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37th PARLIAMENT, 1st SESSION

Standing Committee on Procedure and House Affairs

COMMITTEE EVIDENCE

CONTENTS

Wednesday, February 27, 2002

1530

The Chair (Mr. Peter Adams (Peterborough, Lib.))

1535

Mr. Richard Fadden (Deputy Clerk of the Privy Council, Counsel and Security and Intelligence Coordinator, Privy Council Office)

1540

The Chair

Mr. Toews

Mr. Richard Fadden

Mr. Toews

Mr. Richard Fadden

Mr. Toews

Mr. Richard Fadden

Mr. Toews

Mr. Richard Fadden

Mr. Toews

Mr. Richard Fadden

Mr. Toews

Mr. Geoff Regan (Halifax West, Lib.)

The Chair

Mr. Toews

1545

Mr. Richard Fadden

Mr. Toews

Mr. Richard Fadden

Mr. Toews

Mr. Richard Fadden

Mr. Toews

Mr. Richard Fadden

Mr. Toews

Mr. Richard Fadden

Mr. Toews

Mr. Richard Fadden

Mr. Toews

Mr. Richard Fadden

The Chair

Mr. Toews

Mr. Richard Fadden

Mr. Toews

Mr. Richard Fadden

Mr. Toews

Mr. Richard Fadden

Mr. Toews

Mr. Richard Fadden

Mr. Toews

Mr. Richard Fadden

Mr. Toews

Mr. Richard Fadden

Mr. Toews

Mr. Richard Fadden

Mr. Toews

Mr. Richard Fadden

1550

Mr. Toews

Mr. Richard Fadden

Mr. Toews

Mr. Richard Fadden

Mr. Toews

Mr. Richard Fadden

Mr. Toews

Mr. Richard Fadden

The Chair

Mr. Geoff Regan

Mr. Richard Fadden

Mr. Geoff Regan

Mr. Richard Fadden

Mr. Geoff Regan

Mr. Richard Fadden

Mr. Geoff Regan

Mr. Richard Fadden

Mr. Joe Jordan (Leeds--Grenville, Lib.)

1555

Mr. Richard Fadden

Mr. Joe Jordan

Mr. Richard Fadden

The Chair

Mr. Pierre Brien (Témiscamingue, BQ)

Mr. Richard Fadden

Mr. Pierre Brien

Mr. Richard Fadden

Mr. Pierre Brien

Mr. Richard Fadden

Mr. Pierre Brien

Mr. Richard Fadden

Mr. Pierre Brien

Mr. Richard Fadden

Mr. Pierre Brien

Mr. Richard Fadden

Mr. Pierre Brien

Mr. Richard Fadden

Mr. Pierre Brien

1600

Mr. Richard Fadden

Mr. Pierre Brien

Mr. Richard Fadden

Mr. Pierre Brien

Mr. Richard Fadden

Mr. Pierre Brien

Mr. Richard Fadden

Mr. Pierre Brien

Mr. Richard Fadden

Mr. Pierre Brien

The Chair

Mr. Brien

Mr. Richard Fadden

Mr. Pierre Brien

Mr. Richard Fadden

Mr. Pierre Brien

1605

The Chair

Mr. Richard Fadden

The Chair

Ms. Marlene Catterall (Ottawa West--Nepean, Lib.)

Mr. Richard Fadden

Ms. Marlene Catterall

Mr. Richard Fadden

Ms. Marlene Catterall

The Chair

Ms. Marlene Catterall

Mr. Richard Fadden

Ms. Marlene Catterall

Mr. Richard Fadden

Ms. Marlene Catterall

Mr. Richard Fadden

Ms. Marlene Catterall

Mr. Richard Fadden

1610

Ms. Marlene Catterall

Mr. Richard Fadden

Ms. Marlene Catterall

Mr. Richard Fadden

The Chair

Mr. Blaikie

Mr. Richard Fadden

Mr. Blaikie

Mr. Richard Fadden

Mr. Blaikie

1615

Mr. Richard Fadden

Mr. Blaikie

Mr. Richard Fadden

Mr. Blaikie

The Chair

Mr. Pratt

1620

Mr. Richard Fadden

Mr. Pratt

Mr. Richard Fadden

Mr. Pratt

Mr. Richard Fadden

Mr. David Pratt

The Chair

Mr. Jay Hill (Prince George--Peace River, PC/DR)

Mr. Richard Fadden

Mr. Jay Hill

Mr. Richard Fadden

Mr. Jay Hill

Mr. Richard Fadden

Mr. Jay Hill

1625

Mr. Richard Fadden

Mr. Jay Hill

Mr. Richard Fadden

Mr. Jay Hill

Mr. Richard Fadden

Mr. Jay Hill

Mr. Richard Fadden

Mr. Jay Hill

Mr. Richard Fadden

Mr. Jay Hill

Mr. Richard Fadden

Mr. Jay Hill

Mr. Richard Fadden

Mr. Jay Hill

Mr. Richard Fadden

Mr. Jay Hill

Mr. Richard Fadden

Mr. Jay Hill

1630

Mr. Richard Fadden

Mr. Jay Hill

Mr. Richard Fadden

Mr. Jay Hill

Mr. Richard Fadden

Mr. Jay Hill

Mr. Richard Fadden

Mr. Jay Hill

Mr. Richard Fadden

Mr. Jay Hill

Mr. Richard Fadden

The Chair

Mr. Bélanger

The Chair

Mr. Bélanger

The Chair

Mr. Mauril Bélanger

Mr. Richard Fadden

Mr. Bélanger

Mr. Richard Fadden

Mr. Bélanger

Mr. Richard Fadden

Mr. Mauril Bélanger

Mr. Richard Fadden

Mr. Bélanger

Mr. Richard Fadden

1635

Mr. Bélanger

Mr. Richard Fadden

Mr. Bélanger

Mr. Richard Fadden

Mr. Mauril Bélanger

The Chair

Ms. Cheryl Gallant (Renfrew--Nipissing--Pembroke, Canadian Alliance)

Mr. Richard Fadden

Ms. Cheryl Gallant

Mr. Richard Fadden

Ms. Cheryl Gallant

Mr. Richard Fadden

Ms. Cheryl Gallant

Mr. Richard Fadden

Ms. Cheryl Gallant

Mr. Richard Fadden

Ms. Cheryl Gallant

Mr. Richard Fadden

Ms. Cheryl Gallant

Mr. Richard Fadden

Ms. Cheryl Gallant

Mr. Richard Fadden

Ms. Cheryl Gallant

1640

Mr. Richard Fadden

Ms. Cheryl Gallant

Mr. Richard Fadden

Ms. Cheryl Gallant

Mr. Richard Fadden

Ms. Cheryl Gallant

Mr. Richard Fadden

The Chair

Mr. Michel Guimond (Beauport--Montmorency--Côte-de-Beaupré--Île-d'Orléans, BQ)

Mr. Richard Fadden

Mr. Michel Guimond

Mr. Richard Fadden

Mr. Michel Guimond

Mr. Richard Fadden

Mr. Michel Guimond

Mr. Richard Fadden

Mr. Michel Guimond

Mr. Richard Fadden

Mr. Michel Guimond

Mr. Richard Fadden

Mr. Michel Guimond

Mr. Richard Fadden

Mr. Michel Guimond

1645

Mr. Richard Fadden

Mr. Michel Guimond

Mr. Richard Fadden

The Chair

Mr. Jay Hill

Mr. Richard Fadden

Mr. Jay Hill

Mr. Richard Fadden

Mr. Jay Hill

1650

Mr. Richard Fadden

Mr. Jay Hill

Mr. Richard Fadden

Mr. Jay Hill

Mr. Richard Fadden

The Chair

Mr. Geoff Regan

Mr. Richard Fadden

Mr. Geoff Regan

Mr. Richard Fadden

Mr. Geoff Regan

Mr. Richard Fadden

Mr. Geoff Regan

Mr. Richard Fadden

Mr. Geoff Regan

Mr. Richard Fadden

Mr. Geoff Regan

1655

The Chair

Mr. Richard Fadden

The Chair

Mr. Jay Hill

Mr. Richard Fadden

Mr. Jay Hill

Mr. Richard Fadden

Mr. Jay Hill

Mr. Richard Fadden

Mr. Jay Hill

Mr. Richard Fadden

Mr. Jay Hill

Mr. Richard Fadden

Mr. Jay Hill

Mr. Richard Fadden

Mr. Jay Hill

The Chair

Mr. Richard Fadden

Mr. Jay Hill

Mr. Richard Fadden

Mr. Jay Hill

1700

Mr. Richard Fadden

The Chair

Mr. Benoit

Mr. Richard Fadden

Mr. Benoit

Mr. Richard Fadden

Mr. Benoit

Mr. Richard Fadden

Mr. Benoit

Mr. Richard Fadden

Mr. Benoit

Mr. Richard Fadden

Mr. Benoit

Mr. Richard Fadden

Mr. Benoit

Mr. Richard Fadden

1705

Mr. Benoit

Mr. Richard Fadden

Mr. Benoit

The Chair

Mr. Richard Fadden

The Chair

Mr. Joe Jordan

The Chair

CANADA

Standing Committee on Procedure and House Affairs

NUMBER 050

1st SESSION

37th PARLIAMENT

COMMITTEE EVIDENCE

Wednesday, February 27, 2002

[Recorded by Electronic Apparatus]

¹ (1530)

[English]

The Chair (Mr. Peter Adams (Peterborough, Lib.)): Colleagues, we'll begin. I would ask the cameras to leave this meeting. We'll be fully televised on CPAC. Those images are available. Thank you very much.

Colleagues, the order of the day, pursuant to the order of reference from the House of Thursday, February 7, 2002, is consideration of the question of privilege raised on January 31 by the member for Portage--Lisgar concerning the charge against the Minister of National Defence of making misleading statements in the House. Our witness is Richard Fadden, Deputy Clerk of the Privy Council, who I'll introduce in a moment.

Colleagues, I do have some housekeeping notes. This is the Standing Committee on Procedure and House Affairs, so it's not surprising that I would have housekeeping notes.

The first one is that we've received an answer from the Library of Parliament in response to the question asked to the Clerk of the House by Marlene Catterall. I believe you all have that. If you don't have it, please so indicate to the clerk.

We are still waiting for the translation of the responses from Brian Pallister. There's some problem with the translation there. That's the reason. It's not a delay on his part; it's simply a delay in the process of getting them to us in both official languages.

We have sent out a request for supplementary information from two of the witnesses in our three meetings yesterday. That's Mr. Judd and General Henault. So those requests have gone.

We have received a letter asking for clarification with respect to the list of documents requested by Jay Hill. Jay, if you and I and the clerk could meet after this meeting for five minutes, we'd be grateful. They've come back to us, asking us for some information about specific documents.

I also have a letter from Jim Judd, the Deputy Minister of National Defence, who was one of our witnesses yesterday. I'm afraid I'm going to have to read it, because I only have it in one official language. The translators have a copy of this, but it's only available in the one language. The letter is as follows:

Dear Mr. Chairman:

I have reviewed my testimony before your Committee yesterday and realize that I left some uncertainty in my comments about any meetings that I may have had with my Minister on January 28 or 29, 2002.

I have had my schedule for that period reviewed and, on that basis, would like to provide the following facts. I met with the Minister late on the afternoon of January 28 and twice on January 29 (in the morning, at Cabinet, and at the end of the afternoon). Any advice I might have given the Minister in any of those discussions would be privileged.

I hope that this helps resolve the uncertainty I may have left in my appearance yesterday. Also, we will clarify shortly with the Clerk of the Committee regarding additional documentation that has been requested by the Committee during my appearance.

With regard to that last sentence, that is what I mentioned, the information we requested. Colleagues, would you like me to read that again, or are we comfortable with that? Ça va? Okay?

I would now like to welcome Richard Fadden, Deputy Clerk of the Privy Council. Mr. Fadden, I know you've appeared before our committee before.

¹ (1535)

You should know that for these hearings we have agreement among the parties that the first round of questioning takes the form of 10 minutes from each party in the usual way--the way we did it before--instead of five minutes. Sometimes those 10 minutes will be taken up by one member. Sometimes they'll be taken up by more than one member. I will try to give you an indication of where we are in this process.

I believe all members have copies of Mr. Fadden's statement. I know you have a statement and we're looking forward to hearing it. I have you as Deputy Clerk of the Privy Council. I'd be grateful if you'd give us your full title for the record, please, before you begin.

Mr. Richard Fadden (Deputy Clerk of the Privy Council, Counsel and Security and Intelligence Coordinator, Privy Council Office): Thank you, Madam Chairman.

My full title is Deputy Clerk of the Privy Council, counsel to the Privy Council Office, and security and intelligence coordinator.

The Chair: Thank you. Proceed.

Mr. Richard Fadden: Thank you.

I look forward to providing the committee with all the assistance I can this afternoon. With your permission, I'll start with a few brief remarks, then I'll try to answer any questions.

Mr. Chairman, I thought it might be useful if I started by talking a little bit about the role I play in the Privy Council Office. As you can see, I have three titles and I wear three different hats, through which in the PCO, through the Clerk of the Privy Council, I endeavour to support the Prime Minister.

The Deputy Clerk of the Privy Council is responsible for providing legal advice to the PCO for the coordination of the government's legislative agenda, for the provision of advice relating to parliamentary issues, and for the provision of policy advice on electoral issues.

[Translation]

In this capacity, I also give advice on the framework of our institutions of government and the interrelationships between the institutions and the key officials, elected and appointed, who staff them. In carrying out these functions, I am supported by two secretariats.

[English]

This covers the first two hats, Mr. Chairman. The third is security and intelligence coordinator, a job that has four main functions. The first is to support the Prime Minister by providing information, advice, and recommendations on security and intelligence policy matters; the second is to ensure effective coordination among the members of the security and intelligence community; the third is to be responsible to the Minister of National Defence for the policy and operations of the Communications Security Establishment; and the last is to oversee the intelligence assessment function, a service based on interdepartmental contributions that produces and coordinates intelligence assessments on a wide range of subjects for use by the PM, other ministers, and senior officials of the government.

[Translation]

In carrying out these functions, I am supported by the two following secretariats: the Security and Intelligence Secretariat and the Intelligence Assessment Secretariat.

[English]

With the coordinator job description, it might be reasonable to assume at first glance that I am in the information loop on what the Canadian Forces are doing generally; however, I generally in fact am not. It is important in this context to distinguish between military and security matters.

In a military operation such as the one currently underway in Afghanistan, I am not in the chain of information. If this were a security operation in Canada, I would expect to be involved in activities being undertaken by all the relevant players.

In terms of the military chain of command, I want to be very clear that I am not a part of it, nor is anyone else in the Privy Council Office. In the case under review, I learned on January 29 that the Canadian Forces had taken prisoners in Afghanistan. It was the Clerk of the Privy Council who relayed this information to me after he himself learned of it at a cabinet meeting.

Additionally, I must point out--as a number of my predecessors here have done--that we're talking about JTF-2, a highly specialized military group that, as is the case with many allied countries, operates covertly and within a very narrow reporting structure. Information about this group is disseminated on a strictly need-to-know basis. Operational security for our troops is critical.

¹ (1540)

[Translation]

Nevertheless, if the organization was to uncover intelligence relating to al-Qaeda members in Canada or a terrorist operation planned in North America, I am confident that the Canadian Forces would share the information appropriately and expeditiously with the intelligence community in Canada. This has certainly been the practice to date.

[English]

In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, I hope my remarks are at least slightly helpful. As I noted at the beginning of my remarks, I will do everything I can to be helpful to the committee within the constraints that bind me. I now await any questions you might have.

The Chair: Thank you very much, Mr. Fadden. I appreciate it.

Colleagues, there are a couple of things I forgot. One is that I'm right in assuming the replies to the questions to Commodore Thiffault are public documents. Some media have asked me for them.

The second thing is all of us are now in a situation where we have quite a pile of these documents. The translators have copies of them. So if you're referring to or quoting from a particular document, I'd be most grateful if you could indicate clearly for the translators which document it is and where you are in it.

I have Vic Toews, Geoff Regan, Pierre Brien, Joe Jordan, Bill Blaikie.

Mr. Vic Toews (Provencher, Canadian Alliance): Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Mr. Chair, I'm wondering if the witness took the opportunity to discuss his testimony with anyone prior to coming here today.

Mr. Richard Fadden: Yes, I did, Mr. Chairman. I discussed it with a large number of my colleagues in the Privy Council Office.

Mr. Vic Toews: With whom in the Privy Council Office did you discuss your testimony?

Mr. Richard Fadden: There were a number of people in the communications shop, my colleagues in security and intelligence, colleagues in the machinery of government, the associate and the Clerk of the Privy Council.

Mr. Vic Toews: Why would you discuss your testimony with members of the communications shop, as you call it, Mr. Chair?

Mr. Richard Fadden: Because one of their tasks is to assist members of the Privy Council Office who appear before parliamentary committees. They do the preparation of the documents. For example, they did the xeroxing of my remarks. They make sure they're formatted. They have some expertise in advising members of the office.

Mr. Vic Toews: What you've basically described, Mr. Chair, is fairly routine administrative and secretarial-type work as opposed to the substance of any testimony. I'm talking about the substance of your testimony. Did you discuss that with anyone prior to coming here?

Mr. Richard Fadden: As I said, Mr. Chairman, yes, I did, with my boss, the Clerk of the Privy Council; the Associate Secretary to the Cabinet; and a number of other colleagues.

Mr. Vic Toews: So you discussed your testimony with the witness we're going to have here this afternoon before you came here, Mr. Chair. Is it a regular practice to discuss with another witness the substantive portion of testimony before you come here, Mr. Chair?

Mr. Richard Fadden: I think, Mr. Chairman, it's standard practice in the bureaucracy for officials to prepare themselves as best they can to make sure they have the right set of information, they understand the positions of the government, and they are able to make themselves as useful as they can to the committee. That's what I did.

Mr. Vic Toews: Mr. Chair, I thought we were here to hear what this witness knew specifically and personally, as opposed to what an entire office--

Mr. Geoff Regan (Halifax West, Lib.): I have a point of order.

Mr. Chairman, it seems to me that Mr. Toews is impugning the intentions of this witness, suggesting that he's not going to tell us what his own views are. Even in a court of law a lawyer can talk to his client in advance. He just can't direct them as to what to answer. You can't coach them, that's all.

The Chair: That's enough. It's not a court of law. We've made that clear.

Vic, my understanding is that with this preliminary list of witnesses, we went to great lengths to make sure they did not appear together. My understanding as chair is that we didn't go any further than that.

Please continue.

Mr. Vic Toews: I am a little concerned, Mr. Chair, because we make these efforts to make sure they don't appear together, yet they go behind our backs and collaborate on their testimony.

Mr. Chair, when was this witness first informed that any of our JTF-2 forces were involved in either the taking or transporting of the prisoners?

¹ (1545)

Mr. Richard Fadden: Mr. Chairman, as I tried to set out in my remarks, I was informed by the Clerk of the Privy Council shortly after we returned from cabinet on January 29.

Mr. Vic Toews: How was this information conveyed to the witness, Mr. Chair?

Mr. Richard Fadden: To be honest, Mr. Chairman, I cannot remember whether Mr. Cappe walked down to my office and told me or called me. It was one of the two.

Mr. Vic Toews: So it was Mr. Cappe, then, who conveyed the information to the witness. Was it verbal?

Mr. Richard Fadden: Yes, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Vic Toews: What precisely was the nature and extent of the information conveyed on January 29, when I believe you testified, Mr. Chair?

Mr. Richard Fadden: I think, Mr. Chairman, that he basically summarized the same information that Mr. Eggleton made public after the cabinet meeting, that there had been a general discussion on the subject of the Canadian Forces' operations in Afghanistan and that there had been a discussion of the issue of prisoner status and prisoner treatment. He indicated that the minister had told his colleagues that a number of prisoners had been taken, and he told me that there had been a brief discussion of The Globe and Mail picture, which I think the committee has discussed over the last couple of days. All of this, again, Mr. Eggleton had mentioned.

Mr. Vic Toews: Did the witness have any conversation with the minister about the prisoner issue prior to cabinet on January 29?

Mr. Richard Fadden: Yes, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Vic Toews: So you discussed the issue with the minister prior to the cabinet meeting.

Mr. Richard Fadden: I'm simply suggesting, Mr. Chairman, in response to the question that I had a general discussion on the broad topic that the member is raising.

Mr. Vic Toews: Did you provide any information to the minister at that time?

Mr. Richard Fadden: Mr. Chairman, I would rather decline to comment. Advice and information being passed on to ministers is something we usually don't talk about.

The Chair: Cabinet confidentiality. We accepted that from the military witnesses yesterday.

Please continue.

Mr. Vic Toews: That's fine.

I understand that General Dan Ross is the senior military person in the PCO. Is that correct?

Mr. Richard Fadden: Yes, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Vic Toews: Essentially, what is General Ross's role in PCO?

Mr. Richard Fadden: General Ross works in the foreign and defence policy secretariat. That's the group that coordinates the work of the PCO on foreign policy, defence policy, and aid policy. He operates as the number two in that secretariat. While he is seconded to the Privy Council Office, he is not functioning as a member of the defence department. His role is to act as the director of operations, or number two person, in that secretariat.

Mr. Vic Toews: And he reports to Claude Laverdure?

Mr. Richard Fadden: That's correct, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Vic Toews: What is Mr. Laverdure's role in PCO?

Mr. Richard Fadden: I think he has two functions. One is as an assistant secretary to the cabinet for foreign and defence policy. In that capacity, he provides the clerk and the Prime Minister with a full range of services that all the other assistant secretaries provide, in terms of coordinating activity, being informed of what's going on, and things of this nature.

Mr. Vic Toews: Would you know the basis on which Mr. Laverdure or General Ross decide whether to brief you or the Prime Minister on information relating to a defence issue or a foreign affairs issue that is passed on to them from the Department of National Defence?

Mr. Richard Fadden: In general terms, Mr. Chairman, it's a matter of judgment. Colleagues in our two secretariats or branches work together. Mr. Laverdure and I meet five or six times a week. One of the objectives of these meetings is to try to keep abreast of what's important and what's going on. There is of necessity some overlap, and we try to keep each other informed.

Mr. Vic Toews: After the cabinet meeting on January 29, did you consult with Mr. Laverdure or General Ross as to whether they had previous knowledge of the incident of the taking of prisoners in Afghanistan by Canadian Forces?

Mr. Richard Fadden: I did not, sir.

Mr. Vic Toews: When did you become aware that the Prime Minister said on January 28 that the taking of the prisoners was hypothetical?

Mr. Richard Fadden: I think it was later that day, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Vic Toews: When did you know that the Prime Minister was mistaken in his comment?

Mr. Richard Fadden: The earliest possible time at which I could have made that connection was after Mr. Cappe told me, subsequent to the cabinet meeting, that prisoners had been taken.

¹ (1550)

Mr. Vic Toews: So on January 28, would you have heard the statement by the Prime Minister?

Mr. Richard Fadden: I don't think I heard him when he was making it. I believe it was picked up by the media and I saw it later that day during one of the evening news broadcasts.

Mr. Vic Toews: Who briefs the Prime Minister on national defence issues?

Mr. Richard Fadden: Broadly speaking, I think there are two people: the Clerk of the Privy Council, who is responsible for briefing the Prime Minister on the full range of responsibilities; and, in particular circumstances, the Prime Minister's foreign affairs adviser, Mr. Laverdure.

Mr. Vic Toews: Is that done on a daily basis, sir?

Mr. Richard Fadden: I wouldn't say it's done on a daily basis, but either Mr. Cappe or Mr. Laverdure sees the Prime Minister on a regular basis. Certainly they communicate orally, face to face, over the telephone, and also frequently through the transmission of written material.

Mr. Vic Toews: Do you know if that was done on January 28?

Mr. Richard Fadden: I do not, sir.

The Chair: Geoff Regan, Pierre Brien, Joe Jordan, Bill Blaikie, Marlene Catterall, Jay Hill, Mauril Bélanger.

Mr. Geoff Regan: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank Mr. Fadden for coming before the committee today.

Through you, Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask Mr. Fadden first of all if Mr. Laverdure was in the chain of information. You said in your opening comments that in a military operation such as the one currently underway in Afghanistan, you are not in the chain of information. Is Mr. Laverdure in the chain of information, and in particular is he in the chain of information in relation to the activities of JTF-2?

Mr. Richard Fadden: He is not. Just for the sake of clarity, that chain of information is very clear. It is the unit commander to the Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff to the Chief of the Defence Staff to the minister. No one in PCO is involved on an ongoing basis.

Mr. Geoff Regan: Are you aware whether anyone in the PCO knew prior to the 29th of January that Canadian troops had taken prisoners?

Mr. Richard Fadden: My understanding is no one knew. I knew because the Clerk of the Privy Council caused an inquiry to be made; he wanted to be certain whether anyone knew or not, and the response came back unambiguously that no one knew, in keeping with the procedures that had been laid out.

Mr. Geoff Regan: It is kind of surprising that there wasn't the flow of information that way. I think many people would be surprised at this.

Perhaps you can explain to the committee, through you, Mr. Chairman, how things work within the government. To what degree does the Prime Minister leaves things to each minister to deal with and to what degree are things controlled through the PCO? I think you see where I'm getting at. It's a bit surprising that it works this way. Maybe you can explain this a bit.

Mr. Richard Fadden: Yes, Mr. Chairman, I will try.

In the context of JTF-2 operations in Afghanistan, the Prime Minister and cabinet would have had to agree to their deployment, he would have had to agree to their mission and mandate, and he would want to know on a regular basis what, generally speaking, they were doing. But for reasons of operational security, and also because, I submit, the Prime Minister cannot be briefed in excessive detail about operations, he is not in the regular loop.

So in the case at issue, the determination had been made before JTF-2 left Afghanistan that as long as JTF-2 operated within its mission, its mandate, and the law, and there were no extraordinary circumstances--the capture of Mr. bin Laden, for example, or Canadian troops being hurt--there would be no requirement to report to the Prime Minister.

Mr. Geoff Regan: How would you describe the Prime Minister's management style in the range of hands-on to hands-off?

Mr. Richard Fadden: It's always a dangerous thing, Mr. Chairman, for a public servant to comment on the style of the Prime Minister, so I'm going to quote him. He says he lets his ministers get on with it. My observation would be that he does.

Mr. Geoff Regan: Is that five minutes, Mr. Chairman?

The Chair: It's not quite.

Mr. Geoff Regan: Can I split my time with someone else?

The Chair: By all means.

Joe Jordan.

Mr. Joe Jordan (Leeds--Grenville, Lib.): Thank you, Mr. Chair.

The Chair: This is split time.

Mr. Joe Jordan: Mr. Fadden, I am looking for a point of clarification.

In the answer to a question from Mr. Toews, you indicated you'd spoken to the minister prior to January 29 about the issue of prisoners. I realize you can't divulge the details, but am I right to assume, based on your statement that you didn't learn about the taking of prisoners until the 29th, that this would have been a very general discussion about the public policy, the foreign policy implications, of the transfer and taking of prisoners?

¹ (1555)

Mr. Richard Fadden: That's correct, Mr. Chairman. As I did not know, we were talking about the general issue, not in any respect about detainees that may or may not have been taken by Canada; at the time, I did not know.

Mr. Joe Jordan: Mr. Fadden, you're probably aware of the reference we have from the House of Commons. We're examining the issue of the conflicting statements the minister has made. To the best of your recollection, are you in possession of any information that is at all relevant to this?

Mr. Richard Fadden: Taking into account, Mr. Chairman, the order of reference from the House, I must say that, unless you take a particularly broad construction of those words, I do not think so.

Mr. Joe Jordan: Thank you.

[Translation]

The Chair: Pierre Brien, Marlene Catterall, Bill Blaikie.

Pierre.

Mr. Pierre Brien (Témiscamingue, BQ): Good afternoon, Mr. Fadden.

Do you participate in the development of the agenda for the Cabinet meetings?

Mr. Richard Fadden: Not directly, Mr. Chairman. There is a secretariat within the Privy Council which deals with this on a regular basis. On the other hand, the various components of the Privy Council make contributions, suggestions. So in a very general sense, yes, but it is certainly not one of my responsibilities. So, if I had a topic within my mandate which I felt could be of interest for the Cabinet meeting, I would make a suggestion accordingly. That's about it.

Mr. Pierre Brien: Who is responsible for putting topics such as the one we are discussing, for example, the Afghan prisoners' status, on the agenda? Who in your office would be responsible for putting that on the agenda?

Mr. Richard Fadden: It would be the Priorities and Planning Secretariat. I could explain briefly, Mr. Chairman, that some items are put on the Cabinet meeting agenda in a very natural way. If there is something in the media, if there is a big crisis in Canada, it is done more or less automatically. Some items are also put there because they have been the subject of planning for weeks or months. Others, such as this one may be, have to be debated by the Cabinet because of a combination of public interest, parliamentary interest, minister's interest, Privy Council's interest.

Mr. Pierre Brien: And on the 29th, on the agenda, there was a discussion on this issue of the prisoners' status.

Mr. Richard Fadden: Yes, Mr. Chairman. This has been confirmed already both by the Prime Minister and the Defence Minister.

Mr. Pierre Brien: At what time was it put on the agenda?

Mr. Richard Fadden: I could not answer directly. I'm really sorry: I don't know. Items are put on the agenda at different moments from week to week.

Mr. Pierre Brien: Is it possible to believe that it would have been on the agenda since the previous week, that it might have been already put on the agenda during the previous days, so during the week before the 29th?

Mr. Richard Fadden: Mr. Chairman, it is not because I don't want to answer the question but, honestly, I don't know.

Mr. Pierre Brien: Who would be consulted in the Defence Department for putting a topic on the agenda? For instance, would the Deputy Minister be made aware of the fact that the topic is on the agenda?

Mr. Richard Fadden: Absolutely. In general terms, yes. The way it works usually, under the process I was telling you about, is that a consensus is developed on the items that should be on the agenda. The departments are informed, there is an exchange between the officials, and a decision is finally made.

Mr. Pierre Brien: So the question of the prisoners' status was the subject of a public debate, of a fairly important public controversy which started even before the 17th of January, when committees had met here.

In that context, is there someone in the Privy Council Office whose role was, if there was an ambiguity, for example on the American position, to check things before the discussion, to see what the American position was as close as possible to the date of the Cabinet meeting, and who did that?

Mr. Richard Fadden: Mr. Chairman, first, I would like to take exception to the affirmation that on January 17th there was a large public controversy on that topic. At the beginning of the debate, there was a controversy on the prisoners' treatment. That started a little before the debate on the prisoners' status, but it is not because there is a couple of articles in the media, because there is a couple of questions in the House and that a couple of Americans are making comments that there is a problem. It takes a collection of activities and comments. So I just wanted to mention that, yes, we were aware that some questions were starting to be asked. But there are always questions on this kind of issue.

So, I couldn't say at what date exactly we became aware of the fact that there was a problem requiring some clarifications.

Mr. Pierre Brien: Would an article of the Washington Times, for example, saying that the American Secretary of State, Colin Powell, requested President Bush to change his position and referring to a

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[English]

“four-page internal White House memorandum obtained yesterday by The Washington Times”

[Translation]

constitute the type of information that you would find credible and important enough to verify whether the American position is effectively the subject of such a controversy?

Mr. Richard Fadden: Mr. Chairman, this would probably have led us to wonder what was happening, but I would like to qualify my reply and say that before the Canadian military were sent to Afghanistan, there was no doubt, whether in Canada or in the United States, that the law of armed conflict applied. We had no reason to believe that it didn't apply. There was a debate beetween some high American officials. That did not necessarily mean for Canada that the United States' government had changed their mind.

Did that raise some questions? I confess that yes it did but we didn't think that we had a really serious problem.

Mr. Pierre Brien: So, even after that story in the Washington Times on January 26th, you didn't deem it necessary to verify with the American authorities what their position was or how strong it was at the time?

Mr. Richard Fadden: No, Mr. Chairman. We did verify.

Mr. Pierre Brien: Sorry?

Mr. Richard Fadden: We did verify. What I meant, is that it wasn't only because of the newspaper article. You made some comments in the House, you and your colleagues, and there were a few small articles in the Canadian media. It's because of all these comments that we concluded that there was a potential problem. But it is on the 26th, I believe, that we requested clarifications from the American authorities.

Mr. Pierre Brien: Do you feel it's normal, for example, in the government communications loop, that someone in the Foreign Affairs Department be aware that prisoners had been taken, which is then outside of the JTF-2 chain of command, and that the information wouldn't be shared with you?

Would it be normal that someone in Foreign Affairs knew and that this information didn't get to the Privy Council?

Mr. Richard Fadden: No, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Pierre Brien: It wouldn't be normal.

Mr. Richard Fadden: No, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Pierre Brien: In the statements made by Commodore Thiffault, who is based in Tampa, we can read: “As far as I know the representatives…”

The Chairman: [Editor's note: Inaudible]

Mr. Pierre Brien: In reply to a question asking if there were people from the Privy Council or from the Prime Minister's Office or from Foreign Affairs who were aware of the issue, he answers:

Yes, there is among my staff a representative from Foreign Affairs who reports directly to Foreign Affairs. As far as I know, the Foreign Affairs representative was aware of these circumstances surrounding the taking of prisoners when my Public Affairs Officer gave me the articles around January 25th.

Consequently, on Friday, January 25th, someone in Foreign Affairs was aware of what was happening and you didn't receive the information.

Mr. Richard Fadden: It's the first time I hear of this. The Commodore's operation, in Tampa, is related to the general military operations in Afghanistan. The military authorities are telling me that they were not to deal with the JTF-2 operations. If such is the case, it's the first time I hear of it.

As I was telling the Chairman at the beginning of my intervention, the security measures that were taken to protect the group's operations were very strict and we were not to talk about it to Foreign Affairs.

Mr. Pierre Brien: I want to clarify the question to make sure that you understand. Is there among your staff…

[English]

The Chair: Mr. Brien, can you give us the page, please?

[Translation]

Mr. Pierre Brien : It's on the last page of the report, on page 17. I read again Question 18, a question put to the Commodore:

Are there on your staff in Florida representatives from Foreign Affairs, from CSIS, from the RCMP, or from the Privy Council Office? If yes, do they have their own line of communication with their respective department in Ottawa? If you have such representatives in Florida, at what time did you give them the information regarding the taking of prisoners in Afghanistan?

So, there is a direct reference to the taking of prisoners. At that time, he answers:

As far as I know, the Foreign Affairs representative was made aware of the circumstances surrounding the taking of these prisoners when my Public Affairs Officer gave me the articles mentioned on January 25th.

Mr. Richard Fadden: All I can say, Mr. Chairman, is that the military authorities informed us that the Commodore's operation in Florida wasn't supposed to deal with the anti-terrorist operations we're talking about. I'm surprised by what you are saying.

Mr. Pierre Brien: If that information is confirmed, the Defence Minister wouldn't be the only civilian made aware of the taking of prisoners.

Mr. Richard Fadden: If this information is accurate.

Mr. Pierre Brien: There is something I find rather strange.

The Prime Minister learned at a Cabinet meeting on January 29th, during the meeting, that prisoners had been taken. The information was made public by the Minister right after the Cabinet meeting. Isn't it a normal practice for the Privy Council or the Prime Minister's Office to try and clarify the nature of important information which has just been obtained before sharing it with the public at large? The Prime Minister heard of that, by surprise, at the Cabinet meeting, and the information was made public two hours later, probably even before you were made aware of it.

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[English]

The Chair: Mr. Fadden, you have less than 30 seconds.

[Translation]

Mr. Richard Fadden: If I understand correctly, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Eggleton, the Defence Minister, had spent some time obtaining clarifications on the subject we're talking about. When he spoke of the issue at the Cabinet meeting, he was well informed and he had an opinion. It is not that surprising that he would talk about it after the Cabinet meeting. It's not something that he had just learned.

[English]

The Chair: Marlene Catterall and Bill Blaikie, Mauril Bélanger, Jay Hill, and then David Pratt.

Marlene.

Ms. Marlene Catterall (Ottawa West--Nepean, Lib.): In your role, Mr. Fadden, to what extent do you look at the agenda for a cabinet meeting to see whether it has matters on it related to your responsibilities for security and intelligence?

Mr. Richard Fadden: As a matter of course, Mr. Chairman, senior members of the Privy Council Office are made aware of items that are planned for consideration by cabinet and we would become aware at that time whether or not there's an item within our particular areas of responsibility.

Ms. Marlene Catterall: So you would have known that this issue of the taking of detainees in Afghanistan was on the cabinet agenda for the day, on the 29th?

Mr. Richard Fadden: You're asking me to get very close to an area that I'm not supposed to talk about. I would have to give you details about how the agenda is set out and I cannot do that.

Ms. Marlene Catterall: You may not be able to answer my next question either, then.

We heard from the Chief of the Defence Staff that the taking of a photo of detainees was a breach of security and could have jeopardized our JTF-2 forces. Since this--

The Chair: I think it was the detainees and the troops.

Ms. Marlene Catterall: And the troops?

The Chair: Yes.

Ms. Marlene Catterall: Would you have been made aware of this, not as a matter of military operations, but as a security matter? And please tell me if this is a question you can't answer. I don't know where the dividing line is.

Mr. Richard Fadden: No, I think I can answer that. In general terms, I have a remit to worry about just about anything that touches security and intelligence across the government. But in practical terms, the more operational you become the less involved I become, unless there's a special problem.

In this particular case, it would have been reasonable for the department to take note of the issue and to determine whether or not there was a problem and what to do about it.

Ms. Marlene Catterall: Given that they did and that they did discern it was a problem and took action, is this the kind of security issue on which you would be informed in your role in the Privy Council?

Mr. Richard Fadden: As a sort of report of action taken, yes, Mr. Chairman.

Ms. Marlene Catterall: Would that have triggered you--I can't recall the words you used in your presentation to us--to exercise your responsibility to the Minister of National Defence or to the Prime Minister?

Mr. Richard Fadden: In respect of the Minister of National Defence, absolutely not, because my reporting relationship to him, Mr. Chairman, is for a quite narrow purpose. So it would fall entirely outside of military operations.

In respect of the issue involving the security breach, I must say that it's a serious breach in security terms, but it's not the sort of thing I would have brought to the attention of the Clerk of the Privy Council or the Prime Minister had I been able to. It's a matter for the department to deal with.

Ms. Marlene Catterall: The Department of National Defence.

Mr. Richard Fadden: Yes, Mr. Chairman.

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Ms. Marlene Catterall: So even knowing that the issue of the taking of detainees would be considered by cabinet, you wouldn't have raised that particular aspect of it, the security aspect.

Mr. Richard Fadden: As I think, Mr. Chairman, the Minister of National Defence stated very clearly, cabinet's consideration of this issue was broad and multifaceted and involved a whole range of issues, including the detainees.

As I understand it. ministers were being asked to talk not about operations but about policy. The issue you're talking about, Mr. Chairman, is an operational issue. It's an important operational issue, but it is not one that would necessarily engage the attention of a minister.

Ms. Marlene Catterall: I have one final question, Mr. Fadden. Do you have any information, are you aware of any conversations, and do you have any light whatsoever to shed on what the Minister of National Defence knew about the taking of detainees and the involvement of the Canadian Forces in that, or do you not?

Mr. Richard Fadden: No, Mr. Chairman.

Ms. Marlene Catterall: Thank you.

The Chair: Next is Bill Blaikie, and then Mauril Bélanger, Jay Hill, and David Pratt.

Bill.

Mr. Bill Blaikie (Winnipeg--Transcona, NDP): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I have a few questions. First of all, I've always regarded the Privy Council as being omniscient, where people know all the things that are happening in government, and it seems odd to me that when it came to something as controversial as the issue of what would be done with detainees, they would be so much in the dark, so to speak, as to what was going on. I find it very mysterious, indeed, that the Clerk of the Privy Council only learned of this at cabinet and then was able to pass it on to our witness.

Perhaps by way of trying to get at what may have happened here, I notice that our witness today says that he is not in the chain of information with regard to the operations currently underway in Afghanistan. Then in the next point he says: “In terms of the military chain of command, I want to be very clear that I am not part of it--nor is anyone else in the Privy Council.”

I think I understand the difference between chain of information and chain of command. When you're talking about chain of command, you're very clear. You're not in the chain of command, nor is anyone else in the Privy Council.

But you don't make the same claim about the chain of information. You make the claim about you yourself not being in the chain of information, but you don't make the claim that no one else in the Privy Council is in the chain of information. To me it would seem logical that someone in the Privy Council would be in the chain of information given the normal operations of government and also the sensitivity of the topic. If it wasn't you and it wasn't the Clerk of the Privy Council because he didn't find out until he went to cabinet, according to your testimony, who in the Privy Council would have been in that chain of information?

Mr. Richard Fadden: Mr. Chairman, in terms of operational matters relating to JTF-2 that fall within the mission and mandate in Canadian law, ministers had agreed that the chain of information was, as I said at the beginning, the unit commander, the deputy chief, the chief, and the minister. If, however, something occurs that requires JTF-2 to fall outside of its mission or mandate to do anything that's considered to be unlawful or something extraordinary happens, the policy laid down provides for the minister to inform the Prime Minister.

Mr. Bill Blaikie: There's no provision whatsoever for anybody in the Privy Council to know these kinds of things?

Mr. Richard Fadden: No, Mr. Chairman. As a number of witnesses, including the Chief of the Defence Staff, indicated last night, the reason for this is that we were very concerned about operational security. I appreciate that there's a temporal issue here, but at the time the detainees or the prisoners were taken, it was not an issue of particular controversy. That's what they were sent to Afghanistan to do. We would have been disappointed had they not taken prisoners.

To be perfectly honest, Mr. Chairman, I still have some difficulty understanding why someone in my position or anyone else in PCO should have been told that a bunch of military guys in Afghanistan did their job and took a few prisoners.

Mr. Bill Blaikie: I can try to answer that question. There was a lively policy discussion going on within the country and within the Liberal caucus about what the status of these detainees would be and whether assurances should be sought from the Americans as to the status of the detainees and how they would be treated before they should be turned over. I think it somewhat--I'm trying to think of a polite word here--to suggest that this was a routine event. The whole country is discussing what the status of the detainees would be, and the Privy Council comes to the conclusion that this isn't something they're interested in, that this is just a routine manner. This is a matter of policies, not a matter of routine. It's a matter of policy. In fact, the government did have to....

Do you guys want to shut up over there for a minute? I'm trying to talk. Order. Mr. Chairman, I can hardly hear myself for that conversation on the Liberal benches over there.

This was a matter for real policy decision-making as to how the government was going to be handling this. It seems irresponsible to me that the Privy Council would have taken the view that this was outside their mandate, that this was just a matter of routine decision-making. My understanding, for instance, was that during the Gulf War, the Clerk of the Privy Council was briefing the Prime Minister all the time, rather than let him sit around waiting to learn stuff from cabinet meetings.

º (1615)

Mr. Richard Fadden: Mr. Chairman, Mr. Blaikie is right when he says there was a policy debate. There were some issues that arose concerning the status and the treatment of prisoners. The Privy Council Office and a number of other departments were quite involved in trying to resolve those policy issues.

As I think the Deputy Prime Minister said at one point, whether or not we had prisoners at a particular point in time--and I didn't know, as I indicated--would not have changed the substance of the policy debate. As I indicated earlier, Mr. Chairman, when Canada went into the Afghanistan coalition, we were absolutely certain that the Americans were respecting the law of armed conflict. Ministers have since ascertained that's always been the case. Some questions were raised. Three or four departments in town looked at the international law that's applicable. We sought assurances from the American government, and we remain convinced that there was no substantive policy problem.

I guess what I'm trying to say, Mr. Chairman, is that whether or not Mr. Cappe, I myself, or a large part of the Privy Council Office knew at a particular point in time whether or not there were prisoners, it would not have changed the substance of the policy debate.

Mr. Bill Blaikie: Just on that, finally, it seems to me that's a key claim by the witness. It certainly mattered for the Prime Minister. When the Prime Minister was asked about whether or not the government had a certain policy in this respect, he said it was hypothetical, therefore he didn't have to answer.

If the Privy Council is advising the Prime Minister on what his policy responses are to certain situations and the Prime Minister himself thinks that whether or not it has happened is relevant to how he answers the question, why is it that the Privy Council says it's not relevant? It seemed to be very relevant to the Prime Minster when he was asked. Instead of giving an answer, he says it's a hypothetical question. Well, was this hypothetical question not being tossed around and would it not have been part of your responsibility to the Prime Minster to make sure he didn't go around saying things were hypothetical when they weren't, when they'd already happened?

Mr. Richard Fadden: Mr. Chairman, it goes back to what I was trying to say a few moments ago. We're shifting back and forth in time on this issue.

Mr. Bill Blaikie: That's for sure.

Mr. Richard Fadden: No public servant wants to put his or her minister in a position where it causes difficulty, and I suspect that's the same with ministers in respect of the Prime Minister. But at the time the policy debate was going on, we had no reason to believe there was any difficulty with the operations in Afghanistan. As it turns out, both the minister and the Prime Minister have indicated it would have been desirable for the Prime Minster to be informed.

I don't think anybody in retrospect thinks that would not have been desirable. But it was not necessary for the Prime MInister to be informed, and I submit again that, given the circumstances, it was not necessary for the Privy Council Office to know. It would have been desirable, given events subsequent and the Prime Minister's statement, but I submit that doesn't shift the validity of the policy, which restricts knowledge of a highly confidential and very dangerous set of operations. We set up these policies for a reason.

Mr. Bill Blaikie: Mr. Chairman, I don't think there would have been anything irresponsible or a threat to security involved in having the Prime Minister know that these events had taken place. And I find the claim that somehow it would have been a threat to security to inform the Prime Minister that a significant event had taken place that would require a policy response on the part of the government, a policy response that would be based on the fact that it had taken place rather than on the fact that it was hypothetical.... I find it very difficult to believe that this was an appropriate response. I don't mean just a desirable versus an undesirable response; I think it was a mistake on the part of the Privy Council to not regard that as something they should know and something the Prime Minister should know.

The Chair: David Pratt.

Mr. David Pratt (Nepean--Carleton, Lib.): Mr. Chair, a lot of my questions were taken by Mr. Blaikie. But just to be doubly sure on this, through you, Mr. Chair, to Mr. Fadden, what I'm gathering from what you've said thus far, Mr. Fadden, is that in fact, from your perspecti--and correct me if I'm putting words in your mouth--there were no security implications and no policy implications from the failure of the Minister of National Defence to transmit information earlier with respect to the taking of prisoners. Ideally, of course, it would have been good if the Prime Minister had known on January 28 that we had taken prisoners, but in actual fact nothing hung on it from the standpoint of security issues or policy issues. Is that correct?

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Mr. Richard Fadden: I think that's a fair statement, Mr. Chairman.

What I was trying to say is that from the perspective of security, and policy, and operations, the taking of the prisoners was not an extraordinary event. It was why they were there.

Mr. David Pratt: Mr. Chair, through you. I don't know how the Privy Council Office works or how it has worked in the past, but I presume that in the past the Minister of National Defence, during the Korean War or even the Second World War, would not have been informing the Prime Minister as to when prisoners were taken with respect to particular operations. Is that the case?

Mr. Richard Fadden: I would say that's very likely to be the case. I don't know that factually.

But to go back to one of the earlier questions. prime ministers, and I think this Prime Minister, set policy, determine broad ways of operating, and unless there's a particular problem they expect their ministers and their officials to get on with it.

Mr. David Pratt: So then the fact there might have been some discussion among members of the Liberal caucus with respect to the treatment of prisoners was largely irrelevant to the mechanics of what you folks at the Privy Council Office were trying to deal with.

Mr. Richard Fadden: I want to be careful how I respond to that, because the discussions were important. The issues that were talked about by you and your colleagues were important issues. But again, picking up your wording, in respect of the operations in Afghanistan, I submit there was no direct link.

Mr. David Pratt: Thank you, Mr. Chair.

The Chair: It's Jay Hill and then Mauril Bélanger.

Mr. Jay Hill (Prince George--Peace River, PC/DR): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you, Mr. Fadden, for appearing today.

I'll maybe start by picking up on Mr. Blaikie's comments, and I would invite a quick comment after I make my statement. I find it absolutely amazing that at a time of war, when our country is at war on terrorism and we have young men and women doing the best job they can, doing a terrific job overseas in Afghanistan, our Prime Minister doesn't know that they're involved in an operation where they take prisoners, and he doesn't know that for a week. And you say that's not extraordinary?

I think if the Prime Minister, during the Second World War, didn't know what our forces were doing overseas on a daily basis I would be absolutely amazed.

Mr. Richard Fadden: Mr. Chairman, as I think some of your previous witnesses have said on a number of occasions, the Prime Minister is briefed generally and regularly on Canadian Forces operations in the effort lead by the United States coalition. The only exception to this is that for security reasons ministers have agreed that they would hold very close information about operations.

Mr. Jay Hill: Don't trust the Prime Minister with that information for a week?

Mr. Richard Fadden: No, Mr. Chairman. The issue is whether the Prime Minister has a need to know. The judgment was made that he did not have the need to know because it did not affect the mission, it did not affect the mandate. And I repeat again, Mr. Chairman--

Mr. Jay Hill: Doesn't it affect the Prime Minister's credibility when he has to respond to a question by saying something is hypothetical and it's happened a week before? That's not a need to know?

Mr. Richard Fadden: As I suggested, Mr. Chairman, a moment ago when I was trying to answer Mr. Blaikie's question, we're moving back and forth in time. Of course it would have been good for the Prime Minister to know. But that's with the benefit of hindsight.

At the time the prisoners were taken and until the issue became problematic, from the perspective of the Prime Minister's statement it was an operational issue of no particular import for the Prime Minister because the mission went well, no one was hurt, and Canadian law and policy was followed.

Mr. Jay Hill: And prisoners were taken.

I want to go to the witness' written statement, Mr. Chairman. He states that the third hat he wears is that of “security and intelligence coordinator” and that some of the tasks that flow from that job are: “To support the Prime Minister by providing information, advice and recommendations on security and intelligence policy matters; to ensure the effective coordination among the members of the security and intelligence community”, and then further on, on page 4--

The Chair: Page 4?

Mr. Jay Hill: Oh, sorry, that was page 2.

On page 4 of the document in the English version, halfway through the first paragraph, he states: “...I am confident that the Canadian Forces would share that information appropriately and expeditiously with the intelligence community in Canada.”

Now, I wonder what your definition of the word “expeditiously” is. I'm assuming that JTF-2 is one of our primary intelligence-gathering forces when forces are on the ground fighting a war, in an operational sense, on the ground in Afghanistan. Obviously they're gathering intelligence. It's one of the jobs they do and do well.

Now, if you're briefing the cabinet, and specifically the Prime Minister, on intelligence, how can you do it if you don't have the intelligence that JTF-2 would be providing?

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Mr. Richard Fadden: Mr. Chairman, I'd like to be very, very clear that the reason for JTF-2 being in Afghanistan is to pursue al-Qaeda and Taliban terrorists. Their job is not to collect intelligence. If, however, they acquired intelligence either directly or through the allies, as a matter of course they would refer it back to military intelligence and it would be forwarded to Canadian intelligence in Canada.

Mr. Jay Hill: Okay, I want to return to this issue of your statement, “expeditiously”, on page 4. I would like your definition of what that is in light of the fact that a previous witness, the Deputy Minister of Defence, Mr. Judd, stated that he found out that our troops were involved in the capture of suspected al-Qaeda terrorists, vis-à-vis the now infamous photograph, on January 25 when Vice-Admiral Maddison came to him and said that “these people in this photograph are Canadians”. He used the term that he found out by “happenstance”.

You found out by “happenstance” when the Clerk of the Privy Council returned from a cabinet meeting and happened to inform you, a week after it happened. Is that your idea of “expeditious”?

Mr. Richard Fadden: I think my definition, Mr. Chairman, of “expeditious” will vary with the subject matter at hand. If JTF-2 or anybody else in the Canadian Forces acquired information, either because they detained a prisoner or they tripped over a computer, that suggested there was a risk to Canada or to the United States, “expeditious” would mean “then and there”, within the next couple of hours. If they acquired general information or if there were a general operational report of the sort we're talking about, there are established channels whereby the unit commander reports on a regular basis up the chain of command. By that, I do not necessarily mean a couple of hours. It depends on the kind of information, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Jay Hill: So obviously for the taking of prisoners in a war situation, eight days or whatever is “expeditious”.

Mr. Chairman, does the witness sit on a committee chaired by the clerk of the Privy Council, which is made up of the deputy heads of departments of the government and called the Interdepartmental Committee on Security and Intelligence?

Mr. Richard Fadden: I'm the vice-chair of that committee, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Jay Hill: Does this committee meet weekly?

Mr. Richard Fadden: No, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Jay Hill: When does it meet?

Mr. Richard Fadden: The full committee, when it's chaired by the Clerk of the Privy Council, meets irregularly. It meets when there are particular crises ongoing in Canada. It meets a couple of times a year for planning purposes. There is a subcommittee, which I chair, which meets rather more regularly, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Jay Hill: Did your subcommittee or the full committee meet at any time during the week of January 20 to 29?

Mr. Richard Fadden: No, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Jay Hill: Did you have any meeting during that period of time or any conversation with Deputy Minister Judd?

Mr. Richard Fadden: I'm sure I did, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Jay Hill: You're sure you did?

Mr. Richard Fadden: Yes. I talk to Mr. Judd three or four times a week, I would say, on various subjects.

Mr. Jay Hill: You probably don't recall specifically whether you met with him between January 25 and the cabinet meeting or the time following the cabinet meeting when you say you first learned of the fact that JTF-2 had taken prisoners. Do you recall if you had any meeting between January 25 and January 29?

Mr. Richard Fadden: I suspect I had a meeting, but because I didn't know about it we did not discuss this subject between January 25 and January 29.

Mr. Jay Hill: So this issue, if you indeed did have a meeting or conversation with Deputy Minister Judd, didn't come up. He didn't mention to you that he was a little bit shocked to find out that a photograph in a national newspaper actually revealed Canadians.

Mr. Richard Fadden: I don't believe so.

Mr. Jay Hill: Were you asked by the Clerk of the Privy Council, the Prime Minister's Office, or the Prime Minister himself for further information on reports that Canadian Forces personnel took prisoners in Afghanistan, or to confirm the reports? Were you asked to provide any of that type of information after you found out on the 29th?

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Mr. Richard Fadden: No. I was, on the other hand, asked to pull together a view on the legal situation respecting their status and their determination. But as to the operational part of your question, I was not.

Mr. Jay Hill: Are you aware of this now infamous leaked secret document that supposedly lays out this new and improved reporting procedure for the joint task force?

Mr. Richard Fadden: I have been trying to keep abreast of your proceedings, yes.

Mr. Jay Hill: Well, actually, it was in the news before we even began these proceedings. So you're aware of this document.

Mr. Richard Fadden: Yes, I am.

Mr. Jay Hill: On this alleged document that supposedly outlines this new reporting procedure you've already identified to us as flowing from JTF-2, to the Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff, to the Chief of the Defence Staff, and then onwards to the Minister of National Defence, who drafted this document? Is it a cabinet document?

Mr. Richard Fadden: My understanding--and I draw partially on the testimony of Mr. Judd--is that it was the result of staff work between both sides of the Department of National Defence, that is to say, the Canadian Forces side and the civilian side of the department.

I should say it is a regular part of the operating procedures of the defence department, whenever Canadian Forces are sent overseas, to have--I call it a checklist, I don't know what they call it--a fairly lengthy list of things they go through. They have rules of engagements, reporting procedures, and whatnot. From my understanding of what the document would contain, that is one of the things they would have checked off. They would have worked on it, come to a view, and sent it on.

Mr. Jay Hill: You've never seen this document.

Mr. Richard Fadden: I don't believe so. To be honest with you, I don't know because I haven't seen it, so I don't know if I've seen it before. I've been briefed in some detail about what it contains.

Mr. Jay Hill: Have you ever seen a document that laid out a reporting procedure for the flow of information about the activities of JTF-2?

Mr. Richard Fadden: I've certainly done that. I don't know if it was the document itself or a summary.

The Chair: I have Mauril Bélanger and then Mr. Fadden. This is the last of the ten-minute rounds.

[Translation]

M. Mauril Bélanger (Ottawa--Vanier, Lib.): Mr. Fadden, so that things are clear, I would like to come back to the questions that were asked earlier regarding Commodore Thiffault and the information flow. A question to Commodore Thiffault was quoted as well as a portion of his answer. It might be interesting to quote the full answer.

[English]

The Chair: Mauril, say exactly where it is.

Colleagues, can I repeat this? I know it's going to happen because we have more documents. It's simply a matter of saying which document it is, and then giving the page.

[Translation]

Mr. Mauril Bélanger: Those are questions to Commodore Thiffault, Mr. Chairman. It is on the last page.

The Chair: Thank you very much, Mauril.

Mr. Mauril Bélanger: You're quite welcome.

If I understand correctly, Commodore Thiffault had no responsibility relating to JTF-2. Is that what you understand as well?

Mr. Richard Fadden: This is what I understand. I'd like to bring to your attention his anwer to your Question No. 3. I quote:

[English]

“As I previously indicated, the JTF-2 does not fall under my chain of command.“

[Translation]

Mr. Mauril Bélanger: As was mentioned yesterday, he repeated it several times.

His duties are related to the Apollo mission, if I understood correctly.

Mr. Richard Fadden: Yes, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Mauril Bélanger: He was also asked whether there were other people, for example a representative from the Foreign Affairs Department, from CSIS, from the RCMP or from the Privy Council Office, and he replied that there was someone who reported directly to Foreign Affairs. Is there someone from the Privy Council in Florida?

Mr. Richard Fadden: No, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Mauril Bélanger: Thank you.

After that, it was mentioned that the person who reports directly to Foreign Affairs heard about the taking of prisoners. If I understood Commodore's Thiffault's answers correctly, it is his Public Relations or Public Information Officer who brought that fact to his attention and also to that of the Foreign Affairs individual. Is that also what you understand from the answer to Question 18?

Mr. Richard Fadden: This is what I understand from the answer, but I want to say very clearly that it is the first time I see this answer and that I'm very surprised by the answer, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Mauril Bélanger: In what way do you find it surprising, Mr. Fadden?

Mr. Richard Fadden: As I tried to explain earlier, Mr. Chairman, the Commodore's operations were not supposed to deal with the anti-terrorist operations of JTF-2. The reports were to be sent directly to the Unit Commander, to the Deputy Chief, to the Chief and to the Minister.

When it says here, in your question, “regarding the taking of prisoners”, it is fairly general. There is nothing about the taking of prisoners at a particular moment.

º (1635)

Mr. Mauril Bélanger: It doesn't say either what military units would have taken the prisoners.

Mr. Richard Fadden: You're right.

Mr. Mauril Bélanger: I feel it is totally impossible to prevent someone from knowing whereas it is a public subject, that it is in the newspapers and that everyone is talking about it. So there is nothing abnormal if the Foreign Affairs representative, if he is trying to learn things, becomes aware of it as well and submit a report, is there?

Mr. Richard Fadden: I agree with you wholeheartedly.

This being said, to come back to a comment that was made earlier, the fact that the photograph was published, that a photographer was there and was allowed to take a picture is a breach of security. This shouldn't have happened.

Mr. Mauril Bélanger: That is another topic. By the way, several people told us that there is an investigation in this matter at the present time and that disciplinary measures have been or will be imposed.

If I understand correctly, Commodore Thiffault's duties are in relation to the Apollo mission and not to JTF-2. The fact that other people with the Canadian Government in Florida were aware of that thing is not due to the fact that Mr. Thiffault or other people divulged the information, but to the fact that it was made public through this picture in a newspaper. Some people noticed that it could be Canadian soldiers without necessarily knowing whether they were Apollo soldiers or JTF-2 soldiers.

Mr. Richard Fadden: Yes, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Mauril Bélanger: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Things have been clarified to my satisfaction.

[English]

The Chair: Merci, Mauril.

Colleagues, we're going to five-minute rounds. As I did last evening, I'll go through the parties, and where they wish to participate, I'll ask them to participate.

I have Cheryl Gallant and then Michel Guimond.

Ms. Cheryl Gallant (Renfrew--Nipissing--Pembroke, Canadian Alliance): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

For someone who's not in the loop, the witness seems very well informed.

Through the chair, to the witness, on February 4 the minister said in the House that significant incident reports are not filed with respect to JTF-2. The reports are given entirely on an oral basis. Is that statement accurate?

Mr. Richard Fadden: Certainly it's in keeping with the policy. I've never seen anything in writing, nor has anybody reported to me having seen anything. So to the extent I know, yes, it is.

Ms. Cheryl Gallant: So the written report from the ground commander to the CDS is not categorized as a significant incident report?

Mr. Richard Fadden: It depends on what we're talking about, Mr. Chairman. The Canadian commander in Afghanistan, for example, the commander of the PPCLIs, could well report in writing. I was talking about JTF-2.

Ms. Cheryl Gallant: Are you aware there was a previous practice of providing written reports?

Mr. Richard Fadden: No, Mr. Chairman.

Ms. Cheryl Gallant: Was there a practice in the past of providing written or verbal reports to people outside DND?

Mr. Richard Fadden: Mr. Chairman, the question is rather broad. If you could specify a little bit more, I'll try to answer.

DND provides written reports on any range of issues. I'm just not sure, Mr. Chairman, of the member's interest.

Ms. Cheryl Gallant: With respect to JTF-2.

Mr. Richard Fadden: To my knowledge, no.

Ms. Cheryl Gallant: And was that because they've never been deployed outside Canada before or because you just don't know?

Mr. Richard Fadden: This is the first time JTF-2 have been deployed outside Canada on a military operation. So it's a unique circumstance.

Ms. Cheryl Gallant: So you have no idea of whether or not the practice has been changed or if there's any difference in reporting from the past to now?

Mr. Richard Fadden: As I was trying to suggest, Mr. Chairman, this is the first time that it's been deployed in this capacity, so there was no policy in this area because it had never been deployed in a military capacity before.

My understanding is that generally speaking, for anything involving operational issues that touch on JTF-2, we try not to do it in writing.

Ms. Cheryl Gallant: So the minister testified that there had been a practice in place previously, but everything changed after September 11 and sometime in the fall the reporting practice changed, but you are not aware of any changes?

Mr. Richard Fadden: Again, Mr. Chairman, it's unclear to me how a practice can change when the operation at issue is the first one that ever occurred.

In respect of JTF-2 involvement in a military operation, there is nothing to change it from.

Ms. Cheryl Gallant: In the U.K. and the United States we understand that special forces officers are present in Whitehall and the White House to report on special forces operations to the Prime Minister and the President. Why is this practice not followed in Canada?

º (1640)

Mr. Richard Fadden: Mr. Chairman, I don't know in any great detail what our allies do. However, I have confirmed with the defence department that, broadly speaking, their reporting practices on operations are very similar to our own.

Ms. Cheryl Gallant: After the cabinet meeting on January 29, did you consult with Mr. Laverdure or General Ross as to whether they had any previous knowledge of the incident?

Mr. Richard Fadden: No, Mr. Chairman.

Ms. Cheryl Gallant: Do you feel that after everything that has happened, you should have been informed earlier of the situation of the prisoner taking, the detainees?

Mr. Richard Fadden: No, Mr. Chairman, I do not, because I was not in the chain of command and I had no need to know.

Ms. Cheryl Gallant: When a highly controversial, politically charged defence situation arises, how would the chain of information be altered to afford the Prime Minister executive deniability?

Mr. Richard Fadden: Well, I would reject entirely the suggestion that anybody, anywhere, at any time would seek to provide anyone with executive deniability, Mr. Chairman. When and if either the Clerk of the Privy Council or a minister of the crown believes the Prime Minister should be informed, he's informed. There is nothing behind these rules that has been set up to provide the Prime Minister with deniability. They've been agreed to because of security considerations.

The Chair: Cheryl, you have about 30 seconds if you'd like to make a statement. No?

Thank you very much.

Michel Guimond, then Jay Hill.

[Translation]

Mr. Michel Guimond (Beauport--Montmorency--Côte-de-Beaupré--Île-d'Orléans, BQ): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you, Mr. Fadden, for your presentation. I want to make sure I understand. You wrote black on white, on page 3 of the French version in your presentation notes:

In the case under review, I learned on January 29th that the Canadian Forces had taken prisoners in Afghanistan. It was the Clerk of the Privy Council who relayed this information to me after becoming aware of it at Cabinet.

So, you maintain what you wrote.

Mr. Richard Fadden: Yes, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Michel Guimond: What time was it?

Mr. Richard Fadden: I don't remember exactly, but the Cabinet meeting ended around noon. If I remember correctly, I was at my desk. I was having a sandwich and I was doing paper work. It was some time after that.

Mr. Michel Guimond: Mr. Cappe came into your office to tell you what he had just learned. Is that it?

Mr. Richard Fadden: This is currently practice. Quite often, when Mr. Cappe comes back from Cabinet and there is something of interest for his officials, he mentions it to us. Sometimes he sends an e-mail, sometimes he calls, sometimes he drops by our office. That is what he did that time.

Mr. Michel Guimond: I imagine that in the structure of the higher State officials, the Privy Council Office is no more no less than the Prime Minister's Department. The PCO is seen as being the Prime Minister's Department. So, you must have fairly accurate press reviews every morning.

Mr. Richard Fadden: Yes, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Michel Guimond: You certainly read The Globe and Mail and you know that on January 22nd, there was a picture on the front page of The Globe and Mail. Did you see that picture yourself?

Mr. Richard Fadden: Yes, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Michel Guimond: What did that picture suggest to you? You said that you had learned about it on the 29th. So, on the 22nd, did you consider that they were Americans?

Mr. Richard Fadden: To be honest, I must say that I was very happy that prisoners had been taken. It is for that reason that these people are there. I hadn't tried to know whether they were Canadians or Americans. It just didn't occur to me.

Mr. Michel Guimond: The Deputy Minister Judd told us yesterday, in his testimony, that on the 22nd, he heard of it from Vice-Admiral Maddison. He became aware of it on the morning of the 22nd. Mr. Judd was saying in his testimony: “He subsequently confirmed that with me later that same day.” So, Mr. Judd, a civilian obtains a confirmatioin on the 22nd. Is that what you understand from Mr. Judd's testimony?

Mr. Richard Fadden: I also read his testimony and I agree with you that this is a reasonable interpretation.

Mr. Michel Guimond: In answer to a previous question, you mentioned that you usually talk to Mr. Judd three or four times a week. Mr. Judd has known about it since the 22nd and you say that you became aware of it on the 29th. Chances are that between the 22nd and the 29th, you talked together three or four times. You've never discussed this topic?

º (1645)

Mr. Richard Fadden: No, Mr. Chairman. If Mr. Judd had mentioned it to me, it would have been a breach of security in a way.

When Admiral Maddison talked to him about it, he was acting on behalf of the Minister, who was out of the country at the time. It was perfectly reasonable for him to mention it to Mr. Judd. I myself had no reason to know about it. It is an operational issue which didn't concern me.

Mr. Michel Guimond: Mr. Judd told us that he was not in the chain of command, that he was not in the information loop of JTF-2, but that he could receive that information in spite of the fact that he is not in the chain of command.

Mr. Richard Fadden: Under the Interpretation Act, deputy ministers can act on behalf of their ministers when they are away. Mr. Eggleton was in Mexico at the time. It was a reasonable thing. To my mind, the Vice-Admiral exercised good judgement in talking to Mr. Judd.

The Chair: Michel, that's all. I'm sorry.

Jay Hill.

[English]

Mr. Jay Hill: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to follow up on the line of questioning by Monsieur Guimond, and thank him for correcting what I'd said earlier. At times these dates get confusing.

The Chair: You too?

Mr. Jay Hill: Yes, me too. It shows that none of us is infallible.

Some hon. members: Oh, oh!

The Chair: Speak for yourself.

Mr. Jay Hill: You're using up my five minutes, Mr. Chairman.

I think I'd said earlier that Mr. Judd learned on January 25, and Monsieur Guimond is quite correct in stating that it was on January 22 that Mr. Judd learned, through a happenstance conversation with Vice-Admiral Maddison.

You state that when the minister is out of the country, the deputy minister can fill in. That's why it was appropriate in this particular instance that on January 22 Deputy Minister Judd would have been informed by Vice-Admiral Maddison that the soldiers in the photograph were indeed Canadian.

Mr. Richard Fadden: I think that's what I said, Mr. Chairman. I don't quite understand why Mr. Judd used the word “happenstance”. The Vice-Admiral consciously went to his office to speak to him because he felt there was a security issue there that merited discussion.

Mr. Jay Hill: Just so I fully understand the procedure, when a minister is out of the country the deputy minister is effectively filling in for him. In this particular case, he's not just filling in for him but all of a sudden finds himself in the position where he is at the top of the information flow of highly sensitive information about the activities of JTF-2. All of a sudden, he's a senior bureaucrat and then he's at the end of the line of information regarding the activities of JTF-2. Is that correct?

Mr. Richard Fadden: I think, Mr. Chairman, that Mr. Hill is characterizing it in too much of a binary fashion. The department still had access to the minister. There is access through secure phones. What I am suggesting is that Vice-Admiral Maddison came to the conclusion that there was a security problem with respect to the photo. I believe he had indicated that he had discussed it in passing during his earlier briefing with the minister. He wanted to touch base with the most senior official in Ottawa, and that's what he did.

I just want to correct the impression that when the minister leaves town, the deputy is in charge, in an Al Haig sense. It's not quite that. I'm simply suggesting that there was no violation of the security rules for Mr. Maddison to have exercised the judgment he did and speak to Mr. Judd.

Mr. Jay Hill: I'm not suggesting that there was any violation at all, either. I'm just trying to understand the flow of information under this new and improved procedure that this mysterious leaked document put into place.

Would it have been correct then for the deputy minister, when he learned of that information while the minister was out of the country, to have taken it upon himself to inform the Prime Minister?

º (1650)

Mr. Richard Fadden: Mr. Chairman, I go back to what I said earlier. At the time, there was nothing particularly exceptional about that piece of information, so I would have to answer no.

Mr. Jay Hill: Would it have been possible for him to pick up the phone, or in some fashion tell the Prime Minister?

Mr. Richard Fadden: In practical terms, deputy ministers don't call the Prime Minister quite that easily. There might have been another way, had he decided it was worthwhile, to communicate with the Prime Minister.

Mr. Jay Hill: But by your own admission, this wasn't in sort of practical terms. This was a new process that had been put in place--we don't know when, we're not sure why, we don't who drafted it--prior to the deployment of JTF-2 to Afghanistan, that secured the information flow from JTF-2, to the deputy chief of staff, to the chief of staff, to the minister.

But in this particular case it went, quite rightly, to the deputy minister because the minister was out of the country and unavailable. The minister normally, if he had been in the country, could have told the Prime Minister. That's the flow of information, we've been told. Wouldn't it have been possible for the deputy minister to have told the Prime Minister?

Mr. Richard Fadden: Had the policy called for the information to have been passed on to the Prime Minister, Mr. Judd could have found a way to get it to the Prime Minister.

The Chair: Geoff Regan.

Mr. Geoff Regan: Mr. Fadden, let's talk for a moment about the photograph that was considered a breach of security that the Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff raised with the deputy minister on January 22.

If that photograph had shown the faces of members of the JTF-2, would that have been a different kind of breach of security? If so, how do you expect it would have been dealt with?

Mr. Richard Fadden: My understanding is that the identity of JTF-2 members is guarded. It's a serious security matter if their identity becomes known. I think a rather more serious inquiry would have been put into place to determine how this had happened.

I also understand that the particular breach at issue violated coalition rules about the media and the press, and the coalition took steps to ensure it wouldn't happen again.

Mr. Geoff Regan: So had it been a more serious case, where the faces of members of the JTF-2 had been exposed, and theoretically those individuals and their families had been in danger, would you have expected a different kind of reporting to happen to the minister, the Prime Minister, and the PCO?

Mr. Richard Fadden: You're asking me a hypothetical question, so it's difficult to answer. But I would argue it's at least within the realm of the possible that it would have been noteworthy, because their lives would have been at issue, whereas with the taking of prisoners there was no particular issue, as I tried to argue earlier.

Mr. Geoff Regan: So was there any doubt about the authority of the JTF-2 to take prisoners and turn them over to the Americans?

Mr. Richard Fadden: There was none whatsoever.

Mr. Geoff Regan: In general terms, does the PCO learn of events where departments are performing according to government policy?

Mr. Richard Fadden: That's an interesting question. It's been my experience that, by and large, the PCO hears about bad news. When everything is working really well, we don't get looped in quite as easily or as frequently. But more seriously, the PCO tends to be involved when there's a serious problem, or when there's a variety of issues that need to be coordinated.

Mr. Geoff Regan: What were the priorities facing the government in relation to Afghanistan and the military on January 21?

Mr. Richard Fadden: I think they remained the same as when the government approved their mandate in their mission. They were to engage, insofar as they could, either alone or with coalition partners, with a view to locating and apprehending Taliban and al-Qaeda members. That was their priority mission; it remains their priority mission.

Mr. Geoff Regan: What was the focus of the government that week in terms of the operations, the military, the Princess Pats, JTF-2, and things that were happening in Afghanistan?

º (1655)

The Chair: Very briefly, Mr. Fadden.

Mr. Richard Fadden: I'm not sure I'm qualified to answer that question because it involves a whole range of operations. Once again, I tend to think that some of our discussions underestimate the complexity and range of issues that involve the Canadian Forces in Afghanistan. I wouldn't know, at a particular point, what was capturing the interest of the government.

The Chair: Jay Hill, then to conclude.

I didn't see you, Leon. It's Jay Hill, Leon Benoit, and then conclusion.

Mr. Jay Hill: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Just to follow up on this cabinet meeting of the 29th--maybe it was asked earlier--who's responsible for setting the agenda of the cabinet meetings?

Mr. Richard Fadden: I did try a little earlier to answer the question, Mr. Chairman.

There's a secretariat within the Privy Council Office that is responsible for coordinating the preparation of the agenda, and I tried to indicate earlier there are different kinds of items that go on them--some because of long-time planning, others because it's pretty obvious that there's a crisis, others because ministers ask for them, still others because PCO thinks they should be put on. They're brought together; they're recommended to the Clerk of the Privy Council, and of course it is the Prime Minister's meeting.

Mr. Jay Hill: But is it the Clerk of the Privy Council who ultimately decides which items make it on the agenda?

Mr. Richard Fadden: Well, in the context of the fact, Mr. Chairman, that it is the Prime Minister's meeting.

Mr. Jay Hill: Okay. Do you know on whose advice or how it came about that the issue of the detainees was placed on the agenda?

Mr. Richard Fadden: No, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Jay Hill: You said, I think in response to an earlier question, that you weren't sure whether your boss, the Clerk of the Privy Council, came to you or phoned you. But how long would you estimate it was after the cabinet meeting that he communicated with you?

Mr. Richard Fadden: I would say, Mr. Chairman, within two hours.

Mr. Jay Hill: Did that strike you as odd?

You've said on more than one occasion today that your assessment is it was completely normal, that our troops were over there and they took prisoners, so it didn't matter that you or the entire Privy Council were out of the loop. Yet by your own admission, within two hours of that cabinet meeting, your boss thought it was important enough to tell you.

Mr. Richard Fadden: As I said earlier, frequently after meetings of the cabinet, Mr. Cappe calls, e-mails, or drops by the offices of his senior staff. He sometimes talks about particular subjects that have gone on, whether there's a problem, whether there's follow-up. So I wouldn't characterize it as unusual at all.

Mr. Jay Hill: Did he tell you how this was communicated at the cabinet, or just that he found out?

Mr. Richard Fadden: I honestly don't remember, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Jay Hill: So he didn't tell you whether it was the Minister of National Defence that actually raised the issue and told everybody in attendance that information, or...?

The Chair: I think we're getting very close there, Jay, okay?

Mr. Richard Fadden: Yes, I can't really answer that.

Mr. Jay Hill: Even if you knew?

Mr. Richard Fadden: As it turns out, I don't remember.

Mr. Jay Hill: You referred earlier to a question that I asked regarding the post-mortem, after the cabinet meeting, when Mr. Cappe came to you and informed you that we had indeed taken prisoners. I think the term you used was that you were asked to gather information on the legal status of prisoners. Could you elaborate on that a little bit? What exactly were you looking at?

Mr. Richard Fadden: Well, basically I was asked to follow up on a number of issues that had been raised between mid-January and that time about the treatment and status of prisoners. There had been discussions within the government--within the Judge Advocate General's office, within Foreign Affairs, within Justice and, I think, the Privy Council Office. He simply asked me to pull together these various views so we could confirm what issues needed to be resolved, what needed to be done.

So in practical terms, what I did, Mr. Chairman, is I got a number of people together.... I mean, it's what PCO does; we pull together people from a variety of departments, trying to get their different perspectives on the issue, and articulate a view.

The Chair: You have one minute, Jay.

Mr. Jay Hill: I have one final question, then.

My understanding is that you said earlier that this issue of detainees was basically dealt with. This was in response to questions from some of my colleagues here. Now you're saying you had to dig up some additional information, which would lead me--or anyone--to believe it hadn't been completely dealt with if you were having to dig up more information to provide, presumably, to the cabinet and the Prime Minister, as per one of the hats you wear.

» (1700)

Mr. Richard Fadden: I think that's a fair question, Mr. Chairman.

Very few of us thought there was a serious possibility that a sophisticated western nation like the United States would repudiate the law of armed conflict. Having said that, there were a number of questions raised. It's a subject matter that's quite specialized; the JAG has part of it, Justice has part of it, Foreign Affairs has part of it. I think it was a reasonable thing for the clerk to do to ask me to pull them together so we could get a bit of a picture of where we were, and that's what I tried to do.

The Chair: Leon Benoit.

Mr. Leon Benoit (Lakeland, Canadian Alliance): Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.

Thank you for being here this afternoon, Mr. Fadden.

I have some clean-up questions to try to tie up some loose ends, but first I'd just like to ask you a question on how you view your role here before the committee today. I'd just like to preface the question by reading a quote from Dennis Mills, a Liberal member of Parliament. When he was commenting on the testimony of the Chief of the Defence Staff and the Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff, he said: “If my employees tried to hang me out to dry on the national stage, I'd just say, 'Look, you're working for the wrong company'.”

I want to ask you, Mr. Fadden, with all due respect, whether you see your role here as doing anything to protect the Prime Minister or the minister, such that you would do what Mr. Mills suggests, which is to withhold information or even mislead this committee.

Mr. Richard Fadden: Mr. Chair, I've worked for the Clerk of the Privy Council for two years now, and not only has he never told me that I should say anything less than the truth, he has always told me that he is paying me to tell him and anybody else what I think and what I know within the law and within the policies of the government.

Mr. Leon Benoit: Thank you. I just wanted to get that out of the way. You have a different view, obviously.

Mr. Fadden, you were asked a question by Mr. Hill on whether you'd met with Jim Judd prior to January 29. You responded that you believed you did meet with him or you spoke with him. Could you tell me when that meeting was?

Mr. Richard Fadden: Mr. Chairman, it's not that I don't want to, but I find myself in the same situation Mr. Judd did yesterday. I mean, I talk to him two or three times a week; I just don't remember when. He calls me frequently. I call him. I'm virtually certain we spoke in that timeframe but I honestly don't know exactly when.

Mr. Leon Benoit: You don't remember at all what you talked about, just in general terms. I understand that you can't give detail.

Mr. Richard Fadden: No, but as I indicated earlier, we did not talk about the question of the Canadian Forces taking detainees.

Mr. Leon Benoit: You didn't talk about the question of Canadian Forces at all?

Mr. Richard Fadden: Canadian Forces taking detainees.

Mr. Leon Benoit: Okay, so--

Mr. Richard Fadden: I just want to be clear on that. What--

Mr. Leon Benoit: Mr. Judd had testified that in fact he had seen, that he knew, actually, prisoners had been taken before that date. So you're saying that he didn't share that information with you. I just want to be perfectly clear on that.

Mr. Richard Fadden: That's correct, and I believe that's consistent with his testimony of yesterday.

Mr. Leon Benoit: Okay. Thank you.

Now, on the issue of the information flow, I listened to this very carefully. You said that the normal flow is from the unit commander to the Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff to the Chief of the Defence Staff to the minister. That sounds right, but you said that no one in the PCO is kept in that information loop on a regular basis. You said it's on an ongoing basis, but you didn't really answer the question as to whether in that time period between January 19 and January 28 you were in fact included in that information loop.

Mr. Richard Fadden: In respect, Mr. Chairman, of JTF-2, I had no involvement whatsoever and no knowledge. As I think I answered one of your colleagues earlier, subsequent to the cabinet meeting, the Clerk of the Privy Council queried officers in the Privy Council to inquire whether or not any of us knew, and the answer to that is negative.

» (1705)

Mr. Leon Benoit: You also said something along the lines that you would be informed only if there were extraordinary circumstances. I guess I'm trying to understand why, when it was such a topic of discussion and debate across the country, even within the government caucus, you wouldn't consider the capture of prisoners an extraordinary circumstance, where you may have been, and should have been, probably, included in the information loop.

Mr. Richard Fadden: I guess, Mr. Chairman, because fundamentally that's why they were sent to Afghanistan. I mean, that's what they were being paid to do and that's what I think they do very well.

As you say, there was an issue being debated in the caucus, I believe, and questions were raised in the House. That was regarding the policy of their treatment under a very complex area of international law. Again, I fail to see a direct connection between whether or not there were prisoners and how they were treated.

Mr. Leon Benoit: Then why would the Prime Minister answer a question in the House of Commons knowing that's what was completely expected of the JTF-2? He's right, that they would capture prisoners and turn them over to the Americans. Why would he then refer to that as a hypothetical question when he knew that was policy and that was totally expected?

The Chair: Answer in a few seconds, please.

Mr. Richard Fadden: I think his reference to it being hypothetical meant whether or not they had been taken at that point in time, not whether it was the policy, the practice of the operation to do it.

The Chair: Mr. Jordan has a point of order.

Mr. Joe Jordan: Mr. Speaker, you've asked us numerous times to refer to documents. This phrase “hypothetical” was actually said in a scrum; it wasn't said in the House of Commons. If you look at the entire context of the phrase--

The Chair: Thank you. It's not a point of order.

Mr. Fadden, I want to thank you for appearing before us today and for your testimony. We appreciate that this takes some preparation and a good deal of energy. Thank you very much for being here.

Colleagues, before we leave, I'll recite where we stand. Tomorrow we have two meetings. At 11 a.m. our witnesses are from the Department of Foreign Affairs, and at 3:30 p.m. we meet with Joseph Maingot. This evening at 7:30, in this room, our witness is Mel Cappe, Clerk of the Privy Council.

This meeting is adjourned until 7:30 this evening.