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NDVA Committee Report

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CHAPTER 6: THE BIGGEST ASSET OF THE CANADIAN FORCES: ITS PERSONNEL

A.     Quality of Life

Discussions about the readiness of military forces often concentrate on the training of units and the capacity of various pieces of equipment to perform the tasks for which they were designed. However, the skills, courage, and dedication of its personnel are indispensable to the ability of Canada’s military to carry out its assigned missions. A number of factors influence the level of readiness of military personnel including quality of life issues, recruitment, and leadership training.

Having participated actively in recent years in efforts to improve the quality of life of Canadian military personnel and their families, this Committee would be remiss if it did not highlight the importance of this factor in helping ensure a high level of readiness. Improvements in the quality of life can only help personnel maintain a high level of morale and commitment to the tasks at hand, especially during long deployments outside of Canada for training and for combat or peacekeeping operations.

Having sampled first-hand the discontent felt by many military personnel and their families during the 1998 study, the Committee welcomes the fact that morale has, according to many reports, improved since that time thanks in part to quality of life initiatives. While there are still problems, progress has been made in terms of salaries and other benefits since the mid-1990s when there was an increasing number of news stories about some military families relying on food banks to make ends meet.

For example, various measures recommended by this Committee and by others have helped to reduce the effects of high costs of living on the Pacific coast compared to those in the Maritimes on naval and other personnel. As Rear-Admiral (Retired) Moore, President of the Naval Officers’ Association of Canada noted, the morale of naval and other personnel on the Pacific coast has improved significantly compared to what it was four or five years ago.57

Some may still question the importance of quality of life initiatives in the military and fail to see their contribution to readiness. However, measures to eliminate or at least reduce the effects of various irritants such as poor housing conditions on bases and the high costs of living in some regions can only help to put military personnel in a better state of mind during training and operations. Improvements in the quality of life also help the families of military personnel accept the many sacrifices they have to make, especially when their loved-ones are away on long deployments.





























A Flight engineer operates the C6 light machine-gun mounted in the side door of a CH-146 Griffon flown by 430 Tactical Helicopter Squadron from Valcartier.

Furthermore, better conditions and the availability of services for the families can encourage many in the Forces to prolong their military careers instead of seeking employment in the civilian sector. Unfortunately, the quality of life initiatives may have arrived too late to change the mind of some personnel who decided to leave the military as soon as they could.

The significant haemorrhaging of trained and experienced personnel from the ranks of the military over the last few years has had and will continue to have an impact on readiness for some time to come, given the time and costs involved in bringing new recruits up to similar levels of training and experience. Meanwhile, the tempo of operations during the last decade has pushed many of the remaining members of the Forces to the point of exhaustion. Furthermore, during these complex and often dangerous operations, a number of personnel were injured, physically, psychologically or both, and require continued care and attention.

B.     Care of Injured Personnel

Care of injured personnel was one of the major issues examined during our 1998 study and despite the improvements made in this area by the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Forces, there is still cause for concern. Some procedures and attitudes concerning physically injured personnel have changed for the better and, we trust, will continue to improve. However, the care and treatment of personnel suffering from psychological injuries require continued attention and improvement.

The tempo of operations during the last decade and the horrors witnessed during many of the missions undertaken, such as those in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, have taken a heavy toll on some members of the military and their families. The effects of Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) and other psychological injuries often become evident only months, if not years, after a peacekeeping or combat operation. Thus, effective treatment programs must be available on a continuing basis.

However, there are questions about the effectiveness of the programs made available by the Department and the Forces and there is evidence that attitudes towards military personnel dealing with PTSD or other psychological problems is not conducive to speedy diagnosis and treatment. During the investigation of the complaint by Corporal Christian McEachern, the Ombudsman for the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Forces decided to examine the whole issue of how the Canadian Forces as an organization deal with PTSD. The Committee thanks the Ombudsman for the report and its observations based on information gathered during the investigation that help people within and outside the military better understand the issues. Among other things, the report concluded that the number of CF personnel with PTSD is probably much higher than the number of declared cases because of the reluctance of many individuals to seek treatment.58

One of the reasons for this discrepancy is the fact that while it may take time for some people to recognize that they may have PTSD, others are well aware of their condition, but avoid seeking help because of the stigma attached to PTSD among some of their comrades. The Ombudsman’s report stated that there is overwhelming evidence of scepticism within the military about PTSD, something that may explain why members with PTSD, including Reservists, often feel abandoned by their units. In his testimony to the Committee and in various other presentations, Lieutenant-General (Retired) Roméo Dallaire has been quite frank and open in describing the problems he is dealing with and has been very generous in helping others come to grips with the realities of PTSD.

However, despite the recommendations put forward by this Committee in the past and the commitments made by the Department, it is evident that much more effort is required to improve the attitudes of some in the military concerning PTSD and the treatment programs offered to those who need it. Effective treatment of CF members with PTSD helps not only their situation, but also the readiness level of their units and the Forces in general. Considerable time and effort is invested in the training of military personnel, so the units and the Forces have much to gain in helping individuals deal with PTSD.

New programs have been established to help individuals and their families cope with the effects of PTSD. For example, Sainte-Anne Hospital in Sainte-Anne-de-Bellevue in Quebec, which is operated by the Department of Veterans Affairs, has recently established a program to assist veterans and members of the Forces dealing with PTSD. This and other projects need continued support and additional resources. We therefore recommend that:

RECOMMENDATION 24

The Department of National Defence, together with the Department of Veterans Affairs, give a high priority and additional funding to programs designed to help members of the Canadian Forces dealing with Post Traumatic Stress Disorder and other psychological/physical injuries following their participation in peacekeeping or combat missions abroad or in training, rescue, or other operations within Canada in order to maintain a good quality of life for the individuals.

The care of the injured, whether the injuries are physical or psychological, is an important issue both for the individual faced with debilitating conditions and their family members who provide support. However, it is also of concern for those outside the military as well as for those inside. Military personnel who lose confidence in the commitment of the Forces to take care of them and their families if they suffer injuries will be more likely to leave the ranks at the first opportunity. If civilians also gain the impression that the military does not take care of its injured personnel, they could be less interested in serving their country within its ranks or encouraging their sons and daughters to do so. Such attitudes will adversely affect readiness because of their implications for the recruitment or retention of personnel.

For these and other reasons, the problems faced by individuals suffering symptoms often grouped under the name Gulf War Syndrome are of particular concern. The health of a number of individuals who served in the armed forces of Canada, the U.S., the U.K., and other countries during the period of the Persian Gulf War have seriously deteriorated over the years, but the medical and scientific communities have been unable to clearly identify all the causes.

Some argue that there is a link between exposure to expended depleted uranium shells like those used against tanks and the Gulf War Syndrome while others maintain that no link has been established. The Committee has briefly examined the issues involved, but there is so much scientific information and contradictory claims that it cannot simply come out in favour of one side over another. However, it is clear that all available means must be taken to help these individuals and their families cope with these problems and that more research is needed on the possible causes of the health problems faced by veterans of operations during the Persian Gulf War. We therefore recommend that:

RECOMMENDATION 25

The Department of National Defence and the Department of Veterans Affairs continue extensive research on all the possible causes of what is referred to as the Gulf War Syndrome and any other psychological/physical injuries.

While various programs are necessary to help individuals deal with whatever problems they may have after tours of duty, it is also important to adequately prepare military personnel for the conditions and situations they will experience during combat or peacekeeping operations. Indeed, proper training and unit cohesion are other factors that can ensure that personnel are ready for the next rotation in a peacekeeping operation or a deployment to a trouble spot overseas. The Forces have also tried to lighten the burden of overseas deployments on personnel. For example, the tour of the Griffon helicopter units in Bosnia were reduced to two months instead of the six months usually associated with overseas missions. Such measures shorten the time away from home and both the individuals and their families can benefit.

The fact remains that six-month rotations have been a heavy burden for individuals and their families because many in the military have done a number of six-month tours over the course of a few years. The tempo of operations is one reason for this situation, but the decline in the total number of military personnel is another. There are fewer persons to share the burden of long-term commitments. Thus, recruitment is an important issue in terms of readiness, both to maintain the number of military personnel at adequate levels and to bring new recruits into the ranks to compensate for the departure of experienced personnel.

C.     Recruitment

Indeed, the haemorrhaging of experienced personnel was no doubt one of the reasons why by 2001, the strength of the Regular Force of the Canadian Forces fell below the 60,000 level set by the 1994 Defence White Paper. The reduction to 60,000 was bad enough given the increased tempo of operations which occurred during the 1990s. The Forces and especially the Army became overstretched, but the decline below 60,000 exacerbated the problems. The suspension of recruitment for a few years during the 1990s did not help either because the flow of new recruits into the Forces was interrupted.

When recruitment resumed, the military then experienced increasing difficulty in obtaining the requisite numbers of new recruits. Indeed, many young Canadians opt for careers in the private and public sectors in jobs that often offer better pay and chances for advancement. The Canadian Forces have to work harder to attract new recruits, especially those with the computer and management skills required to operate technologically advanced equipment. Of course, this does not mean that the Forces have only a few of Canada’s best and brightest and that the rest of the personnel cannot reach the same high standards or are not as good as those who preceded them.

On the contrary, Canada is very lucky to have highly capable and dedicated personnel in its military. Lieutenant-General Mike Jeffery, Chief of the Land Staff, was very clear in his praise of the young men and women in uniform, stating that their moral and ethical standards and their commitment to the job and to this nation was as good as previous generations. Indeed, he added that he believed that “…the quality of soldier I am seeing, and particularly the quality of the leader, is superior to what I’ve experienced in close to 37 years of service.”59 Our troops in Afghanistan have faced all the hardships associated with combat, including the tragic deaths of comrades, and have demonstrated the same courage and determination to carry out their mission as their predecessors.


Members of the 2nd Regiment, Royal Canadian Horse Artillery (2 RCHA) help build a barbed-wire perimeter for the new Canadian camp in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.

However, if the Forces cannot get all of the recruits they need for both the Regular and Reserve Forces, their ability to fulfil their numerous commitments will be undermined. Canada is not the only country where the military is facing recruitment problems. Indeed, the United States and many other allied countries are relying on expensive recruitment campaigns and incentives to reach their quotas of new recruits. Some young persons in various countries have recently shown more interest in military service in the wake of the September 11th attacks, but continued economic growth and the resulting availability of jobs in the civilian sector make it difficult to interest others in such a career.

In any case, the Canadian Forces recognized the need to undertake a major recruitment drive in 2001. Efforts to reduce the gap between actual and desired personnel levels have been successful to some extent, but attracting new recruits will likely be a labour-intensive task for years to come. The Army in particular faces a number of problems as it tries to reduce shortages in a number of specialized trades. The signing bonuses of up to $40,000 announced in early 2002 to attract or retain young Canadians with engineering skills are another sign of the times.

The loss of experienced personnel in recent years and problems in recruiting new personnel have an impact on readiness not only at the present time, but also well into the future. It takes time to provide recent recruits with the training and experience equivalent to that of the personnel who recently left the Forces. Besides, like other sectors of society, the military will be affected by the increasing average age of the general population and the retirement in a few years of large numbers of baby boomers, including those in the armed forces.

Our preoccupation with the current state of readiness of the Canadian Forces left us little opportunity to consider the long-term effects of the shrinking size of the military and the problems being encountered in the search for new recruits. The Committee may examine these issues more closely at some future date.

D.     Leadership

The Committee also had only a short glimpse of the issues concerning the development of the leadership skills of Canadian military personnel. This glimpse was provided during the meeting where the Commandant of the Canadian Forces College in Toronto and Dr. Paul Mitchell were the witnesses. However, leadership skills are more important for the readiness of the Forces than the brief moments spent on the issues imply.

Indeed, the Canadian Forces College, in one form or another, has played an important part in the education of senior Canadian military officers since at least 1943. However, during the last five years, there has been even greater emphasis on the education of all officers in the wake of the Somalia inquiry and other developments during the 1990s. In his 1997 report to the Prime Minister on the Leadership and Management of the Canadian Forces, the Minister of National Defence at that time, Doug Young, announced a number of measures including changes in policies to make a university degree as prerequisite for commissioning as an officer, except for those commissioned from the ranks.

The report also called for a review of the Officer Professional Development Program and of the curriculum at the Royal Military College and at the Canadian Forces College where generals and admirals and candidates for these ranks study world developments and defence issues. These reviews were completed and some changes have been made as part of a strategy called Officership 2020. Under this strategy, education is an integral part of the professional development of all officers who are also encouraged to pursue continuing education with financial support. As for the curriculum of the Canadian Forces College, as elsewhere, more attention is being paid to asymmetrical threats.



57Rear-Admiral (Retired) Russell Moore, Proceedings, March 2002.
58Ombudsman to the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Forces, Report to the Minister of National Defence, Special Report, Systemic Treatment of CF Members with PTSD, February 5, 2002.
59Lieutenant-General M.K. Jeffery, Proceedings, May 17, 2001.