NDVA Committee Meeting

37th PARLIAMENT, 1st SESSION

Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs

EVIDENCE

CONTENTS

Wednesday, March 20, 2002

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1550

The Chair (Mr. David Pratt (Nepean--Carleton, Lib.))

Rear-Admiral (Retired) Russell D. Moore (National President, Naval Officers' Association of Canada)

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1555

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1600

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1605

The Chair

Mr. Anders

RAdm Russell Moore

Mr. Rob Anders

RAdm Russell Moore

Mr. Rob Anders

RAdm Russell Moore

Mr. Rob Anders

RAdm Russell Moore

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1610

Mr. Rob Anders

RAdm Russell Moore

Mr. Rob Anders

RAdm Russell Moore

Mr. Rob Anders

RAdm Russell Moore

Mr. Rob Anders

The Chair

Mr. Claude Bachand (Saint-Jean, BQ)

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1615

RAdm Russell Moore

Mr. Claude Bachand

The Chair

Mr. Bachand (Saint-Jean)

RAdm Russell Moore

Mr. Claude Bachand

RAdm Russell Moore

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1620

Mr. Bachand (Saint-Jean)

RAdm Russell Moore

The Chair

Mr. Bob Wood (Nipissing, Lib.)

RAdm Russell Moore

Mr. Bob Wood

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1625

RAdm Russell Moore

Mr. Bob Wood

RAdm Russell Moore

Mr. Bob Wood

RAdm Russell Moore

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1630

Mr. Bob Wood

RAdm Russell Moore

Mr. Bob Wood

The Chair

Mrs. Elsie Wayne (Saint John, PC/DR)

RAdm Russell Moore

Mrs. Elsie Wayne

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1635

RAdm Russell Moore

Mrs. Elsie Wayne

RAdm Russell Moore

Mrs. Elsie Wayne

RAdm Russell Moore

Mrs. Wayne

RAdm Russell Moore

Mrs. Wayne

The Chair

Mr. Rob Anders

RAdm Russell Moore

Mr. Rob Anders

RAdm Russell Moore

Mr. Rob Anders

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1640

RAdm Russell Moore

Mr. Rob Anders

RAdm Russell Moore

Mr. Rob Anders

RAdm Russell Moore

The Chair

Mr. Bachand (Saint-Jean)

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1645

RAdm Russell Moore

The Chair

Mr. John O'Reilly (Haliburton--Victoria--Brock, Lib.)

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1650

RAdm Russell Moore

Mr. John O'Reilly

RAdm Russell Moore

Mr. John O'Reilly

RAdm Russell Moore

The Chair

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1655

Mrs. Elsie Wayne

RAdm Russell Moore

Mrs. Elsie Wayne

The Chair

RAdm Russell Moore

Mrs. Wayne

The Chair

Mr. Bob Wood

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1700

An hon. member

Mr. Wood

RAdm Russell Moore

Mr. Bob Wood

RAdm Russell Moore

Mr. Bob Wood

RAdm Russell Moore

Mr. Bob Wood

RAdm Russell Moore

Mr. Bob Wood

»

1705

RAdm Russell Moore

The Chair

Mr. Rob Anders

RAdm Russell Moore

Mr. Rob Anders

RAdm Russell Moore

»

1710

Mr. Rob Anders

RAdm Russell Moore

Mr. Anders

RAdm Russell Moore

Mr. Rob Anders

RAdm Russell Moore

The Chair

Mr. John O'Reilly

RAdm Russell Moore

»

1715

Mr. John O'Reilly

RAdm Russell Moore

Mr. John O'Reilly

RAdm Russell Moore

Mr. John O'Reilly

RAdm Russell Moore

The Chair

Mr. John O'Reilly

The Chair

Mr. Claude Bachand

RAdm Russell Moore

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1720

Mr. Claude Bachand

RAdm Russell Moore

»

1725

The Chair

RAdm Russell Moore

The Chair

RAdm Russell Moore

The Chair

RAdm Russell Moore

»

1730

The Chair

RAdm Russell Moore

The Chair

RAdm Russell Moore

The Chair

RAdm Russell Moore

The Chair

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CANADA

Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs

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NUMBER 049

l

1st SESSION

l

37th PARLIAMENT

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EVIDENCE

Wednesday, March 20, 2002

[Recorded by Electronic Apparatus]

¹  (1550)  

[English]

    The Chair (Mr. David Pratt (Nepean--Carleton, Lib.)): On behalf of all the members of the committee, I would like to extend a welcome to Rear-Admiral Russell Moore.

    Admiral, I apologize for the length of time it has taken to get this meeting under way. There always seem to be lots of things to occupy members' time around here, but I hope you understand. We do want to get to your comments as quickly as possible, though, so I'll give you the floor. After your statement, there will be a period in which we'll be asking you some questions.

    Rear-Admiral (Retired) Russell D. Moore (National President, Naval Officers' Association of Canada): Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. By way of introduction, as was mentioned, my name is Russell Moore. I am a retired rear-admiral. I retired in 1998, and my last position was Commander, Maritime Forces Pacific.

    Since my retirement, I have been active in the Naval Officers' Association of Canada, which I am representing today. We have some 2,000 members in 15 branches across the country, and our object is to provide encouragement and education to Canadians about the importance of their maritime naval forces. Over the years, we have spawned a maritime affairs division that produces a quality journal on maritime defence security issues. We have created the Maritime Awards Society of Canada, which produces scholarships in partnership with four universities across the country in order to promote post-graduate level studies in the broad range of maritime studies. We were founding members of the Canadian Navy Memorial Trust, HMCS Sackville.

    Our membership encompasses and spans eight decades of experience, from the 1930s right through to the current decade. We believe that has given us a unique view of the ebb and flow of Canadian naval capabilities and operational readiness.

    I have a prepared statement, which I think you have. I don't intend to read it, but I would like to touch on several themes of that statement. My first theme is the importance of investment now, because the dividends don't come for quite a few years afterwards.

    Some of our members joined in the years leading up to World War II, and the story of the buildup to a navy of some 400 ships and 100,000 men and women is well known. Then, as could be expected at the time, there was a rapid decline, only to see another buildup for the Korean conflict.

    The Cold War saw a modernization of our navy. Of course, the main focus of that modernization and buildup during the late 1950s and early 1960s was our responsibilities in NATO. Even though our commitment to this Cold War capability went on for another 25 years, the will to maintain a capable navy and a ready navy waned and we saw decline. By the time I had risen to the position of captain of a destroyer, the fleet was in terrible shape. It was difficult to get a task group of ships to sea, much less to have it do much when we achieved that. Machinery and equipment breakdowns often curtailed planned operations. The functioning equipment was obsolete and of little help to our NATO partners, and was certainly no match for that of our most likely adversary.

    The bright spot in those years was 1977, when a cabinet decision was made to once again to modernize the navy with the approval of a Canadian patrol frigate. Six years later, in 1983, the contract for the CPF was finally awarded. Other programs were also approved at the same time, such as the modernization of the four Tribal-class destroyers , which were built in the early 1970s, and the identification of the need to replace the aging Oberon-class submarines. A revitalized naval reserve was to be equipped with the maritime coastal defence vessels, the MCDVs. And the Sea King helicopters, which first saw service in the early 1960s, were finally to be replaced through a contract signed in 1992.

¹  (1555)  

    In 1977, a decision was made, yet when the events of August 1990 rolled around and the Canadian government decided to join like-minded nations in the Persian Gulf War, the new ships still weren't in service. What made that operation possible was the fact that the equipment that had been purchased and was destined for the new frigates was in the builders' warehouses, and there was therefore the opportunity to strap that equipment onto the deployed ships. We were thus able to deploy a task force of some capability to the Persian Gulf. These were indeed the very first dividends of that 1977 cabinet decision, fourteen years later.

    The twelve Canadian patrol frigates were introduced in the early 1990s, and the capable navy that our country has today came into being. They have served our nation well not only in times of crisis, but in other operations around the world.

    In our own waters, the coastal defence vessels also came into service in the mid-1990s, and these fine ships, manned by our revitalized naval reserve, have also been serving well in a number of roles such as the Swissair disaster, search and rescue, illegal immigration operations, etc.

    I believe, however, that the dividend that was so apparently being collected in the 1990s as a result of an earlier decision is now imperiled. The 1990s have been a decade of neglect. The cancellation of the EH-101 program, some rollbacks to the planned fitting of equipment in the MCDVs, and the curtailment of operational capabilities through the budgets of the mid-1990s are all well-known.

    From other testimony to this committee that I have read, the consequences of curtailed budgets in the 1990s has weighed heavily on the young Canadians in uniform who serve our country. At the same time when we acquired ships capable of global operations, our young men and women had their salaries frozen for six years. These were salaries that had already been allowed to deteriorate against earlier agreed-to benchmarks with the public service. Medical services were reduced, and at times there were tragic consequences.

    In high-cost regions such as my own, Maritime Forces Pacific, Treasury Board policies to continue rent increases in the substandard housing that was available were relentlessly followed. Military families qualified for social assistance, and the trouble ahead with recruiting could clearly be seen in demographic trends. I would like to give some credit to the relief that has been provided in more recent years. The work of this committee that investigated the social conditions in the armed forces in the mid-1990s, specifically in 1996, has indeed led to some relief.

º  (1600)  

    Since September 11, our ships and their men and women have again answered the call. HMCS Charlottetown just returned from the Persian Gulf, where it has been deployed for eleven of the last fourteen months. However, operational tempos of this intensity cannot be sustained, and a heavy price will be paid later in increased attrition.

    On October 8 of this past year, the government announced that Canada was deploying 2,000 land, sea, and air force members to join the war effort against terrorism. It was no surprise to me that the bulk of our contributions was maritime forces, given the inherent capability of our task group of ships, with its embarked aircraft, to deploy immediately within ten days. Indeed, one of the ships was deployed within hours of the decision. Not only was a significant maritime capability deployed, but powerful political and diplomatic messages about our determination were conveyed to friend and foe alike.

    The message that I would like to leave in this section of my statement is that the capability that has served Canada so well through the 1990s and the early years of this decade is the result of investments by governments of the late 1970s and the 1980s. Likewise, the lack of investment in the 1990s will make it difficult for Canada's maritime forces to do the work of the country in this decade and decades ahead.

    How much capability is enough? I believe the publication Leadmark: The Navy's Strategy for 2020 provides the vision of where our naval forces need to go. My own study of Leadmark and other documents proposing present and future capabilities leads me to think the full import of what our maritime forces are doing on a day-to-day basis is not coming through, particularly in the area of support to other government departments in our home waters.

    While other government departments rightly have responsibility for most constabulary duties, the navy's capabilities are an essential contribution. A number of these roles, such as port security and control of shipping, are assigned to our naval reserves. A vibrant and fully manned naval reserve is an integral ingredient to the home security matrix.

    I won't go into the details of what I think are the obvious requirements for investment in terms of dollars and cents. A Senate committee, the Auditor General's annual report, and other interested and knowledgeable Canadians have articulated that very well. But I would like to mention a National Post opinion piece submitted by Jack Granatstein, in which he wrote:

I suggest it is long past time for Canadians to act like a sovereign nation, and that means having a substantial military with well-educated, well-trained people, modern high-tech equipment, and the necessary funds to guarantee both. That is very much in the national interest.

    Based on my 36 years of naval experience, I contend that this is indeed what Canadians want. I have never encountered any opinion other than full support for the view that Canada needs a robust, capable navy to protect our maritime interests at home and abroad. I believe Canadians are ready to pay their fair share, and they look to our political leadership to provide a vision of what needs to be done and to assign the necessary portion of our national wealth to fulfill our sovereign responsibilities.

    That concludes my formal statement.

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    The Chair: Thank you very much for your very thoughtful presentation, Admiral Moore.

    Mr. Anders, for seven minutes.

    Mr. Rob Anders (Calgary West, Canadian Alliance): Do you expect that the navy will get the four operational support ships that it needs?

    RAdm Russell Moore: Yes, as I understand it, it is the first priority for the fleet, next to the maritime helicopters. The current AORs, the two that remain in service—a third one was retired just a few years ago—are approaching their fortieth birthday. It is now time to start planning their replacements. What is needed is a replacement for the existing capability, and that's support of the fleet at sea. But a new program would and will offer the opportunity to provide some lift to our army and air forces by incorporating that requirement into the vessels. I'm confident that this will eventually happen.

    Mr. Rob Anders: Given the shortfalls in the equipment budget that were identified by the Auditor General—$4.5 billion over the next five years—and given the costs of the war on terrorism, where do you see the money coming from for the four new ships?

    RAdm Russell Moore: It will have to come from within the government-approved defence spending envelope. I recognize that it is a question of priorities, but I would hope to see that envelope increased and the spending allocated in order of priority. Certainly, in terms of our maritime capabilities, the afloat logistics support ships have, as I understand it, the highest priority.

    Mr. Rob Anders: Since those have the highest priority, I would think the next big purchase would be the replacement of the four Iroquois-class destroyers. Given the present budget, are newly built destroyers likely?

    RAdm Russell Moore: I'm sorry, but I didn't hear the last part of your question.

    Mr. Rob Anders: Basically, you deem operational support ships to be the first priority item on the budget. Our four Iroquois-class destroyers are also aging, though, so is it likely that we're going to see newly built destroyers as replacements?

    RAdm Russell Moore: I believe that, in time, the capability represented by those destroyers needs to be replaced. It would be, in my view, a follow-on program to afloat logistics support ships. Indeed, we are entering a period when upgrading and modernization of the Canadian patrol frigates will be required in the next decade or so.

    So I believe there's a requirement for both programs, but in terms of how that capability is delivered, I think a lot has to be done before that's decided.

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    Mr. Rob Anders: You mentioned that the Charlottetown spent eleven of fourteen months deployed. What impact is this having on married sailors? I'm sure it must lead to increased marital problems for some of them.

    RAdm Russell Moore: When I've visited ships that have been deployed for long periods—and I did so during my command—it has certainly been my experience that morale is always high on board. The men are happy to do their jobs, but this does take a toll on families over time. The decision to maintain a naval career is in part decided on family issues to a great extent. I always found I had more difficulty addressing those family issues for the people left behind—the spouses or significant others and the families—than I did addressing the issues of the sailors who were deployed. Having the support of families is exceedingly important, and as this type of intense operation goes on, it will take its toll through that means.

    Mr. Rob Anders: Continuing on with the family angle, what's the impact, in your view, of having integrated male-female crews when ships spend six months at sea? First, do you believe operational efficiency is reduced? Second, how prevalent are incidents of fraternization between male and female sailors in mixed manning of ships in terms of their contributions to marital problems?

    RAdm Russell Moore: I had the good fortune of being commanding officer of the first major warship to have an integrated ship's company, HMCS Provider. There was no doubt that it added another level of complexity to the captain's responsibilities. It's something each commanding officer of a mixed-gender ship always has to pay a lot of attention to and work very hard at, but I think our history has supported the notion that the decision was a good one. It does not negatively impact on operational readiness. In fact, I found that some of the women in some of the trades and some of the classifications were better able to perform their duties than some of their male counterparts.

    We've been at this since 1987. A lot has been learned, and it's something that each commanding officer has to remain alert to, both for fraternization within the ship's company—and the rules are very strictly adhered to—and in terms of alleviating the concerns of families back home. Long periods away add to that challenge.

    Mr. Rob Anders: What's your best guess as to when a new maritime helicopter will be in service?

    RAdm Russell Moore: I can only go with what I've been seeing in the media, that being hopefully sometime between 2005 and 2010.

    Mr. Rob Anders: And—

    The Chair: Actually, Mr. Anders, your time is running out. I'm sure there will be lots of time for questions, though.

    We'll go to Mr. Bachand at this point.

[Translation]

    Mr. Claude Bachand (Saint-Jean, BQ): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

    First, I want to apologize for being late. I was sitting on another committee but I was anxious to listen to you. I looked at your resume and so, my first question will be to ask you if you've managed to improve your golf handicap.

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[English]

    RAdm Russell Moore: Regrettably, no.

[Translation]

    Mr. Claude Bachand: My second question is more serious.

[English]

    The Chair: Mr. Bachand, can we stay focused on the task at hand here? We only have some concern about that if a hook goes in the water.

[Translation]

    Mr. Claude Bachand: Mr. Moore, I want to know what you think of the submarines. You didn't mention them. We've purchased four submarines. There's one in Halifax that's still in a dry dock. It's HMCS Victoria. Another is operational and the other two are in the UK.

    In your opinion, was it imperative for the Canadian government to purchase four submarines at a time when the National Defence budget was very limited?

[English]

    RAdm Russell Moore: In my view, sir, it was. The submarines represent a huge capability, and if we had gone on waiting for better times of funding, I fear we would have lost that capability forever within our maritime forces. The skills, the crews, the people, would disappear into other jobs or leave the service, and from that point forward in our history, Canada would lose the capability to conduct submarine operations. Those vessels have such potent war-fighting capability and very useful peacetime uses that they represent a major component and capability of our maritime forces. So when the opportunity came along to acquire those submarines at a fire-sale price—and it really was a fire-sale price—and have the opportunity to maintain that capability, I believe Canada made the right decision.

[Translation]

    Mr. Claude Bachand: You talk about maintaining the capability to conduct submarine operations. I may be wrong since I am no expert in this field but its seems to me that this is the first time Canada owns submarines. I would like you to convince me. You say they represent a huge capability. My own view is that a submarine can protect our coastline from foreign ships hostile to Canada. So I'm not convinced that we need submarines. Are we using them to affirm Canada's sovereignty by having submarines patrolling our waters so that their presence will protect Canadian sovereignty? Is this what you mean by increased capability?

[English]

    RAdm Russell Moore: Well, I said it was a question of maintaining a capability Canada has enjoyed for decades. We acquired the Oberon-class submarines in the mid-1960s, and the three of them were Halifax-based. At various times throughout the 1960s and into, I believe, the early 1970s, we maintained a submarine capability on the west coast by borrowing conventional submarines from the United States Navy. We've had that capability continuously since that time.

    In terms of their employment, we had an episode off the east coast in which we were faced with the Spanish trawler incident. I don't know how that might have escalated—I'm glad it didn't—but the presence of a submarine or the fact that we were just able to say a submarine was present—I don't know whether it did or not—could have influence what our potential opponent might have done.

    There have been times when illegal fishing and narcotics operations have been observed by an undetected submarine until the evidence was taken and other surface forces could be brought to bear. I'm aware of a number of operations in which that did occur, because their presence remains undetected yet evidence can be collected.

    So they're useful in the home waters role, and they're useful in crises around the world.

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[Translation]

    Mr. Claude Bachand: I have one minute left. I will ask you a quick question about the Sea Kings. All the senior generals who came before the committee said that it took 30 hours of maintenance for one hour of flight. But they insisted that they were totally safe. Do you share this view? Would you say the Sea Kings are now totally safe?

[English]

    RAdm Russell Moore: For each hour of flight, they require thirty hours of maintenance. When they are flying, I believe the maintenance done on them makes them safe to fly. It's an issue of their capability, and although I'm sure they are doing good work now, their capabilities are limited by old equipment, tired equipment, and obsolete equipment. They're continuing to serve, but their capability is limited by their age. But I do believe they're safe.

    The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Bachand.

    Mr. Wood.

    Mr. Bob Wood (Nipissing, Lib.): Thank you, Mr. Chair.

    Admiral, am I right in interpreting your report here today as being a case something like the phrase “but for the grace of God”? What I'm asking is if Canada's navy is living on borrowed time.

    RAdm Russell Moore: If by “borrowed time” you mean that this lack of investment that we're seeing now in our maritime capabilities is to be continued, yes, it is borrowed time. Unless there is reinvestment, this absolutely tremendous capability that is now benefiting Canadians around the world will eventually deteriorate. In that sense, yes, it is borrowed time.

    In gross terms, we need to be spending 25% to 28% of our defence budget on equipment. That percentage has fallen through the 1990s. If we are going to avoid the same sort of rust-out that I witnessed in my career in the late 1970s and early 1980s, we need that investment.

    Mr. Bob Wood: You're obviously talking about monetary investments, but do those investments include recruits as well? You say on page 4 of your brief that HMCS Huron is

unable to put to sea as a result of personnel shortages.... The consequences of this neglect of the navy's human resources during much of the Nineties will almost certainly have consequences throughout most of this decade.

    Are you satisfied, sir, with the calibre of recruits for Canada's navy, or do you feel that because of all the adverse conditions—some of which you have mentioned today—and the publicity that has gone with them, the navy has had to lower the bar a bit?

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    RAdm Russell Moore: From everything I've heard, I think we have reason to be content with the calibre of the recruits. The problem has been the personnel policies that I outlined. They have resulted in a shortage of skilled people. As I pointed out in my statement, that keeps HMCS Huron, which represents a huge capability, tied up alongside. That's as clear as any evidence that can be given in terms of what happens when you allow your personnel policies, be they pay or other policies, to drive people out. The reduction that has left the navy with its current shortage was a deliberate policy of force reduction that occurred in the period between 1996 and 1998, and the demographic trends show that there's a shortage of the young Canadians needed to fill those jobs.

    I think the young Canadians I have seen in recent years are of a calibre that has not been surpassed at any time in our naval history. And that's not just my own observation. Any visitor to the ships today, from the business community or from the international military community, comes back with the most complimentary comments on the quality of the young people on our ships.

    Mr. Bob Wood: Admiral, just getting back to your report, I want to thank you for what was probably one of the most upfront presentations to this committee in a long time. I'm sure you're not going to hesitate to answer this question. In fact, before you even answer it, I know what the answer is, but it would be nice if we had it on the record. Is the present government doing enough for, one, the navy, and, two, the forces in general?

    RAdm Russell Moore: As I pointed out in my statement, as it turned out with the world events that followed, the collection of a peace dividend in the early 1990s was premature. That peace dividend was collected from a defence budget that already put Canada close to bottom of the heap with respect to that portion of our national wealth that was invested in national security: fifteenth out of sixteen in NATO, with percentages that were less than half or about half the norm of the leading industrial democracies.

    So although peace dividends were collected elsewhere, there was this collection in the early 1990s in Canada. Now that the country's financial crisis has passed, there has been little evidence of a serious interest in returning funding to the level required to maintain capable maritime forces in the future.

    Mr. Bob Wood: In your mind, what is that level? Is it the level that the Senate was recommending, or is it more?

    I think the problem that this committee has is that we're studying the readiness of the Canadian Forces, as you know. Obviously, it's going to entail recommending more money to be put into the Canadian Forces, but I think we all have to try to get our heads around how much more we need to put in. So far, a lot of people have been reluctant to answer that question. You don't to have to jump over here to answer it, but I think Clive Addy has been the only guy who has come out and said that, in his opinion, it should be 1.9% of GDP, but he'd settle for 1.7%.

    So we have to try to get our heads around how much money we're going to need over a period of time. You must have thought about this.

    RAdm Russell Moore: I certainly have.

º  (1630)  

    Mr. Bob Wood: Share your thoughts.

    RAdm Russell Moore: To carry our fair share of the defence burden of the industrialized nations and our NATO partners, etc., we should be targeting about the average of that commitment to defence in terms of percentage of gross national product. I thought it was about 2.1%, but 1.9% is probably about right. But the order of magnitude is certainly in the range of 2%, not 1.1%, which puts us squarely at the bottom of industrial countries that are providing for their security.

    Mr. Bob Wood: Thank you.

    The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Wood, Admiral Moore.

    Mrs. Wayne.

    Mrs. Elsie Wayne (Saint John, PC/DR): Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.

    Rear-Admiral Moore, I want to thank you for being here today. Like my colleague Bob Wood, I really appreciate your document.

    I have to say I had the opportunity to be out west and to go to the naval base there, and I saw how some of our people were living and the quarters in which they were living. When they told me they had to take their children to the food bank, I couldn't believe we had allowed things to deteriorate to that point.

    I also have to say that with the removal of the port police across this nation, there is a great need for us to have the ships of our navy out there in the harbours and on the Pacific and Atlantic oceans. There really and truly is.

    Let's talk about these submarines that we bought. We bought used submarines, and then they wouldn't float. We then spent a lot of money trying to refurbish them, but when we put one out to sea, there was something wrong with the fuel system, as you know. Do you really believe, Admiral, that we should have bought these used submarines? In Great Britain, they withdrew these submarines from service. The British said they were outdated, so they had more modern submarines built.

    So here we are. We seem to still be behind the times, if you like, in terms of giving our navy the tools they need to do the job.

    RAdm Russell Moore: With respect, Mrs. Wayne, an Upholder-class submarine—those are what we acquired—was and is a modern, capable submarine. The reason the Royal Navy decided to dispose of them was that, in the light of their own country's defence cutbacks, they felt it was more efficient for them to go all-nuclear. They maintain a modern, capable submarine fleet, but so something had to go as part of the British cutbacks. That something was these very capable conventional submarines.

    As I understand it, not all of these submarines were brought into service. They were built, I believe they were commissioned, but the were not brought into service. They were new ships that were mothballed. Bringing them out of that condition, bringing them to Canada, and conducting some of the necessary equipment changes.... We already had a heavy investment in the torpedo system. We didn't want to throw that away because it was worth many hundreds of millions of dollars. The fire control systems, the torpedo tubes, etc., had to be changed to accommodate Canadian requirements, and there was a good reason for that.

    Although they're getting a lot of attention, I believe what we're seeing are the normal teething pains associated with the introduction of any new major program. I don't have knowledge of all the detailed difficulties, I just know what I know from what I follow in the media, but it strikes me as being the norm for the introduction of ships under this circumstance, when they were taken out of mothballs and brought here.

    Mrs. Elsie Wayne: As you know, my shipyard in Saint John, New Brunswick, and the MIL Davie shipyard in Lévis, Quebec, built the frigates. We have felt that with the investment that went into the shipyards, we certainly should have an ongoing navy shipbuilding policy. I say that because my shipyard has now been closed down for over two years. At the Canadian Defence Association meeting at the Château Laurier, I was told the Saint John shipyard was designated in the 1970s to be the naval shipyard for Canada. Are you aware of that, Rear-Admiral?

º  (1635)  

    RAdm Russell Moore: I was not aware of that designation, but I was present in Saint John when the frigate program came into contract. I watched the growth of that tremendous national capability to build new ships, and it's an absolutely world-class capability.

    Mrs. Elsie Wayne: That's right.

    RAdm Russell Moore: I am saddened indeed that we were unsuccessful at exporting some of those ships to countries that were interested in them, and to see that we have lost that capability.

    Mrs. Elsie Wayne: Another question that I have, Mr. Chair, is with regard to the Scandinavian countries.

    Our understanding is that Canada is looking at perhaps purchasing ships from the Scandinavian countries rather than building them right here in Canada. This really disturbs me, Rear-Admiral, and I didn't know whether you were aware of that or not.

    RAdm Russell Moore: No, I was not aware that we were considering building both warships and other government ships anywhere but Canada, Mrs. Wayne.

    Mrs. Elsie Wayne: The retired officers who brought their Caught in the Middle report to us said we need to have a $5-billion increase in the budget each year for our armed forces. They said that would stabilize our armed forces. Are you aware of that, sir?

    RAdm Russell Moore: I'm aware of that report, and I believe what we're reaching here is that 1.9% to 2.1% of the gross national product invested in defence.

    Mrs. Elsie Wayne: Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.

    The Chair: Thank you, Mrs. Wayne.

    Mr. Anders, for a five-minute round.

    Mr. Rob Anders: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

    I was in the middle of a question when we had to move to Mr. Bachand. That question was in regard to the best time estimate for the maritime helicopter. You said that, according to the media, it's sometime between 2005 and 2010. As my follow-up to that, are you relieved to see the Cougar out of the competition?

    RAdm Russell Moore: Not particularly, but I don't know enough about the capabilities the Cougar was going to present. I'm aware of the statement of requirements that the forces wanted to have fulfilled, but I am not aware of how that particular helicopter measured up against that statement of requirements.

    Mr. Rob Anders: In the last series of questions I asked with regard to the male-female crews, you mentioned that the situation adds complexity. Can you expand on what exactly you mean by “complexity”?

    RAdm Russell Moore: The main, major complexity was the need to be absolutely formal and clear on the fraternization issues. There were other minor things, like getting people used to working in a mixed-gender environment in confined spaces while going away for long periods of time, but the number one issue was to ensure that fraternization policies were very clearly adhered to. That took some work when we were putting young men and women together for long periods of time, but we had good leadership and clear policies, and I believe the navy has successfully managed the issue over the last fourteen years that our ships have been integrated.

    Mr. Rob Anders: When you say “complexity”, does that involve pregnancies as a result of fraternization on board? Does it involve fights between male crew members?

º  (1640)  

    RAdm Russell Moore: No. In my time as the captain of the first ship to do this, during my senior appointments on the maritime staff, and as Commander, Maritime Forces Pacific, there were no problems beyond the day-to-day problems of the men and women in the fleet.

    Pregnancy did become an issue because it meant losing a member of the ship's company for a long period of time, but that was rectified by a replacement policy. But I'm not aware of, nor did I have to deal with some of the other problems that you mentioned. I'm not saying they didn't occur, but they would be dealt with by a commanding officer. It's all part of good leadership, and I believe we have that on those ships. Things will go wrong, most certainly, but they will be addressed.

    Mr. Rob Anders: You mentioned the serious problem of manning ships in terms of keeping up overseas deployments. Do you have any stories you could share with the committee on the impact that's having on families?

    RAdm Russell Moore: First of all, I think the nature of the impact was not having the spouse at home as part of the family unit, supporting the family in terms of the normal problems of family-raising, but also in terms of economics. If one spouse was away, that made it difficult for the other spouse to go out and earn a second income. At the salary levels that were being provided, that was a significant issue.

    Over time, when the spouse was left at home—and I'm being careful to say “spouse”, because women are leaving their families behind too these days, of course—there was an accumulation of instances when that spouse left at home would just say, “Enough is enough. I need you at home.” Individuals would then have to make a choice between the career they were following and their family.

    Mr. Rob Anders: Parts from other ships, like the windows of the bridge of HMCS Regina, were borrowed in order to get HMCS Ottawa ready for its deployment. Do you feel that's going to become more and more prevalent?

    RAdm Russell Moore: The spares provisioning that came as the new ships were commissioned was a major part of the project, but there were a lot of best guesses at the time. The maintenance crews, both on board the ships and in the fleet maintenance facilities, didn't have the databases built up over time in regard to reliability and mean time between failures and so on. It's an ongoing process to establish that.

    The other part of the equation, of course, is the lead time taken to prepare items. You wouldn't think windows are something you'd be replacing very often. If you do, you might find they're very difficult to acquire in a short period of time. So I think it has been a time-honoured tradition or requirement that you would have to take spares from other ships or operating systems. It was always done with great concern, for the obvious reasons, but I think it's something that has always happened. Naval staffs do their best to avoid it, but at times it becomes inevitable.

    The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Anders.

    Monsieur Bachand.

[Translation]

    Mr. Claude Bachand: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

    I've mentioned this issue to the Chief of the Defence Staff when he appeared before us and I would like your opinion on the matter. There's presently a major recruitment effort going on not only in the army but also in the navy and the air force. However, very little is being said about retention measures. It's fine to recruit a lot of people but if as many go through the back door, we'll still be stuck with the same problem.

    I think you identified some of the reasons. The number of missions is increasing, which makes family life more and more difficult. I think you even mentioned in your statement a frigate that was out at sea for 11 months. It is therefore difficult for families.

    I was wondering if there are other things that could be corrected in the army or the navy so it's possible to retain experienced sailors with 10 or 20 years of service. I also heard about a problem that had nothing to do with the frequency of the missions but is related to the level of education. You're surely aware of all the bonuses paid in the army and the navy. You know what a sailor with 10 or 20 years of service can feel when he sees a new recruit get a $10,000, $20,000 or $25,000 allowance that he never received. You also know how an experienced sailor will react when he sees younger people with a better education come in, catch up with him or even go further. This has a negative impact on morale that will often get sailors to think it's time for them to leave.

    In your view, is retention getting as much attention as recruitment? What would you do to ensure that experienced sailors stay instead of quitting?

º  (1645)  

[English]

    RAdm Russell Moore: From my experience, I firmly believe the impact on families—which I've described in answering earlier questions—is a key reason for departure. As I understand it, the overall attrition right now is not bad. I heard a figure of about 8% per year, and half of that is what is referred to as planned attrition, or people reaching retirement or the end of their engagements. The other 4% is unscheduled attrition. If I recall correctly, though, those figures today are in line with what always went on during the course of my whole career. But there's no doubt about it that the personnel policies have to be very carefully constructed to avoid the sort of problem you mentioned, and that has occurred at other times in our history.

    The other thing that occurs is upswings in the economic cycle that make sailors more attractive to prospective employers, like higher wages and so on. I saw this in my own command. There was a huge difference in what my sailors were being paid when their job was compared to similar jobs out in the community. I was always surprised that we didn't lose more people to industry.

    In more difficult times, such as when the unemployment rate goes up, people tend to stay. Many factors come into that decision. Pay and allowance is certainly one, but I consider family reasons as probably being the single biggest driver. But, yes, these other policies do have an impact, and the personnel staffs have to be alert to the unintended consequences of policy decisions, and you have outlined a couple of them.

    The Chair: Thank you very much.

    Mr. O'Reilly.

    Mr. John O'Reilly (Haliburton--Victoria--Brock, Lib.): Thank you very much, Admiral. I'm impressed with your presentation. I think it aptly sums up some of the ongoing problems that have existed and still exist. Based on your many years of experience, I think it draws some conclusions that are good for us to be able to address.

    I hope you won't take the sparseness of our committee today as a slight. Even the researchers didn't show up, as the weather has played havoc with us. There are also always 22 committees meeting on Wednesdays, and we don't have enough people to go around. But I'm very pleased to have you here, and I certainly compliment you on your report.

    I have a couple of questions. In your role in support of the Navy League of Canada and the Royal Canadian Sea Cadets, do you have problems getting equipment and uniforms for sea cadets? Are you involved with outfitting them and making sure they have the proper equipment and uniforms to carry out their roles—and particularly the Sea Cadets?

º  (1650)  

    RAdm Russell Moore: No, sir, we are not active in that area in terms of support. We're more involved in the community-based activities as interested citizens who provide support. That could come through fundraising or encouragement in the community, in local attempts, but we have no national role in supporting our Sea Cadets. That falls under the navy and the Navy League.

    Mr. John O'Reilly: Some of them have seemingly really good equipment. A Sea Cadet group in Peterborough, Ontario has started a band, and it is a very good program. Also, one of the ones in my riding, in Coboconk, is teaching sailing to some other people, and they've bought their own sailboat and so forth.

    I was trying to find a naval sword for them for their parade. I guess they're given out to officers as their own and are not something that goes back into stock, because you can't find a decent one anywhere. At least, I couldn't. Anyway, that's a problem that's not for you.

    You said you've launched the Maritime Awards Society of Canada. How much of that fund is for Canadian universities, for post-graduate maritime studies? How much is in that fund, and how much benefit does it provide to each individual person who applies and is successful?

    RAdm Russell Moore: The Maritime Awards Society operates independently of the Naval Officers' Association itself. It has its own board of governors, and I happen to be a member of that board of governors. Over the ten years of our existence, we have been able to raise some $300,000 in scholarships.

    We partner with the universities. There are four of them that match the moneys that we raise through our fund-raising efforts, to provide scholarships that are normally in the range of $5,000, to assist with post-graduate studies.

    Mr. John O'Reilly: That's a very good project.

    In your report, you talk about when the Canadian government decided to join the Persian Gulf campaign against Iraqi aggression against Kuwait. Do you feel the government made the decision before it consulted with the navy to find out what it could contribute, or do you think the government made a decision and the navy had to scramble to put the government decision into order? Should there not have been some consultation about what could be provided before the commitment was made? I just take it from the tone in here that maybe there wasn't any consultation. Or am I reading that wrong?

    RAdm Russell Moore: I was no longer privy to that decision-making process. All I can say is that, with my past experience when other events came up, the normally followed procedure was for the Canadian Forces to make the government aware of the capabilities they could provide. In this case, thanks to this capability that consisted of a task group that was at ten days' notice to go, the navy would have told government it had the ability to deliver so many ships with so much capability within ten days. It would be up to government to choose from the menu of capabilities that the forces were making available. And the same process goes on for air and land forces, so that the government can choose the response it wants.

    But the direct answer is that my experience has been that there has always been full consultation back and forth before the final decision is made.

    The Chair: Thank you, Mr. O'Reilly.

    Mrs. Wayne.

º  (1655)  

    Mrs. Elsie Wayne: Rear-Admiral, in the last couple of years, the defence committee has tabled a document each year. One calls for an ongoing shipbuilding policy. We were not looking at a policy or contract for building twelve frigates at one time, we were looking at one frigate, then a supply ship perhaps, and then a submarine, so that it rotated and was an ongoing shipbuilding policy. That's why I asked you if you knew my shipyard had been designated the navy shipyard.

    There is that need in Canada for the navy, and then you're not caught in the middle, if you like, at any one time. You continue to grow. But with what has happened now with the contract we received and shared with our people from Quebec at MIL Davie, all of those frigates are going to need major repairs at about the same time because we did this contract.

    Have you looked at that and at the fact that we do need to have a naval shipyard in Canada that would rotate and continue to build the ships for the navy?

    RAdm Russell Moore: I have been very interested in shipbuilding policy not only as a naval officer, but, as my resume shows, in my two and a half years on the board of the British Columbia Ferry Corporation. The problem they're faced with is where to build ships and how to get them built because of capability. I believe Canada needs a shipbuilding capability not only to meet the needs of our navy, but the coast guard, the other government fleets, ferry corporations, and so on.

    Although keeping work in those yards by building one ship or one frigate at a time over a period of years is attractive, for obvious reasons, it tends to be more expensive. Other countries have had that experience. The Dutch followed it for a long time in order to keep their capability employed. You can get to a point at which it's an ongoing process. It makes a lot of sense, but it does tend to be more expensive because you don't achieve the economies of scale achieved by ordering six or twelve at a time.

    Mrs. Elsie Wayne: No, I know. But I know the almost 4,000 men we had working at our shipyard...American shipbuilders came up from the United States to interview them. When they had finished interviewing them, the American shipbuilders said they were the best shipbuilders they had ever interviewed. On the first day, they offered over 300 of them jobs in the U.S. As you know, when it comes to the U.S., they have the Jones Act to protect them. We can't bid on any of their contracts down in the U.S.

    I have a major concern. I truly do. When I look at our navy and the role they have to play—and they have to play a major role—we need more personnel and we need more money put into it. I have to say our committee has seen this, and when we table our document each year, we always put that in. I know the chairman asked us to unanimously agree on the document the last time, and I said I would do that just as soon as he put in that we needed a naval shipbuilding policy, and he agreed with that as well.

    I have to thank you very much for being here. I really, really appreciate your document, and we'll work on it. I now have to go back over to the House, though.

    Thank you.

    The Chair: Thank you for being here today, Elsie.

    Do you have any further comments on Mrs. Wayne's points, Admiral?

    RAdm Russell Moore: No. I agree that we need a national shipbuilding policy. We need the capability in our country to build the ships that our country needs—not just the navy, but other government services, provincial services, etc.

    Mrs. Elsie Wayne: Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.

    The Chair: Thank you, Mrs. Wayne.

    Mr. Wood.

    Mr. Bob Wood: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

    I see that you retired in 1998. I guess you must have just missed us out on the west coast when we did the quality-of-life hearings. Or maybe you were there. I'm not sure. I can't even remember when we were there, but I think it was sometime in 1998.

    I'm sure you keep track and keep in touch with your colleagues. Has the morale of the west coast navy improved lately, over the last two or three years? I had the opportunity to be in Comox in January, and I talked to the base commander there. I understand there has been an addition of a little over $600 a month for living conditions at Esquimalt. This is interesting. It was over $600 at Esquimalt and between $200 or $300 at Nanaimo, but when you get up to Comox, it's something like four bucks. Four dollars! In your mind, why is there such a discrepancy?

    When I happened to walk into the colonel's office, he was not a happy camper, and neither were a lot of the other people. Is there a reason for that big discrepancy? That's just getting back to the morale problem and the $600 that I guess was just approved in the last little while.

»  (1700)  

    An hon. member: About a year ago, yes.

    Mr. Bob Wood: Can you comment on that?

    RAdm Russell Moore: Yes, I can.

    It was most distressing to be in command of the men and women serving in a very high-cost area of southern Vancouver Island in the period between 1996 and 1998. The cost of everything they faced was much higher than the cost of living in other areas of the country. The arguments had been repeatedly made over a long period of time that there should be a cost-of-living allowance, a COLA.

    After my departure, I was absolutely delighted to learn that the work done by this committee—and I was there for some of it—had resulted in the minister, as I understand it, overriding the objections of the Treasury Board bureaucrats and introducing a cost-of-living allowance. It's as high as it is in Esquimalt because the basket of services that was looked at was that much higher. That's what was happening in the navy's case. The navy was carefully making comparisons and following this up in terms of what was causing us morale problems, and Esquimalt was compared to Halifax, where rents were much lower and other costs of living were lower.

    So given the fact that Comox is where it is, it's based on the assessed cost of living as compared to baselines that are used to come up with the amounts. So I can't comment knowledgeably on Comox, but I certainly can on Esquimalt.

    Mr. Bob Wood: And Nanaimo, too. That's an air force base at Nanaimo, is it not?

    RAdm Russell Moore: No, that's Comox. There's very little in terms of numbers of military in Nanaimo.

    Mr. Bob Wood: So what I hear you saying is that the morale is a heck of a lot better than it was.

    RAdm Russell Moore: That was a major boost to the morale of families.

    Mr. Bob Wood: And the transfer of postings between the east coast and the west coast is not a problem anymore? Those transfers used to be, right? People were getting out if they had to go to Esquimalt, rather than going there and living in poverty for God knows how long.

    RAdm Russell Moore: Yes, a policy of home port divisions was implemented. You stayed where you joined, basically. This allowed families to stabilize in terms of trying to get out into the community, to build up equity in homes, and to not be subject to all the other turmoil of moves. But it does not apply to officers, so it has created a problem for officers who, by nature of their employment, get moved around the country. But I think this COLA was a significant step forward and has been much appreciated.

    Mr. Bob Wood: What about homeland defence? The navy has taken on a tremendous commitment with the Afghanistan situation and others around the world. Do you feel we have enough navy personnel and equipment to properly do homeland defence? I'm thinking of drug surveillance, NATO manoeuvres, NATO exercises, and United States and Canada exercises. I can't remember, but I'm trying to find this out, because we still have this commitment for a number of ships in the Mediterranean, in that area with Afghanistan now, plus a few others. Is our homeland defence in jeopardy because of the current navy commitment to world peace and what's going on?

»  (1705)  

    RAdm Russell Moore: I believe the resources are certainly stretched, but whether or not the local commanders consider it to be the case that they still have enough at home to do the job or not, sir, I don't know.

    From the testimony that I have read, one thing that does not come through is the role played by Maritime Forces Atlantic and Maritime Forces Pacific, in their operations intelligence centres, to keep up a very close surveillance over what's going on in our ocean approaches. That takes intelligence input from our own Canadian capabilities and those of other navies. It takes surveillance flights by the Auroras, which are our major inputs into that. So in terms of the ability to monitor and keep track of what's going on in our homeland, I think the capability has been largely unaffected by these deployments.

    But I don't know whether or not the commanders on each coast still have enough capability in terms of the coastal defence vessels and the other assets they need at their disposal in order to do the job that needs to be done at this time.

    The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Wood.

    Mr. Anders.

    Mr. Rob Anders: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

    I want to pick up on Mr. Wood's question. We need to be doing work with regard to the whole situation involving drug smuggling, of course, but the other one is migrant smuggling, the smuggling of people, human cargo. While I realize many in the navy would not want to see that as their predominant duty because they'd rather be hunting subs and doing other stuff that may be more sexy in naval terms, what do you feel? I realize your knowledge would be probably more specific to the west coast than the east coast, but what do you feel needs to be done? In your dream scenario, what would you have in order to make sure Canadian sovereignty is upheld and that we do not have a porous border with regard to drugs or migrant smuggling?

    RAdm Russell Moore: In those two roles, which fall under the headache of constabulary duties, I think the navy has embraced them. They're the responsibility of other government departments—Canada Customs, Immigration, and the RCMP in the case of drugs—but the navy has long recognized that the other government departments do not have the assets. They don't have the surveillance, command, and control capabilities that are resident in the headquarters on both coasts. They don't have the ships that can move quickly, with the capability of helicopters and so on in support roles.

    I always relished those duties as a commander, because being sent out on an operation against a drug runner was every bit as challenging as any sort of international exercise. It required an exercise of a lot of the skills that ships need to maintain, so the ships' crews enjoyed them and I enjoyed sending them, and I realized I was making a very real contribution to our sovereign responsibilities.

    Mr. Rob Anders: Can I interject at this point?

    RAdm Russell Moore: Yes.

»  (1710)  

    Mr. Rob Anders: I accept the fact that you think it's an important role. But as far as I understand it, when the incident was going down the last time with regard to the boats coming from China, for example, we were relying on a lot of American information in terms of when those boats would be arriving and everything else. It may have been in conjunction with some of the Canadians working in alliance with the U.S., but what do we need for kit? In other words, if we don't want to be reliant upon the United States to provide us with information about what's going on along our borders, what do we need?

    RAdm Russell Moore: The capabilities that we use that are resident in the United States Navy are mostly those capabilities that are global in nature, so that we get an early warning about vessels of interest that are in the early stages of crossing the Pacific . If we went to the United States Navy and said we wanted to track a certain vessel of interest, they could start that tracking far from our shores. They call up satellite surveillance capabilities that we don't have. As I understand it, though, there is a potential for our defence department s to get more capability in that area in future program.

    Closer to home, we have the maritime patrol aircraft. I haven't spoken about them in my paper, but they are absolutely vital. Their modernization was another project that received setbacks during the early 1990s because of budget cutbacks. That modernization is being done piecemeal now in order to try to bring them up to the current standards.

    There has been an investigation of long-range, shore-based radars that extend out hundreds of miles from each coast. I'm not current on the technological capabilities that those developments would give us, nor on the department's or navy's intention to acquire them.

    Mr. Rob Anders: Out of curiosity, I understand that the Australians have revamped or increased their capabilities with regard to some of these things. Are there things that they're doing right, or pieces of kit or equipment or procedures that they're embarking upon that we could follow or should follow?

    RAdm Russell Moore: I'm sorry, but I just don't know.

    Mr. Rob Anders: Okay.

    Some tests are being conducted to determine if the number of personnel involved in duty watch can be safely reduced when the ships are in home ports. Given the terrorist threat, do you believe it would be safe to reduce the duty watch aboard ships in the home ports?

    RAdm Russell Moore: The size of the duty watch is always dependent on the assessed threat at the time. If the threat being assessed goes up, additional resources are put in place on the duty watch.

    There's quite a difference between home port and the security you have not only on board, but at the entrance to the dockyards and in your harbour. All of those areas are factored in.

    In foreign ports, of course, this threat took on a huge increase in significance following the USS Cole disaster. If the threat is assessed as being high, our ships in foreign ports will put into the duty watch whatever resources are necessary to deal with it, and they may not go into that port if the threat is high enough.

    So a reduction in the size of the duty watch is always an attempt to liberate or let more people get their much needed rest and leave ashore, but it's always balanced against the assessed threat.

    The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Anders.

    Mr. O'Reilly.

    Mr. John O'Reilly: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

    Admiral, we're studying state of readiness right now, and I guess we're looking for your recommendations. I suppose your most serious recommendation is found at the end of your paper, where you state that you believe we must “assign the necessary portion of our national wealth to fulfill our sovereign responsibilities.” I would guess that you're suggesting that there should be more of an increase in military spending.

    When we finish the state-of-readiness report, I believe we're going into the 1994 white paper update, and we'll update yearly the quality-of-life report. Maybe we should actually start again, but I'm not sure. That's up to the chair and the steering committee to decide. But if you were dealing with the state of readiness, the 1994 white paper update, and the quality-of-life report, what specific recommendations would you make in regard to those?

    RAdm Russell Moore: In terms of the navy, I believe the document Leadmark has provided a very clear and complete vision of where our maritime forces have to go. Funding of that program is the issue, in my view. If government allocates increased funding, that vision can be carried out and I think we'll achieve what's necessary for Canada's maritime forces.

»  (1715)  

    Mr. John O'Reilly: Do you think the navy would be better off if it wasn't under a unified command, if we had the head of the navy, the head of the air force, and the head of the army reporting directly, all in equal positions, instead of a unified type of force. Would it be more effective?

    RAdm Russell Moore: No, I don't. I believe the various structures that are in place now work well. I think the command and control of deployed forces being the responsibility of the Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff is the right way to go. As a way of bringing together capabilities from the three services and putting them together in a way that can be deployed abroad, that's the best way of getting the bang for the buck. I don't see anything being achieved by trying to revert to times when we had a much larger standing force.

    Mr. John O'Reilly: In terms of the competition for what the Canadian Forces of the future should look like, depending on who you're talking to, some people think it should be a light, rapidly deployable infantry force with Coyotes, Bisons, and those types of capacities, and with some navy and maybe an upgrade of the air force. Do you feel the navy is properly representing its needs to the government, or do you feel there should be some improvement in that presentation?

    RAdm Russell Moore: What I'd like to see is the air force and army's equivalents to Leadmark. Having those would allow me, as an individual, to make that assessment. I think government needs that. I'm certainly not an expert on the other services, and I haven't seen the documents that provide that sort of vision. Until I do, I find it hard to comment.

    Mr. John O'Reilly: That's probably why I asked that question. The navy has produced something that is state-of-the-art, classy, has lots of depth to it, and contains lots of vision. I don't see that from the other two services, so I'm suspecting that perhaps they'll come out with something on their own that matches Leadmark.

    I'd be surprised if the other services didn't know that document was coming out. When I received it, I was quite impressed with it. I think we all were. The three elements are going to be competing, and the navy is in the lead so far.

    RAdm Russell Moore: Yes.

    Some hon. members: Oh, oh!

    The Chair: Mr. O'Reilly, actually—

    Mr. John O'Reilly: Oh, I'm out of time, am I?

    The Chair: On that high note, you're out of time, yes.

    Mr. Bachand.

[Translation]

    Mr. Claude Bachand: Mr. Moore, you say in your presentation that the collective experience of your members spans eight decades of war and peace. Your resume says you joined the navy in 1962 and retired in 1998, and that you took on several commands. You're therefore an experienced man and so is your association.

    Would you say that the state of readiness of the Canadian navy is now greater, equal or lower than it was ten years ago?

[English]

    RAdm Russell Moore: I know there has been a huge improvement in readiness over the last decade. As I tried to point out in my paper, when it was called upon to go to the Persian Gulf, the state of the navy in 1990 was such that it required a heroic effort to strap on miscellaneous equipment from the new ship program. It wasn't integrated. Training on the new equipment was doubtful. The ships were deployed, but it was only through what was really quite a heroic effort that they were able to make the significant contribution that they did in the Persian Gulf.

    It was the commissioning of the twelve Canadian patrol frigates, the return of the four Tribal-class destroyers—which had been modernized—and the arrival of the coastal defence vessels that gave the capability that steadily grew through the 1990s. It did not happen all at once. The first of the CPFs was commissioned in 1991, I believe, but it wasn't until three or four years later that the frigates not only came on line but were delivered to the navy and were fully integrated and trained to a standard that allowed them to be deployed into harm's way.

    The Canadian navy was really jumping several generations of technology, and it took some time and experience at all levels—not only on the ships, but amongst the staffs on shore and amongst the admirals—to learn how to effectively utilize and deploy the ships.

    So there has been a steady improvement from 1990 until now, when, within ten days and even less, a major contribution to an international crisis was possible. That was done within ten days, and I think that's very significant.

»  (1720)  

[Translation]

    Mr. Claude Bachand: Now do you agree with the findings of the Senate committee that recently reported on the state of readiness of the Canadian Forces? Here are some of the comments of the committee regarding the navy. I would like to know your opinion on that.

    First, the committee said that the navy cannot sustain its present engagement of five ships in the Gulf and that it would have to reduce it to three in the near future.

    Second, it said that the Sea King helicopters are already beyond their service life, which means that their activities in the Gulf cannot be sustained for more than six months.

    According to the committee, the Canadian Forces and the navy did not perform the required maintenance on their major pieces of equipment. This is true because the Auditor General said the same thing. She noted a huge backlog in this area.

    So I can hardly understand your saying that we're better prepared today than we were then, when according to the Senate committee, the navy will have trouble completing a six-month operation.

[English]

    RAdm Russell Moore: The capability of what that new fleet of ships represents was, as I discussed before, brought into being in the service over the course of the 1970s. Operational readiness, though, has been difficult to sustain in the face of the budget cuts that occurred in the budgets of the mid-1990s. Reductions in personnel impact on the ability to maintain equipment, budgets for spares are impacted, and so on. The Senate report's observations are no doubt accurate based on what was collected. It's a function of what has happened to funding during the latter half of the decade.

    I don't know the details in regard to how many ships can be sustained in the Gulf, or for how long. All stops will be pulled to make sure everything is done to sustain them at the level the government requires. At some point, that will strain resources to a limit that will mean a reduction in ships. By that time, hopefully the international situation will be such that it can be done.

    There certainly are problems, and those problems can be attributed to funding, to the budget. All is not rosy. On the first question of where the navy is today when it's compared to where it was ten years earlier, though, there has been a huge increase in capability, but there are certainly going to be problems in the sustainability of that as we go forward. Without investment, without increases in budget, that capability will surely deteriorate over time.

»  (1725)  

    The Chair: Thank you, Monsieur Bachand.

    If I could, members of the committee, I'd like to get a few questions on the record myself.

    Admiral, you talked very briefly about the issue of the Spanish fleet and dealing with that Spanish fleet at the time. I think one of the things we concentrate on here, as far as operational readiness is concerned, is how close we sometimes are to potentially using our forces one way or another, either as a deterrent or potentially in open warfare. I've heard various stories about where we were at that particular time. The tensions seemed to be a lot higher than some people perhaps realized. Could you comment on your assessment of where we were at that particular moment in time?

    RAdm Russell Moore: I can comment briefly. I forget where I was at the time, but I was not on top of it on a day-to-day basis. I do know the stories I have heard, though. There was a lot of conversation at the level between the senior naval staff and others with our NATO ally—networks established over careers, time served together in NATO headquarters—that allowed a dialogue to go on between respective commanders, and that helped to defuse a potentially disastrous situation. But as for how close we were to an actual application of force, I don't know, sir.

    The Chair: On the issue of the submarines—and that's another issue we talked about today, certainly—could you venture a guess as to how much money was saved through the acquisition of those Upholder submarines, versus what it would have cost us if we had built them ourselves?

    RAdm Russell Moore: It would be a guess, but to try to establish a shipbuilding capability for submarines in Canada would have been a very formidable challenge. Building surface warships is one thing, but the complexity of all the skills required—they aren't present in the country—to launch a building program would have been enormous and very expensive. Whether it's a factor of 5:1 or more, I don't know, but it would have been in multiples of five or ten times what we have paid for them by going this particular route.

    The Chair: You had also mentioned that, in your assessment, some of the new recruits coming into the Canadian Forces are among the best we have ever seen. Could we be doing a lot more in regard to the education and personal development of our personnel? Should we?

    RAdm Russell Moore: Yes, and I believe we are. And the only reason I'm quite current on those initiatives is that I happen to be doing a project for a university that has caused me to look fairly closely at the professional development changes that have occurred just in the last year or two.

    I am delighted to see the track that we are on to ensure that all officers eventually have university degrees. The majority of our colonels and above have post-graduate-level education, but provisions are equally made for all ranks to access not only education and training opportunities as a part of their duties, but as a part of their personnel development. These are very forward-looking policies that are now in place, and with the stand-up of the Canadian Defence Academy happening in Kingston in the next couple weeks, they will be enhanced. I think that bodes very well for our future.

»  (1730)  

    The Chair: As a final, very quick question. I presume you've had the opportunity to read over the document Leadmark, haven't you?

    RAdm Russell Moore: Yes, sir.

    The Chair: Is there anything in that document, either minor or major, that you would disagree with?

    RAdm Russell Moore: I didn't come across passages I disagreed with. I believe I said earlier that I felt it underemphasizes the contribution made by our operations and intelligence facilities on both coasts in terms of our homeland defence. I don't think that comes out. I said that in my paper, and it strikes me as one of the things that could have been developed further. The role that the navy has in the support of the other constabulary duties of government—the support to the RCMP, Canada Customs, and Immigration—is also mentioned there, but I don't think it's as well developed as it could have been.

    The Chair: Well, Rear-Admiral, I want to again thank you very much on behalf of the members of the committee. I thought we had a very good exchange today, albeit with fewer members than normal. I thought the quality of the questions and answers was very helpful. Thank you for being here.

    RAdm Russell Moore: Thank you, sir.

    The Chair: I also appreciate the attendance of the members at the table, obviously.

    The meeting is adjourned.