FAIT Committee Report

I.         INTRODUCTION TO THE COLOMBIAN CONFLICT

            Despite the fact that it has long been a formal democracy, Colombia’s history of inequality, political turmoil and violence is also a long one. In particular, the decade of violence known as La Violencia which began in the 1940s saw over 200,000 killed and ended with a political power sharing agreement between the Liberal and Conservative parties that lasted for some 30 years. The current armed conflict between the government and Marxist guerrillas — the 17,000 strong Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the 3,500-strong National Liberation Army (ELN) — began in the early 1960s over such issues as the distribution of political power and the lack of land reform, and for years remained a low-level one largely confined to rural Colombia. The growing drug trade affected all sides in the conflict, however, and the government’s inability to protect citizens throughout the country was one of the reasons for the formation of private right-wing vigilante or paramilitary groups, the most important of which is the 10,500 (and fastest-growing) — strong United Self-Defence Forces of Colombia (AUC).⁶

            The late 1990s saw another upturn in the conflict, and significant gains by the insurgents. Ironically, these were at least partly due to jockeying for position following the decision of Colombian President Andres Pastrana in 1998 to cede a large "demilitarized zone" to the FARC as a gesture of goodwill designed to encourage a broader peace process. Although this move did bring FARC to the negotiating table, many Colombian military officers and others argued that this zone allowed it to strengthen itself both militarily and financially, through increased kidnapping and drug trafficking.

            Some progress had been achieved since 1998, such as the beginning of a formal peace process between the government and the FARC and the increased involvement of the international community. However, this period also saw the worsening of the long-running conflict which has killed thousands of civilians (some 3,000-3,500 people were killed last year); displaced approximately two million others; seen widespread and continuing human rights abuses by all sides; severely strained Colombian democracy; and potentially threatened the stability of the whole Andean region through the spillover of violence, refugees and drug production.

            While the Colombian conflict is often referred to as a "civil war," this is incorrect since the armed insurgent groups have little popular support. The one sense in which the term does unfortunately reflect Colombia’s reality, however, is the fact that the burden of the conflict falls disproportionately on the civilian population. As President Pastrana told Sub-Committee members in Bogotá, "We are not in a civil war, but a war against civil society." In testimony before the Sub-Committee, Colombia’s Ambassador to Canada, Fanny Kertzman, pointed out the shocking scale of the violence in Colombia in this way: in 2000, some 26,000 Colombians were killed from a population of 40 million, which is 65 deaths per 100,000 inhabitants. In Canada, 570 people died violently in a population of 30 million, for 1.9 violent deaths per 100,000 inhabitants — 32 times less than in Colombia.⁷

           Yet Colombia remains a functioning democracy, as shown by the fact that roughly 10 million Colombian voted in congressional elections held on 10 March 2002, despite the increased risks. Public opinion has hardened, however, and the May 2002 presidential election will undoubtedly be a referendum on how the government should deal with the situation.

II.         CANADA-COLOMBIA RELATIONS AND "PLAN COLOMBIA"

           As Jan Egeland, the then-Special Advisor to the UN Secretary General on Colombia, told the Sub-Committee in the fall of 2001:

There is great competition from many other troubled areas, but Colombia is the biggest conflict in the Western hemisphere. It has the biggest human rights problem of the Western hemisphere; it has the biggest displacement problem of the Western hemisphere; and it has the biggest drug problem of the Western hemisphere.⁸

           Witnesses were unanimous that the situation in Colombia is very important to Canada, and that this country could play an even greater role there. Canada has had unbroken bilateral relations with Colombia for almost five decades, and a bilateral cooperation program since the 1960s. In 1999, the two governments signed a new bilateral cooperation agreement, and the number of high-level visits between them has increased.⁹

           From a foreign policy point of view, Colombia is important to all three of Canada’s stated foreign policy objectives:

• prosperity and employment — Colombia is a significant and growing market, and Canadian firms have already made important investments there;

• security within a stable global framework — increased conflict in Colombia could lead either to the collapse of the country or regional conflict, with refugee and other implications; and

• the projection of Canadian values — Colombia represents the most significant challenge in the hemisphere to such Canadian values as human rights and good governance.¹⁰

            In addition to these specific elements, Colombia is more important than ever to Canada because it represents a test case for this country’s commitment to the Americas and its ability to promote human security and good governance in that part of the world. This is a role Canada solidified as a key player in the successful action through the Organization of American States (OAS) in 2000 to preserve democracy in Peru, and as host of the Third Summit of the Americas in Quebec City in 2001. The Government of Canada said at that time that it wanted to be a leader in the Americas, and Colombia is unfortunately where many of the hemisphere’s problems persist. Given the history of the region, it is also undoubtedly true that many states in the Americas look to Canada as an alternative North American voice.

            The position of the United States has been key to the international debate surrounding Colombia. American priorities have been to reduce the supply of narcotics entering the United States from Colombia and to ensure the stability of the country. Much of its assistance has been delivered as part of "Plan Colombia." Developed by the Government of Colombia in close cooperation with the United States, Plan Colombia is a three-year US$7.5 billion program which combines both counter-narcotic (military) and development elements. Some $4 billion of the funding was to be provided by the Government of Colombia, and it was hoped that $3.5 billion would come from the international community. The US$1.3 billion American contribution to Plan Colombia has been largely focused on counter-narcotics (74%), mainly through training and supply of the Colombian military. Given the traditionally poor human rights record of the Colombian military, even strict limits imposed by the U.S. Congress to ensure that this assistance would only be used for counter-narcotics operations has not stopped strong criticism of Plan Colombia in Europe and elsewhere.

            In recognition of the need to see the problems of Colombia in a more regional perspective, in 2001 the Bush administration introduced the Andean Regional Initiative, a US$782 million plan which again combines both counter-narcotics as well as democracy and development programs. In this case, about half of the funding was to go to Colombia, and half to the neighbouring countries of Peru, Bolivia, Ecuador, Brazil, Panama and Venezuela.¹¹

            While the FARC, the ELN and the AUC had all been included on the U.S. government’s annual list of terrorist organizations before the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States, these attacks obviously led to a change of perspective in Washington — not least on "narco-terrorism." In November 2001, Canada also included these groups on its list of those linked to terrorism whose assets were frozen, and could now be seized under new legislation.

            Following continued attacks on oil pipelines and other infrastructure, in January 2002 President Pastrana requested that United States broaden its assistance to Colombia beyond counter-narcotics. In early February 2002, President Bush proposed moving beyond counter-narcotic assistance to spend some US$98 million to train and equip Colombian forces to protect critical infrastructure, beginning with a major oil pipeline used by an American corporation. Following the end of the peace process, the Bush administration has proposed removing restrictions on the use of American military assistance, although it has not suggested the use of American military forces in Colombia.

            As Judy Meltzer of the Canadian Foundation for the Americas (FOCAL), who testified before the Sub-Committee, noted in late 2001:

The debate surrounding the Colombian conflict within Canada has tended to be polarized with concerned human rights advocates advocating against militarized approaches and paramilitary impunity on the one hand, and the Canadian government advocating for negotiated peace and democracy through support of the Colombian government and non-military components of Plan Colombia on the other.¹²

            Ms. Meltzer’s comments accurately described the Sub-Committee’s hearings in Ottawa. This is unfortunate, because both perspectives must be part of Canadian policy. As Ambassador Rishchynski told Sub-Committee members, "…a political solution to the Colombian conflict is the only viable alternative for the country. Military solutions, in our estimation, are simply not viable, given the geography of the country and the length of the conflict over the course of the last 50 years."¹³ Even following the end of the peace process, Sub-Committee members believe that, while more difficult, a negotiated solution is still ultimately the best approach.

           Many witnesses in Ottawa and Bogotá criticized what they referred to as the "military component" of Plan Colombia, and recommended that Canada take a strong public stance opposing it. As then-Secretary of State for Latin America and Africa, David Kilgour, noted before the Sub-Committee, "…the ‘military component’ refers to funding intended to assist the Colombia military in regaining control of the drug-producing regions."¹⁴ As well, a number of witnesses criticized what they saw as a "loophole" in Canada’s arms export policy that allowed the U.S. Department of State to purchase surplus helicopters from the Canadian Forces and later send them to Colombia. Canada does not sell offensive military equipment to Colombia — and in fact sold no military equipment to it at all in 2000 according to the latest annual report on the Export of Military Goods from Canada — although Colombian Ambassador Kertzman asked Sub-Committee members to support Colombian requests to purchase surveillance and other "protection equipment" from Canada.¹⁵

            In response to questions, David Kilgour told the Sub-Committee in March 2001 that, although the Government of Canada has been "very sceptical" about the military or anti-drug component of Plan Colombia, "we neither support nor condemn."¹⁶ Some assume that this is simply deference to the U.S. position on Colombia, yet the military component of Plan Colombia is fully supported by Colombia’s government as well, which told members of the Sub-Committee that it was very important. It may be that public opposition to this domestic policy would limit Canadian access to, and influence on, the Government of Colombia. In any event, Plan Colombia has probably been neither as good as its proponents hoped, nor as bad as its opponents feared.¹⁷

III.           DEMOCRACY AND CONFLICT

We express our confidence that the dialogue and the political negotiations, based on the primacy of law and on respect for international humanitarian law, will lead to a stable, just, firm and lasting peace, putting an end to the violence and human suffering caused by the conflict.

Declaration in Support of the Peace Process in Colombia,
Third Summit of the Americas,
Quebec City, 22 April 2001

Democracy always gives hope. The ironic thing is that amidst this great turmoil and ongoing civil war there has continued to be democracy in Colombia. And many within government, at the presidential and other levels, have sought to take important steps toward human rights reform, have made strong statements, have adopted things…

Alex Neve,
Amnesty International,
November 2001¹⁸

           According to one Canadian observer who testified before the Sub-Committee, "Colombia represents one of the toughest challenges to our thinking about democratization in the hemisphere."¹⁹ Decades of savage conflict and increasing narco-trafficking have led to pervasive violence, corruption and impunity, putting severe strain on both the institutions and the processes of Colombia’s democracy. At the same time, the worst recession in more than 50 years has increased unemployment and even further reduced the government’s ability to address its significant poverty and other development challenges. Yet the fact that President Pastrana was able to campaign on and begin a peace process shows that the country does still function as a democracy. Professor Hal Klepak of the Royal Military College agreed in his testimony before the Sub-Committee that Colombia was a "weak democracy." He added, however, that:

This government is a democracy that, by Latin American standards, is not so bad. It’s in wartime circumstances of dramatic consequences over decades. Britain in 1940 would have been in a hell of a shape by today if it were trying to conduct a war, particularly of this savagery, and to maintain at least the trappings, and I think more than the trappings, of democracy.²⁰

           While the beginning of a peace process and the decision to finally involve the international community were achievements in themselves, progress in the peace talks was unfortunately minimal. Generally speaking, although all parties in Colombia formally agree on the need for peace and deep reform of the Colombian political system, none seem sufficiently ready to make the compromises necessary to achieve them. As Professor Klepak argued before the Sub-Committee, "…there is nothing very powerful that presses either of the… sides… to any bargaining table with a real desire to negotiate a peace. I don’t think we’re at that stage yet." In his view, the Colombian "elite" does not feel the need to compromise on major issues, and the guerrillas and paramilitaries are secure and doing too well financially and militarily to do so.²¹ Dean Stephen Randall of the University of Calgary was even more pessimistic, arguing that, as a result of the drug trade and other factors, neither the guerrillas nor the paramilitaries really want peace.²²

           Continuous violence permeates Colombian society. Ambassador Kertzman began her testimony before the Sub-Committee by showing a video of Colombian news reports of attacks. In her words, "…whatever I can tell you about my country, it’s different if you see the images, and we in Colombia have to watch these images in the news every single day."²³ While this judgement is subjective, some members believe that even beyond the news, violent television programming in Colombia helps desensitize youth and others to the ongoing violence, and that either regulations or, at a minimum, a public relations campaign would be useful.

            In addition to the deaths of thousands of Colombians, the continuing violence has encouraged widespread corruption and undermined the judicial system, leading to almost total impunity. Impunity represents a key to Colombia’s human rights and democratic challenges, and was the focus of a December 1999 report by the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade, which dealt with the response of the Government of Colombia to a terrible 1998 massacre in the northern city of Barrancabermeja.

            Although the Government of Colombia must be held accountable for its failings to protect — or avenge — its citizens through the legal system, it does largely lack both the capacity and the credibility to do so. Ambassador Kertzman told the Sub-Committee in the fall of 2001 that:

Some people would like you to believe that the government is responsible for the rampant violence and terrorist acts that scourge my country. Nothing could be further from the truth. The reality is that the state is not present in every corner of Colombia.

We are modernizing our justice system, we are investing in health and education, and we are building roads in remote areas. We are doing our best with very limited resources. But tell me about any other country in the world that has to contend with the challenges of development and with the threats posed by three terrorist organizations, funded by narcotrafficking, with jeopardizing its democratic system. There are times like these when governments that believe in democracy have to stand together against the threat of terrorism.²⁴

            An important responsibility of any democracy is ensuring the personal security of its citizens, yet the Government of Colombia is simply incapable of doing this. As Ambassador Kertzman noted, "The Colombian government, unfortunately, doesn’t have the capacity to take care of, protect, and secure every single citizen in Colombia."²⁵ While the National Police have a relatively good human rights record, she pointed out that, following repeated attacks, in 2001 more than 200 small towns in Colombia did not have a police presence. The military is also incapable of ensuring security throughout the country. According to Professor Klepak, "Many observers even on the left and historically in Colombia have said that the problem in Colombia is not that the army is too strong, as in other parts of Latin America one might name, but that the army is so weak. It’s a sedentary army. It doesn’t go out and bash anybody. It sits and waits. The Americans get incredibly frustrated with it because it has no active policy."²⁶

            Most agree that a strong and democratic Colombia will require a competent military, and the Colombian military has improved considerably in recent years. Yet attempts to use international assistance to increase the capabilities of the Colombian military are complicated by long-standing proof of links between some Colombian military officers and paramilitary groups that carry out human rights abuses, although the situation is improving. This partially explains why U.S. bilateral assistance focused on training and equipping the Colombian military under Plan Colombia has been widely criticized.

            Alleviating the suffering of Colombia’s citizens must take first priority, yet true security will only be assured by the resolution of the armed conflict. It is up to Colombians to eventually make the necessary compromises to achieve a just peace there. Canada and other states, particularly the G-10 group of countries that were invited by both the Government of Colombia and the FARC to facilitate the peace process, have shown that the international community can play an important role in supporting Colombians in their search for peace, and they must remain ready to do so. The United Nations itself could also play an even greater role in the search for peace in Colombia, although realistically this would depend on the Government of Colombia either requesting or supporting such an initiative.

            The Sub-Committee believes that Canada and the rest of the international community must continue to advocate a peace process in Colombia, which should be adopted as a state policy rather than that of individual presidential administrations. It may also be useful to develop an official international role in the process beyond that of observation and facilitation. The recent end of the peace process has complicated the situation, however, since Canada and other countries have no contact with the FARC, and the most productive avenue is probably to continue to support the Government of Colombia while encouraging an end to kidnapping and the targeting of civilians by the insurgents. Agreement on such principles might hopefully form the basis for a new round of peace negotiations in the future.

            Interested states must also support Colombia’s democracy by helping to strengthen its democratic institutions, and encouraging a culture of dialogue and reconciliation. Given that it is a democracy, however, in human rights and other matters the Government of Colombia must, and will, continue to be held to a higher standard than those it is fighting, who have already shown their disrespect for the democratic process and the rights of civilians.

            Beyond conflict resolution, strengthening democracy in Colombia will require a strengthened justice sector, and Canada should continue its assistance in this area. It will also require even greater participation by civil society and minority groups in the politics of the country, including, ideally, in any comprehensive peace negotiations. Yet a number of civil society groups in Colombia, and those which visited Ottawa as part of the "Invisible Struggles Tour," have expressed concerns to the Sub-Committee about their ability to do so. The Canadian government has supported civil society groups and NGOs in Colombia in the past, and the Sub-Committee believes this element of Canadian policy should be strengthened even further.

RECOMMENDATION 1

The Government of Canada should continue to work with international organizations and institutions as well as with like-minded countries to support the Government of Colombia and encourage all parties in the Colombian conflict to pursue agreement on humanitarian principles and a negotiated solution. Canada should also make itself available to continue facilitating such negotiations, which would ideally become a state peace policy and include a formal international role. In order to strengthen Colombia’s democracy, it should also continue to support civil society groups there, as well as encourage efforts at grassroots reconciliation.

            International investment and trade will be very important to Colombia if it is to address its serious problems of poverty and strengthen its democracy overall, especially given that only 20% of the Colombian population pays taxes. As noted, Colombia’s traditionally strong economy entered a significant recession along with the rest of Latin America in 1998, although it began growing again by 2000. Stephanie Allard of the Canadian embassy in Bogotá told Sub-Committee members in Ottawa that, despite real security concerns which increase costs, the Colombian economy remains an attractive one.²⁷ Colombia is already Canada’s fourth-largest export market in Latin America, with bilateral trade amounting to over C$600 million in 2000. Canada is also a leading foreign investor in Colombia, with upwards of C$5 billion in direct investment, in such key areas as the telecommunications and energy sectors.²⁸

            Sub-Committee members welcome the potential for mutually beneficial trade and investment between Canada and Colombia, and for this reason are pleased that their sister Sub-Committee on International Trade, Trade Disputes and Investment will include Colombia in its current study of The Free Trade Area of the Americas and Canada’s Economic Relations with Latin America and the Caribbean. However, they were also concerned to discover whether or not there was evidence that Canadian corporations have been complicit in human rights or other abuses in Colombia. Thankfully, this does not seem to be the case, and, in fact, according to evidence presented to the Sub-Committee both in Ottawa and in Colombia, the Canadian business community active there takes its corporate social responsibilities very seriously.

            In addition to receiving assurance from Ambassador Rishchynski about Canadian firms and corporate social responsibility, Sub-Committee members also posed the question of Canadian corporate complicity to the Honourable Warren Allmand while he was reporting on a mid-2001 mission to Colombia focused on indigenous issues. In his words, "We went there with the aim of trying to find out if there was, but we couldn’t. I’d have to say, with all honesty, we didn’t find any horror cases or any bad actors. But we think you have to keep a careful watch on things."²⁹

            This last echoed the advice of Dr. Kai Alderson, a former academic who has worked on the issue of corporate social responsibility. Dr. Alderson is now Vice-President for Research and Corporate Engagement for a socially responsible investment firm in Canada. In his words:

We would exclude no Canadian company operating in Colombia…we would not bar any of the Canadian companies operating in Colombia on the basis of their operations in Colombia…I think the issue is less about whether we have evidence that there is a problem, and more about a recognition that there are risks and dialoguing with companies on whether they have the management systems in place to deal with those risks.³⁰

He added that "…security issues and security relations are one of the key points that socially responsible investors are looking at."³¹

            These concerns were echoed by Dr. Randy Gossen, Vice-President for Safety, Environment and Social Responsibility at NEXEN, a Canadian oil firm which has pursued expanding oil exploration interests in Colombia since 1994. According to Dr. Gossen, NEXEN operations in Colombia are based on the International Code of Ethics for Canadian Business, a voluntary code drawn up in response to a 1996 challenge by then-Minister of Foreign Affairs Lloyd Axworthy. The code addresses business ethics, human rights, environmental protection and safety, and community involvement. According to Dr. Gossen:

That document is basically the overall point document that guides our activities wherever we operate. But it’s just words. I think what’s very critical here is that one be perceived as walking the talk, as well as engaging in regular reporting and monitoring and subjecting oneself to some form of external verification. So it’s not just the words. You’re prepared to stand up behind those words. You’d better be prepared to run the whole course in public scrutiny.³²

            While it has not been accused of complicity in human rights or other abuses, however, Export Development Canada (EDC) (formerly the Export Development Corporation) has been criticized by some for its 1994 involvement in the Urra Dam project in northern Colombia. In its response to the 1999 report of the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade, the Government of Canada noted that EDC’s participation amounted to only some 2.6% of this $700 million Scandinavian-led project. In a November 2001 submission to the Sub-Committee, the EDC said that it had taken measures to ensure that the environmental and social commitments undertaken as part of the project are respected.³³

            This case is particularly troubling since, as the Sub-Committee was told in Colombia by representatives of the Embera Katío indigenous people, while some eventually supported the construction of the dam, others did not, and this has seriously divided the community. Consultations were carried out according to Colombian law, yet many believe that these were insufficient, and did not fulfill, for example, the requirements contained in the International Labour Organization’s Convention 169. In the fall of 2001, the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade reviewed the new EDC Act, and the case of EDC activities in Colombia was raised a number of times in the debate over the adequacy of environmental and human rights review by EDC’s Board.

            Overall, while corporate social responsibility is an area in which the Canadian embassy in Bogotá and parliamentarians in Ottawa must continue to be proactive, the Canadian business community currently active in Colombia is setting a positive example for the future.

RECOMMENDATION 2

Since trade and investment will be important elements of Canada’s bilateral relationship with Colombia, the Government of Canada should continue to be proactive in encouraging corporate social responsibility on the part of both Canadian firms operating in Colombia and Export Development Canada.

IV.     PROTECTING AND PROMOTING HUMAN RIGHTS

We can argue over what percentage of daily crimes are the work of the government, of the paramilitaries, or the guerrilla or simple criminals, but that argument will not advance the cause of peace very far. The basic fact is that the Colombian state has neither the power nor the credibility to provide the kind of security for the average citizen that Canadians, for instance, take for granted.

Yes, there is widespread violation of human rights, but let me be very clear that the main instigator of such violations is not the government, as much as there have been serious violations over the years by the military.

Stephen Randall
University of Calgary
November 29, 2001³⁴

           The human rights situation in Colombia is deplorable, ranging from abuse of the right to life through murder, to disappearances, kidnapping and forced displacement and abuse of the right of association on the part of trade unionists, including teachers, mine workers and others. In addition to these abuses, which result both from the conflict itself and the general level of impunity, insurgent groups continue to carry out significant violations of international humanitarian law.

            In the case of trade unionists, as Sheila Katz of the Canadian Labour Congress put it before the Sub-Committee: "Industrial relations is not an illegal activity in Colombia…but it is definitely dangerous." She continued:

It is a dangerous activity to be a trade unionist in Colombia. It is a high-risk occupation…In fact, Colombia is the most dangerous country in the world for a trade unionist. Of all of the assassinations, murders, and attacks against trade unionists in the world, 90% take place in Colombia. It is not a very proud record for a country to have.³⁵

            Apart from trade unionists, significant human rights problems exist in the area of the rights of women and of children. Also, while Colombian society is reasonably tolerant of homosexuals, Sub-Committee members were also told in Bogotá that gays and lesbians in Colombia had been the target of serious attacks. The Government of Colombia must ensure full protection and respect for all people of Colombia irrespective of sexual orientation.

            Although some abuses in Colombia are likely to continue as long as the conflict does, the Government of Colombia and its international partners cannot simply wait for a peace settlement to deal with the human rights situation. Jan Egeland argued before that Sub-Committee that it was important "…to do as much as possible to prevent human rights abuses by doing as much as possible to exert moral pressure on all parties and actors in the conflict." He continued:

All actors are responsible for grave human rights abuse. According to reports that both we and NGOs have made, paramilitary forces are responsible for the majority of human rights abuse against civilian populations. But the guerrillas also are responsible for grave and widespread and systematic human rights abuse, including the industry of kidnapping, which affects large segments of the population.

            He added that, "We believe the Colombian government can do more to prevent human rights abuse, perhaps especially by the paramilitary forces but also by the guerrillas…" He also noted a growing consensus on the need for a global humanitarian accord "to protect the civilian population, because by far the greatest number of victims of this conflict are women, children and refugees. They are not soldiers on either side."³⁶

            As UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Mary Robinson noted before the UN Commission on Human Rights in March 2002, "Unfortunately, throughout 2001 there was a significant deterioration in the human rights situation."³⁷ In her 2001 report on the human rights situation in Colombia, prepared by the UN Human Rights office there, she placed particular emphasis on paramilitary activity. According to the report:

During 2001, the Office continued to observe that paramilitary activity was strengthening and spreading throughout much of the country’s territory. The Office noted the limited effectiveness of the measures taken against paramilitary groups to curb their activities, contain their advance and respond to their aggressions, as well as the fickle commitment on the part of the State in this struggle. The members of the paramilitary groups continued to be the main parties responsible for the increase in human rights violations. They also greatly contributed to the deterioration in the conflict through their systematic use of violence and terror against the civilian population in zones under their control and in areas affected by their raids. Toleration, support and complicity on the part of public servants, as well as non-fulfilment of their duty to safeguard rights, with respect to several acts by these groups, mean that the State continues to bear responsibility.³⁸

            There is little agreement on statistics related to human rights and international humanitarian law abuses in Colombia — for example, the Government of Colombia points out that the Colombian Commission of Jurists does not include kidnapping as a human rights violation.³⁹ Yet the trend is clear. First, the number of direct human rights complaints against members of the Colombian military has decreased significantly over the past several years — from over 3,000 in 1998 to 447 in 2001, according to the Colombian government. While the United Nations and others agree that most massacres are carried out by paramilitary forces, the FARC and the ELN also carry out terrible abuses, particularly of international humanitarian law. As John Jones of Amnesty International noted in November 2001:

We have to distinguish between international human rights law and international humanitarian law. The international human rights law is the right to life, not to be killed, not to disappear, not to be tortured.

The guerrilla is by far the biggest infringement of international humanitarian law—for example, kidnapping people, taking people for hostage. Typically, every day in Colombia ten people are kidnapped, and of these, over half are the work of either the FARC guerrilla or the ELN guerrilla. It is a fund-raising device, but it is a gross infraction on international humanitarian law. It’s not just a question of kidnapping people; also, the guerrillas do kill people.⁴⁰

            The Government of Colombia has made significant strides in terms of establishing structures for the protection and promotion of human rights, particularly ombudsmen, and are to be commended for this. Much more remains to be done, however, both in terms of increased resources and changed mindsets, before these structures can live up to their full potential. As well, key elements such as a national plan of action on human rights, which the Colombian government undertook to develop in 1994, has still not been produced.

            Alex Neve of Amnesty International argued before the Sub-Committee that although President Pastrana and other officials in the Government of Colombia have taken important action on many fronts to address human rights concerns, these have not been fully implemented, and much more remains to be done. He added:

The problem, of course, is the degree to which the military continues to be a very powerful institution in the country and therefore able to counter and block, ignore, overlook many of the initiatives the government may seek to bring forward…

That’s why issues such as impunity, issues such as dismantling the paramilitary groups, and issues around weapons transfers to the country need strong central concerted international pressure to make sure the international community is doing everything it can to diminish the sense of power and hold that the military has in Colombia and strengthen the ability of democratic institutions to do the work, which many of them very much want to do, to promote and improve human rights.⁴¹

            Members of the Sub-Committee who visited Colombia met with senior military commanders in Barrancabermeja, a city which is effectively controlled by paramilitary forces. In response to questions as to why they did not do more to dismantle these forces, the senior army officer argued that unless his men saw a crime take place or paramilitary forces carrying weapons, he was unable to do so legally, and doing so illegally would violate human rights rather than protect them.

            Given concerns about the Colombian military and links to paramilitary forces, Canada has also worked to increase the Colombian military’s knowledge of, and respect for human rights. More than 1,000 Colombian officers and non-commissioned officers have undergone training based on a Canadian human rights curriculum. In addition, embassy personnel, including a new resident Canadian defence attaché, work on a daily basis to ensure the Colombian military understands the importance of human rights, as well as the need to sever all links with paramilitary groups. This is an area where Canada can, and should, do more.

            The recent posting of a Canadian defence attaché in Colombia has increased the direct lines of contact between the two militaries, which will be very useful in strengthening human rights work. The Colombian government has also now posted a senior Colombian officer to Ottawa as defence attaché, and this will also be helpful to continuing human rights cooperation. While the Government of Colombia would certainly ensure that any officer sent to Canada had not been credibly linked to human rights or other abuses, it is evident that Canadian, Colombian and international human rights organizations will scrutinize this individual closely.

            Canada and other nations have worked to protect and promote human rights in Colombia through a number of programs, and Canada has the largest refugee program in Colombia. Mr. Neve acknowledged the good work done by the embassy in Bogotá to support the work of human rights defenders, and told Sub-Committee members in Ottawa that Amnesty International’s priority recommendation would be to protect human rights defenders. As he noted, "When there’s a strong sense of the international community standing with and behind and around these individuals and groups as they do their work, the degree of protection they enjoy increases dramatically."⁴²

            One human rights issue with particular resonance for Canadians is the plight of indigenous peoples in Colombia, whose stated position is one of neutrality in the conflict. As Ambassador Rishchynski told Sub-Committee members in Ottawa:

To me, the plight of the indigenous in Colombia is one of the greatest tragedies of the conflict. These communities, which spent most of the 1980s and into the new constitution of the 1990s fighting for recognition of their inherent rights to land and territory, as communities now find themselves, if one can use the term so crassly, as the ham in the sandwich, in the Colombian conflict…⁴³

            He added that indigenous peoples in Colombia need protection, as well as evidence that the international community sees them as a priority. In November 2001, the Honourable Warren Allmand of Rights and Democracy came before the Sub-Committee to discuss the report of a delegation organized by Rights and Democracy with the cooperation of the Assembly of First Nations and including the Chair of the Sub-Committee, Mrs. Beth Phinney, M.P. He told Sub-Committee members that: "We call upon the Canadian government and the international community to use every means available to denounce the gravity of the situation facing the survival of Colombia’s indigenous people and see that their specific concerns and proposed solutions are acted upon."⁴⁴ According to Ambassador Rishchynski:

I think the visit of the AFN was extremely important to them. Subsequent to that, Rigoberta Menchu of Guatemala came to Colombia and she said she hoped that somehow her organization, Indigenous Initiative for Peace, and the AFN and other Canadian groups might perhaps be able to play a much larger role in terms of supporting their brothers in Colombia. I think this is the kind of international action necessary in terms of keeping their struggle as an absolute front-burner priority for the international community.⁴⁵

            A concrete example of the dangers facing indigenous leaders in Colombia is the case of Kimy Pernia Domico, who testified to the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade in 1999 to explain the concerns of the Embera Katío people. Tragically, just days after meeting the Rights and Democracy/AFN delegation in Colombia, he "disappeared," and many fear he is dead. While this case is not unique, it is one that resonates particularly with Canadians. The police investigation has not gone well, and the Canadian government has pressed the Government of Colombia for more progress, and should continue to do so. More generally, Sub-Committee members met with representatives of the Embera Katío and other indigenous groups while in Colombia, and agree that their situation is one Canadians and others must continue to highlight.

            An important development in the human rights situation in Colombia has been the opening of a UN Human Rights Office there. The Office has a wide mandate, and sees its role as one of helping the Colombian government to improve the human rights situation in the country. While the Government of Colombia requested that the UN establish this Office in 1996, its relationship with it has not always been easy. A major element of the work of this Office is an annual report on the human rights situation in the country, which has generally been critical of the actions of the Colombian government, particularly on the lack of sufficient action to combat paramilitary groups. President Pastrana told members in Bogotá that the Government of Colombia did not always feel it was treated fairly in these reports, adding that he has spoken to UN Secretary General Kofi Annan about this.

            Jan Egeland observed that the opening of a human rights office in Bogotá was a major step forward. As he put it: "It’s active, it has a presence, and it’s going to step up its work with regional offices. There is an annual report that is very clear and very explicit. As well, there is, after all, a chairman’s statement that comes with very concrete recommendations that should be followed up."⁴⁶ The UN Human Rights Office in Colombia has recently expanded its work, opening additional offices in Medellin and Cali. Canada has been a strong supporter of this Office, and has dispersed approximately $1.6 million in support of its activities over the past four years.. This Office remains funded totally by voluntary contributions by member states, however, and some members believe the Government of Canada should encourage the UN to establish core funding instead.

            The Government of Colombia feels that its real progress on human rights is ignored by NGOs and others it characterizes as predisposed to criticize. Yet while Canada and other states will continue to support and work to strengthen the democratic Government of Colombia, that government must understand that they will also continue to view the professional work done by the UN Human Rights Office in Colombia as an independent evaluation of its progress on human rights, and will continue to insist that its recommendations, and those of other bodies such as the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, be implemented. UN human rights mechanisms in both Colombia and elsewhere are part of the solution to the human rights crisis in Colombia, not part of the problem.

            While acknowledging progress where merited, Canada, European nations and others have strongly criticized the human rights situation in Colombia, particularly at the UN Commission on Human Rights in Geneva. The Commission acts by consensus, and sometimes appoints special rapporteurs and adopts condemnatory Resolutions to deal with countries facing difficult human rights situations.

            This has not been the case with Colombia, however. As Adèle Dion of the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade explained to the Sub-Committee in March 2001, … "the Government of Colombia has demonstrated, in a number of UN forums and bilaterally, its willingness to tackle its very serious problems."⁴⁷ Instead of a condemnatory Resolution, therefore, in recent years the Commission has instead used the Canadian-developed mechanism of a Chairperson’s Statement — developed on a tripartite basis by the Chair of the Commission, concerned member states, and the country in question — to both recognize Colombia’s cooperation and higher level of commitment, and to underline continuing concerns. While the lack of a stronger Resolution disturbs many, the Commission can only adopt a Resolution on Colombia if it finds consensus to do so among members. Even if this is not the case, members can still adopt an even stronger Chairperson’s Statement on Colombia.

            Although its resource constraints are real, the Government of Colombia will be held responsible for implementing policies designed to improve its country’s human rights situation. In particular, it must increase its actions to combat paramilitarism, and ensure that civilian courts deal with both civilian and military violations of human rights. Other states have a responsibility as well, however, for ensuring they both assist it and maintain the pressure on it to do so.

RECOMMENDATION 3

The Government of Canada should continue to strengthen its human rights work in Colombia. In particular, Canada should increase support for the UN Human Rights Office in Colombia and insist even more forcefully that the Government of Colombia work to combat both guerrilla and paramilitary groups. Finally, the Canadian embassy in Bogotá should continue to focus on the protection of human rights defenders and indigenous peoples, as well as increase its human rights work with the Colombian military.

V.     COMBATTING THE DRUG TRADE

            Political violence and conflict occurred in Colombia long before the emergence of the drug trade in the 1960s and 1970s. Yet although drugs are not the cause of conflict in Colombia, they certainly fuel it, in two ways: directly — as guerrilla and paramilitary groups (the latter known in Spanish as autodefensas) fight for control of territory for the cultivation of cocaine and finance their operations from drug profits; and indirectly — as corruption and organized crime further weaken the state and its ability to end the conflict. As one witness put it, "All of Colombia is narcotized, it’s not just the guerrillas. The country is under the impact of this…the autodefensas…are in no way clean on this, nor is congress, nor is the judiciary, nor is anybody — the left is guilty too."⁴⁸

            Drug addiction is a relatively new and growing problem in Colombia itself, but the country’s primary role in the international drug trade continues to be as the source of the majority of the world’s cocaine and a growing amount of its heroin. The illegal drug trade is a multi-billion dollar business, and generates the vast majority of the income of both the paramilitaries and, along with kidnapping, the guerrillas. In addition to direct violence and crime the purchase of land for drug cultivation has set back the issue of land reform. This is very important, given that the majority of land in Colombia continues to be owned by a small majority, and land reform continues to be a requirement for a just peace in Colombia.

            The Pastrana government has taken a strong stand against the drug trade, and made it a key element of Plan Colombia. Given U.S. assistance, the anti-narcotic side of Plan Colombia, has progressed much more quickly than the social-policy side. Several Sub-Committee members visited the headquarters of Joint Task Force South, a special military counter-narcotics command, at Tres Esquinas in southern Colombia. They were told that counter-narcotics operations and results have roughly tripled since the beginning of Plan Colombia assistance.

            One of the more controversial aspects of Plan Colombia is the aerial spraying of large areas of Colombia, beginning in the south, in a bid to destroy narcotics. Drug production itself produces significant environmental damage, since, as Sub-Committee members saw at the Tres Esquinas, the production of cocaine involves large quantities of dangerous chemicals such as sulphuric acid, acetone (paint thinner), caustic soda and gasoline, as well as cement. Among other areas, this is having a devastating effect on the Amazon basin. Yet critics argue that such spraying is counterproductive, since it also produces environmental damage, does not distinguish between drugs and other crops and threatens the health of the peasant population in the areas being sprayed. One critic of the effects of aerial spraying is Colombia’s Defensor del Pueblo, (Human Rights Ombudsman), Mr. Eduardo Cifuentes, whom members met in Bogotá. Given the debate over this issue, the United Nations has suggested studying the issue of aerial spraying, although some believe that the Organization of American States (OAS) could better carry out such a study. Whatever the vehicle, given the importance of the health and other issues involved, Sub-Committee members believe that such a study could be of great value.

            A further complication is that while much of Colombia’s drug production is carried on by large-scale criminal operations, which are responsible for the sophisticated labs and the eventual distribution of the drugs, an increasing amount is carried out by small-scale farmers who are pressured to grow drugs or are simply unable to grow anything else of equal (or near) value. All drug production is illegal. Yet, as Canadian Ambassador Rishchynski told Sub-Committee members in Ottawa, while the large-scale criminal production should be addressed through law enforcement means, any consideration of small-scale production must take into account the social and economic conditions which exist in Colombia, and provide economic alternatives to farmers.⁴⁹ One example of "alternative development" is through crop substitution programs, but no one model is likely to solve the numerous problems associated with the drug trade in Colombia, and much work remains to be done in this area. For example, while infrastructure and other problems would remain, it will be important for Canada and the international community to continue to reduce trade barriers as a way of encouraging alternative development in Colombia.

            Finally, beyond the need to take action to monitor the export of precursor chemicals through import and export permits, and to take action to combat money laundering — perhaps through RICO (Racketeer-Influenced and Corrupt Organizations) like legislation — it has become increasingly clear in recent years that the drug trade involves both the supply of drugs and the demand for them. From this perspective, a reduction in the demand for drugs in North America and Europe would help address the problem in Colombia. As Warren Allmand pointed out before the Sub-Committee, "…sad to say, it is the cocaine and marijuana users of North America who principally finance the violence and death in Colombia."⁵⁰

            A larger debate on the proper approach to the international trade in drugs is now beginning, but will not be resolved quickly. In the meantime, Canada continues to pursue a "balanced" approach which focuses on both supply and demand reduction, and which supports international efforts to address this issue through the United Nations and other mechanisms. In recent years, the OAS has also done important new work on developing a hemispheric approach to the issues of the drug trade — such as the development of a Multilateral Evaluation Mechanism (MEM) to evaluate the anti-drug actions of OAS states. Efforts along these lines deserve continued Canadian support.

RECOMMENDATION 4

The Government of Canada should continue to work with other states in developing an international approach to combatting the drug trade. In particular, Canada should reinforce OAS efforts to develop regional cooperation on this issue, and should also support the proposal for a scientific study of aerial spraying under the auspices of either the OAS or the United Nations.

VI.         HUMANITARIAN AND DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE

            As noted above, Canada and Colombia have increased their bilateral contacts in recent years, and the Canadian embassy in Bogotá is well respected for its work on human rights and other issues. Given the importance of this work, the Sub-Committee believes that with more resources, it could do even better.

            Although Canada and other states must provide humanitarian assistance for the immediate needs of the Colombian people, they must also continue development assistance, which is a broader investment in Colombia’s future. The country has real poverty and other development challenges which must be met (almost half of the population lives in poverty), and any progress in this area might also help alleviate some of the root causes of its conflicts.

            A key humanitarian issue in Colombia is the tragic situation faced by the increasing number of displaced people, who cannot be adequately helped under existing Colombian or international programs. Jan Egeland told Sub-Committee members that this was the most underestimated and forgotten problem that Colombia has today. In his words:

These are the forgotten victims of the conflict. These are very humble people. These are peasants, and very little attention is given to them…. Some are driven out by paramilitary forces and some by guerrillas, some are driven out by criminals, and some are driven out by the drug cultures. They all have stories to tell, and Canada has played a leadership role in providing political asylum to human rights campaigners and threatened people. This is something we would really like to pay tribute to, and something we hope you can be doing also in the future…⁵¹

            While Canada has supported the efforts of the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees to help the displaced outside of Colombia, however, it has not supported that Office’s coordinating function within the country. Having discussed the plight of the displaced in Ottawa and Colombia, and particularly having met with victims of displacement in Barrancabermeja, the Sub-Committee agrees that this is an area which merits strong Canadian engagement.

            The situation in Colombia has deteriorated since the programming strategy of the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) was last revised in 1995. CIDA has therefore been developing what Ambassador Rishchynski called more "people-centred kinds of programming as opposed to the more institutional nature of our programming that had evolved over the course of the 1980s and early 1990s."⁵² CIDA officials testified before the Sub-Committee in the fall of 2001 to explain the logic behind their proposed changes. They added that the Agency planned to continue spending the same amount in Colombia — some C$60 million over five years, or $12 million annually.⁵³ Having discussed these changes in both Ottawa and Colombia, and in particular having visited a number of small projects assisted by CIDA’s C$550,000 Canada Fund — which is administered through the embassy in Bogotá, and is therefore very flexible — the Sub-Committee welcomes the change in CIDA’s focus.

            While it is important to ensure that increased resources would be effectively used, the needs in Colombia are real. Accordingly, we believe that the government should increase CIDA assistance to Colombia, particularly that targeted toward assisting the displaced. Development and humanitarian needs exist across the country, yet members of the Sub-Committee also believe that it may be useful for CIDA to focus a significant amount of its assistance on one area or community — for example Barrancabermeja, which suffers from the presence of paramilitary groups and a large number of displaced peoples, but which is admittedly not typical due to the fact that the country’s largest oil refinery is located there — in order to demonstrate the impact that properly targeted assistance can have, and therefore encourage further international assistance.

RECOMMENDATION 5

In order to build on the already good work being done by Canadian embassy staff in Bogotá on human rights, humanitarian and other issues, the Government of Canada should increase CIDA funding for Colombia, particularly that targeted to addressing the crisis of displacement, which particularly affects indigenous and Afro-Colombian communities, strengthening the judicial system, and improving human rights training for the Colombian military. Beyond addressing these issues on a national basis, the Canadian government should also consider undertaking a CIDA pilot project focusing on one area or community.

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6             Dean Stephen Randall of the University of Calgary noted in testimony before the Sub-Committee that the paramilitaries have
               “grown astronomically in the last couple of years.” Evidence, 30 January 2002, p. 6.

7             Evidence, 26 September 2001, p. 5-6. 

8             Evidence, 31 October 2001 (a.m.), p. 2.

9             Contact has also increased at the non-governmental level; for example, in the summer of 2001, the Edmonton YMCA hosted two
               groups of students from the Bogotá YMCA.

10           See Government of Canada, Canada in the World, Ottawa, 1995.

11           See “Fact Sheet: Andean Regional Initiative,” U.S. Department of State, Washington File, 25 March 2002.

12           Judy Meltzer, “The Enduring Colombian Conflict: A Canadian Perspective,” Ottawa, FOCAL Policy Paper FPP-01-12,
               November 2001, p. 10.

13           Evidence, 20 September 2001, p. 6.

14           Evidence, 14 March 2001, p. 4.

15           Evidence, 26 September 2001, p. 24, See also Export of Military Goods from Canada: Annual Report 2000, Ottawa, 2001.

16           Evidence, 14 March 2001, p. 12 and 16.

17           Professor Hal Klepak told the Sub-Committee in May 2001 that, “Plan Colombia is a blow, but one which will not be decisive.
               This committee has probably already seen that both in Washington and in Bogota, there’s a tendency to make a big hoopla as if
               things were moving forward very well, but even the greatest optimists are talking about wiping out 20% of the guerrillas’
               financial sources, or at least of the most significant guerrillas. At the end of the day, a 20% drop in the revenues of these
               organizations is really almost laughable. ”Evidence, 16 May 2001, p. 7.

18           Evidence, 7 November 2001, p. 18.

19           Ms. Meltzer, The Enduring Colombian Conflict: A Canadian Perspective, p. 4.

20           Evidence, 16 May 2001, p. 13. 

21           Ibid., p. 6. 

22           Evidence, 30 January 2002.

23           Evidence, 26 September 2001, p. 2.

24           Ibid., p. 3-4.

25           Ibid., p. 21.

26           Evidence, 16 May 2001, p. 15.

27           Evidence, 21 November 2001.

28           Enbridge Inc. is one of the major Canadian players in the energy sector in Colombia. Although it did not appear before the
               Sub-Committee, Enbridge Inc. did provide a written Submission of Enbridge Inc. to the Sub-Committee on Human Rights
               of the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade, House of Commons, Ottawa, December 5, 2001.

29           Evidence, 31 October 2001, (p.m.) p. 13.

30           Evidence, 21 November 2001, p. 10.

31           Ibid., p. 14.

32           Ibid., p. 2.

33           Export Development Corporation, Export Development Corporation and Human Rights Due Diligence, Statement Prepared
               for the Sub-committee on Human Rights and International Development, Ottawa, 21 November 2001.

34           “Colombia: The Context and Recommendations for Canadian Policy,” Presentation to the Sub-Committee on Human Rights
               and International Development of the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade, Stephen J. Randall
               FRSC, Dean, Social Sciences, University of Calgary, 29 November 2001, p. 2. Dr. Randall updated this presentation in
               testimony before the Sub-Committee on 30 January 2002.

35           Evidence, 6 June 2001, p. 3.

36           Evidence, 31 October 2001 (a.m.), p. 3.

37           “U.N. Rights Chief Accuses Colombia’s Rightist Gangs,” Reuters, 19 March 2002.

38           Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights on the Human Rights Situation in Colombia,
               United Nations Economic and Social Council, E/CN.4/2002/17, 28 February 2002, Paragraph 202.

39           Evidence, 26 September 2001, p. 15.

40           Evidence, 7 November 2001, p. 6.

41           Ibid., p. 19.

42           Ibid., p. 19.

43           Evidence, 20 September 2001, p. 27-28.

44           Evidence, 31 October 2001(p.m.), p. 5. See also Report: Mission to Colombia to Investigate the Situation of Indigenous Peoples,
               May 27-June 3, 2001, Organized by Rights and Democracy with the Cooperation of the Assembly of First Nations (Canada),
               Montreal, Rights and Democracy, 2001.

45           Evidence, 20 September 2001, p. 28.

46           Evidence, 31 October 2001 (a.m.), p. 16.

47           Evidence, 21 March 2001, p. 17.

48           Evidence, 16 May 2001, p. 13.

49           Evidence, 20 September 2001, p. 22.

50           Evidence, 31 October 2001 (p.m.), p. 3.

51           Evidence, 31 October 2001 (a.m.), p. 6.

52           Evidence, 20 September 2001, p. 26.

53           Evidence, 31 October 2001(p.m.), p. 24.