a February-to-May timeframe.

Prior to September 11, the industry and government were undertaking a consultation on a long-term deployment of explosives detection equipment. This would involve extensive realignment of baggage handling systems, particularly for checked baggage. We anticipate the timeframe for that will be pushed up, so it will probably be completed in 2002 or early in 2003. The centrepiece of that system involves putting CTX machines, produced chiefly by one company in the United States, InVision, in line in the baggage handling systems. This involves very extensive expenses with regard to baggage handling systems in the bowels of airports.

It is our understanding that the CTX machines, which are just like the CAT scans that exist in Canadian hospitals, are embargoed by the U.S. government at this point in time. We are trying to get this embargo lifted so that we can obtain these machines for the third tranche.

Ms. Val Meredith: You mentioned that the minister made the announcement, so is it the government that is purchasing the equipment, or is it your not-for-profit organization that is purchasing the equipment? If it's the government purchasing it, what are you as a not-for-profit organization purchasing, and where is the money coming from?

Mr. Clifford Mackay: The most recent equipment that Mike just referred to is being purchased by the government. The reason the government agreed to do so was that it was the fastest and easiest way to get the equipment by far. We were very concerned, particularly in the first week or so after the crisis hit, that if we didn't move extremely quickly, we couldn't get our hands on the equipment. That's why the government was moving in that direction.

The role ATSC is playing is the role it always plays. It is providing the deployment schedule, and it's working with the individual airports to make sure the equipment is in fact deployed in the most efficient way possible. I won't get into all the technicalities of that, but there is a lot of work that needs to go on around that. Also, it's making sure—

Ms. Val Meredith: So who is paying for that equipment?

Mr. Clifford Mackay: The equipment is being paid for by the Government of Canada.

Ms. Val Meredith: So if that equipment will be paid for by the Government of Canada, who owns it?

Mr. Clifford Mackay: At the moment, the Government of Canada owns it.

Ms. Val Meredith: So that's at the moment, but is there an agreement that it is going to be transferred to this not-for-profit corporation?

Mr. Clifford Mackay: No, we have no agreement at the moment. If things operate the way they currently operate, that equipment will likely just be transferred to ATSC in due time, because they will be responsible for the equipment's maintenance and for looking after it on an ongoing basis. That's what they do.

Ms. Val Meredith: So the money coming in to this not-for-profit corporation is used strictly for purchasing the equipment, deploying it to the airports, and operating the equipment.

Mr. Clifford Mackay: The fees the corporation charges to the airlines are charged in order to cover their operating costs, which are almost entirely focused on the cost of maintaining and deploying the equipment now. In the past, there have been some capital costs, but they have been relatively minor, because the company is relatively new and all of the equipment it had was given to it by the government four or five years ago. Whether or not that continues, we'll have to see. But its primary functions at the moment are the maintenance of the existing equipment and ensuring that the standards are maintained.

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The Chair: Thank you.

Gerry, Alex and Reg.

Mr. Alex Shepherd (Durham, Lib.): Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.

Getting back to the structure of the non-profit—

The Chair: Gerry's first.

Mr. Alex Shepherd: Oh, I'm sorry.

Mr. Gerry Byrne (Humber—St. Barbe—Baie Verte, Lib.): We've heard there are various organizations at various levels involved in airport screening and security. You have a very strong membership, and you have organized yourselves under an umbrella organization to lobby on behalf of the industry, but also to form a joint-venture, non-profit organization, to actually maintain and operate security screening equipment.

We've heard testimony that, in terms of screening personnel and services, that's actually done on a lead-carrier basis. We've now heard testimony that basically we're going to have another tier of security, whereby Transport Canada is currently purchasing fairly sophisticated and advanced technology for airport screening, and that the current understanding is that they will continue to own this equipment until such time as that changes.

Why is it the organization has seen fit to organize itself as an umbrella group to purchase screening technology, yet it has not seen fit to organize itself for the actual hiring and implementation of screening personnel in airports across the country?

Mr. Clifford Mackay: History is involved in the answer to that question. The organization took on the job of owning and maintaining the security equipment at the time when the government, from a policy point of view, had made fundamental decisions to devolve itself out of operations in the air industry. You'll all recall this involved the devolution of airports, and it involved the devolution of the air navigation system. This was a small part of the much bigger exercise that was going on.

The government came to the industry and said it did not want to be in the business of owning and operating all of this equipment across the country anymore. It asked the industry to work with government to try to find another way to ensure it got done in a reasonably efficient fashion. That was the genesis of the Air Transport Security Corporation. It's just that simple. This was a convenient mechanism—not-for-profit, so that we didn't have to worry about those sorts of motivations—and it was set up and a board was established.

The company's board has representatives from the airline industry and from the airports, as well as independent board members. It is an independent company that runs itself at an arm's-length basis from ourselves as members. It's a standard, straight-up, not-for-profit corporation. That's why it exists as it exists.

Why did it not go further and move into actually providing the operators for the machines? At the time, the judgment was made that the current system seemed to be operating quite well—and this is going back four or five years now. It was thought there would be enough complexities in negotiating with the government for the transfer of these assets and in setting up this company, so there was a desire to avoid adding even more complexity to the process. That's really why the decision was made to restrict the mandate of that company strictly to the owning and maintenance of the equipment itself.

Mr. Gerry Byrne: But if it's a question of complexity versus simplicity, if you have one organization that's providing a standard of care and diligence in airport security screening, that also leads to greater accountability. When you have multiple operators, lead agencies, or lead carriers under the current system, then you have a fabric made of many cloths, quite frankly. You don't have consistency, and you don't have a way to impose standards from the industry's point of view. You have regulations currently applied by Transport Canada and appropriately put, but from the industry's point of view itself, you really don't have one voice from the screening point of view.

Mr. Clifford Mackay: I think you're making a fair point. All I can say to you at the moment—and I think the question was asked earlier as well—is that we have an open mind on that. If there's a better way of doing it... for example, if we need to look at that company and its mandate and move it into the operating side of screening, as opposed to just the equipment side, it's not something we would reject at the moment.

It's difficult for me to say anything beyond that, because I can't speak for the board of the company. The board hasn't had that discussion. From an industry perspective, I can say we are open to discussions on what we can do to further improve the system.

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Mr. Gerry Byrne: Of course, the cost is passed on to consumers through the ticket price, but is there any discussion that there may be a conflict in the fact that carriers currently pay for screening services? Does the industry or the association have a point of view on whether or not... Have you done any analysis as to whether or not there's a conflict between the industry being self-policing and the amount of services it's providing? Given the fact it makes the decision—at least, it participates in the decision of screening services in consultation with the regulatory body, that being Transport Canada—as to what the current level of services would be at any airport, be it Pearson or St. Anthony Airport in northern Newfoundland, is there a conflict? How is the oversight done?

Mr. Clifford Mackay: The oversight is primarily done by Transport Canada, of course. The regulations and the enforcement are, by international standards, relatively vigorous, and they're going to become more vigorous.

Is there a conflict? We don't believe so, because we are talking about safety and security. This is a cultural thing for our industry, but I think it's very important never to forget it. If you have to make a choice between what's safe and secure as opposed to an extra 0.5% on some financial statement, in our business you make the choice for what's safe and secure. In the long run, that's the only way you stay in business. It's just that simple. If you get a reputation for being unsafe, then you will not be in business, so doing things at the margin for financial reasons in this area makes absolutely no sense in our industry. It has never made sense, so the conflict really doesn't exist. Having said that, though, public safety is paramount, which is why we have Transport Canada looking over our shoulder.

I think you were also trying to get at what happens if the costs get much higher. I must tell you—and I think we should be very candid about this—that we are seeing security costs go up exponentially, not just by 10%, 15%, or 20%. They're going up by hundreds and hundreds percent as life unfolds here. We think we do have to have a pretty fundamental conversation about who pays and how, because we are now into a situation that is so different from anything we knew in the past.

In airports alone, the cost of policing has tripled. If the government doesn't decide to continue to buy this equipment, those costs are going to be enormous. Now, yes, we can try to figure out how to pass this all on to the travelling public, but you are talking about huge cost increases at the same time when we're also seeing the same sort of thing happening in insurance and in other areas.

So cost is going to have to be an issue when it comes to security. I don't think there's any way to get around that.

Thank you.

The Chair: Alex, then Reg.

Mr. Alex Shepherd: Getting back to that point, very early in your comments, you made the statement about the costs to the airline industry and whether they should be paid by the public and so forth. But it occurred to me during your further testimony that all the equipment this non-profit corporation has acquired basically came from the government, so there hasn't been a lot of new investment by the industry itself for new equipment. Is that correct?

Mr. Clifford Mackay: That's correct.

Mr. Alex Shepherd: Do you not see a very specific conflict of interest there, in that you're part of the decision-making process to acquire equipment, but at the same time, you don't want to pay for it?

Mr. Clifford Mackay: If you're asking me if there is a conflict in the sense that... We will do whatever the regulations require us to do. If the government says—and we were in those negotiations even before September 11—there is a new standard because ICAO is moving in this direction for whatever reason, then that will be the standard we will meet. We will do whatever we have to do in terms of buying equipment, etc., to meet it.

We had a very extraordinary circumstance right after September 11, when we did say to the government that we didn't have the financing to do it at the moment, but if they had told us we needed to do it, we were going to do it. Their answer was, no, that we should let them do it directly, because it was faster and easier for the government to get its hands on the equipment. That's the environment we're living in at the moment.

I don't know if that's going to be a regularized environment or not. I can tell you, though, sir, that if the requirements and the standards say this is the level of screening we need to see taking place, whether it's passengers or baggage, that will be the level we will screen to. There's no doubt about that.

• 1115

Mr. Alex Shepherd: Getting back to that debate you want to have about who is to pay, I really haven't heard your case for saying the travelling public should pay. Why should people in my constituency who never fly be responsible for the additional costs? What's the business case for that?

Mr. Clifford Mackay: The argument we would make along those lines would have two or three points. First, we are into an extraordinary circumstance, which does have national security overlays to it. That's the first argument we would make.

The second argument we would make is that air transport is not just simply for the people who fly on the airplanes. This is an integral part of our economy. It's absolutely critical to our economic competitiveness. We would therefore argue that a real interest exists on the part of the Canadian taxpayer in making sure the system is as vibrant and as efficient as it possibly can be. I think there are broader economic arguments as to why we want a healthy system.

And I think there are some arguments to be made on areas like security, in that there may be a national interest in doing that. So I would make both those arguments.

Mr. Alex Shepherd: On just one point though, as far as enhanced security is concerned, isn't that going to actually be to the direct betterment of the airline industry? That's what people are looking for. They'll get back to flying on airplanes, so you have a direct benefit in making certain these security measures are undertaken.

Mr. Clifford Mackay: I agree with you, sir, and that's why I don't think it's entirely a one-way street.

Until recently, until September 11, the policy position of the Government of Canada was that it paid for nothing. We paid 100%, full stop, period, and, oh, by the way, it made the rules while we just paid for everything and passed the costs on to our customers. If that's still the policy, then I guess that's the policy, but we would not agree with it.

The Chair: Thank you, Alex.

Reg.

Mr. Reg Alcock: Let's just go a little bit further with that, because that is the policy. If someone comes out with a new concern about the flammability of the seat covers in airplanes and there's a regulatory change saying you have to move to a new kind of fabric, the airline pays for it. This goes on and on.

I wanted to just correct your comments about devolution. The devolution of airports, air traffic control, and security, was done largely at the request of the industry, which felt it could run those things more efficiently and that it would be able to ride the...

I was on this committee when we did it. I sat and listened to the arguments when they said they could be more efficient, they could ride the innovation curves, and could keep sharper at a lower cost. Now, after they've filled all the airports with doughnut shops, they've now come back and asked us for more money to run them. I find that a little bit hard to accept, frankly.

I agree with you that, to the extent to which there are extraordinary policing costs, RCMP costs, there is an argument that certainly those costs at the front end—the intelligence gathering and all of that stuff that's truly in the ambit and control of policing—should be carried by the federal government, because there are national security implications. However, when it comes to the role your organization should be playing, which is to see that our security systems are... I can accept the fact the government bought them—although I would even argue that—because of the urgency of time, with the details to be worked out later. I'll accept that. But I'm sorry, I think Alex is absolutely right. I think you have a responsibility to carry this load.

Mr. Clifford Mackay: I guess our view would be that we disagree with you there, sir. Having said that, we are prepared to sit down and talk about it.

There is one impression I don't want to ever leave anybody in this committee with. If the requirements are that thou shalt have this particular kind of machine, it's not an issue. It will happen. We can debate and argue about who pays for it, but it will happen. I don't want anybody to have any misgivings about that at all.

The Chair: James, then Peter.

Mr. James Moore: I have a question regarding airport security. How many new airport security personnel have been trained and/or hired since September 11?

Mr. Clifford Mackay: I don't have the number.

Do you have it off the top of your head, Mike?

Mr. Michael Skrobica: I don't have that.

Mr. Clifford Mackay: We'll have to get you the number. I can tell you that—

Mr. James Moore: Roughly, ballpark, has there been an effort to hire more people and to train them, given that you say it takes forty hours of training? It has now been over a month since the attack. Forty hours have passed.

Mr. Clifford Mackay: I do know that there has been an effort, but I can't give you the number. I just don't know what it is. As an organization, we've been spending our time not so much on that end as on helping to get people security-cleared, because that's been a huge bottleneck.

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Mr. James Moore: Are there new hirees coming down the pipe who are being looked at?

Mr. Clifford Mackay: The answer is that there absolutely are, because a lot of people before September 11 were working on what was called a temporary pass. One of the rules changed shortly after September 11 was that you can no longer work on a temporary pass. You need to have full-blown security clearance before you are able to actually work on the air side.

Mr. James Moore: And was this in response to September 11?

Mr. Clifford Mackay: This was in response to September 11. There have been at least 2000—

Mr. Michael Skrobica: It's 2,300.

Mr. Clifford Mackay: At least 2,300 new passes have been issued since September 11, so that will give you some sort of order of magnitude, but we'll have to get back to you with better numbers.

Mr. James Moore: Okay, before I pass it to Mr. Goldring, my second question is about the reality that lead carriers pay for and finance the airport security, their portion of it, and that it's built into the tickets. Given that consumer confidence has dropped since September 11, they say bookings are off between 30% and 35%. Those figures are disputed, but they say so. Given that reality, is this a stable funding formula for financing airport security?

Mr. Clifford Mackay: I wish I knew the answer to that question. The difficulty with giving you a good answer is that we will finance airport security, period, if that's what we have to do to meet the standards. There is absolutely no choice, because it's axiomatic to our business. We cannot operate without meeting those standards, period.

Is that a sound basis for financing the system going forward? That's a much more difficult question to answer. I personally feel we need to look hard at that question. I'm not sure it is, because I'm not sure the nature of the kinds of equipment and the investments we're going to make in the future aren't of such a scale and a nature that we're going to have to look at other ways to do it. And I can tell you other countries are having the same discussion.

Mr. James Moore: What will the carriers do if... For example, say the extension of no-fly zones does not just apply to Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport. Suppose the United States expands that into other markets—La Guardia, JFK, O'Hare, or what have you—and that there is therefore a drop in Air Canada's transborder routes. If it's built specifically into tickets, what are the alternative funding arrangements? Will it simply be that the financial arrangements being given to airport security will tail off, or—

Mr. Clifford Mackay: If it's left to the market, there is only one place to go for the money. I hate to say it, but it's the truth, and that's the travelling public. It means that if you want to fly to La Guardia or if you want to fly to Reagan, you're probably going to see a significant surcharge on your ticket. There is no other choice. There just isn't one. And that will have an impact on the travelling public, who flies, and who chooses.

Mr. James Moore: Okay, thank you.

The Chair: Peter.

Mr. Peter Goldring: Going back to the forty-hour training requirement, Mr. Mackay, even if the existing people are being upgraded in their training, are there any protocols or any standards that determine the number of security people you need per airline passenger? If there is a determination of that, has that number been increased in the area of 100% yet, or not?

Mr. Clifford Mackay: Transport Canada regulates the staffing requirements per screening station, so there is an obligation to have a minimum of three screeners per screening station, except under special circumstances. These would be for very small airports with very low—

Mr. Peter Goldring: Has this been increased?

Mr. Clifford Mackay: It has not been increased at this point in time.

Mr. Peter Goldring: Given that you say it's three per, I'm coming through Edmonton and Ottawa and I'm seeing one empty machine, but there are six people on the other machine. Is that number being maintained at six because you haven't had an increase from three to six, you haven't had a doubling of the people? It would seem to me that you need a doubling but don't have it, so you're just combining from one machine to another.

Mr. Clifford Mackay: The current regulations call for a minimum of three per screening station. What may have happened in Edmonton—

Mr. Peter Goldring: Well, if I'm to understand this correctly, the lineups we're experiencing are there because the standards have not been increased. Who makes this up, and why hasn't it been moved in the interest of moving the public and keeping the interest of people in flying? I would think you're going to lose your flyers because of these lineups. What do you have to do to move this increase up?

And just as a secondary question if I can put it in there, what is the average rental rate of one of these machines to the airline? Do they pay for an empty machine, or do they just pay for the machine they use? In other words, there are two parts here.

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Mr. Michael Skrobica: If I may, with regard to the first part of your question that pertained to the lineups, it's not necessarily a function of the staffing. The staffing may remain the same; however, the review obliged now with regard to a hand search of bags went up from 10% to 25%.

Mr. Peter Goldring: But you're not increasing the number of people.

Mr. Michael Skrobica: The standards for staffing and how many stations are open are usually determined by the consortium of airlines at that particular airport.

Mr. Peter Goldring: But who will increase it?

Mr. Michael Skrobica: It would be the consortium of airlines at that airport.

Mr. Peter Goldring: And there was the second part. What does one of these stations, in this case a double scanner... you must have some kind of a... does it rent by the month, by the week, by the hour?

Mr. Clifford Mackay: The formula—

Mr. Peter Goldring: What would the rate for one machine be?

Mr. Clifford Mackay: I can't give you the rate for one machine, but I can tell you what the formula is, although we don't calculate it that way. In terms of the way in which the formula works, that ATSC charges for the use of the machine and for its maintenance.

Mr. Peter Goldring: I can understand that, but everybody else in the rental business knows what their machines rent at, and these are standard machines.

Mr. Clifford Mackay: These machines are owned by ATSC and—

Mr. Peter Goldring: What is the rental rate on one machine?

Mr. Clifford Mackay: The rental rate is 0.07 cents per passenger through the machine.

Mr. Reg Alcock: That's all it costs?

Mr. Clifford Mackay: Yes, 0.07 cents per passenger through the machine.

Mr. Reg. Alcock: That's cheap at twice the price.

Mr. Clifford Mackay: Yes.

Mr. Peter Goldring: How many passengers go through the average machine?

Mr. Clifford Mackay: It depends on the airport. If my memory serves me correctly, the total revenues for ATSC last year were around $6 million. That would give you some sort of a rough idea, but my guesstimate would be that we're probably talking about somewhere around 30 million passengers.

The Chair: Pete, are you done?

Mr. Peter Goldring: Yes, I'm done.

The Chair: Okay, we'll go to Marcel for a quick question, and then we have some committee work to do.

Mr. Marcel Proulx (Hull—Aylmer, Lib.): How many screeners have been fired over the last five or ten years?

Mr. Clifford Mackay: I can't give you a number. I don't know. We'd have to find out—

Mr. Marcel Proulx: Have any ever been fired?

Mr. Clifford Mackay: Oh, I'm sure the answer to that is yes. The standard is that if you fail an infiltration test, you're sent off to training. If you fail another infiltration test—it doesn't matter when—then you're fired.

Mr. Marcel Proulx: So they're given a second chance.

Mr. Clifford Mackay: They're given a second chance.

Mr. Marcel Proulx: Is there any possibility that if they keep failing—or if they fail the first time, for that matter—

Mr. Clifford Mackay: They only get to fail once.

Mr. Marcel Proulx: —they could be charged for negligence under the Criminal Code?

Mr. Clifford Mackay: I have never heard of that one. I don't know what you'd accomplish by doing it. They're fired anyway.

[Editor's Note: Inaudible]

An hon. member: ...consider this a crime.

Mr. Marcel Proulx: If you drive your car in a dangerous manner, you can be charged with criminal negligence. If you do your job negligently as a screener, maybe you should be charged.

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

An hon. member: He's in the wrong party.

Mr. John Cannis (Scarborough Centre, Lib.): Mr. Chair, can I get a clarification?

The Chair: Very quickly, John.

Mr. Clifford Mackay: I don't think we have that under active consideration, frankly.

The Chair: Okay, John would like just a quick clarification, and then we want to move on to the committee work. I'm losing my memory.

Mr. John Cannis: Mr. Goldring, you asked a question about how many people were at a station, and you mentioned there were six. Is that right, Peter?

Mr. Peter Goldring: Sorry?

Mr. John Cannis: You were talking about the number of people at one station. Did you experience three or six people at one station?

Mr. Peter Goldring: I saw six people at one station, but the gentleman here says they have three.

Mr. John Cannis: But there are supposed to be three.

Mr. Peter Goldring: They had nobody at the other one.

Mr. Clifford Mackay: It's at least three.

An hon. member: Maybe one machine broke down and they were all at the other one.

Mr. Peter Goldring: No, they both worked.

Mr. Clifford Mackay: Just to be clear, you cannot operate one of those machines unless you have three qualified people at it. There are exceptions for very small airports, but that's the... If you feel you have to have an increased level of screening, or if other circumstances arise in which you feel you need more personnel on a machine, there is a lot of flexibility for the lead airline and the consortium of airlines in that particular airport to say to the screening company that they want five people on that machine today.

So you can go up, but you certainly can't go below three.

The Chair: Thanks very much gentlemen. You have certainly helped us with our work plan here. We appreciate it that you came.

We'll suspend for two minutes before we go to our work plan, which will be in camera.

[Editor's Note: Proceedings continue in camera]