INST Committee Report

The State of Competition

       At the outset of this report, and in the Interim Report as well, the Committee asserted that Canada’s economic environment could be characterized as one in which non-compliance with the law is more the exception than the rule. We paid tribute to the Competition Act, the Competition Bureau and the Competition Tribunal for this state of affairs. To this list, we could have added the litany of competition lawyers and economists who keep these government institutions abreast of developing trends in the marketplace and the newest analytical techniques used to judge economic behaviour.

I think right now in Canada, when you look at our position …  in the world and the economy we’re in today, we should be proud of the fact that we have a productive and efficient economy. I think that our Act has served us well in trying to get there. [Robert Russell, Borden, Ladner & Gervais, 65:10:30]

It may be that in a number of areas we simply don’t have that many meritorious cases. [Neil Campbell, McMillan Binch, 59:12:15]

The Enforcement Record

       Evaluating the enforcement record of the Competition Bureau requires understanding of both what is being asked of it and, in particular, what market behaviour it can pursue from a practical sense. We are asking the Bureau to pursue all four objectives listed in the purposes section of the Competition Act, as well as to uphold the spirit of this Act. Section 1.1 states that the purpose of the Competition Act is to maintain and encourage competition in Canada in order to:

• promote the efficiency and adaptability of the Canadian economy;

• expand opportunities for Canadian participation in world markets and recognize the role of foreign competition in Canada;

• ensure that small and medium-sized enterprises have equitable opportunity to participate in the Canadian economy; and

• provide consumers with competitive prices and product choices.

       These objectives are mostly qualitative in nature and are not amenable to objective measurement; only subjective evaluations are possible. This is why we ask the Commissioner of Competition to report annually on his agency’s enforcement and advocacy activities, rather than on his effectiveness in realizing the objectives of the Act. People are then left to form their own opinions on the Bureau’s effectiveness in enforcing the Act and realizing its purpose.

       In the Committee’s view, an evaluation of the Competition Bureau’s enforcement record cannot be divorced from the costs of litigation. The Committee was told on several occasions that the Bureau incurs enforcement costs, on average, of approximately $1 million per litigated case.⁷ This cost presumably varies according to the type of case, whether a criminal or civilly reviewable practice, a merger or an abuse of dominant position case, an anticompetitive pricing practice or a conspiracy case, etc. More importantly, however, this large enforcement cost drives a huge wedge between the goal of complete compliance with the law and the economic behaviour we observe in the marketplace; so this cost must, among other factors, figure into the Bureau’s enforcement strategy.

       We must clarify what we are asking of the Bureau. The Committee is not asking the Commissioner and his staff to pursue every case with a positive net economic benefit; nor should the Commissioner strictly engage in profit maximizing law enforcement. Rather, the Commissioner should pursue those meritorious complaints with a substantial economic impact. This will deter egregious anticompetitive behaviour given the resources the government is able to allocate.

       There are good reasons to take the last of these three approaches. The first approach would require the Commissioner to pursue all cases that would generate fines in excess of the public enforcement costs. This could require unlimited resources, which taxpayers would be reluctant to pay given the limited benefit each would receive. The second approach, which involves fines reflecting, not their deterrence value, but their profit-making potential, would undermine the public good, which the government and Parliament are entrusted to promote. Canada wants no part in such a litigious society. The Committee is not willing to sacrifice economic justice, nor is it prepared to live with the “chilling effect” on economic activity, which such an unwavering approach implies.     

I would like to … talk about the generic necessity of ensuring … that the Bureau’s resources and institutional framework are indeed as strong as they should be, so the mandate can be carried out in an efficient and effective manner. [Calvin Goldman, Davies, Ward & Beck, 59:09:20]

I want to commend the Committee … in setting the scene — the market context within which this market behaviour is being assessed, enforcement decisions are having to be made, and discretion exercised by the Commissioner. [George Addy, Osler, Hoskin & Harcourt, 59:12:55

       Table 2.1 provides a partial statement of the Bureau’s enforcement record over the past few years by selected provision in the Act. The Committee is aware that many conclusions can be drawn from data, including diametrically opposing conclusions. For example, based on the number of complaints, one might conclude that more vigilant enforcement should be directed against price maintenance violations than any other anticompetitive practice (i.e., refusal to deal, and tied selling, exclusive dealing and market restriction). However, one might just as reasonably conclude that, based on the number of investigations relative to the number of complaints, the Bureau is relatively lax, and possibly too lax, on predatory pricing, refusal to deal, and tied selling, exclusive dealing and market restriction complaints. Both views are possible given the lack of critical and pertinent facts to each case.

A disjunction is created between the expectations of people complaining to the Bureau about pricing practices and what the Bureau is prepared to deliver. This is most serious, in relation to price discrimination and predatory pricing, where the complete absence of formal enforcement actions opens the Bureau to the charge that it is choosing not to enforce the Act. This suggests either that the case selection criteria be revised so as to minimize impediments to bringing pricing cases and that the Guidelines be revised to more closely follow the Act or that the provisions be reformed to provide clearer direction for Bureau enforcement policy. Either way, the result would be closer coincidence between what the law says and the Bureau’s enforcement policy.⁹

       More generally, the Committee would like to report that, given the rather steady and holding trend in both the number of all complaints and investigations in the four- and five-year periods considered in Table 2.1, at a time when economic activity was buoyant and growing steadily, the business community has been relatively more compliant with the law. However, we cannot because even the number of complaints is dependent on people’s knowledge of what an offence is under the law and their perceptions of the attention the Bureau will give their complaint. Because these important factors are not known nor recorded, we cannot adjust the data accordingly.

       The record level of fines collected by the federal treasury as a result of the Bureau’s recent intensive pursuit of conspiracies could be interpreted as a sign of greater vigilance that will soon pay off in a more robust economic activity based on more efficient firms and the adoption of aggressive, competitive pricing policies. But even here most of these fines can be attributed to convictions made from international conspiracies. The Bureau might be just riding on the coattails of competition authorities of other jurisdictions. Furthermore, guilty pleas in conspiracy cases are just as likely to reflect the high cost of litigation and the potential for private information to be transferred to the public domain in other jurisdictions such as the United States where rivals may seek treble damage awards. These facts suggest guilty pleas are more likely to reflect the cost benefit of going to trial in Canada than actual guilt or the deterrent effectiveness of the law.

In terms of … enforcement issues, there are really three things that can be dealt with … There is this question of funding … There’s also the question of alternative enforcement mechanisms like private access …The other area on the agenda … is we need to radically reform the Tribunal process. [Margaret Sanderson, Charles River Associates, 59:11:20]

Part of the debate … around splitting section 45 into both a per se and a civil offence … [is] … that, it will be more costly for the Commissioner to prosecute a civil offence. Under the criminal model now, responsibility is split between two departments, so there are two budget funds to address the cost of prosecution. The Commissioner’s office acts as an investigator, and the Department of Justice acts as the prosecutor. To the extent the role of the Commissioner is revisited, part and parcel of … that should always include the resource implications … to the Bureau. [George Addy, Osler, Hoskin & Harcourt, 59:11:15]

       The enforcement of any law, including that of competition, cannot be conducted in a vacuum. Anchors upon which behaviour is assessed are essential; moreover, clear markers distinguishing acceptable from unacceptable market behaviour are required. The economic content of the written law is simply insufficient. Jurisprudence and enforcement guidelines are required to flesh out the sometime abstract economic thinking on which the law is based. Indeed, when jurisprudence and enforcement guidelines properly reflect economic theory, they serve to guide the business sector in voluntarily complying with the law and the Bureau in enforcing it.

       Competition law experts appearing before the Committee reached virtual unanimity on this score. In their opinion, there is simply insufficient jurisprudence to properly guide market participants. Uncertainties in the law and its application abound. Where these competition law experts begin to differ, however, is in terms of the principal cause. Some suggest a weak law is the culprit, while others suggest a risk-averse Competition Bureau is to blame. The rift widens when it comes to the proposed solution of providing greater financial incentives to develop the needed jurisprudence. Some maintain that it would be worthwhile to do so, yet others believe this is an expensive way of realizing greater certainty in the law, preferring instead more clarity in the Bureau’s enforcement guidelines. For its part, the Committee will come down the middle on both these issues. We believe that more jurisprudence is needed and this might be partially realized with the implementation of private rights of action, as prescribed in the amended version of Bill C-23. In addition, the Committee recognizes that refinements in the enforcement guidelines are needed.

       The Bureau’s enforcement guidelines are meant to fill the cracks in the public’s understanding of the law left by insufficient jurisprudence. As the VanDuzer Report, in terms of the anticompetitive pricing provisions, put it:

I think we need far more testing of the interpretations of the Act made by the Commissioner … not just more powers for the Commissioner. [Stanley Wong, Davis & Company, 59:11:30]

First, nobody really wants to have to go to court or before the Tribunal for the sheer sake of providing jurisprudence for others. That’s kind of a public service that perhaps nobody necessarily wants to provide. [Donald McFetridge, Carleton University, 59:10:50]

[I]f there had been more cases, we would not … have so many guidelines. We would not … consider, for example, in section 78, all the illustrative anti-competitive acts or abusive acts that a dominant firm can do. This could have been explored before the Tribunal, and we would see that in the jurisprudence. [Donald McFetridge, Carleton University, 59:10:50]

       Once these revisions are completed, we expect the Commissioner of Competition to keep to the enforcement guidelines. Major deviations from them are not acceptable. If further changes are required, the enforcement guidelines should first be amended then enforced, not the other way around.

“Time is of the Essence” Enforcement Tools

       On a number of occasions before the Committee, the Commissioner of Competition has argued for amendments to the law granting him new powers to issue cease and desist orders of his own right, without allowing the affected party a right to be heard prior to the making of the order, and without any authorization from the Competition Tribunal. Such a power was granted under section 104.1 of the Competition Act in respect of any domestic air service, as defined in the Canada Transportation Act, in terms of any anticompetitive behaviour (predatory pricing, paragraph 50(1)(c), and abuse of dominant position, section 79). Bill C-23 would extend the duration of this order (beyond a maximum of 80 days if all renewals are put into effect) to allow for good faith, but belated information exchanges between the contesting parties. Bill C-23 would provide this same power (adding a new provision, subsection 103.3(2)) to the Competition Tribunal in respect to all industries and all civilly reviewable conduct in the Act.

I think the elements are in the Act. I think the interpretations are very poor. I don’t think you need separate rules for separate industries. But I do think you need clear and consistent application of clear guidelines. [John Scott, Canadian Federation of Independent Grocers, 59:09:45]

If you were on the inside and if you saw the difficulty and extent to which they have tried to comply with this law, I think you would come to the conclusion that the answer is, yes, it is effective, the Commissioner is very vigilant, and Air Canada has struggled daily with trying to understand what they can and can’t do under the current regime. [Lawson Hunter, Stikeman Elliott, 59:09:45]

Our experience is that the guidelines are … ignored when it comes to a specific case. We have the example recently of the Competition Bureau abandoning its merger enforcement guidelines when it came to arguing the Superior Propane case. We have other cases in which the Tribunal has taken no notice of guidelines. … But to think that guidelines … will necessarily result in less uncertainty … I think only jurisprudence can do that, and we don’t have a heck of a lot of it. [Donald McFetridge, Carleton University, 59:10:05]

• An injury to competition will occur that cannot be adequately protected by the Tribunal.

• A person is likely to be eliminated as a competitor.

• A person is likely to suffer: a significant loss of market share; a significant loss of revenue; or other harm that cannot be adequately remedied by the Tribunal

       Critics mention that the ex parte procedure — without notice to any other party  — presents, as a fait accompli, an order that has the same force as a court order and a breach of which is punishable by fine or imprisonment. Once the order is made, the party may bring an application to set the order aside. In normal litigation practice, motions and applications made ex parte are the exception rather than the rule. Moreover, the test that is asked of the Tribunal in granting the order, particularly that of a significant loss of market share or a significant loss of revenue, is so low a hurdle that it treads on having the Commissioner cross over the boundary of protecting the process of competition to protecting individual competitors. This concern is supported widely across the economics field because of the strongly held belief that competition by its very nature means that there will be winners and losers in terms of revenues and market share. Thus, the Competition Act now risks interfering with the competitive process. As an alternative, these critics argue in favour of an award of damages and possibly fines as the appropriate method of deterring anticompetitive behaviour.

       For his part, the Commissioner believes that these extraordinary powers are necessary owing to the inadequacy of the procedures and/or the remedies currently available to the Bureau to use against the threat of price predation and other anticompetitive conduct in a timely fashion. The ex parte procedure is adopted because the alternative of providing notice of the proceedings would impose a process that would involve the Commissioner in time-consuming litigation before the Tribunal in support of the interim order, which would significantly reduce the “timeis of the essence” aspect for which the power is being sought. 

I think the way to deal with predatory pricing is to wait and look at the offence. I think where we have a problem in this country is that it doesn’t do much good after finding that an offence has been committed if we take the civil branch and abuse of dominance and say, “Well, don’t do it again”, and then issue an injunction. That type of remedy is simply insufficient. I think what we really want … is to use the civil branch and use fines. And ultimately, perhaps … damage awards. [Donald McFetridge, Carleton University, 59:10:40]

       In assessing the pros and cons of these “time is of the essence” enforcement tools, the Committee looks to the data, which clearly show that predation is often alleged but seldom occurs. Between 1994 and 1999, there were 382 cases of alleged predatory behaviour, but the Bureau found only 7 deserved investigation. Nine were solved by alternative case resolution (ACR) and none justified prosecution. Although the high incidence of allegation would favour the damages award and fines enforcement method, the Bureau’s decision to investigate only seven cases brings somewhat back into balance the choice of either method (assuming that we are willing to live with prosecutorial discretion to achieve this balance, rather than a systemic basis for balance). At the same time, the Committee is unaware of any incidences of the “chilling” pro-competitive behaviour that the current competition regime has had on the business sector, let alone what incidences of chilling might arise from a deterrence system based on an award of damages and fines.   

There’s the predatory pricing. Clearly, you need a remedy besides cease and desist. A remedy based on damages and fines seems to be a sensible deterrent. [Jeffrey Church, University of Calgary, 59:10:55]

[T]here’s a fallacy in … saying … that the cease-and-desist powers … because they act very quickly, are necessarily desirable. … It is perfectly possible to have an enforcement provision against predatory pricing through the Act, working through the normal process with the Tribunal, not using any injunctive relief. Provided one introduces fines and makes the disincentives for a conviction high enough … [Roger Ware, Queen’s University, 59:12:15]

       These changes will permit the return of the Competition Act to law of general application, with no “special provisions for special industries.” For this reason, the Committee recommends:

What we have right now is a Commissioner of Competition who by statute is independent and reports to the Minister of Industry but who takes no direction from the Minister of Industry other than for the purposes of starting an inquiry. [Stanley Wong, Davis & Company, 59:11:30]

       A particularly surprising (and disturbing) issue — that of the Commissioner’s independence from government — surfaced around the time of the Committee’s first set of hearings in 2000. This issue continued to percolate and has since boiled over to include questions of accountability. Doubts on the Commissioner’s independence first arose when the Commissioner conducted a review of his own merger enforcement guidelines, as they would apply to the banking sector at the request of the Minister of Finance, suggesting that he too had reservations on their general application. The questions began to multiply as the Commissioner acquiesced to the government a second time when he sought extraordinary cease and desist powers to deal with potential predatory behaviour on the part of Air Canada — once again putting into doubt the Act’s general application. More recently, in the Superior Propane case the Commissioner abandoned the very merger enforcement guidelines that he confirmed as fit to the Minister of Finance.

       However, the Committee does not share all these views and believes that it is important to distinguish perception from reality. In terms of independence, a consensus within the competition law community appears to have formed on the belief that the Commissioner is indeed independent from government in terms of case selection, administration and disposition. The Commissioner is not independent from government in terms of his budget and reporting obligations.

       On the matter of enforcement direction, no one could point to any case where the government intervened in the Commissioner’s enforcement decision making. On the matter of the Competition Bureau’s organization within government, the Committee understands that the Commissioner is subordinate to the Minister of Industry and Cabinet so that, at the end of the day, the government can be held to account to the people for the actions of the Commissioner, one of the most influential public servants in Canada. For example, from time to time, competition experts have judged the Commissioner’s enforcement record based on what they call Type 1 and Type 2 errors. A Type 1 error is defined as not taking an enforcement action when there should have been (the market behaviour in question was anticompetitive). A Type 2 error, on the other hand, is defined as taking an enforcement action when one should not have occurred (the market behaviour was benign from a competition perspective). However, there is also a Type 3 error. The Committee will define this error as wasting the taxpayer’s money through inefficient enforcement action. After accounting for deficiencies in the law, at the Competition Tribunal and in his budget, for which the government may be held accountable, any remaining deficiencies in enforcement may be attributable to the Commissioner and his administration of the Competition Bureau. This error can only be corrected by executive decisions and thus institutional independence from government is not advised.

What we have now is really decision-making in the hands of a single individual who is really unaccountable. Every time we see an unsuccessful case, there is immediate pressure to amend the Act. [Stanley Wong, Davis & Company, 59:11:30]

Essentially what’s happened in … cases, where speed is of the essence, such as predatory pricing … the Commissioner has been concerned that the process doesn’t work expeditiously enough; therefore he’s sought additional powers, turning his own office into an investigator and an adjudicator. As soon as a single body is performing both of those functions, concerns are going to be raised about independence. So if we can solve the adjudication model, if we can have the Tribunal play a more active, effective role as an independent check, and procedurally allow it to balance these concerns … its very important that there be … an expeditious process and … a full due process for the various parties. [Margaret Sanderson, Charles River Associates, 59:11:55]

There are really two important things about enforcement policy … One is independence and the other is accountability. The Commissioner needs to be independent, needs to have the resources required to do the job, but needs to be accountable, too. That means we have to be able to go to Tribunal and test the Commissioner’s decision. That’s one way of keeping him accountable. [Jack Quinn, Blake, Castles & Graydon, 59:11:45]

       On the matter of accountability, competition law experts identified a number of ways the Commissioner might be held to account for his enforcement actions. We have already mentioned his accountability to the people through the government of the day. He is also accountable to the people through Parliament — and specifically by way of appearance before this Committee. Beyond bureaucratic means, the Commissioner is accountable for his enforcement decisions to the Competition Tribunal, which can rescind or vary all civilly reviewable decisions he makes, as well as judge his request for a cease and desist remedy.

       If there is weakness in the accountability regime, it has been in decisions not to take an enforcement action with respect to civilly reviewable matters. However, the Committee is confident that forthcoming private rights of action — with the adoption of Bill C-23 — will partially address accountability with respect to sections 75 and 77. In terms of mergers  that is, on the release of private information relating to a merger proposal where no enforcement action is taken —  the Commissioner must perform a careful balancing act. He must weigh the merger participants’ privacy rights with that of the public’s right to know. According to the competition law experts appearing before this Committee, there is little issue here, but they do note that both U.S. and European competition authorities are more forthcoming in providing information than Canada’s Competition Bureau. However, the Committee must reiterate the point that Canada, as a small market, is and should be more lenient on mergers relative to larger jurisdictions, including on issues of information disclosure. At the margin, strategic market information released to the public is of less value in larger and less concentrated markets. Finally, this leaves only section 79, the abuse of dominant position provision; here, the public itself has been most vocal, and parliamentarians have heard them loud and clear and this has spurred many amendments for reform.  

The Commissioner … is one of the most highly accountable officials in the Government of Canada, and that comes in part from his oath under the Act and it comes in part from … your ability to take him to court on a judicial review. It comes in addition from the fact that any six residents can force him to conduct an inquiry and can go to the Minister of Industry and ask … to reopen an inquiry that’s been discontinued. [Neil Campbell, McMillan Binch, 59:11:55]

Private Rights of Action

       A limited private right of action currently exists in respect of criminal matters, but such action has been rarely initiated. Under section 36 of the Competition Act, a person may bring an action for damages (and costs) if the person has suffered loss or damage as a result of either: (1) conduct contrary to Part VI (“Offences in Relation to Competition”); or (2) the failure of a person to comply with an order of the Competition Tribunal or of another court under the Act. Accordingly, a right of private action for damages may arise in three circumstances:

       Under current law, the Commissioner of Competition is the only party with standing to make an application for civil review before the Competition Tribunal. But this is about to change. After considerable study, the Committee amended Bill C-23 to allow private parties to have access to the Tribunal for resolving disputes on a limited number of civilly reviewable business practices: refusal to deal (section 75); and tied selling, exclusive dealing and market restriction (section 77).

       Witnesses appearing before the Committee on Bill C-23 were generally supportive of amendments leading in this direction. The main argument against private access was the potential for abuse in the form of “strategic litigation”;  that is, legal action commenced not for the purpose of seeking a remedy to anticompetitive behaviour, but rather to gain an advantage over a competitor. The Committee, however, is satisfied that the safeguards included in Bill C-23 adequately address these concerns.

[W]e do have a leverage problem in the context of a merger or in the context of an abuse-of-dominance inquiry, where the Commissioner’s say-so often governs, particularly for parties who are in a small market and have difficulty looking at the current costs and time of a Tribunal proceeding. That is why it’s important to streamline the Tribunal process.[Neil Campbell, McMillan Binch, 59:11:55]

One other way to bring more resources into enforcement and to get more jurisprudence is the issue of private actions and allowing standing for private actions before the Tribunal. [Donald McFetridge, Carleton University, 59:10:55]

       Throughout the Committee’s hearings on the Competition Act there was broad agreement on the principle of granting private access to the Tribunal; there was less consensus on the relief that should be available. Many witnesses did support a right to claim for damages, yet others did not. The Committee therefore ran with the consensus it did obtain, proposing to limit the plaintiff to injunctive relief. As previously stated, the primary reason for denying claims for damages would be to discourage strategic litigation. In the longer term, however, we believe damages and fines will be necessary to realize effective enforcement.

       The expected benefits of private enforcement differ slightly based on whom you believe. Some argue it will bring a litany of cases which the Bureau does not have the mandate or resources to pursue. Private enforcement will complement public enforcement and, perhaps, generate savings that will stretch the Bureau’s current enforcement budget. Yet others believe it will bring only a very limited number of cases; however, these will be pivotal cases that will enrich our body of jurisprudence; bring more certainty into the law; and discourage anticompetitive behaviour that might otherwise slip between the cracks of law and practice.

       The Committee believes that, with only injunctive relief as the carrot, private parties in most cases may only be exchanging the costs associated with the alleged anticompetitive conduct for litigation costs (hopefully less than $1 million per case on average with reforms in Tribunal processes). Indeed, if this scenario does in fact unfold over the next few years, it will very quickly become common knowledge across the business sector and Canada will be no further ahead. Rights with no value attached to them are but window dressing — something that, as many observers have described, has adorned Canada’s antitrust Acts for too long.

       A number of witnesses suggested that the enforcement problems in competition policy being encountered by Canada are not solely the result of inadequate legislation, but also stem from a lack of sufficient enforcement resources allocated to the Bureau. Moreover, some witnesses claimed that the Bureau has staff retention problems due principally to low salaries compared to what some of its veteran staff could earn in the private sector doing similar work, or following other pursuits. In fact, these commentators identified a number of reorganization models to get around this recruitment and retention problem, but they failed to provide an assessment on any weaknesses from which these models are likely to suffer. The VanDuzer Report further pinpointed a shortage of, and consequently the need to acquire and develop, industry-specific expertise to complement enforcement officers and ensure that they can make accurate assessments in a timely manner. In these witnesses’ opinion, learning on the job is not always efficient.

       However, the Committee is also aware that part of the enforcement problem over the past decade was the result of uncontrollable factors such as the deregulation and liberalization of transportation, telecommunications and energy sectors. Increased funding in this period did not match the increased responsibility that these developments imposed on the Bureau. A second uncontrollable factor was the unforeseeable merger wave, which, as a number of witnesses remarked, seems to be abating and is mostly behind us now. The Committee believes the Competition Bureau does need additional enforcement resources to fulfill its mandate in an effective manner and, therefore, recommends:

Deterrence: Crimes, Fines and Jail

       Probably the single most important enforcement instrument in Canada’s competition policy toolbox is the court fine. Unlike cease and desist orders that prohibit future use of a practice, fines levied by the Court have the dual purpose of punishing the assailant and deterring others — considering the same anticompetitive activity. Jail time  which is also an important deterrence weapon — has played a relatively minor role. Together these enforcement instruments are used only in the most egregious criminal cases.

[W]hen the mandate itself was unfolding — and the mandate was not as broad as it is today — I can assure you the challenges that face one individual at the top of the Competition Bureau are such that … they warrant consideration of a three-person body. [Calvin Goldman, Davies, Ward & Beck, 59:09:15]

I would suggest that the Bureau cannot be effective … without adequate resources in trying to administer a law of general application in an environment that is increasingly deregulated. They need the resources to act in a properly informed manner. That doesn’t necessarily mean bringing many more cases. [Calvin Goldman, Davies, Ward & Beck, 59:10:50]

When we’ve had $150 million worth of fines under this section in the last few years, you need to be careful about saying that the law doesn’t have sufficient strength. [Lawson Hunter, Stikeman Elliott, 59:09:20]

When you think about the biggest multinational companies in the world coming and paying attention very closely, after the United States, to Canada, paying huge fines and having individuals pleading guilty to crimes in Canada, that is fairly remarkable. I think the Bureau is a very credible enforcer on the world stage on cartels. It has also done perfectly well on local cartel activity in Canada. It has sent people to jail. It has obtained convictions. [Neil Campbell, McMillan Binch, 59:12:55]