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37th PARLIAMENT, 1st SESSION

Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs

EVIDENCE

CONTENTS

Tuesday, May 21, 2002

1540

The Chair (Mr. David Pratt (Nepean—Carleton, Lib.))

Lieutenant-General M.K. Jeffery (Chief of the Land Staff, Department of National Defence)

1545

1550

1555

1600

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1610

The Chair

LGen M.K. Jeffery

The Chair

LGen M.K. Jeffery

The Chair

LGen M.K. Jeffery

The Chair

LGen M.K. Jeffery

1615

1620

1625

1630

1635

1640

1645

The Chair

1650

Mr. Benoit

LGen M.K. Jeffery

Mr. Benoit

LGen M.K. Jeffery

Mr. Leon Benoit

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LGen M.K. Jeffery

The Chair

Mr. Price

1700

LGen M.K. Jeffery

Mr. Price

1705

LGen M.K. Jeffery

The Chair

Mr. Peter Stoffer (Sackville—Musquodoboit Valley—Eastern Shore, NDP)

LGen M.K. Jeffery

1710

The Chair

Mrs. Elsie Wayne (Saint John, PC)

LGen M.K. Jeffery

The Chair

Mrs. Elsie Wayne

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LGen M.K. Jeffery

Mrs. Elsie Wayne

LGen M.K. Jeffery

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The Chair

LGen M.K. Jeffery

The Chair

Mrs. Gallant

LGen M.K. Jeffery

Mrs. Cheryl Gallant

LGen M.K. Jeffery

Mrs. Cheryl Gallant

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LGen M.K. Jeffery

Mrs. Cheryl Gallant

LGen M.K. Jeffery

Mrs. Cheryl Gallant

LGen M.K. Jeffery

1730

The Chair

Mr. Bob Wood (Nipissing, Lib.)

LGen M.K. Jeffery

Mr. Bob Wood

LGen M.K. Jeffery

The Chair

CANADA

Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs

NUMBER 057

1st SESSION

37th PARLIAMENT

EVIDENCE

Tuesday, May 21, 2002

[Recorded by Electronic Apparatus]

¹ (1540)

[English]

The Chair (Mr. David Pratt (Nepean—Carleton, Lib.)): We'll call this meeting to order. I'm sorry about the tardiness of getting going.

Thank you very much, General Jeffery, for being here. This is something we've been waiting for for a while and we're quite anxious to hear about it, so we'll let you get on with it.

Lieutenant-General M.K. Jeffery (Chief of the Land Staff, Department of National Defence): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

As I have appeared in front of the committee several times before, I think you all know I feel very strongly about a number of the issues the army is facing. Every time I've been here, I've tried to provide you with a sense of the direction I am intending to take the army in.

One understands, I believe, that moving an institution as large and as complex as an army in this era is not easy, and the senior leadership of the army has spent a good number of years trying to bring a more coherent strategic focus to the direction of this institution. That has most recently been published in this, Advancing with Purpose. The Army Strategy. It is, of course, only a core document, if you will, of a body of work that will see us move forward over the next decade to, I believe, the kind of army this nation really needs. What I'd like to do today is provide the committee with an overview of not only the strategy, but most importantly, some of the implicit objectives and thrusts within that strategy, provide you with a sense of what that will mean for the army over the next decade, and then give you the opportunity to ask me questions, or indeed to comment on that.

I will take some considerable amount of time, as I discussed with you earlier, Mr. Chair. It is a complex issue, so I don't apologize for that. If we're going to do this subject properly, I'm afraid I do have to spend a certain amount of time, but having said that, I will try to move as quickly as possible. I provided paper copies of slides in French and English. I will speak in English and use the English slides, and I'll try to keep you abreast of where I am as I move forward.

As it says in the second slide, the intent really here is to provide you with, as we call it in the vernacular of the institution, commander's intent, where I see the army going, and hopefully, to achieve a level of unity of thought, ensuring that you, ladies and gentlemen, have a clear understanding of where we're going.

If you turn to the next page, I'll follow that basic outline. I'll talk very briefly to the situation, because you've heard me speak on it before, spend some time on the army's strategy, and then, most importantly, get into the army of tomorrow concept and the interim army model, which are really the essence of where we're trying to go.

With the army's situation, page 3, you know the domestic footprint of the country. I think perhaps the most important message there is where it talks about the size of the army. I emphasize that this army is not large. It is a quality organization, but as the old saying goes, quantity has a quality all its own, and I wouldn't want that to be lost on people. As you know, the army is extremely busy. We have a number of operations going on around the world. The most significant of those are currently the major contribution in Bosnia and the significant contribution in Afghanistan, which takes a good percentage of the army's field force.

If you go to the next page, you'll see the magnitude of the tempo we are facing, and have faced for over a decade, and that very much tells a story. It is one of the major impacts that have made it difficult for the leadership of the army really to chart a course for the future. But I want to leave this very brief situation report with a clear sense that from my vantage point, this army, your army, has been extremely successful. It's because of those people right there, the young men and women in uniform, that we continue to be successful. The challenge for me and the leadership is to ensure that this continues to be the case.

If you go to the next slide, the focus of my comments is really on the need for and the direction of the fundamental change that must come. Perhaps most important of all, and I want to spend just a few minutes on it, is the changing nature of the global environment. What is it we as a nation, and specifically we as an army, face on the world stage? That slide talks to the changing dynamic, and I've addressed some of these issues with the committee before.

¹ (1545)

Uncertainty is the key for the future. I was with a group of European army commanders, all of my colleagues from western and even eastern Europe, including the chief of staff of the U.S. army, at a conference in Europe a couple of months ago, and Dr. Elliot Cohen from John Hopkins University spoke to us about a number of issues. One thing he said really struck home: “You gentlemen are leading militaries entering the century of surprises”. He suggested to us that the end of the Cold War and the fall of the Berlin wall was the first major strategic surprise. The World Trade Center disaster was the second strategic surprise. He said, the challenge for you and leaders in all institutions of this century is that you are going to face more of them and they will be larger and more frequent. If there's one sense I have of the coming century, it is what Dr. Cohen articulated, a century of surprises. That means armies must be able to respond to that uncertainty, and that's a key element of the dynamic.

The second thing he said--a view shared increasingly by academics and observers, professional military and others in the security environment--is that the world is changing. From a security point of view, it's changing perhaps fundamentally. Increasingly, we are of the view that we may very well see the end of a long wave of history where the dominant form of conflict, which has been interstate warfare, the nation states against each other, gives way to a new form perhaps more similar to that we saw in the Middle Ages. We in uniform have to be prepared for conflict between not just nation states, but religions, criminal gangs, roving warlords, and perhaps even economic interests, an environment totally foreign to what we have known in the past. No one could predict that, but those are the general senses we get, and as we look at moving the army forward, it is that kind of environment that's at the forefront of our minds, the uncertainty we will face for the future.

But it's not that alone that drives the need for change. Indeed, as you'll see from the next slide, I have clear direction within the department, as part of existing government policy, to reform this institution and move it forward, but also we face some significant challenges. I've spoken to the committee about them before, so I will not spend any amount of time on this, but we do face sustainability challenges. While the strategy is not a solution to or a panacea for the sustainability issue, changing does allow us to at least deal with it in some measure. But perhaps equally important is the reality that in order to enhance and maintain the capability we require for the future, the institution must change. Capability is not just the number of soldiers I have or the number of weapon systems, it is the ability of the force to perform a specific task or mission. For that, given the changing nature of the world and the changing technology, we have to change the way in which we're structured.

Finally, any organization needs to know where it's going. There's an old saying: if you don't know where you're going, any road will get you there. But of course, it's very difficult to lead in a difficult time of transition if you don't have a clear and articulated vision of where you're trying to go. As one of the key elements of this, as I try to lead the army forward, is a focus. I'm looking for unity of thought, purpose, and action, because, as we see in military operations with a clear mission and good leadership, you can do a lot with an organization like ours. The same is true with reforming and modernizing an army. You need that clear sense of focus and vision, and that's what we intend to provide.

So against that backdrop, against those sorts of challenges, this strategy is meant to respond and provide a holistic and balanced approach to preparing the army for the future. But I want to make clear that given some of the challenges we have faced, we need to ensure that no matter where we go, this strategy and this institution are founded on core values. The army has faced some very difficult times in the last decade, and we, professionally and ethically, want to make sure we never make those sorts of mistakes again. So values--and we are a values-based organization--have to be a key foundation principle of this strategy for where we're going.

¹ (1550)

The second key element is the frame of the strategy, and we adopt a very common tool in strategic planning in the three horizon model. If you would think not about one army, but in conceptual terms, about three armies, what I'm trying to do is manage the army of today and show that it can train for, be prepared for, and undertake the missions the government assigns, while at the same time we're designing and building that army of tomorrow, the next major army, about ten years out. Also, given the uncertainty of the future and the way in which the world changes quickly, the senior leadership of the army has to be focused intellectually over the strategic horizon on a different world, a different strategic environment, conceiving that future army. Those activities, managing today, designing and building tomorrow, while we're conceiving the future, have to go on at the same time. So inherent in that strategy is that framework.

The following two slides talk to the army vision. A clear statement of where we're trying to go is written in those words in the strategy. I will not spend a lot of time on it, you can read that for yourself, but a lot of the issues embedded in it, particularly the ones that are in bold there, I will draw out as I speak. So I, in fact, will describe that vision in some detail. I have to tell you, Mr. Chairman, I am not by nature one who is enamoured of fancy vision statements, but we felt we really did need to ensure that the description, if you will, of where we're trying to go in as clear and coherent manner as we can was present in the strategy.

If you'll go to the next couple of slides, you'll see that flowing from that are four strategic objectives. I should mention that they are aligned with the department strategy, although the words may be slightly different. I want to spend just a few minutes on them, and then really devote the remainder of my remarks to the last two.

Connecting with Canadians is far more than communication, it's a reflection of the reality that the army has been the fabric of this nation for a very long time. That includes not only our regular force, but of course, and significantly, our reserves. Men and women in uniform are part of every community of this nation. As the army moves forward, as the army does what the nation demands of it, we can never be separated from that community, from being part of that fabric. Why is that a significant objective? Because, from my perspective, we have forgotten some of the difficulties we've had in the past, and this is forgetting our roots. That objective is there to ensure that we never again forget where our roots are.

The second strategic objective, and a very difficult one, is to shape army culture. It's an interesting word, a word that means many things. It talks about the very nature of the society from which we come, ensuring that we are a part of that society and that we never distance ourselves socially and culturally, but it talks even more about the very nature of how an army runs.

¹ (1555)

At the end of the First World War all the elements for conflict we would see in western Europe in the Second World War were already in existence. The world saw the tank, the airplane, massive fire support in the form of artillery and mobile communications. All of that was in existence in 1919, but it wasn't really until the late 1930s, when the Germans put it together in a new form of warfare called “lightning war”, the Blitzkrieg we saw in France in 1940, that a new form was born. The interesting and most telling aspect is that many European armies, including our own, following that experience, went back to what they knew. They went back to the kind of military they saw prior to and during the early stages of World War I, where horses were dominant. It was the principal form of transportation, it was the principal form many parts of our military of that era carried. What I'd say is that the horse culture reasserted itself, and it was that horse culture that was an impediment to those professional armies recognizing the new form warfare would take and to the ability to move their institutions forward.

The reason I have taken pains to tell you that story is my concern that as we look at militaries in this age, particularly western militaries that have grown up during the Cold War, where warfare takes the dominant form of tanks and mechanized operations, we are in serious danger of allowing that culture to be the dominant force, when in fact it may very well be that warfare is going to come in many new forms. We should never assume that just because that is the form it has taken, it will be that way tomorrow. Indeed, it may very well be that the kinds of activities your army has been engaged in over the last decade, different kinds of operations, without a dominant form of mechanized and armour-type operations, will be the kind of warfare we see for the future.

I believe I've used the example before with you, but General Krulak of the U.S. Marine Corps talks about the three block war, combat operations, peace and stability operations, and humanitarian operations all conducted at the same time, all within a three-block radius. That is a different kind of environment. As I try to move the army forward, I need to make sure that at the very least, we open minds to the possibility, maybe even the probability, that the form of war even the professional soldiers have experienced will not be the form for the future. Therefore, we must change that culture if we're going to move the army forward.

The third strategic objective is to deliver combat-capable and sustainable force structure. I'm not going to dwell on that, because a lot of what I'm going to say will focus on that. Managed readiness I will mention a little bit later on, so I won't focus on it, but those four objectives are the major elements of where we're trying to go.

If you go to the next line, at the top of page 10, I really do want to make sure I sounded cautionary. The strategy is meant to be a journey, not an end-state. There is a tendency, certainly within the military institution, and I suspect in much of society, when someone talks about where are we going and new forms we want, to see in excruciating detail all the bits and pieces of what the army is going to look like in 10 years time, right down to the individual soldier level. Given the nature of change and the speed with which it's going to happen, I don't think that is practical, and indeed, even though I could do it, to try to do so would be counterproductive and would result in trying, on a regular basis, to change that culture and that dynamic. This is a rolling strategy, it is the path we are going to follow, and this strategy must and will be responsive to the changing world, while still providing that focus of where we need to go. The detail will come in the weeks, months, and years ahead. It isn't all present today. The focus for my remarks really is on that army of tomorrow.

If you go to the next page, you'll see a transformation concept to take the army from where it is today to the army of tomorrow, about 10 years hence. I want to spend a few minutes fleshing out that concept and give you a sense of what we see, what I see, as the concept for that army of tomorrow.

The core of your army is the regular force, and the core of that regular force is three regular brigades, not large, but with potential and real capability, given what we face. It has traditionally had depth. It's been focused on one kind of operation, as I've already implied, the kind we saw on the central front, a uniform level of readiness befitting the kind of conflict we saw there, reserves formed largely, because of our history, to be a carbon copy of the regular force, albeit at lower states of readiness, ready to respond in time of great need, but not necessarily well structured to respond on a regular basis, centred on open terrain, that is to say, for that European kind of operation, with a standard formation in unit structure, very much focused on manoeuvre and firepower of the kind we have seen over the last 40 or 50 years.

º (1600)

As we move forward, we have an evolving concept in three parts. First is a strategic layer very much in line with the department's Strategy 2020. It very much speaks to an army that is of much more strategic value to Canada and to the government, indeed, structured to provide strategic value. That means a force that's rapidly deployable, modernized to meet the needs of the current era, interoperable with a wide variety of nations, and sustainable. That interoperability dimension is significant, and I'll come back to it. It's a balanced structure to accomplish a broad range of potential missions, not just one form of warfare, but the kind of requirements we've seen over the last 10 years, and even more, to be able to better respond to that global environment I spoke of earlier. We must have what we refer to as a capability-based planning approach. That really talks to the reality that the force needs to be adaptable to whatever the world throws at us quickly. We have to be able to structure the force to adapt. Finally, we must be able to fit together in a complementary fashion with our allies, whoever they may be. The Canadian Forces design for NATO and the central European front knew exactly where we were going to use them and how we were going to use them. We knew exactly who we were going to work with. So interoperability of military force was relatively easy. In the last 10 years we've worked with nations that even a few years before had been our opponents. That's the future. Whatever the future holds, we need to be able to work with any nation on relatively short notice--that needs to be a dominant aspect--while still maintaining the ability to command nationally the forces that are in combat.

Flowing from that strategic concept is an operational tactical one. That spectrum of conflict speaks to the changing nature of the world. I only want to make the point that all those kinds of operations may be clear in the theoretical construct of peace or war, but the reality is that we need to be able to engage in all of them, if necessary, at the same time. It's that very difficult and almost convoluted and chaotic environment that we have to be prepared to face.

I'll spend the next few minutes talking about some of the drivers that force us to structure and how the army needs to structure to deal with that chaotic environment. The next slide talks about the evolving battle space. You'll see represented on that slide four planes. The top left-hand corner talks to the physical plane. We are a physical force. We have troops, we have weapon systems, we manoeuvre and fire those weapon systems around the battlefield. At the end of the day, two opposing armies are physical forces coming together.

We've always known there are other forces at play. Increasingly, those other forces are having a greater role. The clash between two militaries has always been a moral conflict, but in the modern era that moral dimension will be increasingly important.

Playing a greater role are the elements on the electromagnetic and, increasingly, the cyber plane, which in the past have played a very small, if any, role in land warfare. The challenge for us is not just a conceptual one, but a very important resource one. When an army has most, if not all, of its resources, manpower, and weapon systems focused in that physical plane, it has very few resources to apply to the other planes, which are becoming critical to our success.

º (1605)

That leads me into the whole issue of information and the information age. The next slide is an example. There's an old saying that with statistics you can do anything--figures lie and liars figure--but this does give you the kind of trend we're seeing in military operations. You'll see there the data rate in words per minute, giving you an indication of information flow and showing you in the 150 years or so from the U.S. Civil War forward in major conflicts the data flow we have available, and against that, how many soldiers it takes to cover a particular area on the ground. You may say it's a reach to join those two issues together, but we believe there's very significant cause and effect here. What it really says is that as you know more, you are able to use the force much more effectively, much more efficiently. And with the growth in communications and available information for military commanders, they were able to disperse their forces more and more, to the extent that you see relatively small forces in Afghanistan still covering a very large area. That trend, we believe, will increase.

There are other dynamics of that more information-rich environment. The next couple of slides give you a sense of it. The one on expanding band width gives you a sense of the amount of information available to a military force from top to bottom. You'll see just from the change in the shape of that information flow that within the next decade we have the potential, because of technology, to have more information available in the mind of, or at least available to, the individual private soldier than commanders have today. We believe that kind of power will change fundamentally the way in which you use an organized military force. We aren't clear on all the implications, but we do know that will change the very nature of it.

Some of the trends are already clear, and the next slide talks to one of them. Land forces have historically had to fight for information. The term reconnaissance, knowing and finding out, is a key part of what military forces on the ground have always done. We've actually had to fight for information. Indeed, historically, a large number of the casualties are spent in those early days of conflict fighting for information. As the power of technology allows us to know more, we can manoeuvre already knowing, and don't have to fight for that information. So it forces, potentially, a significant change on the very structure of the force you have.

The next couple of slides talk to another impact of that environment. You're seeing some of it on your TV at night, the ability to deliver new munitions with great precision. It's not just the technological accuracy of weapon systems, it's the power of information, that information-rich environment, that allows us to take those weapon systems and use them much more effectively, and as you'll see on the bottom slide on page 15, to move from a low-information environment, where firepower has to be massed to make up for that lack of information, to an increasingly information-rich environment, where you can use precision fires. Again, we believe that will have a fundamental impact on the kinds of weapon systems we need to have and the structure. I'll draw a parallel and come back to that point a little bit later in my presentation.

º (1610)

The Chair: General, I think it's a very telling slide, putting that in historical perspective. Can you explain for the members of the committee what CEP stands for?

LGen M.K. Jeffery: The term is circular error probable, which means, in simple terms, that the majority of the rounds being dropped or fired will fall into a circle of the size that is being identified. So you can see, because of accuracy, with a 3,300 foot circular error probable, you're covering a very large area to hit a target, whereas, as you get through to 400 foot CEP, the accuracy of the weapon system is a lot smaller, so the majority of those rounds will fall into an area that size; when you get to the Gulf War in 1991, you're within a 10 foot area.

The Chair: Not to dwell too long on this, it also has clear implications for civilian casualties as well.

LGen M.K. Jeffery: I know it's a term people don't like, but the technical term is collateral damage. If you're going to try to target an area, what are the things you're going to hit, what other people, what other installations, were they military capability, or indeed infrastructure capabilities? That's a clear dynamic of that.

The Chair: Thank you.

LGen M.K. Jeffery: And to make the point, Mr. Chairman, I would suggest to you that in this day and age, if all you had were B-17s, you probably couldn't use them, for that sort of reason. That's another dynamic as well. The political utility of weapon systems with that degree of inaccuracy is very limited. That's a piece of this as well.

The Chair: Thank you.

LGen M.K. Jeffery: That and many similar changes in technology drive us to a new type of operational and tactical concept. As we see the army for tomorrow, we're talking about an army that needs to have increased agility.

I talked about a strategic army. It has to be able to move and respond quickly, but respond in that information environment. Command-centric and knowledge-based mean ensuring we have an organization that can leverage the power information provides us with and respond quickly, integrate the information, and improve our firepower through increased precision and responsiveness. It also means looking at non-lethal means, which relates to the question I just responded to, to ensure that things like unacceptable damage in a variety of areas are minimized.

We also need to recognize that in this environment force protection takes on an increasingly important role, and while in other environments, particularly the Cold War, the central European front, the recognition that we were going to take a large number of casualties was a given, in this environment increasingly it's not. We have to increase our ability to protect the force. Of course, all of that requires sustainability. If we're going to move a force strategically to respond with these new kinds of capabilities, that force has to have the ability to be sustained.

The final part of that conceptual package is a force generation concept. This, Mr. Chairman, is really one of the significant changes we intend to implement. At the top of page 17 you will see that the current force generation concept is focused very much on that European war I spoke of earlier. The army is designed, as indeed many armies in the western world are still designed, for what we refer to as an open terrain extended regime. That means large forces are going to manoeuvre in an open environment, as you saw in the Gulf War, or as we planned to do in central Europe, engaging targets or enemy at long range. Technology now allows us to do that in a coalition environment, working with people we have worked with for a long time. Because we know that's the environment, we have optimized the army and its structure for it. Thus you see, and those symbols imply, mechanized infantry battalions and mechanized brigade groups, which are the dominant form land combat units take for this kind of world. Our expectation has always been that this provides us with the best response to that kind of conflict, and if something else of a different nature is thrown at us, as is implied by those question marks, then the force can adapt. But by focusing on that kind of regime, which is the most demanding, we are best prepared to respond.

The concept is a valid one and has been sound. As we emerged from the Cold War and looked at some of the new types of operations, there was consideration of adapting to a different form, but the sense was that we didn't know enough, so we needed to take some risk and continue with that form. We've now seen 10 or more years of that change, and increasingly, our sense is that this structure does not provide us with the ideal concept for force generation. As we have adapted, we've had to take that army apart every time we wanted to use it, and it creates significant turmoil within the army with regard to how you do the job. A part of the drain and the load the soldiers have been carrying is due to the fact that we've actually restructured the army on the fly every time we've used it.

That concept for tomorrow looks more like the bottom slide, which talks about optimizing the army for complex terrain. Increasingly, this world is urbanized. Our assessment is that the kinds of operations we will undertake will be increasingly in urban environments, that the ranges we have to engage in are much closer, and that we need to be able to optimize the information environment, information operations, and manoeuvre approach I spoke of earlier, and as I've said already, to be interoperable with any kind of force. If we can do that, if we can optimize that force, we still have the potential to adapt to that top right-hand box, the open terrain, the extended regime concept, if indeed we are required to do that or any other operations;. That will give us much more flexibility, because we are designing that army to meet those specific needs.

º (1615)

The next couple of slides give you a sense of what that concept is at the generation level. It takes us from being an army optimized for symmetric warfare, open terrain, contiguous battle space, that central European front, based on units of about 700, that was the building block in large standardized multipurpose formations, and moves us to an army optimized for asymmetric warfare, which is really what we increasingly face in a complex terrain environment and a non-contiguous battle space where there's no clear front line. We are going to build the army on a 100-person block, the sub-unit, as we call it, the company, the squadron, and ensure that the unit or the organization is much more scalable, that we are able to deal with much more flexible formations, as befits the uncertainty of the new era. It will have a breadth of multipurpose capability to do more, not necessarily in more depth, but overall, it will be able to respond to the uncertainty of the world.

That leads us into the concept for fourth generation, as I said, optimized for complex terrain, while remaining adaptable for other missions. All of this leads us to the concept of modularity, where we can actually design the army in such a way that we can plug it together in different forms relatively quickly to give us more responsiveness, given the uncertainty of the world. At the same time, we need to rationalize functional capabilities, because today we have every organization built with all it needs for its operations in its own structure. We have heterogeneous organizations, many different kinds of capability within one unit. This gives us the ability to move toward more homogeneous organizations, which gives us greater efficiency and effectiveness.

At the same time, we need to improve the training. I have spoken to the committee before, Mr. Chairman, about the importance of collective training and why it's such a high priority. This is part of that strategy as well, to ensure that we manage readiness and improve collective expertise. Finally, the committee knows only too well the importance of better aligning the reserve and the regular component to gain the maximum benefit from both parts of our army capability.

To go back now to that transformation concept, you'll see that the army of tomorrow will still consist of three brigades, similar in design, but very different from today. Without walking you back through the points underneath that box, I think you get a sense, at least in some form, of the concept we're trying to lead toward. The work over the years and months ahead is to get us to that army of tomorrow.

Part of the thrust here and part of why I'm trying to push this strategy out is that I need to engage particularly the military itself, the professional soldiers of this country, in an intellectual and professional debate that sees the maturation of the concepts I'm talking about. This is not easy. We're trying to change culture, as I've implied already. I'm trying to take the Cold War warriors and move them into the 21st century. A large part of this is, indeed, to get the army to reform itself. It's also important that government and the nation understand what we're trying to undertake, because it is going to take time, and at the very least, I need understanding of why that change has to come about.

One of the big challenges, though, given how far out that is, is that we need to get some of the changes going quickly. I see the need in this transformation concept to impose an interim model to focus some of our work, and the next slide, at the bottom of page 19, talks to that. I need to change, but there's a limited flexibility in the short term. There's a tempo issue and there's a fatigue issue within the army. I cannot get to that one army of tomorrow in one step. As I've implied already, we lack maturity in some of the concepts, and that work needs to go on.

º (1620)

There is some level of policy uncertainty. It has been stated that there will be a policy review. Clearly, there are decisions in structural matters that are not mine or the government's to make. I believe the government will not be prepared to make major changes in the short term until that policy issue is clarified, but I believe it is unreasonable to hold that up. That is why I asked the minister for and got agreement on moving forward with this strategy prior to the defence policy review, understanding that it will not impede that review.

Of course, as I have said to you before, I have limited resource flexibility. That reality forces me to create some flexibility within to start this transformation. Where does that leave me with the interim model? The interim model is intended to start the change. I'll talk you through that structure, an interim structure as a mid-point change target for both sustainability and modernization initiatives. I am accepting some risk by reducing capability readiness in some areas. Indeed, if you look at the slide at the bottom of the page, you will have some sense of that right away.

Across the bottom of the slide at the bottom of page 20 you will see a graph illustrating field force strengths within the army--I emphasize field force, the fighting force of the army--over the last eight or ten years. You'll see the five main categories: command, which really talks to command and control; sense, which is surveillance and reconnaissance-type assets; act, which really is your primary infantry, armor, and artillery, major manoeuvre and firepower elements of the army; shield, force protection pieces of air defence, engineers and others; and sustain, our combat service support and medical staff. Those are the major functional elements I'm talking to.

While it's a relatively small change, if you look at the interim model 2007 part, under command and sense, you will see that in both cases it's larger. What I'm doing is increasing the number of personnel and, in parallel to that, the number of systems and resources assigned to those functions. I have to increase command and sense capability to achieve the kind of information-rich, command-centric, knowledge-based organization of which I have spoken already in conceptual terms. You can't achieve that without building the new capability. It has to come from somewhere. If you look at the act and shield lines, you will see they have gone down. In simple terms, I'm taking resources out of other areas. So I'm reducing the amount of indirect fire, I'm reducing the amount of engineering, as a first step to give me flexibility to build that capability. What that translates into is the elimination of mortar platoons and pioneer platoons in our infantry battalions and having those functions done by our artillery and engineers respectively. It's a risk, but it's a risk I believe is imperative in the context of where we're trying to go. That gives you some sense, then, of one of the risks.

At the same time, I have to significantly improve the management of readiness and capability. I talked to the committee before about the army training and operations framework to better manage, from a more central point of view, the more limited assets and the tempo of this army to make best use of what we have.

Finally, we aim to improve significantly and make greater use of our reserve force. We already have, in the last couple of rotations in Bosnia, made significant increases in the number of reserves, and most notably the number of foreign reserves, we are putting forward, and it is our intent, starting this fall, to put a full reserve infantry company into Bosnia. My hope is that we will do more, both domestically and internationally, to take advantage of the capability the reserves can provide.

º (1625)

I'd like to give you a sense, in organizational terms, of what I believe we can achieve and how we start to apply the concepts I've been espousing, the structural vision on page 22. I want to talk first and foremost about our manoeuvre units and give you a sense of our 12 manoeuvre unit base in this army. You'll see allied in graphic terms across the page our 12 manoeuvre units. In the centre are six infantry battalions, based on our new LAV III, which will be the core of manoeuvre capability within the army. Those units are being modernized as we speak, and by the end of this year all of them will have been re-equipped, at least in respect of the infantry capability with the new LAV III. There will be more systems to deliver in the following two years, but the fundamental change will have occurred by the end of this calendar year for those units.

What we need to do, however, is change the remainder of our manoeuvre units. First, the three light infantry battalions implied on the right are today only dismounted infantry battalions. They are significantly deficient in a number of areas. While maintaining the kind of high individual skills you've seen illustrated and practised in Afghanistan, we need to ensure that these units have more mobility and more firepower, to make them more flexible, so they can do the different kinds of work we see in the new era. In short, I need to be able to ensure that they can still do the Afghanistans, but also the Bosnias of the world without having to do major retraining. We believe we can do that with the right organization and the right equipment.

You will see on the right-hand side the annotation of special operating forces, and it's an annotation to indicate we need to also look at making those organizations more capable in the special operating force field. You've already seen both our own and allied special operating forces and the strength they bring for the kinds of operations we face. We believe we're going to need more of that capability in the future, and the intent is to explore that, though it's not a purely army problem or decision.

At the other end of the spectrum, our three armoured units need to be restructured to better reflect the realities of what we face. It is my intent to concentrate our Leopard tanks, which have been upgraded to a C2 version and have a significant capability, into one unit in western Canada, and to take some risks by lowering its readiness levels. It will still be able to do the job, and we will use that capability in much of the training we have, but we won't necessarily maintain it at a high level of readiness, bearing in mind that we're not expecting to need to use that sort of capability on short notice, but rather to concentrate the other two armoured units in reconnaissance and surveillance, really using them as the foundation for the kinds of information operations we're trying to move towards.

That, Mr. Chairman, gives you a foundation of those 12 manoeuvre units. If I can very quickly just walk you through the remainder of the structure, the command and three brigade headquarters we currently have will be maintained, but that command support capability is meant to be a significant improvement, as I've already implied. So we're building that command support capability, and it's starting now. We've been undertaking significant experimentation and trials, and those trials will go on in 2 Brigade in Petawawa this year and next year. Indeed, we intend to build that command support capability in Petawawa, starting this year and going into next year with some of the new command and control equipment that's coming into service. Having learned that, we'll then move that capability to the other brigades.

º (1630)

The mechanized infantry battalions, as we already had planned, will maintain their capability with the LAV III, but we see a significant increase in the capability of our three light battalions, as I've already said.

Our armour will be organized with a tank regiment, and that will be moved to a lower level of readiness, while our two reconnaissance regiments will be moved to a higher level of capability and will be significantly improved.

In parallel with that, we intend to concentrate our medium guns in one unit in western Canada and lower its readiness, while focusing the other two indirect fire units on light and mortars. Those units will undertake the responsibility of providing critical mortar support to infantry units. Our air defence regiment will be largely unchanged in the short term.

Our engineering units will remain unchanged, but they will take on the additional responsibility of generating pioneers.

Our three helicopter squadrons, which,, as you well know, are actually part of the air force, but a key element of land force capability, will not see any significant structural changes, but the Chief of the Air Staff, in conjunction with the army, is planning to significantly improve the surveillance capability of those systems and is looking at plans to improve their capability in firepower.

Combat service support and other elements within the field force will see no significant change.

With the next page, the interim army model, additional army troops will see no change in the short term. However, the institutional army, our basic infrastructure here in Canada, will see significant improvements on the training side, the growth of our land force doctrine and training system to have better training capacity, and the establishment of a Canadian manoeuvre training centre in Wainwright in western Canada by 2004. That will provide us with a fundamental improvement in capability, to ensure that we are able to achieve the level of collective training and the flexibility to train in the environment I refer to.

The last point I want to make about that interim model and the army of tomorrow is on land force reserve restructuring. Having appeared in front of the committee before, I know its interest in the reserves, and I would not want anybody to get a sense that this is only a regular force initiative, despite the main focus. This slide at the top of page 24, while a little busy, gives you a sense, I believe, of the kind of approach I'm taking.

On the left-hand side of that chart we're talking about past failures, mistrust, and misunderstanding, which were impediments to moving reserve restructuring forward. When I came into this job, at the request of the minister and the Chief of Defence Staff, I developed a strategic plan in conjunction with the reserve community with a first phase that was a significant effort to improve trust and health within the reserve community as a precursor to achieving a fundamental restructuring in phase two. That remains the structure for not only LFRR, but increasingly for the army strategy, because, in my mind, as you look on the right-hand side of that chart and see army transformation, the interim army model is very much a parallel to phase one of LFRR. It is meant to be that mid-point objective to ensure that we align both the regular and reserve component, and as we both move forward to that army of tomorrow, it's not two objectives, but one for both the regular and reserve. You'll see, I believe, Mr. Chairman, the broad brush strokes of the alignment to ensure that the regulars and reserves are actually working to the same end.

What I'd like to do is now try to summarize. I have a number of slides, but I'm going to skim over them, because I've covered all the points and you can read them at your leisure. The issues on that CLS decision slide I've very much covered already, but those are things that already have been decided, are being implemented.

The next slide talks to general intent, and while those elements have not been decided, they are largely things within my purview that I see happening relatively quickly.

The next slides are meant to give you a sense of where I want to go, and to varying degrees, I may be able to make those decisions on my own, or I may require government approval. But really it is the sense of where I'm trying to go and how quickly we're going to get there I want to leave you with.

º (1635)

Within command you can see, with the formations and units, that we have different levels of headquarters and command. I'm trying to move forward to develop a command and control concept that is much more responsive and provides the shared situational awareness that is so imperative in the new information age, to move first to 12 identical manoeuvre unit headquarters, giving us an inherent flexibility as an army. Then, based on the experience that gets us there, the aim is to spread that command and control capability across all the headquarters. My expectation is an army that is leaner in command and control respects and flatter in structure, because that's where you get the sort of adaptability we need.

The next slide talks to the sense function. You'll see some of the structure we already have in place that provides the reconnaissance and surveillance that is so essential today. While we move this forward and develop the intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition, and reconnaissance concept, ISTAR, as we call it, in the interim I need to improve and rationalize our reconnaissance and surveillance capability. I've got a lot of very sophisticated equipment out there--you've heard me talk about Coyote--that is not being optimized. I believe we can get more capability without any significant increase in resources just by restructuring. So the first thing we have to do is get more capability out of that. In the next few years we need to do that. While we've moved forward, as part of the experiments that will go on over the next couple of years, we must develop an integrated surveillance capability with some of the new ISTAR systems we'll be bringing into service, to realize that concept of the army of tomorrow in the information-rich environment.

The same approach applies within the manoeuvre environment. You'll see the structure of armour and infantry regiments I spoke of, the interim improvement in light infantry battalions, possibly special operating capability, integrating ISTAR with manoeuvre, and achieving 12 manoeuvre units with greater organizational flexibility, while at the same time developing a new manoeuvre concept for the army of tomorrow. That is where the intellectual debate within the army really must focus.

The next slide talks to firepower. You can see from that slide on firepower structure the number of weapons systems, both direct and indirect, we have in service. I need to get more value out of those systems, and in the medium term my concept is to increase the effectiveness of that firepower by introducing as quickly as possible more precision and improving the range rate of fire and terminal effects of those systems, also increasing the utility and efficiency through the better use of technology, in short, by reducing mass. I see the ability to have fewer weapons systems with smaller manpower or personnel requirements, but those systems being more capable and moving us forward as quickly as we can to rationalize the systems we already have in line with that concept, while developing long-term firepower concepts that integrate direct and indirect fire, because we believe that about ten years out new technologies will actually allow you to do that.

The next couple of slides talk to shield and sustain. Shielding, being force protection, of which I spoke earlier, is an area where our conceptual work still is immature, and I and my staff have a lot of work to do on this. We need to make sure we use the resources we have to better protect the force in a fully integrated fashion. Sustaining, in my view, is an Achilles heel, the weakest part of our organization. We need to improve it in the short to medium term as much as we can, while seeing the need to look at a whole new fundamental sustainment concept.

º (1640)

To go to page 29, as I've illustrated already, this army transformation and the release of the strategy is meant as much as anything to engage people in a debate. A professional and intellectual debate is essential to changing the way in which this army works, changing the army culture, and moving us forward to the army of tomorrow. But while we engage in that debate, it doesn't mean we're standing still. That's why the interim army model is there, and we're already moving forward to implement that model. I cannot give you specifics as to timelines, but by the end of the summer I will have a plan in place that will see specific targets for the next five years, exactly what's got to be approved and achieved, and when.

Clearly, none of this is meant to or will prejudice what has to happen in the context of a defence policy review, and whatever is decided there, this work will have to be reassessed, but I believe very strongly we must move forward if we're going to take advantage of the opportunity given here and institute a cycle of strategic adjustments as we learn more and resource and policy issues change over the years ahead.

You would not be surprised to know that even within the army there is significant debate on this issue. Indeed, there is concern about what I and the army leadership are doing. This slide at the bottom of page 29 gives you a sense of the concerns and the risks, express concerns about the loss of tank capability and expertise, the risk we are incurring with indirect fire, the uncertainty we continue to have with our defence, the loss of flexibility in critical mass within the infantry through the reduction of pioneers and mortars, the reduction in engineer capacity, and not surprisingly, the regimental balance, the impact on our regimental system.

I really need to say two things. I share the concern that there is risk there, but I don't believe, Mr. Chairman, that any of them, or indeed the sum total, provides a reason not to proceed, because, in my view, the risks of not moving forward are even greater. Yet I cannot miss the opportunity to express my sympathy and understanding for the issues in the regimental system. I come from that, indeed, I am strongly of the view that the regimental system continues to be one of the strengths of our army. It is not my intent at all in anything I've said to dismantle the regimental system, but to make the regimental system adapt to the needs of the army, the needs of the 21st century. If a regimental system cannot support that, then I would suggest to you it is no longer relevant. I think it can and must be relevant to the future, and we need to get there.

I do have concerns, however, and the last couple of slides focus on them. You've heard virtually all these things from me before. One is sustainability. The army continues to carry a load, and I am concerned about how much longer it can do so. The strain is not just a physical one, it's a moral one, and there are concerns about self-worth and trust of the leadership. Those are potential impediments to moving this forward.

I also am concerned about army demographics, not that they are unique to the army. Every institution, business, government, and military, faces a demographic challenge in the decade ahead, and that will have an impact on the strategy. As I implied in my commentary on the army regimental system, I have faced some internal unity issues, and army discipline will be a significant issue as I try to implement the strategy.

The last thing I will leave you with, ladies and gentlemen, as an important counterbalance, given the emphasis I have placed on technology throughout my presentation, is a clear sense that I know and strongly believe technology does not replace leadership, technology does not replace a soldier. Indeed, the best weapon on the battlefield continues to be and always will be the well-equipped and well-led soldier. That's important for me, the army leadership, and everybody to understand, because if we get through this and just have our technology, but do not have that, we will have failed and the army will not be capable. So whatever happens, that is the greatest risk of all.

º (1645)

Mr. Chairman, that really concludes my presentation. This has taken a significant amount of time and I appreciate your patience, but I felt it was important to give you as much of an overview as I could. I've probably gone into some areas that were a little deep, but I'm prepared to go as deep or as far as you wish to go for as much time as you wish to spend.

The Chair: Thank you very much, General. I must say, we are constrained somewhat by the time here, but on behalf of all of the members of the committee, I would like to thank you for that extremely comprehensive presentation. You've certainly raised a lot of issues, and I expect there are going to be lots of questions. I think you've demonstrated in your presentation that the army is not standing still. If anything, it seems you've adapted to the phrase that the best defence is a good offence, and in this case the offence is new ideas. There are certainly lots of new ideas here, and I, for one, am looking forward to some of the questions around the table.

I'll start as usual with Mr. Benoit, for seven minutes.

º (1650)

Mr. Leon Benoit (Lakeland, Canadian Alliance): Thank you, Mr. Chair, and thank you, General, and all of you, for being here today. I do appreciate that very much. I'm afraid you've left me with a lot more questions than you have answers in your presentation. I've written down so many questions during your presentation that I really don't know where to start. So I'll start with a very general question.

You've talked about the process of change, and at the same time as you're going through that process, which has to take more resources in people and money, I would suggest, it seems to me that you'll be expected to maintain operations at current levels overseas, and possibly increased levels here in Canada. So how do you anticipate being able to go through this period of change without increased resources?

LGen M.K. Jeffery: That is the $64,000 question. It is clearly the biggest challenge of the lot.

First, any institution has its limits. So irrespective of what we do as an army, we can only do so much. One can debate how much that is, and we have had those discussions around this table before. I've tried to give you my perspective on that, and it is not my intent to go back over that ground. There's a limit to what the institution can do, but it must modernize, it must move forward. That has to be part of the bill, because if this army is to remain relevant to the needs of the nation and to the needs of what this government and this country expect us to do on the international stage, we've got to modernize. That bill has to be paid.

The approach is, as you've seen, to do those things that have to be done to get us going and moving forward. Part of the difficulty of moving forward to date has been a desire to solve the resource imbalance issue you're well aware of, and we have not been able to do that. In my view, we now have to move forward irrespective of that. We can move forward, indeed, we can go a long way, but can we get to that army of tomorrow with the resources we have right now? The answer is, no.

Mr. Leon Benoit: Okay, General. I guess that's answered part of the question.

We already know we're running budget deficits every year. There's been a lot of talk about overstretching of personnel. I think it's generally agreed that things have simply been pushed too far, and yet in this environment, you're saying you have to modernize. I'm certainly not arguing with you, I agree with you, but isn't that going to require a substantial increase in resources?

LGen M.K. Jeffery: Clearly, it's going to cost money. I'm not prepared to sit here and put a price tag on it, but I would put it in a couple of areas.

First, barring a policy review that changes the size of the army, I have to work within an overall people envelope. I've illustrated already what the adjustment is, or some of that adjustment, to be able to achieve that. We believe we can get to the interim army model in that timeframe. Whether we can get further than that, it's too early to tell, but the operating assumption is that there will be no significant increase in personnel.

As for capital equipment, some we've already bought. We've just introduced a good deal of equipment, not only our weapon platforms, but a very modern communications system and a new command and control system that is only now starting to come into service. Part of what we're trying to do is get the best value we can for the money that's already been spent. Clearly, part of this moving forward is the cost of new capital equipment for ISTAR, and that's part of the capital plan that is being developed.

So yes, there's money there, and in global terms, there are elements of it in the program past, current, and future. Whether or not it will be adequate, at this stage I can't tell you. My sense is that it's inadequate to get us to the army of tomorrow.

Mr. Leon Benoit: So we're in a situation where already there's overstretching, running budget deficits. Won't this change you're talking about require substantial new training, which will mean that there'll be people taken away from operations? People are needed for operations, unless we're going to have a substantial reduction in overseas operations.

Second, something you haven't mentioned today, what about potential needs here at home? I like the fact that you're focusing on our combat capability and overseas capabilities, but the army has been used and will be used again to deal with natural disasters, to deal with civil unrest here at home, to deal with other potential terrorist attacks; it will be used with the G-8 meetings in June. All these things are added to the load. How can you possibly make these changes with all these other demands put on you as well?

º (1655)

LGen M.K. Jeffery: The issues at home always will take precidence, in the same way the Canadian Forces have responded in an ice storm, in several floods, and other domestic issues. Whether we're talking about those or more defence-related responses at home, it doesn't matter what's going on, if we have to respond, we will.

On the issue of managing the change, I'd like to refer you to the very last page of the deck, the very last slide, which I did not use, but purposely put in here, because it's the kind of issue I thought might come up. You'll recall that I previously talked to the committee about managed readiness, and indeed, it is one of the strategic objectives. That very simple model of a triangle is the essence of where we're trying to move the army. There are three sides to that model to show you that the army has to be dealing with reconstituting forces that have come back from operations, while at the same time it has units on high readiness or undergoing operations. The intent is to move us to a model where at any one time you have about a third of the army in reconstitution, a third undergoing training, and a third at high readiness or on operations. We think it's about a three-year cycle, each side being about a year. In a sustainable model you can have about a third of the army at high readiness or committed on operations at any one time. More than that becomes inherently unstable and unsustainable. It doesn't mean you can't do it for a short period, but that's the limit.

As to managing change within that, the time the army is being reconstituted is the time we're implementing major change, new equipment, major restructuring, new doctrine. During the training part we then build that capability and develop it in operational respects, then we apply it in the operational phase. So this is more than just readiness. As we look at change, we see the reality. Think of this as a perpetual wheel that the army is always changing. In a sense, what we have to accept is that having any more than a third of the army committed in any one period starts to make the army unsustainable. If you take that cost now, you pay the price later in a less capable army.

The Chair: Thank you, General.

Mr. Price.

Mr. David Price (Compton—Stanstead, Lib.): Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Thank you very much, General, for your presentation. It's extremely important. I read this a little while ago now, and to be very honest, I didn't get anything out of it compared to what I got out of your presentation today. We tend to read an awful lot of material, so we probably go through it a little quickly, but I'm wondering who's going to see this. It really doesn't put forward the picture I get out of what you presented to us today. What you presented today is really very much a change-around with regard to where we're going with the Canadian Forces. There's nothing wrong with that, and I can see where you're coming from. You've only got so much to work with and you're looking to the future and trying to see how you are going to get out of this box and solve the problems you have ahead of you.

So that's one question, how you're going to present that to the people we have out there today who will have to deal with this. I'm sure it's been a small group working on this project. If you could answer that, I'll then go into another.

» (1700)

LGen M.K. Jeffery: I understand the perspective and share the concern. Communication has been a great concern to me from the outset. Part of the issue here is also the completeness of the whole package.

There is often a tendency to want all the answers right away, and therein lies part of the issue here. The interest was in getting something out that is clear and coherent while a lot of the other parts of it are being matured. Frankly, change is like moving a rock that has been sitting on the ground for a long time and is starting to sink into the ground. The toughest part is to get it turned over. Having got it turned over, you can start it moving. This is a part of trying to get the rock turned over.

But it is supported by an active communications plan that is ongoing. What I should have said earlier and didn't is that on the army web page much of what I've said is already present, and we will be coming forward with additional documents in various forms. So if you go to the army web page, www.army.dnd.ca, you will see written material on the army of tomorrow concept, the interim army model, and some of the other supporting pieces. We will continue to do that with more and more documents. Mr. Chair, I can ensure that you get those documents in paper form immediately following this session.

I'm also travelling across the country, taking every opportunity to speak to, most importantly, from my point of view, the army. Given my comments on culture, I need to make sure that's communicated within the army, to get people moving forward, but I take every opportunity to speak to many others in Canadian society, government leaders, both federal and provincial, business people, Canadians in the street, because it is extremely important.

Mr. David Price: That brings me to the next point. If we're going to look at a plan like this, it is really a major change-around. It involves two things. First, we're supposed to be increasing the army, and we're actually reducing it here. Even though you're saying it's stable, we have to look at it as reducing, and that means fewer jobs. Yes, we're going higher-tech in one way, but that's always a much harder sell.

We'll come back to the reserves, because there we do have something we could increase quite easily. You said the regimental system, for instance, would be able to remain intact. I have a hard time understanding how that could happen with this type of plan, particularly in the reserves. Maybe you could talk a little about that. We have been talking a long time about total force structure, which did include the reserves. You still talk a little about the reserves, but I find very little, when maybe that's an area we could go into to actually increase our people on the ground. Reducing is what we're doing, and that's the opposite of what we really want to do. We want to get more exposure out there. We're never going to be able to sell it to the public if we're disappearing.

» (1705)

LGen M.K. Jeffery: One thing I would like to address is the whole issue of capability, and it is difficult for all of us to get our minds around. I go back to the issue of culture. How does one measure what capability is? I would suggest to you that we've all measured capability in physical terms, the number of soldiers' boots on the ground, the number of weapon systems, the number of units, etc. As we look at that dynamic in the future, we're of the view that this is not a reasonable measure, as the very concept of what capability is changes. I go back to the change of data flow rate versus soldiers over area. You look at the change of warfare and the change of different kinds of capabilities over that timeframe, how big armies were, how they were structured, and how they were laid on the ground. They were all, in a sense, capable in their own era, but that capability changed over time and that's part of this dynamic.

So that's part of what we have to recognize. Change means just that. It's going to look different--improvement of capability, but with a different structure.

The Chair: Thank you, General.

Mr. Stoffer.

Mr. Peter Stoffer (Sackville—Musquodoboit Valley—Eastern Shore, NDP): Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.

I was able to participate in a parliamentary training exercise with the Delta Group in Wainwright, Alberta, this past week. The crew I was with were fabulous. If those young people are the future of our army and our reserve force, our country will be in great hands. That was one of the best weeks I've ever had as a member of Parliament. They worked my butt off, without a word of a lie, but they're highly trained and very professional. They asked me a couple of questions I thought I had time to ask you.

On page 26 of your booklet you put something down that I find disturbing--I don't mean to say you personally--under “Resource Flexibility”: “The scarcity of resources allocated by the Department will be enduring.” To me, that sends a very clear message. If I were a young man thinking of the military as a career, I'd look at that and go, geez, if the government's not going to put in the resources that are necessary for the future, what career, what future would I have? Does the army actually believe the government will not put in adequate resources, that the scarcity of resources will definitely continue?

Second, a lot of the troops I spent the time with and many others I speak to across the country are asking for more bullets to practise with. Visions and plans are all great, but if they don't have the actual bullets to practise with on the training field, they're sitting in their barracks or doing other things. What they want is to have the capability to be armed combatants, to be confident in their ability through their training. When they're told they can only have 15 or 20 rounds and no more, because of costs, we go back to that enduring resource allocation they feel they're being cheated by.

The last question I have for you, sir, concerns alternative service delivery on the supply chain. When I was in Edmonton, I got to speak to a lot of people. They're very concerned, the regular forces, the civilian workers, and the reservists, about our government handing over the supply chain to a foreign national company like Tibbett of England. I'd like your comments on that.

LGen M.K. Jeffery: I guess the first point, and perhaps the most difficult, is the reality of enduring resource scarcity. It seems to me, as a Canadian looking around the world, that resource scarcity is a reality we're all grappling with. As I look from an army point of view at the challenges we've faced over the past decade, I see no indication that the resource scarcity we've lived with is likely to change. So what this is saying--recognizing that this is as much a communication to my own people--is, don't assume that somebody's going to solve your problem by bringing a whole pile of cash to the game. We have to move this organization recognizing that resources will continue to be scarce. I think that's just a pragmatic approach to running a large organization and moving it forward. Mr Chairman, if you and the government can change that, that will make my day and then some, but I am not tying my strategy to the necessity or the essentiality of resources. In the context of what I responded to the committee earlier, I can't get all the way there without a change.

The issue of no bullets is an important one, and there are two dimensions. I do have sustainability problems. There are limits to how much ammunition I can use, and that's a reality. I would dearly love to be able to give the soldiers a lot more, but I don't have them. Part of that, however, is also a cultural change, because part of what we're trying to do as we introduce more and more simulation is not only have a way of training better, but in fact, change the way we train. I mentioned the Canadian manoeuvre training centre, and by 2004-2005, in the same area where the member mentioned he was training, we will have a laser-based force-on-force training system that is world-class and more realistic in many respects than real ammunition. That's where we're going, and part of it will be a saving in resources, because we'll be able to use less ammunition. It won't be cheap, but that's part of the offset.

I would suggest that the issue of alternative service delivery in the supply chain is also part of the change we're talking about. Can we continue to run this organization without accepting risks? I think the answer is, no. We have recognized that and have adapted to tightening our belts, and this is part of it. It is not just my place to assess the risk, there are many other parts of the institution, including government, that have to look at that risk.

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The Chair: Thank you, General. Thank you, Mr. Stoffer.

Mrs. Wayne.

Mrs. Elsie Wayne (Saint John, PC): General Jeffery, it is my understanding that while we've been here, the department has confirmed that we will pull our ground forces out of Afghanistan by the end of July or August. They've just announced it. Is our mission there finished, is the job done, or is it that we do not have the personnel available to maintain our contribution to that mission? As you know, they've been stating that we'll be replaced by troops from Romania. This only gives us a couple of months, and if we don't have the troops to replace them, what is to happen now?

LGen M.K. Jeffery: You will appreciate that I came here to talk about the army strategy and the army vision. I'm afraid I am at somewhat of a disadvantage in being told an announcement has been made, as I have not been privy to the announcement. I am well aware of where we are in planning and decision-making, and I feel I'm not really in a position to respond.

I will say two things, however. From my vantage point--and it is only mine as a soldier--looking at what the Canadian Forces are doing there, clearly, the job is not done. I don't believe that, nor do I believe it is the Chief of Defence Staff's view. Ultimately, it's the government that must decide that, but I made it very clear that resources are a major challenge, and as I replied and illustrated in one of my charts, you can only get so much out of an organization. That is also a reality.

The Chair: General, I appreciate the fact that you were here to talk about restructuring, but we don't often get a person of your rank before the committee, so I think I can forgive committee members for asking you whatever question they want to put to you at this particular time.

Mrs. Elsie Wayne: When it comes to what you have presented to us today, in order for the forces to be sustainable, there are certain changes that have to take place. I'm sure the majority of us have been pushing extremely hard for the military to become a top priority in Canada and to get the funds there for you, General Jeffery, and others, so you can do what you feel is best for our military, for our men and women in uniform.

I just arrived here at noon today. I was reading the papers on the plane, and there were some stories about your senior officers recommending the elimination of our parachute companies. I understand that no decision has been made on that report as yet, but can you advise us as to when decisions might be made with regard to that?

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LGen M.K. Jeffery: As you would appreciate, we deal with not only resource issues, but policy issues. There are many studies being done all the time, and one of those studies, done a couple of years ago, looked at whether or not we should retain a parachute capability in Canada, bearing in mind that there are many layers to that, the highest of which is the maintenance of a combat parachute capability, the ability to deliver from the air an infantry unit. While that capability is dispersed across the army, the essence of it is there. That study has been done. No decisions have been made as a result of it. It is my expectation that it will be one of the issues addressed within the context of the policy review: what capability do we maintain if we are dealing with resource limitations, and where are those limitations?

But I should also tell you my own view, because I do have a view. I would like a combat parachute capability. I can't imagine that any army commander would say he wouldn't like that. But is that capability essential? Is it higher on the list than a number of other things? That becomes much more of a challenge. As I look down the list, there are a lot of things I need, and I believe this army needs, before that.

That doesn't mean one doesn't have the ability to deliver people by parachute, it doesn't mean necessarily that we wouldn't have the ability to train people to do parachuting, but it may very well mean that we don't have the ability to deliver a whole unit that way. We cannot be all things to all people. As part of that modernization, in order to build and buy new capability, I'm taking away from old capability, and this is a similar kind of dynamic. Those decisions haven't been made, but that may be an outcome.

Mrs. Elsie Wayne: But if we had enough money put back into the budget for Defence, perhaps you wouldn't have to do that, sir. Perhaps you would be able to do both. That is a concern a lot of us have.

I have to say, I've had a number of serving and retired army personnel in touch with me about the fact that we have not had a training exercise at the full brigade level for close to a decade. I don't know if it is accurate or not, but this is what they've been telling me. If it's true, are there any plans for brigade level training in the near future, and what are the effects of our not training on that scale?

LGen M.K. Jeffery: I have addressed this issue several times with the committee over the last year. I continue to stress that the information is accurate. The last time we had a major full brigade exercise was 1992. We have had some smaller training events within the context of a brigade since then, but nothing of the type we require. It is clearly one of my major objectives, one of the department's objectives, to improve that training. It is inherent in the strategy and where we're trying to go.

One of the limits is resources, but also tempo. When the army is so busy, you actually lose the ability to even find the time to do training. That is why managing readiness is so important. It establishes a disciplined approach within the army to training, which should allow us to train all units to the requisite level on a regular basis, and train also a good part of the army to that level, with brigade or formation training as well.

» (1720)

The Chair: To pick up on Mrs. Wayne's question, General, a lot of us were surprised to see the night shots of American troops rolling out of planes over Afghanistan in parachutes. With your knowledge of that particular operation, was that necessitated by the terrain or the operational conditions? Did it cause anybody in the department to think that maybe the parachute capability is something we need, a core capability we shouldn't lose? Can you shed any light on that for us?

LGen M.K. Jeffery: I am not aware of the specifics in the operational theatre that led to people dropping by parachute. As I said in my earlier remarks, though, I am not suggesting for a minute that we don't need to maintain the ability to parachute. Indeed, as one looks at the kinds of special operating forces around the world, it is a method of choice in a number of areas or environments.

The ability to do that is not necessarily synonymous with the ability to deliver a full unit or more, with all its necessary and ancillary support weapon systems, by air. We're going back to the airborne regiment with all the engineers, artillery, and other support that get delivered with it. That's a different matter entirely. It's expensive to do all that and do it well.

The Chair: Thank you.

Ms. Gallant.

Mrs. Cheryl Gallant (Renfrew—Nipissing—Pembroke, Canadian Alliance): General, do you see the army of tomorrow being comprised of two or three brigades?

LGen M.K. Jeffery: As I have shown in the transition concept, the army of tomorrow is a three brigade model. If the government decided, given policy and resource issues, that it could be different or that the demands were different, we could look at different structures. Right now it is a three brigade model.

Mrs. Cheryl Gallant: Thank you.

If, as you mentioned, the armoured units are all combined to form one core out west, will the personnel levels at the bases from which you are taking these armoured units be maintained?

LGen M.K. Jeffery: I appreciate that question. Actually, I had an earlier question that I did not get a chance to respond to. I want to make sure that I correct any wrong perception here. The intent is that this restructuring should involve no significant change to personnel levels. As I have tried to illustrate, it's moving people from one part of the army to the other as we change capabilities. That's one of those limits I work under with the interim army model, because that's not a decision I can make, it's a governmental decision. If I saw the need to reduce the size of the army, the decision would have to be made by government.

In that context, the decision to move, actually to reorient, the three existing armoured regiments is more one of equipment movement than major personnel movement. The three brigades, with their current allocation of armoured units, would remain the same, but what those units do would change. Though we have developed the detailed implementation plans, it is too early for me to tell you what the actual numbers moving back and forth might be, but they should be relatively low.

Mrs. Cheryl Gallant: Then going back to the paratroopers, what numbers are we looking at? We have vast expanses of land in Canada that are not approachable by land vehicle, nor do they have landing strips. Should there be a requirement for defence or disaster relief, how would you plan to insert the troops? What number of paratroopers do you expect or hope to retain?

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LGen M.K. Jeffery: I can't answer that question, because, as I said, no decisions have been made, and my plan has not been put together with any intent to reduce or eliminate the current level of parachute capability. As I've said earlier, that's a decision that will be made as a result of some later review, it's not part of the current plan.

Mrs. Cheryl Gallant: I'm just trying to understand what might be behind the thinking in the report that was referred to earlier. For example, the U.S. 82nd Airborne Division has something like 15,000 troops. Now Canada is considering paring ours down to perhaps the company level, not even a regiment. So if we were to need a significant number of people in the Arctic region, what is the plan? Do we just hope the Americans will take care of that capability if we can't do it ourselves?

LGen M.K. Jeffery: First let me be clear as to what current combat parachute capability we have. One company in each of our three light infantry battalions is a parachute company. That means everybody has that training and the basic capability. We do not have a full unit combat parachute capability, nor do we have current training and equipping for other types of capability, engineers, artillery, etc.

The question of what capability we have or would retain is an interesting one. It implies that we see a threat in the Arctic regions of the country and that we need to retain a parachute capability to respond to it. There was debate on this issue even at the height of the Cold War. I would have thought there is not a great danger of a potential opponent parachuting into northern Canada or delivering in such a way that we have to parachute a unit into that region.

With requirements for dealing with other defence and sovereignty issues, domestic requirements, search and rescue, a major air disaster, other capabilities, parachute is one way of getting there, depending on what risk and cost we're prepared to accept. There are other ways of getting there as well, and notwithstanding the statement by the questioner, the reality is that we still have a large number of airstrips around this country that are quite accessible. Even delivering people by parachute still requires sustaining, and sustaining by parachute is problematic.

So what I'm saying is that it's a very expensive capability for, arguably, in a domestic context, a limited requirement, arguably too for any international requirement. Again, when you can only have so much, where do you draw the line?

Mrs. Cheryl Gallant: The army has had first-hand experience with the supply chain through the private sector, so how is it overcoming the serious concerns in the field, for example, the inability to provide safe running water, time delays in obtaining equipment and communications parts in a timely fashion, and the problem that as soon as someone is trained from the private sector abroad, they decide it's time for them to go home, and they need to have someone new doing the job, so there's no real continuity?

LGen M.K. Jeffery: The whole approach to alternative service delivery, looking at new ways of delivering capability, recognizing the resource challenge we face, being more flexible, is something we've grappled with since the early to mid-nineties. We've tried a number of things, as have many of our allies, and we're still learning the lessons from that. There will be growing pains in any change, and this is no different. I think, in many respects, the jury is still out on how effective it will be. The question raises a number of issues the intent of which I'm not clear on. Companies doing this type of work are going to have issues of attrition. They're going to lose people they have to replace, and we will be very concerned. That's part of the demand we place on them.

With the other specific issues, I would need to have more detail before I could really respond.

» (1730)

The Chair: Thank you, Mrs. Gallant.

General Jeffery, we're over our time right now, but Mr. Wood has been waiting patiently to ask a question, and perhaps we could allow him to do so.

Mr. Bob Wood (Nipissing, Lib.): That's the first time anybody's actually given me credit for being patient.

How is continuity going to affect you? I guess what I'm saying is, how long are you in the armed forces for? This is a ten-year program. You're starting this off, and I would presume it's your job to keep it moving. Are there people who share your views, and is continuity going to be a problem in your mind?

LGen M.K. Jeffery: I believe, in this day and age, continuity will always be a problem. I talked about three challenges in the strategy, and the biggest one is unity, unity of thought, purpose, and action. It talks about the organization trying to take itself forward. It has been, in my view, fundamental to why it's taken me this long to get to where we are. Building this is not only a matter of what I believe, but what the collective army leadership believe they need to do to move forward is a key part of it. As you rightly said, this is a ten-year strategy, indeed, it is a two generation strategy. Part of what I and the army leadership today are trying to develop is not just a blueprint, but a cultural change and ownership on the part of the senior army leadership of the kind of change that needs to go on. I believe it's there.

How long I am around is not really the question. As you imply in your question, I'm not going to be here for ten years, for a whole pile of reasons, not the least of which is that I'm already in my 38th year of service, but the passing of the torch from me to my successor, from him to his successor, and so on is an important dynamic here. That's why buy-in, unity of thought, purpose, and action is so important as we take the army forward. I believe the essence of it is there, or I wouldn't have started this. The challenge, though, is to build it into a force.

Mr. Bob Wood: I didn't see anything mentioned about quality of life in this report. You're not adding or subtracting, you're rearranging, as I guess somebody said, the deck chairs. What about deployment as a problem now? Is it going to be the same thing in your world, in your new army? If so, where does quality of life fit into this? It's a very important piece of it.

LGen M.K. Jeffery: It's a vital piece. You can appreciate that we had many debates and discussions about what went into the strategy and what did not. My view is that the people dimension of this is omnipresent. If you look specifically at the whole managing readiness piece and the commentary on sustainability, it gets to the essence of it. The essence of an army is soldiers, not technology. A well-trained, well-equipped, well-led army is what we're talking about. The soldier is the key, and if the soldier does not have a life, we don't have an army. It's not just about quality of life, it's about having a life that has enough balance that he or she wants to stay.

The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Wood.

General Jeffery, Colonel Peters, Lieutenant-Colonel Kampman, I'd like to thank all of you for being here today. I think it's been a very good and productive discussion, and I think we had some good questions asked as well. So thank you very much for being here.

The meeting is adjourned.