JUST Committee Meeting

STANDING COMMITTEE ON JUSTICE AND HUMAN RIGHTS

COMITÉ PERMANENT DE LA JUSTICE ET DES DROITS DE LA PERSONNE

EVIDENCE

[Recorded by Electronic Apparatus]

Wednesday, May 2, 2001

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[English]

The Chair (Mr. Andy Scott (Fredericton, Lib.)): I'd like to call this meeting of the Standing Committee on Justice and Human Rights to order, meeting number 10.

Today, pursuant to a vote taken yesterday, we will be proceeding directly to the clause-by-clause on Bill C-7, an act in respect of criminal justice for young persons and to amend and repeal other acts.

Before we begin that process, I have asked the table to circulate the witness list for Bill C-24, as per the discussion we had yesterday. That is our intention, so please respond to the clerk in terms of that proposal. They will be getting in touch with the various witnesses and asking them to prepare their briefs so we won't lose time and they won't lose time in their preparation.

• 1545

On that note, I'm advised that everybody has a copy of the agenda with the business before us. As long as we have all the paper ready for this exercise, I will proceed to clause-by-clause consideration.

I understand there are amendments to clause 2 from the Canadian Alliance.

(On clause 2—Definitions)

Mr. Chuck Cadman (Surrey North, Canadian Alliance): Mr. Chair, we propose to amend clause 2 by deleting lines 29 to 43 on page 3 and lines 1 to 21 on page 4.

What we're suggesting here is the elimination of the presumptive offence, and what we're doing here is to.... Let's look at our amendment for clause 2, where we're setting up a whole definition for violent offence. Under amendments proposed by us we're doing away with the whole concept of presumptive offence and serious violent offender and the interpretation problems of the government's legislation over what's to be treated in the most serious fashion.

Under the government's legislation of the last Parliament, it had a presumptive offence and a serious violent offence as violent offences and others. In Bill C-7 it has been decided to do without violent offences. We're suggesting just two categories of offence, namely violent offences and non-violent offences, which we'd actually have listed. This has been taken from the Corrections and Conditional Release Act. Violent offences would be those federal legislation already uses as a criterion to determine safety concerns when considering how to treat adult offenders. By following this list we're being consistent, we're being all-inclusive, and we're being transparent so Canadians, the courts, and the offenders will know just how the process actually operates. The courts will retain the power of discretion to consider specific circumstances in each case.

(Amendment negatived)

The Chair: Mr. Cadman or someone else from the Alliance also has amendment A-2 to clause 2.

Mr. Cadman.

Mr. Chuck Cadman: Yes, Mr. Chair. We are suggesting that Bill C-7, in clause 2, be amended by replacing lines 1 to 4 on page 5 with the following:

“violent offence” means an offence under section 235 of the Criminal Code or an offence set out in Schedule I or II to the Corrections and Conditional Release Act.

It's basically the definition of a violent offence, and it's consistent with the CCRA.

(Amendment negatived)

The Chair: Let's go to amendment A-3.

Mr. Chuck Cadman: Mr. Chair, I move that Bill C-7, in clause 2, be amended by replacing lines 7 and 8 on page 5 with the following:

pears to be ten years old or older, but less than sixteen years old and, if the context

This essentially addresses the age of application, making the maximum age of application the 16th birthday and reducing the minimum age to 10.

(Amendment negatived)

The Chair: Shall clause 2 carry as presented?

[Translation]

Mr. Bellehumeur.

Mr. Michel Bellehumeur (Berthier—Montcalm, BQ): I want the record to show that I am opposed to the adoption of clause 2.

[English]

(Clause 2 agreed to on division)

(On clause 3—Policy for Canada with respect to young persons)

The Chair: I see an amendment that is proposed by the government.

Mr. John Maloney (Parliamentary Secretary to Minister of Justice and Attorney General of Canada): The amendment is that Bill C-7, in clause 3, be amended by replacing lines 35 to 38 on page 6 with the following:

right to privacy, are protected,

(iv) timely intervention that reinforces the link between the offending behaviour and its consequences, and

(v) the promptness and speed with which persons responsible for enforcing this Act must act, given a young person's perception of time;

This amendment would add a new paragraph under the declaration of principles to strengthen the notion of timely intervention found in subparagraph 3(1)(d)(iv). This amendment would reinforce the notion of timely intervention according to the policy intent by reminding each person responsible for enforcing the legislation of the importance of intervening rapidly after a young person commits an offence, taking into account the young person's perception of time.

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In fact, this is a paragraph Judge Jasmin suggested in his paper.

The Chair: We've heard the amendment. Again, I just want to make sure everyone's operating off the same paper.

Mr. Toews.

Mr. Vic Toews (Provencher, Canadian Alliance): I have significant legal concerns about the impact of a statement that says “given a young person's perception of time”. Does this now mean that we have to embark on some kind of metaphysical inquiry as to whether or not a prosecution is proceeding in a timely fashion? If it's not proceeding in accordance with this young person's perception of time, what are the legal consequences?

This act is going from strange to bizarre. Maybe I'm missing something. It says, if we take this in context here, the following principles apply in this act—just so that I've got it right—that criminal justice for young persons must be separate from that for adults, and the following shall be emphasized: persons responsible for enforcing this act must act with promptness and speed according to a young person's perception of time.

Now, the administrator of this act has to ask himself, how does a young person perceive what we're doing here? He must then act on the basis of how the young person feels the matter should be proceeding. This imports some kind of subjective test, and I can already see lawyers salivating and wondering about.... Again, is this some kind of metaphysical inquiry? How does this relate to the administration of justice?

Can't we use plain English or—I assume there's an equivalent—plain French and say that matters shall proceed in an appropriate and timely fashion? If we talk about a young person's perception of time, what are we really saying?

The Chair: Is there a response?

[Translation]

Ms. Yolande Viau (Lawyer, Youth Justice, Department of Justice): The intent of this provision is to take into account a young person's notion of time versus that of adults, not any one young person in particular, but youth as a whole. A young person's perception of time, whether it be a week, a month or a year, is not the same as an adult's perception.

Often, young persons who appear in court six months after committing an offence claim that they have no recollection of what transpired. In their mind, these events took place long, long ago. It's important that we understand the importance of rapid intervention. It was in this spirit that the amendment was put forward.

[English]

The Chair: Thank you very much.

Are there any comments? Mr. Toews.

Mr. Vic Toews: If all we're saying is that matters should proceed as quickly as possible, shouldn't we be saying that rather than talking about giving, embarking...? I can just see a young-offender judge saying, well now, what does this young person perceive about time? Now we have a 12-year-old person in front of us, a 16-year-old person, a 17-year-old person. Shouldn't we really just be saying that we ought to move things along in a timely fashion?

Indeed, what are the consequences now if we fail to recognize on a subjective basis what this young person perceives time to be?

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The Chair: Does the government wish to respond?

Madame Viau, Madame Kingston, and Mr. Maloney.

Mr. John Maloney: We're just discussing here whether Mr. Toews might be a little more amenable to.... We appreciate what he's saying. We have “given a young person's perception of time”; what if we had just “given young persons' perception of time”?

Mr. Vic Toews: The issue I'm concerned about here is the subjectivity that we're importing into a legal standard. I think a judge has to be given some discretion to say let's move this along in a timely fashion, and given this individual's circumstances, perception, and what not, this is too long, or we have to have the trial tomorrow or in a month. Am I missing something here?

The Chair: We'll go to Mr. Owen for the government response.

Mr. Stephen Owen (Vancouver Quadra, Lib.): I think it may be helpful to consider the issue in child protection law, which quite properly accepts, as the government witness has mentioned, the different concept of time of young people. I read this to refer generally, not specifically.

I agree with Mr. Toews that a judge should always have the discretion to import some subjectivity into an individual case's consideration, perhaps to speed it up, but I don't see anything in terms of the administration of justice that's offended by simply recognizing what is considered in many child protection statutes as the need to treat youth differently from adults in terms of the need for timely hearings.

The Chair: Does anyone from the government wish to comment?

Mr. John Maloney: If we remove “a” from “a young person's”, and make it s', I think we will have taken it away from the subjectivity of having to look at each accused's perception of time, and generalized it, looking at young people's perception of time. Certainly timeliness was a concern of many witnesses who came before us; they were concerned that they be dealt with in an expeditious fashion.

The Chair: Mr. Toews, could we—

Mr. John Maloney: Actually, it's more consistent with the French as well.

Mr. Vic Toews: All I'm saying is if you look in child welfare proceedings—and I used to do a lot of those proceedings on behalf of the Government of Manitoba and the director of child welfare in Manitoba—there are specific timelines. For example, you have to take a matter before the judge within four days. So there are specific timelines to ensure that a judge is moving a matter along. Obviously you don't want to take a baby away from the mother or the father and lose that baby in a legal no-man's land. But what I'm concerned about are the consequences. Are we jeopardizing a prosecution because some young person might not have, or young people generally don't have, the same perception of time that the judge might have?

There are all kinds of things that are involved here—for instance, the court facilities. I'm thinking of northern areas. We're not just talking about the perception of time; we're talking about facilities. If I go to Norway House in Manitoba to prosecute a young offender, and I only get up there once a month, and I'm snowed out in any particular month, then we've passed two months. That might be an eternity for a 12-year-old boy. I don't know. But this is very dangerous.

The Chair: Paul.

Mr. Paul DeVillers (Simcoe North, Lib.): Mr. Chairman, the way I read the amendment it's simply trying to acknowledge what many of us have learned through experience: that there is a difference in time. Young people appreciate time differently from older people. Maybe when Mr. Toews reaches the age of maturity that some of us on the committee have, he'll have more appreciation for that concept. I think that's basically all we're trying to do.

The Chair: Thank you, Mr. DeVillers.

Monsieur Bellehumeur.

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[Translation]

Mr. Michel Bellehumeur: I find it odd that the government is again tabling at the last minute amendments of this nature. In my view, the bill has been sufficiently amended and is complex enough as it is. However, Mr. Chairman, this is one type of amendment, perhaps the only one that we in Quebec would like to see made to the Young Offenders Act. We want the importance of always acting with speed and diligence to be clearly spelled out.

I cannot object to an amendment like this. However, It's sort of like removing a rotten apple from an entire barrel of rotten apples. Ultimately, the bill is no better for it because it is still out of whack.

Admittedly, the government should have brought in this amendment long ago. We have been asking for just such a provision to be included in the Young Offenders Act. Until now, it has refused to do so. By some miracle, the government has finally realized that maybe it should add a provision respecting speed and diligence.

This provision is, in and of itself, a sound measure, but it is not in the right piece of legislation. This should have been included in the Young Offenders Act in the first place, without all of this messing about.

I have little else to say about this amendment, Mr. Chairman, other than that it is a good amendment, but that it is not included in the right legislation.

[English]

The Chair: Having heard various opinions on this, I'd like to put it to a vote. Do I understand the government's position? Are we amending this, Mr. Maloney, striking the “a”—

Mr. John Maloney: Striking the “a” and making “person's”—

The Chair: “Young persons' perception of time”?

Mr. John Maloney: Persons'.

The Chair: Is that all understood?

An hon. member: No, I don't understand it.

The Chair: If you look at the government amendments, clause 3, page 6, and you look at subparagraph (v), in the second line in subparagraph (v) in that amendment, it says “given a young person's”—possessive—“perception of time”. The “a” is removed and it becomes “persons”', plural possessive. Am I correct?

Mr. John Maloney: Yes.

(Amendment agreed to on division) [See Minutes of Proceedings]

The Chair: We have a second amendment, A-4, again from Mr. Cadman. I understand from the clerk that the first amendment does not interfere with the second amendment, so it is in order.

Mr. Cadman.

Mr. Chuck Cadman: Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Again, this amendment would change line 43 on page 7 to “subsection (1), bearing in mind that the principle set out in paragraph (1)(a) is to be considered the paramount principle set out in that subsection.”

Subclause 3(2) uses the words “liberally construed” to provide wide latitude for the courts and indeed all parties dealing with young persons. What this amendment merely ensures and stresses is the protection of the public must be the principal goal. We're not proposing by this amendment that all other provisions for the benefit of a young person must be ignored. The protection of the public is not at issue in most cases, and in many others a young person can be considered for the full range of options. We're just proposing that the protection of the public must be the principal goal.

Ms. Judy Sgro (York West, Lib.): May I ask a question?

The Chair: Yes.

Ms. Judy Sgro: Is it not possible to get these in writing for us? It would be easier to absorb them. We have ours, but the amendments that Mr. Cadman's putting down, are they...?

The Chair: They're all here. She just doesn't have—

Ms. Judy Sgro: We don't have them.

The Chair: I'm sorry. When I held it up I thought I made it clear. There's a document with a large number of amendments.... I apologize, I thought they were available.

Ms. Judy Sgro: No, none of us have them.

The Chair: Some do. Anyone who doesn't have this large, thick, we'll call it “Cadmanesque” document, please indicate so we can see that you get it.

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(Amendment negatived) [See Minutes of Proceedings]

(Clause 3 as amended agreed to on division)

(On clause 4—Declaration of principles)

The Chair: On clause 4, Mr. Cadman. That would be amendment A-5.

Mr. Chuck Cadman: Mr. Chair, this amendment applies to the restrictions of extrajudicial measures. Do you want me to read the amendment? Can I ask for clarification here? Would you like me to read the amendment in every case?

The Chair: I don't think it's necessary. We all have them in front of us. If you feel compelled....

Mr. Chuck Cadman: Well, I'll read this one:

non-violent offence, has not previously been found guilty of an offence and has not previously been dealt with by the use of extrajudicial measures; and

We have a few amendments on extrajudicial measures, Mr. Chair. I think most people know by now that I've been involved with extrajudicial measures for the past number of years now.

What we want to do with our amendment is to ensure that extrajudicial measures are limited to first-time, non-violent offenders, and that this need not be used for repeat offenders or for violent offenders. That's what this amendment is about, to restrict the use of extrajudicial measures to first-time, non-violent offenders.

(Amendment negatived) [See Minutes of Proceedings]

The Chair: Amendment A-6.

Mr. Chuck Cadman: Amendment A-6 again applies to extrajudicial measures. It essentially follows my previous comments to make extrajudicial measures applicable only to first-time, non-violent offenders.

(Amendment negatived) [See Minutes of Proceedings]

(Clauses 4 to 8 inclusive agreed to on division)

[Translation]

Mr. Michel Bellehumeur: I would imagine that the government plans to vote in favour of all of these provisions. However, I plan to oppose them. Therefore, to speed things up, Mr. Chairman, you can let the record show that I oppose all of these items. Then I won't need to repeat my objection every time.

Thank you very much for your understanding.

[English]

The Chair: Well, we're all happy that you're worried about the time.

(Clauses 9 and 10 agreed to on division)

(On clause 11—Notice to parent)

The Chair: On clause 11, there's amendment A-7 from the Alliance.

Mr. Chuck Cadman: Thank you, Mr. Chair. This would amend clause 11 by replacing line 43 on page 11 with the following:

of the sanction and shall give or cause to be given to every victim of the young person, in writing, notice of the victim's right to request information under section 12.

Clause 12 provides the requirement that “a police officer, the Attorney General, the provincial director or any organization established by a province to provide assistance to victims shall, on request, inform the victim of the identify of the young person and how the offence has been dealt with”, but there's nothing in the legislation requiring anybody to advise the victim of the right to request the information. In other words, it's fine to say that somebody has to honour the request, but if the person wanting the information doesn't know that they can request it, it's kind of useless. So that's essentially what this is about: it's to make sure that people are notified that they are able to request that information.

Mr. John McKay (Scarborough East, Lib.): I have a question.

The Chair: Mr. McKay.

Mr. John McKay: Could I have the government people speak to that? I would like to hear what the objection is to that.

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Mr. Dick Barnhorst (Counsel, Youth Justice, Department of Justice): This issue was considered carefully with provincial officials, and they were generally opposed to having to give this notice in writing to victims.

Mr. Chuck Cadman: They were opposed to letting people know that they had the right to request information?

Mr. Dick Barnhorst: They were opposed to a requirement that would say that in every case they had to give notice to the victim.

Mr. Chuck Cadman: What we're asking for is that they tell the victims that they have the right to request the information.

Mr. Dick Barnhorst: That's right.

(Amendment negatived) [See Minutes of Proceedings]

(Clauses 11 to 13 inclusive agreed to on division)

(On clause 14—Exclusive jurisdiction of youth justice court)

The Chair: On clause 14, we have two amendments. The first is A-8.

Mr. Cadman.

Mr. Chuck Cadman: Again, this amendment follows other similar proposals that change the upper age of application of the legislation of 18 years old to reduce it to 16 years of age, consequential to some of our others.

(Amendment negatived) [See Minutes of Proceedings]

The Chair: Now amendment A-9. Mr. Cadman.

Mr. Chuck Cadman: Amendment A-9 again is consequential and addresses the age of application; it proposes to change the upper age of the legislation from 18 years to 16 years.

(Amendment negatived) [See Minutes of Proceedings]

(Clauses 14 and 15 agreed to on division)

(On clause 16—Status of offender uncertain)

The Chair: On clause 16, Mr. Cadman, amendment A-10.

Mr. Chuck Cadman: I won't read through all of this. Essentially, this again addresses the age of application to move it from 18 years to 16 years at the upper end.

(Amendment negatived) [See Minutes of Proceedings]

(Clauses 16 to 29 inclusive agreed to division)

(On clause 30—Designated place of temporary detention)

The Chair: On clause 30, Mr. Cadman.

Mr. Chuck Cadman: This again addresses the age of application and follows other similar proposals to reduce the age of application from 18 years to 16 years.

(Amendment negatived) [See Minutes of Proceedings]

(Clauses 30 and 31 agreed to on division)

(On clause 32—Appearance before judge or justice)

The Chair: On clause 32, Mr. Cadman.

Mr. Chuck Cadman: This amendment is similar to a number of the others proposed, where adult sentences are to be available for young persons who are at least 14 years of age and who are found guilty of a violent offence.

What we're doing here is eliminating the requirement to determine whether an adult could be sentenced to imprisonment for more than two years and eliminating the presumptive offence treatment. If a young person commits a violent offence and is at least 14 years of age, an adult sentence is to be imposed, unless the court determines a youth sentence is in order.

(Amendment negatived) [See Minutes of Proceedings]

(Clauses 32 to 37 inclusive agreed to on division)

(On clause 38—Purpose)

The Chair: On clause 38, I go first to Mr. Maloney.

Mr. John Maloney: Mr. Chair, I move that clause 38 of Bill C-7 be amended by (a) replacing lines 2 and 3 on page 38 with the following:

section 42 (youth sentences) is to hold a young and (b) by replacing line 8 on page 38 with the following:

reintegration into society, thereby contributing to the long-term protection of the public.

This amendment would rearrange the specific purpose and principles of sentencing to reflect a change made in Bill C-7, the declaration of principles. The motion better reflects the policy intent and makes the specific purpose and principles of sentencing consistent with the purpose and principles set out in clause 3 and responds to a major concern of the Barreau du Québec.

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(Amendment agreed to on division)

The Chair: Thank you very much.

We now have amendment A-13, from Mr. Cadman.

Mr. Chuck Cadman: Mr. Chair, this amendment proposes to clarify and expand the purpose and principles of the youth justice process.

This amendment changes the present wording, which in our view is limited and unsatisfactory. Subclause 38(1) only includes meaningful consequences for the young person and the promotion of rehabilitation and reintegration into society as the purpose of sentencing. We believe the purpose of sentencing needs to be radically enhanced.

This amendment significantly expands the purpose of sentencing to include all the different interests of a proper justice process. There must be consideration of the need to denounce the crime to all citizens, to express our dissatisfaction with this type of behaviour. There must be consideration of how best to deter the particular offender from committing additional offences. And this is different from having meaningful consequences, with respect. That simple sentence of a period of closed custody for an offender may have meaningful consequences for that offender, but it may not be the best way to deter that particular offender from further criminal activity.

I've also added two additional considerations. There must be consideration of promotion for the respect of law and order and the maintenance of safe and secure communities. So where there must be consideration to promote a sense of responsibility to the young person and acknowledgement of the harm done to victims and the community, the present bill seems only to be concerned with interests of the offender where considering the purpose of sentencing and ensures that the sentence has meaningful consequences for the young person and promotes rehabilitation and integration. There is no mention of ensuring the protection of the safety of the community, and there is no mention of acknowledging the harm done to others.

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

The Chair: Thank you very much.

Mr. John McKay: May I speak?

The Chair: Mr. McKay.

Mr. John McKay: Again, I'd like to hear the staff response on the issues of denouncing and deterring, which seems to be a favourite of colleagues opposite. What is the meaningful reason why this would not be included in the principles of sentencing?

Mr. Dick Barnhorst: The absence of deterrence is based on very sound research. I think this committee heard that mentioned last week, when we had the witness from New Brunswick before the committee, who was citing that research.

On the question of denunciation, one of the big issues in the whole sentencing area, of course, is to be very clear, and one of the problems we have under the Young Offenders Act is there is such a variation of possible purposes the court could choose. This is an accountability approach. It says to hold this young person accountable for the offence. That is the purpose—including of course, the meaningful consequences and rehabilitation and reintegration.

It is quite likely that an appropriate, accountable sentence for a young person will have the effect of indicating to the community that this is an inappropriate behaviour, and that's what the denouncing of it would be. But rather than throw that concept in, this idea is based on holding the young person accountable for the offence committed. If it also has the effect, which I think in most cases it will, based on the proportionality principle in this bill, that society is essentially denouncing, saying that this is inappropriate behaviour, I think it's covered in that.

Mr. John McKay: Is it your view that anything is lost in your sentencing principles by not adding those kinds of concepts into the sentencing?

Mr. Dick Barnhorst: Yes. I think it could distort the clarity we have in the principles. The denunciation principle in the Criminal Code can easily take a court off in a different direction from the direction we're trying to address here, which is to focus on the offence and have a proportionate response that holds that young person accountable.

The idea of denouncing as a main purpose would simply not fit with the scheme that is laid out here.

Mr. John McKay: Thank you.

The Chair: Thank you.

Mr. Toews.

Mr. Vic Toews: I'm just curious. You indicate that the principle of accountability may well have an element of denunciation in it, and that may then be communicated to society. Given the restrictions on society ever finding out what happens in court, how is that denunciation in fact communicated to society at large—or accountability, for that matter?

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Mr. Dick Barnhorst: First of all, I want to be clear about how denouncing fits in here. It is the fact that the young person has suffered a significant consequence as a result of committing a significant offence. That's what I'm getting at with the denunciation.

In terms of communication to the public, you're quite right, it's subject to the limitations of the long tradition in the youth justice system of protecting privacy. So for those people who are aware of what happened, in fact that message will be communicated. In addition, the sentence that was given to the young person can be reported in the press; you just can't identify the young person.

The Chair: Thank you very much.

Mr. Toews.

Mr. Vic Toews: We don't give victims the right to know the information. The press can't speak about what has happened or indicate any particular individual's name. Indeed, as I understand it, even after the individual dies the press is unable to report any names or to clarify what may have occurred in respect to that young child or youth or youthful offender.

I don't understand how accountability to society at large is achieved by the individual lawbreaker. All you're saying is that we can never find out who this lawbreaker is. The victim has no right to be notified of that. The only one who may find out is some person who happens to be in the court by coincidence. In fact, there is no formal accountability in any way. The only accountability to society at large occurs by happenstance or fortune.

The Chair: Mr. Owen.

Mr. Stephen Owen: I think what Mr. Toews is saying is that he disagrees with one of the basic premises of youth criminal justice legislation, which is, in many circumstances, to protect the identity of the young offender, with some exceptions as appear in this bill.

I respect his view on it, but I think that is not the thrust of this bill and it's not the thrust of the history of youth offender legislation in this country.

The Chair: Thank you very much.

Mr. Toews.

Mr. Vic Toews: If I have that point clear then, this bill does not in any way attempt to establish any formal accountability mechanism so that society at large knows whether any particular individual has committed a crime or an offence. As long as I can understand that this is the philosophical thrust behind this bill....

The Chair: Mr. DeVillers.

Mr. Paul DeVillers: Mr. Chair, I think Mr. Toews is linking two things that aren't necessarily linked. I think there's accountability for the young offender. The communication of it to society is another issue. So I think we can accept half of what you're saying on the communication side, but we don't accept the first half on the lack of accountability.

Mr. Vic Toews: Fine. So if I can clarify this, there is no linkage between the accountability of a young offender and the transmittal or the knowledge that the society would receive in respect of that accountability—the two are two separate concepts?

Mr. Paul DeVillers: Yes.

Mr. Vic Toews: If that's the position, that those are two concepts, what society is entitled to know and how the offender is dealt with by the justice system....

The Chair: I read respectful disagreement there.

Mr. Owen.

Mr. Stephen Owen: That may be the way you read it. I don't think you should import that meaning to those who have different points of view. There are exceptions to the publication of information to do with more serious offences and there are other ways of holding an individual accountable under the act. So I don't accept the premise of your statement.

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(Amendment negatived) [See Minutes of Proceedings]

(Clause 38 agreed to on division)

(On clause 39—Committal to custody)

The Chair: On clause 39, I refer to amendment A-14.

Mr. Chuck Cadman: Yes, Mr. Chair. Thank you.

What we propose to do in this amendment is to eliminate the patterns of findings of guilt. The question must be asked, what is a pattern of findings of guilt? We've gone through this type of wording in the past, especially with dangerous offender legislation under the Criminal Code. Is a pattern two offences, three offences, what kinds of offences? Do they all have to be similar? Can break and enter, sexual assault, and manslaughter not be a pattern because the crimes are diverse?

Our amendment is closely related to many other similar amendments proposed by us. It also clarifies and simplifies the legislation.

I respectfully suggest that we look at clause 39. It states that a custody order shall not be made unless the young offender committed a violent offence or has failed to comply with previous non-custodial sentences or non-custodial sentences inconsistent with the purpose, and on and on and on.

To my mind, paragraphs 39(1)(a), (b), and (d) probably cover most, if not all, situations. This amendment just addresses paragraph 39(1)(c).

Under the amendment, the youth court justice may make a custody order if the young person committed a violent offence after attaining the age of 14. There is no need to have a history that indicates a pattern of findings, whatever that is. This just leads to further confusion, and I think that a lot of the testimony we've had before has indicated the confusion and the complexity of this. We're trying to alleviate some of that through this amendment.

(Amendment negatived) [See Minutes of Proceedings]

(Clause 39 to 41 inclusive agreed to on division)

(On clause 42—Considerations as to youth sentence)

The Chair: Mr. Cadman, I refer you to amendment A-18.

Mr. Chuck Cadman: Thank you, Mr. Chair. This refers to the maximum custody and supervision period. I believe it's consequential to one that will actually come later under this list.

We're proposing that the total maximum sentence be four years and six months, up from the three years, in order to make sure we maintain the three years of incarceration preceding the one half period of supervision.

(Amendment negatived) [See Minutes of Proceedings]

The Chair: Amendment A-19.

Mr. Chuck Cadman: Again, this deals with the same issue. It's consequential and again proposes to increase the total maximum sentence to four years and six months, up from the current three.

(Amendment negatived) [See Minutes of Proceedings]

The Chair: Amendment A-15.

Mr. Chuck Cadman: This was the original amendment the others were consequential to. I won't bother going through the whole thing again. It deals with increasing the maximum period to four and a half years, up from three years, again to address that same situation.

(Amendment negatived) [See Minutes of Proceedings]

The Chair: Now government amendment G-3.

Mr. John Maloney: The amendment, Mr. Chair, is that Bill C-7 in paragraph 42(7)(a) be amended by replacing lines five and six on page 51 with the following:

(a) either

(i) the young person has been found guilty of an offence under one of the following provisions of the Criminal Code, namely, section 231 or 235 (first degree murder or second degree murder within the meaning of section 231), section 239 (attempt to commit murder); section 232, 234 or 236 (manslaughter), or section 273 (aggravated sexual assault), or

(ii) the young person has been found guilty of a serious violent offence for which an adult is liable to imprisonment for a term of more than two years, and the young person had previously been found guilty at least twice of a serious violent offence;

• 1630

Mr. Chair, this amendment corrects a drafting error that links intensive rehabilitative custody and supervision sentences to age of presumptive offences. The intensive rehabilative custody and supervision order is a therapeutic sentence for youth who have committed the most serious, violent offences. It changes the age of application for presumptive offences made in Bill C-7 or incorporated into the definition of presumptive offences. This change had the unintended impact of linking the intensive rehabilitation custody and supervision sentences to the age that a jurisdiction applied presumptive offences, thereby limiting its application. The amendment would remove age restrictions on this youth sentence, and it responds to a unanimous provincial-territorial resolution, which included Quebec, that the amendment be made.

(Amendment agreed to on division)

The Chair: Amendment A-16, Mr. Cadman.

Mr. Chuck Cadman: Yes, Mr. Chair. This goes to other amendments we've proposed dealing with the elimination of the presumptive—

The Chair: Excuse me, Mr. Cadman. I am advised that with the passage of G-3, A-16 is not receivable.

A-17 is receivable.

Mr. Chuck Cadman: A-17 goes to the elimination of the serious violent offence, and it follows a number of other similar proposals of ours. The category of serious violent offence is to be eliminated. They would only be violent offences that are clearly defined within the list, and non-violent offences too. Bill C-7 is confusing and complicated. It's been written, I would suggest, as a make-work project for lawyers, and I think we've heard enough evidence of that. What will be a serious violent offence? What will be presumptive? I've made those arguments before. This amendment goes toward the elimination of the serious violent offence.

(Amendment negatived [See Minutes of Proceedings])

(Clause 42 as amended agreed to on division)

The Chair: Monsieur Bellehumeur.

[Translation]

Mr. Michel Bellehumeur: Several witnesses have stated that this is a good example of an overly complex provision. I would like someone to explain it to me and to give me a concrete example of how it will be implemented.

[English]

The Chair: Which article, Michel?

[Translation]

Mr. Michel Bellehumeur: Are we not on clause 43?

[English]

Ms. Paula Kingston (Counsel, Youth Justice, Department of Justice): Basically, what it says is that if a youth has two youth sentences, you add them up, and the beginning of the sentence is the start date of the first sentence and the end date is the end date of the last sentence. And you apply any kind of eligibilities for review or whatever based on the merged sentence. You merge the sentences.

The Chair: Thank you very much.

Monsieur Bellehumeur.

[Translation]

Mr. Michel Bellehumeur: You've read me the clause, but in concrete terms, in everyday life, how would it apply? You read to me the text of clause 43, which no one understands. I can read it for myself. It says:

[...] deemed to have been sentenced to one youth sentence commencing at the beginning of the first of those youth sentences to be served and ending on the expiry of the last of them to be served.

It's all there in black and white. I can read it for myself. However, in concrete terms, what does this all mean? Give me an example for a young person charged with shoplifting. He receives a sentence. Subsequently, he is charged again. I image that's what happens, because now there are two sentences. I'd like an example because I don't understand this clause. I can only draw some comfort from the fact that all of the witnesses found this provision to be overly complex and drafted in nonsensical jargon. Give me a concrete example that will help judges eventually interpret this piece of legislation that everyone in Quebec is so eager to see passed.

[English]

Ms. Paula Kingston: A simple example would be a young person who has been convicted of an offence and received a sentence for six months and then received a consecutive sentence for three months. The sentence would then be a nine-month sentence, and you would add up the two sentences in that case. And in determining the portion to be served in the community and in custody, you would apply it to the nine-month sentence. You basically merge those two sentences.

[Translation]

The Chair: Mr. Bellehumeur.

Mr. Michel Bellehumeur: According to the example you just gave, would the young person then receive a 9-month sentence, rather than a 15-month one? Would the longer of the two sentences remaining to be served be chosen?

• 1635

[English]

Ms. Paula Kingston: Just to be clear, it would be a six-month custody and supervision order, followed by a consecutive three-month custody and supervision order.

Within those separate custody and supervision orders, if it were just the six-month one, it would be two thirds in custody and one third in the community, depending on the offence, but in most cases, that would be the case.

So you would have a nine-month custody and supervision order. You would serve six months in custody, followed by three months in the community.

The Chair: Okay, I think that's clear to me.

[Translation]

Mr. Michel Bellehumeur: Mr. Chairman, I understand that a judge could impose a sentence of six months in custody and three months' probation, but this provision refers to two sentences.

If I understand your example - and tell me if I'm wrong - you're talking about someone who is sentenced initially to six months in custody on one charge and subsequently, on another charge, to nine months in custody. If that's the case, I understand your explanation. The nine-month sentence is not tacked on to the six-month sentence. It's the nine-month period that counts, if I'm not mistaken.

[English]

Ms. Paula Kingston: I was speaking of one sentence of six months, a custody and supervision order of six months, followed by a consecutive additional custody and supervision order of three months, for a total of nine months altogether.

The Chair: Mr. Owen.

Mr. Stephen Owen: If I could express it another way, isn't it simply to avoid a situation where someone is going in and out?

Ms. Paula Kingston: That's right.

Mr. Stephen Owen: They go in, and then they come out.

(Clauses 43 to 49 inclusive agreed to on division)

[Translation]

The Chair: Mr. Bellehumeur.

Mr. Michel Bellehumeur: You do remember that these clauses are being adopted on division.

[English]

The Chair: I say “on division” every time, just for you.

Mr. Michel Bellehumeur: Thank you.

(On clause 50—Application of Part XXIII of Criminal Code)

The Chair: Mr. Cadman, this will be amendment A-20.

Mr. Chuck Cadman: Thank you, Mr. Chair.

This amendment speaks to the victim fine surcharge. I'll let the committee know that I'm proposing two schemes here; there's another one further along. This one would add section 737 to the list of sections so that the provisions of the Criminal Code for adult victim surcharges are incorporated into Bill C-7. But we're proposing that young persons come under the same scheme as adults with respect to victim fine surcharges.

Again, as I've said, we've proposed two methods of doing this. The other would actually put the section right into Bill C-7.

(Amendment negatived) [See Minutes of Proceedings]

(Clauses 50 to 52 inclusive agreed to on division)

(On clause 53—Funding for victims)

The Chair: Mr. Cadman, clause 53.

Mr. Chuck Cadman: This refers back to the amendment I just proposed, which was negatived, the inclusion of the victim's fine surcharge, referring to section 737.

(Amendment negatived) [See Minutes of Proceedings]

The Chair: Next is amendment A-22.

Mr. Chuck Cadman: Amendment A-22 is the other scheme. I won't bother reading all of that one, because it's about three pages long.

It changes the victim fine surcharge scheme to the same victim surcharge scheme that's legislated within the Criminal Code for adult offenders. The provision of the legislation would leave a victim's surcharge scheme to the individual provinces. If the province does not provide direction, there's provision for the youth justice court to impose the fine surcharges.

Both subclauses 53(1) and 53(2) state that the province and the youth justice court “may” impose the surcharges. In other words, Bill C-7 leaves the whole issue of victim fine surcharges to a discretionary procedure. The Criminal Code provisions for adults contain “shall”, which is mandatory towards imposing that surcharge.

• 1640

The Standing Committee on Justice and Human Rights, in our report—and many of us remember this one—Victims' Rights: A Voice, Not A Veto, proposed a mandatory scheme for both adults and young persons. The government fulfilled that mandatory scheme through Bill C-79 in the last Parliament, but decided to leave it out of the youth legislation. What we're doing is proposing to enter that into the youth legislation.

The Chair: Mr. McKay.

Mr. John McKay: I have not memorized the Victims' Rights: A Voice, Not A Veto paper. I thought when we did the amendments in the Criminal Code our changes did adhere rather religiously to that issue.

Mr. Chuck Cadman: What we proposed through our recommendations was that the youth justice system be treated the same way.

Mr. John McKay: The issue is that the contents of that report haven't found their way into the youth justice bill.

Mr. Chuck Cadman: Precisely.

Mr. John McKay: That's an interesting comment. I'd like to hear that.

The Chair: Ms. Kingston.

Ms. Paula Kingston: I think when you look at the situation of adults and youth in terms of ability to pay a victim fine surcharge, you'll find a difference. Therefore, the discretion is built in.

In many instances, a young person just doesn't have the ability to pay. Therefore, that would be taken into account by this. This provides flexibility to the province as well as to the judge.

Mr. John McKay: I understand that argument as to treating youth differentially from adults. Having said that, I would have thought our report had addressed that issue, that there's a differential treatment between victims for adults and victims for youth. But apparently when we adverted our minds to the subject a year or two ago when we wrote that report, it was our view that victims should be treated in a similar manner, be they subject to adult crime or youth crime.

So I'm interested in the argument on that issue, but I'm also interested in your response to Mr. Cadman's argument on the issue of where you've set it up so that a province can effectively opt in or not. It seems to me that addressed one of the concerns you expressed previously.

[Translation]

Ms. Yolande Viau: As my colleague mentioned earlier, even if we dealt with all victims in the same way, regardless of whether the offence was committed by an adult or by a young person, the fact remains that when a fine is imposed, we must take into account the offender's ability to pay. That is where there is a slight difference.

[English]

(Amendment negatived) [See Minutes of Proceedings]

(Clause 53 agreed to on division)

(On clause 54—Where a fine or other payment is ordered)

The Chair: Mr. Cadman, on amendment A-23.

Mr. Chuck Cadman: Again, this is just an amendment that's consequential to the first unit I proposed on victim fine surcharge.

(Amendment negatived) [See Minutes of Proceedings]

(Clauses 54 to 60 inclusive agreed to on division)

(On clause 61—Age for purpose of presumptive offences)

The Chair: On clause 61, Mr. Cadman.

• 1645

Mr. Chuck Cadman: Thank you, Mr. Chair.

This is another consequential amendment going to the elimination of the presumptive offence. I won't go through that again.

The Chair: Thank you very much, Mr. Cadman.

I am reminded by the clerk that amendment A-24 is not receivable because it would remove the clause. The way to do that would be to vote against the clause.

(Clause 61 agreed to on division)

(On clause 62—Imposition of adult sentence)

The Chair: Mr. Cadman, clause 62.

Mr. Chuck Cadman: This is a consequential amendment going to the elimination of a presumptive offence. It's the same thing.

(Amendment negatived) [See Minutes of Proceedings]

(Clause 62 agreed to on division)

(On clause 63—Application by young person)

The Chair: Clause 63, Mr. Cadman.

Mr. Chuck Cadman: This is again consequential on the presumptive offence issue.

(Amendment negatived) [See Minutes of Proceedings]

(Clause 63 agreed to on division)

(On clause 64—Application by Attorney General)

The Chair: I'm told that both amendment 27 and 28 aim to delete the clause. The way to do that would be to vote against the clause.

(Clauses 64 and 65 agreed to on division)

(On clause 66—No election if youth sentence)

The Chair: Clause 66, Mr. Cadman.

Mr. Chuck Cadman: I withdraw amendment A-30, Mr. Chairman.

(Clause 66 agreed to on division)

(On clause 67—Election—adult sentence)

The Chair: The amendment is A-32.

Mr. Chuck Cadman: It's a consequential amendment, Mr. Chair, on the subject of presumptive offence.

(Amendment negatived) [See Minutes of Proceedings]

The Chair: Next is amendment A-31.

Mr. Chuck Cadman: It's consequential to the elimination of presumptive offence, Mr. Chair.

(Amendment negatived) [See Minutes of Proceedings]

(Clause 67 agreed to on division)

(On clause 68—Proof of notice under subsection 64(4))

The Chair: For the reasons expressed before, both A-33 and A-34 are designed to eliminate the clause. Therefore, they are not receivable.

(Clauses 68 to 70 inclusive agreed to on division)

(On clause 71—Hearing—adult sentences)

The Chair: Mr. Cadman, that's amendment A-37.

Mr. Chuck Cadman: This amendment, Mr. Chair, addresses the issue of the procedure for adult sentencing. It's a consequential amendment. It follows similar changes where the Attorney General will not have to make application toward seeking an adult sentence. The changes still permit the young person to make the application to avoid an adult sentence. Of course, the youth justice court still retains the discretion to apply the full realm of sanctions.

(Amendment negatived) [See Minutes of Proceedings]

(Clause 71 agreed to on division)

(On clause 72—Test—adult sentences)

The Chair: I refer you to amendment G-4 from the government side.

Mr. John Maloney: Thank you, Mr. Chair.

We have an amendment that Bill C-7 in clause 72 be amended by (a) replacing lines 44 and 45 on page 76 with the following:

purpose and principles set out in subparagraph 3(1)(b)(ii) and section 38 would have sufficient length to hold the young person

and (b) replacing lines 6 and 7 on page 77 with the following:

purpose and principles set out in subparagraph (3)(1)(b)(ii) and section 38 would not have sufficient length to hold the young

• 1650

The explanation for this, Mr. Chair, is that the amendment would clarify the test for an adult sentence. It would direct the judge to consider the accountability principle in subparagraph (3)(1)(b)(ii) and would clarify the length of the available sentences as a determining factor in whether an adult sentence is required. It's in response to concerns raised at a meeting of the youth justice training committee of the National Judicial Institute.

The judges were concerned about how judges might interpret proportionality and adequate to hold the young person accountable in determining whether an adult sentence should be imposed. It's an attempt to reduce the complexity in this element of the bill.

(Amendment agreed to on division) [See Minutes of Proceedings]

(Clause 72 as amended agreed to on division)

(On clause 73—Court must impose adult sentence)

The Chair: Clause 73, Mr. Cadman.

Mr. Chuck Cadman: Mr. Chair, this is another consequential amendment to the previous amendment dealing the procedure for adult sentencing.

(Amendment negatived) [See Minutes of Proceedings]

(Clauses 73 and 74 agreed to on division)

(On clause 75—Inquiry by the court to the young person)

The Chair: Mr. Cadman, clause 75.

Mr. Chuck Cadman: Mr. Chair, this is a consequential amendment on the elimination of the presumptive offence.

(Amendment negatived) [See Minutes of Proceedings]

(Clause 75 agreed to on division)

(On clause 76—Placement when subject to adult sentence)

The Chair: Clause 76, Mr. Cadman.

Mr. Chuck Cadman: Mr. Chair, this is a consequential amendment dealing with the age of application. It reduces the maximum age to 16 years.

(Amendment negatived) [See Minutes of Proceedings]

The Chair: Next is amendment A-41.

Mr. Chuck Cadman: This is a consequential amendment on the age of application and a reduction at the upper and lower ends.

(Amendment negatived) [See Minutes of Proceedings]

(Clauses 76 to 81 inclusive agreed to on division)

(On clause 82—Effect of absolute discharge or termination of youth sentence)

The Chair: Mr. Cadman. It's amendment A-42.

Mr. Chuck Cadman: This is a consequential amendment going to the elimination of presumptive offence.

(Amendment negatived) [See Minutes of Proceedings]

(Clauses 82 to 84 inclusive agreed to on division)

(On clause 85—Levels of custody)

The Chair: Mr. Cadman. It's amendment A-43.

Mr. Chuck Cadman: This is a consequential amendment to the victim fine surcharge amendment I proposed earlier, which was defeated.

(Amendment negatived) [See Minutes of Proceedings]

The Chair: Next is amendment A-44. Mr. Cadman.

Mr. Chuck Cadman: This again is a consequential amendment to the victim fine surcharge amendment I proposed earlier.

(Amendment negatived) [See Minutes of Proceedings]

(Clauses 85 to 91 inclusive agreed to on division)

(On clause 92—Transfer to adult facility)

The Chair: Mr. Cadman. It's amendment A-45.

Mr. Chuck Cadman: This is a consequential amendment on the age of application, Mr. Chair.

(Amendment negatived) [See Minutes of Proceedings]

(Clauses 92 to 97 inclusive agreed to on division)

(On clause 98—Application for continuation of custody)

The Chair: Mr. Cadman.

Mr. Chuck Cadman: This is a consequential amendment, Mr. Chair, to the elimination of a serious violent offence.

(Amendment negatived) [See Minutes of Proceedings]

• 1655

(Clauses 98 to 109 inclusive agreed to on division)

(On clause 110—Identity of offender not to be published)

The Chair: Clause 110, Mr. Cadman.

Mr. Chuck Cadman: This is consequent to amending the elimination of presumptive offence.

(Amendment negatived) [See Minutes of Proceedings]

The Chair: Amendment A-48, Mr. Cadman.

Mr. Chuck Cadman: Again, consequential amendment, Mr. Chair, to the age of application.

(Amendment negatived) [See Minutes of Proceedings]

(Clause 110 agreed to on division)

(On clause 111—Identity of victim or witness not to be published)

The Chair: Clause 111, Mr. Cadman.

Mr. Chuck Cadman: This is a consequential amendment, Mr. Chairman, to the age of application.

(Amendment negatived) [See Minutes of Proceedings]

(Clause 111 to 119 inclusive agreed to on division)

(On clause 120—Access to RCMP Records)

The Chair: Clause 120, Mr. Cadman.

Mr. Chuck Cadman: This is a consequential amendment to the elimination of the presumptive offence.

(Amendment negatived) [See Minutes of Proceedings]

(Clause 120 to 145 inclusive agreed to on division)

(On clause 146—General law on admissibility of statements to apply

The Chair: Clause 146, Mr. Cadman, A-51.

Mr. Chuck Cadman: Consequential amendment to the age of application, Mr. Chair.

(Amendment negatived) [See Minutes of Proceedings]

(Clauses 146 to 173 inclusive agreed to on division)

(On clause 174—Young Persons)

The Chair: Mr. Cadman, amendment A-52.

Mr. Chuck Cadman: Consequential amendment, Mr. Chair, to the age of application.

(Amendment negatived) [See Minutes of Proceedings]

(Clauses 174 to 180 inclusive agreed to on division)

(On clause 181—Proof of Previous Conviction)

The Chair: Mr. Cadman, amendment A-53.

Mr. Chuck Cadman: Again, Mr. Chairman, a consequential amendment to the elimination of a serious violent offence.

(Amendment negatived) [See Minutes of Proceedings]

(Clauses 181 to 183 inclusive agreed to on division)

(On clause 184)

The Chair: Clause 184, Mr. Maloney.

Mr. John Maloney: We have an amendment, Mr. Chair, that Bill C-7, in clause 184, be amended by (a) replacing line 20 on page 162 with the follwing:

has been sentenced to a term of imprisonment for an offence while and (b) replacing line 38 on page 162 with the following:

or adult is under sentence of imprisonment imposed under an

Section 184 is intended to amend the Criminal Code to provide that where a youth is serving both a youth and an adult sentence at the same time, the youth sentence is automatically converted into an adult sentence, allowing the two sentences to merge and to be served as one sentence. It is necessary to amend the section to refer to sentences of imprisonment, as otherwise any adult sentence—for example, a fine—would automatically convert the youth custody sentence into an adult custody sentence.

This is in response to a concern raised by the federal-provincial-territorial sentence calculation working group.

The Chair: Mr. Toews.

Mr. Vic Toews: For clarification, does this have the impact of changing consecutive sentences to concurrent sentences?

Ms. Paula Kingston: The answer is no.

The Chair: Mr. Bellehumeur.

[Translation]

Mr. Michel Bellehumeur: I'd like to know if that's the correct line. You are amending your own proposed amendment to Bill C-7. Is that correct? The words “pour les adolescents” appeared to be new since they were underlined. Is that in fact the case?

[English]

The Chair: Ms. Kingston.

Ms. Paula Kingston: This is amending the current Criminal Code.

• 1700

[Translation]

Mr. Michel Bellehumeur: I'm trying to follow along in Bill C- 7. On page 162 of the bill, on line 32, the words “pour les adolescents” were probably added before the government decided to amend this provision once again. I'm merely trying to understand. You are amending your own proposed amendment. Correct?

[English]

Ms. Paula Kingston: This a consequential amendment to the Criminal Code. The Criminal Code now provides, on application, for these two sentences to be converted. Upon crown application, in many instances the crown is not aware of this; that happens often in practice. So what would happen here is that this would be a legislative conversion.

[Translation]

The Chair: Mr. Bellehumeur.

Mr. Bellehumeur: I'm reading the Criminal Code. In this particular clause of Bill C-7, you have added the words “pour les adolescents” and now you are amending this clause once again.

What prompted you to change the wording and further amend the text from “pour les adolescents” to include the words “est ou a été condamné à une peine d'emprisonnement”? The reference was to the Young Offenders Act.

[English]

Ms. Paula Kingston: Well, certainly it does, but this amendment picks up the same language that is used in the Criminal Code but is more specific in referring to a sentence of imprisonment. It adds the words “of imprisonment” just to make it extra clear that even though this isn't the Criminal Code and we're talking about merging two sentences, it's two sentences involving custody.

(Amendment agreed to on division) [See Minutes of Proceedings]

(Clause 184 as amended agreed to on division)

The Chair: Shall clauses 185 through 189 carry?

Mr. Chuck Cadman: Excuse me, Mr. Chair. One of mine has been left out of here. It's in the book, but it's not.... It's amendment A-54.

The Chair: To which clause?

Mr. Chuck Cadman: Clause 184.

The Chair: Okay, we have an amendment to clause 184. Can I get unanimous consent for Mr. Cadman to go back to clause 184?

Some hon. members: Agreed.

Mr. Chuck Cadman: This is another amendment dealing with section 745, age of application. It's partially consequential but it's partially new with these amendments.

Firstly, section 745.1 would apply only to those young persons under the age of 16. Secondly, we are proposing a term of incarceration between 10 and 15 years for young persons who commit first or second degree murder and were 14 or 15 at the time of the offence.

(Amendment negatived) [See Minutes of Proceedings]

(Clause 184 as amended agreed to on division)

(Clauses 185 to 189 inclusive agreed to on division)

(On clause 190)

The Chair: Clause 190, Mr. Cadman.

Mr. Chuck Cadman: Thank you, Mr. Chair.

This is another consequential amendment on the age of application: legislation applied to young persons between the age of 10 and 15 years inclusive instead of 12 to 17 inclusive.

(Amendment negatived) [See Minutes of Proceedings]

(Clauses 190 to 200 inclusive agreed to on division)

(Schedule 1 agreed to on division)

(Clause 1 agreed to on division)

The Chair: Shall the title carry?

Some hon. members: Agreed.

The Chair: Shall the bill carry?

Some hon. members: Agreed.

The Chair: Monsieur Bellehumeur.

[Translation]

Mr. Michel Bellehumeur: For this one particular clause, I request a recorded vote. I remind you that I could have made a similar request for each clause.

[English]

The Chair: Thank you, Monsieur Bellehumeur.

[Translation]

Mr. Michel Bellehumeur: I know that you will appreciate me even more.

• 1705

[English]

The Chair: Thank you, Monsieur Bellehumeur.

Shall the bill carry?

Some hon. members: Agreed.

(Motion agreed to: yeas 8; nays 5)

The Chair: Shall I report the bill to the House with amendments?

Some hon. members: Agreed.

The Chair: Shall the committee order a reprint for use at report stage?

Some hon. members: Agreed.

The Chair: Before everybody takes off, I want to pay tribute to all the members, and particularly the members who have been around for a little longer. I want to thank Monsieur Bellehumeur very much for his assistance. I want to also make particular mention of Mr. Cadman, who has never failed to be here during the course of this over a period years, and did a great deal of work to have the amendments presented. I think he deserves acknowledgement for that.

[Translation]

Mr. Michel Bellehumeur: You didn't tell me that when I tabled my 3,000 amendments in the House.

[English]

The Chair: Monsieur Bellehumeur, the many times that I have given reference to your efforts I would have thought qualified. If you want us to say thank you very much, Monsieur Bellehumeur, the committee I'm sure speaks as one.

[Translation]

Mr. Michel Bellehumeur: I have a question, Quite often, you refer to the department's lawyers as the drafters of the bill. I'd like to put a face to bills C-7, C-3 and C-68. Are Ms. Viau, Ms. Kingston and Mr. Barnhorst the ones responsible for drafting this marvelous bill. They aren't? Then who is?

[English]

Ms. Paula Kingston: We instruct professional drafters to draft it.

The Chair: Members of the committee, please, before people leave, I would like to instruct staff, because we have a heavy legislative agenda between now and summer, to proceed to organize around organized crime according to the list we circulated earlier. I'm presuming that we have consent to do that. That way, we can move the Bill C-24 discussions quickly.

Thank you very much. Thank you to everyone over a long period of time.

The meeting is adjourned.