NDVA Committee Report

CHAPTER 5: DEFENCE OF CANADA

A.     Readiness and Homeland Defence

Increasing or at least maintaining the readiness of the Canadian Forces at a level sufficient to ensure the rapid and efficient deployment of units anywhere in the world is a complex endeavour. Units and doctrine have to be transformed and equipment has to be replaced or modernized. However, it is by no means certain that all the financial resources and personnel required will be available in sufficient quantity to do this now or in the near future. The fact remains that foreign deployments are only one element of the many tasks carried out by the Canadian Forces.

While geography has usually isolated Canada from the world’s trouble spots, there has always been a need to devote some of our military resources to the surveillance and defence of Canadian territory, airspace, and waters. At a time when the capacity of the Canadian Forces to deploy overseas needs more resources and fresh thinking to keep pace with technological and doctrinal developments, the defence of Canada has become much more complex in the face of international terrorism. Thus, more demands are being placed on the overstretched resources of the Canadian military.

Indeed, the September 11, 2001 attacks provided another example of the importance of military readiness. As the events unfolded and the full extent of the coordinated attacks was still being assessed, Canada’s military went on alert. For example, while CF-18s patrolled Canadian airspace as part of NORAD’s response to the crisis, other elements of the Canadian military went into action to load and deploy transport aircraft carrying food and supplies to various communities within Canada. These communities suddenly found themselves taking care of thousands of stranded passengers following the grounding of all commercial flights within or entering North American airspace.

Without proper training and equipment, military units would have been unable to contribute meaningfully on such short notice to the efforts deployed on September 11th and subsequent days to mitigate the effects of the terrorist acts and to deter new attacks. Indeed, it is not always possible to count on weeks and months to train and equip military personnel in order to respond to a threat to national or international security. While some may think that combat capable forces are not necessary in peacetime, military capabilities and training must be maintained precisely because they may have to provide a quick and effective response to sudden and unexpected events.

Indeed, despite terrorist incidents and the proliferation of conflicts in distant regions of the world, many persons in North America had perhaps been lulled into a false sense of security following the end of the Cold War. The attacks against the U.S. brutally illustrated the surprise element of terrorist actions and the need to maintain military units at a certain level of readiness to ensure a rapid response when something happens. They also demonstrated that there is still a need to ensure airspace surveillance.

B.     Airspace Surveillance and NORAD

When the Cold War ended, some questioned the need to maintain a fighter aircraft capability for the surveillance of Canadian airspace. Nevertheless, a country’s ability to monitor all aircraft within its national airspace is an important element in the assertion of sovereignty. Without the capability to intercept and identify intruding and suspicious aircraft, a country’s claim that it controls activities within its airspace is questionable. A new and unwelcomed element was introduced because we now know beyond any doubt that airliners can be hijacked and turned into weapons. Both in Canada and the U.S., additional jet fighters were put on alert after the attacks and carried out patrols over cities to deter further attacks using hijacked airliners or any aircraft against key installations, including nuclear power stations.

Following a few months of intensive operations, the tempo of patrols by fighter aircraft has declined only slightly in the U.S. as well as in Canada. New security measures at airports and elsewhere have reduced the possibility of hijackings. However, while the costs of maintaining constant fighter patrols over potential terrorist targets, if only in terms of wear and tear on the aircraft, can be quite high, there is still a need to remain vigilant. Measures have been taken or are being planned to improve the monitoring of air traffic within North American airspace, notably through better coordination between civil and military air traffic control. Indeed, on the military side, the North American Aerospace Defence Command (NORAD) continues to play an important role in ensuring North American security.

Since 1958, Canada and the U.S. have cooperated together within the context of NORAD to provide effective surveillance of North America’s airspace. Thanks to its involvement in NORAD, Canada has been able to ensure the surveillance of the wide expanse of its airspace and contribute to the defence of its closest ally. Without NORAD, it would have been necessary for Canada to assume on its own the significant costs of providing the various elements, such as the North Warning System, involved in the surveillance of the wide expanse of its airspace. If it had neglected the surveillance of its airspace, Canada would face strong pressure from the U.S. to either bolster its surveillance capacity or allow its powerful neighbour to take a dominant role in monitoring its airspace.

Under NORAD, the two countries have cooperated to ensure the surveillance of continental airspace without harming their respective sovereignty. Indeed, while U.S. military aircraft have flown in Canadian airspace as part of NORAD operations, Canadian CF-18s and Canadian personnel aboard U.S. Air Force Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) aircraft have flown in U.S. airspace for many years. A number of Canadians were also involved in the operations carried out by a few NATO AWACS aircraft deployed to the U.S. in the wake of September 11th to help the hard-pressed U.S. AWACS fleet. Given the number of aircraft flying through North American airspace and of those crossing from one country to another, cooperation between allies is a necessity to ensure effective airspace surveillance and, if necessary, a quick response to counter suspicious or aggressive actions.

In contrast, even during the Cold War, the surveillance of coastal territories and waters did not appear to require the same kind of coordinated action and speedy response. Canada and the U.S. were satisfied just with the exchange of information on activities within their respective territories and waters and the occasional joint exercises. The realization that gaps in the surveillance of the approaches to North America could be exploited by terrorists to infiltrate and prepare attacks have prompted both countries not only to increase their respective surveillance efforts, but also to explore ways of improving their cooperation in this domain.

C.     Surveillance of Coastal and Other Areas

The 1994 White Paper on Defence pointed out the traditional contributions of the Canadian Forces to surveillance operations such as patrols by Aurora aircraft and naval ships along Canada’s coasts and in the North. These patrols are necessary to detect and deter foreign military activities close to Canadian shores and to assist efforts by other government departments and agencies to counter criminal activities such as people or drug smuggling and illegal fishing. Incidents harmful to the environment such as accidental or deliberate oil spills by foreign vessels can be observed and evidence collected to assist efforts to bring the perpetrators to justice. The possibility that terrorists might try to infiltrate into Canada through its coastal waters to prepare attacks within North America has added more impetus to efforts to ensure better offshore surveillance.

Canada’s long coastline and the wide expanse of its northern regions have always posed a significant challenge to defence planners. Satellite technology already provides some limited capabilities in terms of surveillance over wide areas, but more technological developments are required in this area to plug all the gaps. The use of satellites for wide‑area surveillance and other space-related issues merit more attention than we as a Committee were able to give to these issues because of all the other complex issues related to the readiness of the Canadian Forces. Indeed, satellites used for communications, navigation, and surveillance are increasingly vital elements to the readiness of any military force. Given the high costs of the technology used in these systems, careful planning and coordination are necessary to ensure that funds desperately needed by various elements of the Forces are not squandered.

While surveillance from space offers great potential, more traditional means like the Aurora long-range patrol aircraft and naval vessels will continue to be the main tools with which to monitor activities along Canada’s shores. As discussed in the chapter on foreign deployments, the mid-life update of the Aurora aircraft is now proceeding. The emphasis of the new electronic equipment will be more on surface surveillance than on anti-submarine warfare, but the Auroras will still continue to play a key role in the surveillance of Canadian waters and territory.

The Navy’s frigates, submarines, and especially the maritime coastal defence vessels (MCDVs) are also key elements of the surveillance of the waters off our shores. Since these include not only Canada’s territorial waters, but also wide areas of the oceans off our three coasts, the burden on our small navy is quite significant. The Navy must be able to carry out surveillance operations close to our shores while still maintaining the capacity to deploy some ships to the other side of the earth if and when an international crisis develops. The Navy’s burden will likely increase in the coming years because the surveillance of Canadian waters in the Arctic will require more and more attention while the polar icecap continues to melt.

The effects of climate changes on the Arctic polar icecap will probably include, among other things, increased shipping activity in Arctic waters. In order to assert its sovereignty over its territories and waters in the Arctic, Canada will have to maintain its naval capabilities and improve them whenever the opportunity presents itself. Indeed, we should prepare now for the implications of the melting polar icecap instead of reacting only if and when other countries start exploring the possible shipping routes in the Arctic Ocean. In the meantime, Canada’s naval vessels should operate more frequently in northern waters when conditions allow in order to gain more experience in Arctic operations.

To some extent, Canada’s new submarines can play an important role in providing surveillance in northern waters as well as elsewhere along Canada’s coasts. Their operation under the polar icecap would be very limited for safety reasons pending the addition of some sort of air independent propulsion system. However, the melting icecap is actually increasing the area in northern waters where the subs could operate without such restrictions. Thus, it is unfortunate that technical problems are delaying the delivery of the two submarines still in the U.K. and the operational use of all four subs. The new Victoria class submarines are an important element of the Navy’s surveillance capabilities in Canadian waters, so any new delays in bringing the subs up to fully operational levels will be of considerable concern to the Committee.

In the meantime, the MCDVs are proving their worth in surveillance operations off Canada’s coasts. The crews of the MCDVs are composed mainly of Reservists who by all accounts are doing a fine job in fulfilling their main tasks such as shipping control. The MCDVs patrol littoral areas and can assist police authorities in detecting and stopping drug and other types of smuggling. The Committee is therefore concerned that only 10 of the 12 MCDVs are currently in full operation. The Committee also believes that more attention should be paid to providing all of the mines countermeasures capabilities that were planned for the MCDVs when the vessels were on the drawing board. Considerable research has been done on such capabilities, but given the terrorist threat, more action has to be taken.

In short, various air, naval, and land units can play a role in ensuring the surveillance of Canadian airspace, waters, and territory. The coordination of the various operations and the exchange of information between units or between aircraft and warships are greatly assisted by the continued emphasis within the Canadian Forces on joint operations. By training together, Army, Navy, and Air Force units can work together effectively and react quickly and appropriately when an emergency arises. Given the element of surprise often involved in terrorist attacks, the effective coordination of actions by various military units can greatly assist the detection or at least the response to the incidents.

D.     Relationship with U.S. Northern Command

The need for better coordination of various military units has also been recognized by the U.S. Prior to September 11th, the emphasis in U.S. military operations was predominantly on overseas deployments and the command structures of the U.S. Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps reflected this. Since the late 1990s, homeland defence and the various commitments made by the U.S. military to help civilian authorities deal with terrorist attacks were cobbled together while better coordination of these efforts was the subject of debate. The attacks against Washington and New York prompted the U.S. government and the military to take action to ensure better coordination between U.S. forces in the continental U.S. Indeed, U.S. military forces have greatly increased patrols in U.S. airspace and on the sea approaches to the continental U.S. and these efforts will now be a fixture in U.S. military operations.

To ensure the effective coordination of all the U.S. military units involved in the direct defence of U.S. territory, the U.S. government announced in April 2002 that Northern Command will be established starting on  October 1, 2002. The air and sea approaches to the continental U.S. will be in the zone of responsibility assigned to Northern Command. Other U.S. military commands cover zones of responsibility that cover regions in Europe, Asia, and Africa, but they are basically responsible only for U.S. military units within the zones. Central Command that is responsible for U.S. military operations in Afghanistan is more or less an example of how Northern Command could operate.

The U.S. units involved with NORAD will be an element of the new Northern Command, but NORAD itself will not change any major aspects of its operations. Canada continues to be part of NORAD and operations in the Canadian region of NORAD remain the same. There may likely be changes in the way the Commander in Chief of NORAD will report within the U.S. military chain of command. Precisely what this may mean for Canada is currently being discussed between Canadian and U.S. officials. As for the effects of the establishment of U.S. Northern Command on other Canadian military units including Aurora patrol aircraft and naval ships, there has been much speculation in some Canadian circles that these units will come under the command of the U.S. military. Others have pointed out that Canada’s defence, trade, and other policies are more closely linked to those of the U.S. than ever before and that the high level of interoperability between Canadian and U.S. forces has been achieved without loss of sovereignty by Canada.⁵⁵

The fact remains that Northern Command is the result of restructuring within the U.S. military and does not have an immediate impact on Canadian military operations. There already exists considerable cooperation between the naval and land forces of the two countries, as well as between the air forces, but each country retains command over its military forces. The establishment of Northern Command and the emphasis on better coordination between military units and quick response to terrorist incidents could have some implications for military units in both countries. Given Canada’s strong commitment over the years to the defence of North America, there may be opportunities to increase the coordination of military operations involving both countries without any negative effects on the sovereignty of either one. We therefore recommend that:  

RECOMMENDATION 22

The Canadian government authorities continue to explore with their U.S. counterparts possible ways of improving the longstanding cooperation between Canada and the U.S. in NORAD and in the defence of North America in general, in light of the establishment by the U.S. of its new Northern Command, and that Parliament be kept informed.

The goal of NORAD has always been to ensure the effective operational control of the various air defence resources of both countries while each country remain in command of their respective forces. Whether within NORAD, NATO, or a multinational coalition acting on behalf of the United Nations, Canadian military units have often been under the operational control of military commanders of other countries, but they were still under the command of Canadian authorities. Indeed, as Vice-Admiral Ron Buck, Chief of the Naval Staff pointed out, there have been many occasions where Canadian officers have had operational control over ships and other units of foreign countries.⁵⁶ In short, it is possible to improve coordination between the military units of different countries without infringing on their individual sovereignty. Given the international terrorist threat, close cooperation between allies is more important than ever.

Indeed, cooperation among allies is not just a question of joint and combined exercises by the land, naval, and air forces of various countries. Many other elements are involved in efforts to improve international and homeland security, some of which are not strictly military in the traditional sense. For example, in our November 2001 interim report, we applauded the government’s announcements concerning its decision to give more resources to the Communications Security Establishment (CSE), an organization within the Department of National Defence, which cooperates with the U.S. and other allied countries in the gathering and analysis of signals intelligence. Such intelligence is an important element in monitoring international developments and terrorist threats. There is always a danger that if there are no more major terrorist attacks in North America for a few months, people will again become complacent and question the usefulness of signals intelligence gathering and other security measures. Thus, the operations of CSE and improvements in military intelligence and intelligence generally must continue to receive a high priority.

E.     Military Contributions to Homeland Defence

The work done by the CSE and those involved in military intelligence has been a feature of defence and security operations for decades. However, in the age of rapidly evolving technology and the potential willingness of terrorists to use nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons of mass destruction and terror, the line between defence and security has become increasingly blurred. The possibility still exists for confrontations on the battlefield between the armed forces of one country and the equivalent forces of another, but with asymmetrical threats, the military must also be ready to deal with or at least to contribute to efforts to deter terrorist attacks against the homeland.

Given the limited resources available just to keep military forces at a high level of readiness and to have the means necessary to deploy them overseas, the need to devote more resources to homeland defence adds a new level of complexity to the distribution of budgetary resources. This is one reason why, within the context of a study on readiness, the Committee examined the current and potential contributions of the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Forces to efforts to counter asymmetrical threats. Indeed, the Committee began to consider these issues long before the attacks of  September 11th because they do have some implications for defence spending.

Indeed, some argue that the military should concentrate on its traditional capabilities and leave homeland security issues to police and other authorities while others point out that the military has resources which can support the first responders to terrorist attacks using weapons of mass destruction. Care must be taken to ensure that traditional military capabilities are not allowed to deteriorate because too much military spending is reallocated to homeland defence. On the other hand, it would be somewhat counter-productive to have armed forces more than ready to confront the armed forces of a foreign state, but totally powerless to do anything while terrorist attacks cripple their homeland’s critical infrastructure and terrorize the population.

In short, Canada’s armed forces must be able to contribute to the defence of the homeland while still retaining their basic military capabilities at a sufficiently high level. By the same token, Canadians must recognize that the military is only one of the elements that can help ensure Canada’s security. Indeed, as our November 2001 interim report pointed out, police, firefighters, and other first responders are our first line of defence to deter and mitigate the effects of terrorist attacks with weapons of mass destruction. However, the military must be able to help the first responders. The Committee therefore welcomes the government’s decision, as indicated in its response to the interim report, to establish a new high-readiness team that will be able to deploy, on short notice, anywhere within Canada to assist authorities dealing with chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear terrorist attacks.

The Committee also welcomes the additional funding announced by the government in its 2001 Budget for agencies like the Office for Critical Infrastructure Protection and Emergency Preparedness (OCIPEP) to enhance emergency response and preparedness training for first responders who might have to deal with chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear attacks. Indeed, this had been proposed in Recommendation 14 of this Committee’s interim report. The distribution of funding for training for first responders is one of the many responsibilities of OCIPEP that is an agency within the Department of National Defence.

F.     Critical Infrastructure Protection

OCIPEP was established in February 2001 in recognition of the need to take more effective action in protecting Canada’s critical infrastructure against terrorist attacks. The Minister of National Defence is the Minister responsible for the organization that is also the government’s primary agency for ensuring national civil emergency preparedness since it encompasses the functions of Emergency Preparedness Canada.

The new agency has the task of developing and implementing a comprehensive approach to the protection of Canada’s critical infrastructure that is more and more dependent on information technology systems. These systems are not only a crucial element of banking and commerce, but also a vital tool in the operation and monitoring of many of the physical elements of the infrastructure such as factories, pipelines and hydroelectric dams. Disruptions in the information technology systems in general, notably in the banking sector, or in the computers actually controlling, for example, the flow of oil through a pipeline or electric power through a regional or local grid could have a serious impact on a country’s economy and social stability.

Accidents or disruptions in the information technology or cyber part of the infrastructure could also result in environmental disasters such as oil spills near pipelines and floods around dams that may require the evacuation of thousands of citizens. This explains to some extent why the functions of what was called Emergency Preparedness Canada, which was also within the Department of National Defence, have been shifted into the newly created agency. While one part of OCIPEP is involved in the protection of the critical infrastructure, another element can assist provincial and municipal authorities dealing with the consequences of a disaster, whether natural or man-made.

Indeed, OCIPEP was involved in the coordination of the operation that provided many municipalities across Canada with supplies when they had to provide food and lodging to foreign travellers stranded because of the terrorist attacks in Washington and New York. The fact that it was up to Canada’s fleet of military transport aircraft to deliver emergency supplies to various points across the country, because civil aircraft were grounded, again highlights the importance of this element of the Canadian Forces. While the transport aircraft are key to the Canadian military’s ability to deploy its units abroad to world trouble spots, they are also vital for transporting emergency supplies within Canada when natural disasters or terrorist attacks occur. This is in addition to the major role played by the Hercules transports in national search and rescue. Since some of the Hercules are among the oldest aircraft currently in the Air Force’s inventory of air transports, the same concerns about their availability when required for national emergencies as well as for overseas deployments apply. We therefore recommend that:

RECOMMENDATION 23

Sufficient numbers of new and replacement transport aircraft be acquired in the near future to meet the domestic needs of Canada, including search and rescue operations, while ensuring the airlift capacity required for foreign deployments, as called for in recommendation 16.

While the Canadian Forces can help authorities deal with the consequences of a disaster, emergency preparedness and critical infrastructure protection are not strictly military issues. Indeed, in Canada, many departments and agencies are involved in efforts to ensure national security. The Solicitor General is the lead minister for public safety and has specific responsibility for working with other government departments and agencies with regard to the counter-terrorism plan. The creation of OCIPEP within the Department of National Defence accentuated the Department’s contribution to the counter-terrorism plan. The February 5, 2001 press release from the Prime Minister’s Office issued when OCIPEP was created stated that the Minister of National Defence, while responsible for the Office, will collaborate closely with the Solicitor General and other ministers to ensure a coherent and comprehensive approach to critical infrastructure protection and emergency preparedness. The Office was also given the task of building partnerships with the private sector that owns and operates much of the critical infrastructure.

Indeed, the security of a country now depends not only on its ability to defend itself against a foreign military attack, but also on its capacity to ensure the stability of its economic and communications sectors and of society in general. A country must therefore protect its infrastructure, but in the computer age, it cannot do so simply by deploying tanks and sentries around dams and pipelines. Meanwhile, the military, which is itself more and more dependent on information technology for everything from administrative duties to battlefield management, must not only play a role in protecting the national infrastructure, but also ensure that its own computer systems are not vulnerable to disruptions.

Canadians cannot simply assume that terrorists will never target the country’s critical infrastructure. Canada and the United States are so interconnected in terms of oil and gas pipelines, electrical power grids, trade, and computer systems that terrorists attacks against one country would more than likely have effects on the other. Terrorists could launch attacks within or through Canada with the goal of damaging the U.S. energy, communications, and economic sectors. Attacks by hackers against U.S. Internet sites using servers in Canada and other countries are just one example of the vulnerability of U.S. information technology systems to indirect attacks. Indeed, Canada, the U.S., and many other countries are so closely linked economically and technologically that they each have a certain responsibility for the protection of the other’s critical infrastructure.

The Canadian military is only partially involved in the protection of the critical infrastructure and even OCIPEP is not the predominant protector. As in the U.S., the emphasis is on cooperation and coordination between government agencies and the business sector that owns and operates a large part of the critical infrastructure. In other words, the protection of the critical infrastructure is not solely a government responsibility. Nevertheless, the military cannot assume that the protection of the critical infrastructure is not one of its concerns. For example, disruptions in civilian communications systems could have an impact on the military’s ability to operate within Canada and to deploy overseas. Furthermore, numerous terrorist attacks against the critical infrastructure could undermine the country’s economy that underpins defence spending while hampering the production of military equipment by Canadian industries.

In short, ensuring the readiness of the Canadian Forces has always been a difficult endeavour because of restraints on defence spending and the rapid evolution of military doctrine and technology. The task is now more complicated than ever because the homeland is more and more directly threatened and closer attention must be paid to the defence and security of Canada’s territory and its critical infrastructure. The commitments and capabilities of the Canadian Forces will have to be closely examined and possibly adjusted in light of the continually changing requirements. During this process, care will be needed to retain and protect the most important asset of the Canadian Forces, its personnel.