NDVA Committee Report

CHAPTER 3: OPERATIONALLY READY
FOR WHAT?

One cannot evaluate the operational readiness, or even the relevance, of a military force unless we know what it is expected to be able to do. As a Committee, we believe that the Canadian Forces should, at a minimum, be able to make a “modest” but meaningful contribution (in the sense of being able militarily to make a difference) to United Nations, NATO or multilateral operations. Here, we are speaking about contributions across the spectrum of combat intensity.

The question is, “will we be able to fulfill even such modest commitments on a continuing basis?” In the most recent departmental Level I Business Plans, senior officers and officials acknowledged the stresses faced by the CF as it tries to maintain even core capabilities — “…capabilities that are the backbone of the multipurpose combat capable force and future defence and foreign policies.”¹⁷

The conclusions of recent DND business plans cannot leave one optimistic about the operational readiness of the Canadian Forces. While most believe that the Navy is best prepared for operations, the Chief of the Naval Staff has, himself, expressed reservations in this regard.

We already have one destroyer tied up dockside for lack of crew. Further losses in personnel will only compound matters. We have some of the best frigates in the world. However, even the most sophisticated warship, without crew, is a waste of a significant public asset.

The official response may be that current shortfalls will quickly be made up by the success of the recruiting campaign. This is all well and good, but new recruits require experienced personnel to train them. Our concern, given current taskings and deployments, is whether we do in fact have the personnel available to do the training, and, at the same time, to ensure that all operational requirements are being met.

Among the problems cited by the Chief of the Naval Staff were:

Overall, it was concluded that these problems have the potential to severely degrade fleet operations and effectiveness. As if the foregoing were not enough, the Navy may also be saddled with the responsibility of Arctic sovereignty and security patrols as the polar ice cap melts.

The Chief of the Air Staff concluded the following with respect to his service:

The Army Chief of Staff delivered the most pessimistic message. According to him:

Finally, we might do well to remember that General Maurice Baril, in his final report on Operation Assurance, the attempt to deploy an emergency force to Zaire in 1996, concluded that the operation was hampered “due to factors as the active posting season, leave, equipment [un]availability, and other tasking, there exists a real life gap between our real readiness levels and those derived from Defence Planning guidance tasks.”²⁰

Needless to say, this statement is quite telling. It reminds us that it is important to distinguish between the theoretical or planned capabilities of the CF and the actual or real capabilities. Michael Hennessey has observed that for the Canadian Forces “moving from notional capability to actual capability was problematic,” during the period described, mainly because real operational readiness was difficult to gauge. Douglas Bland has gone on to conclude that “…the operational readiness system, such as it is, has long been criticized as being unreliable. There is little evidence to suggest that this serious defect in national security planning has been corrected.”²¹

In our Report on Plans and Priorities (June 12, 2001), we argued that “There can be no question that CF personnel have gained much experience through repeated and varied deployments over the last decade which many of those who served during the Cold War never gained. Today’s serving men and women have confronted challenges never envisioned by those that stood ready on NATO’s central front. Thus, it is reasonable to conclude that today’s CF personnel — as individuals — are as combat capable, if not more so, than their comrades of earlier years. However, this is not the same as arguing that the overall ‘system’, for lack of a better term, is as combat capable as it was ten years ago.” There is nothing we have heard in the way of testimony, in the interim, that would lead us, as a committee, to change our view.

When we argue on behalf of the necessity to maintain credible armed forces, it is not because we believe we can thereby influence international events involving the major powers. Still, they might be more inclined to listen if we brought significant resources to the table. Professor Douglas Bland takes this argument further. Canada, he says, “requires armed forces not to influence others’ decisions about their interests and actions, but to influence decisions others may take about Canada’s interests and policies.” In the absence of adequate Canadian military forces, “…others will take decisions about vital Canadian interests in North America and internationally.”²²

A.     Capability-Based Planning

As noted at the outset of our report, the strategic environment, for which we expect our military to be prepared, is an increasingly complex one. The lack of “traditional” or “obvious” foes makes planning difficult. How do we determine the appropriateness and readiness of a force in the absence of a clearly defined enemy? How do we assign clear missions for which to prepare, when we cannot readily know from where the next challenge will come? Needless to say, these realities will continue to complicate the lives of force planners for sometime to come.

In order to deal with the complexities of the foregoing, the United States has moved to what is called a capabilities-based planning system. Such an approach, while not precluding the consideration of specific threats, does shift the weight of planning considerations away from the historical emphasis on specific threats. As explained by General Richard Myers, Chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff:

The United States cannot know with confidence which nations, or non-state actors will pose threats to its interests, or those of its allies and friends. It is possible to anticipate with greater accuracy the capabilities that an adversary might employ. Such a capabilities-based model focuses more on how an adversary might fight than on who the adversary might be. It broadens our strategic perspective and requires us to identify the capabilities US military forces will need to deter and defeat a wide variety of adversaries.²³

According to General Myers, an appropriate blueprint for change would then include the following:

American strategic thinking has made an important shift, moving away from configuring U.S. forces for two simultaneous major regional conflicts towards ensuring that the U.S. has the capabilities to meet modern threats whatever their source and nature. What is of utmost importance is the ability to deploy quickly, have a high degree of interoperability and be able to make effective use of technological advances. These principles will have significant bearing, not only on the American military, but also on those of its allies. Combined operations will require other militaries to reach minimum standards of interoperability and technological sophistication. It is perhaps telling that it was the Marines, a service whose speciality is amphibious operations, which were the first corps of regular troops into Afghanistan — a landlocked country.

The U.S. Quadrennial Defence Review also identified broad areas of capability that could enhance U.S. military power. These included: advanced remote sensing, long‑range precision strike, transformed manoeuvre and expeditionary forces, and systems to overcome anti-access and area denial threats. The need for, and effectiveness, of these was demonstrated in Afghanistan.²⁴

The Afghanistan campaign has also shown the advances made in the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) — the use of computers, communications, sensors and weapons to refine military operations and speed-up cycle times in warfare. More will be done to enhance surveillance and intelligence gathering capabilities. The new demand is for “persistent” or “staring” surveillance, that is, for continuous surveillance. As well, assets contributing to a picture of a battle-space will receive priority; such as the Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (J-STARS) airborne reconnaissance platform.²⁵

In addition, precision-guided weapons technology is likely to be boosted. While sea and air-launched cruise missiles will remain an important part of the weapons inventory, the new weapon of choice in Afghanistan has been the Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM). The JDAM “is a free-fall bomb given extraordinary accuracy by the addition to the tail of inexpensive satellite-guidance equipment using the Global Positioning System (GPS).” The inventory now also includes 2,000 lb. “thermobaric” bombs “which create intense heat and pressure and are particularly useful against targets in enclosed spaces such as cave structures, where forces may be sheltering.” They were reportedly first used in Afghanistan in late February.²⁶

Finally, Afghanistan has also demonstrated the value of special forces, whose virtue lies in flexibility and the ability to deploy quickly. The latter, of course, made possible by a wide variety of support aircraft and ships. The success of special forces will also spur the Army on to becoming more mobile and flexible.²⁷

Needless to say, the United States is far ahead of us and all other allies when it comes to the Revolution in Military Affairs. However, while we cannot expect to match them, we all need to be able to work with them. The U.S. will expect it of us and, for obvious reasons, it is in our interest to be able to do so.

The Canadian Forces have also moved to a capabilities based approach. According to Lieutenant-General George Macdonald, Vice-Chief of the Defence Staff, we came to the same conclusions as the Americans.²⁸ The question for us, however, is “are we providing the proper force structure suggested by a capabilities-based approach?” The 1994 White Paper is, after all, still official policy.

Lieutenant-General Macdonald argued that a capability can be defined as “the capacity to act in a specific way to achieve a specific end.” He also noted that capability goals are derived from government policy. While our conclusions, with respect to the need for moving to a capabilities-based approach were the same as those of the U.S., the Americans have had a defence review. They have had discussion and debate on the direction that U.S. defence policy should take — on the “ends” of defence policy.

We have a defence policy, designed in 1994, guiding an entirely new approach to force planning. What is important to remember here is that, in the final analysis, readiness is very much a political matter. It is the government that allocates resources and determines the ultimate objectives or ends of policy. As argued by Douglas Bland in his testimony before our Committee:

…I believe that the operational readiness of the Canadian Forces is a political responsibility, not merely a military responsibility. By that I mean that the Chief of the Defence Staff is responsible to prepare the Canadian Forces, but only to the standards directed by Parliament. Without a clear statement of readiness from Parliament, without a clear link between policies and capabilities, all those decisions about readiness made by the CDS may be simply haphazard and random.²⁹

This is an important observation. Virtually everyone who appeared before us argued that the CF could no longer meet the commitments of the White Paper. In itself, this need not necessarily be viewed as a tragedy. The White Paper is an anachronism waiting for its epitaph. What is important is that we not allow a capabilities‑based approach to be used to justify what we believe is an inadequate budget. But, in the absence of a defence review, we know only that the budget is inadequate when measured against the requirements of the White Paper — agreed by all to be somewhat dated.

At the same time, no one that has given testimony before our Committee would seriously argue for a reduction in defence spending. Yet, the issue cannot be laid to rest until the government provides some concrete direction with respect to what it wants the CF to be ready for. If we continue along our present course the CF will become increasingly rudderless. In light of the degree of concern around these issues, a responsible Committee must ask “why the obvious hesitancy over the initiation of a full fledged defence review?”

B.     Assessing Readiness

When testifying before our Committee, Dr. Peter Kasurak, from the Office of the Auditor General, argued that: “…the problem with readiness is that it is very difficult and complex.”³⁰ In a similar vein, Major-General (retired) Clive Addy, argued that “…in whatever form the government of Canada wishes to define the operational capability of its Canadian Forces, it must do so in such a manner that this capability is exercised and measured. Trying to get an idea of what is expected is rather difficult in the present White Paper. In Chapter 3, where it is stated that the maintenance of ‘multi-purpose, combat capable forces is in the national interest,’ the authors skittishly spend more time defining what this is not rather than what it is, and hence initiated seven years ago an inherent source of confusion and constant debate.”³¹

Major-General (retired) Clive Addy here points to a basic requirement of readiness standards. If these are to make sense, they need to be assessed in light of clearly defined roles and missions, as well as on a clear statement of what we understand the threat to be. As he went on to note, “the difficulty is always to measure our capabilities in respect of an agreed standard. That standard is best derived…from operationally researched scenarios based on a clear defence policy and possible threats. I believe that to define this is essential no matter how difficult it might appear to some.”³² The tradition has been to leave this to the judgement of senior commanders. As stated by Major-General (retired) Lewis Mackenzie, “…funny enough [readiness is] not a term we use…within the Army; historically it is a commander’s responsibility to evaluate [readiness] according to his own standards.” This is also a view supported by others. Lieutenant-General Gervais has argued that, “…commanders are obviously responsible for these particular [declarations] pieces of paper…you don’t necessarily always have to have a piece of paper, it can be done verbally, but it can also be done later on by the commander on the ground.”³³

When the Somalia inquiry asked about the CF, and how operational readiness was actually measured, no coherent system could be brought forward. At the same time, the CF were “operating generally without an agreed system for measuring operational readiness.”³⁴ From what we have been able to determine, it seems that little has changed. According to Kasurak, with respect to the CF, “…the concept of readiness has not been well developed, nor have adequate systems been built to manage it.”³⁵

The lack of an appropriate system is doubly disconcerting given that “readiness” is one of the essential concepts behind the management framework of all military organizations. It is a defining military concept, “…as vital to understanding the health of the armed forces as taking a pulse is to assessing the well-being of the human body.” It is the Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS), along with subordinate commanders, who are responsible and accountable for the operational readiness of the CF. This responsibility is especially important when elements of the CF are to be deployed. It is, therefore, “…incumbent on officers in the chain of command to maintain an accurate picture of the state of the armed forces at all times and to assess the operational readiness of CF units and elements for employment in assigned missions before they can be deployed on active service or international security missions.”³⁶

According to agreed upon definition, operational readiness is “the state of preparedness of a unit to perform the missions for which it is organized and designed.” It is closely associated with operational effectiveness, that is, with “the degree to which operational forces are capable of performing their assigned missions in relation to known enemy capabilities.”³⁷

What these definitions highlight is the fact that readiness is relevant and measurable only in relation to a unit’s assigned mission. If there is no mission, there is nothing against which to assess readiness. “If a unit has a very general mission then, the measurement of its standards of readiness can only be general.” ³⁸ But, as the mission becomes more specific, so too does the assessment of readiness. What this tells us is that not all units need to be at the highest readiness levels at all times. To expect this is simply unreasonable and makes little planning sense. As well, the costs of maintaining all units at high readiness levels would be prohibitive. However, their readiness, once measured against their mission, needs to be understood according to clear and transparent standards of evaluation. As well, a unit should never be deployed unless it has clearly demonstrated that it is operationally ready according to such criteria. To simply ask of the commanding officer whether or not the unit is “good to go” is not sufficient.

Assessing and determining operational readiness is a function of command. Commanding officers, “…at all levels are responsible and accountable for the accomplishment of missions assigned to them and for missions they assign to their subordinate units, they are also accountable for the operational readiness of units to accomplish those missions.” The assessment of readiness will inevitably comprise both qualitative and quantitative assessment criteria. “Strategic and tactical doctrine, leadership, and morale are all factors contributing to operational effectiveness and are part of the equation as much as numbers of personnel and equipment.” ³⁹ The mission statement is the sine qua non for assessing operational readiness, but, by itself, it cannot be a sufficient indication of the standard of readiness expected of units. Readiness is the responsibility of senior commanders and commanding officers. It is they who must clearly define for their subordinates the skills and functions required and the standards by which these will be measured in relation to assigned missions.

While we are not in a position to offer up a comprehensive system for measuring operational readiness, we can concur that an operationally ready unit should have the following:

Readiness assessments are especially important with respect to missions that are unusual or, in regard to which a commander has had little experience. Here, when assigning a mission, it is especially important to know the criteria for accomplishing the mission and the standards of readiness necessary to achieve it.

The strategic environment, in which the CF is now operating, is an unpredictable one. Determining readiness on the basis of assigned missions or planning scenarios will not be easy. We suspect, however, that the ability to do so is more crucial today than only a few years ago. On NATO’s central front, roles, missions, timelines, etc. could be well, and easily, established. The threat was obvious, measurable and predictable. Today’s threat is more ambiguous. Capabilities-based management is predicated on the fact that timelines will be unpredictable, as will the threat and mission. To be “good to go” is now a rather more complex matter.

In a very basic sense, readiness is about whether military units are capable of performing to their design limits and therefore requires careful management — states “…need to ensure that they have enough potential military capability to meet their security needs…and they must…ensure that this capability will be available when it is required.” Too little capability will put deployed forces at risk, while low readiness could mean delays in deployment, poorly maintained equipment and inadequately trained troops. At the same time, as noted earlier, too much readiness can prove unnecessarily expensive. Thus, managing readiness involves making choices about where resources should be spent in the defence establishment.⁴¹

One of the models for assessing military capability, presented to our Committee, was that of the U.S. Army. The U.S. Army has five pillars or components of military capability:

Defence planners must, therefore, “trade off these components against each other to achieve the best mix.” It is also important to know how much better off one would be by diverting money from readiness to modernization or from force structure to readiness.⁴³ If it is decided that investment in future technology is the preferred way to go, then, in order to achieve the savings that will allow for future expenditures in the RMA, current force levels may need to be kept below preferred levels. Such a scenario could prove particularly problematic during periods of high operational tempo.

In their testimony, the witnesses from the Auditor General’s Office concluded that, given current budget overstretch, force structure, modernization and current readiness are still not being balanced. “There is still a discrepancy across the various pillars and…hard choices still need to be made regarding them.” As a consequence, the CF will be faced with either making further reductions or seeking an increase in funding. For the AG, the status quo is simply not tenable.⁴⁴

The readiness aspect of the five components of military capability includes:

These need to be regularly evaluated if we are to have an adequate understanding of whether or not units can meet their assigned missions, or whether they are realistically prepared for a variety of “potential” deployments.

Of course, there is no such thing as a perfect system of evaluation. However, there are certain criteria that are readily identifiable. “Over the years, the Office of the Auditor General has…developed views as to what a good readiness measurement system would look like.” Such a system would be:

The audits done by the AG have repeatedly shown that the CF does not have readiness reporting and management systems that can meet these criteria. Since 1984, the Department of National Defence has developed and discarded at least five separate readiness-reporting systems.⁴⁶ We hope that this is due to the fact that management has been trying to find the best system possible and not the system that will best justify its practices.

Our Committee believes that the Department of National Defence must put in place a proper and comprehensive method for measuring the readiness of the Canadian Forces. We also expect that, whatever method is finally adopted, it be put before SCONDVA for review and that, thereafter, the Department report to SCONDVA on a regular basis with regard to the state of readiness of the CF. It is fundamentally important for Parliament to have a sound appreciation for the state of readiness of the Canadian Forces and, as well, to have a clear understanding of the basis used for such determination. For parliamentarians to make sound recommendations with respect to defence planning (largely understood as spending) we need to know about readiness targets, mission goals, and the degree of success the CF has in meeting these.

In this regard, we need help — honest help — from the experts who come before us. Unfortunately, our system is such that offering up honest opinion is not always rewarded. Those who appear before us sometimes seem more intent on guarding information than on sharing it.

In order to ensure the operational readiness of CF formations and units, we recommend that:

RECOMMENDATION 5

The Department of National Defence put in place a comprehensive system for determining the readiness of the Canadian Forces. This system should set clear and standardized measurements of operational readiness for the CF and its component units.

RECOMMENDATION 6

No notice inspections be carried out, on a regular basis, on the operational readiness of selected commands and units of the Canadian Forces.

RECOMMENDATION 7

Yearly readiness evaluations be done on the CF and its component units and that these be tabled with SCONDVA upon completion.

We need to ensure that the various components of the CF are operationally ready and that the standards used for assessing readiness are appropriate to the anticipated missions. As well, we need to ensure that our forces have the training and equipment that will make them interoperable with our allies. And finally, we need to set adequate funding lines to make the foregoing possible.

Lieutenant-Colonel John Boyd of the United States Air Force has argued that a sound scheme for ensuring operational readiness will rest on three things: people, ideas, and equipment. If you have the right people, you will generate the right ideas and these will ensure that you acquire the right equipment. We are convinced that the CF has the right people. Over the years, our Committee has visited virtually every Canadian military installation and has always come away feeling fully confident in the abilities and dedication of serving personnel.

We are also confident that our personnel will develop the appropriate ideas and concepts necessary for meeting current and future challenges. When meeting with them, we have always been impressed by the intellectual rigour brought to the discussions; this we found to be largely true for all ranks. However, the development of appropriate strategic, tactical, force structure, and operational constructs cannot be done in a vacuum. They are a response to two things — the strategic environment in which we find ourselves, and the overall policy goals set for the CF by government. It is, therefore, incumbent upon us to provide the requisite policy direction. The resulting framework will then guide appropriate decisions on numbers of personnel, training and equipment purchases.