NDVA Committee Meeting

Notices of Meeting include information about the subject matter to be examined by the committee and date, time and place of the meeting, as well as a list of any witnesses scheduled to appear. The Evidence is the edited and revised transcript of what is said before a committee. The Minutes of Proceedings are the official record of the business conducted by the committee at a sitting.

For an advanced search, use Publication Search tool.

If you have any questions or comments regarding the accessibility of this publication, please contact us at accessible@parl.gc.ca.

Previous day publication Next day publication

37th PARLIAMENT, 1st SESSION

Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs

COMMITTEE EVIDENCE

CONTENTS

Tuesday, February 5, 2002

1530

The Chair (Mr. David Pratt (Nepean--Carleton, Lib.))

Mr. Clive J. Addy (Individual Presentation)

Mr. John O'Reilly (Haliburton--Victoria--Brock, Lib.)

The Chair

Mr. John O'Reilly

The Chair

Mr. Clive Addy

1535

1540

1545

1550

1555

The Chair

Mr. Benoit

Mr. Clive Addy

1600

Mr. Benoit

The Chair

Mr. Benoit

The Chair

Mr. Leon Benoit

The Chair

Mr. Clive Addy

Mr. Benoit

Mr. Clive Addy

Mr. Benoit

The Chair

Mr. Clive Addy

Mr. Leon Benoit

Mr. Clive Addy

The Chair

Mr. Claude Bachand (Saint-Jean, BQ)

1605

Mr. Clive Addy

Mr. Claude Bachand

Mr. Clive Addy

Mr. Claude Bachand

Mr. Clive Addy

Mr. Claude Bachand

The Chair

M. Bachand

Mr. Clive Addy

1610

The Chair

Mr. David Price (Compton--Stanstead, Lib.)

Mr. Claude Bachand

Mr. David Price

1615

Mr. Clive Addy

Mr. David Price

Mr. Clive Addy

Mr. David Price

Mr. Clive Addy

The Chair

Mr. Peter Stoffer (Sackville--Musquodoboit Valley--Eastern Shore, NDP)

1620

The Chair

Mr. Stoffer

Mr. Clive Addy

Mr. Peter Stoffer

Mr. Clive Addy

Mr. Peter Stoffer

Mr. Clive Addy

Mr. Peter Stoffer

1625

Mr. Clive Addy

Mr. Peter Stoffer

Mr. Clive Addy

Mr. Peter Stoffer

Mr. Clive Addy

Mr. Benoit

1630

Mr. Clive Addy

Mr. Leon Benoit

Mr. Clive Addy

Mr. Benoit

Mr. Clive Addy

Mr. Leon Benoit

The Chair

Mr. Clive Addy

The Chair

Mr. Peter Stoffer

The Chair

Mr. Claude Bachand

1635

Mr. Clive Addy

Mr. Claude Bachand

Mr. Clive Addy

Mr. Claude Bachand

The Chair

Mr. Bryon Wilfert (Oak Ridges, Lib.)

1640

The Chair

Mr. Clive Addy

The Chair

1645

Mr. Bryon Wilfert

The Chair

Mr. Peter Stoffer

Mr. Clive Addy

Mr. Peter Stoffer

The Chair

Mr. Clive Addy

Mr. Peter Stoffer

Mr. Clive Addy

Mr. Peter Stoffer

Mr. Clive Addy

Mr. Peter Stoffer

1650

Mr. Clive Addy

The Chair

Mr. Bob Wood (Nipissing, Lib.)

Mr. Clive Addy

Mr. Wood

Mr. Clive Addy

Mr. Wood

Mr. Clive Addy

Mr. Bob Wood

MGen Clive Addy

Mr. Wood

Mr. Clive Addy

Mr. Bob Wood

Mr. Clive Addy

1655

Mr. Wood

Mr. Clive Addy

The Chair

Mr. Benoit

Mr. Clive Addy

Mr. Benoit

Mr. Clive Addy

Mr. Benoit

Mr. Clive Addy

Mr. Leon Benoit

Mr. Clive Addy

The Chair

Mr. Leon Benoit

Mr. Clive Addy

Mr. Benoit

1700

Mr. Clive Addy

Mr. Leon Benoit

Mr. Clive Addy

Mr. Leon Benoit

The Chair

Mr. Leon Benoit

The Chair

Mr. David Price

Mr. Clive Addy

Mr. David Price

Mr. Clive Addy

Mr. David Price

Mr. Clive Addy

The Chair

Mr. David Price

Mr. Clive Addy

1705

The Chair

Mr. Claude Bachand

Mr. Clive Addy

Mr. Claude Bachand

Mr. Clive Addy

Mr. Claude Bachand

Mr. Clive Addy

Mr. Claude Bachand

Mr. Clive Addy

Mr. Claude Bachand

Mr. Clive Addy

Mr. Claude Bachand

Mr. Clive Addy

The Chair

Mr. Claude Bachand

1710

Mr. Clive Addy

Mr. Claude Bachand

Mr. Clive Addy

Mr. Claude Bachand

The Chair

M. Bachand

Mr. Clive Addy

The Chair

Mr. Carmen Provenzano (Sault Ste. Marie, Lib.)

Mr. Clive Addy

Mr. Carmen Provenzano

The Chair

Mr. Peter Stoffer

Mr. Clive Addy

Mr. Peter Stoffer

1715

Mr. Clive Addy

The Chair

Mr. Peter Stoffer

Mr. Clive Addy

Mr. Stoffer

Mr. Clive Addy

Mr. Stoffer

Mr. Clive Addy

The Chair

Mr. Stoffer

The Chair

Mr. Bryon Wilfert

1720

Mr. Clive Addy

Mr. John O'Reilly

The Chair

CANADA

Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs

NUMBER 041

1st SESSION

37th PARLIAMENT

COMMITTEE EVIDENCE

Tuesday, February 5, 2002

[Recorded by Electronic Apparatus]

¹ (1530)

[English]

The Chair (Mr. David Pratt (Nepean--Carleton, Lib.)): I'd like to call this meeting of the Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs to order. We now have quorum.

We have a couple of items on our agenda today, the first being the appearance and statement by Major-General (retired) Clive J. Addy, and this of course is on the study on the state of operational readiness of the Canadian Forces. And we also have what I think would be a fairly brief item to deal with as well in connection with the budget for the Subcommittee on Veterans Affairs.

We have General Addy's biography here, and you should have all received some notes on a presentation made back in November, was it?

Mr. Clive J. Addy (Individual Presentation): [Retired Major General] It was scheduled for November, but I couldn't make it for that time.

Mr. John O'Reilly (Haliburton--Victoria--Brock, Lib.): Mr. Chair, on a point of order, I wonder if we could pass this budget. I don't see anything on it. Does anyone want any discussion on it ? Is there any reason why we couldn't pass it now?

The Chair: Ms. Beaumier is the chair of the subcommittee and I don't know if she would want to speak to it. I don't imagine she would have any problem whatsoever if we were to pass it right now.

Mr. John O'Reilly: I think everybody would like to see this thing passed.

I would move that we pass the budget as presented.

(Motion agreed to).

The Chair: That was quick.

General Addy, you have the floor.

Mr. Clive Addy: Thank you very much.

Mr. Chairman, to say that things have changed since your June report, and my review of it reported to the Defence Associations National Network, is an understatement. You can talk about September 11, but we know it has indeed focused most Canadian minds. That focus is now on the question of overall security and how basic and vital a foundation the state of our security is to our prosperity and to justice in our country and around the world.

Like many others, I was approached at this turbulent and risky time by media buffs for advice and opinion on the state of our military. Having participated and watched, it appeared to me that our country might be reaching the point of having more advisers than soldiers, and this alone was certainly troubling.

Suffice it to say that the operational state of our armed forces and, more importantly, the pertinence of past funding of our 1994 white paper are indeed matters of current and vital interest to Canada and Canadians. I will not quote the known recent polls on this.

I was particularly pleased with your committee's most recent report and I do support its recommendations, with the added caution to be aware of solving only the September 11 terrorist threat. On the other hand, I was, as you know, very upset at what I viewed as a pusillanimous effort in the December 10 budget to redress this.

In my outline to you, written before September 11, it had been my intention to go through a rather academic analysis of what the array of vague words such as “operational readiness”, “operational effectiveness”, etc., mean. Each is often used with such authority, but who knows what they might mean? I will forgo this seemingly futile exercise, but I underline that much debate revolved in the past on the selective use of vaguely defined and unmeasured concepts. The basis of one speaker's selective definition over another's is no longer worth pursuing, in my view.

Having listened to our Minister of National Defence attempting to define exactly what we could produce, and watching people continue to hustle with great zeal throughout the Canadian Forces to put together what we have in Afghanistan, which was in essence a white paper commitment, is testimony enough to me as to our underfunded, undermanned, overtasked, and somewhat ill-prepared force.

Don't get me wrong. There is no way this reflects upon those who are serving. Our Canadian Forces will do the best they can with what we have given them. They will operate professionally and selflessly and face the unlimited liability that their profession demands. Their normal manner will be done in a far better way than we deserve for the support we have given them.

Whereas the aim of your committee was originally to clarify what was indeed the operational state of our forces, it remains so now for the much more substantive reason of establishing the real baseline for our present and future national security. I would, therefore, wish to deal with the following four topics and then be open for questions: first of all, the need to measure our operational capability as best we can; secondly, the need for a national security review; thirdly, some descriptions on our present capability wanting; and finally, some what I consider cautions when you're looking at analyzing our security policy.

Let me start by saying that the Government of Canada, henceforth, and in whatever form it wishes to define future operational capability of its Canadian Forces, must do so in a manner that this capability is exercised and measured. Trying to get an idea of what capability is expected is rather difficult in the present white paper, anyway.

In chapter 3, where it is stated that the maintenance of “multi-purpose, combat-capable forces is in the national interest”, the authors skittishly spend more time defining what this is not, rather than what it is, and hence initiated several years ago an inherent source of confusion and constant debate.

More recently, Dr. Janice Stein has added her own benign historical revision of our military past and our present security needs, which has not clarified anything in the whole domain.

There's been a plea for some time from the Auditor General for us to define better and to measure our operational capabilities. In the past this has presented quite a challenge to military hierarchies of all services when various methods were tried and used. The present size and overtasking of our forces largely exacerbated this.

The duty is always to measure our capabilities in respect of an agreed standard. That standard is best derived, in my view, from operationally researched scenarios based on a clear defence policy and possible threats. I believe that to define this standard is essential, no matter how difficult it might appear to many.

The alternative has been to leave this solely to the judgment of senior commanders and, at times, senior politicians and bureaucrats. I do believe any measuring system must include the written judgment of senior military commanders, but I insist that it must not be limited to that. Once the measurement is made, then politicians can decide what to do with these facts.

¹ (1535)

I normally do not consider bureaucrats qualified to comment. This may seem quite un-Christian of me and out of character. One of my reasons for this apparent lack of objectivity can be taken from the sad and evasive testimony of a high-ranking member of the policy branch of the department, who testified this spring before the Senate defence committee and stated: “All intelligence indicates that there would be ample warning for Canada to deploy a brigade”. I might suggest to him that I don't believe there will ever be ample warning to deploy a brigade or anything else. The other one was: “Korea was the last occasion when Canada had to deploy a brigade-size force”. And, quite conveniently, I seem to remember that 57th Brigade, 4th Brigade, and No. 1 Air Division were deployed to Europe for about 40 years.

No, we need to measure our capabilities objectively to reassure Canadians. Any stock market trader will tell you that security begins in the mind of the investor. In this case, the investors, I believe, are the citizens of Canada.

A need for a defence review as part of a national security review is my next topic. Let me start by saying that the 1994 white paper as it now stands is, in the opinion of the Federation of Military and United Services Institutes of Canada and the Council for Canadian Security in the 21st Century and others, in need of a review in its own right. More importantly, and I hope more evident to most today than in February 2001 when we wrote our first report, Canada's Strategic Security XXI, we believe this review must involve directly the Department of Foreign Affairs, Department of National Defence, the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Department of Immigration, Department of Finance, and indirectly most others.

The federation paper entitled Canada's Strategic Security XXI does not purport to provide all the answers or even raise all the questions, but it does deduce that national security goes beyond the Department of National Defence and requires intelligent reflection, coordination, and the resources at the national level.

Its only formal recommendation, I remind you, is that the government charter an independent blue ribbon panel of experts to quickly draft a national security strategy for the 21st century. Its mandate would be to find maximum feasible convergence on issues of paramount importance to the security of Canada. This strategy would guide foreign defence and even finance policies. The panel should report to Parliament.

The federation proposes as well the creation of a national security office to coordinate this strategy at the national level better than the present PCO/PMO system. The recently confirmed responsibilities of the new Deputy Prime Minister goes some way along these lines and are most welcome.

It might be that the present white paper, with some modifications, would meet this strategy as a national defence policy, but it is beyond a doubt, in my view and that of the federation, that proper funding and better use of allocated funds would be required. For instance, on the latter point, it is evident that Canada, as a G-7 or G-8 member, could do with much improved strategic lift. However, if this lift costs such a large proportion of the budget that it limits the deliverable force to only one location in very limited numbers, one must ask if this is indeed a sound national security investment.

In the same vein, the federation looks forward to receiving responses on procurement requested by SCONDVA and its comments on these, as it is our view that we can do more also in this area to save money.

Finally, it is our view that only in a national security context more global than defence can the true role and perspective of our reserves be adequately understood and defined and, hopefully, thus be properly funded.

As previously stated, we are not alone in suggesting a review. At the University of Calgary, Dr. David Bercuson, assisted by a number of other well knowns, advisers on things military, has produced a document called To Secure a Nation, a similar but more detailed policy along these lines. I highly recommend to you all those 25 specific and very clear recommendations. Your own most recent report would seem to hint clearly at this as well.

What is then the state of our forces now and into the future, and is this state as it should be? You'll hear statements, normally couched in a plethora of qualifiers, that we can meet the commitments of the 1994 white paper. The difficulty is whether these forces are trained and ready at the necessary level. Some are. Most individuals know what their trade demands and can perform it well. Like a football team or an orchestra, success depends on more than the sum of the individual parts. It relies on practice and team work. From statements of the leaders of the navy, army, and air force, we find that funds preclude, in large measure, the attainment of the levels of teamwork deemed necessary for operational preparedness.

¹ (1540)

One should also realize that budgets limit some regular combat arms units not immediately earmarked for UN or NATO or other duty to some 15 days collective training per annum.

One might ask similar questions about the acclimatization training undergone recently by the 750 destined for Afghanistan and how much they may have practised what are now known as ”the rules of engagement”.

The most telling of these statements from operational leaders are found in the latest versions of what are called the “Level One Business Plans” for 2001. These were gleaned from those various business plans and collated in a study called Caught in the Middle, produced by the Conference of Defence Associations and their researcher Sean Henry.

Let me refresh you on some of the most telling.

First of all, the navy

will not be able to deliver its mandated level of maritime defence capability without additional resources... The increased cost of fuel, combined with no flexibility left in operating budgets, will lead to a decrease in necessary fleet operations... Unless funding relief is obtained, the navy will have to, inter alia, eliminate national and international exercises which are used to achieve and maintain requisite readiness levels.

The air force “faces significant shortfalls. For pilots the situation is extremely serious and will likely get worse over the next three years... The result is loss of capability”.

This is in the short term, for the two branches considered better off. For the army, the picture is far more daunting: “Collective training has fallen below the prudent level”.

Nine years it's been since the last brigade level exercise. “The ability to generate only company-sized force packages likely does not meet government expectations.” It does not meet the white paper policy.

“Only two out of nine battalions will train at this level this year.” This means one-third of all people commanding a battalion and going on to higher rank will never have commanded or have been tested at that level. That's the long-term reality.

The future looks less rosy, though the army intends to have a brigade-level exercise if funds permit in two to three years.

For fiscal year 2001-02 the army is $172 million short of what is needed for minimum operations. It also has an accumulating “infrastructure rust-out and facilities recapitalization debit of $900 million”.

Let's not speak of equipment needs and personnel shortfalls. I think they are known to you already. Essentially all branches are short in their ability to maintain the white paper commitments, but continue to do their best to achieve as close to it as they can. They are on a slippery slope.

I've not covered the deputy chief of defence staff, vice-chief of defence staff, or other NDHQ branches, though I know the intelligence branch of our armed forces and the Joint Operational Centre continue to operate at untenable levels of understaffing.

On the logistic and medical side there is no joy either. You may wish to visit these and ask your own questions in those domains.

More importantly, you must consider what the future five to ten years from now looks like, when an additional five to six billion dollars will be required just to replace what we have now, leaving aside the increases in operating and maintenance budgets and the investment that will be required in high technology.

A similar detailed and interesting analysis of the equipment replacement bow wave in On Track, the magazine of the Conference of Defence Associations, was produced by Colonel MacDonald in August. It validated very much the same figures put out by the Auditor General, and I commend that to your reading.

Some might say that's a lot of money. Some might even say surely that's too much. Some might say do we need armed forces in those numbers? Others might say do we need armed forces at all? To attempt to answer these questions is relatively easy providing the listener recognizes the role of his or her security in relation to his or her well-being and that the Canadian Forces get a tremendous operational capability for the dollars spent.

This is not easily done, however, when the minister himself clouds the issue and says in response to Ambassador Celucci's call to arms reported in the National Post on August 2 of last year: “More than $3 billion dollars has been reinvested over the past three years... Canada has the seventh largest defence budget...”

To a similar letter in the spring, his response, dated last September, states that this amount was $2.3 billion. The truth is, the way our allies and friends in NATO look at us... The fact is that we spend $265 per capita U.S. on defence; the NATO average is $589, including our eastern partners. The fact is that the percentage of GDP has been used as a measure in NATO because it caters to such major differences as conscription in some other allied countries, and it reflects both the ability and the resolve to support one another better, based on our true worth, rather than a straight number of dollars. At 1.2%, I will remind you all that we are second-last in NATO, right after the Duchy of Luxembourg.

¹ (1545)

By the way, number 8 in total U.S. dollars expended--we can call ourselves number 7--is Holland, with 60% of our population, 1/30 of our size, facing one ocean, contributing more to UN today than we do, and contributing only slightly less than we do to defence.

Without a clear mirror, in the eyes of our friends we find that we are bald.

As to the number of forces, we do not get as much per defence dollar as most NATO countries. The cost of our infrastructure over our vast and cold country as well as the competitive cost of our labour for our volunteer force account for much of this difference. We can do better.

In summary, as a member of the G-7 and as a nation so dependent on trade, particularly with the U.S., as a nation that believes and relies on multilateralism for a better world, Canada must be seen to contribute to its own security by its citizens and to do its share by its allies and friends. I believe that 1.2% of the gross domestic product for defence does not meet this challenge.

I shall forgo the oft-repeated and well-known quote from Minister Manley about relieving oneself when the bill is being passed, but remind you of Ambassador Celucci's words of July 27, repeated again after September 11, and I quote:

At this point, I must note that many of our friends in Canada have expressed a concern in this area, one that many on the U.S. side of the border share. That concern is over resources for Canadian forces. While these resources were cut drastically because of the end of the Cold War, and the need to put the Federal budget back into balance, it has now reached the point where without significant increases, the Canadian forces could lose much of their effectiveness. In the last two years the forces have received increases and as friends, allies, and admirers of the good work the Canadian military does, we hope this trend will continue.

And so do I.

Recent discussions on prisoners of war, desert uniforms, and cabinet communications, though interesting to the media and the opposition, are of much lesser importance to our soldiers, their mission, and our allies. Vital to them is our ability to train, support, sustain, and equip our troops. Here I believe we are still wanting.

In the domain of communications, however, one might ask why DND has not provided a clear, public, reasonably regular, and detailed briefing on what our troops are expected to be doing, and what those who are deployed are doing since October. Basing such briefings on some of the Somalia inquiry recommendations as a checklist would have alleviated, in my view, some of the present and possibly future unknowns and would have crystallized the focus on what counts.

I'd like to proceed now with some cautions. They're particularly pertinent in respect of the budget we received on December 10. I would caution when we look at the future that we not focus on what I call the “flavour of the month” role of the forces. Today it is immediate terrorism. We will slam the door on people stealing aircraft and flying them into tall buildings, but we've resolved little else. There is still a knowledge wanting.

The other pertinent aspect to it is that we have to be very knowledgeable. We've been poor and we will continue to be poor at forecasting where the next conflict will be, how big it will be, and what our involvement will be. For that we need armed forces with flexibility inbred in them.

I do believe that the answer is still at the present time general combat capability. People will ask you, and Ed Greenspon will say, “Don't get sucked into general combat capability. We need a specialized role”.

One of the futile things about a specialized role is you normally choose to specialize in the role that is the least useful whenever the crisis comes. If you look up a little history, you will find those types of things.

The other one is the challenge of space. And you can read all of the articles, if you want. You've been very fortunate to visit NORAD and to know what's going on. Perhaps I can remind you that there are over 600 active satellites in 2001, over $100 billion invested in communications and business up there. One thousand are to be launched in the next ten years and 20% annual growth in that domain alone is forecast.

When you start talking about protecting your lines of communication and commerce, I would suggest that space has become one of your major lines of communication and commerce. You should be looking at that and not at saving, perhaps, a treaty that may or may not be as relevant as it used to be.

¹ (1550)

The challenge of intelligence, and coordination of that intelligence, is absolutely critical to avoid having the kind of information that causes embarrassment such as you all have witnessed over the last couple of days. There are ways of doing that much more effectively than that which we do now. Joining together the information of the Solicitor General, the RCMP, CSIS, DND, our allies is actually feasible. If you want to know how it can be done, I would suggest you remind yourself of the big boards that I believe you all saw when you went to NORAD and you saw that big chart there. Perhaps you know that the collation and the sources of that information are nigh on infinite.

Security policy itself should mitigate and recognize that it cannot prevent the occurrence. What do I mean by that? I mean you should be ready for just about anything, or have a plan for just about anything, but please don't expect that you will be able to prevent everything that is capable of occurring in the world today and in the future.

We should posture our forces at home by national need, not by political riding or other considerations, and we should rethink some of this. I'm particularly sensitive, having been commander of the west, as to the removal of all land forces from British Columbia. I do not consider this a question of party, I consider this a question of national need. It is the most danger prone province in Canada effectively, and we've taken out the land forces from that particular province and we have not distributed what I would consider a useful item for that part of the country--helicopters.

We should look to joint capabilities and technologies for efficiencies in economies. Can an unmanned, for instance, all-weather attack helicopter replace the manned helicopter, or even the role of the tank? The answer is probably and probably in many ways; and it might be replaced by something else. But these things take time and these things take development and they take coordination. You don't park the tank now, waiting for some technological solution 10 years down the pipe. You don't do those kinds of things; we have in the past, and we've lost capability.

Beware of giving up personnel and equipment then on a promissory note of future technological purchases. A bird in the hand is not a bad philosophy to retain. But if you don't make decisions and if decisions are late in coming and the options are not taken by the leaders of the country outside of uniform, then you do have these quandaries and these wastes.

Committing troops is important. As a nation in this world, putting people on the ground is important. It's risky, but not committing them can be riskier in the long term. The security of our nation requires armed forces as far as I'm concerned and will continue to do so both at home and abroad. I think the trend will change in that there will be more of a focus on at home, as the impunity of North America has been called a mythology since September 11 and we are more concerned about it. Canadian forces must be structured, tasked, and funded to do what Canada needs now and into the future. How good it was 10 years ago is totally irrelevant and of no interest to anybody who knows their profession.

Canada's security needs to go beyond defence policy and must be addressed and coordinated in this broader context. These needs are now expressed in the 1994 white paper, and Canadian forces are unable to meet them to the best of their expected ability. This is due largely to the lack of funding, the reduced size of our forces, and the consequent overtasking. The present really is sad, although our soldiers keep operating in miraculous fashion, but we need to retain and train more people than those called for in the 1994 white paper. The army, in particular, needs a healthy and immediate injection of people.

I don't believe personally that any future plan for the security of Canada will call for fewer people than were called for in the white paper. I firmly believe that it will call for at least a minimum of 70,000 to do the job properly, even with the injection of technology. But I do believe that it is now time for a new and broader national security policy leading to a revised defence policy, which must be funded appropriately. We can't continue to ask our people to do the impossible.

I have the privilege to be an adviser to the ombudsman and to know what effects that kind of policy has on the individuals we send over there and I am not impressed.

That, Mr. Chairman, concludes my presentation.

¹ (1555)

The Chair: Thank you, General Addy.

Mr. Benoit, a question.

Mr. Leon Benoit (Lakeland, Canadian Alliance): Thank you very much, Mr. Chair, and thank you, General, for your presentation. I appreciate it very much. I only wish that the whole committee could have heard your presentation on a very forward-looking defence policy--some of the issues looking well into the future--that you presented at a conference last weekend, along with Professor Bercuson, Professor Granatstein, and others. I very much appreciate that.

My first question is on an issue you brought up, and that's the issue of the rules of engagement for our troops. The recommendations from the Somalia inquiry made it clear that the rules of engagement for a mission should be established quickly so the troops have a chance to train together and to familiarize themselves with the rules. You did mention that. I know there would be instances of course where you don't have the luxury of doing that because the call is very quick, but in fact it's coming up five months since September 11 and a mission must have been anticipated. It was in November that a 48-hour notice was given to our troops. Certainly there has been some time in this case of warning.

I'd like to ask you, as an officer, when you would reasonably hope to see the rules of engagement in your hands, and I guess, on the other hand, when you would expect to see them in your hands. They may be two different things. So I'd like to ask you to comment on that and relate it to the current mission in Afghanistan.

Mr. Clive Addy: If I could, there are aspects of rules of engagement that you know, Mr. Benoit, are relative to the command chain and they will always be the greatest details of negotiation. It's a larger document than just, can I shoot or can I not.

At the soldier level it's rather intriguing and it's important--and I'll give you an anecdote after--but I'll tell you the simple manner. First of all, it's chapter 6 if you look at UN rules. I'll put it in the chapter 6, chapter 7 context. Chapter 6 of the UN rules say you probably take a bullet before you shoot at anybody else. Chapter 7 says that if anybody looks mean or looks like they're getting in the way of your mission, you will shoot first. I have simplified. Please understand that I have simplified. For the soldier on sentry on a dark night, I'd better be a heck of a lot clearer than that. However, in essence that's what you would be talking about.

I would suspect that the 3rd Battalion Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry trained in both those options until such time as their job was clarified. I hope that they did their best. If there are funnies now coming out as to treatment dealing with landmines or with other types of things that they have not been briefed on, I would be soundly upset that it had not been briefed to them before that particular time.

I am not knowledgeable as to the rules of engagement that framed their training since the month of November when they had 48 hours' notice to move. Therefore, I cannot honestly say whether they've done good or they've done bad, but I can tell you that there is a quandary when, at the last minute, one delivers the rules of engagement. There is a question mark, and in fact that question should be asked.

º (1600)

Mr. Leon Benoit: When the minister said just last week that the rules of engagement were just finalized, some of our troops from the PPCLI were over there already. Is that normal? Is that what's expected?

The Chair: Mr. Benoit, just for the clarification of the committee, are you referring to the advanced reconnaissance party?

Mr. Leon Benoit: That's right.

The Chair: They were there to basically help define the rules of engagement, just so we're clear on that.

Mr. Leon Benoit: I'm actually asking General Addy the question

The Chair: But I'm clarifying that for the committee members so they'll understand.

Mr. Clive Addy: But your prompted point is well taken that there are always some details that are refined by the reconnaissance party or advance parties--normally, the reconnaissance party.

Mr. Leon Benoit: Right, but there is a larger group leaving this week--

MGen Clive Addy: Yes.

Mr. Leon Benoit: --and the minister said that the rules of engagement were only finalized last week. That seems to me not to be much time for the troops to become very knowledgeable--

Mr. Clive Addy: Your question is valid. Your concern is valid. I would suggest that I do not have the details on what they were trained on, nor do I have the details of what those rules of engagement were to be able to pass a proper judgment and to answer your answer correctly.

Mr. Leon Benoit: To do with budget, of course you mentioned that in your paper and you say that people would say that's a lot of money, surely that's too much, and do we need an armed forces in these numbers? While I believe that maybe some Canadians are asking that question, recent polls show quite a change in the attitude of Canadians, especially if they're asked the question in a realistic way--not, do you want money spent on the military or do you want money spent on health care? It's a false choice, because there are other choices, like prioritizing spending and getting rid of the low-priority spending and some of the wasted spending. So it's a false choice. When Canadians have it put to them in a realistic, fair way, they say, yes, let's fund the military. I've noticed a real change in that regard.

At the same time as this question still is being asked, even by some members of Parliament probably from most parties, the U.S. President has just asked for a large increase in military spending in the United States. I'm wondering about what your thoughts are on how the Americans might view Canada when there was so little commitment made in the budget while the President is asking for somewhere near a 20% increase in their military budget, and it'll probably be approved.

The Chair: General Addy, you've got less than a minute to respond.

Mr. Clive Addy: Yes, thank you.

I was about to say that my dad was a judge and my brother is a lawyer, and I know a leading question when I'm given one.

Some hon. members: Oh, oh!

Mr. Leon Benoit: We certainly didn't intend that, General Addy.

Mr. Clive Addy: But I will answer it as a soldier by saying that the amounts we spend in Canada compared with what other countries spend are seen by other countries I've served with as being less than Canada should be spending, with its economy. It's not doing its share.

I think most Canadians have shown that--both in the MacLeans poll and in the other polls we're all very familiar with. For the first time in a long time, they've accepted the fact that if we want war, we must pay for it.

The Chair: Thank you.

Monsieur Bachand.

[Translation]

Mr. Claude Bachand (Saint-Jean, BQ): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I do not know whether you need interpretation, Mr. Addy.

º (1605)

Mr. Clive Addy: No, not at all. Thank you.

Mr. Claude Bachand: I saw in your resumé that you had quite a brilliant military career that spanned nearly 35 years. You started off very well by studying at the Collège militaire royal de Saint-Jean.

Mr. Clive Addy: And I am proud of it.

Mr. Claude Bachand: So that is probably why you are a top-ranking, highly recognized military man today: you started off well.

I have a question that may seem strange to you. It is on loyalty. I have noticed that people in uniform are usually extremely respectful of civilian controls. I think that here in Canada, as in other western countries, the question of loyalty to civilian power is extremely important. Otherwise, we would live in a militarily controlled state, and that is not easy without civilian control.

You were once a major-general, and I'm goint to talk to you about the readiness of the armed forces. High-ranking generals from Canada's ground forces, naval forces and air force as well as the chief of staff came to tell this committee that the Canadian army is better prepared now than it was 10 years ago.

I will admit I have a problem with that. I have not been national defence critic on this committee for very long, but if you look at the funding level, or the drop in the number of military people, or the poor state of the equipment, now that you are no longer in uniform, do you share the views of those who still are, namely that the Canadian army is now generally better prepared than it was 10 years ago?

Mr. Clive Addy: I could say that no, I do not share that opinion. I already said in my presentation that not only do I not believe it, but I think you cannot measure it.

Secondly, it is irrelevant. The important thing is to know whether we can do what we must do today or whether we will be in a position to do what we expect will be our mission in a few years with the funds being given to us. I think it is silly to ask that question on those two areas. It is an unfair comparison that cannot be measured and I think it is even dishonest. If those were statements made by colleagues in uniform, I apologize for that. You asked me for my own opinion and I am giving it to you.

Mr. Claude Bachand: Thank you for your honesty.

[English]

The Chair: Monsieur Bachand, you've got four minutes. Spend them as you choose.

[Translation]

Mr. Claude Bachand: All right.

Mr. Addy, an increasing number of people are wondering [Editor's Note: Inaudible] I personally think the current liberal government is not a pro-military one. If you look back any number of years you can see that the budget is not consistent. Our allies have criticized us for not injecting enough money. You know the statistics: NATO ranks us 18 out 19 for our effort, if you take GDP into account.

All this to say that an increasing number of people are also wondering about the army's current structure. What I mean by that is that we really have three armies; I repeat: air force, ground forces and the navy. Given our inability to provide financial support for defence or our unwillingness to lend it financial support, some people are wondering whether the solution wouldn't be to specialize the roles.

By specialization of roles I am referring to Canada's international reputation for peacekeeping missions. As a solution, do you think it is possible that we could abandon part of the air force and some of the maritime forces and focus on a more specific role, a role for which we are known worldwide?

I also want to hear your views on interoperability because that is another way for people to say that if we can be interoperable, perhaps we would not need as many people.

Earlier on I heard you mention the number 70,000. If there is no willingness or budget, do you think it is possible to find other solutions and to discuss the white paper, in order to do things other than those specified in the white paper?

Mr. Clive Addy: I must answer your question two ways. First of all, Canada will do what Canada wants. It is a sovereign country. It is an independent country. It will vote according to its intentions and budget.

However, if you compare Canada to other countries, it has been very spoiled since the end of the Second World War. It may think it has made an effort, but that is only its opinion, and it is not shared by everyone else in the world.

You asked a direct question on peacekeeping. I am one of those who firmly believe, without exception, that before becoming a peacekeeper, you have to be a good soldier, seaman or pilot. Knowledge of the profession gives you some credibility in the eyes of the person opposite to you. He knows you know what you are doing and that is what maintains the peace. It is a physical deterrent.

If you have ever heard my friend Roméo Dallaire—and I am sure that you have—who would have given his right arm to have a sufficient number of skilled people on the ground in Rwanda... It was not very many. We are not talking about peacekeeping here; we are talking about people who are ready for war, but who know how to restrain themselves if they have to. So they maintain that credibility. Do not be fooled by the notion of peacekeeping. It is a peacekeeping operation carried out by real soldiers. That is the first point.

The other question dealt with three areas: the navy, air force and ground forces. If we specialize only in peacekeeping, we leave the door open everywhere in Canada, in space and elsewhere to every other modern-day threat. As a serviceman, and especially as a Canadian citizen, I would never dare make that recommendation, not at all. More thought must be given to what we can do with the little money available to us, based on generosity and our perception of our need to focus on one area or another. People who talk about specialization are those who try to shirk the responsibilities of a sovereign country. That is my conclusion. A sovereign country has responsibilities and defence is a major one.

º (1610)

[English]

The Chair: General Addy, I'm going to have to cut you off there in fairness to the other members of the committee who want to ask questions as well.

Mr. Price.

Mr. David Price (Compton--Stanstead, Lib.): Thank you, Mr. Chair, and thank you very much for coming, General. Unfortunately a snow storm stopped you last time, but not this time.

Just as a starting point, Mr. Bachand and I just returned from Washington and from McDill, the command and control centre for Afghanistan. It was nice to have Mr. Bachand along, because now the Bloc has a critic who is very pro-military, and that's good.

Some hon. members: Oh, oh!

Mr. Claude Bachand: I voted in favour of the report.

Mr. David Price: You see, he's coming along very nicely.

We heard some very interesting things there. We of course had briefs in the State Department and actually in the defence college.

Your briefing was fairly well right on; it was rather dark and gloomy, but there are other sides to it too. And we heard two different times how, as far as the Americans are concerned, in this war in Afghanistan, in any place they're going to have to operate in the world they can only depend on the Canadians, the Brits and the Dutch. There are only three.

We were there as a NATO group, so you can imagine how...they were fairly hard on the Europeans. They were saying: you guys aren't in the game at all; you're out there, you're spending money, you're buying equipment; you're not buying the right stuff.

The thing that did bother me a little, though, is they did say quite clearly for the Canadians, it's your air force and it's your navy. They never mentioned our ground forces. That's a little disturbing, particularly with the wrecking equipment we have at least, because they're asking for that and we're doing a good job on that.

So you were talking about the fact of not specializing. Instead of the word “specializing”, I tend to look at the word “partnering”, which is going slightly in that direction, but not all the way. I'd like to hear your comments on that, because what we're seeing at NATO right now is a lot of specializing, yes, and then people are partnering along with that.

We're stuck in a situation here where we have one big partner on the other side. We have another partner that's starting to have a little opening, and that's Mexico. We've opened that door there very slightly, but we're opening it.

What are your thoughts on the partnering part? We're being a specialist as a partner in a particular group, which is a little of what we're doing now. You take what we're doing with the navy in Afghanistan; we're doing the protective part of their carrier group.

What we did in Kosovo with our air force was that we had the equipment. Granted, if we don't keep up on that, we will also lose ground very badly.

º (1615)

Mr. Clive Addy: My response is that we've been doing that since NATO was created. 1st Air Wing was always part and parcel of 4th Air Tactical Air Force, joint with them. We were always part...if not in the northern army group, in the southern army group, and the navy was always doing submarine warfare primarily as part of the Atlantic defence. So before you go in and say it's something new, it isn't, and we have been doing certain things like that before.

What we have done since the end of the Cold War is what we should have done before then, and that is to put together the jointness of the Canadian Forces and act as part of a joint organization.

When you're looking at structures and at those kinds of partnerships, you have to be quite readily aware, as Canadians, that as you break up those three forces and dish them out, whatever level you dish them out at, you lose more and more sovereignty the longer and lower you get. Your control on how your soldiers are treated, where they're going, what they're doing is less and less the smaller the group.

And that is why, from the Second World War onwards, they said when we go into those things, they should not be below the rank of general officer. We've done that since the 1990s and it's had some funny repercussions. Some of them are folklore or assumed to be consequences, others would require some honest research.

To answer your question, I think most of the conflicts we're going to be involved in will force us more and more towards the Americans, more and more towards service linkages, as opposed to a joint linkage as Canadians. We should not lose the ability to operate as a joint group, as Canadians, in an operation that we would want to take part in and the Americans would not want to take part in right away. It seems to me we did that at the start of the Second World War and other places like that, so that possibility has to be retained, intellectually and organizationally, if not otherwise.

I think a study would have to be done in a much more profound manner than my answering the question, yes it's a good thing, no it's a bad thing at this particular time.

Mr. David Price: I guess what I was looking at is this. We're talking about a new white paper and going in that direction. We have to start looking at it in different ways.

Today they mentioned we have a new kind of war out there, the terrorist war. It's different. There's not a visible enemy, there's not a visible country, and when you win a battle it's silent. If you stop a plane from being hijacked, you've won a victory.

Mr. Clive Addy: Right now it is in Afghanistan. But if there were the same battle in Iraq, if something went up in the Middle East--and our Prime Minister has already told us we'd be there if somebody called us--I'd suggest to you that they would be somewhat different from some of the battles we've been used to, to date.

Mr. David Price: That's why I say we have to be careful. We're not preparing just for a war on terrorism. We have to keep the other side there, too. We have to be very careful about that, because what we see happening with particular countries is that they are looking in that direction and saying it's terrorism, and they're focusing just on that.

Mr. Clive Addy: Terrorism includes other types of threats, which involve a whole pile of very strange things.

Maybe I should have given that lecture on where we're going. To me it appears that in that domain it will require us to focus a lot more on what defence of Canada means, as opposed to the idea that we should focus elsewhere. That dominated our thinking during and after the Cold War. Now this change has said that part of our defence concept has to focus a little more on what we do at home, and from a conceptual point of view, that is important.

The Chair: Thank you, General Addy. Thank you, Mr. Price.

Next is Mr. Stoffer.

Mr. Peter Stoffer (Sackville--Musquodoboit Valley--Eastern Shore, NDP): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you, sir, for your presentation.

I just want to make a comment to Mr. Benoit of the Canadian Alliance Party about the good work he did with Corporal McEachern of Edmonton regarding the ombudsman report. I think that was an outstanding piece of work, which the ombudsman redid today. I know you did a lot of work yourself. So I thank you for that.

Mr. Price, perhaps you should have taken the Prime Minister along with you to Washington if you want an ally when it comes to military expenditures. That's just a little joke.

My first question to you, Mr. Addy--

º (1620)

The Chair: Mr. Stoffer, don't you know the rule? Cheap shots are only permitted on this side.

Some hon. members: Oh, oh!

Mr. Peter Stoffer: I was trying to get a joke in there.

Here comes another one. What I'm about to say is not in reference to our current Minister of National Defence. Don't we risk putting all our military eggs in one basket? I don't mean that with regard to the minister per se. Everyone is talking about our relationship with the U.S., where we're becoming closer aligned and are doing more military exercises. But the fact is that we have a good relationship with NATO, although maybe not what it should be according to the white paper. When it comes to our meeting the global threat of whatever may happen down the road--we have no idea what could happen tomorrow--wouldn't it be more advisable to have better liaison with other countries we're neighbours with, such as Holland, England, Australia, New Zealand, the United States, or Mexico? I get the feeling that we're focusing just on what the Americans want and what they're doing. I fear that we may put all our military concerns into one basket. We did that to our economy. If they eventually go down south, we go down south. We have no backup for that. The same would apply to the military. Wouldn't you agree?

Mr. Clive Addy: I think there's a risk and that there's reality in the risk. Let me put it that way.

There was a wonderful article in the New York Times two days ago that referred to the end of NATO, American force, American strength. It's worth reading. It's by an American. It says that the end of NATO will be the predominance and the extension of the capability. In Lord Robertson's speech the other day on people contributing, he made reference to the same point. I think that is very much a concern that people have, that the Americans will become so uniquely powerful. They've already shown in this last one, quite frankly, that they will choose their allies, the ones they prefer, just as you pointed out, Mr. Price, and they will make up their own rules as they go along. That on its own has a danger that Canada must look at--but not just Canada, the whole of NATO.

On the other hand, you have to be honest about it. Our good Dutch friends, the Brits, and the others that wanted to go to Kabul decided they didn't want Canada. They wanted Canada only in an engineering fashion, probably to build the headquarters or whatever of the organization that was there. From my perspective that's not the role for Canada's army either. It's not our type of role.

It's not an easy solution, but it is a risk, and putting our “egg” in one basket is--

Some hon. members: Oh, oh!

Mr. Peter Stoffer: That's a good line, isn't it? You can use that, by the way.

Mr. Clive Addy: That is what would bother me the most, I would suggest.

Mr. Peter Stoffer: Okay. Thank you for that.

You also mentioned giving up personnel and equipment. I'd also like to discuss the fact that we're still downsizing the military in terms of the supply chain being outsourced to Tibbett & Britten of England and the fact that they're still looking at bases and infrastructure to downsize. I assume it's being done to save money and to put that money in other forms. Do you think it's a good idea at this time, prior to a new white paper or a new review, to be outsourcing our supply chain and our military facilities similar to what we're doing in Shearwater?

Mr. Clive Addy: I think a lot of what people thought would be the great benefits of out-sourcing have not produced the results they wanted. It produced risks they had not foreseen. I think there should be a pause in all of that. I think a pause would be wise in order to have a look at what the results of that have been.

On the other hand, I'm not one who shares the criticism that everything that has to be done from a logistic point of view must be done by someone in uniform. I think there is room there for contractors.

Mr. Peter Stoffer: There is now.

º (1625)

Mr. Clive Addy: I would suggest to you that most of our heavy lift is from contractors, and you might try to find more reliable allies or more reliable contractors to do that. I would encourage them to do that.

Mr. Peter Stoffer: Sir, you are a major-general and a career soldier. We heard in November that the troops were to be put on a 48-hour notice for departure. My question to you is this, and I asked the minister this, but he never did answer it. How are they going to get there in 48 hours from Edmonton?

Mr. Clive Addy: No, I think you're mixing apples and oranges in the sense that the soldier himself is on 48 hours' notice to get on the bus to leave Edmonton in order to go wherever they want. Whether 48 hours is a reasonable amount of time or an exaggerated amount of time, I leave that to the commanders who chose that at the time. It doesn't mean they are going to be in Afghanistan in 48 hours; it means they are going to be at the gates of their base ready to go with all their kit, briefed and properly trained. Please understand that is what it meant.

Whether people should have been on that notice, the impacts of that mean that there are no holidays, no leave, no this, no that. Anybody on course probably gets their course cancelled, whether it's a military course or a private course. It has large implications. And I caution anybody to use that just to show people how macho or ready they are. That really is a bad use of leadership. You have to think about those notices to move intelligently, because they have repercussions on everything.

Mr. Peter Stoffer: Sir, the government never did meet the obligations of the 1994 white paper in terms of its troops, its reservists, its equipment, and its finances. After the comments by the minister about adjusting the white paper to the current realities of the economics, is there not a fear that they may end up dumbing down the current white paper and making it even worse than it is now?

Mr. Clive Addy: That's my greatest fear. I don't know if I'd deal with it this way, but I would ask this committee, in particular, to have a look at how Australia went about designing its new defence white paper.

It has an annex there that is called “Funding”, and when you sign up to the principles, you sign up to the cheque, and the pay and bill. I do not see us having a security white paper or a security review without a significantly committed budget to it. It has to be in gross terms.

I don't think there's anybody in uniform who didn't understand that when we went through the serious budgetary restrictions to get ourselves out of the deficit, sacrifices on behalf of everybody were necessary. I am really scared that this same type of mentality is being maintained now when we are a little richer, and secondly, when we have slipped so far at this present time. That's what worries me.

Mr. Leon Benoit: No. That's actually the question I'm going to ask you next. That's scary when you can anticipate. You can tell I'm having a little trouble here this afternoon.

But the issue I'm bringing up right now is that if the Americans become so powerful relative to the other NATO allies that really they deliver most of the military power, this could maybe promote an isolationist mood in the United States amongst the politicians and amongst the population.

º (1630)

Mr. Clive Addy: I might.

Mr. Leon Benoit: It's happened before, so I'm asking you to respond to that possibility and tell us what we can deliver militarily as a country to our NATO allies, to the United States in our NORAD alliance, which could have serious economic consequences, either positive or negative, depending on what we do.

Mr. Clive Addy: I think there is that. If I can relate again to how much the Americans spend on their own defence and how much we do, and with them being that much more powerful than not only us but the rest of the alliance, it does offer that type of thing. They might ask themselves, why should we be allied, because we can do it all on our own? That would be a dangerous type of move and I don't think that the Europeans would want that to happen either, so we have to be careful of that. The military has a great impact on it.

Mr. Leon Benoit: The other issue is the American command idea of expanding NORAD--and this I think is one idea that's been thrown out there--whereby you'd have NORAD basically extended to the army and the navy as well. Many people, including some members of Parliament, have expressed the concern that if this were to happen it would be a real added threat to Canadian sovereignty.

Would you see it that way?

Mr. Clive Addy: Let me go back to an experience I do know, where I thought this was going to be an impossibility, and then it progressed and one had to ask whether it was valid and so on. But it was with the Franco-German brigade or division and it took place when I was at central army group in Europe. I never thought, first of all, that the French and Germans would get together on anything, let alone a division in a brigade, but I saw this thing sort of foment. What they did, however, is retain control to use those troops elsewhere if they weren't being used in that sort of division, and it's that kind of thing that allowed them to be less focused constantly on the idea that he commands differently from me; he's more gigantic; he's the dominating one; he's the A-male or whatever. So all of those types of very human relationships were somewhat attenuated by the fact that they did do other training and they did break away from those structures.

I'd be leery of too much of too much of an integrated structure at the lowest level, too far down the.... I would as a soldier. I would not extrapolate that feeling in regard to the air force, nor would I extrapolate it in regard to the navy, because the navy is a self-contained ship anyway. How many ships to you need in order to say “stay Canadian”? I don't know how many, but I think the task group has worked best in the past.

Mr. Leon Benoit: Yes, so you're not as concerned there as in the army.

The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Benoit.

Members of the committee, perhaps I could take a brief chance to follow up on one of Mr. Benoit's questions.

Maybe you can give me a 15-second answer on this, General Addy. Do you think Americans spend too much on defence?

Mr. Clive Addy: No. Compared to what?

The Chair: Taking into account their global responsibilities and the politics. But you've given the answer, and I appreciate that.

Mr. Peter Stoffer: Is that the money they spend now? What about the future money they plan to spend?

The Chair: I was lumping it all together.

Mr. Bachand, five minutes.

[Translation]

Mr. Claude Bachand: I must pursue the topic broached by Mr. Pratt. Indeed, based on what I have seen, the American president has significantly increased the national defence budget and also did not want to renege on his policy to give taxpayers a tax refund. So his only option is perhaps to invest less in road infrastructure and to soft-pedal social programs, education and health.

So when they say they are putting in enough money, it is often at the expense of other programs. In the final analysis, it is a question of social policy.

I would also like to go back to the question of sovereignty. I am a sovereignist... You know my political party—and if I were Quebec's Defence Minister, I would be very concerned about the turn of events. I would just like you to confirm your opinion. You seem to say that Canada's military capabilities will diminish or become antiquated as the threat to Canadian sovereignty increases. I see that it is always the Americans who give the military commands and always... which is understandable since money talks. I know the Americans and obviously, if they pay 90% of the bill, they will not hand over the command to someone who pays 1%.

It is nonetheless surprising to see the turn of events: we are now under military command, a unified, NORAD-type command that would apply to all the others. Do you think this discussion is related to the fact that there is a lack of political will on the part of the Canadian government to take the military issue seriously by investing the sums necessary to maintain a respectable army?

This is all slowly leading up to a role change which will force us to throw ourselves into the arms of the Americans and lose Canadian sovereignty.

I also do not want to go back to the question of borders or the request by the Americans to harmonize our immigration laws. However, I think they are treating us a little like the 53rd American state. Don't you?

º (1635)

Mr. Clive Addy: Throughout their history, Americans have always taken care of number one first and have always managed that very well, thank you. Sometimes, the interests of our neighbour don't coincide with ours. We haven't always been as good at defending our own rights in all areas. This is a matter of history.

If I may use your own words from your question “forces us to throw ourselves into the arms of the Americans”, I say no to that. There are people who will not throw themselves into the arms of the Americans but who wouldn't give another penny for defence and who, without an agreement, will still find themselves in the same boat as the Americans, whether they like it or not.

If you go ahead with confidence and armed forces of some worth, intelligence and weight, then you will still have some credibility. We can talk in that area with the Americans.

It's an either/or situation.It's not an absolute; defence has never been absolute. It never was and never will be. But what I'm telling you is that in my opinion, for the time being, we're absolutely not doing enough.

Mr. Claude Bachand: When you say “talk with the Americans”, do you realize we're talking about a pygmy conversing with a giant? Maybe the giant isn't interested in discussing things at length. Maybe he's simply interested in having everything under his control and, finally, having the whole planet obeying the same cultural and military, etc., model as the United States of America. Maybe that's also the problem.

Mr. Clive Addy: The art of being Canadian, in North America, is to be so while also being the neighbour of today's major world power. It's a matter of judgment. What do we have to do to remain Canadian and keep a brilliant economy within a respectable social framework in such a context?

I frankly think that at the international level we have to do our share and pay our dues, which often happens to be defence. In this case, it's quite clearly defence.

Mr. Claude Bachand: Do you maintain your assertion—

[English]

The Chair: I'm going to have to cut you off there, Mr. Bachand.

Mr. Wilfert.

Mr. Bryon Wilfert (Oak Ridges, Lib.): Mr. Chairman, through you to the general, I found your comments most interesting. I too am a sovereignist, although my sovereignty is a little larger than just the province of Quebec. I'm very concerned about sovereignty generally in this country, and it would seem to me that probably the most important issue that we are not talking about is sovereignty.

We seem to talk a lot about issues that in my personal view are totally irrelevant--he said, she said, who knew what when. The comments of my colleagues on the other side are interesting, because they're asking questions and making comments in here that would be nice if they were made in the House, quite frankly.

I think the real issue is the issue of sovereignty and how we are going to protect that sovereignty. Canada historically has never had a large standing armed forces either at the beginning of the Great War or at the beginning of the Second World War. In fact, we didn't have a tank, but we wound up with the third or fourth largest army at the end of the Second World War. We have always responded effectively when our national interests have been threatened.

You indicated we're not congratulating ourselves, even in the House, about the capture of these al-Qaeda individuals by JTF-2. Instead, we seem to be concerned about other issues. So those particular soldiers were well trained and obviously did their job, which seems to have been lost both in the media and in some other quarters.

You mentioned that all states are governed by the national interest and quite clearly you put some cold water on the issue of specialization. You talked about what the defence of Canada means. What I would like to know is this. What specific tools do you think we need in the defence of Canada? Obviously, if you're going to have tools you need to have the dollars, I don't think there's any question of that. If we have the dollars and we are prepared to earmark the dollars, where should those dollars actually go in the defence of Canada?

Secondly, when the Secretary-General of NATO talked about Canada, Mr. Chairman, he also talked about the European allies and about the fact that everyone needs to tow their weight and that the United States since September 11 has rediscovered multilateralism. Up until September 11 they were doing everything but acting on a multilateral basis. In fact, they were retreating again. I think the issue is how to keep the Americans engaged.

Thirdly, the issue of America's command is a very important debate and one that I think we should be having in this committee and that I would be totally and unequivocally opposed to. I was surprised that the general in question made those comments when he did. The department seems to be making lots of comments, logos, and other things that have not been discussed here. I often wonder who's making the policy. In any event, perhaps you could comment on what you see as a way to counterbalance that kind of approach, which in my own view would not serve the national interest.

Finally, I would just say, General, that I would absolutely agree with your comment about British Columbia, having visited the former base at Chilliwack. I think it was absolutely the wrong decision, given the moneys that were invested in there, and to try to operationalize everything out of Edmonton to me makes no sense. That base is still there today. It's still an unresolved issue, which I think is a tragedy. At least it could have been turned into a major training base or facility, but certainly given the nature of earthquakes and forest fires and a need to respond rapidly, I think we should never have closed it. But then I wasn't here at the time that we did.

That would be through you, Mr. Chairman.

º (1640)

The Chair: Mr. Wilfert, I appreciate your observing the protocols of this committee, and I must say as well, Mr. Wilfert, that you appear to be catching Mr. Benoit's disease.

Some hon. members: Oh, oh!

The Chair: General Addy, you have a little less than a minute to respond.

Mr. Clive Addy: I think your question of sovereignty is a key one, and I think the question of sovereignty and how you protect it is a key one. The question I would throw back to you is this: under what circumstances would you allow American troops in Canada, under whose command, and under what circumstances? I think that's the measure you have to think about when you're thinking about whether we are going to be in groups together or not. You have to think of what those circumstances are, and if the circumstances end up being because we have nothing here on the ground to do our own, we haven't done enough on our own.

What do I mean by that? I would say to you that if there is a flood, a strike, or something like that where we cannot respond any more to the kinds of things we've been used to responding to and the citizens of Canada expect us to respond to, then we've gone below that sort of level.

What about the air force, and the navy, and the coastal protections, and our own laws, and so on? If we have armed forces who are incapable of maintaining the policies we have established as a country, like a 200-mile limit, and to police those, and we don't have enough people to do it adequately based on the threat, based on the commercial protection that we must afford, then I'll assure you that, one, those restrictions will not be respected, and secondly, those restrictions that are of interest to the Americans will be protected by the Americans, and that's a loss of sovereignty.

In the air area, we rely as much on space, if not more proportionately and per capita, as do the Americans. And when this debate starts and we say are we going to “arm space”, have a missile defence system, it's in our interests to establish our own criteria and our own policy. And if we don't know what we're doing and we don't know that we have realms of commerce up there, then we're not governing responsibly.

The Chair: General, I'm going to have to cut you off there, unfortunately.

Mr. Wilfert.

º (1645)

Mr. Bryon Wilfert: want you to know, Mr. Chair, that I happen to be one of the few members here who recognizes the chair on a consistent basis, and I think one should expect a little more of a liberal approach from the chairman.

The Chair: Duly noted, Mr. Wilfert.

Mr Stoffer.

Mr. Peter Stoffer: Mr. Chairman, thank you.

Major-General Addy, you're absolutely right, and so is Mr. Wilfert, about some of the questions that have come from opposition regarding the uniforms--who knew what when. But the reason we asked that is that they may be minor in detail, but if the government can't answer a simple question as to uniforms or a simple question as to who knew what...

Mr. Wilfert has said about the JTF and the capture of those al-Qaeda people we have no proof that JTF2 actually captured those people. For all intents and purposes, they could have been just escorting them on behalf of the Americans. We simply don't know. We can't congratulate them if we simply don't know. And I'll put to you that we shouldn't have to have that information. JTF2 is a secret force. They shouldn't be on the front page of The Globe and Mail. I found that rather disgusting, and the minister was bragging about the fact that he recognized it. But my question to you is a little different; it's about integration.

We hear a lot about integration with the U.S., and as you're saying, I have a feeling we're not going to have any command, we'll just more or less do what they tell us. But my question to you is, in terms of doing protection for our country, wouldn't it be wise to integrate our armed forces, for example, and work with our coast guard, our RCMP, our CSIS, CSE, etc.?

In the recent NAFO talks--that's the fisheries--over in Europe, Canada lost every argument we tried to fend off against illegal fishing inside our 200-mile limit. We have absolutely no way of determining who is illegally fishing in our waters; we just know it's happening. So if we can't protect our fish stocks, how in God's name are we ever going to protect ourselves militarily if we don't integrate our forces, for example, the armed forces with our coast guard and every other element of security? And I can't agree with you more about forming a security issue for the country in the future.

Mr. Clive Addy: s that a question?

Some hon. members: Oh, oh!

Mr. Peter Stoffer: He's good. I feel like I'm in the House.

Should we not integrate more closely with our own domestic services?

The Chair: General Addy, I think Mr. Stoffer--

Mr. Clive Addy: Yes. The question of having an interdepartmental security approach with those four departments I mentioned before and involving all the others is indeed just for that very reason. You can't have a fisheries policy that is not protected, secured, policed, call it what you will; you just can't have it.

Mr. Peter Stoffer: And last question, sir, when you talk about a land force based in, for example, British Columbia, how many people are you actually referring to?

If we wanted to make a recommendation to the government, we'd have to say a brigade or a troop level of so many people. What would you recommend?

Mr. Clive Addy: In field engineers, in the squadron last time... I would say you have to be talking about anywhere from about 500 to 1,000 regular force there, anyway.

Mr. Peter Stoffer: Sir, I would like to throw this at you and see if you would recommend it or not. Some of us have been calling for an inspector general, someone completely independent of government who responds to Parliament. Regarding availability or anything to do with the white paper, we could actually say we could move them in 48 hours and we'd have that capability.

We have an ombudsman now, but we don't have an inspector general to actually see if the government is meeting its commitments. Would you agree or disagree that this is the position that we require in this country--a watchdog, more or less?

Mr. Clive Addy: I will answer the question quite bluntly and say that the senior person in uniform's responsibility... should be that person. And I would be hard pressed to say that an inspector general outside of that is necessary for a country of our size.

I would suggest to you, however, that within the structure of the Canadian Forces there is room for an inspector general to make sure that all three forces are meeting their commitments.

Mr. Peter Stoffer: Wouldn't you agree, sir, that the Chief of the Defence Staff and those other positions are very political? You've been in those positions before, and I get the feeling that they sound an awful lot like the minister themselves and not like soldiers. That's why I say it should be someone independent, so we can get rid of any perceived political bias.

º (1650)

Mr. Clive Addy: It's Canada's tradition, and I've written about this and I've said it before, and that's the way the things are. If you wish to change it, gentlemen, you are more qualified than I to decide. But Canada's tradition is that man in uniform. When he is talking before a group like this or any group where he's talking about government policy, either he follows what the minister says, with whatever subtle nuances his brain will permit him to make, or he takes his uniform off.

The Chair: Thank you, General Addy.

Mr. Wood.

Mr. Bob Wood (Nipissing, Lib.): General, you were making reference to the media and you said that our country might have more advisers than soldiers. Well, the media seems to have more military advisers than the military does.

The thing that bothers me about these people is that every time they get on the tube and radio, they don't have a lot of positive things to say about the military and the way it's run. And I am wondering whether we are doing anything right.

Mr. Clive Addy: We're doing a lot right.

Mr. Bob Wood: Good. Tell me about it.

Mr. Clive Addy: We're hiring Canadians to do our work.

Mr. Bob Wood: That's it?

Mr. Clive Addy: That's probably the biggest one, yes.

Are we equipping our people properly? Not as well as we should. Do we have enough people and are we looking after them as well as we should? I don't think so. There are bundles of paper. Are we looking at the wrong topics when we talk about our military? More frequently than not, yes.

What things are we doing right? What things have we done right? The last thing we did right is we decided to get involved and we decided to get involved with the right people. We decided to get involved with the Third Battalion, Princess Patricia's regiment. We decided to send them into Afghanistan. We decided to send them in a combat role for which they were trained. That was a very good decision.

I could go on. I will say that the question for which you take a lot of credit is what we did for the quality of life of our soldiers and our families. I think the work of this committee was outstanding in that venue. What really bothered me was that it was an uphill fight. The requirement for it to become a fight is what bothered me.

The fact that people who were actually serving in uniform could not decide on their own not to raise rents in places like Edmonton, when the heating wasn't working, and all the rest of it...I had to ask myself why that occurred. Why did it take a standing committee, why did it take that kind of effort in order to bring justice to the people? And why do they have to keep an eye on that constantly so that it's not eroded?

Those are the things that upset me. I would love to turn around and say that we are doing the best we possibly can as Canadians. I can say to you right now that the soldiers, sailors, and airmen we have are doing the best they possibly can.

You go to see a reserve armory across Canada--and I'm sure you've had the opportunity--and you ask yourself this: is this the quality that Canada should expect its sons and daughters to be serving in? I don't think so.

Mr. Bob Wood: You retired in 1996--

MGen Clive Addy: I did indeed.

Mr. Bob Wood: --and I think when we were having these hearings someone--I don't know if it was Baril or who it was--made the statement that their priorities were wrong. They had a choice. They could either invest their money in equipment or invest their money in the quality of life for the people, and they at that time decided to go with the equipment.

Is that right? I think that's what we were told.

Mr. Clive Addy: There's probably a lot of truth in that, yes. But there are some things in terms of people, as you must know, that are generated by Treasury Board and over which the military has very little choice.

One of the questions that arose is that if I am working in this department rather than DND, or even at DND as a civilian, and there's a Treasury Board regulation for salaries of people at this x rate, the money comes right out and everybody even at DND is paid that. But if you raise the salaries in the military, go ahead and see what happens. That means your O and M is going down, your capital budget's being affected, this, that, the other thing. It's a very funny little game that's being played there. And since that game was being played, it was putting false options in the hands of commanders. And, yes, indeed, I do believe you are correct when you say they opted to have equipment more than they opted to have money for the people.

Mr. Bob Wood: General, I have one last question. I would like you to outline what you think are the top three priorities for the forces and I'd like you, if you can, to give this committee some idea of how much money it would cost to satisfy those priorities.

Mr. Clive Addy: That's a good question, and I will answer it in generalist terms as much as I possibly can.

I think the army needs help. I think the armed forces has to go up to at least 70,000. I think your reserves have to be re-established in Canada. When I said we have to look after our own communities in Canada, I think a big focus of that has to be on the reserves--and not using the reserves to see how fast can they go and fill a hole in the regular force, but really give them a job right back here in Canada. I think that our navy is doing a fine job, and I think at the present time the navy needs trained people more than it needs anything else. I think our air force at this particular time has to be focusing more on its role in the next dimension, space, than on a lot of other things it is focusing on now.

º (1655)

Mr. Bob Wood: What about money?

Mr. Clive Addy: I would say 1.9% of GDP would do the job. I would say if you gave us 1.6% you'd probably shut up General Addy for a while, but the next generation would ask for the other 0.3%.

The Chair: Very succinctly put, General.

Mr. Benoit.

Mr. Leon Benoit: Thank you very much. I have to leave at 5 p.m. so I'll go to short snappers here, General--

Some hon. members: Oh, Oh!

Mr. Leon Benoit: --well, for me, relatively brief ones.

American politicians privately and publicly say that they want to get out of peacekeeping because it keeps their troops from large group training and they're really concerned about that. I've heard it first privately and now it's been said publicly by some of the top American politicians speaking on the issue.

What are your thoughts on that in Canada? Has an overcommitment to peacekeeping in the past caused problems with training?

Mr. Clive Addy: I would say to you as a Canadian, as a citizen of Canada and as a citizen of the world, that you have responsibilities internationally. You have to choose them properly and you have to be prepared to have them. When you have an armed force that is so small that you keep sending the same people around, you have a problem. That problem is not in what your role should be, it is that you don't have enough people or resources dedicated to fulfilling that role. You must train your people before you go on peacekeeping, they must have the collective training, and they must have time to get a breath before they go on to the next one. And we don't have that volume.

Mr. Leon Benoit: I want to ask a question that you've actually asked yourself in your presentation under the section on what is then the state of our forces now and into the future, and is this state as it should be. And near the end of the first paragraph you say: “we find that funds preclude in large measure the attainment of the levels of teamwork deemed necessary for operational preparedness”. One might ask similar questions about the acclimatization, operations, or tactics that the 1,000 destined for Afghanistan might have practised together.

I'm asking that question. I want you to respond to it.

Mr. Clive Addy: I think I responded to it in another part when I said that statistically, of the nine battle groups in Canada, only two of them actually trained as a battle group per year. That means four over a two-year tour, which is normally the commanding officer's tour. So you figure it out.

Mr. Leon Benoit: But I want you to explain why that's important.

Mr. Clive Addy: Why is that important?

Mr. Leon Benoit: Yes.

Mr. Clive Addy: Because that's how you get the collective skills required and the individual knowledge of the company commanders, the sergeants-major, the CO, and how these organizations operate. Otherwise they will go out through the whole chain of command and be advising people around here. They are two- and three-star generals as they come into this op, and they've probably never touched what their profession demands that they do. Are they skilled, are they talented? No, not if they haven't been able to do that.

I can tell you that theoretically I probably could have given you a wonderful lecture on how to command a battle group or a brigade, but until I took it out into the dark, and until I got a few people lost and things didn't turn up right.... I reacted how I could. Then I sent those people over to that first role in Bosnia, and I went over to see how they were doing, whether my brilliant plan made any sense or not. It had big holes in it, let me tell you.

But that's after years and years of training. You have to practise people in those things, and that is training, that is teamwork. You wouldn't expect a football team just to dress and be qualified to hike a ball and then ask them to go out there. Why would it be any different for an army?

The Chair: You've never seen the parliamentary football team.

Some hon. members: Oh, oh!

Mr. Leon Benoit: And the football team only has money on the line, not their lives. There's a big difference.

You mentioned the DND briefings, as recommended in the Somalia inquiry. Could you explain what you're getting at there?

Mr. Clive Addy: I'm sorry?

Mr. Leon Benoit: You mentioned the issue that we don't get DND briefings, as recommended in the Somalia inquiry.

» (1700)

Mr. Clive Addy: Oh, yes. My view is that when you have a conflict--you can call it a war, a major conflict, a terror, or whatever you wish to call it--and you have people deployed in those kinds of missions, you should have regular briefings by people who know what's going on, in a public forum. I don't think you should have the CNN thing every morning, but I would suggest to you that... Since October, how many have we had? Can you count them on your hands?

Mr. Leon Benoit: Two.

Mr. Clive Addy: I would say that's not enough, and that half of what you're arguing about in the House of Commons could have been avoided by having these briefings regularly, having people brought up to date as to what's going on.

Mr. Leon Benoit: Exactly. Thank you very much.

Mr. Clive Addy: I'm sorry, but it's not just for the House of Commons, either. It's for the men and women in the forces. It does two things: it informs them and it reassures them that the proper decisions are being made.

Mr. Leon Benoit: Thank you.

Can I ask one more?

The Chair: Actually, I don't think you have time.

Mr. Leon Benoit: Okay.

Thank you very much, General.

The Chair: Mr. Price.

Mr. David Price: General [Inaudible—Editor] when we were down there the week of September 11, but the Americans are now talking about this nice new chunk of budget they're going to put in the military. It will include a standing force of 5,000 permanently based in Europe--I'm going in another direction. I'm wondering how you think that's going.

The way I understand it, I think it's going to come under NATO. I think that's what they're looking at. But I'm wondering what your thoughts are on how that's going to affect [Inaudible—Editor]. All of a sudden, now there's another whole group there. What are the Europeans going to do?

Mr. Clive Addy: My only perception is the tendency towards getting Europe to do its own side of NATO, and with the expansion of NATO at the present time, I'd be hard pressed to give you even an opinion at this moment. To answer that honestly, Mr. Price, I'd have to do more than just give you the end-of-the-conference answer. I'd have to look at it, I'd have to study it.

Mr. David Price: I found it very interesting that the Americans have been pulling--

Mr. Clive Addy: It is, and it's a big indicator of whether there's confidence in the rest of NATO too.

Mr. David Price: Exactly.

Mr. Clive Addy: Now, the other side of the coin, as you know, is that an offer has been made in respect of nuclear missile defence, of the Americans and the Russians getting together and providing something. The other leg in that is the Europeans doing something. So if there's any sauce that is unclear right now, or is unstirred at this particular time, it is certainly that domain.

Mr. David Price: Well, the European missile defence, which is going to be the first layer, is going to be all-American technology. Well, there's some French, but it's mostly all-American technology. The Americans are the ones making the dollars in that.

I have a question on the reserves, which I believe in very strongly, footprints in the community. In particular, do you think September 11 will create an opening to move ahead a little further in our reserves? You mentioned the fact that the lack of training hours is just terrible for the reserves. Should we be looking at specifying the roles they now have a little more clearly? I don't mean re-roling, by any means.

Mr. Clive Addy: In respect of the reserves, I would recommend the armed forces look at recognizing that the reserves have a military task for which they must have a certain potential, and they have a regional task for which they must have a responsibility. That's the way I would look at it.

I would say that as you throw money at OCIPEP--I know the acronym, but I don't know exactly what it means... yes, the Office of Critical Infrastructure Protection and Emergency Preparedness, its linkage with the footprint across the community is, I think, important. I think it's something people should look at.

The Chair: Have you anything further, Mr. Price? You have a minute and a half left.

Mr. David Price: I have a couple questions that are way too long.

Looking at the direction we should be going in, you mentioned the involvement of all the different ministries in a new, let's say, start-up of a policy going toward a white paper. Do you think we should involve all of those ministries at the same time, or should we go ahead and develop the foreign policy side of it completely before looking at the military side?

Mr. Clive Addy: I think the foreign policy side has to come before the military side. But I also think foreign policy is not the only one. I really do think the security of Canada and the Solicitor General's branch have to be part of it as well. I think those two elements are very, very key before you involve what kinds of tools will then be used, which is in fact what the Department of Defence is--it's the tool to execute a portion of that security.

Mr. David Price: But do you think we should go... I think you mentioned--

Mr. Clive Addy: I don't think you should involve every department right off the bat. You and I will not be still alive when those recommendations are produced.

» (1705)

The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Price.

Monsieur Bachand.

[Translation]

Mr. Claude Bachand: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have two quick questions.

The National Defence budget is still a major item. The Canadian government invests over $11 billion in national defence. Do you think there's still room within those $11 billion to better manage that money?

A voice: Twelve.

Mr. Claude Bachand: Sorry, $12 billion. Do you think there's another way, what with all the divisions and sections in the department, to manage this $12 billion amount even better? I know the answer may be long, but I'm asking you to think about it.

Mr. Clive Addy: There are ways to save money. I can tell you that right off the bat. Here's an example. If you have to buy ships, buy them from the Americans and you don't need a shipbuilding industry in Canada. We can do it that way; it's less expensive. It's that much less taken away from those $12 billion.

Mr. Claude Bachand: You're getting into a very interesting debate there, the debate about “requirements” or “procurements”. If you have the choice of buying a ship for $100 more in Canada and decide to buy in the U.S. instead, is that good?

Mr. Clive Addy: If the difference were $100, I'd say you're a dope, but I can assure you it will be a bit more than that.

Mr. Claude Bachand: So what's the cut-off point for not being considered a dope anymore?

Mr. Clive Addy: I don't know. There's no absolute. You're asking how much we should invest in the future of any given Canadian industry and what risks we'd be taking by paying less for a piece of equipment rather than having the capacity in question.

Mr. Claude Bachand: To get back to my first question. You still think there is room to...

Mr. Clive Addy: I think there is still room in the area of material procurement. I think there may perhaps also be some management methods that could simplify things.

I will put a question to you and give you an absolutely typical example. To enroll someone in the reserves, I can tell you that it takes three and a half months. And that's an improvement over the six months that we needed before. Now, is this reasonable in a modern country like ours? Isn't there a loss of money and effort due to paperwork and procedure? There are also losses because of procedures.

Mr. Claude Bachand: In general, how do you see this question of privatization, in other words the fact of giving over to private enterprise some services that are presently being provided within the National Defence envelope? There is a kind of loss of solidarity when people aren't part of National Defence, and it's given to a private business that is actually working for another employer. Maybe you don't have the same solidarity with Defence as when it's done by people inside the shop. However, costs can maybe be avoided if you call on the private sector. How do you see calling on the private sector?

Mr. Clive Addy: Personally, I accept calling on the private sector when it allows us to save the money in the short and long terms without risking the lives of Canadians or Canadian soldiers. In my book, that's the criterion. If it doesn't involve risking the lives of Canadian soldiers, that a criterion.

But when you go to Bosnia and you have a base where everything is breaking down and disappearing, the soldier's life is being threatened. You have to ask what contracts they're under when they're being sent over there, what the rules are and so on.

Mr. Claude Bachand: That seems to be the case in Bosnia, for the whole support sector, the messes and so on. Apparently that was given over to the private sector.

Mr. Clive Addy: Yes.

[English]

The Chair: We don't have any generals speaking. That's our job.

Anything further?

[Translation]

Mr. Claude Bachand: So you seem to be questioning that because if...

» (1710)

Mr. Clive Addy: Non, I was asking you a question, I wasn't questioning that fact.

Mr. Claude Bachand: You're asking a question.

Mr. Clive Addy: Yes.

Mr. Claude Bachand: Do I have time?

[English]

The Chair: You have a minute.

[Translation]

Mr. Claude Bachand: I'd like to get back to the defence of our air space, which is the air force's purview. President Bush put an end to the ABM Treaty. If I understand your position, in the future, we would have to be developing a part of our air force. Are you in favour of the space shield? What's your position on that?

Mr. Clive Addy: The space shield, seen from the context of the Cold War, is a quite different thing than protecting our air space from the context of a probable technological future. During the next five to six years, there is going to be enormous miniaturization that will probably double again during the 20 following years. So a lot of munitions other than traditional munitions, huge rockets, etc., that constitute a menace through... Space become an area where it's more economical to distribute all those elements. So this knowledge of space has to be thought about in view of the long term and...

Mr. Claude Bachand: I see. In your opinion, it's inevitable.

Mr. Clive Addy: In my opinion, it's inevitable. It would be especially irresponsible not to think about it.

[English]

The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Bachand.

Mr. Provenzano.

Mr. Carmen Provenzano (Sault Ste. Marie, Lib.): General Addy, interoperability has been a key factor in Canada's defence policy and we hear perhaps some noises that the current situation might negatively impact on the future interoperability of our land forces. Do you agree with that? What's your position on that?

Mr. Clive Addy: I will take this opportunity to answer a question from one of the honourable members who is not here right now, who asked me: What is good? I would say to you that our naval ships, our shipbuilding, and the interoperability of our navy are probably one of the highest levels of interoperability and positive things that have occurred in the Canadian Forces in a long time. So I'd say no, there is no real problem with the navy.

With the air force, our fighters and our surveillance equipment are becoming a problem at the present time.

And in the army I think there's a long way to go to be interoperable. First of all, we have to decide at what level we're going to be interoperable, and that's a question beyond common uniforms, the same rifle, whether they will buy the Coyote vehicles or not. It has to do with command and control and sharing information and having the same kinds of command and control systems.

So I think in the land there's major progress to be made, in the air we're falling a little behind from where we were, and in the navy we're holding our own. That is the best I can describe it to you.

Mr. Carmen Provenzano: That's good.

Thank you.

The Chair: Mr. Stoffer.

Mr. Peter Stoffer: The problem with the question I'm going to ask is I'll get punished for it down the road. Are we too top heavy in terms of generals and admirals as compared to front-line soldiers and sailors? What is the NATO average, or is there a ratio, say, for general to front-line soldiers?

Mr. Clive Addy: I don't know what the NATO average is. I'm sure that the RCMI have statistics on that.

I would say to you, yes, we are extremely high on general officers versus others. We are far less high than we used to be. Also, in our role as a smaller country with a smaller defence force, we still have to fulfill all of these positions. We still have to have influence around the world at various places such as NATO, NORAD, where if you're going to have influence, you had better not be sending the clerk. You have to have somebody who's trained. So there's a balance to be had there.

I think they're looking at 70 general officers in the Canadian Forces at this particular time. I think that same number of general officers could probably officer a far larger force, but they certainly need those 70.

Mr. Peter Stoffer: Thank you.

On the aspect of defence spending, you touched briefly on shipbuilding and you said “has”. It's actually “had”. We actually had a shipbuilding policy for the defence at one time. But one of the aspects of putting additional resources into the military and building that equipment here in Canada is the regional development that it offers. Yet many presentations we get don't mention that. I'm wondering, is that just an omission?

I would assume that people like you, who are very well respected throughout the country and who are asking for more infrastructure, more money going into the military, would see the benefits of putting 750 people to work in Abbotsford, for example, the benefits of a shipbuilding policy for defence, the benefits of building Coyotes or whatever here in this country, because there are regional developments that equate to that as well.

» (1715)

Mr. Clive Addy: Well, sir, if I could be so bold as to say this, there is another document before Caught in the Middle, done by the Conference of Defence Associations, called The Benefits of Spending on Defence which says exactly what you're asking.

On one hand, it's a benefit. On the other hand, it can become an added cost to a very, very limited budget, so it's not an easy solution. But we have published, shown, distributed a document called The Benefits of Spending on Defence, which points out that very thing.

The Chair: Can we get a copy of that?

Mr. Peter Stoffer: If we could get a copy of that, that would be great.

Mr. Clive Addy: I believe you have one, but I'll get you another one to make sure you do.

Mr. Peter Stoffer: Thank you.

Finally, with all the concerns in the news about what the opposition is doing, with the lack of the Sea King procurement, with the report now about post-traumatic stress disorder, with Susan Riordon and her husband Terry, and all the negative press that comes out about the military, young people are looking at that and asking what...? You talked about 70,000 people for the troops. My question is, where are we going to get them from? What can you advise us to advise the minister or the government to say, if we do this, then we'll have the troop deployment and recruitment down the road? Why would an 18-year-old young man or young woman join the military today, with all the negative press that's out there?

Mr. Clive Addy: It's one of the most difficult questions asked of me today.

Mr. Peter Stoffer: I'm sorry.

Mr. Clive Addy: It is.

I don't say this lightly, but people join, I think... I joined for two things. I joined for adventure and I joined because it gave me a feeling that I'm doing something beyond a job. Those two feelings have to be in the minds of the youth of Canada when they do that.

I think, quite strangely enough, that photograph, which should never have been on the front of The Globe and Mail, is probably going to do more for recruiting than a whole bunch of other things. But it's that kind of thing that attracts people to join the armed forces.

The negative side of the coin is... There's a lot I say that is negative, but I always try to think what it will do to other folks. The other thing about the Canadian military, you must understand, is that because we're so small there is a large network inside that is from father to son, from cousin to whatever and so on, and whenever something is going wrong inside you can stand out here and say it's all rosy, but if you're not telling the truth and they know down there, I'm not sure that's any good for recruiting either. That's why I'm saying it's a dilemma.

If I can make one recommendation, it is to never lose sight in your mind that people serve their country in our armed forces because they have a sense of adventure; that's the first thing they want. The second, which is really, really important, is that they are doing something different. They have something more than a job.

When you talk about quality of life, that's important. But when you say quality of life and I'm not going to allow you any more money for training, you may as well pack it in.

The Chair: Thank you, General.

Mr. Peter Stoffer: You can have the rest of my time, sir.

The Chair: Mr. Stoffer, you owe me.

Mr. Wilfert.

Mr. Bryon Wilfert: Good evening, Mr. Chair.

I have one question the chairman won't be surprised I'm going to ask, because I like to ask this question. It is totally different from what I asked you before.

We are deploying troops in an area of the world where we have basically had no one on the ground, in central Asia, whether it's Tajikistan or Turkmenistan or wherever. Basically our intelligence, in large measure, comes from other sources, particularly through the United States. We're the only G-8 state that doesn't have a foreign intelligence agency.

My question to you is, what do you see--and I'm not asking about the structure or who we have at DND or whether it's stand-alone--in terms of being able to fulfill Canada's national interests and being able to better prepare our forces who are deployed in various regions of the world, keeping in mind that we can't be all things to all people, that the model I might suggest might be the Australian model, on a more regionalized basis? I'd be interested in any of your comments in that regard, and since Mr. O'Reilly came in, I'll say it through the chairman.

» (1720)

Mr. Clive Addy: I'd like to say, first of all, that I agree with you--G-7 and G-8. We need some kind of an intelligence network outside the confines of Canada. I do feel that, and I don't say that lightly. I think, from the benefits you've pointed out, our ability to know about things going on... Intelligence is a commodity, a commodity that's tradable. You could get better deals from the Americans if you could give them something. Canadians have access to forums the Americans don't have access to. If we focus on those types of forums and the kind of information we could get...

And I would suggest to you that we don't need a CIA, but we do need to think about where we get our intelligence from, what embassies we are going to focus on, and who we are going to put in there. Like you, I could care less who does it, as long as he or she's Canadian and they get the information that's required.

Mr. John O'Reilly: Mr. Chair, on a point of order, the bells are ringing, but they're not ringing in this room. There's 12 minutes left.

The Chair: Twelve minutes? Should we head over? Okay.

Thank you very much General Addy. We appreciate your being here today. Your comments have been very informative.

The meeting is adjourned.